Nos. 19-635, 19-715, 19-760

In the Supreme Court of the United States__________________

DONALD J. TRUMP, Petitioner,v.

CYRUS R. VANCE, JR., in His Official Capacity as DistrictAttorney of the County of New York, et al., Respondents.

__________________

DONALD J. TRUMP, ET AL., Petitioners,v.

MAZARS USA, LLP, ET AL., Respondents.__________________

DONALD J. TRUMP, ET AL., Petitioners,v.

DEUTSCHE BANK AG, ET AL., Respondents.__________________

On Writs of Certiorari to the United States Courts of Appeals for the Second Circuit and the

District of Columbia Circuit__________________

AMICUS BRIEF OF CHRISTIAN FAMILYCOALITION (CFC) FLORIDA, INC.

IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS __________________

DENNIS GROSSMAN

Counsel of Record6701 Sunset Drive, Suite 104Miami, Florida 33143(516) 466-6690dagrossmanlaw@aol.com

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

February 3, 2020

Becker Gallagher · Cincinnati, OH · Washington, D.C. · 800.890.5001

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii

AMICUS BRIEF OF CHRISTIAN FAMILYCOALITION (CFC) FLORIDA, INC., AFLORIDA NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORPORATION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

INTEREST OF THE AMICUS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

I. The Subpoenas Should Be Quashed Because ofthe Plausible Risk They Will Cause SeriousDistraction and Diversion From PresidentialDuties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

a. Any Competent Attorney Would RecognizeThe Implications of These Broad-RangingSubpoenas and Would Demand The Client’sImmediate and Ongoing Attention –Confirming Their Serious and OngoingDistraction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

b. The Virtually Limitless Scope of the PresentSubpoenas Distinguishes Them From theNarrow and Discrete Incursions This CourtHas Permitted Into the Presidential Sphere . 7

c. The Rationales Employed by the Second andD.C. Circuits are Misplaced . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

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d. This Court Has Recognized the Need forComplete Presidential Immunity To Preventthe Type of Distraction These SubpoenasPortend. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

e. The Present Subpoenas Violate the Spirit ofArticle II and Undermine a SignificantAspect of the 2016 Presidential Election . . . 14

f. The Issue Raised by the Petitions is Not aPartisan or Political Issue, But anInstitutional Issue Upon Which the Integrityof the Presidential Office Depends . . . . . . . . 15

II. In 19-635, The Subpoena Should Be QuashedAlso Because State and Local Authorities MayNot Issue Process Which Impairs ThePresident’s Ability to Perform His OfficialDuties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

CONCLUSION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim

Johnson v. Maryland, 254 U.S. 51 (1920). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Mayo v. U.S., 319 U.S. 441 (1943). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12, 13

Osborn v. Bank of United States, 22 U.S. 738 (1824). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

U.S. v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7, 8, 14, 18

CONSTITUTION

U.S. Const. Amend. XII . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 14

U.S. Const. Art. II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim

U.S. Const. Art. VI, § 2 (Supremacy Clause) . . . . . 16

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AMICUS BRIEF OF CHRISTIAN FAMILYCOALITION (CFC) FLORIDA, INC., A FLORIDA

NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORPORATION

The Christian Family Coalition (CFC) Florida, Inc.(“CFC” or “Amicus”), hereby submits its Brief AmicusCuriae in these 3 cases in support of the President ofThe United States, Donald J. Trump, in his request to(1) reverse the judgments of the Second and D.C.Circuits, and to (2) order issuance of the injunctions thePresident seeks to quash the disputed subpoenas.

INTEREST OF THE AMICUS1

Amicus is a non-profit corporation registered inFlorida since 2003 as a human rights and social justiceadvocacy organization representing over 500,000 fair-minded voters in the Sunshine State. Amicus activelyseeks to protect human rights and social justice inlitigation and political forums. These values also areamong the President’s responsibilities as ChiefExecutive and Commander-in-Chief under Article II ofthe Constitution. Amicus has an interest in these casesbecause the subpoenas at issue are virtually limitless,wide-ranging fishing expeditions into the privatefinancial affairs of the President and his family andpose a plausible risk of serious Presidential distraction

1 All parties have consented to the filing of this Amicus Brief. Nocounsel or other representative or agent of any party in these casesauthored any part of this Amicus Brief or exercised any form ofcontrol or approval over this Amicus Brief or any portion of it. Noperson or entity, aside from Amicus or its counsel, made amonetary contribution to the preparation or submission of thisAmicus Brief.

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from the duties and functions of his Office – to thedetriment of the security and welfare of the entirecountry.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

This Court should reverse the judgments of theSecond and D.C. Circuits in these 3 cases and orderissuance of the injunctions the President requests.

Amicus fully supports the legal arguments by thePresident in these 3 cases. Amicus wishes to focus onthe practical consequences of these subpoenas in theirextraordinary potential for Presidential distractionwhich is not consistent with Article II of theConstitution.

The subpoenas in all 3 cases – often copied fromeach other – are massive, unduly intrusive, andvirtually limitless fishing expeditions into the privatefinancial affairs of the President and his family. Theyinevitably will distract and divert the President’sattention and focus from the serious affairs of Statewhich besiege his Office on a daily, sometimes hourlybasis. Their serious potential for distraction anddiversion of Presidential energy and focus are notconsistent with Article II of the Constitution and theunique and awesome responsibilities it imposes on thePresident.

The welfare and security of the country – indeed, ofthe entire world – demand the President’s undividedattention to the responsibilities of his Officeunimpaired by the distraction of these blunderbusssubpoenas. They probe every minutia of thePresident’s private finances and those of his family.

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Distraction is inevitable and inherent in their breadthand scope. If these subpoenas do not violate Article IIof the Constitution, it is difficult to imagine any thatwould.

Nor are these subpoenas consistent with thisCourt’s jurisprudence which permits only discrete andlimited intrusions into the Presidential sphere in termsof subpoenas or personal liability.

The subpoenas violate the spirit of Article II andundermine a significant aspect of the 2016 Presidentialelection. Article II, as amended by the TwelfthAmendment, prescribes the procedure for electing thePresident. The people have spoken in their election ofDonald Trump. His non-disclosure of his income taxreturns and private financial data was a central issuein the election campaign. The people chose him,knowing and accepting this non-disclosure. Thepresent subpoenas are, in effect, an impermissible endrun around the election, seeking to undo by compulsoryprocess the Presidential non-disclosure the electoratechose at the ballot box.

Additionally, the subpoena in 19-635 is invalid fora further reason. It violates the Division of Powers andprinciples of federalism. State and local officials – thatsubpoena was issued by the local District Attorney inNew York County, New York – may not control orimpair the President’s performance.

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ARGUMENT

I. The Subpoenas Should Be Quashed Because ofthe Plausible Risk They Will Cause SeriousDistraction and Diversion From PresidentialDuties

Amicus fully supports the President’s legalarguments against the disputed subpoenas. There arepractical reasons as well under Article II of theConstitution for issuance of the injunctions thePresident requests in all 3 cases.

In all 3 cases, the respondents’ wide-ranging andblunderbuss subpoenas for virtually all the President’sincome tax returns and financial records for manyyears pose the plausible risk of serious distraction fromthe President’s performance of his official duties andresponsibilities. The likely distraction and diversionfrom the duties of Office are palpable and real.Article II of the Constitution commands that thesubpoena be quashed.

The official duties and responsibilities of thePresident are daunting. Under Article II of theConstitution, the President is Commander-in-Chief ofthe nation’s armed forces, is responsible for theirconduct everywhere in the world, is Chief Executive ofthe United States government, the nation’srepresentative to the rest of the world, the personresponsible for choosing all major department headsand federal judges (subject to Senate approval), and thesingle person ultimately responsible for the functioningof the entire Executive Branch of Government.

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The President has the nuclear-launch codes by hisside 24/7, must be ready and focused at a moment’snotice to address any crisis at any time anywhere inthe world and beyond, is on-call at 3:00 AM no lessthan 9-5, and requires a live-in office in the WhiteHouse to discharge his official duties around the clockand around the world.

The details of the present subpoenas show theenormity and breadth of their likely distraction fromthe President’s critical Article II responsibilities. Thesubpoenas in blunderbuss fashion of varying degreesseek “all” income tax returns, financial statements, work papers, source documents, and much more, foran 8-year period from 2011-2019 in 19-635(App.pp.117a-120a in Cert.Pet. in 19-635), and forseveral years in 19-715 and 19-760 (Jt.App.pp.128a-140a in 19-715/760). Any reasonable person targetedby these extremely broad subpoenas would bedistracted and actively concerned in their wake.

This is common sense. The subpoenas inherentlycarry with them the potential for both draconianconsequences in their criminal potential and thespecter of litigation surprise and guesswork in theirenormous breadth. Their effect, if not purpose, willkeep any target guessing, concerned, distracted, and inconstant contact with one’s accountants, advisors andattorneys – precisely the distraction and dysfunctionthat Presidential immunity and Article II are designedto avoid.

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a. Any Competent Attorney Would RecognizeThe Implications of These Broad-RangingSubpoenas and Would Demand The Client’sImmediate and Ongoing Attention –Confirming Their Serious and OngoingDistraction

Any competent attorney would recognize this. Anycompetent attorney whose client was served withbroad-ranging subpoenas like these would give thefollowing advice – get in here (attorney’s office)immediately so we can assess the situation, examinethe documents and consequences, explore possibleremedies, and discuss tactics and damage control. Inother words, the client needs to be distracted tocooperate fully with his/her attorney on an ongoingbasis to protect his/her rights. To suggest otherwise isto be disingenuous in the extreme. An attorney whogives any lesser advice to a client in this situationwould be guilty of legal malpractice as a matter of law.

Respondents ignore this reality. Respondentsignore the real-life consequences of their subpoenas. Respondents may pretend their subpoenas will causelittle or no distraction for the President, but theirarguments fail when measured against the realisticadvice any competent attorney would give to a client inthis situation.

This alone highlights the serious and unavoidabledistraction these subpoenas will cause. They areinherently incompatible with Article II of theConstitution and the need for the President to focus hisenergies and attention on the serious, often-life-and-death affairs of state without the distraction these

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broad-ranging subpoenas portend. The welfare andsecurity of all Americans, and likely everyone world-wide, demand no less.

b. The Virtually Limitless Scope of thePresent Subpoenas Distinguishes ThemFrom the Narrow and Discrete IncursionsThis Court Has Permitted Into thePresidential Sphere

The far-reaching and intrusive reach of the presentsubpoenas distinguishes these cases from decisions ofthis Court which allowed limited judicial inroads intothe President’s time and energies. Specifically, thewide-ranging and virtually limitless reach of thesesubpoenas distinguishes them from the narrow anddiscrete exceptions to Presidential immunity allowed inClinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997), and U.S. v.Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).

An examination of Clinton and Nixon underscoresthe point. In Clinton this Court allowed Ms. PaulaJones to pursue her claim against the sitting PresidentClinton arising from discrete and limited instancesof sexual abuse by Mr. Clinton occurring prior to hisPresidency. This Court in Clinton discussed therelatively limited intrusion that the action – whicharose from specific discrete events primarily on a singleday in 1991 (520 U.S. at 685) – would portend for thefunctioning of the Clinton Presidency. Id., at 691-92.This Court held that “separation-of-powers principleswould [not] be violated by allowing this action toproceed.” Id., at 699 (emp.added). This Court in Clintonfurther underscored the limited nature of the intrusionfrom Ms. Jones’s highly specific claim by analogizing it

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to – and implicitly approving – two similarly non-intrusive lawsuits against President Kennedy arisingfrom a single automobile accident occurring prior to hisPresidency. Id., at 692.

This Court permitted the same type of limitedintrusion into Presidential administration in U.S. v.Nixon. In Nixon this Court upheld a relativelynarrowly focused criminal trial subpoena for discretecommunications between President Nixon and some ofhis aides when the latter were criminal defendants.This Court in Nixon underscored the extremely limitedintrusion of the subpoena because it reflected a“demonstrated specific need for evidence” consisting of“disclosure of a limited number of conversations”(418 U.S. at 713; emp.added).

Thus the discrete and limited foci of both thelawsuit in Clinton and subpoena in Nixon underscoredthe limited nature of any intrusion or dysfunction theywould cause. Neither would adversely affectPresidential administration or the President’sresponsibilities and duties under Article II. Neither asingle lawsuit arising from discrete sexual acts(Clinton) nor a subpoena compelling “disclosure of alimited number of conversations” (Nixon) would impairthe proper functioning of the Presidency or present aplausible risk that Presidential energies or focus wouldbe diverted or distracted in a material way.

Clinton and Nixon stand in extreme contrast to thepresent subpoenas. The present subpoenas collectivelyare blunderbuss, broad, and virtually limitlesscommands for production of “all” income tax returns,financial statements, financial records, supporting

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papers, and far more, concerning the President, hisfamily, and his vast multi-billion-dollar businessenterprise spanning a period of 9 years since 2011 in19-635 (Cert.Pet.App.pp.117a-120a in 19-635), andeither 4 years, 9 years, or without time limit in 19-710/765 (Jt.App.pp.265a-266a, 2d Cir.Op. in 19-710/765).

There is no way the present subpoenas areconsistent with proper and reasonable functioning ofthe Presidential Office. The subpoenas requireinordinate focus and distraction from any other callingor endeavor. The ultimate victims will be the Americancitizenry and indeed all persons worldwide who dependon the President’s undistracted attention to theweighty matters of state and the pursuit of worldpeace.

c. The Rationales Employed by the Secondand D.C. Circuits are Misplaced

In each of these 3 cases, the Circuit Courts usedflawed rationales to dismiss arguments of Presidentialdistraction. In 19-635, the Second Circuit belittled theintrusive nature of the subpoena, reasoning it “does notrequire the President to do anything at all”(Cert.Pet.App.p.20a in 19-635) – apparently becausethe subpoena technically was directed not to thePresident but to his accountants who hold his financialand tax records. The Second Circuit focused on thewrong burden. The problem is not the burden ofproduction but the burdens of distraction and divertedattention. The latter burdens are real and palpableunder the present subpoenas which pose a plausiblerisk of substantial distraction and diversion from

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Presidential duties in violation of Article II of theConstitution.

In 19-760 a different panel of the Second Circuitalso erred in rejecting arguments of Presidentialdistraction. The panel in 19-760 acknowledged thatwhere Presidential records are subpoenaed, a courtwould need to consider “the objection that it woulddistract the Chief Executive in the performance ofofficial duties” (Jt.App.p.263a in 19-715/760). However,the panel then dismissed arguments of Presidentialdistraction in the case before it by relying erroneouslyon this Court’s decision in Clinton v. Jones, supra. Thepanel held that “any concern arising from the risk ofdistraction in the performance of the [President’s]official duties is minimal in light of the SupremeCourt’s decision in Clinton v. Jones” (Jt.App.p.309a in19-715/760). But Clinton v. Jones is far off the mark. As discussed in detail above, the narrowly focused andlimited intrusion into the Presidential sphere allowedby this Court in Clinton v. Jones – arising from a singlesexual encounter – is light years away from themassive and virtually limitless distraction imposedunder the sheer weight and breadth of the presentsubpoenas (pp.7-9 supra). There is no way Clinton v.Jones even begins to support the subpoenas.

Finally, in 19-715 the D.C. Circuit repeated themistakes of the two Second Circuit panels. The D.C.Circuit dismissed concerns over Presidentialdistraction on the ground that it is the President’saccountants, not the President, who will incur theburden to “retrieve and organize the relevantinformation” (Cert.Pet.App.p.75a in 19-715). This

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repeated the mistake of the first panel of the SecondCircuit which had focused on the burden of productionrather than burden of distraction. The D.C. Circuitthen repeated the mistake of the second panel of theSecond Circuit. It cited Clinton v. Jones as precedentto support the subpoena’s allegedly permissible“burden on the time and attention of the ChiefExecutive” (Cert.Pet.App.p.75a in 19-715). Like theSecond Circuit, the D.C. Circuit erred by disregardingthe drastic differences between the minimal “burden”in the narrowly focused litigation in Clinton v. Jonesand the massive burdens and distractions occasionedunder the wide-ranging subpoenas in the present cases(pp.7-9 supra).

In short, the rationales employed by the Second andD.C. Circuits are misplaced. They focus on the wrongburdens, trivialize the realistic burdens of distractionconfronting the President, and mistakenly rely on thisCourt’s decision in Clinton v. Jones whose narrow factsdo not begin to support the heavy burdens imposed bythe present subpoenas.

Worse, by ignoring the burdens on the President,the Second and D.C. Circuits ignore the ultimateburdens suffered by the American citizenry who mustdepend on an undistracted and unimpaired ChiefExecutive to protect the country and secure worldpeace.

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d. This Court Has Recognized the Need forComplete Presidential Immunity ToPrevent the Type of Distraction TheseSubpoenas Portend

This Court has underscored the disastrous potentialfor Presidential distraction that compels a finding ofPresidential immunity. In Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.731 (1982), this Court held that the President isimmune from personal liability for official actsperformed in office because of the serious potential forPresidential distraction over fears of personal liability.This Court held:

“Because of the singular importance of thePresident’s duties, diversion of his energies byconcern with private lawsuits would raiseunique risks to the effective functioning ofgovernment. As is the case with prosecutors andjudges – for whom absolute immunity is nowestablished – a President must concern himselfwith matters likely to arouse the most intensefeelings…. Nor can the sheer prominence of thePresident’s office be ignored. In view of thevisibility of his office and the effect of his actionson countless people, the President would be aneasily identifiable target for suits for civildamages. Cognizance of this personalvulnerability frequently could distract aPresident from his public duties, to thedetriment of not only the President and his officebut also the Nation that the Presidency wasdesigned to serve.”

Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 751-53.

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Admittedly, Nixon v. Fitzgerald dealt withPresidential immunity for official acts rather thanimmunity from litigation over private acts. But thedistraction and diversion of energies that both causeare the same especially where, as here, the titanicnature of the subpoenas concerning private acts carriesover into the public sphere and creates a plausible riskof diversion of energies and distraction from officialPresidential duties.

This Court’s later analysis of Nixon v. Fitzgerald isnot inconsistent with this result. In Clinton v. Jones,this Court explained that the “dominant concern” inNixon v. Fitzgerald was to protect the President fromliability for official acts by enabling the President tomake official decisions without “diversion of thePresident’s attention” caused by concerns over a laterdamage action. 520 U.S. at 694 n.19. But the fact thatthis was the “dominant concern” in Nixon v. Fitzgeralddoes not mean it was the only concern. This Court’sbroader recognition in Nixon v. Fitzgerald – of thedeleterious effects that the judicial process (includingsubpoenas) may have on Presidential function andperformance – applies as much to overbroad intrusioninto private matters as to personal liability arisingfrom official acts.

This Court left open exactly this issue in Clinton v.Jones. In Clinton this Court recognized that – andexpressly did not decide whether – an “exceptionalcase[ ]” may require a blanket Presidential immunityfrom a particular judicial process notwithstanding itsorigin in private rather than official acts (520 U.S. at690n.12: not decide “exceptional case[ ]”). For this

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purpose, the present petition clearly involves an“exceptional case” warranting Presidential immunityand entry of the requested injunction. The enormousbreadth and depth of the wide-ranging subpoenas inthe present cases – and the distraction and diversion ofPresidential energy and focus they will cause –distinguish these cases from the discrete and limitedincursions into Presidential time this Court permittedin Clinton v. Jones for the single lawsuit arising fromdiscrete acts of sexual harassment or in U.S. v. Nixonfor the specific and limited trial subpoena for“disclosure of a limited number of conversations.”

Indeed, if these cases are not “exceptional cases”warranting Presidential immunity, it is hard toimagine any case that would be. The integrity andfunction of the Presidency clearly warrant theinjunctions the President seeks.

e. The Present Subpoenas Violate the Spiritof Article II and Undermine a SignificantAspect of the 2016 Presidential Election

Article II of the Constitution, as amended by theTwelfth Amendment, prescribes the procedure forelecting the President. The people have spoken in theirelection of Donald Trump. His non-disclosure of hisincome tax returns and private financial data was acentral issue in the 2016 Presidential electioncampaign. The people elected him, knowing andaccepting this non-disclosure. If democratic electionsof the President are to mean anything, their expressionof popular preference should weigh heavily in theresolution of this Article II dispute. Under authority ofthis exact same constitutional provision, the people

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have already decided the issue of non-disclosure in theexercise of their democratic prerogatives.

Viewed in this perspective, the present subpoenasare nothing less than an impermissible end run aroundthe 2016 election. They seek to undo by compulsoryprocess the Presidential non-disclosure the people havealready chosen at the ballot box.

f. The Issue Raised by the Petitions is Not aPartisan or Political Issue, But anInstitutional Issue Upon Which theIntegrity of the Presidential OfficeDepends

This is not a political or partisan issue. Rather, thisis an issue that goes to the heart and soul of thePresidential Office and the President’s ability tofunction effectively as the elected Chief Executive ofthe nation. This is an issue which cuts across partylines and transcends partisan beliefs. A Republican orConservative President today who is victimized by anabusive subpoena issued by Democratic or liberalgovernmental officials may be followed tomorrow by aLiberal Democratic President victimized by a similarsubpoena issued by Conservative Republicanopponents. Neither is permissible. Neither canwithstand scrutiny under Article II of the Constitution.The protection of the institution of the Presidencyrequires the injunction the President seeks.

For these reasons, the President’s ability to performhis Article II responsibilities unimpaired bydistractions from respondents’ wide-rangingblunderbuss subpoenas mandates reversal of the

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judgments of the Second and D.C. Circuits withdirections to issue the injunctions the Presidentrequests.

II. In 19-635, The Subpoena Should Be QuashedAlso Because State and Local Authorities MayNot Issue Process Which Impairs ThePresident’s Ability to Perform His OfficialDuties

In addition to the above reasons for granting therequested injunctions, the nature of our federal systemseparately requires an injunction in 19-635. Thesubpoena in 19-635 emanates not from a federalauthority but from the local District Attorney in NewYork County, New York. This Court has consistentlyheld that State and local officials may not use theirpowers to impair or affect the functions of federalofficials. Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. at 691 n.13(“Because [of] the Supremacy Clause … any directcontrol by a state court over the President … mayimplicate concerns that are quite different from theinter-branch separation-of-powers questions addressedhere [federal court vs. President]”);2 see also Johnson v.Maryland, 254 U.S. 51 (1920) (State may not requireU.S. Post Office mail-truck driver to obtain Statedriver’s license); Osborn v. Bank of United States, 22U.S. 738, 867-68 (1824) (State may not control or tax

2 This Court in Clinton v. Jones expressly declined to decidewhether a State court action could proceed against the President,520 U.S. at 691, while strongly intimating that it may not. Id., at691 n.13.

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an entity of the federal government); M’Culloch v.Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 429-30 (1819) (same).

The import and lesson of these cases are clear. Theyrestrict State authority which purports to control orimpair in any way the official performance of a federalgovernmental official or entity. That is, “the activitiesof the Federal Government are free from regulation byany State.” Mayo v. U.S., 319 U.S. 441, 445 (1943). This principle should apply with special vigor to protectthe Office of the President – the federal government’sChief Executive officer – from assertions of control byState courts.

There are an estimated 2,300+ local prosecutingattorneys’ offices throughout the United States(Pet.br.pp.25-26 in 19-635). The potential for abuse andpolitical mischief is obvious. Many local DistrictAttorneys, if not most – including the respondent in 19-635 – are elected in partisan elections with strongpolitical biases. Not surprisingly, the respondentDistrict Attorney in 19-635 is an elected LiberalDemocrat who has served his wide-ranging criminalsubpoena seeking information and documents from aConservative Republican President. To allow this kindof political gamesmanship to infect and distract thePresidency with compulsory subpoena process is todegrade the Office of the President and expose everyfuture President to the same meddling, control,distraction and abuse.

If allowed in this case, then every future President– especially Presidents with extensive businessholdings – will be vulnerable to the same abuse anddegradation. It will not matter whether the President

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is a Democrat, Republican, Liberal, Conservative, orotherwise. There will always be some local prosecutorsomewhere – among the 2,300+ in the United States –who will want to follow suit against any givenPresident, if allowed in 19-635. Article II of theConstitution and the integrity of the Office of thePresident command that this be shut down, now.

CONCLUSION

It bears emphasis that the impermissibility of theState court subpoena in 19-635 is merely anadditional reason to quash the subpoena in thatparticular case. The primary reason, discussed above,remains and applies in all 3 cases under review: Thesubpoenas are not confined to the type of discrete andlimited intrusion into the Presidential function allowedin Clinton v. Jones or U.S. v. Nixon but insteadconstitute wide-ranging, virtually limitless andblunderbuss commands for production of documentsthat trigger a plausible risk of serious Presidentialdistraction and diversion of energy and focus that willimpair the ability of the President to perform hisofficial duties.

The subpoenas contravene Article II of theConstitution. This Court should reverse the judgmentsof the Second and D.C. Circuits and order entry of theinjunctions the President requests.

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Respectfully submitted,

DENNIS GROSSMAN

Counsel of Record6701 Sunset Drive, Suite 104Miami, Florida 33143(516) 466-6690dagrossmanlaw@aol.com

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

Dated: February 3, 2020