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researchICTsolutions Supporting evidence based policy & regulation in Namibia

Supporting evidence based policy & regulation in Namibia

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Page 1: Supporting evidence based policy & regulation in Namibia

researchICTsolutions

Supporting evidence based policy & regulation in Namibia

Page 2: Supporting evidence based policy & regulation in Namibia

researchICTsolutions

Evidence based ICT policy and regulation in Namibia since 2006 - 4 key interventions

Telecommunication Sector Liberalisation in 2006 Interconnection dispute resolution 2009 Retail price dispute resolution 2011 Leased Line wholesale price dispute 2012-2014

Page 3: Supporting evidence based policy & regulation in Namibia

researchICTsolutions

Prices benchmarking - across countries and time Benchmarking of cost to mobile termination Benchmarking of regulation for other jurisdictions

Benchmarking main tools to support regulators and policy makers:

There are limitsBenchmarking fairly quick fix for under resourced regulators Cost models are more precise: first choice if time and money allows For some regulatory questions not enough data available such as cost of E1 capacity across a country Local conditions so different from other jurisdictions that transfer is not straight forward

Page 4: Supporting evidence based policy & regulation in Namibia

researchICTsolutions

There are limits to what benchmarking can do

Benchmarking fairly quick fix for under resourced regulators Cost models are more precise: first choice if time and money allows For some regulatory questions there is not enough data available Local conditions can be so different from other jurisdictions that transfer is not straight forward

Page 5: Supporting evidence based policy & regulation in Namibia

researchICTsolutions

Liberalisation of Telecom Market in 2006

Page 6: Supporting evidence based policy & regulation in Namibia

researchICTsolutions

Cabinet was undecided on whether to open market or not

Presentation to President and Cabinet on behalf of the regulator (NCC) Benchmarking to convince the government to liberalise:

Botswana had an even smaller population and equally sparsely populated Botswana had 2 operators, higher penetration and lower prices We used price benchmarking and the 2004 RIA household survey

Prices in Namibia were very expensive, technology outdated and subscriber numbers lower compared to other SADC countries A second licence went on tender 6 weeks later

Page 7: Supporting evidence based policy & regulation in Namibia

researchICTsolutions

MTC dropped prices, increased staff salaries and introduced 3G The CEO of MTC had had said 2 months earlier that Namibia would not need 3G and that SMS are the main killer app

May 2005

Announcement of second mobile licence had immediate impact

Page 8: Supporting evidence based policy & regulation in Namibia

researchICTsolutions

New operator Leo was caught between a rock and a hard place:Termination rate dispute 2009

Page 9: Supporting evidence based policy & regulation in Namibia

researchICTsolutions

Connect 50 

Leisure 

Connect 50  

Freedom  

Connect 

100 Leisure  

Connect 

100 Ac4ve  

Connect 

250 

Achiever  

Connect 

500  

Connect 

1000 

Pioneer  

Professional  Tango per 

minute 

Fusion 59  Fusion 39  Tango Day 

and Night 

Tango per 

second 

Tango Seven 

to Twelve 

On‐Net Peak  On‐Net Off Peak  On‐Net Off Off Peak  MTR 

Page 10: Supporting evidence based policy & regulation in Namibia

researchICTsolutions

However, new entrant could not win market share: MTC reduced prices when Leo did, MTC emphasied QoS when Leo did MTC always matched any possible advantage the new operator offered its customers

This was good for the consumer but not good for the only private mobile operator.

Benefit of size: Off-net Price > On-net price = expensive to switch (Cost of Switching Initially, mostly on-net calls, after switching mostly off-net calls)

New Entrant

Incumbent Mobile

Operator

Page 11: Supporting evidence based policy & regulation in Namibia

researchICTsolutions

Interconnection Dispute 2009Hearing hosted by ministry and regulator (NCC):

Agreement was reached to settle dispute by benchmarking MTC though it meant taking an SADC average While it actually meant benchmarking cost of termination

Benchmarking study Benchmarking mobile termination rates Benchmarking of cost to mobile termination (Austria, Australia, Tanzania, France) Benchmarking of regulation for other jurisdictions: EU, UK, Australia = cost of an efficient operator

During the process MTC refused to co-operate In the end consensus could be established and MTR dropped from 10 US cents to 3 within 18 months

Page 12: Supporting evidence based policy & regulation in Namibia

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Benchmarking cost of terminationMobile termination costs Namibia (N$/ZAR): MTC being the most efficient operator 2009

June 2009 MTR

MTC total expenditure per minute

MTC opex per minute

MTC direct cost and depreciation per minute

MTC direct cost per minute

MTC 50% of dircet cost and depriciation per minute 0.24

0.34

0.48

0.97

1.02

1.06

Same quick back-of-the-envelope calculation was used in 2013 to drop MTR to 2 US cents

Page 13: Supporting evidence based policy & regulation in Namibia

researchICTsolutions

Benchmarking cost of terminationMobile termination cost per minute in N$/ZAR: target rate 0.30 (including 25% mark-up)

Tanzania LRIC + mark up

Australian Efficient Operator (44% market share)

Swedish Efficient Operator

French Efficient Operator (upper level)

MTC’s estimated cost of termination

Austrian Efficient Operator

Telecom Namibia’s estimated cost of termination

French Efficient Operator (lower level) 0.12

0.14

0.23

0.24

0.24

0.26

0.35

0.59

Page 14: Supporting evidence based policy & regulation in Namibia

researchICTsolutions

Dispute about below-cost on-net rates and club effects 2011

Page 15: Supporting evidence based policy & regulation in Namibia

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330%$

330%$

330%$

330%$

497%$

500%$

597%$

597%$

600%$

650%$

833%$

833%$

833%$

MTC$Connect$50$Lite$

MTC$Aweh$Aweh$light$

MTC$Aweh$aweh$

Leo$Hola$

Switch$

Leo$Post$Paid$Off$Peak$

Leo$Post$Paid$Peak$

Leo$Prepaid$

MTC$Tango$per$second$

MTC$Postpaid$

MTC$Tango$Free60$

MTC$Tango$TOP10$

MTC$Tango$Special$Rate$

Off#net'Prices'as'%'of'termina2on'rate'(0.30N$)'

Page 16: Supporting evidence based policy & regulation in Namibia

researchICTsolutions

Traffic: based on data submitted by operators to the NCC in 2011

On-net Off-net Fixed

Leo 56.7% 40.9% 2.4%

MTC 96.4% 0.8% 2.8%

Switch 15% 55.7% 29.3%

Page 17: Supporting evidence based policy & regulation in Namibia

researchICTsolutions

Resolution of retail price disputeBenchmarking off-net to MTR ratios across selected countries Benchmarking regulatory best practice: CCK on club effects (2010) Resolution Price cap: off-net = on-net = calls to fixed lines Possible because MTR = cost of efficient operator

Initial consensus but then MTC changed its mind and took NCC to court and lost The company and actually same person that designed the intervention for the CCK testified in court on behalf of MTC to the opposite

Page 18: Supporting evidence based policy & regulation in Namibia

researchICTsolutions

Consequences of these interventions

Page 19: Supporting evidence based policy & regulation in Namibia

researchICTsolutions

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

23802043

18551535

12841009

744556

40434422414310771

MTC active Sim cards in 1000

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013Return on equity 45.4% 37.3% 34.0% 31.5% 33.6% 34.0% 28.4% 31.1% 36.2%

Profit Margin 38.1% 36.0% 30.5% 29.0% 27.9% 28.2% 21.9% 21.8% 23.2%EBITDA margin 61% 60.2% 52.2% 50.9% 53.8% 55.8% 53.2% 53.2% 55.0%

Monthly ARPU in N$ 159 141 125 102 90 54 65 66 64

Lower margin - high volume business

MTC cannot complain

Page 20: Supporting evidence based policy & regulation in Namibia

researchICTsolutions

Consumers are better off

Low User Medium User High User

8.74.5

1.8

13.4

6.92.8

13.4

6.96.9

20.2

6.96.9

24.8

16.5

11.0

41.1

24.1

11.5

Sep-05 Dec-08 May-10 Mar-11 Sep-12 Sep-12 in 2005 prices

MTC prices for OECD (2006) baskets

Page 21: Supporting evidence based policy & regulation in Namibia

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Ongoing Wholesale Price dispute

Page 22: Supporting evidence based policy & regulation in Namibia

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Pre-arranged Connectivity - Leased lines

Telecom Namibia submitted new prices Prices were gazetted Other operators responded Hearing conducted 2 October 2014 Regulator has to assess:

complaints price in comparison to other jurisdictions cost of providing service appropriate returns for Telecom Namibia (WACC)

Page 23: Supporting evidence based policy & regulation in Namibia

researchICTsolutions

Retail Price BenchmarkingIceland

DenmarkNorway

LuxembourgTurkey

GermanyGreece

Belgium Austria

AustraliaUnited States

Telecom Namibia 2014 proposedTelkom South Africa

PortugalItaly

FranceMexico

KoreaUnited Kingdom

JapanBotswana BTC

Telecom Namibia 2011Ireland

Canada 23,09120,384

18,36017,59417,441

16,55416,345

14,80312,087

10,97210,564

10,1979,119

8,3737,773

7,4807,384

7,0755,330

4,2033,920

3,0791,851

1,423

34 Mbps OECD retail basket in USD

Page 24: Supporting evidence based policy & regulation in Namibia

researchICTsolutions

Retail Price Benchmarking

OECD retail basket 2 Mbps USD

IcelandSweden

DenmarkTelkom South Africa

Turkey Poland

NorwayLuxembourg

GreeceBTC Botswana

Telecom Namibia Proposed 2014Austria

GermanyPortugalBelgium

NetherlandsTelecom Namibia 2011

United StatesItaly

IrelandMexico France

United KingdomKorea

CanadaCzech Republic

AustraliaJapan

Slovak Republic 5,4334,845

4,3653,755

3,6023,007

2,7531,942

1,8621,7231,720

1,6591,4741,4441,424

1,3291,231

1,1031,055

994952929902

693668658

590586

448

Page 25: Supporting evidence based policy & regulation in Namibia

researchICTsolutions

Wholesale Price Benchmarking

Telkom 2013 BTC 2013 Telecom Namibia 2011 TelecomNamibia Proposed

7,75112,852

3,5194,373

Telkom 2013 BTC 2013 Telecom Namibia 2011 Telecom Namibia Proposed

15.0%30.0%80.0%

51.7%

34 Mbps OECD retail basket in USD

2 Mbps OECD retail basket in USD

Telkom BTC Telecom Namibia 2011 Telecom Namibia Proposed

8971,032

199251

Telkom BTC Telecom Namibia 2011 Telecom Namibia Proposed

15%30%80%62%

Page 26: Supporting evidence based policy & regulation in Namibia

researchICTsolutions

Weighted Average Cost of Capital

gearing=% of debt

Gearing 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

Total assetsN$ million 1,781 2,040 2,231 2,325 2,534 2,566 2,629 2,913

YoY growth 14.5% 9.4% 4.2% 9.0% 1.3% 2.4% 10.8%

Total liabilitiesN$ million 801 1,025 1,168 1,237 1,393 1,374 1,376 1,746

YoY growth 28.0% 14.0% 5.9% 12.6% -1.4% 0.2% 26.9%

Gearing % 45.0% 50.2% 52.4% 53.2% 55.0% 53.5% 52.4% 59.9%

Bond amount issued N$ million 347.0 347.0 347.0

Interest payment on bonds N$ million 32.3 32.5 32.3

Implied cost of debt based on short term bond % 9.3% 9.4% 9.3%

Debtto Equity Ration # 0.817 1.010 1.099 1.137 1.221 1.153 1.099 1.497

Shareholders’ Equity in nominal termsN$ million 980 1,015 1,063 1,088 1,141 1,192 1,252 1,167

YoY growth 3.6% 4.7% 2.4% 4.9% 4.5% 5.1% -6.9%

Source: Annual reports, 2006-13

WACC= (% of debt)*(cost of debt) + (% of equity) (cost of equity)

Page 27: Supporting evidence based policy & regulation in Namibia

researchICTsolutions

Cost of DebtCost of debt = risk free interest rate + debt premium for TN

=8.8%+1.5%=10.3%Namibian Government (nominal)

Description MaturityYield/MTM (Jan 2014)

GC 15 2015 6.38%GC 17 2017 7.61%GC 18 2018 7.89%GC 21 2021 8.59%GC 24 2026 8.99%GC 27 2027 9.30%GC 30 2030 10.10%Expected Bond 2024 8.82%

risk free interest rate = 8.8%

Debt Premium by rating

Moodys S&P Fitch Description Operators Average debt premium

Aaa AAA AAA treasury bonds- maximal security

Aa1 AA+ AA+very high credit ratingAa2 AA AA

Aa3 AA- AA-A1 A+ A+

average credit rating

Belgacom(Moodys)A2 A A Belgacom(S&P) Swisscom 1.07%

A3 A- A-

TeliaSonera, Telenor, Vodaphone,

Telecom Namibia (FItch national long-term rating)

1.50%

Baa1 BBB+ BBB+

lower credit rating

Bougues, Deutsche Telekom, Organge 1.81%

Baa2 BBB BBB Elisa, KPN(Moodys), TDC, Telekom Austria (Moodys), Telefonica, Vivendi 1.95%

Baa3 BBB- BBB- KPN (S&P), Telekom Austria (S&P) 1.98%Ba1 BB+ BB+

risky credit rating

Telecom Italia, Portugal Telecom, OTE (Moodys), Telekom Slovenije, Vimplekom (S&P),

Telecom Namibia (Fitch - long-term local currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR))

3.56%

Ba2 BB BB 5.44%

Ba3 BB- BB- OTE (S&P), Vimplecom,(Moodys)B1 B+ B+

high riskB2 B BB3 B- B-

Caa CCC+ CCC Very risky, bankruptcy risk

Sources: PTS (2014)

debt premium Telecom Namibia = 1.5%

Page 28: Supporting evidence based policy & regulation in Namibia

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Cost of EquityCost of equity = rate of return for risk-free investment + β * Equity Risk Premium

European regulators determined the equity risk premium for mobile networks (PTS, 2014): • Denmark: 3.85% equity risk premium, • France: Arcep applies a 5% equity risk premium, • Netherlands: 5% equity risk premium • Norway: NPT applies a 4.5% equity risk premium • Great Britain: Ofcom bases its assessment of the equity risk

premium at 5% • Sweden: 5.5%

Equity Risk Premium about 6% for Namibia based on Benchmarking

Page 29: Supporting evidence based policy & regulation in Namibia

researchICTsolutions

Cost of Equity - Benchmarking BetaCompany

Market cap in US$ million

Asset Beta

Corporate tax rate

Debt Equity ratio for Telecom

Namibia

Equity Beta for Telecom Namibia

Weights based on

market cap

Weightred Equity Beta for Telecom

NamibiaBelgacom 11,920 0.53 0.33 1.497 1.06 0.02 0.03Bouygues group 10,752 0.83 0.33 1.497 1.66 0.02 0.04Deutsche Telekom 68,015 0.35 0.33 1.497 0.70 0.14 0.10Elisa 4,380 0.6 0.33 1.497 1.20 0.01 0.01Iliad 12,414 0.6 0.33 1.497 1.20 0.03 0.03KPN 13,039 0.32 0.33 1.497 0.64 0.03 0.02Mobistar 1,081 0.55 0.33 1.497 1.10 0.00 0.00Orange 37,232 0.42 0.33 1.497 0.84 0.08 0.06OTE 6,356 0.43 0.33 1.497 0.86 0.01 0.01Portugal Telecom 1,744 0.39 0.33 1.497 0.78 0.00 0.00SonaeCom 646 0.5 0.33 1.497 1.00 0.00 0.00Swisscom 27,429 0.36 0.33 1.497 0.72 0.06 0.04TDC 6,485 0.35 0.33 1.497 0.70 0.01 0.01Tele2 5,261 0.74 0.33 1.497 1.48 0.01 0.02Telecom Italia 19,876 0.32 0.33 1.497 0.64 0.04 0.03Telefonica 68,248 0.52 0.33 1.497 1.04 0.14 0.14Telekom Austria 3,998 0.45 0.33 1.497 0.90 0.01 0.01Telekom Slovenije 1,215 0.33 0.33 1.497 0.66 0.00 0.00Telenor 32,304 0.72 0.33 1.497 1.44 0.07 0.09TeliaSonera 29,304 0.61 0.33 1.497 1.22 0.06 0.07Vimpelcom 11,700 0.52 0.33 1.497 1.04 0.02 0.02Vivendi 31,604 0.62 0.33 1.497 1.24 0.06 0.08Vodafone 86,044 0.46 0.33 1.497 0.92 0.18 0.16Sum 491,047 0.98

Source: Reuters accessed 3 october 2014

PTS (2014)

TN annual report 12/13

Page 30: Supporting evidence based policy & regulation in Namibia

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WACCsWACC Input Assumptions %

Telecom Namibia low

Telecom Namibia high

Gearing % 60% 50%Risk free rate (nominal) % 8.8% 8.8%Debt premium (nominal) % 1.5% 5.44%Market Risk Premium (nominal) # 6% 6%Equity beta (leveraged) # 0.98 0.98Corporate Tax Rate % 33% 33%Expected Inflation % 6.1% 6.1%CalculationsCost of debt % 10.3% 14.3%Cost of equity % 14.7% 14.7%Results WACC (nominal before tax) % 12.1% 14.5%

Page 31: Supporting evidence based policy & regulation in Namibia

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Comprehensive Sector ReformSupported by relatively simple tool of benchmarking It is important to build up data sets to be able to use historic data and to monitor developments Benchmarking has been the primary tool to deliver evidence Consultation and balancing interests has been the main approach to affect change:

In 2009 MTC and Leo received international data and voice gateway licenses

compensation for potential revenue loss for MTC lead also to a reduction in international calling prices (fixed and mobile)

Page 32: Supporting evidence based policy & regulation in Namibia

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Regulation - Negotiation

It is a give and take for operators

It is about fair competition for the regulator

Page 33: Supporting evidence based policy & regulation in Namibia

Case Study Kenya

Page 34: Supporting evidence based policy & regulation in Namibia

MTR US cents

Mar 2007 Mar 2008 Mar 2009 July 2010 July 2011 July 2012 July 2013 July 2014

1.131.321.642.542.54

5.056.01

7.14

Page 35: Supporting evidence based policy & regulation in Namibia

Monthly cost of OECD Low User basket in US cents, based average exchange rate for 2011 based on OECD 2006 Definition

Jan-10 Sep-10 Jan-11 Sep-11 Oct-11 Sep-12

2.12.12.12.12.1 1.81.81.81.81.8

3.9

2.02.02.02.02.0

5.8

2.52.72.32.3

6.3

7.3

Safari Airtel Orange Yu

Safaricom increased prices and then dropped them again

Page 36: Supporting evidence based policy & regulation in Namibia

Safaricom’s voice traffic in billion minutes

Jul-Sep 2010 Oct-Dec 2010 Jan-Mar 2011 Apr-June 2011 Jul-Sep 2011 Oct-Dec 2011 Jan-Mar 2012

5.265.22

6.27

5.415.254.92

6.01

Page 37: Supporting evidence based policy & regulation in Namibia

Safaricom’s traffic and subscriber market shares

Jul-Sep 2010 Oct-Dec 2010 Jan-Mar 2011 Apr-June 2011 Jul-Sep 2011 Oct-Dec 2011 Jan-Mar 2012

65%67%68%69%68%70%76% 77%78%

88%86%86%86%94%

Safaricom share of traffic Safaricom share of subscribers

Page 38: Supporting evidence based policy & regulation in Namibia

Safaricom’s key performance indicators for financial years ending in March 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

RevenueKsh billion 47 61 70 84 95 107USD million 542 701 805 959 1,083 1,222

After-tax profitKsh billion 12 14 11 15 13 13USD million 137 158 120 173 150 144

Dividend paidKsh billion 3 2 4 8 8 8.8USD million 34 23 46 91 91 101

Subscribers in million 6.10 10.23 13.36 15.79 17.18 19.1EBITDA Margin 51.7% 45.9% 39.6% 43.6% 37.7% 35%Base stations 1558 1899 2162 2501 2690Voice Average Revenue per User (ARPU)

Ksh 356 294 303USD 4.07 3.36 3.46

Average minutes of use (MoU) 60.6 96 116Average implied price per minute (ARPU /Average MoU)

Ksh 5.87 3.06 2.61

US cents 6.71 3.50 2.98

Source: Safaricom annual reports Average exchange rate for 2011 used for conversion

Page 39: Supporting evidence based policy & regulation in Namibia

Impact of Termination rate reduction in Kenya

The reaction to the termination rate reduction was immediate, leaving no doubt about the causal relationship Retail prices dropped by 60%, immediately the day after reduction was announced - Opposite effect to the waterbed effect! 9.5% more subscribers in last quarter or 2010 quarter - duplicated SIM Safaricom is a good example for what happens if a dominant operator does not respond to competitive pressure or tries to increase price after cutting them In both instance Safaricom lost market share and traffic to other operators

Page 40: Supporting evidence based policy & regulation in Namibia

Case Study South Africa

Page 41: Supporting evidence based policy & regulation in Namibia

Mobile Termination glide Path in South African cents

Peak Off Peak CommentSince 2001 125c 89c

March 2010 89c 77c political intervention

March 2011 73c 65c Gazette No. 33698, 29 October 2010

March 2012 56c 52c

March 2013 40c 40c

Page 42: Supporting evidence based policy & regulation in Namibia

15 April 2010

Loosing Billions

Page 43: Supporting evidence based policy & regulation in Namibia

10% loss or 10% less revenue? There is a big difference

17 May 2010

Page 44: Supporting evidence based policy & regulation in Namibia

400 million

less revenue in one

quarter

22 July 2010

Page 45: Supporting evidence based policy & regulation in Namibia

Staff retrenchment to offset impact Vodacom: R800 million loss in revenue

1 March 2011

Page 46: Supporting evidence based policy & regulation in Namibia

17 May 2011

Vodacom: R1.5 billion loss in revenue

R500 million net interconnect loss

Page 47: Supporting evidence based policy & regulation in Namibia

17 May 2011

MTN: ZAR 2.5 billion lost in revenues Telkom interconnect revenue dropped 37.4%

Page 48: Supporting evidence based policy & regulation in Namibia

28 March 2012

“I know that it is counter intuitive, but it is what happens,” said

Knott-Craig.

Page 49: Supporting evidence based policy & regulation in Namibia
Page 50: Supporting evidence based policy & regulation in Namibia

January 2012 OECD Low User Basket costs in USD (FX= average 2010)

Country Name Cheapest product from Dominant Operator Cheapest product in country % cheaper than dominantRank US$ Rank US$Mauritius 1 2.39 5 2.39 Dominant is cheapestEthiopia 2 2.61 7 2.61 naNamibia 3 2.74 8 2.74 Dominant is cheapestKenya 4 2.85 1 1.90 33.4%Egypt 5 2.91 9 2.91 Dominant is cheapestSudan 6 3.53 6 2.46 30.5%Ghana 7 3.87 11 3.28 15.1%Libya 8 3.90 14 3.90 Dominant is cheapestRwanda 9 4.28 3 2.16 49.4%Guinea 10 4.62 2 1.93 58.1%Sierra Leone 11 5.04 13 3.88 23.1%Uganda 12 5.51 10 2.94 46.6%Congo Brazaville 13 5.63 17 5.63 Dominant is cheapestTanzania 14 5.82 12 3.75 35.7%Algeria 15 6.21 4 2.28 63.3%Tunisia 16 7.24 18 6.46 10.9%Senegal 17 8.11 24 8.11 Dominant is cheapestBotswana 18 8.16 20 7.66 6.0%Sao Tome &Principe 19 8.21 25 8.21 Dominant is cheapestNigeria 20 8.40 16 5.22 37.8%Madagascar 21 8.45 27 8.45 Dominant is cheapestMali 22 8.78 29 8.78 Dominant is cheapestBurkina Faso 23 8.88 28 8.53 4.0%Benin 24 9.10 22 7.92 13.0%Mozambique 25 10.00 33 10.00 Dominant is cheapestChad 26 10.14 34 10.14 Dominant is cheapestD.R. Congo 27 10.37 19 7.62 26.5%Côte d’Ivoire 28 10.41 36 10.41 Dominant is cheapestCameroon 29 10.44 35 10.28 1.5%South Africa 30 11.07 32 9.83 11.2%Togo 31 11.18 38 11.18 Dominant is cheapest

Page 51: Supporting evidence based policy & regulation in Namibia

40

55

70

85

100

Jan 11 Mar 11 May 11 Jul 11 Sept 11 Nov 11 Jan 12 Mar 12 May 12

8ta Cell CMTN South Africa Vodacom South AfricaVirgin Mobile

Page 52: Supporting evidence based policy & regulation in Namibia

Telkom Fixed-line operating revenues and expenses in ZAR million (Telkom 2011, Telkom 2012, FY ending March)

2011 2012 Change

Interconnection Revenues

Total Revenues 1,679 1,757 78Mobile Domestic 498 375 -123Mobile International 186 630 444Fixed 328 262 -66International 667 490 -177

Interconnection Expenses

Total Expenditure 5,193 4,839 -354Mobile network operators 3,704 3,218 -486

Fixed 404 306 -98International network operators 792 1,029 237

Interconnection Loss Total -3,514 -3,082 432Interconnection Loss Mobile only -3,206 -2,843 363

Interconnect revenue up, expenses down, net improved by ZAR432 million

Telkom past on MTR cuts 100% to customers

Page 53: Supporting evidence based policy & regulation in Namibia

Revenue up 7.8%, profits up 27.9%

Vodacom

Page 54: Supporting evidence based policy & regulation in Namibia

Interconnect revenue down 10.3%, expenses down 13.4%, net interconnect profit up 6.2% in South

Africa, additional ZAR 66 million

10.2% increase in traffic from Telkom due to

pass through of MTR cuts

Vodacom

Page 55: Supporting evidence based policy & regulation in Namibia

MTN South Africa

Revenue up 7.7%

EBITDA

margin up by 1.2%

CAPEX up 5%

Page 56: Supporting evidence based policy & regulation in Namibia

MTN South Africa: ZAR million Financial year ending December

2010 2011 changeRevenue 6,568 5,924 -644Expense: interconnection and roaming 5,483 5,183 -300

Net Interconnect 1,085 741 -344

Still a net receiver of ZAR 741 million net Overall higher profits in 2011 compared to 2010

Page 57: Supporting evidence based policy & regulation in Namibia

Vodacom: R66 million more profit after cuts, net profit from termination R1.14 billion

MTN: net profit from termination: R741 million

Increase prices, invest less, retrench staff?

However, not same dramatic price decreases as Namibia and Kenya due to only small

reductions

Page 58: Supporting evidence based policy & regulation in Namibia

ConclusionTraffic flows are complex and who benefits from termination rate cuts depends on business strategies and the competitive interactions of all operators Cost based termination rates lead to more and fairer competition an thus more subscribers, traffic, investment and a bigger pie of revenues to be shared among operators Quick and steep glide path to lower MTRs to cost of an efficient operator

Page 59: Supporting evidence based policy & regulation in Namibia

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MTR

MTR for operators with less than 20% market share

Difference

Previous 0.4 0.4 0%1 April 14 0.2 0.44 55%1 April 15 0.15 0.42 64%1 April 16 0.1 0.4 75%1 April 17 0.2

Second Call Termination Amendment regulations March 2014

Page 60: Supporting evidence based policy & regulation in Namibia

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Cheapest OECD basket in USD vs MTR in US cents

0

4

8

12

16

MTR in US cents

0 1.25 2.5 3.75 5

Page 61: Supporting evidence based policy & regulation in Namibia

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Q4 2010

Q1 2011

Q2 2011

Q3 2011

Q4 2011

Q1 2012

Q2 2012

Q3 2012

Q4 2012

Q1 2013

Q2 2013

Q3 2013

Q4 2013

Q1 2014

Q2 2014

33 33

36

27 26

29

23 23 22 21 20

8 8 8 9

19.8 19.5 20.1

17.014.9 15.6

13.1 12.9 12.2 11.5 10.9

5.3 5.2 4.9 5.03.5 3.4 2.8 2.4 2.5 2.3 2.3 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.2 1.1 1.1

Cheapest in Africa in USD SA basket price in USD SA Rank

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Country name

Cheapest product

% cheaper than dominantdominant operator cheapest in country

USD Rank USD RankEgypt 2.57 1 1.61 3 37.4%Ghana 2.73 2 2.13 4 22.0%Sudan 2.83 3 1.06 1 62.5%Ethiopia 3.90 4 3.90 5 Dominant is the cheaperMauritius 4.05 5 4.05 6 Dominant is the cheaperKenya 4.26 6 1.46 2 66%Rwanda 5.06 7 5.06 10 Dominant is the cheaperTunisia 5.91 8 5.73 11 3.1%Algeria 6.33 9 6.33 15 Dominant is the cheaperLibya 7.00 10 7.00 16 Dominant is the cheaperSouth Africa 7.18 11 4.97 9 31%Nigeria 7.20 12 4.54 8 37%Uganda 8.44 13 7.02 17 17%Sierra Leone 9.26 14 9.26 20 Dominant is the cheaperNamibia 9.43 15 8.24 18 12.6%Mozambique 10.13 16 10.13 22 Dominant is the cheaperBotswana 11.14 17 10.15 23 8.9%Benin 11.37 18 11.37 24 Dominant is the cheaperMauritania 13.16 19 13.16 26 Dominant is the cheaperLiberia 13.19 20 13.19 27 Dominant is the cheaperCentral African Republic 13.78 21 13.78 29 Dominant is the cheaperSao Tome and Principe 14.48 22 14.48 31 Dominant is the cheaperNiger 15.55 23 15.55 34 Dominant is the cheaperBurkina Faso 15.64 24 15.40 33 1.5%Cote d'Ivoire 15.74 25 15.74 35 Dominant is the cheaperMali 15.89 26 15.89 37 Dominant is the cheaperLesotho 16.01 27 13.23 28 17%Togo 16.25 28 16.25 39 Dominant is the cheaperCameroon 16.37 29 8.32 19 49%Chad 16.42 30 16.42 41 Dominant is the cheaperTanzania 16.44 31 6.32 14 62%Congo Brazzaville 16.58 32 14.54 32 12%Senegal 16.83 33 16.83 42 Dominant is the cheaperD.R. Congo 17.10 34 10.10 21 41%Zambia 17.25 35 15.83 36 8%Swaziland 18.99 36 18.99 44 Dominant is the cheaperSeychelles 20.35 37 20.35 46 Dominant is the cheaperMadagascar 20.80 38 4.17 7 80%Angola 22.04 39 20.28 45 8%Zimbabwe 22.70 40 16.30 40 28%Cape Verde 31.53 41 31.53 47 Dominant is the cheaperMorocco 46.72 42 12.28 25 74%Guinea 5.97 12Gambia 5.99 13Cameroon 8.32 19Gabon 13.87 30Malawi 15.96 38Guinea-Bissau 17.52 43