38098 4847

SUPPLEMENTTO

The London GazetteOf TUESDAY, the itfh of OCTOBER, 1947

byRegistered as a newspaper

THURSDAY, 16 OCTOBER, 1947

SINKING OF THE GERMAN BATTLESHIPBISMARCK ON 27™ MAY, 1941.

The following Despatch was submitted to theLords Commissioners of the Admiralty on the$th July, 1941, by Admiral Sir JOHN C.TOVEY, K.C.B., D.S.O., Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet.

Home Fleet,. 3th July, 1941.

Be pleased to lay before the Lords Commis-sioners of the Admiralty the following despatchcovering the operations leading to the sinkingof the German battleship BISMARCK onTuesday, 27th May, 1941. All times are zoneminus 2.

First Reports of Enemy.2. In the second week of May an unusual

amount of German air reconnaissance betweenJan Mayen Island and Greenland was noticed.It seemed possible that the object of this recon-naissance was to locate the ice-limits eitherwith a view to an attack on Jan Mayen Island,or to assist some ship to break in or out ofthe North Sea, through the Denmark Strait.On i4th May, accordingly, I asked the FlagOfficer-in-Charge, Iceland, for a report of theice conditions round Jan Mayen Island. Thereport showed that the approach was possibleonly from between south and south-west, withice blocking all other directions. Reports oftroop movements in Norway, a false alarm ofan air invasion of Iceland and an air reconnais-sance of Scapa Flow all continued to direct myattention towards the Denmark Strait; and oni8th May I instructed SUFFOLK, who was enpatrol, to keep a special watch on the passagein both directions close to the ice. The Rear-Admiral Com'manding, First Cruiser Squadron,in H.M.S. NORFOLK, sailed from Hvalfiordthe next day and relieved SUFFOLK, who1

returned to- Hvalfiord to refuel.

3. Early on 2ist May a report was receivedof ii merchant vessels and. 2 heavily-screenedlarge warships -northbound in the Kattegat theday before. Later in the day the warshipswere located at Bergen and identified from air

• photographs as one Bismarck class battleshipand one Hipper class cruiser. There were in-dications that these two were contemplating araid on the ocean trade routes (Admiraltymessage 1828/2ist May) though, if this were so,it seemed unlikely that they would stop at aplace so convenient for air reconnaissance asBergen. Two other .pointers were a report (un-reliable) of a U-boat, north of Iceland, and anattack 'by a German aircraft on ThorshavenW/T station.

4. The following dispositions were made: —(a] HOOD (Captain Ralph Kerr, C.B.E.),

flying the flag of Vice-Admiral Lancelot E.Holland, C.B., Vice-Admiral Commanding,Battle Cruiser Squadron, and PRINCE OF•WALES (Captain John C. Leach, M.V.O.),screened by ELECTJRA (Commander CecilW. May), ANTHONY (Lieutenant-Com-mander John M. Hodges), ECHO(Lieutenant-Commander Cecil H. de B.Newby), ICARUS (Lieutenant-Commander

.Colin D. Maud, D.S.C.), ACHATES(Lieutenant-Commander Viscount Jocelyn),and ANTELOiPE (Lieutenant-CommanderRoger B. N. Hicks, D.S.O.),. were sailed fromScapa to1 Hvalfiord.

(&) BIRMINGHAM (Captain AlexanderC. G. Madden) and MANCHESTER(Captain Herbert A. Packer), on patrol inthe Iceland-Faeroes .passage, were orderedto fuel at Skaalefjord and resume patrol.

(c) SUFFOLK (Captain Robert M. Ellis),w.ho had just arrived at Hvalfiord after beingrelieved by NORFOLK (Captain Alfred J. L.Phillips), flying the flag of ^Rear-AdmiralWilliam F. Wake-Walker, ' C.B., O.B.E.,lRear-Admiral Commanding, First Cruiser

4848 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 16 OCTOBER, 1947

Squadron, in the Denmark Strait, wasordered to rejoin the Rear-Admjjal Comman-ding, First Cruiser Squadron, after complet-ing with fuel. In -order to conserve fuel, thismovement was deferred, SUFFOLK beingsailed to arrive on patrol just before theearliest possible time of arrival of the enemy.

{d) ARETHUSA (Captain Alex C.Chapman), who was due at Reykjavik 'Withthe Vice-Admiral Commanding, Orkneysand Shetlands, on a visit of inspection toIceland, was ordered to remain at Hvalfiordat the disposal of the Rear-Admiral Com-manding, First Cruiser Squadron.

(e) KING GEORGE V (Captain Wilfrid R.Patterson, C.V.O.), flying the,flag of theCommander-in-Chief, Home Fleet,GALATEA (Captain Edward W. B. Sim),flying the flag of Rear-Admiral Alban T. B.Curteis, C.B., Rear-Admiral Commanding,Second Cruiser Squadron, AURORA(Captain William G. Agnew), KENYA(Captain Michael M. Denny, C.B.),NEPTUNE (Captain Rory C. O'Conor),and the remaining three Home Fleetdestroyers ACTIVE (Lieutenant-CommanderMichael W. Tomkinson), PUNJABI (Com-mander Stuart A. Buss, M.V.O.), andNESTOR (Commander' Conrad B. Alers-Hankey, iD.S.C.), were brought to shortnotice at .Scapa. INGLEFIELD (CaptainPercy Todd, D.S.O.; Captain (D), ThirdDestroyer Flotilla) and INTREPID (Com-mander Roderick C. Gordon, D.S.O'.) arrivedon 22nd May and joined this force, as didH'ERMIO^NE (Captain Geoffrey N. Oliver)on completing the repair of her fourth turret.

(/) The sailing of VICTORIOUS (CaptainHenry C. Bovell) and REPULSE (CaptainWilliam G. Tennant, C.B., M.V.O.) in Con-voy W.S. 8B was cancelled by the Admiraltyand they were placed at the disposal of theCommander - in - Chief, Home Fleet.VICTORIOUS was already at Scapa andREPULSE was ordered to sail from the Clydeto join.

(g) The submarine MINERVE (Lieutenantde Vaisseau P. M. Sommeville) on patrol offSouth West Norway wias m'oved to thevicinity of position 61° 53' N. 3° 15' E.', andthe P.3i (Lieutenant John B. de B. Kershaw)was sailed from .Scapa to patrol west ofStadtlandet.

(h) A 'bombing attack by Royal Air Forceaircraft was .arranged for the dark hoursand a reconnaissance of the coast fromTrondheim to Kristiansand South for firstlight on 22nd May. Neither of these wasable to1 establish definitely whether the enemywas still at Bergen, owing to the fog and lowcloud over the Norwegian coast, but someof the bombers attacked ships, in harbour.

(*) The Admiralty transferred 828 Squad-> ron of Albacores to Sumbuorgh, to attack the

enemy at Bergen. I had hoped to embarkthem in VICTORIOUS in place of herFulmars, but when it became known that theenemy had sailed, it was too late to do so.'

5. The lack of further news about the enemy'smovements was disturbing; and the need wasfelt of an air patrol similar to "Sentinel"(since established) across the route betweenNorwegian waters and the Northern - Straits to

report if the enemy left. Here, too, weatherconditions were bad, with large stretches ofifog, but it would have been possible with theaid of A.S.V.* to maintain some sort ofwatch, f

6. This state of uncertainty continued untilthe evening of 22nd May, when the Command-ing Officer, R.N. Air Station, Hatston (CaptainHenry L. St.J. Fancourt), on his own initiative,despatched an aircraft to try to break throughthe fog belt to the Norwegian coast. This air-craft carried Commander Geoffrey A.Rotherham, O.B.E., the executive officer ofthe station and a Naval observer with muchexperience, and was piloted by Lieutenant (A)Noel E. Goddard, R.N.V.R. Flying almost atsurface level, .they succeeded in penetratingto the fiords and carried out a search of theposition where the enemy ships had been photo-graphed. Finding nothing there, they examinedBergen harbour, under heavy fire, andreported that the ships had sailed. This skilfuland determined reconnaissance is deserving ofthe highest .praise, as is .the initiative of CaptainFancourt in ordering it. ^

3D7. The report of the departure of the war-

ships and convoy reached me at 2000 on 22ndMay and, in view of the qualifications of theaircraft crew, I had no hesitation in acceptingit. There seemed to be four possible explana-tions of the enemy's intentions:—< •

(a) The convoy (might contain importantmilitary stores for Northern Norway andhave gone on up the Leads. Movements oftroops to 'Kirkenes (had 'been reported forsSJne weeks.• (&) The convoy might contain a .raiding

force bound for Iceland, possibly with a viewto capturing an aerodrome for operationsagainst Reykjav^ and Hvalfiord.

(c) The battleship and cruiser might betrying to break out on to the trade routes.This theory had the support of Admiraltyintelligence. If it were correct, the furtherquestion arose of which passage the enemywould select. Such information as was avail-able suggested that on all previous occasionsthe Denmark Strait route had ^been taken,and this was therefore considered the mostlikely; but the passages between Iceland andScotland could not be ruled out, especiallyin view of the enemy's stop at Bergen.

(d\ The battleship and cruiser might havecovered an important convoy over thedangerous sea passage as far as the InnerLeads, and might now be returning to theBaltic.

8. The third possible move carried the greatermenace to our interests and dispositions weretherefore made to meet it. These dispositionsalso gave a reasonable possibility of interfering,before it was too late, with any attemptedlanding in Iceland.

(a) SUFFOLK was sailed to join the Rear-Admiral Commanding, First CruiserSquadron, in the Denmark Strait.

Admiralty footnotes:—* A.S.V.—radar equipment in aircraft.f At the request of the Admiralty, Coastal Com-

mand carried out the more southerly air patrols atthis time and there were insufficient A.S.V. aircraftleft to fly any further patrols.

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 16 OCTOBER, 1947 4849

(b) ARETHUSA was sailed to join MAN-CHESTER and BIRMINGHAM in the Ice-land-Faeroes passage. These ships were dis-posed 'by MANCHESTER in equal areasbetween 61° N. 10° 30' W., and 64° N.15° W. Five trawlers were on their normalpatrol west of these areas.

(c) The Vice-Admiral Commanding, BattleCruiser Squadron, with this force then onpassage to Hvalfiord, was instructed to coverthe patrols in the Denmark Strait and theIceland-Faeroes passage, operating north of62° N.

(d) KING GEORGE V, VICTORIOUS,GALATEA, AURORA, KENYA, HER-MIONE and seven destroyers sailed fromScapa at 2245 to cover the passages, operat-ing south of 62° N. LANCE (Lieutenant-Commander Ralph W. F. Northcott) wascompelled to return to Scapa with boilertrouble, but REPULSE and three destroyersof the Western Approaches Command joinednorth-west of the Butt of Lewis on the fore-noon of 23rd May. I had intended to detachtwo cruisers to patrol the Faeroes-Shetlandspassage, but I finally decided to keep all fourin company with one.

(e) Air reconnaissance of all the passagesbetween Greenland and the Orkneys and ofthe Norwegian coast was asked for, as well-as reconnaissance of forces approaching Ice-land. An additional air patrol line about260 miles west of the Iceland-Faeroes pas-sage was also established by the AdmiralCommanding Western Approaches.

9. It was desirable that the cruiser patrolsin the passages, and the heavy ships a§ well,should be as nearly complete with fuel as pos-sible when, the BISMARCK was located. Theproblem -involved in ensuring this, during thelong period between her location at Bergen andthe report of her departure, was not an easy one.If the BISMARCK had chosen the Iceland-Faeroes passage, the cruisers which were sentto refuel at Skaalefjord would only just havebeen in time to intercept her when they resumedtheir patrol. The force in company with mewas likewise sailed at the latest possiblemoment, for it was obvious that fuel wouldbecome a vital factor before the operation wascompleted.

10. The battlefleet proceeded to the north-westward until reaching latitude 60° N., farenough north to 'be in a position to deal withan attack on Iceland or a possible break back,and then steered west. There had been aninterval of 29 hours between the time the enemywas 1'ast seen at Bergen and the time they^werefound to have left, so no accurate estimationof their " furthest on " position could be made;but the time of their first sighting by SUFFOLKshowed later that they must have sailed on theevening of 2ist May, soon after they had beenphotographed' at Bergen and long before theirdeparture was discovered.

First Sighting.11. The air patrols arranged for 23rd May

were seriously depleted by weather conditions.Two sorties were carried out in the Iceland-Faeroes gap, the more westerly one backing itup was maintained only from 1300 to 1700,while the Denmark Strait patrol did not fly atall, though I did not learn of this until later.

A 2

12. The Rear-Admiral Commanding, FirstCruiser Sqfladron, had issued the followingsignalled instructions to NORFOLK andSUFFOLK:—

" SUFFOLK is to patrol within R.D.F.*distance of tife ice-edge on line running north-east and south-west. Southern end of 3 hourbeat to be on line 310° from Staalbierg Huk.The time at southern end to be at 2200 andevery .6 hours thereafter. When clear inshoreNORFOLK will patrol about 15 miles abeamof you. When thick inshore NORFOLK willpatrol to cover inshore passage. NORFOLKwill make contact with you at 13006/24thMay in position 66° 45' N. 26° W. to checkposition. Investigate ice up to minefield onparting company to-day Friday/'

t13. On the afternoon of 23rd May the atmo-

spheric conditions in the Denmark Strait wereunusual, being clear over and close to the ice,and misty between the ice and the land.SUFFOLK took advantage of this to movefurther to the eastward across the top of theminefield than would otherwise have beenprudent and kept close to the edge of the mistso as to have cover handy if the BISMARCKwere sighted at close range. NORFOLKpatrolled 15 miles on the beam of SUFFOLK'Spatrol.

14. Shortly after turning back to the south-westward on completing her investigation ofthe ice-edge, SUFFOLK at 1922 sighted theBISMARCK, followed by the PRINZ EUGEN,7 miles on the starboard quarter, steaming thesame course as herself. SUFFOLK made anenemy report, increased to full speed andaltered to 150° to take cover in the mist and tomake for the gap in the minefield if unable toround its northern edge. She was able, how-ever, to keep under cover and to follow theBISMARCK round, the minefield, maintainingtouch by R.D.F. Her alert look-out and theintelligent use made of the peculiar weatherconditions enabled SUFFOLK, after this shortrange sighting, to avoid being engaged. At2028 she sighted the enemy again, reportedthem and once more retired into the mist. Atthe same time, NORFOLK, who had mean-while been closing, also made contact, this timeat a range of 6 miles. The BISMARCK openedfire, but NORFOLK retired safely under asmoke screen, though some salvos fell closeenough to throw splinters on board.

15. This report from NORFOLK (2032/23rdMay) was the first intimation that I receivedof the enemy being sighted, as none ofSUFFOLK'S reports up to date had been re-ceived in the battleflee't. The two cruisers pro-ceeded to shadow with great skill in very diffi-cult conditions. There were rain storms, snowstorms, ice floes and mirage effects, which occa-sionally deceived SUFFOLK into thinking thatthe enemy had closed to very short range.SUFFOLK took up a position on the starboardquarter of the enemy within R.D.F. range ofthe edge of the ice, to ensure that the enemycould not turn back unseen between her andthe ice; NORFOLK on the port quarter coveredany possible turn to the southward. The Rear-Admiral Commanding, First Cruiser Squadron,reports that a third, smaller, ship was thought

Admiralty footnote:—* R.D.F.—radar.

4850 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 16 OCTOBER, 1947

to be present; but SUFFOLK never saw thisship and in view of her position iit^is^onsideredthat its presence is not established. ,It is curious,however, that PRINCE OF WALES also ob-tained 3 echoes soon after meeting the enemy.It is possible that two separate R.D.F. echoeswere being received from the .BISMARCK.Aircraft from Iceland were also sent to shadow,and one made a report of enemy's course andspeed to NORFOLK.

Battle Cruiser Force.16. HOOD and PRINCE OF WALES and

their screen' were meanwhile closing at highspeed. They arrived in the vicinity of theenemy sooner than I had expected. At 0205 theVice-Admiral Commanding, Battle CruiserSquadron turned to a course nearly parallel tothat of the enemy to wait for the relative posi-tions to become clear and for daylight. Theopposing forces were in close proximity at thistime, and it is possible that the ship sighted by-NORFOLK at 0229 was the PRINCE OFWALES. During the rest of the night PRINCEOF WALES obtained frequent D/F* bearingsof NORFOLK and SUFFOLK and passed them

. in to the Vice-Admiral Commanding, BattleCruiser Sauadron. At 0340 HOOD1 and.PRINCE OF WALES increased to 28 knotsand altered in to make contact.,

17. It was-the intention of the Vice-Admiral.'Commanding, Battle Cruiser Squadron, thatHOOD and PRINCE OF WALES should

-engage the BISMARCK, leaving the PRINZEUGEN to the cruisers, but the Rear-AdmiralCommanding, First Cruiser Squadron, was notaware that the battle-cruiser force was so near;NORFOLK and SUFFOLK, therefore, shadow-ing from the eastward and northward

-respectively at -a range of about 15 miles,were not in a position to engage the PRINZEUGEN who was now stationed ahead of the,BISMARCK on a course of 240^.

18. HOOD and PRINCE OF WALES sightedthe enemy at 0535 from a direction just beforehis beam and came into action at 0553 steeringto close the range as fast as possible. All threeships opened fire practically simultaneously ata ran'ge of about 25,000 yards. The shootingof both the HOOD and the BISMARCK wasexcellent from the start and both scored hitsalmost at once. The BISMARCK's second orthird salvo started a fire in HOOD in thevicinity of -the port after 4-inch mounting.This fire spread rapidly and, at 0600, just afterthe ships had turned together to open ' A 'arcs, f HOOD was straddled again: there was ahuge explosion between the after funnel and themainmast and the ship sank in 3 or 4 minutes.She 'had fired only 5 or 6 salvos. The loss by

'one unlucky hit of this famous ,ship with Vice-Admiral Lancelot Ernest Holland, C.B.,Captain Ralph/Kerr, C.B.E., and her fine com-pany, was a grievous blow.

19. PRINCE OF WALES had started offwell for so new and unpractised a ship andhad • straddled with her sixth salvo. She hadbeen engaging the BISMARCK, while herselfbeing engaged by the PRINZ EUGEN. After

' Admiralty footnotes'—* D/F—direction finding.t ' A ' arcs are the arcs on which all guns of a

ship's main armament will bear; thus allowing themto fire simultaneously' at the enemy.

emptying her aircraft in preparation for a nightencounter, she had been unable to refuel it intime to fly off before contact was made. It wasjust about to be catapulted when it was hit bysplinters and had to b'e jettisoned. As soon asHOOD had been disposed of, the BISMARCKshifted her main .and .secondary armament firequickly and accurately on to the PRINCE OFWALES. The range was now about 18,000yards and PRINCE OF WALES' starboard5.25-inch battery -had also come into action.Within a very few minutes she was hit by four15-inch and three smaller, probably 8-inchshells; her compass platform was* damaged andmost of the people on it killed or wounded;both forward H.A. Directors and the starboardafter one were out of action; one four-gunnedturret had jammed and the ship, was holedunderwater aft. The Rear-Admiral Command-ing, First Cruiser Squadron, reports thatPRINCE OF WALES' salvos were now fallingshort and had a very large spread. The Com-manding Officer considered it expedienttemporarily to break off the action and, at0613, turned away under smoke. The range

-on ceasing fire was 14,600 yards.

20. SUFFOLK reported that the BISMARCKhad suffered three hits, but neither the Rear-Admiral Commanding, First Cruiser Squadron,noi- PRINCE OF WALES -had been able toobserve any hits for certain, though blacksmoke had been seen at times. Her fire at anyrate was still very accurate. (It is now knownthat she did probably suffer three hits, one ofwhich caused her to leave an oil track and mayhave had . a considerable effect on her

, endurance.)

21. The Rear-Admiral Commanding, FirstCruiser Squadron, ordered the destroyers in thearea to search for survivors of the HOOD andtold PRINCE OF WALES to remain in com-pany with him and maintain her best speed.By 0720 she had cleared away most of thedebris on the bridge, and resumed conning fromthe compass platform; two guns of ' Y ' turretwere again in action and'her best speed had been^reported as 27 knots.

Decision to Break Off the Action.22. The Commanding Officer of the PRINCE

OF WALES in this report says: —" Some explanation remains to be made

as to my decision to' break off the engage-ment after the sinking of H.M.S. HOOD—a decision which clearly invites most criticalexamination. Prior to the disaster to HOODI felt confident that together we could dealadequately with the BISMARCK and her'consort. The sinking of the HOOD obviouslychanged the immediate situation, and .tihere•were three 'further considerations requiringto be weighed up, of which the first two hadbeen in my mind before action was joined,namely."—

(a) The practical1 certainty that owingto mechanical ' teething troubles ' a fulloutput from the main armament was not tobe expected.

(b) The working tip of the ship aftercommissioning had only just reached astage'where I had felt able to report tothe Commander-ki'-Chief, Home Fleet, thatI considered her reasonably fit to 'take partin service operations. This was the first

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 16 OCTOBER, 1947 4851

occasion on which, she had o!one so. Fromthe gunnery point of view/the personnelwas immensely keen and well drilled, butinexperienced.

(c) The ilikelihood of a decisive con-centration being effected at a later stage.In all the circumstances I did not consider

it sound tactics to continue single-handed theengagement with two German ships, both ofwhom might be expected to be at the peak oftheir efficiency. Accordingly I turned awayand 'broke off the action pending a morefavourable opportunity."

23. The Rear-Admiral Commanding, FirstCruiser Squadron, in his report says: —

" At 1545 Admiralty signal 1445* 'had beenreceived. At that time I had no evidencethat the enemy's speed was in any wayreduced by damage and I did not considerit likely that he would fight or that we couldcatch him, as ihis policy was obviouslyevasion.

The question whether I should re-engagewith PRINCE OF WALES had been exercis-ing my mind for some time before the receiptof this signal. The factors to be consideredwere as follows:—In the first place, thestate of efficiency of 'PRINCE OF WALES.I had seen her forced out of action after10 minutes' engagement, at <fche end of which•her salvos were falling short and had a verylarge spread indeed. As a result of the actionshe was short of one gun and her bridge waswrecked. She was a brand new ship, withnew turrets in which mechanical 'breakdownshad occurred and were to be expected, apartfrom damage, and she had had a bare mini-mum period for working up. I had beenunable to observe for certain any ihits on theBISMARCK and her shooting had givenstriking proof of its efficiency. To put it ina nutshell, I did not and do not consider thatin iher then state of efficiency the PRINCEOF WALES was a match for theBISMARCK.

This, however, was in no way a decidingfactor. My object was the destruction of theBISMARCK and I knew that other forceswere on the vway to intercept her. I hadtherefore two -broad alternatives, one to en-sure that she was'intercepted by the Com-•mander-in-Qhief, the other to attempt herdestruction with my own force.

This second alternative involved my beingable to bring her to action and this requiredan excess of speed. I had no evidence that,with PRINCE OF WALES reduced to 27knots, I possessed it. If, however, theattempt had shown that we could overtake herI would have had to engage with the wholeforce and press the action to a range at whichthe 8-inch cruisers' fire would be effective—and could be spotted—namely 20,000 yardsor less.

In view of the relative efficiency of the twoheavy ships I was of the opinion that such an

Admiralty footnote-—* Admiralty signal 1445/24 asked the Rear-Admiral

Commanding, ist Cruiser Squadron, to state* —(i) the remaining percentage of the BISMARCK's

fighting efficiency;(ii) what ammunition she had expended;(iii) the reasons for her frequent alterations of

course;(iv) his intention as regards the PRINCE OF

WALES re-engaging.

action would almost certainly result asfollows. A gradual reduction ot PRINCE OFWALESe.fgunfire due to material failures anddamage, in return for which the BISMARCKwould receive some damage. That suchdamage, though it would affect her fightingefficiency, would also have any large effecton her speed I considered improbable, as ina modern well-protected ship the most thatcould be expected would be some loss ofdraught due to damaged funnels or fans, orwaterline damage forward or aft.

At the range to which the action must bepressed the cruisers might well be left to bearthe brunt of the BISMARCK's and PRINZEUGEN's fire and suffer a reduction of speeddue to hits in their large and unprotectedmachinery spaces or waterline. I should thenhave a damaged PRINCE OF WALES, andpossibly damaged cruisers, with which to tryand maintain touch with a BISMARCKdamaged but still capable of a high speed.

The alternative was to ensure her inter-ception by the Commander-in-Chief. This Ifelt I had good reason for thinking I couldachieve. At this time I was expecting theCommander-in-Chief to be able to make con-tact about oioo f on the 25th—before dark—and I saw no reason why our success so far inkeeping touch should not continue. Even ifwe had to wait till next day for the Com-mander-in-Chief, the conditions of darknesswere no more difficult than those of lowvisibility with which we had been able to dealby the use of R.D.F. and it would only bedark from 0200 to 0500."(fThis was due to a miscalculation. The

earliest the Commander-in-Chief could arrive,even if he forecast exactly the enemy's move-ments, was between 0600 and 0700/25th May.)

" The decision was not an easy one. Iappreciated that my force was superior innumber and the weight of the moral factorsinvolved. I could not feel, however, thatPRINCE OF WALES in her then state ofefficiency was worth her face value or thatmy extra cruiser would counterbalance herweakness. But for the probability of a T/B*attack from VICTORIOUS and interceptionby the Commander-in-Chief the situationwould have been fundamentally different, andany other course but to re-engage could nothave been considered.

As it was, however, the alternatives couldbe summed up as follows: —

(i) To engage with my whole force; thishad possibilities varying from the highlyproblematical result of the destruction ofthe enemy, through the gamut of a longstern chase at high speed which would makeinterception by the Commander-in-Chiefimpossible, to that of being driven off withloss of speed and inability to keep touch.

(ii) Against this was the alternative ofcontinuing to keep touch, with the possi-bility that we might fail to do so, thoughwith PRINCE OF WALES in support Ihad no fear of being driven off.

„ Weighing these alternatives, I chose thelatter. This did not preclude the possibilityof attacking the enemy, but in so doing myobject must be to ensure interception rather

Admiralty footnote:—* T/B—Torpedo/Bomber aircraft.

4852 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 16 OCTOBER, 1947

than attempt his destruction, and on thispolicy I acted.

Their Lordships' signal had enquired my"intentions'" as regards re-engaging withPRINCE OF WALES. I was careful in myreply to slate my " opinions " and not myintentions, and I was grateful that They leftthe matter to my judgment."

24. After full consideration of the facts, Iam of the opinion that this decision was justi-fied and correct. Some of the factors affectingit require emphasis. The PRINCE OFWALES, with many of the contractor's work-men still on board, had joined the Fleet on25th March. It was not till 27th April thatthe last of her turrets could be accepted fromthe contractors and that practice drills -with thewhole main armament could be started.Captain Leach had been able to report on i7thMay, shortly before the Fleet sailed for thisoperation, that he considered his ship fit tooperate; but neither he nor I interpreted thatreport as implying that she was fully worked up.Her turrets, of a new and untried model, wereknown to be liable to teething troubles andcould already be seen to be suffering them.The effects of all this on her gunnery had been,witnessed by the Rear-Admiral Commanding,First Cruiser Squadron, and he knew, in addi-tion, that her bridge was seriously damaged,that she had taken in 400 tons of water aftand could not exceed 27 knots. The BIS-MARCK'and PRINZ EUGEN, on the otherhand, after working up for many months underideal conditions in the Baltic, had given evi-dence of a ve~ry high degree of efficiency: theBISMARCK had been hit, but the Rear-Admiral Commanding, First Cruiser Squadron,could see no sign of damage. - > ^

25. In these circumstances, the senior officeron the spot was clearly justified in his con-clusion that he was more likely to achieve hisobject of ensuring the enemy's destruction bykeeping touch until the approaching reinforce-ments should arrive. If these powerful rein-forcements had not been In the vicinity, theproblem would, of course, have been a differentone.

26. At 1445 the Admiralty asked the Rear-Admiral Commanding, First Cruiser Squadron,to report on the percentage fighting efficiency .ofthe BISMARCK and requested his intentionsas regards PRINCE OF WALES re-engaging.The Rear-Admiral 'Commanding, First CruiserSquadron, replied that the BISMARCK'sefficiency was uncertain but high, and-that heconsidered that PRINCE OF WALES " shouldnot re-engage until other heavy ships are in con-tact unless interception fails. Doubtful 'if shehas speed to force action-." From his reply Iassumed that the Rear-Admiral Commanding,First Cruiser Squadron, would not force actionunless the situation changed materially, or in-structions were received either, from theAdmiralty or myself. I had complete confidencein Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker's judgment, nordid I wish, the enemy to be forced' away to- thewestward.

Shadowing during Daylight on zqth May.27. After the action had 'been broken off,

the three ships continued to shadow. Theenemy proceeded on a south-westerly course,with minor alterations, until 1240. They triedhard, by frequent alterations of course >and

speed, to throw off- the shadowers; and therapid variations of visibility, between two andseventeen. miles, were of great assistance tothem; but their efforts were without success.SUFFOLK, using, her R.D.F. in a masterlymanner to overcome the difficulties of varyingvisibility, shadowed from the starboard quarterto cover any attempt to break back along theice; NORFOLK, with PRINCE OF WALES incompany, kept out on the port quarter to ensurethe detection of any alteration to the southward.About 1240 the enemy seem to have abandonedhope of evasion by daylight, for they turnedsouth, presumably to gain sea-room for anotherattempt by night, and' reduced to 24 knots.

Movements of the Battlefleet.28. At the time the first report of the sight-

ing of the enemy was received by me, KINGGEORGE V, with REPULSE, VICTORIOUS, .GALATEA, AURORA, KENYA, HERMIONEand nine destroyers in company, was inapproximate position 60° 20' N. 13° W. I hadalways thought the enemy, when breaking out,might have long distance aircraft reconnoitringahead of them, to give warning of any of ourforces in a position to intercept; if either orboth of our capital ship forces were reported,the enemy might turn back through the Den-mark Strait or shape course and speed to avoidcontact. I therefore altered 'course to 280°and. increased to 27 knots with the idea ofreaching a position from which I could inter-cept the enemy to the eastward of the DenmarkStrait, and at the same time be able to rein-force HOOD and PRINCE OF WALES if theywere able to bring him to action and reduce his.speed, or force him in my direction. As moreinformation' was received, it became clear thatthe enemy intended to continue his attempt tobreak out; though there was still the chancethat he would turn back when he encounteredHOOD and PRINCE of WALES or, if HOODand PRINCE OF WALES were to the west-ward of him when contact was made, he mightendeavour to break to the south or south-eastward.

29. The sinking of the HOOD and thedamage to PRINCE OF WALES made it un-likely that the enemy wctild fife* forced to turnback, and the best hope lay for interception bymy force, though tin's would 'riot become pos-sible unless he reduced his speed. Course wasaltered accordingly to 260°, and later to 240°.Reports suggested that the enemy was keepinga few miles off the edge of the ice, possiblyin the hope of finding thick weather. From mypoint of view the greatest danger lay in hishugging the coast of Greenland, and thenmaking his way to the westward, where Isuspected he might have an oiler: for, if hecould refuel, he would be able to use higherspeeds than KING GEORGE V could main-tain and so get away.

30. The enemy's alteration to the southwardand his reduction of speed were a great relief,although there seemed a good chance that hewas leading our forces into a concentration ofU-boats. It suggested that he did not knowof my force and it made interception possible.

31. There was still a grave risk of his gettingaway by sheer speed, and though I knew thelack of experience of the crews of the aircraftin VICTORIOUS and of VICTORIOUS's own

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 16 OCTOBER, 1947 4853

officers and ship's company, I decided I mustcall upon their aid in an endeavour to reducethe BISMARCK's speed and to ensure mybeing able to bring her to action with KINGGEORGE V and REP'ULSE—a call they re-sponded to with such splendid gallantry andsuccess.

32. I therefore detached the Rear-AdmiralCommanding, Second! Cruiser Squadron, at1509 with VICTORIOUS and the four cruiserswith instructions to steer the best course to getwithin 100 miles of the enemy and deliver aT/B attack. Though VICTORIOUS wouldbe of great value in company with me the nextmorning to locate the enemy if they escapedduring the night, a reduction of speed was themore important object and could only beachieved by detaching her at this stage.

33. KING GEORGE V and REPULSEsteered an intercepting course with the objectof bringing the enemy to action soon after sun-rise with the sun low behind us. The situationat this time was as follows: —

(a) The enemy appeared to1 have settleddown to a-course of 180° at about 22-24knots. They were, for no apparent reason,zig-zagging. They were -shadowed bySUFFOLK from astern and by PRINCE OFWALES and NORFOLK from the portquarter. The BISMARCK had suffered somedamage but retained her fighting efficiency,though an aircraft had reported that shewas leaving an oil wake. Their reducedspeed was probably dictated by the needfor economy of fuel and to afford an oppor-tunity of breaking contact (by an increaseof speed after dark. PRINCE OF WALEShad two guns out of action and considerabledamage to her bridge.

(6) KING GEORGE V and REPULSEwere closing from the eastward and would,if the enemy held their cotirse, make con-tact about 0830, half an hour after sunrise.•REPULSE was short of fuel, but had justenough .to fight a short action and thenreach Newfoundland. By midnight all des-troyers had lefLfor Reykjavik to fuel.

(c) R0DNFJQ (Captain Frederick H. G.Dairy mple-Hansilton), with three destroyers,was approaching from "fche south-eastwardand would join about 1000.

(d) RAMILLIES '(Captain Arthur D.Read) was approaching from the south,steering to get to the westward of the enemy,and would make contact about noo.

Attack by Aircraft of VICTORIOUS.34. The Rear-Admiral Commanding, Second

Cruiser Squadron, with his force proceeded at28 knots on the course which would bring himsoonest within 100 miles. He hoped to get nearenough to launch the attack by 2100, but ashort engagement with PRINCE OF WALEScaused the enemy to make ground to the west-ward; and. it became apparent thatVICTORIOUS could not be within TOO milesof them before 2300. The Rear-Admiral Com-manding. Second Cruiser Squadron, thereforeordered the striking1 force to be flown off at2200, some 120 miles from the objective.

35. VICTORIOUS had only just commis-sioned. She was about to carry a large consign-ment of crated Hurricanes to Gibraltar, there

to be assembled and flown to Malta, when shewas put under my command for this operation.The only operational aircraft she had on board*were, nine Swordfish of 825 and six Fulmarsof 802 Squadron. She had only had a weekto work up and the Fulmar crews were farfrom fully trained. The Commanding Officerhad decided that nothing less than the whole of825 Squadron could be expected to produceany result in a torpedo attack. He realisedthat the Fulmars were far from ideal for shadow-ing, but decided to use them to maintain touch,in the hope of being able to1 launch anothertorpedo attack in the morning.

36. The nine Swordfish were flown off at2210, followed at 2300 by three Fulmars andat oioo by two more as reliefs. The weatherwas showery with squalls; wind north-westerlyfresh; visibility good except during shoiwers.Sunset was at 0052.

37. 825 Squadron, by very good navigationand with the assistance of the A.S.V. locatedthe IBISMARCK at 2330 and altered to thesouthward with the object of making theirattack from ahead. The cloud was increasingand they lost touch, but after circling roundfor some time located NORFOLK and PRINCEOF WALES and were re-directed toy the for-mer. A few minutes later the A.S.V. gearagain indicated a ship and the squadron brokecloud to deliver their attack, only to find them-selves over a United States coastguard cutter.The BISMARCK was six miles away and,observing this incident, opened H.A. barragefire, keeping it up throughout the attack. Eightaircraft got in then: attacks, the ninth losingtouch in a cloud layer and failing to find- thetarget. At least one hit was obtained.

3'8. This attack, by a squadron so lately em-barked in a new carrier in unfavourable weatherconditions, was magnificently carried out andreflects the greatest credit on all concerned.There can ibe little doubt that the hit was largelyresponsible for the BISMARCK being finallybrought to action and sunk.* The value ofA.S.V. was once more demonstrated; without it,it is doubtful whether any attack would havebeen possible.

39. The. Fulmars, whose object was toshadow and to distract the enemy, were lesssuccessful. Only one of each group madecontact and these did not succeed in holdingthe enemy for long. The crews were-inex-perienced, some of the observers finding them-selves in a two-seater aircraft for the firsttime, with a wireless set tuned only on deckand no homing 'beacon. Night shadowing isa task which tries the most experienced ofcrews and it is not surprising in these difficultconditions that they failed to achieve it. Theutmost .gallantry was shown by the crews ofthese aircraft in their attempt. Two of theFulmars failed to return, but the crew ofone was rescued later by a merchant vessel.

Admiralty footnote:—* It is now known that the hit received in the

action with the HOOD about 0600 on May 24th andthe resulting loss of oil fuel caused 'Admiral Lutjensto decide at 0800/24 to make for the French coast.The torpedo hit by the VICTORIOUS at 0015/25 nodoubt confirmed him in this decision. The imme-diate and principal cause however of the BISMARCKbeing brought to action was the hit at 2105/26thMay by the aircraft of the ARK ROYAL, whichdemolished her rudder and left her out of control.

4854 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON -GAZETTE, 16 OCTOBER, 1947.

40. The Rear-Admiral Commanding, SecondCruiser Squadron, meanwhile, had been steam-

«ing towards the position of the -BISMARCK,to shorten the 'return journey of the aircraft.The homing jbeacpn' of VICTORIO'US: hadbroken down and the return of the strikingforce unfortunately coincided with'a rain squallround the ship. They missed" her in the dark-ness and it was necessary to home them byD/F on medium frequency and ito carry outan all-round sweep with a signal projector.It was with considerable relief that the Rear-Admiral'Commainding, Second Cruiser Squadron,sighted them at 0155, one hour after they weredue and uncomfortably close to the end oftheir endurance. The homing procedure wascontinued for ,the benefit of the missing Fulmarsuntil 0250 when the Rear-Admiral Command-ing, Second Cruiser Squadron, was regretfullycompelled to order VICTORIOUS to stop it.It was -by then quite dark and searchlightsweeps in waters close to the enemy, and whereattack by submarines had to be expected, weretoo hazardous. Course was set to close thelast reported position of the enemy, in prepara-tion for a search 'at dawn; this course was alsoconsidered to be the best calculated to avoidan encounter before daylight.

First Cruiser Squadron and PRINCE OFWALES.

41. Throughout the afternoon NORFOLK,SUFFOLK arid PRINCE OF WALES con-tinued to shadow. The enemy's alterations ofcourse ' to the southward and south-eastwardand their reduction of speed were all in ourfavour. The Rear-AdmiraL Commanding, FirstCruiser Squadron, endeavoured further to delaythem, and so to assist me to intercept, byengaging the enemy from astern: but the enemymust have made an alteration of course ctothe south-westward while the shadowing forcewas temporarily out of touch, for when hedid come within gun range at 1840, the Rear-Admiral Commanding, First Cruiser Squadron,'found himself still on the port quarter insteadof astern. A few salvos were exchanged atlong range, and the brief action had the un-desirable result of forcing the enemy furtherto the westward, away from, my force. Theunreliability .of PRINCE OF WALES', arma-ment was demonstrated once more, as two gunsagain went out of action.

• 42. The Rear-Admiral Commanding, FirstCruiser Squadron, considered the possibility ofworking to the westward of the enemy to force .them towards me; but tihe risk of losing touchaltogether was' too great and he continuedshadowing as before, instructing PRINCE OFWALES hot to open fire except in'response toenemy fire. : '•

43. Just when the torpedo attack by theaircraft of VICTORIOUS was developing, theshadowing ships were confused by an Americancoastguard cutter, which appeared on the bear-ing of the enemy, and touch was again tem-porarily lost. It was regained at^ons, but thelight was very bad and only two.salvos werefired. -

-., 44. By 0140 it was 'getting dark and SUF-FOLK was ordered to act independently1 andkeep " touch by R.D.F., thev: CommandingOfficer having-previpusly been instructed to.concentrate on the BISMARCK if. the enemy

should separate. Experience had suggestedthat the.R.D.F. of PRINCE OF WALES wasnot reliable; the.R.D.F. fitted in NORFOLKhad the disadvantage of working on limitedbow • bearings only, so , that she would losetouch at once if. forced to turn away. TheRear-Admiral Commanding, First Cruiser,Squadron, therefore, with NORFOLK andPRINCE OF WALES, maintained a positionin close support of SUFFOLK.Loss of Touch.

45. The loss of touch, when it came, wascaused primarily by over-confidence. TheR.D.F. had been giving such consistently goodresults and had been used so skilfully that ithad engendered a false sense of security. Theattention' of the Rear-Admiral Commanding,First Cruiser Squadron, had been drawn, bothby the Admiralty and by me, to the,.evidentdanger of U-boat attack, and he had Borderedthe ships in company to zig-zag. SUFFOLKwas shadowing from the extreme range of herinstrument, losing touch' on those parts of herzig-zag which took her furthest from .the enemy.The enemy altered sharply to starboard whileSUFFOLK was moving'to port, and, by thetime she got back, had gone. It is of interestthat "on both hej last two contacts at 0229 andat 0306, SUFFOLK detected two ships; it wouldappear that the PRINZ EUGEN was still incompany with the BISMARCK'.*Searck—Morning of 25^ May.

46. SUFFOLK searched towards the enemy'slast bearing until- it became certain that theyhad succeeded in evading and .then reportedthe fact (at 0401). The Commanding Officerdecided that it was essential first to "allow foran increase of speed, coupled 'with a smallalteration to starboard, since failure to do' -sonow could not subsequently be retrieved. Heacted accordingly. By noo his- curve of searchhad covered enemy courses up to 220°. TheRear-Admiral Commanding, First CruiserSquadron, informed me that the enemy hadprobably made a 90° turn to the west, or hadturned back and cut away to the eastwardunder the stern of -the shadowers. At 0620 hedetached PRINCE OF WALES to join me andhimself searched to the westward, north ofSUFFOLK, • tf

47. When I hearcl that the' enemy had suc-ceeded in breaking away from the shadowingforce, it seemed probable that they would eithermake for an oiler or they would make for adockyard. If the former, they would prob-ably steer north-west towards the Davis Strait,which offered an excellent. hiding place foran oiler, or southwards towards where an oilerwas suspected to be operating in about25° 30' N: 42° W. If they were making for adockyard1 port, they could steer north-east forthe North Sea or south-east for Brest, the'Straitsof Gibraltar" dr Dakar. In view of the limitedcapabilities of VICTORIOUS, I had insufficientforces to search all the possible courses of theenemy. I therefore decided to cover the pos-sibility that they were joining a tanker, for thesetwo ships, refuelled, at large in the Atlantic,would constitute a much more serious andimmediate menace to our interests than theywould, damaged, in a French or German port.Admiralty footnote-—

* It is now known that the PRINZ EUGEN partedcompany from the BISMARCK'at about 1814 on 24thMay.

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 16 OCTOBER, 1947 4855

48. The enemy's courses west of south werebeing covered by SUFFOLK and, to a lesserextent, by NORFOLK and PRINCE OFWALES. KING GEORGE V worked acrossto the south-westward to cover a southerlycourse, allowing for an increase of speed bythe enemy. Consideration was given to flyingoff- the Walrus from KING GEORGE V tosearch the perimeter astern of the ship and socover a south-easterly course of the enemy;but the swell was such that the sacrifice of theaircraft would almost certainly result, and Idid not wish to expose KING GEORGE V toU-boat attack whilst picking up the crew. Sub-sequent analysis shows that such a search mightpossibly have located the BISMARCK.

49. The Rear-Admiral Commanding, SecondCruiser Squadron, was ordered by signal toorganise an air and surface search, withVICTORIOUS and his four • cruisers, north-west of the last known position of the enemy.When I issued these instructions, I estimatedthat the Rear-Admiral Commanding, SecondCruiser Squadron, and VICTORIOUS werewell to the northward of this position; but inpoint of fact he had been steaming south athigh speed and was now close to it. It isprobable therefore that the air search carriedout did not extend.as far as the circle on whichthe enemy now was and would not have foundthem even if the aircraft had searched to theeastward, as the Rear-Admiral Commanding,Second Cruiser Squadron, and the CommandingOfficer of VICTORIOUS ' had originallyintended.

50. This completed the immediate search,leaving a sector between north and south-eastunwatched. The search was backed up to acertain extent by the ships which had beendetached by the Admiralty from various otherduties and which were approaching the scene.RODNEY recovered her screen, which -hadearlier been forced by bad weather to dropastern, and -took up an extremely well-chosen position on the route for the Bay ofBiscay. RAMILLIES patrolled to the south-ward of KING GEORGE V and PRINCE OFWALES. EDINBURGH (flying the flag ofCommodore Charles M. Blackman, D.S.O.,Commodore Commanding, Eighteenth CruiserSquadron), who had been patrolling off theBay of Biscay and -had been sent by theAdmiralty to act as relief shadower, was nearthe track for Gibraltar. In addition, somedegree of search was provided by REPULSE,whom I had been compelled to detach to New-foundland for fuel, and by LONDON (CaptainReginald M. Servaes, C.B.E.), who had beeninstructed by the Admiralty to search for anenemy tanker believed to be in the arearound 25°'30' N. 42° W. Force '.' H," some1,300 miles to the south-eastward, had beeninstructed by the Admiralty to steer to interceptthe BISMARCK from the southward.

51. The track of the BISMARCK as drawnon the attached strategical plot (see Plan, i) isprobably reasonably accurate. It shows hownarrowly she avoided contact with the variousBritish forces during her run east. She startedby crossing about 100 miles astern of KINGGEORGE V at 0800 on 25th May and thenpassed about 50 miles from RODNEY and 45miles from EDINBURGH. On the next day

she passed 85 miles under the stern of convoy ,W.S. 8Bg.and 25-30 miles ahead of theCaptain J(x)), Fourth Destroyer' Flotilla, whohad parted company with this convoy. It isunderstood that the Captain (D), FourthDestroyer Flotilla, had disposed the convoyescort to the westward of the convoy in 'thehope that the BISMARCK would be deflectedif she appeared steaming towards it.

52. At 1030 on 25th May, a series of D/Fbearings was received from the Admiralty whichindicated that the enemy was breaking backacross the Atlantic. The signals appeared to<oome from the same ship which, had trans-mitted several signals soon after the T/B •attack of the night before; they could therefore 'reasonably be attributed to the BISMARCK.These bearings, as plotted in KING GEORGE V,showed a position too far to the northward,which gave the misleading impression that theenemy was making for the North Sea. J broad-cast this position of the enemy and instructedall Home Fleet forces to search accordingly.PRINCE OF WALES' had not yet joined, butthe course of KING GEORGE V was altered to°55°» 27 knots, to make for the Iceland-Faeroes gap.

53. A position of the enemy transmitted bythe Admiralty made it clear that the enemy wasmaking for a French port and had a lea'd ofabout 100 miles. The accuracy of the informa-tion which was issued by the Admiraltythroughout this stage of the operation and thespeed with which it was passed out werebeyond praise. The situation could be clearlyenvisaged by all the forces concerned and Iwas able to preserve wireless silence.

•* 54. KING GEORGE V, RODNEY, NOR-FOLK, EDINBURGH and Force " H " allproceeded at their best^ speed towards the Bay.of Biscay; and a sweep was flown, in the eveningby Coastal Command flying boats as far aslongitude 30° W. When this failed to locatethe enemy, two cross-over patrols by flyingboats were arranged to start at 1000 on 26thMay, across his probable track. In addition tothese forces, COSSACK ..(Captain ;$)}, FourthDestroyer Flotilla), with SIKH (CommanderGraham H. Stokes), ZULU (Commander HarryR. Graham, D.S.O'.), MAORI (CommanderHarold T. Armstrong, D.S.C.), and the PolishShip PIORUN (Commander E. Plawski) weredetached by the Admiralty from convoyW.S. 8B early on 26th May and instructed tojoin and scieen KING GEORGE V and ROD-NEY, to be joined by JUPITER (Lieutenant-Commander Norman V. J. T. Thew) fromLondonderry; and DORSETSHIRE (CaptainBenjamin C. S. Martin), on receipt of the firstenemy report, reported that she intended toleave convoy S.L. 74, which she was escorting,and came up from the south-west to interceptand shadow.

'Other Dispositions.55. Meanwhile, those forces which could not

reach the most probable track of the enemywere moving to cover alternative possible move-ments. MANCHESTER and BIRMINGHAMtook "up the Iceland-Faeroes patrol andARETHUSA that of the Denmark Strait, withair patrols of all the northern passages to assist.The Rear-Admiral Commanding, Second

4856 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 16 OCTOBER, 1947

Cruiser Squadron, in GALATEA, with VIC-TORIOUS, KENYA, AURORA andHERMIONE in company, proceeded' towardsthe Iceland-Faeroes passage, carrying out airsearches on the way. The cruisers had notenough fuel left to escort VICTORIOUS to theBay-and she could not be allowed to proceedunescorted.

56. Two Swordfish aircraft were lost duringair searches on 25th and 26th May; but thecrew of one of them had a remarkable escape.The aircraft landed alongside a ship's lifeboat,unoccupied but complete with provisions and

i water, and the crew spent nine days in the boat. before being picked up by a merchant vessel.• One of the Fulmar crews was also rescued by amerchant vessel.

$7. PRINCE OF WALES also proceededtowards Iceland; and destroyers were sent outto screen her and VICTORIOUS. SUFFOLK,after her search, was too short of fuel to steamat the high speed necessary to come up with

" the BISMARCK; considerable forces were betterplaced than she was for intercepting an enemymovement to the south-eastward and the Com-manding Officei. considered he would be betteremployed covering VICTORIOUS in thenorthern area, where there was nothing morepowerful than a 6-inch cruiser. He therefore

. set course to the north-eastward until he wasinstructed, on 26th May, to proceed to an areain the Davis Strait south-west of Cape Farewell•and search for enemy supply ships.

-58. Two ether precautions were taken by theAdmiralty: the Flag Officer Commanding,North Atlantic, was instructed to arrange airand submarine patrols to prevent passage of theStraits of Gibraltar, NELSON being sailed from"Freetown to reinforce; and LONDON was re-?,1

called from her search for a tanker and in--structed to escort convoy S.L. 75, which wasapproaching the area west of the Bay of Biscay./

59. At noo on 25th May, when in position41° 30' N. 17° 10' W., the Flag Officer Com-manding, Force " H " (Vice-Admiral SirJames F. Somerville, K.C.B., D.S.O.) hiRENOWN^Captain -Rhoderick R. McGrigor),with ARK ROYAL (Captain Loben E. H.Maund) and SHEFFIELD (Captain CharlesA. A. Larcom) in company, was instructed by^the Admiralty to act on the assumption that the*enemy was proceeding to Brest. Course was setfor a favourable initial position and1 a com-prehensive scheme of air search, to cover allenemy speeds between 25 and 15 knots, wasprepared for the following day.

60. No information had been received since23rd May of the two German bajttlecruisers atBrest, so a security patrol was flown off in themorning to search to the west and northwardin case one or both of these ships should be atsea in support of the BISMARCK. Ten Sword-fish were flown off at 0835 on 26th May for thefirst search, whose western edge was next to the.'flying boat patrols arranged by the Admiralty:It had been hoped to thicken the search withFulmars, bul the weather conditions renderedthis impracticable. The wind was from 320°,force 7,* sea rough, sky overcast, visibility 10-12miles; the round down of ARK .ROYAL was

Admiralty footnote:—• * Wind force 7—moderate gale, 27-33 m.p.h.

rising and falling 56 feet and the handling ofaircraft on deck was extremely difficult. Whilethe search was in progress Force " H " pro-ceeded to i each a position to windward, so thatthe operation of aircraft would not be impededby subsequent movements of the BISMARCK,if the latter were located.

The BISMARCK Located.61. At 1030 on 26th May one of the Coastal

Command flying boats on cross-over patrolsighted and reported the BISMARCK. TheFlag Officer Commanding, Force " H ", onreceipt of this report, ordered ARK ROYAL tofly off two shadowing aircraft fitted with longrange tanks to gain touch, as he feared thatthe flying boat's position might be inaccuratein view of the weather conditions and the dis-tance from her base. (It was, in fact, about 35miles in error.) Threeiquarters of an hour afterthe first sighting,-one of ARK ROYAL's search-ing aircraft also located the enemy, followedshortly by another. The flying boat reported atthis time that her hull had been holed byshrapnel and soon after she lost touch. Thereports of the aircraft from ARK tROYALplaced the enemy about 20 mile:s north of hercorrect position, but this error was due to thereference position passed out by the Flag OfficerCommanding, Force " H "^and was correctedlater in the day.

62. The BISMARCK was shadowed con-tinuously by aircraft from ARK ROYAL forthe rest of the day and excellent reports weremade. Particular credit is due to the crewsof these aircraft whose part, though unspec-tacular and often forgotten, is as important andfrequently as dangerous as that of the aircraftwhich attack with torpedoes. The Flag OfficerCommanding, Force '•' H ", manoeuvred hisforce throughout the day to maintain theweather gage for flying operations, to avoidloss of bearing on the BISMARCK and to keepwithin 50 miles of her to facilitate the launchingof T/B attacks. "He was instructed by theAdmiralty that RENOWN was not to becomeengaged with the BISMARCK unless the latterwas already heavily engaged by either KINGGEORGE V or RODNEY.

63. The first report of the BISMARCK placedher about 130 miles south of me, steering asouth-easterly course at 22 knots. It was evi-dent that she had too great a lead for KINGGEORGE V to come up with her unless herspeed could be further reduced or she couldbe deflected from her course; our only hopelay in torpedo attacks by the aircraft of ARKROYAL.

Fuel.64. The shortage of fuel in the Home Fleet

battleships was a matter of grave anxiety;KING GEORGE V had only 32 per cent, re-maining, and RODNEY reported that she-wouldhave to part company at 0800 the next morn-ing. When these ships joined company laterin the day, they had to share an A/S screenof three destroj'ers (SOMALI (Captain CliffordCaslon), TARTAR (Commander Lionel P.Skipwith) and MASHONA (CommanderWilliam H. Selby)) and even- these were dueto leave that night for lack of fuel. Therewere known to be several U-boats in the areaand it was safe to assume that every availabledestroyer and U-boat in -the ports of Western

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 16 OCTOBER, 1947 4857

France would also be ordered to sea. TheAdmiralty had also warned me to expect heavyair>"attack. It was therefore essential to allowa sufficient reserve of fuel to enable the battle-ships to return to United Kingdom ports at areasonably high speed. The loss of HOOD andthe damage to PRINCE OF WALES had leftKING GEORGE V as the only effective capitalship remaining in Home Waters. I was notprepared to expose her unscreened at lowspeed to almost certain attack by U-boats unlessthere was very good prospect of achieving aresult commensurate with the risk. I there-fore decided that unless the enemy's speed hadbeen reduced, KING GEORGE V should re-turn at 2400 on 26th May to refuel.

First TjB Attack.65. The speed of KING GEORGE V was re-

duced to 22 knots at 1705 on- 26th May toeconomise fuel and RODNEY, who had by thenbeen overhauled, was formed astern. I hadrecommended the Flag Officer Commanding,Force " H," to remain with ARK ROYAL; hewas maintaining his position on the beam of theBISMARCK and had detached SHEFFIELD toshadow. The visual signal ordering this lattermovement was not repeated to ARK ROYAL,an omission which, as will be seen later, hadserious consequences.

66. 'A striking force of 15 Swordfish, one ofwhich had to return, was flown off at 1450;they were armed with Duplex pistols set to30 feet instead of 34 feet, in consequence of thedoubt which then existed in ARK ROYALwhether the enemy ship was the BISMARCKor the PRINZ EUGEN. The weather wasparticularly bad in the vicinity of the targetand reliance was placed on the A.S.V. setcarried in one of the aircraft; this aircraftlocated a ship at 1550, about 20 miles from theexpected position of the enemy, and an attackthrough the cloud was ordered. The ship de-tected was SHEFFIELD, of whose presencenear the BISMARCK the striking force was notaware, and eleven torpedoes were dropped ather. Two of the torpedoes exploded on hittingthe water, and three more on crossing the wake,the remainder being successfully avoided bySHEFFIELD, who, with great forbearance, didnot fire a single round in reply.

67. The flying boat was still shadowting,though her reports now differed widely in posi-tion from those of the aircraft of ARK ROYAL.Her signals were made on H/F* and her posi-tion could not therefore be checked by D/F.She reported twice during the afternoon that shewas being attacked by enemy aircraft, butthese were probably shadowing Swordfish fromARK ROYAL.

Second TIB Attack.68. A second striking force of 15 aircraft

was launched at 1915. Owing to the limitednumber of serviceable aircraft, it had beennecessary to re-arm and refuel most of thosewhich had taken part in the first attack. Inview of the apparent failures with Duplexpistols in the first attack, contact pistols wereemployed on this occasion. The striking forcewas ordered to make contact with SHEFFIELDbefore launching the attack and the latter wasinstructed to home the striking force by D/F.

Admiralty footnote:—* H/F—high frequency.

69. The aircraft approached SHEFFIELDbelow the clouds and then climbed to 6,000 feetto make their final approach. The weather inthe vicinity of SHEFFIELD appeared to beideal for a synchonised torpedo attack, 'butwhen the aircraft came near -the BISMARCK,they found that she was under a cold front.A thick bank of cloud with base about 700 feetand top between 6,000 and 10,000 feet wasencountered and the force became split up. Thetorpedo attacks had therefore to be made bysub-flights or pairs of aircraft over a long periodin the face of intense and accurate fire; theywere pressed home with a gallantry and deter-mination which cannot be praised too highly.One aircraft, having lost touch with his sub-fligiht, returned to SHEFFIELD for a freshrange and bearing of the enemy and went inagain by himself in the face of very heavyfire to score a hit on the port side of tljteBISMARCK. At least two hits were scored,one of which so damaged the BISMARCK1 srudders that she was unable to keep off thewind, which providentially was from the north-west, for any length of time; a result whichARK ROYAL and her aircraft crews had wellearned and which ensured my being able tobring the BISMARCK to action next morning.

70. When I received the first report thatthe BISMARCK had altered course to 340°I dared not hope that it was more than a tem-porary alteration to avoid a T/B attack; afurther report four minutes later that she wassteering 000° suggested, however, that herrudders had been damaged and that she hadbeen forced up into the wind towards KINGGEORGE V and RODNEY. I immediately,turned towards our estimated position of'theBISMARCK in an> endeavour to make contactin time to engage her from the eastward in thefailing light. But with frequent rain squallsand gathering darkness the light conditions be-came too unreliable, and with no certainty ofthe enemy's position or of that of our ownforces, but with confirmation of the damageto the enemy and the knowledge that the FourthDestroyer Flotilla was shadowing, I decidedto haul off to the north-north-eastward andwork round to engage frpm the westward atdawn.

71. The Flag Officer Commanding, Force" H," had informed me that no further T/Battacks were possible that evening and thathe was preparing all remaining Swordfish fora strong attack at dawn. He was instructedto keep not less than 20 miles to the south-ward of the BISMARCK so as to be clear ofmy approack.,

Night Shadowing and Attack by Destroyers.72. SHEFFIELD made, her tost enemy

report at 2140 on 26th May. At this timethe BISMARCK turned and fired six accurate15-inch salvos at her, at a range of nine miles.SHEFFIELD turned away at full speed andmade smoke, but suffered a few casualties fromsplinters. The turn caused her to lose touch,but shortly afterwards she made contact withthe Captain (D), Fourth Destroyer Flotilla(Captain Philip L. Vian, D.S.O.), in COS-SACK, who with MAORI, ZULU, 'SIKH andthe Polish destroyer PIORUN, was approachingthe BISMARCK. The Captain (D), FourthDestroyer Flotilla, as I knew he would, haddecided to shadow and attack the BISMARCK,

4858 SUPPLEMENT TO.THE LONDON GAZETTE, 16 OCTOBER, 1947

instead of screening KING GEORGE V andRODNEY; and was wisely proceedmg at highspeed, in spite of fuel shortage, to get in touchbefore dark. Ships were spread 2.5' miles apartat -right angles to the estimated bearing ot theenemy. The approximate bearing and distanceof the enemy was obtained from SHEFFIELDand, in view of the 'heavy sea running, speedwas reduced and the flotilla manoeuvred toavoid.a ihigh speed end-on contact.

73. The BISMARCK was 'sighted byPIORUN, on the port wing, at 2238, just afterthe last shadowing aircraft left to return toARK ROYAL: destroyers were ordered to takeUp stations for shadowing: at 224:2 the enemyopened1 a heavy fire on PIORUN, who made aspirited reply before turning away under smoke.It was evident to the Captain (D), FourthDestroyer Flotilla, that the enemy's speed hadbeen so seriously reduced by the torpedo*bomber attack that interception by the battle-fleet was a certainty, provided that the enemycould be held. He therefore decided that hismain object was to keep touch and his secon-dary object to attack with torpedoes if hethought this would mot involve the destroyersin serious losses. He ordered tile destroyersto attack independently as opportunity offered.

74. Throughout the night and until 0845 on27th May, when the battlefleet came into action,these destroyers maintained touch in spite ofheavy seas, rain squalls and low visibility.They were frequently and accurately engagedby the main and secondary armaments of theBISMARCK, who was apparently firing byR.D.F.; but'by skilful handling |tn'ey avoidedserious damage and suffered a very small num-ber of casualties. The four ships of the 7thDivision all delivered torpedo attacks duringthe night, COSSAQK and MAORI making tw'oeach; hits were scored by COSSACK andby MAORI, the latter's torpedo causing a fireon the forecastle of the BISMAjRGK; SIKHmay also have scored a hit.

75. The Commanding Officer of .the PIORUNhad -not worked with .the Fourth DestroyerFlotilla before and he therefore decided towait until;r|ast to deliver his attack as he didnot wish to^ interfere: with the flotilla and wasnot fully eonversant,r with their methods. Hehad 'drawn the BISMARCK's fire for an hourduring the period of dusk, hoping that thiswould assist the other destroyers to get in theirattacks, but -after dark he retired, to a distanceof - some 6 to 8 miles to wait for them to finish.He had not succeeded in regaining touch when,at 0500, he was ordered by the! Captain (D),Fourth Destroyer Flotilla, to,.' proceed toPlymouth to fuel if not in contact with theenemy. The Captain (D),-Fourth DestroyerFlotilla, knew that Commander Plawski wouldcertainly attack the enemy as soon as ihe couldfind him: conditions as 'light came would notbe easy and the Captain (D), Fourth DestroyerFlotilla, was concerned lest a valuable ship anda-, fine crew should be Host without need.PIORUN continued to search until 0600 andleft an hour later.

76. The conduct of the night operations bythese five destroyers under the> Captain (D),Fourth Destroyer Flotilla, was a model of itskind. In heavy weather, frequently underfire, they Jhung on to their -prey "v^ith the 'Utmostdetermination, hit her with torpedoes and

delivered her to me the next morning, withoutsuffering damage, other than by splinters, toany of their shiips. •:

77. During the night NORFOLK arrived inthe area and made her way round to the north-eastward of the enemy, ready to flank marktor the battleships in 'ithe morning: EDIN-BURGH was compelled to leave for •London-derry owing to lack of fuel (she arrived therewith 5^ per cent, remaining): and the DORSET-SHIRE was also approaching, to arrive soonafter the battlefleet joined action. KING'GEORGE V and RODNEY worked round tothe westward ready to engage at dawn.

•78. The BISMARCK was making frequentalterations of course, possibly involuntary, andit was difficult to gauge her progress from thefrequent course reports which were received.As was only to be expected with forces whichihad been widely separated in weather unsuit-able for taking sights, considerable differencesin reckoning were now apparent. I instructeddestroyers to fire starsihell to indicate the posi-tion of the enemy, but frequent rain squallsprevented these from being seen in KINGGEORGE V, while the Captain (D), FourthDestroyer Flotilla, reported that the reactionsof the BISMARCK to this practice were un-pleasant. Destroyers 'in touch were then in-structed to transmit on medium frequency sothat bearings might be obtained by D/F, butsome 'had their aerials shot away and ZULUhad a smashed deck insulator, which causedenough sparking when transmitting to illuminate,the whole ship. It became evident that therelative positions were not known with suffi-cient accuracy for a dawn approach to 'bepracticable. The visibility, too, was uncertain;and I decided to wait for full light.

ACTION OF 27TH MAY.Weather: Wind—north-west, force 8.*

Weather—overcast; rain squalls..Visibility—12-13 miles.Sea and swell—45.Sunrise—0722.

Choice of Tactics.79. It was clear from the reports of the

ships which ihad come under her fire that, inspite of the damage she had already receivedfrom guns and torpedoes, the gun armamentand control of the BISMARCK 'were notseriously affected. Everything suggested, how-ever, that her rudders had been so seriouslydamaged that she could not steer; in the strongwind prevailing, she could, by working herengines, haul off the wind only for short periods.So it was possible for me to select the direc-tion and time of my approach and to dose towhatever range I chose. The experience ofthe Fourtlh Destroyer Flotilla made it clear thatthe BISMARCK had R.D.F which ranged'accurately up to 8,000 yards; by day, she couldrange very accurately up to about 24,000 yards',either by means of the excellent stereoscopicrangefinders the Germans have always had orpossibly by R.D.F.

,"'k «

80. I decided to approach with the ad^vantages of wind, sea and light and as nearlyend-on as possible, so as to provide a difficulttarget and to close quickly to a range at whichrapid hitting -could be ensured. I hoped that

Admiralty footnote'—* Wind force 8—fresh gale, 34-40 m.p.h.

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 16 OCTOBER, 1947 4859

the sight of two battleships steering straightfor them would shake the nerves of the range-takers and control officers, who had alreadyhad four anxious days and nights.

. The Approach.Si. Between 0600 and 0700, D/F bearings

of a series of reports by-MAORI enabled therelative position of the enemy to be deducedwith reasonable accuracy. The BISMARCKhad settled down to a course of about 330°, at10 knots. The horizon to the north-eastwardwas clear and the light good, but south of eastwere rain squalls and a poor background.The strong wind and heavy sea made it mostundesirable to fight to windward. 1 decidedto approach on a bearing of west-north-westand, if the enemy held his course, to deployto the southward, engaging him on oppositecourse at a range of about 15,000 yards andsubsequently as events might dictate. At0737, when the enemy bore 120°, 21 miles,course was altered to 080° to close: RODNEYwas stationed on a bearing of 010° and in-structed not to close within six cables of meand to adjust her own bearing. NORFOLKwas shadowing (from the north-westward, readyto carry out flank marking for the battleships,and at 0820 she came in sight and providedme with a visual link. It had been necessaryto alter course on the way in to avoid rainsqualls and to allow for the reported alterationsof course of the BISMARCK, but at 0843 shecame in sight, bearing 118°, 25,000 yards,steering directly towards us, our course atthis time being 110°.The Action.

82. RODNEY opened fire at 0847, followedone minute later by KING GEORGE V andthen by the BISMARCK. The BISMARCKhad turned to starboard to open ' A ' arcs,and directed her fire at RODNEY. This turnof the enemy made it look as if it would bebetter for us to deploy to the north-eastward,

'and I -hoisted the signal to turn to 085°; theBISMARCK, however, almost immediatelyaltered back to port, so the negative washoisted and I indicated my intention toturn to 170°. RODNEY, who wished to openher ' A ' arcs, had anticipated the haulingdown of the first signal and started to altercourse to port; KING GEORGE V also hadaltered 20° to starboard to open her distancefrom RODNEY; so that the ships were wellseparated, which was entirely in accordancewith my wishes. The BISMARCK's fire Vasaccurate at the start, though it soon began tofall off; she made continual alterations ofcourse, but it is doubtful whether these weredeliberate.

83. The range was now 20,000 yards anddecreasing rapidly, the general trend of theenemy's course being directly towards us.Shortly after our turn to the southward, theBISMARCK shifted her fire to KINGGEORGE V. By 0905 both KING GEORGEV and RODNEY had their secondary arma-ments in action. At this stage the effect ofour gunfire was difficult to assess, as hits byarmour piercing shell are not easily seen; butafter half an hour of action the BISMARCKwas on fire in several places and virtually outof control. Only one of her turrets remainedin action and the fire of this and of hersecondary armament was wild and (erratic.But she was still steaming.

84. Some interference from our own funneland corditejsmoke had been experienced, and at0917 the course of the battlefleet was alteredtowards the enemy and right round to north,RODNEY again anticipating the signal. Whenthe turn had -been completed, the lines of fireof KING GEORGE V and RODNEY wereapproximately at right angles; a heavy volumeof fire could be produced without interferencein spotting between the two ships. DORSET-SHIRE had been firing intermittently since0902 from the other side of the enemy, as hadNORFOLK from her flank marking position.

85. In order to increase the rate of hitting,the battleships continued to close, the rangeeventually coming down to 3,300 yards. By1015 the BISMARCK was a wreck, without agun firing, on fire fore and aft and wallowingmore heavily every moment. Men could beseen jumping overboard, preferring death bydrowning in the stormy sea to the appallingeffects of our fire. I was confident that theBISMARCK could never get back to -harbourand that it was only a matter of hours beforeshe would sink.

86. The shortage of oil fuel in KINGGEORGE V and RODNEY had become acute.It was not merely a matter of having sufficientoil to reach one of our harbours: I had to con-sider the possibility of damage to fuel tanksby a near miss from a bomb or a hit by a tor-pedo; this might easily result in the ship beingstopped in an area where U-boats were knownto be concentrating, and where I had bee.nwarned to expect heavy air attack. Furthergunfire would do little to. hasten the BIS-MARCK's end. I therefore decided to breakoff the action with KING GEORGE V andRODNEY, and I instructed any ships still withtorpedoes to use them on the BISMARCK!DORSETSHIRE anticipated my order and tor-pedoed the BISMARCK at close range on bothsides: she sank at 1037 in position 48° 09' N.16° 07' W. Although her sinking had been seenfrom the after Director Control Tower in KINGGEORGE V, the fact did not become knownto me until uoo and I informed, the FlagOfficer Commanding, Force '•' H ", that Icould -not sink the BISMARCK with gunfire:this signal (1045/27th May), which was per-haps unfortunately phrased, was addressedonly to him and was intended to ensure that heshould take any steps which might help tohasten her sinking: when intercepted byothers, it may have caused some misunder-standing.

87. The BISMARCK had put up a mostgallant fight against impossible odds, worthyof the old days of the Imperial German Navy,and she went down with her colours still flying.DORSETSHIRE picked up four officers, in-cluding the Third Gunnery Officer, and 75ratings; MAORI picked up 24 ratings; but at1140 DORSETSHIRE sighted a suspiciousobject, which might have 'been a U4>oat, andships were compelled to abandon the work" ofrescue. Some of the remaining survivors mayhave been rescued by the Spanish cruiserCANARIAS.

88. From the information available, itappears that the BISMARCK suffered threehits by gunfire on 24th May, one hit by air-craft torpedo on 25th May and two on 26thMay, two hits by desttoyer torpedoes early on

4860, SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 16 OCTOBER, 1947

27th May, one by RODNEY's j torpedo, andthe subsequent heavy pounding bydgunfire. Atthe end of this she was in a sinking condition,and the final torpedoes from DORSETSHIREonly hastened her end. A few casualties andslight damage from splinters were incurred inSHEFFIELD and the destroyers! of. the FourthDestroyer .Flotilla during the night of 26th/27th May; there were no casualties or damageto any of our ships during the subsequent dayaction.

89."'In KING GEORGE V! W/T trans-mission on power on certain wavelengths

• interfered with reception on JR.D.F. Forthis reason I was unable, during theaction to keep the Admiralty fully in-formed of its progress, especially in viewof the fact that I had been warned toexpect heavy attack by enemy aircraft, andI did not wish to risk being fixed iby D/F. TheBISMARCK's sinking was reported as soon asit was known and a description of the engage-ment was deferred until it was ! practicable totransmit a long signal by w,ireless. Thislimitation applies in some degree to all ships

g§nd will have to be borne in mind in thefuture.

Return of the Fleet. „90. KING GEORGE V and RODNEY with

' COSSACK, SIKH and ZULU, proceeded to thenorthward, DORSETSHIRE and MAORIrejoined at 1230, and the screen was augmentedby JUPITER during, the. afternoon. Nine

..further destroyers had joined 'by 1600 the, following day. Several signals 'were received"on 28th May, indicating that air Attacks on thefleet were impending, but only four enemy air-craft appeared. One of these bombed the

-screen without effect, while another jettisonedwits solitary bomb on being attacked by aBlenheim fighter. ^MASHONA and TARTAR,100 miles to the southward, were heavilyattacked, MASHONA being sunk at noon, withthe loss of one officer and 45 ratings; TARTARshot down one of the attacking aircraft.PIORUN underwent six attacks iby aircraft onher way back to Plymouth; all were driven offby gunfire.

91.. RODNEY, screened by MAORI, SIKHand COLUMBIA (Lieutenant-CommanderSomerville W. Davis), was detached to theClyde at 1700; DORSETSHIRE; was detachedto the Tyne at -2316; KING GEORGE V wasdelayed by fog, but eventually anchored in'Loch Ewe at 1230 on 29th May. GALATEA(Rear-Admiral Commanding, Second CruiserSquadron), AURORA and PRINCE OFWALES arrived at Hvalfiord on 27th May;EDINBURGH (Commodore 'Commanding,Eighteenth Cruiser Squadron) arrived atLondonderry' on 28th May and NORFOLK(Rear-Admiral Commanding, ;First CruiserSquadron) at the Clyde on 29th May; Force" H " returned to Gibraltar.

Conduct of 'Officers and Men.92. Although it was no more than I expected,

the co-operation, 'skill and understanding dis-played by all forces during this prolonged chasegave me the utmost satisfaction. Flag andCommanding Officers of detached units in-variably took the action I would have wished,before or without receiving instructions fromme. The conduct of .all officers and men, of

the Fleet which I have the honour to command-was in- accordance with the traditions of theService. Force " H " was handled . withconspicuous • skill throughout the operation byVice-Admiral Sir James F. Somerville, K.C.B.,D.S.O., and contributed a vital share in itssuccessful conclusion.

Supply of Information and Disposition ofForces.

93. The accuracy of the enemy informationsupplied by the Admiralty and the speed withwhich it was passed were remarkable, and thebalance struck between information and instruc-tions passed to the forces out of visual touchwith me was ideal. The disposition of Force" H," RODNEY and the other forces placed atmy disposal, completed my own dispositionsand enabled me to avoid breaking W/T silenceat a time when this was particularly important.

(Signed) JACK C. TOVEY,Admiral.

Commander-in-ChieffHome Fleet.

H.M.S. RENOWN,qth June, 1941.

To: The Commander-in-Chieft Home Fleet.The following report of the operations cul-

minating in the destruction of the German(battleship BISMARCK is forwarded in accord-ance' with Admiralty message 0032 of 28thMay, 1941.

2$th May.2. At 0330 on Sunday, 25th May, Force

" H " was in position 39° 35' N. 14° 10' W.tsteering 310° at 24 knots. At this time instruc-tions were received to steer to interceptBISMARCK from the southward. The enemyhad last been located in position 56° 30' N.36° oo' W. at 0306 when SUFFOLK lost touch.The' existing course and speed was thereforemaintained.

3.' At 0400 instructions were received thatdestroyers should be sent back to Gibraltar•before it became necessary to fuel them, asForce " H " might be required for extendedoperations. The three screening destroyers weretherefore detached at 0900 with instructions totransmit two signals when 150 miles clear, oneinforming the Admiralty of the position, courseand speed of Force " H " at 0730, and theother requesting Commander - in - Chief,Plymouth, to1 keep me fully informed of theresults of Brest reconnaissance.

4. At noo, when in position 41° 30' N.17° 10' W., orders were received for Force";H " to act on the assumption that the enemyhad turned towards Brest at 0300/25. Coursewas therefore altered to 360°.

5. At 1215 Force " H " altered course to345° to reach the initial position for an airsearch a.m../c26 based on the assumption thatthe enemy's .maximum speed of advance was notmore than 25 knots. It was my intention tocarry out, if necessary, three searches ,of thearea across the Bay of Biscay allowing for theenemy -making a substantial detour to the south-

.ward. The first search was designed to coverenemy, speeds of 2$ to 21 knots, the second 21

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 16 OCTOBER, 1947 4861

to 18 knots and the third 18 to 15 knots, Force" H " maintaining an intercepting position tothe eastward throughout.

2,6th May.6. During the night the north-westerly wind

and sea increased, and speed had to be reducedto 23 knots at 2115, to 21 knots at 2340, to19 knots at 0020 and finally to 17 knots at0112.

7. (In consequence of this reduction of speed,which the BISMARCK with a following seawould not have suffered, course was altered to000° at 0300/26 to reach.the best position forflying off the search.

8. The latest intelligence regarding theGerman- battle-cruisers was contained in a re-connaissance report that they were' still at Brestat 1515/23. This lack of information causedme 'spine anxiety as I could not entirely dis-count the possibility that one or both battle-cruisers might have put to sea to supportBISMARCK. With this possibility in view asecurity patrol was flown off at 0716 to searchto the west and northward before assumingA/S duties.

9. It had been intended that the first searchshould cover the area bounded by 47° 30' N.21° 3o'.W., 49° oo' N. 23° 40' W., 52° 25' N.20° oo' W., 51° 40' N. 17° oo' W., but owingto the head seas experienced during the nightthe area for the search, measuring some 280miles by 120 miles was transferred 35 milestd the south-east.

10. Ten Swordfish were flown off at 0835•from position 48° 26' N. 19° 13' W. Twocross-over patrols by Catalinas, arranged by theAdmiralty, lay along the western edge ofARK ROYAL's reconnaissance. Weatherconditions at this time were wind from320° force 7, sea rough, sky overcast, visibility10-12 miles. It had been hoped to increase thedensity of the search by the use of Fulmars,but weather conditions rendered this impractic-able. ARK ROYAL's round down was risingand falling 56 feet at times, as measured bysextant*. The handling of the aircraft on theflight deck was always difficult and several slidbodily across the deck which was wet withspray.

11. At 0930 the A/S patrol was landed on;no relief was flown off in order that everyavailable aircraft should be available for atorpedo striking force. Whilst the search wasin progress Force " H " proceeded at 15 knotson a course of 015° to reach -a position towindward1 so that the operation of aircraftwould not be -impeded by subsequent altera-tions of course of the BISMARCK should thelatter be located.

12. At 1030 a Catalina (Duty Z) made areport of " i BS 240° 5 miles steering 150 fromposition KRGP 3313 ". This report, received at1050, placed title enemy 285° 112 miles fromRENOWN. An amplifying report five minuteslater gave the enemy's speed as 20 knots. Iinstructed ARK ROYAL to fly off twoshadowers fitted with long range tanks to gaintouch, as I feared the Catalina's 'position mightbe somewhat inaccurate in view of the weatherconditions and the distance from her base.As the reconnaissance ..aircraft had already

readied the limit of their search I decided notto recaUujbhem by wireless, but informed ARKROYAL that I would continue the presentcourse and speed until they had returned when

• a full scale striking force was- to be prepared.

13. At 1114 the Catalina reported that -herthull had been iholed by shrapnel and requestedinstructions. I asked ARK ROYAL how manyaircraft would be required to ensure gainingcontact; she replied 6 but (proposed to fly offthe two aircraft fitted with long range tanksat once to carry out a square search.

14. At this time (1125) the Catalina losttouch and I instructed ARK ROYAL tosend at least 4 aircraft. Before these couldbe flown off one of ARK ROYAL's aircraftreported in touch (at 1114) but also reportedthe enemy as a cruiser and gave the positionof the enemy as 77 miles to the west of Force" H ". This was some 25 miles further tothe eastward than the Catalina's report butwas considered to be a more accurate positionin view of the shorter time, interval betweendeparture and sighting. Seven minutes later asecond aircraft of the reconnaissance gaifiedtouch and reported that the enemy was a battle-ship. The aircraft on track 305° was the firstto sight followed by the aircraft on .track 285°.There were five more aircraft to the northwardof these two and three more to the southward.These aircraft were on their way back to theARK ROYAL when touch was first gained. Thelong range shadowers were flown off at noonand the majority of the reconnaissance landedon. Force " H " was then manoeuvred to thesouth-east on a course 140° at 24 knots., myintention Tt>eing to maintain the weather g;agefor flying operations, to avoid loss of bearingon BISMARCK, and to keep within about'50miles of the enemy to facilitate the launchingof T/B attacks. Should it be desirable forRENOWN to attack unsupported it was myintention to do so from up wind and asternwith the object of causing him to turn and thusslow up his retreat, and also to enable full useto be made of smoke.

15. The two shadowers were relieved asnecessary throughout the day. Touch wasmaintained -continuously and excellent reportstransmitted until the shadowers were finallyrecalled at 2230.

16. Orders were received from Admiralty at1145 that RENOWN was not to becomeengaged with BISMARCK unless the latter wasalready heavily engaged by either KINGGEORGE V or RODNEY.

17. The Conimander-in-Chief, Home Fleet,reported his position at 1050 as 51° yf N.20° 42' W., closing the ship reported by theCatalina, and requested Admiralty confirmationthat the report did, not refer'to RODNEY.This was confirmed by Admiralty.

18. At 1208 the Catalina reported 4 UN* 050°10 miles steering 140° from position KRG74731. It was assumed that these were fourof the five destroyers which had just partedfrom Convoy W.S.8B, and who were now some50 miles W.N.W. of the BISMARCK.

Admiralty footnote1—* UN—unknown vessel.

4862 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 16 OCTOBER, 1947

19. At 1201 the Commander-in-Chief, HomeFleet, reported -that his position .at/-noo. was51° 33' N. 20° 43' W., course 150°, altering to130° at 1155, speed 26 knots.

20. It was evident at this stage that unlessaircraft from ARK ROYAL could reducd theenemy's speed he could not be overhauled.by our batteships till well within range ofbombing aircraft from the French coast thefollowing day. Jt was also doubtful whetherthe Comrnander-in-Chief, Home Fleet, wouldhave sufficient fuel to enable him to 'continuethe chase until the following day.

21. At 1315 I detached SHEFFIELD with:orders to close and shadow the enemy, whowas then some 40 miles south-west ofRENOWN who was in position 49° 39' N.18° 58' W. at 1330. The V/S* signal orderingthis movement was not repeated to ARKROYAL, and as will be seen later this omissionhad serious consequences. %

22. ARK ROYAL informed me that after theinterrogation of observers who had sighted theenemy ship, considerable doubt arose, whetherthe ship was in fact BISMARCK dr PRINZEUGEN. In consequence the torpedoes of thestriking force, which was then being ranged,were set to 30 feet instead of 34 ias originallyintended. The torpedoes were fitted with.Duplex pistols: - The striking force, of 15Swordfish look off- at 1450 in position 49° 35' N.18° 30' W., 'One aircraft had to return andmade a successful emergency landing with thetorpedo in place just after the last of the strikingforce had left the deck. It had bleen intendedto carry' out a synchronised diversion byFulmars,-but this had to be abandoned owingto sea and cloud conditions.

23. Weather and cloud conditions were par- 'ticularly bad over the target area when thestriking force took off. Reliance was thereforeplaced on the A.S.V. set carried in one of theaircraft of the striking force. This aircraftlocated a ship 20 miles from the position givento the leader on taking off. This ship -wasSHEFFIELD, of whose presence nearBISMARCK the striking force were not aware.A situation report made to Admiralty at 1345containing the information that SHEFFIELDhad been detached -to shadow had been receivedby ARK ROYAL, but had not been decodedbefore the striking force left.

'24. At 1550 on reaching a position over thesupposed target an attack through the cloudwas ordered, and eleven torpedoes were droppedat SHEFFIELD. The latter increased to fullspeed and took successful avoiding action. Ofthe eleven torpedoes dropped, two were ob-served by SHEFFIELD to explode on hittingthe water and three more exploded when cross-ing her wake. - During this unfortunate incidentit is satisfactory x to record that not a singleround was fired at thee attacking aircraft byany gun in SHEFFIELD, where the mistakehad been immediately appreciated.

25. At 152^ the Catalina reported havinglost touch with the enemy in position 47° 30' N.19° oo' W. "Both this report and the precedingone at 1330 placed the enemy 60 miles southof the position 'reported by aircraft from ARK

Admiralty footnote —* V/S—visual signal. • '

ROYAL. If was assumed that the discrepancywas probably caused by navigational errors inthe Catalina. ', The latter made infrequentreports and, as H/F was employed, could notbe D/Fd. The need for frequent reports ona D/F-able wave was strongly felt throughoutthe operation.

26..At 1551, the Commander-iri-Chief, HomeFleet, reported his position, course and speedas 50° 18' N. 18° 45' W., 128°, 26 knots, andthat ROD'NEY bore 100° eleven miles fromhim. This -was the first definite informationthat had been received of ROD'NEY since hersignal timed 0900/25. Course was altered to140° at 1650 to maintain position onBISMARCK, who had been reported steeringthat course at 1340.

27. At -1632 the Catalina signalled that shewas being attacked by enemy aircraft, typeunknown. She had previously made this .signalat 1345 but on each occasion the alarm wascaused by the ARK ROYAL's shadowingSwordfish.

28. The striking force returned to ARKROYAL at 1720. Owing to the motion on theship the three aircraft who had realised thatthe target was friendly and who had not firedtheir torpedoes, were ordered to drop thembefore landing on. Meanwhile the reliefshadowers had reported that the enemy shipwas definitely BISMARCK.

29. On completion of landing on speed wasincreased to 29 knots to regain lost ground, andby reducing the distance from the enemy toassist the next striking force in gaining contact.

30. At 1747 SHEFFIELD gained touch withBISMARCK and made her first enemy report.Being in some doubt regarding the Cpmmander-in-ptuef's intentions, I requested his position,course and speed and asked whether he wishedme to leave the carrier and join him. I addedthat should no reply be received I would remainwith the carrier. A second striking force of 15aircraft was prepared with all possible speed.Owing to the limited number of serviceableaircraft to provide this number, it was necessaryto refuel and rearm most of the aircraft thathad" just returned.

31.' At 1900 the Polish destroyer PIORUNwas sighted 9 miles to the southward and thebearing aridxdistance of the enemy passed toher. The latter portion of the signal, instruct-ing destroyers to shadow and attack as oppor-tunity offered, was not passed owing tovisibility closing down. ' Having sightedPIORUN, it appeared evident that the fourdestroyers which had been reported by theCatalina at 1208 as 4 UN and had also beensighted by first striking force, were Captain(D), 4th Destroyer Flotilla in COSSACK, withZULU, MAORI and SIKH in company. Toassist these.destroyers and the striking force inmaking contact, SHEFFIELD was ordered tomake -her call sign for D/F-ing purposes.

32.-The second striking force took off at1915 in'position 48° 35' N. 16° 54/-W., -whenthe enemy bore 167°, 38 miles. In view of thefailures with Duplex pistols in the precedingattack, contact pistols were employed on this

• occasion, torpedoes being set to run at 22 feet.The striking force had orders to make contact

• with SHEFFIELD 'before launching the attack,

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 16 OCTOBER, 1947 4863

both to ensure gaining contact with the enemyand to avoid any possibility of SHEFFIELDbeing mistaken for the target. SHEFFIELDwas instructed to home the striking force byD/F.

33. The aircraft approached SHEFFIELD at1955 below the clouds and then climbed to aheight of 6,000 feet. The weather conditions atthis time appeared to be ideal for a synchronisedtorpedo attack\ cloud 7/ioths from 2,000 to5,000 feet. During the climb contact was lostwith SHEFFIELD but regained at 2035 whena bearing and distance (110° 12 miles) ofBISMARCK was passed by SHEFFIELD byV/S. The force took departure for the targetin sub flights in line astern at 2040. On nearingthe enemy a thick bank of cloud with baseabout 700 feet oand top between 6,000 arid10,000 feet was encountered and the forcebecame split up. At 2047, when it wascalculated that the enemy would be in a suit-able position for an attack down wind fromastern, No. I sub flight dived through thecloud, but on reaching the base the enemy wasseen four miles down wind to the eastward.Position for an attack on the port beam wasgained by approaching just in the clouds, andthe final dive to attack was made at 2055. Oneaircraft from No. 3 sub flight followed closelyand also attacked from the port beam. Thisaircraft observed a hit on BISMARCK abouttwo-thirds of her length from forward. All fouraircraft came under intense' and accurate firefrom the first moment of sighting until out ofrange.

34. No. 2 sub flight, having climbed to9,000 feet in cloud, dived down on a bearingobtained by A.S.V. and two aircraft attackedfrom the starboard beam under intense fire.The third aircraft having lost touch with hissub flight in the clouds returned to SHEFFIELDfor a range and bearing on the target. Havingobtained this he pressed home a lone and deter-mined attack from the port bow in face of veryheavy opposition, and his crew saw the torpedostrike BISMARCK amidships port side.

35. No. 4 sub flight followed No. 3 sub flightinto the cloud and became iced up at 6,600feet. After seven minutes the aircraft divedand found a clear patch at 2,000 feet.BISMARCK was sighted almost at onceengaging No. 2 sub flight to starboard. All fouraircraft circled astern of the target and attackedsimultaneously from port coming under heavyfire. One aircraft was hit many times and bothpilot and air gunner were wounded, theobserver being uninjured. 175 holes werecounted in this aircraft which had to be writtenoff as one of the longerons had been cut.

36. No. 5 sub flight of two aircraft lost contactwith the remainder and with each other in thecloud. Having started to ice up at 7,000 feetthey came down and when still in cloud at3,500 feet one was engaged by A.A. fire. Oncoming out of the cloud this pilot saw the enemyahead of him and down wind so retired into thecloud, being engaged continuously while gaininga more favourable position. He eventuallycame in low on the BISMARCK's starboardbow and dropped just outside 1,000 yards. Theother aircraft of this sub flight made threeattempts to come in but was so heavily engaged'

on each appearance that he finally jettisonedhis torpedo and returned to ARK ROYAL.

37. No. 6 sub flight followed into the cloudand when at 6,300 feet turned 40-degrees toport and climbed clear at 7,450 feet, w,aited forabout 15 minutes and returned-to SHEFFIELDfor another range and bearing" of the enemy.These two aircraft then searched at sea leveland attacked on the starboard beam. Intensefire prevented close approach and one droppedat about 4,000 yards while the other returned tothe carrier and jettisoned before landing on.

38. The striking force "attack took muchlonger than had been anticipated (2055 to 2125)owing to bad weather conditions aroundBISMARCK who appeared to be under a coldfront.

39. At 2040 a signal was received from Com-mander-in-Chief, Home Fleet, giving his posi-tion, course and speed at 1800 as 49° 48' N.17° 33' W., 100°, 22 knots, with RODNEYin company. He also stated that unless theenemy's speed was reduced he would have toreturn in KING GEORGE V at midnight torefuel, leaving RODNEY to continue the chase.He recommended that RENOWN should re-main with ARK ROYAL.

40. During and after the torpedo attack onBISMARCK shadowing aircrait reported fre-quent alterations of course and that she wasmaking smoke. On receipt of these reportsRENOWN and ARK ROYAL altered course asrequisite to maintain a position some 40 milesdistant from the enemy in order that flyingoperations could not be unexpectedly ham-pered. It appeared possible that BISMARCKwas endeavouring to shake off shadowers beforedark; on the other hand she might have suf-fered damage to shafts or steering gear as aresult of the torpedo attacks.

41. Owing to the time taken to deliver theT/B attack insufficient light remained to carryout another attack before dark. Aircraft couldhave flown off but in the failing light locationof the target would have been difficult, friendmight have been mistaken for foe and certainlymany of the aircraft would have failed to regainthe carrier. It was therefore decided to main-tain shadowing aircraft as long as possible andconcentrate on preparing all remaining Sword;fisU for a strong striking force at dawn.

42. Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet, re-quested that aircraft might give the destroyersa visual link with the enemy and ARK ROYALwas instructed to comply. The two shadowingaircraft were ordered to remain in touch as longas possible and establish this link before return-ing. . They left the BISMARCK at 2230 and,after making a detour in heavy rain, locatedthe destroyers. By this time, however, theywere not certain of their own position and wereunable to assist the destroyers. These two air-craft were D/Fd back to ARK ROYAL, landingon at 2320 when it was practically dark.

43. At 2220 ARK ROYAL reported that onetorpedo had definitely hit BISMARCK amid-ships, and Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet,was informed accordingly at 2225. Later, in-formation was received from ARK .ROYALthat a second hit had most probably been ob-tained aft, and Commander-in-Chief was againinformed at 2240.

4864 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 16 OCTOBER, 1947

44. SHEFFIELD made her last enemy reportat 2140. At this time BISMARCK turned andfired six accurate I5~in. salvos at SHEFFIELDat a range of 9 miles. The latter turned awayat full speed and made smoke but suffered afew casualties and superficial damage fromsplinters". These casualties consisted of ikilled, 2 dangerously wounded who have sincedied, two seriously and six slightly wounded.All were ratings. After this SHEFFIELD1 losttouch but at 2142 sighted Captain (D), 4thDestroyer Flotilla, in COSSACK with 3 otherdestroyers closing the enemy and signalled thelast observed bearing and distance ofBISMARCK.

45. At 2251 ZULU made a contact and re-ported the enemy steering 110°. From this timeonwards Captain (D), 4th Destroyer Flotillaand his destroyers maintained contact, report-ing the enemy's course as 110°, 060°, 340°and finally by midnight 310° into the sea.Rear-Admiral Commanding, i8th CruiserSquadron in EDINBURGH was sighted to thewestward at 2315.

46. Just before midnight a signal was re-ceived from Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet,giving his position, course and speed at- 2215as 49° 10' N. 15° 29' W., 170°, 21 knots, withRODNEY in company. Shortly afterwardsRear-Admiral Commanding, i8th CruiserSquadron, reported his position, course andspeed as 48° 32' N. 15° 22' W., 025°, 13 knots,that he had no fuel left for shadowing and wasproceeding to Londonderry. •

47. At 2345 I informed Commander-in-Chief,Home Fleet, of my position (48° 42' N.15° 17' W.), that no further T/B attack waspossible that evening and that I intended turn-ing west for a short distance to keep clear ofhim. Shortly afterwards I received his inten-tions -to engage from the westward at dawnand 'directions that RENOWN and ARKROYAL were to keep not less than, 20 miles 'to the southward of BISMARCK. Course andspeed was adjusted during the night to comply.

z'jth May.48. At 0036 ARK ROYAL reported that after

being torpedoed, BISMARCK made two com-plete circles and reduced speed. I informedCommander-in-Chief, Home Fleet, accordinglyat 0046.

49. It was evident the Commander-in-Chief,Home Fleet, was in some'doubt regarding theposition of BISMARCK. I therefore reportedto him at 0112 that the estimated bearing anddistance of the enemy from me at 2345 was165° 41 miles.

50. The situation at this time was as follows.RENOWN and ARK ROYAL some 40 milesto the northward of BISMARCK, workinground to the west to reach a position to thesouthward; Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet,

.proceeding southward to engage at dawn; andRear-Admiral1 Commanding, ist CruiserSquadron, working round to the north-east.DORSETSHIRE who had left S.L. 74 at0930/26 in position 44° 08' N. 24° 50' W.was closing from the south-west. SHEF-FIELD'S position was. not known exactly butassumed to be in vicinity of BISMARCK andto the westward of the latter.

51. At 0115 a flash was seen bearing 152 °,followed 'four minutes later by heavy gunflashes. Course was altered to 210° to keepclear to the westward. During the middlewatch the destroyers carried out attacks, andsignals were received between 0202 and 0210stating that ZULU, MAORI and COSSACKhad attacked, the last two claiming one hiteach. MAORI added that there was an ex-tensive fire on the forecastle.

52. At 0210, Rear-Admiral Commanding,ist Cruiser Squadron, reported his intentionto keep to the northward and flank mark forKING GEORGE V and RODNEY. At 0301DORSETSHIRE reported her position, courseand speed which indicated she would crosssome 10 to 15 miles ahead of RENOWN.

53. The destroyers were instructed by Com-mander-in-Chief, Home Fleet, that after allattacks were completed they were to fire star-shell every half hour to indicate the positionof the enemy, whose course and speed wasnow reported as 310°, 8 knots.

54. During the night Commander-in-Chief,Home Fleet, experienced difficulty in makingdestroyers transmit their call signs on M/F*in order that D/F bearings .could be obtained.Many D/F bearings obtained proved to beinaccurate and caused considerable doubt asto the exact position of the enemy.

55. At/0335 I informed Comanander-in-Ghiefof my position and reported starshell ihad beenseen bearing 100°, and that an aircraft wouldbe flown oft ARK ROYAL at 0500 to spot forKING GEORGE V.

56. At 0610 I ordered SHEFFIELD who ihadsignalled her position at 0500 to obtain andpass a p/F bearing of MAORI who was intouch .with the enemy. The third class bearingof 118° which she gave put BISMARCK furthersouth than her previously estimated1 position.

57. At dawn visibility was Jow, and afterconsultation with ARK ROYAL I decided todelay flying off the striking force as therewas a serious risk of .mistaking friend for foeand I was in considerable • doubt as to theposition of KING GEORGE V and RODNEY.Having informed the Commander-in-Chief,Home Fleet, that the striking force wouldarrive at 0715, I later informed him that theattack was postponed on account of lowvisibility, and later still that I had cancelledthe attack on account of the difficulty ofidentifying our own ships in the existingvisibility. I was satisfied that until the situa-tion clarified it was undesirable to fly. off thestnking force.

•58. While these signals were being passedthe destroyers' reports of the position of theBISMARCK suggested she might be as much as60 miles to the northward of RENOWN.Course was therefore altered to the .northward,and at 0810 after ARK ROYAL had struckdown her aircraft as it was impossible in exist-ing weather conditions to keep them ranged,MAORI was sighted to the northward. MAORIreported the enemy as being 009° distant nmiles from her and thereby only 17 miles fromRENOWN. The latest estimate previous to thisreport placed BISMARCK 40 miles from

Admiraltyfootnote1—. * M/F—medium frequency.

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 16 OCTOBER, 1947 4865

RENOWiN. As contact was now definitelyestablished course was altered to 180° to rangethe striking force and aircraft were flown off at0926 in position 47° 16' N. 15° 51' W.

59. In the 'meantime the spotting aircraftwhich had been flown off at 0509 had become'lost in rain, failed to establish contact byW/T with KING GEORGE V and eventuallyhad to be D/Fd back.

60. After sighting MAORI I considereddetaching ARK ROYAL to the southward torange the striking force, keeping RENOWN inthe vicinity of MAORI ready to- 'supportKING GEORGE V and RODNEY as required.I decided however that the appearance ofRENOWN on the scene before KINGGEORGE V established contact was undesir-able in view of the low visibility and further-more it was imperative to afford ARK ROYALthe maximum degree of protection shouldKING GEORGE V fail to establish contact andthus leave the third striking force as the onlymeans of dealing with BISMARCK.

61. Heavy gunfire was -heard to the north-ward at 0855 but no report was received in-dicating wihat ship or ships were in action.

62. At 0940 SHEFFIELD appeared from thewestward, and I ordered her to join ARKROYAL on a course of 290° while RENOWNturned towards the scene of action to investi- °gate. ARK ROYAL was instructed to fly offa spotting aircraft for RENOWN.

63. At 0952 a signal was intercepted fromCxDmmander-in-Chief, "Home Fleet, orderingdestroyers to close. Five minutes before thisI had informed Cornmander-in-Chief, HomeFleet, that SHEFFIELD and ARK ROYALhad been detached, and that RENOWN wasclosing him from the southward; I alsorequested ihis position, course and speed.

64. The Commander-in-Chief's signal order-ing the destroyers to close coupled with NOR-FOLK'S signal that she had ceased flank mark-ing and Rear-Admirab Commanding, istCruiser Squadron's signal ordering DORSET-SHIRE to torpedo BISMARCK at close range,led me to suppose that the action was success-fully concluded so in view of the Admiraltysignal which ihad just been received indicatingthat a heavy scale of air attack was to beexpected I decided to rejoin ARK ROYAL toafford A.A. protection. I informed Commander-in-Ohief, Home Fleet, accordingly at 0953.

65. At 1025 as I still had no definite in-formation I asked Commander-in-Chief if hehad disposed of the enemy; ihe replied that shewas still afloat, adding three minutes later thathe could not get -her to sink by gunfire. Shortlyafterwards Commander-in-Chief" also informedme that he 'had been forced to discontinue theaction on account of fuel. I was about to orderthe T/B striking force to finish off the BIS-MARCK when DORSETSHIRE, who had beenordered by Rear-Admiral Commanding, istCruiser Squadron to torpedo the enemy at closerange, reported at 1034 tnat t^6 BISMARCKwas sinking and1 at 1039 that she had beensunk.

66. The torpedo striking force from ARKROYAL located the BISMARCK just in timeto see the finish of the action. The enemy was

C

duwn in the water, on fare and -silenced.DORSETSHIRE was seen to be in closeproximity to BISMARCK and would have beenendangered by a torpedo attack on the latter.The striking force therefore closed KINGGEORGE V for instructions' but could obtainno answer either by V/S or W/T. The strikingforce then returned to the vicinity of theBISMARCK and were in time to see DORSET-SHIRE sink her with torpedoes from closerange.

67. Meanwhile at 0955 an enemy aircraft hadbeen sighted 'by RENOWN and engaged.About this time COSSACK and NORFOLKboth reported that they were being bombed.SHEFFIELD'S R.D.F. was not efficient owingto damage from splinters when she had beenengaged by BISMARCK. Enemy aircraft weresighted from time to time and engaged when-ever they came out of the clouds. Weatherconditions prevented the use of fighters. Thereappeared to be both Focke-Wolfes and Heinkelspresent.

68. The striking force returned about 1115and were ordered to jettison their torpedoesbefore landing on as the motion of the ship waseven greater than the previous day and to landon with torpedoes would have jeopardised theaircraft. Whilst landing on was in progress aHeinkel came out of the clouds and dropped astick of two large and about five smaller bombs600 yards astern and to port of ARK ROYAL.This' was the last interference experienced byForce " H ". Landing on was completed by1152, and from then on the air appeared clearof enemy aircraft and course was shaped to thesouthward at 24 knots.

(Signed) J. F. SOMERVILLE,Vice Admiral.

Flag Officer Commanding.Force " H ".

APPENDIX.COASTAL COMMAND OPERATIONS IN CONNECTION

WITH THE BISMARCK AND PRINZ EUGEN2IST-27TH MAY, 1941.

May 2ist.At 1300 hours an aircraft of P.R.U. located

and photographed one Bismarck class battleshipand one Hipper class cruiser at anchor in smallfiords near Bergen.

The weather deteriorated during the afternoonand evening but a strike of 6 Whitleys of No. 612Squadron and 12 Hudsons of Nos. 220 and 269Squadrons took off between 2150 and 2330hours to attack. Owing to bad weather con-ditions only 2 Hudsons dropped bombs, andpoor visibility prevented any results beingobserved.May 22nd.

Aircraft patrolled off the Norwegian coastfrom first light but weather conditions by 1000hours had forced all of them to return. Blen-heims of No. 248 Squadron maintained meteoro-logical sorties off the coast all day reportingthe weather conditions, which became, worsewith 10/10 cloud down to sea level.

Sunderlands of No. 201 Squadron maintaineda patrol up the meridian of 5° West betweenlatitudes 6220 N and 6500 N from 0930, but hadto return at noo on account of fog with nilvisibility.

4866 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 16 OCTOBER, 1947

At 1930 a Fleet Air Arm Maryland succeededin penetrating to the anchorages and found thebillets empty and no sign of ;the vessels inBergen roadstead.

May 2,-yd.The Norwegian coast patrols could not take

off owing to weather conditions. Sunderlandsof No. 201 Squadron carried out a patrol be-tween the Faeroes and Iceland from 0650-2000and Hudsons of No. 220 Squadron patrolledbetween the Shetlands and Faeroes from0400-1250, when they had to be recalled as thebase was closing down. Catalinas of No. 210Squadron, after a delayed start due to weather,patrolled to the south of Iceland from 1300-1650when they also had to be recalled as the basesin United Kingdom were closing down.Iceland based aircraft should have patrolledthe Denmark Strait but here again weather con-ditions of continuous rain, cloud'10/10 at 300feet and visibility of 1,000 yards forced theabandonment of all flying. These .conditions im-proved slightly towards the end of the day and,after the sighting of the enemy force by H.M.Ships SUFFOLK and NORFOLK at 1922 and2028 respectively, it was found possible to getaircraft off at 2225 and 2320 to locate andshadow the enemy.

May 2^.ih.The Sunderland1 of No. 201 Squadron which

had taken off from Reykjavik sent a first sight-ing report of the enemy at 0620' and followedthis up with four subsequent amplifying 'sig-nals, the last being at 0900. The action be-tween the BISMARCK and H.M. ShipsPRINCE OF WALES and HOOD was wit-nessed and bearing and distance of enemy sig-nals given to H.M.S. NORFOLK. The Sun-derland also signalled the position of survivorsof H.M.S. HOOD at 1000 and the fact thatBISMARCK was leaving a large trail of oilfuel.

The Hudson of No. 269 Squadron which hadtaken off at 2320 on the 23rd May did not locatethe enemy, but another Hudson of the sameSquadron did so and reported at 0554. Thisaircraft also witnessed the action in whichH.M.S. HOOD was sunk, and continuedshadowing until 0808. A third Hudson locatedand shadowed the enemy from 0905 till 1340.

A Catalina of No. 240 Squadron from Reyk-javik contacted the enemy at 1432, shadowinguntil 1640. During this time frequent bearingsand distances of the enemy were given to thetwo cruisers and the PRINCE OF WALES.Fire was opened on this aircraft by both enemyships from time to time. Finally, a Catalinaof No. 210 Squadron took off at 1612, but didnot sight the'enemy in worsening weather visi-bility although all three H.M. Ships were sightedat 212^ and a formation of F.A.A. aircraft at0035 on the 25th. During the day 6 aircraft ofNo. 22 Squadron armed with torpedoes flewfrom Wick to Kaldadarnes in Iceland as a strikeforce, together with Catalina and Sunderlandreinforcements.

May 2$thni 0306 hours contact with the enemy force

was lost by the two shadowing cruisers and inorder to assist re-location a long range sweepby Catalinas was organised. This sweep wasdesigned to cover either a break back to Norway

or a course shaped by the enemy for FrenchBiscay ports. The Catalinas took off at 1345and did not land back until 1030 on 26th May.Some of our own surface forces were sightedbut no positive enemy sighting was made,although one Catalina at 0120 on 26th Maypassed over the wake of a heavy ship whichgave no answer to challenge or signals. Theaircraft circled for an hour but in the darknessand low cloud at 500 feet it was impossible toestablish any identity. The position, courseand estimated speed of this unknown ship wassignalled to base but fuel supply would notpermit shadowing until dawn. As it was, thisaircraft did not land back until 1203 on 26thMay.

May 26thAs additional precautions to prevent a break

back to Norway, Hudsons of No. 269 Squadronpatrolled the Denmark Strait throughout theday in very bad weather conditions, a furthersweep was iqairried out south of Iceland bytwo Sunderlands, one Catalina and one Hudson,and a continuous patrol was maintained betweenthe Faeroes and Iceland by two Sunderlands.

To endeavour to prevent an unseen escapeinto a French Biscay port two patrols wereplaced athwart the estimated line of advancefrom the last sighted position of the enemytowards the Bay of Biscay. On the initiativeof ;bhe A.O.C.-in-C., Coastal Command, thesouthern of these two patrols was somewhat tothe south of the .general appreciation as to thelikely course steered by these two ships. ACatalina of No. 240 Squadron flew the northernpatrol and a Catalina of No. 209 Squadron thesouthern patrol. Both were on patrol by 0930hours.

At 1030 hours aircraft " Z " of No. 209Squadron sighted the BISMARCK and sent afirst-sighting report. An amplifying report wassent five minutes later while the aircraft wastaking cover in cloud. At 1039 cloud cover wasinadvertently broken almost over theBISMARCK, which immediately opened fire,and before cloud could be regained the aircraftwas hit by shrapnel and holed in several places.The other Catalina was diverted to assist in theshadowing and made a sighting report at 1328.Meanwhile " Z " of No. 209 Squadron hadlost touch in worsening visibility at 1045.Efforts to re-locate failed, though at 1510 thisaircraft sighted and communicated with theother Catalina—" M " of No. 240 Squadron—which by this time had also lost touch. " Z "then left the scene for base, plugging, the holesin the hull, and landed safely at Loch Erne.Meanwhile " M " regained contact with anenemy ship at 1600 and continued to -reportpositions and courses until 1800, when contactwas lost and the aircraft had to return to basehaving reached prudent limit of endurance.. A relief Catalina—" O " of No. 210

Squadron—had been flown off at 1215 to con-tinue the shadowing. At 2340 this aircraftsighted and reported an enemy ship and con-tinued to signal positions at intervals until0240 hours on 27th May.

May 2fjthAt 0404 this aircraft reported having lost

touch with the enemy ship, though at 0712 itsignalled the presence of a Blohm and Voss float

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 16 OCTOBER, 1947 4867

plane, after which limit of endurance forced areturn to base after a flight of 26 hours 12minutes.

As the Hipper class cruiser—PRINZEUGEN—last seen in company with theBISMARCK early on -25th May was un-accounted for, Coastal Command maintainedtwo patrols by Sunderlands of No. 10 Squadronacross the mouth of the Bay of Biscay fromdawn during the day, and Hudsons of No.

206 Squadron carried out searches in this areafrom 0900 till 1830, while Wellingtons of No.-221 Squadron completed the patrols across themouth of the Bay up till 1900 hours.

Over the whole period from the locating ofthe two enemy ships near Bergen on 2ist Mayuntil dusk on 27th May, aircraft of CoastalCommand flew 69 sorties, totalling 580 hoursflying, while searching for or shadowing thesetwo ships.

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