jgumfc. 41172 5327

SUPPLEMENT TO

The London GazetteOF TUESDAY ioth SEPTEMBER, 1957

bj> SutfcotttpRegistered as a Newspaper

THURSDAY 12 SEPTEMBER, 1957

The Ministry of Defence,Uth September, 1957

DESPATCH BYGENERAL SIR CHARLES F. KEIGHTLEY, GCB., GBE., DSO.,

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, ALLIED FORCES

OPERATIONS IN EGYPT—NOVEMBER TO DECEMBER, 1956

The following despatch describes the opera-tions in the EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN from30th October, 1956, when orders were issuedby Her Majesty's Government to be pre-pared in certain circumstances to initiateoperations in EGYPT until 22nd December,1956, when evacuation was completed. I amforwarding certain detailed recommenda-tions on specific organisational tactical andtechnical matters separately.

ONEBackground

On llth August, 1956, in the appointment ofCommander-in-chief of the British MIDDLEEAST Land Forces, I was informed that, inview of EGYPT'S action in nationalising theSUEZ CANAL, Her Majesty's Government andthe French Government had decided to con-centrate certain forces in the Eastern Mediter-ranean in case armed intervention should benecessary in order to protect their interests andthat in this event I was to assume the appoint-ment of Allied Commander-in-Chief of allBritish and French Forces engaged.

In my capacity as Commander-in-ChiefMIDDLE EAST Land Forces -I had already beenengaged in planning for possible operations inthe area but mainly in the event of BRITAIN

being involved as a result of her commitmentsthrough the Anglo-Jordanian Alliance.

It was now necessary to consider specificallywhat action should toe taken against Egypt ifher seizure of the Canal should result inhostilities.

The following forces were earmarked by theBritish and French Governments should opera-tions prove to toe necessary: —

BRITISHNaval

Aircraft Carrier Task GroupSupport Forces Group, including Cruisers,

Darings, Destroyers and FrigatesMinesweeping GroupAmphibious Warfare Squadron

Land16 Independent Parachute Brigade Group3 Commando Brigade, Royal Marines10 Armoured Division3 Infantry Division

Air(Medium and Light Bomber ForceFighter/Ground Attack Force, shore-

based and carrier-borneReconnaissance, Transport and Helicopter

Forces

5328 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 SEPTEMBER, 1957

FRENCHNaval

Aircraft Carrier Task GroupSupport Forces Group, including 1 Battle-

ship, Cruisers, Destroyers and Frigates.Minesweeping Group

Land10 Division Aeropprtee7 Division Mecanique Rapide

AirFighter/Ground Attack Force, shore-

based- and carrier-borneReconnaissance and Transport Forces

The following Commanders were nominatedto draw up plans and to assume command inthe event of operations:—

Vice-Admiral D'Escadre P. BARJOT—Deputy Commander-in-Chief

Vice-Admiral M. RICHMOND, CB., DSO.,QBE.—Naval Task Force Commander

(Succeeded Iby Vice-Admiral D. F.DURNFORD-SLATER, CB., on 24th October,1956).

Contre-Amiral P. LANCELOT—DeputyNaval Task Force Commander

Lieutenant^General Sir Hugh STOCKWELL,KGB., KBE., DSO.—Land Task ForceCommander

General de Division A. BEAUFRE—DeputyLand Task Force Commander

Air Marshal D. H. F. BARNETT, CB.,CBE., DFC.—Commander Air Task Force

General de Brigade -R. BROHON—DeputyCommander Air Task ForceI formed a small Allied 'Headquarters in

LONDON and similarly Task Force Com-manders built up their Headquarters whichwere also located in LONDON.

Owing to the Forces concerned being locatedas far apart as the UNITED KINGDOM, MALTA,CYPRUS, FRANCE and ALGIERS, and my Head-quarters being split between LONDON andCYPRUS a great deal of travelling was requiredby all Commanders.

Throughout August and September planswere made to take action in EGYPT if somecrisis should occur to demand pur interven-tion. These plans were necessarily flexible asit could not be foreseen precisely in whatcircumstances it might be necessary to inter-vene.

Whatever action was required by us wouldhowever clearly require airborne and seaassault operations and the British and FrenchAirborne Forces and Commandos were pre-pared and trained for such action.

The main limitations to our operations werecaused by the following factors: —

1. Lack of harbours or anchorages orlanding craft "hards" in CYPRUS: therebynecessitating any seaborne assault beinglaunched from MALTA, which was over 900miles away.

2. Shortage of airfields in CYPRUS. At•the outset of the planning only NICOSIA wasin operation and that was under reconstruc-tion and not working to full capacity.

AKROTIRI and TYMBOU were developedrapidly during September and October.

3. Limited resources of landing craft andair transport. We had only a total of 18LST's and 11 LCT's. We had an air liftfor two battalions but very limited ah* supplyresources.

TWO

Early in October I was instructed to recastour current plans so that action could if neces-sary be taken any time during the wintermonths.

This had wide repercussions.Men could not be kept for long stretches

at a number of hours notice to move, andin view of the prolonged period that the callup had lasted it was especially desirable tosend reservists, who had been called up at veryshort notice, on leave.

Certain vehicle ships had to be unloaded assome of the vehicles had been loaded for asmuch -as three months and batteries and equip-ment were deteriorating so much that theywere unlikely to be able to start on landing.In addition there was a danger from petrolfumes in the loaded ships.

A stockpile of supplies was built up inCYPRUS but even so owing to the limited portresources the majority of ships for the follow-up and supply for the assault troops must comefrom the UNITED KINGDOM. This demandedships which it was quite impossible economic-ally to hold loaded for a long stretch beingrequisitioned and sailed to the EASTERNMEDITERRANEAN.

Neutral shipping in and approaching theSUEZ CANAL would have to be diverted beforeany operations could take place.

Up-to-date intelligence was required ofEgyptian preparations and land and air dis-positions. This would necessitate photographicreconnaissance over the area of assault and theairfields.^

Action would 'be necessary and was plannedto evacuate the British contractors working inthe SUEZ BASE.

Weather would be deteriorating and empha-sised the time required to sail .the assault land-ing craft from the nearest harbour where theycould be held, at MALTA, to PORT SAID.

The effect of these factors was to make arequirement for a longer period between theexecutive order to start operations beingreceived and the date it was possible to landon the mainland of EGYPT.

The period of1 notice which had beenaccepted for the start of operations was 10days, although in the event we got little morethan 10 hours.

ExercisesOne of our greatest problems was to train

and exercise the troops and Headquarters in-volved for the task which lay ahead, owingto the immense dispersion of the forces,involved.

The forces in the UNITED KINGDOM wereconcentrated on SALISBURY PLAIN and at theirhome stations and certain useful unit training,was carried out.

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 SEPTEMBER, 1957 5329

Landing exercises were carried out with theCommandos and 6th Royal Tank Regimentat MALTA.

It was in the Command and control fieldand especially with regard to Signal exerciseswhere we were most handicapped and it is agreat credit to all the 'Headquarters and Signalstaffs that in the event communications workedso well.

Early in October Task Force Commandershad pressed for a Command Signal Exercisein particular to exercise the Headquarters ship.This exercise, called Exercise BOATHOOK, wasagreed in October and planned to take placeearly in November; in the end it never tookplace.

Israeli MobilisationDuring the last week in October intelligence

sources were reporting from TEL Aviv andelsewhere increasingly strong indications ofIsraeli mobilisation. As a result of thesereports certain precautions were taken asregards the preparedness of our forces.

On October 29th ISRAEL attacked across theSINAI Peninsula.

THREE

Situation on 30.ffc OctoberOn 30th October I was informed that Her

Majesty's Government were issuing a require-ment to ISRAEL and EGYPT : —

(a) to cease hostilities by land, sea andair;

(b) to withdraw contestant troops tenmiles from the SUEZ CANAL ;

(c) to allow occupation by Anglo-FrenchForces of PORT SAID, ISMAILIA and SUEZ.I was to be prepared to take action on 31st

October in the event of this requirement notbeing met by either country.

It was therefore clear that instead of 10 daysinterval between the executive order and thestart of operations I was liable to get about10 hours, and our operations might well bequite different to those for which we hadplanned.

There-was much to be done.

Of the many immediate steps to be takenthe most important were:—

(a) To complete the preparedness of theAllied Air Force.

(b) To embark and sail the BritishAssault Force from MALTA and the FrenchAssault Force from the WESTERN MEDITER-RANEAN.

(c) To embark and sail the immediatefollow-up forces from MALTA, the WESTERNMEDITERRANEAN and the UNITED KINGDOM.

{d) To open up all Command Signal netsbetween my Allied Force Headquarters,Task Force Headquarters and formations.Allied Forces were then located as

follows: —NAVAL FORCES

British and French Naval Forces were thenin the general area of the CENTRAL MEDITER-RANEAN.

A2

LAND FORCESBritish

16 Independent Parachute Brigade inCYPRUS.

3 Commando Brigade and 6 Royal Tanksin MALTA.

10 Armoured Division in LIBYA.3 Infantry Division in the UNITED KING-

DOM.

French10 Division Aeroportee partly in CYPRUS.7 Division Mecanique Rapide in ALGERIA.

AIR FORCESBritish

Bomber force in CYPRUS and MALTA.3 Ground attack squadrons in CYPRUS.

French2 Ground attack squadrons in CYPRUS.

FOUR

The Plan of OperationsAt 0430 hours 31st October I was informed

that the ISRAELI Government had agreed therequirement and that EGYPT had refused.

My object was defined as follows: —(i) To bring about a cessation of hostili-

ties between ISRAEL and EGYPTIAN forces.(ii) To interpose my forces between those

of ISRAEL and EGYPT.(hi) To occupy PORT SAID, ISMAILIA and

SUEZ.

The agreement to our requirements by theISRAELIS and the refusal by the EGYPTIANSmeant that we were now involved in opera-tions against the EGYPTIANS but with limitedobjectives.

My instructions were that air operationsagainst the EGYPTIANS would start on 31stOctober.

My estimate of the Egyptian strength at thistime was as follows, not taking into accountsuch forces as were known to have been en-gaged in the SINAI Peninsula: —

Egyptian Air Force80 MIG 15's45 IL 28 bombers25 Meteors57 Vampires200 trainers, communication and transport

Egyptian Army75,000 Infantry300 tanks which included over 150

modern Russian tanks (JS 3's, T 34's andT 85's).

An unknown number of self-ipropelledanti-tank guns, including the modernRussian SU 100's.

A considerable number of anti-aircraftguns and a modern radar organisation.

My main concern was naturally that of speed.Certain parts of the previous plans coukl fitin with the operation which I was now requiredto carry out; certain of them could not.

5330 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 SEPTEMBER, 1957

The limiting factor was clearly the Com-mando and armour located at MALTA. As aresult of previous preparedness and excellentwork by all officers and men they were em-barked on the night 30/31st October anddirected to sail at full speed for PORT SAID,a distance of 936 miles by the shortest route.At the maximum speed of the landing craftthis trip must take 6 days.

The aircraft carriers and HQ ships had beenassembling in the CENTRAL MEDITERRANEANfor Exercise BOATHOOK. This was in some waysan advantage and in some ways a disadvantage.Although it resulted in ships toeing reasonablyconcentrated they could not be briefed per-sonally or easily for the operations in hand.

The Royal Air Force were the most easilyprepared for action. It was clearly necessaryto eliminate the threat of Egyptian air effortfrom being able to engage our landing craftas they sailed from MALTA along the Egyptiancoast or our air transports from CYPRUS as .theyapproached their dropping zones. Further,any action by the IL.28 bombers against ourovercrowded airfields in CYPRUS would havedone damage out of all proportion to theeffort involved.

Although the effectiveness of the Egyptian AirForce was never overestimated, they had beenin action against the ISRAELI forces and theyhad foreign technicians who were certainlycapable of carrying out missions on the Koreanpattern.

So my first objective was the Egyptian AirForce.

The plan for this was a combination of highlevel bombing with contact and delay actionbombs to damage runways and discourageaircraft from taking off. This to be followedby daylight ground attacks.

It was estimated this would take 48 hoursto complete.

The next problem was when to use ourairborne forces.

We had a limited airborne effort but in par-ticular our air supply lift and air supplyresources were very restricted. The offensivepower we had against the Egyptian anti-aircraftguns was from the Fleet Air Arm and fightersfrom CYPRUS, the time over target of the latterbeing limited to ten to fifteen minutes.

My final objective at this stage it may beremembered was SUEZ. My problem was there-fore to prevent the Egyptians moving any oftheir armoured forces, which were concentratedin reserve, to the CANAL ZONE and especiallyon to the Causeway, that narrow strip of sandat places only a few hundred yards wide, onwhich the road runs from {PORT SAID toISMAILIA. Here even a few tanks might havecaused a physical block which would havetaken a very considerable time to clear. Wehoped to do this by keeping them uncertainuntil the last moment whether our main attackwas to toe at PORT SAID or ALEXANDRIA. This,in fact, we succeeded in doing.

It was therefore decided to employ the air-borne forces early enough to facilitate a quickrun through of the armour but to avoid usingthem piecemeal whereby they might becomeimmobilised.

Weather was also a factor to toe reckonedwith. At this time of year weather candeteriorate very suddenly and very seriously.

Apart from the start of air operations, thespeed of operations was dictated solely by localfactors. It was estimated that we would landour assault forces from MALTA by November6th, have seized ISMAILIA by November 8th andSUEZ by November llth. That would havecompleted the whole operation in 12 days fromthe start of air operations.

FIVEThe Operation

At 1615 hours GMT on 31st October,1956, Valiant and Canberra bombers under thecommand of Air Marshal BARNETT began theirattacks on Egyptian airfields at ALMAZA andINCHAS near CAIRO and at ABU SUIER andKABRIT in the CANAL ZONE. These attackswere continued with the aid of flares duringthe early part of the night and encountered acertain amount of anti-aircraft fire but no nightfighters.

iWe had an anxious moment when I wasinstructed, after -the aircraft had taken off ontheir first mission which included CAIRO WESTAIRFIELD, not to attack that airfield, sinceinformation had been received that AmericanNationals were being evacuated to ALEXANDRIAand were using the road close to the airfield.Since CAIRO WEST was a main bomber basefor the Russian made IL 28's its suddenreprieve was a matter of concern. However, inthe event, the Egyptians only used it to removetheir IL 28's to LUXOR.

I was also instructed to be prepared toattack CAIRO Radio later after issuing warningsso as to avoid civilian casualties.

During the night HMS NEWFOUNDLANDencountered the Egyptian Frigate DOMYAT inthe RED SEA and sank her after she had failedto reply to a signal: 68 survivors were pickedup.

From daylight onwards Allied shore-basedand carrier aircraft carried out highly success-ful attacks on aircraft on Egyptian airfieldswhile French naval aircraft set fire to aRussian-built destroyer off ALEXANDRIA.

Two attempts were made to sink the oldLST AKKA which -had been identified as aprepared tolockship. Anchored in shallowwater in LAKE TIMSAH she was well placedfor towing into the narrow channel at thesouthern end of the lake. Unfortunately theattacks were only partially successfu3i and beforethe ship could be sunk she had been towedin a sinking condition to her blocking position.In view of the subsequent orgy of sinkingcarried out by the Egyptians the relativeimportance of the AKKA assumed far less signi-ficance than seemed likely at the time.

By the end of the day the Egyptian AirForce had been severely treated: a largenumber of aircraft had 'been destroyed ordamaged on the ground and very few appearto have been airborne. Only one of our aircrafthad been attacked in the ah* and suffered slightdamage, while others had incurred minordamage from anti-aircraft fire.

During the night, bomber attacks fromCYPRUS and MALTA were kept up against

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 SEPTEMBER, 1957 5331

Egyptian airfields followed up by groundattacks by naval and shore based aircraft fromfirst light onwards on 2nd November. Later inthe day these attacks were made on HUCKSTEPCAMP, which contained many armoured fight-ing vehicles and large quantities of militarytransport, and on ALMAZA BARRACKS, also amilitary concentration area.

CAIRO Radio was then attacked during themorning by a force of Canberras with topcover provided by French fighters. Bombswere dropped on the Radio Masts of the trans-mitter station which are some 16 miles fromthe town, after warnings had been given by theVoice of Britain Radio in CYPRUS. After theattack the short wave transmitters of CAIRORadio went off the air and the Voice ofBritain operated on the CAIRO wavelength.This attack was only partially successful butby the time the damage had been repaired andthe short wave transmissions of CAIRO Radiohad been fully resumed a cease fire had comeinto effect.

During the day air reconnaissance disclosedthe first signs that the Egyptians were carryingout extensive blocking of the CANAL. Shipswere seen sunk across the entrance to PORTSAID and another ship was seen sunk nearEL FIRDAN.

By the end of 2nd November it was evidentthat the task of neutralising the Egyptian AirForce was all but complete. A number ofIL 28's still remained untouched on LUXORairfield which was attacked during the night2-3rd November and on 4th November.

During 3rd November the bulk of the aireffort was switched from airfields to othermilitary targets. HUCKSTEP CAMP and ALMAZABARRACKS were again attacked, as was themarshalling yard at ISMAILIA with the objectof slowing up any reinforcement of PORTSAID by rail. The above utilised a small partonly of our available air effort, but lack ofsuitable targets in areas away from the civilianpopulation, whose safety was from the outsetone of our primary concerns, materially re-stricted their activities. The use of the bomberwas in fact to be discontinued and their lastattack was an attempted raid on the guns andsubmarine base at AGAMI ISLAND offALEXANDRIA on the night of 3-4th November.The attack was intended primarily to attractattention away from PORT SAID.

The main air effort from now onwards wasdirected against the very heavy military move-ment in title CANAL area. Armed reconnais-sance missions found much military transportand considerable numbers of tanks. Thesewere heavily intermixed with civilian vehiclesof all descriptions and many military targetshad to be discarded by pilots for this reason.

It is interesting to record the behaviour ofall these vehicles on the arrival of our aircraft.In general military crews (abandoned theirvehicles, whereas the civilian traffic proceededunperturbed. This speaks highly for the in-tegrity of our aircrew and the complete trustin our frequently broadcast intentions ofattacking only military objectives. Similar be-haviour had been reported during our airattacks on airfields, when pilots reported thatthe only military activity seen was from anti-aircraft guns but that numbers of spectators

watched their activities from the perimeter ofthe landing ground. The same undisturbedpublic interest was later to be reported fromPORT SAID in the course of the assault.

On tile 3rd and 4th November air attackswere directed at armoured concentrations andmilitary movement on <the roads. Photographicreconnaissance of the PORT SAID beaches anddefences was completed. This showed that theEgyptians were prepared to defend the townand the beaches and that there were consider-able numbers of anti-aircraft guns in positionand some dug-in tanks. Mines were also seenon the beaches. Nasser had already announcedhis intention of concentrating to fight -theAllies' and there was every indication that pre-parations were being made accordingly.

As a result of our latest information onEgyptian defences and dispositions, the weatherforecast and the progress of the assault forcefrom MALTA, I confirmed with the Task ForceCommanders that we should carry out an air-borne assault on the PORT SAID area on the5th November.

It was accordingly planned to drop at firstlight on 5th November one British ParachuteBattalion on GAMIL airfield, West of PORTSAID, and one French Parachute Regiment intwo echelons, firstly on the Southern exits fromPORT SAID and secondly on the Southern endof PORT FUAD. The British force was toadvance into the town and occupy it if resist-ance was slight but if unable to do so it wouldwait for the seaborne assault on .the followingday. To this end Allied shore based andcarrier aircraft attacked all military road move-ment and concentrations of tanks and vehicles,as well as coast defences and anti-aircraft gunsites around PORT SAID, the greatest care beingtaken throughout to avoid damage to civilianproperty.

During 4th November Lieutenant-GeneralSTOCKWELL and Air Marshal BARNETT joinedVice-Admiral DURNFORD-SLATER in H.M.S.TYNE and sailed from CYPRUS together withthe seaborne support troops lor both theBritish and French parachute operations.

The sea convoys from MALTA and ALGIERSwere also converging on PORT SATO, the weatherwas good. Anxiety was caused by the activi-ties of the U.S. Sixth Fleet which, since 31stOctober, had been moved to and stationedin the same operating areas as our own carriers,in order to provide protection for the evacua-tion of U.S. nationals from ALEXANDRIA andthe LEVANT. Despite the very real difficultiescreated by this situation and the greatinconvenience experienced by our forces,thanks to the good sense of .the two navalcommanders both were able to carry out theirfunctions efficiently and without incident. TheU.S. Fleet withdrew from the area during thenight 4/5th November.

During the day aircraft from the Britishcarrier force attacked three enemy E-boatsheading for ALEXANDRIA. Two were sunk andthe third, though damaged, was allowed topick up survivors from the other boats andwas seen making its way to harbour.

Two further problems were to arise beforethe actual assault. By 4th November I hadbeen informed that I could no longer counton the arrival of 10 Armoured Division from

5332 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 SEPTEMBER, 1957

LIBYA. This formation was therefore removedfrom the Order of Battle. I was offered instead3 Infantry Brigade which had come out fromENGLAND to replace 10 Armoured Divisionin LIBYA and was then in MALTA. GeneralSTOCKWELL considered he did not require anymore infantry but might later need additionalarmoured units. Two such regiments werethen earmarked 1b come from fche UNITEDKINGDOM.

At 2015 hours GMT on 4th November Iwas asked to state, in the event of a post-ponement of the airborne assault for 24 hoursbeing ordered for political reasons, what wasthe latest time by which a decision must bemade. In reply I gave the hour as 2300 hoursGMT and added that any such postponementwould have most serious consequences andmust be avoided at all costs. Admiral BARJOTfully supported my views. It was accordinglyagreed there should be no postponement andthe stage was now set for the assault.

SIX

The Airborne Assault—5th NovemberThe morning of 5th November broke clear,

with a light wind, and for some hours before-hand Allied paratroopers had been loadingand emplaning in their aircraft on NICOSIA andTYMBOU airfields.

At 0820 hours GMT 3 Parachute BattalionGroup and 16 Parachute Brigade TacticalHQ, some 600 strong, began their jump on toGAMIL Airfield to the West of the town. Afew minutes later 500 men from the 2 Regi-ment Parachutistes Coloniaux (2RPC) droppednear the water works to the South of PORTSAID.

Anti-aircraft fire was encountered and wasdealt with by anti-flak patrols of shore basedaircraft. Although nine transport aircraft werehit there were no casualties and all returnedsafely to their base.

Both landings were successful although .theywere met with considerable fire from machineguns, mortars and anti-aircraft guns used ina ground role and from self-propelled guns,the Russian self-propelled SU IOC's. TheFrench quickly secured intact their two impor-tant objectives, -the water works and the mainroad and rail bridge over the INTERIOR BASIN.The Egyptians succeeded in destroying theless important pontoon bridge. The Waterworks were of particular value for, althoughwe had made provision to supply the town bywater tanker, in that event strict water ration-ing would have been necessary.

By 0900 hours the airfield was securely inour hands and shortly afterwards a helicopterwas able to land to take off casualties. 3Parachute Battalion then advanced eastwardstowards PORT SAID town.

A particular centre of resistance which fora tune held up the Eastward advance of theBritish parachute force was the COASTGUARDBARRACKS, which were demolished by anextremely accurate air strike by Wyverns andSea Hawks of the Fleet Air Arm without

-damage to surrounding buildings. Meanwhile

the Russian self-propelled anti-tank guns (SU100's) which had been dug in along the fore-shore left their emplacements and turned tomeet the threat from GAMIL.

These guns were most skilfully handled andcaused us considerable trouble, the fightinghere was hard and the Egyptians made gooduse of their dug positions which were oftendifficult to locate. I warned GeneralSTOCKWELL that unless the parachute opera-tion achieved complete success these armouredself-propelled guns might have to be neu-tralised by destroyer fire before the seabornelanding was made next day.

Egyptian, resistance was very stubbornthroughout .the morning. It centred mainlyround the SU 100's which were being usedas mobile centres of resistance. By degreesthe 3 Parachute Battalion overcame these posi-tions and under continuous fire made furtherprogress towards the town.

One of the features of this operation was theexcellent support provided by the aircraft fromthe Carrier Force. Continuous missions wereflown throughout the day and there was alwaysa "cab rank" of British and French aircraftoverhead waiting to be called down on 'targetsby the troops on the ground. Such targets aspresented themselves were for the most parton the outskirts of the town. Shore basedfighters and ground attack aircraft meanwhilemade certain that no revival was possible fromthe Egyptian Ah- Force and that no reinforce-ments reached PORT SAID.

At 1345 hours GMT a second drop of 100men of 3 Parachute Battalion Group withvehicles, heavy equipment and re-supply wasmade at GAMIL. Some 460 French para-chutists of 2 Regiment Parachutistes Coloniauxdropped on the Southern outskirts of PORTFUAD: here for a time resistance was stub-born and some 60 of the enemy were killed,thereafter opposition at PORT FUAD collapsed.Egyptian military vehicles made for the ferryacross the harbour and were attacked withgreat effect from the air.

At 1500 hours GMT the local EgyptianCommander in PORT FUAD contacted the Com-manding Officer of 2 Regiment ParachutistesColoniaux to discuss surrender terms on be-half of the Governor and Military Commanderof PORT SAID. The latter was referred toBrigadier M. A. H. BUTLER, DSO., MC, Com-mander of 16 Parachute Brigade, who was incontrol of the whole airborne assault and whohad dropped at GAMIL. Half an hour later at1530 hours GMT a Cease Fire was orderedby the Commander in PORT SAID while nego-tiations were in progress. Surrender termswere agreed and the Egyptian forces began tolay down their arms while their police wereassisting under orders. Subsequently, how-ever, the proposed terms were rejected by theEgyptians, and operations were resumed at2030 hours GMT. It was later confirmedthat the matter had been referred to CAIROwhence orders had been issued for the fightto be continued. Although we had cut all pos-sible telephone communications, there werewireless sets and an underwater cable whichwe had not the resources to destroy in time.On the resumption of operations, the Garrisonand populace were encouraged to resist by

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 SEPTEMBER, 1957 5333

loudspeaker vans which toured the townannouncing that Russian help was on the way,that LONDON and PARIS had been bombed andthat the Third World War bad started. Atthe same time arms were distributed to civi-lians, some from lorries and some from pilesdumped in the streets. These arms appearto have been handed out to all civilians, manyof whom used them indiscriminately, causingcasualties to both sides.

Up to this stage there had been very littlefighting in built up areas and hence few casual-ties had been caused to civilians or damageto private property.

In PORT FUAD 2 Regiment ParachutistesColoniaux met little further resistance andcompleted the capture of the area during thehours of darkness. 3 Parachute Battalion werehowever up against much stiffer resistance.On the narrow strip of land between the seaand LAKE MANSALA they came under firefrom mortars, including the Russian multi-barrel type, from ARAB TOWN.

It was now clear that PORT SAID could notbe captured and cleared by the ParachuteForce alone and that the seaborne force wouldhave to make an opposed landing the nextmorning.

The decision to launch a comparativelysmall airborne force without preliminary airbombing or naval bombardment against a largetown, whose defence was numerically nearlythree times as strong and was supported byarmour, had proved a justifiable risk. PORTFUAD, the water works and the most importantbridge to the South had been captured intactand a small but serviceable airfield was in ourhands. All this had been achieved with fewcasualties to our own troops and negligiblecasualties to civilians or damage to property.The subsequent tribulations which were suf-fered by PORT SAID were entirely due to thelocal Commander being overruled andinstructed to continue the battle.

SEVENThe Seaborne Assault—6th November

The heavy air and naval pre-assault fire planhad been drastically reduced and I had issuedprecise instructions that supporting fire wasto be confined strictly to known enemy de-fences and to .those which engaged our assault.Air bombing was prohibited and heavy navalguns were banned.

We thus maintained our policy of acceptingrisks to our own forces in order to minimiseEgyptian civilian casualties and damage .totheir property. The results bear witness tothe effectiveness of these measures and theirstrict observance by the forces engaged, despitethe distorted and exaggerated reports broad-cast from CAIRO and circulated throughout theworld.

For 45 minutes before .the landing some3000 yards of the beach were subjected tocovering fire from destroyers. The object ofthis fire, which was extremely accurate, wasto neutralise known enemy positions whichhad been dug amongst the bathing huts onthe foreshore. That it achieved its purposewas evident from the quantity of ammunitionand equipment which was later found aban-doned on the.beaches. Although this fire was

comparatively light and was only used againstknown positions or SP guns which activelyfired, it achieved the result of enabling ourforces to land without suffering the casualtiesusually expected in an assault against adefended and mined coast.

It was not found necessary to engage thecoast defence guns on the breakwater whichwere silent and had evidently been neutralisedafter previously being attacked from the air.Fortunately also the French Parachute forcehad completed the occupation of PORT FUADduring the night so that the Frendh seabornelanding on this flank required no supportingfire.

Further support for the assault on PORTSAID was provided by an air strike on thebeaches lasting for 10 minutes immediatelybefore the start of the naval gunfire: thebeaches were again engaged in a low levelattack along their whole length after the navalfire had stopped and just before the leadingtroops reached the shore.

'Preceded by minesweepers the assault forcereached its destination exactly on time afterthe sea passage from MALTA of over 900 mileshaving taken 6 days. At 0450 hours GMTthe leading waves of 40 and 42 Royal MarineCommandos came ashore and across thebeaches in LVT's (Landing Vehicle Tracked)'before disembarking. This obviated whatotherwise would have been an excessively longwade on the gradually shelving beach, and anexposed run across the broad beaches beforereaching cover. One squadron of the 6th RoyalTank Regiment was waterproofed and wadedashore from LCT's (Landing Craft Tanks)which touched down in 4£ feet of water.

At the same time the French Assault Forceconsisting of l,st Regiment Etranger Para-chutistes and three Naval Commandos, sup-ported by a squadron of light tanks, wasmaking an unopposed landing on the beachesof PORT FUAD.

As the Royal Marine Commandos passedthrough the beach huts, which were by thenon fire and amongst which quantities of aban-doned ammunition were exploding, they cameunder small arms fire from buildings along thesea front and one SU 100 on their right flankopened fire on one of the supporting destroyers.The destroyer returned the fire and as a resultconflagration started in the shanty town inthe immediate neighbourhood of the SU 100;fanned by a stiff breeze a large area of thiscollection of shacks was burnt out.

Luckily an area free of the Russian minesplaced along the beaches was found at thepoint of assault.

The objectives of 42 Commando supportedby the tank squadron less one troop, was toget through PORT SAID as quickly as possibleto the area of GOLF COURSE CAMP andthereby seal off the Southern exits of thetown, while 40 Commando with one troop oftanks was to clear the vicinity of the harbourin order to enable craft to enter without comingunder fire.

42 Commando met considerable resistance inthe area of the Governorate where 100 to 150Egyptian Infantry debouched from buildingsSouth and West of the Square. They were en-gaged by supporting tanks, but as they con-

.tinued to hold out in a. block of buildings

5334 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 SEPTEMBER, 1957

which lay across the main axis of advance of42 Commando, an air strike was called downat 0700 hours GMT. Immediately after thisthe advance was resumed with the Commandostravelling in their unarmoured open LVTsescorted by tanks. They moved rapidly downthe RUE MAHOMET ALI coming under firefrom side streets with grenades being throwndown from balconies overhead.

The Commandos replied with their personalweapons while the tanks knocked out anti-tank guns halfway down the street and overrana further three guns as -they emerged into theopen South of the heavily built up area.

The Commandos suffered some casualties atthis stage in their vehicles and while subse-quently clearing the houses on either side ofthe street.

Meanwhile 40 Commando was carrying outa deliberate clearance of the houses along theQUAI SULTAN HUSSEIN bordering the harbour.A considerable number of Egyptian infantrywere seen and engaged to the West of thisaxis and strong opposition developed amongstthe warehouses behind NAVY HOUSE.

At 0540 hours .GMT the CommandingOfficer of 45 Commando took off from HMSOCEAN in a helicopter to reconnoitre the land-ing zone for his unit. In the smoke and hazethe pilot lost his way and landed temporarilyin an Egyptian held football stadium wherethe party came under fire. Quickly realisinghis mistake he re-embarked his -passengers andmade good his escape in spite of a considerablenumber of bullet holes in his machine.

45 Commando were landed using 22 heli-copters from HM'S OCEAN and THESEUS and90 minutes later 400 men and 23 tons ofstores were ashore near the CASINO PIER with-out further incident. This was the first occasionon which such an operation had been carriedout.

The remainder of 6 Royal Tank Regimentdisembarked at the FISHING HARBOUR laterin the morning. One squadron was placed insupport of 45 Commando who had the taskof clearing -the town between the axes of thetwo leading Commandos: the other squadronby-passed the opposition with which 40 Com-mando was dealing and finally joined up withthe French parachutists well South of the townnear the bridges over the INTERIOR BASIN.

By 0730 hours GMT 42 Commando and itssupporting tanks had taken up positions inthe area of .the GAS WORKS and GOLF COURSECAMP South of the town from which they en-gaged Egyptian infantry near the PRISON. Theseappeared to be forming up for a counter-attack and an air strike was called down onthem at 0900 hours whereupon they rapidlydispersed.

From then onwards until 1200 hours GMT42 Commando engaged Egyptian infantry try-ing to cross their axis from East to Westevidently seeking sanctuary in the rabbitwarren of ARAB TOWN. This Westward movewas also due to pressure from 45 Commandowho were slowly clearing the middle of PORTSAID.

Like all street fighting the clearing of PORTSAID was a slow process made more difficultby the fact that most of the regular Egyptiantroops had by then discarded their uniforms

for " gallabiyahs ", and were indistinguishablefrom civilians, many of whom were armed.

Streets had to be cleared house by houseand sometimes room by room. This took timeand required a considerable expenditure ofsmall arms ammunition and grenades. Failureto observe 'the normal street fighting drill andthe wish of all ranks to get through PORT SAIDas quickly as possible led in some cases toavoidable casualties to our own .troops. It isa tribute to their -patience and forbearance thatso little damage was done to PORT SAID.

At 0900 hours GMT Lieutenant-GeneralSTOCKWELL reported that, with the other TaskForce Commanders and General BEAUFRE, hewas going ashore to try to secure the un-conditional surrender df PORT SAID. Negotia-tions were in progress through the ItalianConsul and a rendezvous had been arrangedat the Consulate. Lieutenant-GeneralSTOCKWELL and his party sailed into theharbour in a motor launch as far as the CanalCompany building where they were fired onfrom the direction of NAVY HOUSE. Goingabout they landed near the CASINO PALACEHOTEL and proceeded to the Consulate. TheEgyptian Commander however failed to cometo the rendezvous and as a result fighting con-tinued throughout the day.

By 1015 hours GMT a tough battle wastaking place in PORT SAID but the situation wasgradually being brought under control. Britishand French forces had linked up at the WaterWorks and the advance Southward was beingorganised.

I was particularly anxious to secure as muchof the Causeway running South from PORTSAID as quickly as possible, mainly in order toprevent our "break-out from the Causeway frombeing blocked by the Egyptians but also toenable PORT SAID to be -used for unloadingmen and material without interference or therequirement of a lot .of troops to secure it.

In PORT SAID the last area of resistancecentred round NAVY HOUSE where tankssupporting 40 Commando used their guns toblow in the doors of warehouses from whichEgyptian fire was still coming.

Finally, just before dusk an air attack wascalled down on NAVY HOUSE itself which stillheld out. This building was engaged and ourtroops occupied the area. All organisedresistance now ceased, 3 Parachute Battalionhad also closed up to the edge of ARAB TOWNand the Commandos had linked up with theFrench South of the town. Sporadic snipinghowever continued throughout ,the night.

At 1700 hours GMT orders were receivedfrom LONDON .that a United Nations Forcewould take over from us and that a Cease Firewas to take effect 2359 hours GMT, and thatno further move of forces would take placeafter that hour. Orders were therefore issuedto the leading troops to halt at midnight bywhich time the leading Allied Forces hadreached EL CAP, some 23 miles South of PORTSAID.

EIGHT

The Occupation of Port SaidEarly the next morning I flew into GAMIL

airfield and joined General STOCKWELL there.We then toured the town together in a Land

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 SEPTEMBER, 1957 5335

Rover which enabled me to get a first handimpression of the situation in PORT SAID andthe fighting. The Egyptian Garrison had con-sisted of three regular battalions supported byRussian self-propelled anti-tank guns(SU 100's) and a considerable number of anti-aircraft guns which had been used in aground role after the parachute drop. TheGarrison had been swollen by a last minuteinflux from SINAI and there were some 4,500Egyptian regular troops in the area. Arms andammunition, mainly of Soviet manufacture,had -been supplied on a lavish scale and therehad been a widespread distribution to civiliansof all ages. The scale of this can be judgedfrom the fact that on 8th November 45Commando recovered fifty-seven 3-ton truckloads of arms and ammunition from the arearound ARAB TOWN. This material was mainlysurrendered by Egyptians in civilian clothes.

British casualties had amounted to 16 killedand 96 wounded, while the French had had10 killed and 33 wounded. The value of heli-copters for evacuating the wounded to the air-craft carriers was amply demonstrated. TheFrench had converted a large liner as ahospital ship.

The Egyptian casualties were much moredifficult to assess at the time since the civilianadministration had broken down and norecords of dead or wounded were available.Neither was it possible to distinguish betweenmilitary casualties who had abandoned theiruniforms, and civilians, who were killed orwounded with arms in their hands.

The damage to property was mainly confinedto buildings along the sea front, the burnt outportion of shanty town, the block near theGovernorate and NAVY HOUSE, both of whichhad been attacked from the air with rockets.Damage to the main town was remarkablyslight.

The subject of Egyptian casualties anddamage to property has since been thoroughlyinvestigated, first by Sir Walter MONCKTON andthen by Sir Edwin HERBERT, whose findingshave been published in a Government WhitePaper.

The situation in PORT SAID on November8th was then as follows: —

Tactical Headquarters of the Joint TaskForce was in HMS TYNE moored alongside theWestern breakwater. 3 Commando Brigadetogether with 6 Royal Tank Regiment and3 Field Squadron RE were engaged in clear-ing up the Northern part of the town. PORTFUAD was occupied by the French. Onebattalion of 16 Parachute Brigade was onGAMIL Airfield, the French Parachute battalionround the water works, and a British Para-chute battalion with a French element was atEL CAP. During the day a clash took placehere, either because the local Egyptian troopswere unaware of the Cease Fire or as an actof deliberate provocation.

From now onwards great efforts were madeto restore the administation of PORT SAID tonormal. The Egyptian administration wasbolstered up by our Civil Affairs Officers, fooddistribution was organised, public utilities suchas sewage and electric light were quicklyrepaired and the streets cleaned up. Fortu-nately the water works were intact, but a care-ful watch was kept on the level of the SWEET-WATER CANAL in case the Egyptian Army

chose to restrict the flow of water to PORTSAID. Arrangements were also made to accepta hospital train from CAIRO whose despatchwas organised through United Nationschannels.

High priority was given to salvage opera-tions and teams immediately started to inspectthe wrecks sunk by -the Egyptians. Therewere 21 of these in the harbour, far more thanair photographs had disclosed since many ofthem were completely submerged. Blockingof the harbour had been catered for in theplanning and two salvage ships, an ocean tugand four harbour itugs together with the neces-sary Clearance Diving Teams and HMSDALRYMPLE (wreck dispersal and surveyvessel) had been included in the assaultconvoy. The two salvage vessels enteredharbour on 7th November and by the 9thNovember a channel had .been marked throughthe iblockships. Further salvage vessels con-tinued to arrive over the next week, but it wasnot until 12th November that the first LST wasable to pass through the blockships and berthin the inner harbour. Search for obstructionswas extended down to EL CAP while consider-able progress was made in actual salvage workand a base was established on shore by 'thetime the main salvage force arrived.

On 9th November I was instructed that thepolicy of Her Majesty's Government and theFrench Government was to retain our hold inPORT SAID until the United Nations Force wasestablished there and that we should do so insufficient strength to insure against a breachof the Cease Fire.

The Allied Forces were to be redeployed asfollows:—

Naval ForcesTwo British and one French Carrier to

remain on station in the Eastern Mediter-ranean.

Ships for picket duties were to takestation off CYPRUS.

CYPRUSA minesweeping force, salvage and clear-

ance ships would remain until the CANALand its approaches were clear, a RED SEAelement being based on ADEN.

Land Forces<In PORT SAID the build-up of 3 Infantry

Division, less 1 Guards Brigade, was to becontinued until completed.

The French were to provide the equiva-lent of the one Brigade Group in PORTFUAD.

16 Parachute Brigade to be withdrawn tothe UNITED KINGDOM, less one battaliongroup in CYPRUS.

3 Commando Brigade was to return toMALTA.

3 Infantry Brigade from MALTA and1 Guards Brigade from the UNITED KING-DOM to reinforce CYPRUS.

Air ForcesOf the bomber force previously available

20 Valiants and 24 Canberras were to beheld in the UNITED KINGDOM at varyingdegrees of readiness. All shore based air-craft in the Mediterranean were to remainin position.

5336 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 SEPTEMBER, 1957

During the next few days 'the above planwas modified to the extent of retaining thepersonnel of 1 Guards Brigade and most ofthe artillery of 3 Infantry Division in theUNITED KINGDOM ready to fly out if required,while their vehicles and equipment were heldalready loaded at MALTA. Other units of thebuild up, mostly administration, were held inthe UNITED KINGDOM ready to be despatchedby air or sea should hostilities recommence.This was obviously only a temporary expedientuntil the situation became clearer.

Plans were also formulated to deal eitherwith a renewal of hostilities by EGYPT or anAllied evacuation. In the former case I in-tended to break out down the causeway andcapture ISMAILIA and the airfield at ABUSUEIR as a first step.

NINE

The United Nations Emergency ForceOn 13th November a team of United

Nations Observers who had sailed from HAIFAwere disembarked at PORT SAID and movedSouth .through our forward positions at ELCAP. United Nations Liaison Officers were alsoattached to Allied Force Headquarters and to2 Corps Headquarters.

Three days later the leading elements ofthe United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF)arrived by air at ABU SUEIR and shortly after-wards I was informed that it had been agreedto station one infantry company of this forcein PORT SAID. This company of Norwegiansarrived by train on 21 November and wasreceived with noisy demonstrations by theinhabitants. Early the next morning I wasinformed- that as a result of the arrival of theUnited Nations Force, one British battalionand one third of the French occupation forcewould be withdrawn. On 25 November GeneralBURNS met Lieutenant General STOCKWELLand myself in PORT SAID and we agreed toaccept ifurther United Nations troops in PORTSAID and that a company should be establishedbetween the Allies and the Egyptians at ELCAP.

With the arrival of the United Nations Emer-gency Force it now seemed that hostilities byeither side were out of the question and I there-fore informed the Chiefs of Staff that I couldmake certain reductions in the Allied sea, landand ak forces and still retain a balanced forcecapable of dealing with any likely eventuality.From the morale aspect there was now everyreason for sending as many troops as possible,particularly reservists, home for Christmas.

The next day I was officially informed thatHer Majesty's Government had agreed to thewithdrawal of Allied units from PORT SAIDas the United Nations Emergency Force be-came effective; I was therefore to plan on thisbasis although the question of dates had notyet been settled ; my plans need no longer pro-vide for a break out towards ISMAILIA, but onlyat preventing the Egyptians from movingtroops into PORT SATO until the latest practicaltime before our final embarkation.

From then onwards our thoughts were en-tirely concentrated on evacuation which initself raised many problems, the biggest beingthe fate of the Allied Salvage Fleet.

TEN

The EvacuationThe plan for the evacuation had to take the

following factors into consideration: —(i) The minimum period for the opera-

tion was 14 days although the final date ofembarkation had not been settled and theperiod might be prolonged by as much as4 days.

(ii) Egyptian troops were to be preventedfrom entering PORT SAID until the Alliedevacuation was complete.

(iii) Internal security would remain a com-mitment to the end.

(iv) A balanced force had to be main-tained to meet any emergency.

(v) French and British withdrawal plans•had to be synchronised, particularly as re-gards shipping arrangements.

(vi) The safety of our own troops had tobe secured during the final stages of em-barkation.Some indication of the task can be judged

from the number of men, vehicles and quan-tity of stores which were ashore on 1December: —

British FrenchMenVehicles

13,5002,200

6,000

8,5002,200

(includingtrailers

and motorcycles)

4,000Stores (in tons) ...

In addition to which a large number ofBritish personnel and Allied refugees had tobe evacuated.

The plan was phased so that on the finalday of embarkation the remaining British ele-ment would consist of 19 Infantry Brigademade up of 1 Royal Scots, 1 West Yorks andone squadron 6 Royal Tank Regiment. TheFrench element would consist of 1,500 men,and 200 vehicles including one squadron oflight tanks.

By 30 November a Danish Company hadrelieved 1 West Yorks at EL CAP and was in-stalled between Allied and Egyptian positions,facing outwards, an unusual military posturefrom which they were relieved a few dayslater by a company of Indian infantry. InPORT SAID a Jugoslav battalion had disem-barked and passed through our lines on theirway Southward and soon afterwards further.Danish, Swedish and Colombian contingentsarrived to swell the size of the United NationsEmergency Force Garrison. These units co-operated with British troops and Egyptianpolice in maintaining law and order.

During the whole period of occupation theEgyptians did their best to provoke incidentsin PORT SAID. A campaign of intimidationwas carried out to prevent Egyptians andforeign nationals from co-operating with theAllied authorities, shopkeepers were forced bythreats to keep their shops closed and subver-sive posters and leaflets appeared in the streets.Arms and ammunition were smuggled by boatacross LAKE MANSALA, bombs were thrown'at military vehicles and efforts made to ambushpatrols at .night. As a result curfews were

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 SEPTEMBER, 1957 5337

imposed, searches for arms were carried outwith productive results and a number ofEgyptians detained. Some further Alliedcasualties were also suffered including the kid-napping of a British Officer.

On 15 December provocation reached itspeak whti 17 separate incidents in which threeBritish and a number of Egyptians werewounded. A special cordon and search ofpart of ARAB TOWN was carried out duringwhich a quantity of arms was discovered andsome 300 Egyptians detained. During thefollowing night and the next day the Egyptiansintensified their efforts and in one ambush anofficer of the Royal Scots was killed.

The next stage in the withdrawal consistedof all British troops, who now numbered some7,000 with 600 vehicles, being concentrated inan inner perimeter preparatory to the finalstage of embarkation. This was carried outsmoothly and resulted in a cessation of furtherincidents.

On 13 December the final day of embarka-tion was fixed for 22 December but there wasstill no decision on the future of the AlliedSalvage Fleet. This continued to cause Vice-Admiral DuRNFORDnSLATER and myself theliveliest concern up to the very last minute.Not only was this .fleet carrying out its task ofclearing PORT SAID Harbour and the entranceto the CANAL with greatest efficiency but it wasextremely doubtful whether the United Nationswould be able to collect a comparable fleeteven after -prolonged delay.

It was very disappointing that in the end thebest agreement that could be reached was thata limited number of ships should remain underUnited Nations Flag after our final withdrawal.The fact .that the Egyptians had placed over40 obstructions in an International Waterwayseemed, when viewed from PORT SAID, to carrylittle weight with the United Nations.

One encouraging piece of news received on18 December was that the Egyptians hadagreed to hand over the British employees ofthe Suez Contractors who had been internedsince the start of operations. At that time itwas believed that Lieutenant MOORHOUSE, thekidnapped British officer, was still alive andthat he would also 'be handed over: unfortu-nately this proved to be untrue. The con-tractors duly arrived in PORT SAID on 21December and the next day they disembarkedin CYPRUS en route for ENGLAND. At the sametime all Egyptian prisoners of war anddetainees were handed over.

On 22 December, the final day of embarka-tion, all went smoothly and the last troopswere on board by 1710 hours GMT leavingPORT SAID in charge of the United NationsEmergency Force. By 1930 hours GMT thelast ship was clear of the harbour thus bringingthe operation to a close.

ELEVENACKNOWLEDGEMENTS1. Allied Command

I would like, firstly, to pay a tribute to allthe French forces engaged on this operation.In many ways they had a more difficult task

than had the British forces, perhaps mainlyadministratively.

But from my Deputy, Admiral BARJOT andhis three Land, Naval and Air Commanders,General BEAUFRE, Admiral LANCELOT andGeneral BROHON down to their experiencedparachutists, commandos, airmen and sailors,they displayed skill, comradeship and gallantryof the highest order.

Seldom before can such intricate operationshave taken iplace with more friendship andunderstanding at all levels.

2. British Commanders and StaffsThis operation demanded 'the hurried forma-

tion of new headquarters, new commandchannels and many unusal problems in whichall services and many civilians were concerned.

It is not possible to name the many hundredsof officers, and others in the Service Ministries,in all operational Headquarters and in theHeadquarters of the MIDDLE EAST, who didoutstanding work; ibut in particular I wouldpay a tribute to Lieutenant-GeneralSTOCKWELL. Land Task Force Commander,Vice Admiral DURNFORD-SLATER, who com-manded the Naval force, and Air MarshalBARNETT who commanded the Air Forces. Ofmy own staff Major General HOBBS and AirVice Marshal HUDLESTON did outstandingwork on the operational side, Major GeneralBUCKLE and Brigadier LUCAS on the adminis-trative side and Vice Admiral RICHMOND asmy personal link in LONDON with the Chiefsof Staff.

PRESSIn modern days world public opinion is a

most important weapon of war. This was fullyappreciated at the outset by myself and my staffbut regrettably the short notice which we hadbefore the operation started resulted in short-comings in Press communications and arrange-ments which we never managed to rectify intime.

I am therefore most grateful to thosemembers of the Press, and especially thoseamong the accredited correspondents, becausethey had the most exasperating time, whoreported accurately and objectively and whowere cheerful and uncomplaining throughoutsome difficult and often dangerous days.THE BRITISH SAILOR, SOLDIER AND AIRMAN

Finally, in case (the events which followed theSUEZ operations should have obscured thestraight military success achieved I should liketo record my admiration and gratitude to thesailors, (soldiers and airmen who achieved allthe military objectives given to them.

The skill and gallantry required, particularlyof parachutists, commandos and pilots wasequal to that demanded in any operation ofwar and it is they more than anyone else whodeserve praise.

(Signed) CHARLES KEIGHTLEY, General,Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces.

10th June, 1957.

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