Strengthening State-Citizen Relations in Fragile Contexts (full report)

8/6/2019 Strengthening State-Citizen Relations in Fragile Contexts (full report).

1/48

Strengthening state-citizen

relations in fragile contextsThe role of cash transfers


2/48

AcronymsASAL AridandSemiAridLands

BMZ GermanFederalMinistryforEconomicCooperationandDevelopmentCDF CommunityDevelopmentFund

DFID UKAIDDepartmentforInternationalDevelopment

EU EuropeanUnion

GHD GoodHumanitarianDonorship

HSNP HungerSafetyNetProgramme

IDS InternationalDevelopmentStudies

IDPs InternallyDisplacedPersons

ILO InternationalLabourOrganisation

MDGs MillenniumDevelopmentGoals

NSSF NationalSocialSecurityFundNASSIT NationalSocialSecurityInvestmentTrust

NPF NationalPensionsFund

NFI Non-Fooditems

OECD OrganisationforEconomicCo-operationandDevelopment

OPCT OlderPersonsCashTransfer

OVC-CT OrphanandVulnerableChildrenCashTransfer

PA PastorialistAssociation

PCRR ProgrammeCharterofRightsandResponsibility

RCs RightsCommittees

SAGE SocialAssistanceGrantsforEmpowerment

SPR SocialProtectionRights

SRM SocialRiskManagement

SSN SocialSafetyNet

USAID UnitedStatesAgencyforInternationalDevelopment

Tables and guresTable1: Listofdistricts,chiefdomsandtownssurveyed

Table2: ASALdistricts,beneciaryandnon-beneciarysub-locations

Figure1: Theresearchprocess Figure2: Prosandconsofpovertytargetinganduniversalapproaches

tocashtransfers

Figure3: SSNdeliveryowchart

AcknowlegementsHelpAge International is grateful to the Governments of Sierra Leone, Sudan and

Kenya for their cooperation and participation throughout the process of this study.

Specically the Social Safety Net (SSN) programme and the Hunger Safety Net

Programme (HSNP) sta in Sierra Leone and northern Kenya respectively.

Thanks also go to the UN system and NGOs that also provided useful information

during the course of this study. Many thanks to HelpAge International sta in Nairobi,Khartoum, El Geneina Darfur and London who made insightful comments and

provided guidance throughout the course of this study. Special thanks to the hundreds

of older people in Sierra Leone, west Darfur, Sudan and northern Kenya who took

part in focus groups discussions that helped shape the ndings. Finally, HelpAge

International is grateful to the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation

and Development (BMZ) for providing the nancial support for this study.


3/48

Contents4 Executive summary

10 1. Introduction and methodology

1.1Introduction

1.2Researchobjectives

1.3Researchquestions 1.4Rationaleforthechoiceofeldresearchlocations

1.5Researchmethodology

1.5.1Theresearchprocess

1.5.2Qualitativemethods

1.5.3Datacollectiontechniques

1.5.4Samplingtechniquesforfocusgroupdiscussions

1.5.5Studyperiod

1.5.6Limitationsofstudy

16 2. Fragility and social protection

2.1Statefragility

2.1.1State-citizenrelations 2.2Socialprotection

2.3Keydebatesandtrendsinsocialprotection

2.3.1Instrumentalistandactivistperspectives

2.3.2Poverty-targetedsafetynetsoruniversalapproaches?

2.3.3Governmentornon-governmentdelivery?

2.4Conceptualframework:Theroleofcashtransfersinfragilecontexts

24 3. Case studies: Sierra Leone, northern Kenya and Sudan

3.1Contexts:categoriesandattributesoffragility

3.2Theimpactoffragilityoncitizens:theexampleofolderwomenandtheirhouseholds

3.3Existingsocialprotectionmeasurestargetingolderpeople 3.3.1Sudan

3.3.2SierraLeone

3.3.3Kenya

3.4Cashtransfersandstate-citizenrelations

3.4.1ImpactoftheSSNonstate-citizenrelationsinSierraLeone

3.4.2LimitationsandchallengesoftheSSN

3.4.3ImpactoftheHSNPonstate-citizenrelationsinnorthernKenya

3.4.4LimitationsandchallengesoftheHSNP

3.4.5TherelevanceofcashtransfersinbridgingthegapbetweenreliefandrecoveryinwestDarfur,Sudan

44 4. Conclusions and recommendations

4.1Conclusions:Emergingissuesandimplicationsforstate-citizenrelations 4.1.1Thenatureofstatefragility

4.1.2Thenatureofprogrammedesign

4.1.3Thenatureofprogrammeownership

4.2Recommendations:Principlesandgoodpracticesforcashtransfersinfragilecontexts

4.2.1Governmentownership

4.2.2Appropriatedesignandimplementation

4.2.3Legalandpolicyframework

4.2.4Evidencebasedoncontext

4.2.5Relationshipbuilding

4.2.6Eectivecommunication

4.2.7Innovativedeliverysystems 4.2.8Learningfromexistingsocialprotection/cashtransferschemes

4.2.9Linkagestootherprogrammes

4.3Areasforfutureresearch


4/48

4Strengtheningstate-citizenrelationsinfragilecontexts www.pension-watch.net

Executive summaryHelpAgeInternationalhasbeenworkingonsocialprotectionandcashtransfersfor

olderpeopleforanumberofyears. Ourexperienceinfragilestatesandsituations 1

hasshownthatcashtransfershaveanumberofbenets,bothforolderpeopleand

theirhouseholds,andforbroaderdevelopmentalobjectives.

HelpAgeInternationalsinterestinfragilestatesandsituationsisalsoinformed

bythefactthattheyaccountforasixthoftheworldspopulationandathirdofallpeoplesurvivingonlessthanUS$1aday.Fragilestateshavepovertyrates

averaging54percent,comparedwith22percentinotherlow-incomecountries. 2

Olderpeopleparticularlyolderwomenandtheirhouseholdsaremore

vulnerablebecausetheyareseverelyaectedbythescarcityofstate-provided

supportsystems,rangingfromlackofaccesstobasichealthandeducation

servicestolackofaccesstobasicincomesupport.

Thereisincreasingacknowledgementwithintheinternationaldevelopment

communitythattheworldsmostvulnerableandchronicallypoorpeoplewholive

infragilestatesandsituationsneedtobesupportedbysocialprotection

mechanisms,includingcashtransfers. 3Thesemechanismscanreducerisk,

vulnerabilityandpoverty.

Thisreportexaminestheroleofcashtransfersinstrengtheningstate-citizen

relationsinthecontextoflong-termdevelopmentinfragilestatesandsituations.

Cashtransfersaspartofawidersocialprotectionsystemhavethepotentialto

strengthenstate-citizenrelationsandbyextensionthelegitimacyofthestate.

However,thecurrentdevelopmentdebateoncashtransfersfocusespredominantly

onthenarrowobjectiveofpovertyreduction.Inthecontextoffragility,however,

itisimportanttomovethedebateoncashtransfersbeyondvulnerability,riskand

povertytousingthemasatooltoaddressacentralunderlyingmanifestationof

fragilitytheabsenceofafunctioningstate-citizenrelationship.

Thepotentialgainsfromthisapproachincluderaisingthelivingstandardsof

vulnerablegroups,andprovidingtheopportunitiestoexercisetheirrightsas

citizens.Forthestate,thebenetofimplementingsustainablecashtransfer

programmesistoincreaseitslegitimacyandpopularsupport,andstrengthenstate

institutions,whicharecriticaltoconictprevention,recoveryfromconictand

stateresilience.

Statefragilitycanbeseenasacontinuum.Atoneendofthespectrum,astatecan

befragiletothepointwhereinternalorexternalforcesareabletochallengeits

authorityinallorpartofitsterritorythroughviolence.Attheotherendarestates

thatareunableorunwillingtocaterforthewelfareofaparticulargroupofcitizens

orcertainregionswithinthecountrybuthavenosignicantchallengestotheir

authorityintheformofviolence.

Akeymanifestationoffragilityistheabsenceofafunctioningstate-citizen

relationship,andfragilestatessharecertaincommonfeatures:

highlevelsofpoverty

pooraccesstobasicservices

infrastructuraldeciencypoorroadnetworksandlowtelecommunication

coverage

lackofsocialtrustindividedsocieties

fragmentedandcompetingelites

weakstatebureaucracies

pronetoviolentconictorarecurrentlyinviolentconict.


5/48


Social protection and state fragility

Therearedieringapproachestosocialprotection,whichareparticularly

signicantwhenappliedtofragilestates.

Intheinstrumentalview,theaimofsocialprotectionisessentiallyrisk

managementtominimisetheimpactofexposuretorisk,andtochangethe

behaviourofthepoorinwaysthathelpthemlowertheirvulnerabilityandmove

outofpoverty.Theactivistview,ontheotherhand,takesatransformative

approach,arguingthatpolicyshouldbedirectedatchangingthestructural

contextthatmakespeoplevulnerableintherstplace.

Therearedieringviewsonhowcashtransfersshouldbeimplemented.

Isitmoreecienttotargetthoseidentiedasthepoorest;orareuniversal

benets,whichavoidtheproblemsassociatedwithtargeting,moreeective

andsimplertoadminister?

WhatinstitutionsarebestplacedtoimplementthesemeasuresstatesorNGOs,

orsomecombinationofboth?Areexternalactorsappropriateasdonorsor

implementers?

Finally,whenthesedebatesfocusonfragileorconictstates,afurther

dimensionhastobeconsideredwhetherandatwhatpointsocialprotection

measuresintheformofcashtransferscanbeapplied.Cantheybeeective

inshort-termemergencyresponses;ifso,isitalsopossibletoextendand

developthemforlonger-termrecoveryanddevelopment?

The case studies

UsingexamplesbasedonresearchundertakeninSierraLeone,northernKenya

andSudan,thisreportarguesthatsocialprotectionprogrammesintheformof

cashtransfers,ifwelldesigned,couldplayasignicantroleinstrengthening

state-citizenrelations.Thenatureofprogrammedesignandprogrammeownership

iscriticaltoshapingthisrelationship,whichisofcrucialimportanceinfragile

contexts.

Ineacharea,eldresearchfocusedondiscussionswithcommunities,whilesemi-structuredinterviewswereconductedwithlocalandcentralgovernment

ocials,UNandNGOpersonnel.

Researchinthethreecasestudyareasaddressedthefollowingspecicquestions:

TowhatextentdoesSierraLeonespoverty-targetedSocialSafetyNet(SSN)

cashtransferprogrammestrengthenstate-citizenrelations?

TowhatextentdoestheHungerSafetyNetProgramme(HSNP)innorthern

Kenyaanditsrightscomponentinparticular,strengthenstate-citizen

relations?

Towhatextentcanacashtransferprogrammecontributetobridgingthegap

betweenhumanitarianreliefandrecoveryinareaspronetoconictsuchas

westDarfur,Sudan?

Thechoiceofthethreecasestudiesisinformedbythefactthattherearedierent

typesoffragilitywithuniquefeaturesandcharacteristics.Byexploringthe

ecacyoftwocashtransferprogrammesonedeliveredbythegovernmentin

apost-conictsituation(SierraLeone),andonedeliveredbynon-governmental

organisations(NGOs)inafragileandfood-insecureenvironment(northernKenya)

theresearchndingshighlightthefactorsthatinuencethenatureofstate-

citizenrelationsincontext-specic,cashtransferprogrammes.InwestDarfur,

Sudan,itexploresthepotentialofcashtransferstocontributetopeacebuilding,

ruraldevelopmentandlocalinstitutionbuilding,atatimewhentheUNandNGOs

arebeginningthetransitionfromemergencyrelieftorecoveryanddevelopment.


6/48


Conclusions

Emerging issues and implications for state-citizen relations

Programme designTheSierraLeoneandnorthernKenyacasestudiesindicate

thatthenatureandtypeofprogrammedesignaectstheabilityofcashtransfer

programmestostrengthentherelationshipbetweenthestateanditscitizens.

Astate-ledprogrammesuchastheSSNinSierraLeonedemonstratesthesevere

limitationsofapoorlydesignedpoverty-targetedprogrammeinacontextwhereinstitutionalcapacityisweak.Anomaliesassociatedwithprogrammedesignand

poorimplementation,includinginstitutionalandinfrastructuralconstraints,did

haveanadverseeectonstate-citizenrelations.Trustinpublicinstitutionswas

furthererodedandstateactorsinthiscaselocalchiefsusedtheprogrammefor

clientelismandpatronagepurposes,creatingmistrustbetweenthecommunities

andthestate.

Incontrast,adonor-nancedandNGO-implementedprogramme(HSNP)in

northernKenyasuggestshowasocialprotectionrightscomponentcanaddvalue

andhaveanunintendedpositiveimpactonstate-citizenrelations.However,issues

ofownershiplimitthelongtermimpactoftheprogrammeonstate-citizenrelations

onawiderscaleandsustainablebasis.Thepoverty-targetednatureofthemain

HSNPprogrammehighlightsthetensionsbetweenapoverty-targetedprogrammeandarights-basedapproachtosocialprotectionprogramming.Theoutcomewas

veryhighlevelsofreportedgrievances,withmanystillremainingunresolved.

Thendingsalsoshowedthat,wherealmosteveryoneisvulnerableandpoor,

targetingbasedonvulnerabilitycreatesriftsinandbetweencommunitiesin

fragilesituations.

Itisclearfromthesestudiesthatpoverty-targetedcashtransfersareahuge

challengetoimplementinfragilestatesandsituationswithhighlevelsofpoverty,

lowinstitutionalcapacityandlackofreliabledata.

Programme ownershipCashtransferscanbeusedinthecontextofemergencies

andasatoolforlonger-termdevelopment.Forthelatter,governmentownership

iscriticalbothtosustaincashtransferprogrammesandtodevelopstate-citizenrelationsoverthelongterm.DonorsandNGOscanplayacomplementaryrolein

providingtechnicalassistanceinprogrammedesign,developingtheinstitutional

capacityofthestateandbuildingintransparencyandaccountabilitymechanisms

thatstronglylinkrelevantstateinstitutionswiththecitizens(forexample,

nationalandlocalhumanrightsbodies).

TheSierraLeoneSSNcashtransferprogrammewasfullyownedbythe

government,whiletheHSNPinKenyaislargelydonor-ownedwithonlylimited

engagementofstateinstitutions.EvenifNGOsareimplementingcashtransfers,

theyshouldbepartoftheoverallnationaldevelopmentagendaandnotanisolated

programme.NGOsshouldcomplementgovernmentsandnotreplacethem.

Sudandoesnotcurrentlyhaveacashtransferprogramme.Therefore,anormative

butcautiouscasecanbemadeforcashtransferschemes,becausetheyare

potentialinstrumentsforstrengtheningstate-citizenrelations,andbyextension

thelegitimacyofthestateinconictaectedareas.Lessonscanbelearntfrom

theSierraLeoneandnorthernKenyacasestudiesonwhatnottodoandhowto

goaboutdesigningandimplementingcashtransfersintheSudanesecontext.


7/48


Recommendations

Principles and good practices for cash transfer in fragile contexts

BasedonthendingsofthisstudyandavalidationworkshopheldinNairobiwith

seniorpolicymakersfromSudan,SierraLeoneandnorthernKenya,thefollowing

principlesandgoodpracticesforcashtransferinthecontextoflong-term

developmentinfragilestatesandsituationshavebeenidentied.Whilethemajority

oftheseprinciplesareconcurrentwithprinciplesinnon-fragilestatesorsituations,theyareparamountinordertoreducefragilityanditsrootcauses.

Government ownershipGovernmentownershiporatleastgovernment

involvementincashtransferprogrammesisthekeytotheirsuccessinfragile

contexts.Governmentshouldbeinvolvednotjustinprogrammedesignand

implementationbutalsoinnancing,monitoring,andevaluatingprogramme

performance.Governmentmustalsobethedecisionmakerintheelementsofcash

transferdesignthataectthelong-termsustainabilityoftheschemes.Beyondthe

issueofsustainability,government-ownedprogrammes,ifappropriatelydesigned,

havethepotentialtostrengthenstate-citizenrelations,whichiscriticaltonation

building,peacebuildingandsocialcohesion.

Appropriate design and implementationInfragilecontexts,programmedesign

shouldincludesimpleandtransparent/understandableselectioncriteriathatidentifybeneciariesusingveryclearcategoriesforexample,olderpeople,

peoplewithdisabilities,andorphansandvulnerablechildren.Programmes

shouldincludeeectivegrievancemechanismslinkedtoexistingaccountability

andombudsmanstructures,particularlyatthelocalgovernmentlevelwhere

implementationtakesplace.Thesemechanismswillpromotecitizenparticipation,

voice,empowermentandownership.Designandimplementationshouldbe

basedonabroadconsultationprocessinvolvingalltherelevantstakeholders.

Theprogrammemustbeseenbythewidercommunityandsocietytobefair.

Legal and policy frameworkAlegalandpolicyframeworkforsocialprotection/

cashtransfersisessential.Involvingallthesectoralministries,departmentsand

agencieswithsocialprotectionmandatesduringpolicyformulationcreatesbuy-in

andlimitsthepotentialforturfbattlesbetweengovernmentagencies.

Evidence based on contextProgrammesshouldbebasedondetailed

researchevidencethatcanguidethedesignandimplementationofprogrammes.

Policyadvisersshouldpresentdecisionmakerswithpolicyoptionsandscenarios

basedonthecontextinwhichfragilityoccurs.

Relationship buildingAmulti-stakeholderapproachwillhelptobuild

relationshipstodevelopsocialprotectionchampionsinkeyministries,government

departmentsandagencies.South-Southlearningworkshops,trainingsandeld

visitstoexistingprogrammesinothercountriesshouldbeorganisedforrelevant

policymakersandprogrammestainkeyagencies.Theseareimportantplatforms

andprocessesforbringingtogetherandbuildingajointunderstandingamongst

stafromdierentgovernmentdepartmentswithsocialprotectionmandates.

Eective communicationInvestmentincommunicationmechanismsusing

eectiveinformation,educationandcommunicationstrategiesensuresthatrelevant

informationaboutprogrammesiswelldisseminatedandpresentedinsimple

languagethatcitizensunderstand.Thereshouldbetransparencyaboutwhowillbe

involvedintheprogrammesandwheretheyarebeingimplemented.Thisiscritical

toensuringthecredibilityandacceptanceofprogrammes.

Innovative delivery systemsInnovativewaysofdeliveringcashthroughthe

privatesectorcanplayasignicantroleinfragileenvironments,especiallywhere

functioningstatestructuresarenon-existent.Usingmobilephonetechnologyand

mobilebankingtodelivercashtransfersalsohasthepotentialtoextendother

nancialservicestoremoteruralcommunities.Developmentpartnerscanplay

animportantroleinensuringthatprocurementofprivateservicesisinthelonger-

termnationalinterestandcapacitiesareinplaceinrelevantministriestoensure

transparentprocurementprocesses.


8/48


Learning from existing social protection/cash transfer schemesWhere

programmesalreadyexist,itisimportanttoensurethatrevisionstodesignand

implementationarebasedonmutuallearningfromexistingschemes.

Socialprotection/cashtransferprogrammesshouldberenedandimproved

toaddresseectivelypublicgrievancesandproblemswithimplementation.

Linkages to other programmesCashtransfers,inparticularbroad-based

schemes,provideopportunitiesforoutreachtoothersocialservices.Eorts

shouldbemadetolinkcashtransferprogrammestoothercomplementarysocialprotectionservicessuchashealth,educationandagriculturaloutreach.

Transfersimplementedonthebasisofcitizenshipentitlementsalsoprovidean

opportunitytoreinforcecitizenshipinfrastructure,suchasnationalregistration

systemsbasedoncivilregistration(births,deathsandmarriages)andnational

identitycardprogrammes.


9/48

1. Introduction andmethodology

W

aleOsofsan/HelpAgeInternational



10/48


1. Introduction and methodology1.1 Introduction

Inrecentyearstherehasbeenaconsiderableamountofinterestinfragilestates

andenvironments.Thisispartlyasaresultofthesecuritythreatsuchstatespose

towiderglobalpeaceandsecurityandpartlybecauseofconcernsfortheprotection

ofhumanrightsandwellbeingofpeoplelivinginthesestates.

LeadinginternationaldevelopmentinstitutionssuchastheWorldBank,the

GermanFederalMinistryforEconomicCooperationandDevelopment(BMZ),the

EuropeanUnion,theUnitedKingdomDepartmentforInternationalDevelopment

(DFID),theOrganisationforEconomicCo-operationandDevelopment(OECD)

andtheUnitedStatesAgencyforInternationalDevelopment(USAID)haveshown

considerableinterestinfragilestates.Theiraimistotransformthemintostable

andresilientpoliticalentitiesthatprovideforthesecurityandwelfareoftheir

citizens.However,thecomplexitiesofdeliveringeectiveaidanddevelopment

assistanceinfragilecontextsrequireinnovationandmuchimprovedmulti-

stakeholderengagement.

Theinternationaldevelopmentcommunityrecognisesthatverylargenumbersof

chronicallypoor,vulnerablepopulationsliveinfragilestatesandenvironments.Theneedtofocusonhumandevelopmentinthesestatescannotbeover-

emphasisedbecausetheyconstituteasignicantproportionoftheworlds

poorestandmostvulnerable.

Thereisanincreasingacknowledgementandconsensusthattheworldsmost

vulnerableandchronicallypoorpeoplewhoarelivinginfragilestatesand

environmentsneedtobesupportedwithsocialprotectionmechanisms,including

cashtransfers.Thesemechanismsareknowntoreducerisk,vulnerability

andpoverty.

Overthelastfewyears,asolidevidencebasehasbeenbuiltwhichshowsthat

cashtransfers,aspartofawidersocialprotectionsystem,areeectiveinstruments

toimprovehumandevelopmentandfoodsecurityoutcomes.However,further

researchisneededonthepotentialroleofcashtransferstostrengthenstate-citizenrelationsand,byextension,thelegitimacyofthestate.Researchisalsoneeded

onthecomplexissueofusingshorttermcashtransfersinemergencesoften

unpredictableandsubjecttodonorfatigueandimplementingthemtosupport

thetransitiontorecoveryandlonger-termdevelopmentinitiativesinconict-

aectedstates.

Inthecontextoflonger-termdevelopment,thecurrentdebateoncashtransfers

focusespredominantlyonthenarrowobjectiveofpovertyreduction.Inthe

contextoffragility,however,itisimportanttomovethedebateoncashtransfers

beyondvulnerability,riskandpovertytousingthemasatooltoaddressacentral

underlyingmanifestationoffragilitytheabsenceofafunctioningstate-citizen

relationship.Toooftenthedebateoncashtransfersassumesthatpoverty-targeted

safetynetsaretheonlyfeasibleoptioninfragilestates.Yetthisapproach

pre-determinesthenatureanddesignofcashtransferprogrammesandtendsto

overlookotheroptionsthatcouldbemorerelevantinfragilecontexts.

Thereisnowacriticalopportunitytoinuencedevelopments,notonlyinthethree

casestudycountriescoveredbythisresearch(Kenya,SierraLeoneandSudan)

butinmanyotherfragilecontexts/states.Amorecontext-specic,innovativeand

visionaryapproachtocashtransferscanbeachievedthroughdialogue,bybreaking

downbarriersbetweenstatesandtheinternationalaidcommunity.Suchan

approachwoulddelivernotonlybetterhumandevelopmentoutcomesformillions

ofchronicallypoorpeoplebutalsohelptomakestatesmoreaccountableand

responsivetotheircitizens.


11/48


Thereportisorganisedintofourmainsections:

Section 1presentstheintroduction,researchobjective,researchquestionsand

methodology,andthelimitationsofthestudy.

Section 2addressestheconceptualdenitionsoffragility,socialprotectionand

state-citizenrelations.Itgoesontoexaminethreekeydebatesrelatedtosocial

protectionand,byextension,cashtransferswhicharerelevanttofragilestates/

contexts.Italsopresentsaconceptualframeworkforunderstandingtheroleofcashtransfersinfragilestates.

Section 3isthecoreofthestudy,whichidentiestheattributesoffragilityin

eachofthecasestudycountriesandtheirimpactonthepopulation.Thesituation

ofolderwomenandtheirhouseholdsisusedasanexampletoillustratethe

particularchallengestheyfaceinfragilecontexts.Thesectionoutlinesthe

existingsocialprotectionmechanismsineachcountryandthegapsincoverage.

Itthenexaminestheimpactofcashtransfersonstate-citizenrelationsinSierra

LeoneandnorthernKenya;andtherelevanceofcashtransfersinbridgingthe

gapbetweenreliefandrecoveryinwestDarfur,Sudan.

Section 4concludesbyidentifyingtwoemergingissuesprogrammedesign

andownershipandtheirimplicationsforstate-citizenrelations.Finally,it

recommendssomeprinciplesandgoodpracticesincashtransferprogramminginfragilecontexts,andareasforfutureresearch.

1.2 Research objectives

Thegeneralobjectiveofthisresearchistounderstandtheextenttowhichcash

transferscancontributetoimprovingstate-citizenrelationsinfragilestatesand

fragilesituations.Thendingswillcontributetothedebateoncashtransfersand

developanuancedunderstandingonhowbesttodelivercashtransfersinfragile

statesandsituations.

1.3 Research questions

Theresearchaimstoanswerthefollowingquestionsrelatingtothethreecase

studies:

TowhatextentdoesSierra Leonespoverty-targetedSocialSafetyNet(SSN)

cashtransferprogrammestrengthenstate-citizenrelations?

TowhatextentdoestheHungerSafetyNetProgramme(HSNP)in northern

Kenya,anditsrightscomponentinparticular,strengthenstate-citizenrelations?

Towhatextentcanacashtransferprogrammecontributetobridgingthegap

betweenhumanitarianreliefandrecoveryinareaspronetoconictsuchas

west Darfur, Sudan?

1.4 Rationale for choice of eld research locations

Thechoiceofthethreedierentcasestudiesisinformedbythefactthatthereare

dierenttypesoffragilitywithuniquefeaturesandcharacteristics.Byexploring

theecacyoftwocashtransferprogrammesonedeliveredbythegovernment

inapost-conictsituation(SierraLeone),andonedeliveredbynon-governmental

organisations(NGOs)inafragileandfood-insecureenvironment(northernKenya)

theresearchndingshighlightthefactorsthatinuencethenatureofstate-citizen

relationsincontext-specic,cashtransferprogrammes.ThewestDarfur(Sudan)

casestudyexploresthepotentialofcashtransferstocontributetopeacebuilding,

ruraldevelopmentandlocalinstitutionbuildingatatimewhenthegovernment,the

UNandINGOsarebeginningthetransitionfromemergencyrelieftorecoveryand

development.


12/48


1.5 Research methodology

Thissectiondescribestheresearchprocessandthemethodologyadopted.

Itoutlinesthesamplinganddatacollectiontechniquesusedforeachcasestudy

andhighlightsthelimitationsofthestudy.

1.5.1 The research process

Foreachcasestudy,alogicalstructureandprocedurewasfollowedinorderto

answertheresearchquestions.Themodelisillustratedinthediagrambelow:

Equalattentionwaspaidateachsteptoensurethattheresearchwasconducted

properlyandthendingsareasvalidaspossibleunderunpredictableresearchconditions.Theresearchprocessisnotaclear-cutsequenceofprocedures

followinganeatpatternbutacomplexinteractionbetweentheconceptualand

empiricalworld,withdeductionandinductionoccurringatthesametime.

1.5.2 Qualitative methods

Themethodologyemployedisprimarilyqualitativeusingdocumentaryreviews

tocomplementdatagatheredthroughsemi-structuredinterviewsandfocusgroup

discussions.Forastudyofthiskind,whichneededtofocusontheperceptions

ofstakeholders,aqualitativemethodofresearchprovedtobeabetteroption

thanquantitativemethodsofdatacollection.Areectiveapproachprovidedthe

bestanswerstotheresearchquestionsbecauseitfocusesonthepeople,policy

processesandprogrammesbeingstudied.Ithelpedtocaptureexplanationsofpeoplesactionsandsituationsaswellasthefactorsconstrainingtheir

behaviour.Inthecourseofthisresearch,eortsweremadetoelicitthesubjective

interpretationsoftherespondents.Thisapproachsuggestedacourseofaction,

whichwaslessformalisedbutmoreinductive.

1.5.3 Data collection techniques

Adeskstudyreviewofliteratureontheconceptsofstatefragilityandsocial

protectionwascarriedoutandrelevantdocumentsonsocialprotectionineach

countrywerealsoreviewed.TheseincludedSierraLeonesandKenyasdraft

policydocumentsonsocialprotection,andvariousreportsontheSocialSafety

Net(SSN)programmeandtheHungerSafetyNetProgramme(HSNP).

Data

analysis

Validationworkshop

Findings,recommendationsand

futureresearch

Literaturereviewand

conceptualframework

Researchobjective

andquestions

Data

collection

Data

analysis

Figure 1: The research process


13/48


Semi-structuredinterviewswithkeypolicymakerswereconductedinFreetown,

Nairobi,KhartoumandElGeneina(Darfur)andeldvisitsweremadetoexisting

cashtransferprogrammestargetingolderpeopleinSierraLeoneandnorthern

Kenya.Thesevisitsinvolvedsemi-structuredinterviewswithlocalgovernment

ocialsincludinglocalchiefs.Focusgroupdiscussionswereconductedwith

beneciariesandnon-beneciariesin12chiefdomsinthenorthernandsouthern

regionsofSierraLeoneandthreedistrictsinthearidandsemi-aridlandsof

northernKenya.Intheconict-aectedareaofSudan,westDarfur,semi-structuredinterviewswere

conductedwithocialsofUNagencies,NGOsandtheWestDarfurStateMinistry

ofSocialWelfare.FieldvisitsweremadetofourInternallyDisplacedPersons

(IDP)campsinwestDarfurandfocusgroupdiscussionsconductedwithOlder

PeoplesCommitteemembersineachIDPcamp.Finally,atwo-daystrategic

researchvalidationworkshopwasorganisedinNairobiwithkeypolicymakers

fromSierraLeone,SudanandKenya.

1.5.4 Sampling technique for focus group discussions

SamplesforthefocusgroupdiscussionsinSierraLeonewereselectedonthe

basisofstatisticaldatacontainingthenumberofbeneciariesineachchiefdom,

districtandregion.Thediscussionswerecarriedoutinthefourdistrictswiththehighestnumberofbeneciaries:thethreenortherndistrictsofPortLoko,Bombali

andTonkoliliandthesoutherndistrictofBo.

Withineachdistrict,thethreechiefdomswiththehighestnumberofbeneciaries

wereselectedasgeographicalareasfromwhichtodrawsamples.Thisprovided

atotalof12chiefdoms(threechiefdomseachinfourdistricts).Ineachofthe

chiefdoms,fourbeneciaries(twomenandtwowomen)andfournon-beneciaries

(twomenandtwowomen)wererandomlyselectedatthecommunity Barre4,

wherehundredsofbeneciariesandnon-beneciarieswereinattendance.

InnorthernKenya,onlythreeofthefourdistrictswheretheHSNPisbeing

implementedweresampled:Turkana,WajirandManderadistricts.Therewere

noavailableightstoMarsabitthefourthdistrictatthetimetheeldtrips

tookplace.Thesampleswererandomlyselectedfromtwosub-locationsineach

district(Turkana,WajirandMandera):onesub-locationwhereSocialPension

methodologywaspiloted;andanearbysub-locationwheretheHSNPhadyetto

beimplemented.Theselectionofabeneciarysub-locationandanon-beneciary

sub-locationallowsforcomparisonstobemadewithregardtotheimpactofthe

HSNPRightsComponentonstate-citizenrelations(see3.4.3).

Inthepilotareas,focusgroupdiscussionswereconductedwithmembersofthe

HSNPRightsCommitteeswhichcomprisesbeneciariesandnon-beneciaries

(vemenandfourwomen).Inthenon-pilotareas,discussionswereconducted

withsociallyactivemembersofthecommunity.

InSudan,focusgroupdiscussionswereconductedinfourselectedcampslocated

inwestDarfurstate:KrindigI,KrindigII,MedinatHujajandKerenik.ThefourselectedIDPcampswerebasedontheresearchersaccessandsecurityissues

inaverydicultenvironment.HelpAgeInternationalhasbeenoperatinginthese

campssince2005.

Thefocusgroupscomprisedveoldermenandveolderwomenineachcamp.

ThediscussionswereheldintheOlderPeoplesSocialCentres,whichare

age-friendlyspacesconstructedbyUNHCRandHelpAgeInternational.

TheyaimedtoidentifythechallengesfacingolderIDPsinparticular,andthe

rolecashtransferscouldplayinthetransitionfromemergencyrelieftorecovery

andlong-termdevelopment.


14/48


1.5.5 Study period

ThestudybeganinNovember2009andtheeldtripswerecompletedduring2010.

Thedateswere:

SierraLeone:7to21March

Kenya:20Juneto2July

Sudan:27Julyto12August

SierraLeone:20Octoberto10November

Kenya:28Novemberto10December

1.5.6 Limitations of the study

Amajorlimitationofusingqualitativemethodsisthesmallnumberofsamples

usedfordatacollection.However,thesampleswererepresentativeofthetarget

groupsandonlyrelevantsocialprotectionpolicymakers,programmemanagers

andheadsoflocalgovernmentdepartments,includinglocalchiefs,wereselected

forsemi-structuredinterviews.Thefocusgroupdiscussionsincludedboth

beneciariesandnon-beneciariesofcashtransferprogrammesinSierraLeone

andnorthernKenya,andoldermenandwomenresidentinthefourwestDarfur

IDPcampsselected.

InSierraLeone,thetimelagofovertwoyearssinceimplementationoftheSSN

raisedthepossibilitythattherewouldbedicultiesintrackingexbeneciaries,

whomighthavemovedordied.Inaddition,itwasanticipatedthatmany

beneciariesmightnotbewillingtosharetheirexperiencesofaprojectthat

theyhadbenetedfromtwoyearsbefore.However,thesmallandmanageable

samplesineachchiefdom(see1.5.4)meantthattrackingex-beneciariesand

non-beneciariesdidnotprovetoochallenging.

InnorthernKenyaandSudan,thelanguagebarrierwasaninhibitingfactor,as

theresearcherhadtorelyonlocaltranslators.Sudanprovedthemostchallenging

inaccessingrelevantinformationontheextenttowhichcashtransferprogrammes

couldcontributetobridgingthegapbetweenhumanitarianreliefandrecoveryin

areaspronetoconict.Somerespondents(governmentandUNagencysta)were

reluctanttotalkaboutissuesrelatingtocashtransfersandtothereturnofIDPs

totheiroriginalhomes.


15/48

2. Fragility andsocial protection

W

aleOsofsan/HelpAgeInternational



16/48


2. Fragility and social protection

2.1 State fragility

Thereisnoconsensusonthedenitionoffragilestates.Thisstudyadoptsthe

denitionsgivenbytheGermanFederalMinistryforEconomicCooperationand

Development(BMZ)andtheUKDepartmentforInternationalDevelopment(DFID).

BMZdenesfragilestatesasthoseinwhichstateinstitutionsareveryweakoratriskofcollapse,andwhosepopulationssuerfromwidespreadpoverty,violence

andarbitraryrule.Italsocorrelateswithlackoflegitimacyandoftenitiswomen,

childrenandethnicorreligiousminoritiesthataremostlyadverselyaected. 5

DFIDdenesfragilestatesasstateswherethegovernmentcannotorwillnot

deliverwhatcitizensneedtolivedecent,securelives.Theycannotorwillnot

tacklepoverty.6

Takingintoaccountboththesedenitionsandthoseofotherinternational

developmentagenciessuchastheWorldBank,OECDandtheEU,thecommon

featureidentiedinallfragilestatesistheabsenceofafunctioningstate-citizen

relationshipthelackofeectivepoliticalprocessestoinuencethestateto

meetsocietalexpectations.Inoperationalterms,theconceptoffragilityhelpsus

focusonthespecicdimensionsofastateorsocietythatcancauseinstability.

Allstateshaveaspectsoffragility,andmoststablestatescanalsogothrough

situationsoffragility,orhavepocketsoffragilitywithinspecicregionsor

communities.Statefragilityisthereforeacontinuum.Atoneendofthespectrum,

astatecanbefragiletothepointwhereinternalorexternalforcesareableto

challengeitsauthorityinpartsofitsterritorythroughviolence.Attheotherend

arestatesthatareunableorunwillingtocaterforthewelfareofaparticulargroup

ofcitizensorcertainregionswithinthecountrybuthavenosignicantchallenges

totheirauthorityintheformofviolence.Categorisingfragilestatesmaybeuseful

indrawingimportantdistinctionsbetweendierentattributesandcharacteristics,

butthesedistinctionsshouldbeseenasuidphenomenaratherthanabsolutes.

Mostfragilestatesarecharacterisedbysomeorallofthefollowing:

Highlevelsofpoverty

Pooraccesstobasicservices

Infrastructuraldeciency,suchaspoorroadnetworksandlowtelecommunication

density

Lackofsocialtrustunderpinningthesocialcontractbetweenthestateandits

citizens

Fragmentedandcompetingelitesoftenmanifestedalongethnic,regionalor

religiouslines

Pronetoviolentconict,arecurrentlyinconictorrecoveringfromconict

Rentierstatesandweaktax/scalstates. 7

Statescanalsobeconsideredfragilewhentheyareunabletoperformtheirbasic

functions.Thesefunctionsarecapturedintheliteratureonstate-buildingand

failingstates.8Thefunctionsofthestateframeworkcanbeusedtoelucidatethe

complexconceptofstatefragility.Thisreportfocusesontwointerrelatedfunctions.

Theseareservicedeliverytothestatescitizens,especiallythepoorandinreturn,

thedegreetowhichthestatehaslegitimacyintheeyesofitspeople.Inmost

fragilecontexts,weaknessesinstatecapacityoritsfailuretoperformthese

functions,togetherwiththeweaknatureofitsrelationshipwithitscitizens

aretheunderlyingcausesofitsfragility.


17/48


2.1.1 State-citizen relations

Inthisreport,thetermstate-citizenrelationsreferstoaformofsocialcontractthat

givesthestateitslegitimacyprovideditservesthewillofitscitizens.Inpractical

terms,itinvolvestheabilityofcitizenstodemandservicesandholdstateactorsto

account;andtheextentofthestatesresponsivenesstotheirdemandsandneeds.

Italsoincludescitizensrightsandresponsibilitiestowardsthestateandthelevel

oftrusttheyhaveinthestate.State-citizenrelationshipismulti-dimensional,

touchingonthepolitical,economic,socialandcivilspheres.Instatescurrentlyorpreviouslyaectedbyconict,orpronetoconictinpartsoftheirterritory,

rebuildingpublictrustinstateinstitutionsandmanagingpublicexpectationsis

essentialtoachievingpeaceandstability.

2.2 Social protection

Socialprotectioncanbebroadlydenedasasetofpublicactionsthatprovide

directsupporttopeopletohelpaddressrisk,vulnerabilityandpoverty.Forthe

purposeofthisreport,itisdenedmorenarrowlyasanalternativetermtosocial

security,referringtothesystemofcashtransfers,usuallyprovidedbythestate,

thatoerincomesecurityintheeventofpoverty,unemployment,sickness,

disability,oldageorlossofthebreadwinner.

2.3 Key debates and trends in social protection

Thisreportdoesnotaimtocovertheextensiveandimportantdebateson

deliveringcashtransfersaspartofawidersocialprotectionpackage,butfocuses

onthreeinterconnecteddebateswhichareparticularlyrelevantinfragilestates

andsituations:

theinstrumentalistandactivistperspectiveswhichmayinuence

programmedesign

theimpactofpoverty-targetedsafetynetsanduniversalapproaches

thebalancebetweenprogrammedeliverybystateandnon-stateactors.

2.3.1 Instrumentalist and activist perspectives9

CollaborativeresearchfromtheInstituteforDevelopmentStudies(IDS)onsocial

protectionfromaglobalperspectivesuggeststhatapproachesfallintotwobroad

categories.Thesecanbecharacterisedasinstrumentalistandactivist.

Theinstrumentalistapproacharguesthatextremepoverty,inequalityand

vulnerabilityareimpedimentstotheachievementofdevelopmenttargetssuchas

theMDGs.Inthisviewsocialprotectionisaboutputtinginplaceriskmanagement

mechanismsthatwillcompensateforincompleteorweakinsurancemechanisms

untilatimethatprivateinsurancecanplayamoreprominentroleinsociety. 10

ThisapproachismainlyassociatedwiththeWorldBanksSocialRiskManagement

(SRM)framework,whichexploreshowsocietiesmanagerisk.Itarguesthatall

individuals,householdsandcommunitiesareexposedtomultiplerisksfromdierentsources.SRMaimstoprovideinstrumentsthatenablethepoor(aswell

asthosewhoarenotpoor)tominimisetheimpactofexposuretorisk,andto

changetheirbehaviourinwaysthathelpthemlowertheirvulnerabilityandmove

outofpoverty.

IntheSRMframeworkvulnerabilityisattributedtoagencytheindividualor

groupandtheeventsaectingthematapointintheirlifecycle.Vulnerabilityis

classiedaccordingtoarangeofrisksthatmayaectavarietyoflivelihoodassets.

Thisanalysisinformspolicyandprogrammeworkwhichprioritisesshort-term

poverty-targetedsafetynetsthataimtocushionrisksandshocksthatmayaect

specicvulnerablegroups.

Theactivists,ontheotherhand,takeatransformativeapproach.Theyarguethat

thepersistenceofextremepoverty,inequalityandvulnerabilityisasymptomofsocialinjusticeandstructuralinequality.Socialprotectionisthereforeviewedas

acitizensright.


18/48


Theactivistapproachextendsthedebateonsocialprotectiontoarenassuch

asequity,empowermentandeconomic,socialandculturalrights,ratherthan

conning[its]scopetotargetedincomeandconsumptiontransfers. 11

Therationaleforsocialprotectionisinformedbytheidealofaguaranteed

socialminimum,whereentitlementextendsbeyondcashorfoodtransfersand

isbasedoncitizenship,notphilanthropy.

Accordingtothisanalysis,policyshouldbedirectedatchangingthestructural

contextthatmakespeoplevulnerableintherstplace.Thereistheneedtopursuepoliciesthatrelatetopowerimbalancesinsocietythatencourage,create

andsustainvulnerabilities. 12Thiscontrastswiththeinstrumentalistapproach

ofdesigningpolicyinstrumentsthatprotectpeoplewhentheyfaceshort-run

shocksandlivelihoodrisksinaspeciccontext.

Theimportanceofthisdebateisthatitishasadirectimpactonprogramme

design.Shouldsocialprotectionprogrammes,suchasunconditionalcash

transfers,bepoverty-targetedoruniversal?Whataretheargumentsforand

againsteachapproach?

2.3.2 Poverty-targeted safety nets or universal approaches?

Theargumentssupportingeitherpovertytargetingorauniversalapproachto

cashtransfersfrequentlyfocusonecientresourceallocation,whichissubjecttobudgetaryandscalconstraints.

Poverty-targetedsafetynetprogrammesgainedinuencewiththeWashington

Consensus13inthelate1980sand1990s.Theiracceptancewas,andstillis

basedonthenotionthatitisbettertoconcentratelimitedresourcesonschemes

targetingthepoorestandthemostvulnerableinthesociety.Theseschemes

havebeenregardedasmoreeectiveintransferringresourcestothepoorwhile

simultaneouslyensuringcosteciency,especiallyinsituationswhereresources

areextremelylimited.

Althoughthelogicbehindthisapproachseemstenable,numerousstudieshave

highlightedkeyproblems.Forexample,astudyinhigh-andmiddle-income

countriesintheAmericasfoundthatpovertytargetingisaverycostlyandcomplicatedexercise,whichinvolveshighadministrativecost.Manymeans-tested

andpoverty-targetedprogrammesalsoexperiencehighexclusionandinclusion

errorssothatthenon-poorendupconstitutingasignicantproportionofthe

beneciaries,whilealargeproportionofthepoorareexcluded. 14

FIANInternationalsanalysisofpoverty-targetedcashtransferprogrammesin

twolow-incomeAfricancountriesZambiasKalomopilotprojectandMalawis

Mchinjipilotprojectillustratestheshortcomingsinthedesignofbothprojects.

FIANarguesthatinthehandsofacorruptorpoliticisedimplementing

bureaucracytheseprogrammes(povertytargeted)canotherwiseturnintoatool

foroppression.Thebestwaytoovercomesuchriskswouldbetogetawayfrom

narrowandlittletransparentselectivetargetingandtostrengthenthetransfersto

therecipientsashumanbeings,ratherthanasbeingpoor. 15Thisstudystronglyrecommendsauniversalrights-basedapproachtotransfers.Thiswouldmakethe

recipientsrights-holderswhoareindependentoflocalelitesinboththeselection

anddistributionprocess.

Inadditiontotheshortcomingsofpoverty-targetedprogrammesincountrieswith

highlevelsofpovertyandlowadministrativecapacities,theargumentinfavour

ofuniversalprogrammessupportssocialpolicyobjectivesbasedontheconcepts

ofsolidarity,citizenshipandnationbuilding.Inlinewiththeactivistideological

perspective,theargumentforuniversalismisbasedonequityandsocialjustice.

Universalprogrammesarealsoknowntobeadministrativelyeasiertoimplement

becausetheydonotrequiresophisticatedandcomplextechniquesinselecting

beneciaries.Theymaynotbecompletelyfreefromabuseandleakagesbutthey

arelesspronetoelitecaptureandmanipulation.


19/48


Themainargumentagainstadoptingauniversalapproachfocusesonthescal

implicationswhereresourcesarelimitedandgovernmentshavecompeting

priorities.ThisisclearlyapoliticaldecisionresearchbytheInternationalLabour

Organisation(ILO)andHelpAgeInternational,usingcostingtools,showsthat

universalprogrammesareaordableeveninlow-incomecountries. 16

Giventhehighlevelsofpovertyinfragilestatesandsituationsandthelimited

resourcesavailable,therationalefortargetingthepoorestmayseempersuasive.

However,asalreadynoted,thisisaverydicult,expensiveandcomplicatedexercise.Extremelyhighlevelsoferror,bothofinclusionandexclusion,arewell

documented.

Programmesdesignedtofostersolidarityandstrengthentheconceptofcitizenship

arecriticaltofragilecontextsinwhichthestateisnotseentohaveanypositive

impactonthelivesofitscitizens.Programmesbasedoncitizenshipandsocial

justice,notphilanthropy,arerequired.

Figure 2: Pros and cons of poverty targeting and universal approaches to cash transfers

Characteristicsof fragility

Highlevelsofpoverty

Pooraccesstobasic

services

Infrastructural

deciencypoorroad

networksandlowtelecommunication

coverage

Lackofsocialtrust

inethnicdivided

societies

Fragmentedand

competingelites

oftenmanifested

alongethnicor

religiouslines

Weakstatebureaucracies

Pronetoviolent

conictorare

currentlyinviolent

conict

Poverty-

targeted

approach

tocash

transfers

Pros

Higherscalcost

Competitionforscarce

resourcesespeciallyother

socialexpenditure

Cons

Basedonrights,entitlements

andcitizenship

Contributestonation-building

Easytoscale-up

Improvesbroad-basedaccess

tobasicservices

Biggerimpactonpovertyand

inclusivegrowth

Promotessocialcohesion

Pros

Pronetoleakagesandcorruption

Patronageandclientelism

Compromisedintegrity

Excludesvastmajorityofthepoor

Highlevelsofgrievances

Exacerbatessocialmistrust

inethnicdividedcommunities

Diculttoscale-up

Cons

Lowerscalcost

Universal

categorical

approachto

cashtransfer,

forexample,

social

pensions;

childand

disability

grants


20/48


2.3.3 Government or non-government delivery?

Thethirdcriticalaspecttoconsideriswhichactorsshouldbeinvolvedin

deliveringcashtransfersinfragilestatesandcontexts.Thekeyquestionis:should

cashtransfersbestrictlystate-led,oraresmallerscalenon-stateprogrammesalso

likelytoimprovestate-citizenrelations?

AnOECDreportillustratesthetensionsbetweentheprinciplesintwokey

documentsthatguideinternationalinterventionindevelopingcountriesand,byextension,infragilestates.Ontheonehand,theGood Humanitarian Donorship

(GHD)initiativeisassociatedwithhumanitarianaidanditsprinciplesofneutrality

andindependence.Ontheotherhand,theOECDPrinciplesofengagement

infragilestatesfocusonbuildingthecapacityofstateinstitutionsandtheir

relationshipwiththewidersociety.Thereportarguesthattheprinciples

guidingthesetwoinstrumentsshouldnotbeseenascontradictorybutmutually

complementary.17

GHDprovidesaforumfordonorstodiscussgoodpracticeinHumanitarian

Financing18andothersharedconcerns.Bydeningprinciplesandstandards,it

providesbothaframeworktoguideocialhumanitarianaidandamechanismfor

encouraginggreaterdonoraccountability.Itsprimaryobjectivesfocusonmeeting

theimmediateneedsofpeopleaectedduringandafterman-madecrisesandnaturaldisasters;preventingtheoccurrenceofsuchsituations;andstrengthening

disasterpreparedness.

Itskeyprinciplesare:

Humanitysavinghumanlivesandalleviatingsueringwhereveritisfound

Impartialityimplementingactionssolelyonthebasisofneed,without

discriminationbetweenorwithinaectedpopulations

Neutralityhumanitarianactionmustnotfavouranysideinanarmedconict

orotherdisputewheresuchactioniscarriedout

Independenceautonomyofhumanitarianobjectivesfromthepolitical,

economic,militaryorotherobjectivesthatanyactormayholdwithregardtoareaswherehumanitarianactionisbeingimplemented.

Incontrast,theOECDprinciplesofengagementinfragilestatesfocusona

longer-termvisionforinternationalengagement.Theirmainobjectiveistohelp

nationalreformerstobuildeective,legitimate,andresilientstateinstitutions. 19

Thefocusisonakeyelementofstatebuildingenhancingthecapacityofthe

statetodeliverbasicservicestoitscitizens.

Theprinciplesareasfollows:

Takecontextasthestartingpoint

Donoharm

FocusonstatebuildingasthecentralobjectivePrioritiseprevention

Recognisethelinksbetweenpolitical,securityanddevelopmentobjectives

Promotenon-discriminationasabasisforinclusiveandstablesocieties

Alignwithlocalprioritiesindierentwaysindierentcontexts

Agreeonpracticalcoordinationmechanismsbetweeninternationalactors

Actfastbutstayengagedlongenoughtogivesuccessachance

Avoidpocketsofexclusion.


21/48


Bothsetsofprinciplesareusefulinguidingexternalinterventioninfragilestates,

whetherthestateisinconictorrecoveringfromconict.Humanitarianactors

rightlyarguethatnon-stateactorsshouldnotjustfocusonthedeliveryof

immediatereliefmaterials,suchasfoodandnon-fooditems(NFIs),butalsobe

involvedinthedeliveryofcashtransferstotheaectedandvulnerablepopulation.

Themainobjectivesaretosavethelivesofpeopleatriskinanon-discriminatory,

unbiasedandimpartialmanneraswellasimprovingcopingmechanisms,

strengtheningresiliencetocopewithfutureshocksandvulnerabilities.ThusNGOshaverecentlyaddedcashtransferstotherangeofinstruments

theyuseinassistingpeopleduringemergencies.

Thekeyissueiswhetherornotitispossibletodesignshort-term,humanitarian

-ledcashtransferprogrammesinawaythatcancontributetooratleastinformthe

designofstate-ledprogrammes.Inthecontinuumbetweenhumanitarianreliefand

longer-termdevelopment,cashtransfersinemergencyinterventionscouldsupport

thedevelopmentoflonger-termsocialprotectionprogrammeswheretheyhave

notexistedbefore.20Theseprogrammesneedtobedevelopednotinisolationfrom

governmentandtheyalsoneedtoproactivelybuildanevidencebasetoinform

nationalpolicydebateandformulation.

Forexample,HelpAgeInternationaliscurrentlypilotingasix-monthcashtransferprogrammetargetingolderpeoplein93IDPcampsinHaiti.Oneoftheaimsisto

usethelearningandworkwiththeHaitiangovernmenttodevelopalonger-term

socialpensionprogramme.Onlystate-ownedprogrammeshavethepotential

inthelonger-termtostrengthenstate-citizenrelations,sothegoalistoensurethat

thestateistheprimaryactorindeliveringservices,includingcashtransfers,toits

owncitizens.

TheGrowupFreefromPovertyCoalition(GUFFP)anetworkofUKNGOs

workingonsocialprotectionalsobelievesthatforcashtransferstobesustainable

andinstitutionalised,thestateshouldbethemainactorinnancing,delivering

andadministeringsuchprogrammes. 21

2.4 Conceptual framework: the role of cash transfersin fragile contexts

Thisstudyispremisedonthenotionthatawell-designedcashtransferprogramme

canplayavitalroleinaddressingchronicpovertyandvulnerabilitiesinfragile

contexts;tacklingsomeoftheunderlyingcausesandmanifestationsoffragility;

andstrengtheningtherelationshipbetweenthestateanditscitizens.Astatethat

catersforthewelfareofallofitscitizensirrespectiveofsocialclassisboundto

beseenasmorelegitimate.Regularcashtransferprogrammessuchasuniversal

non-contributorysocialpensionsinNepal,KosovoandTimorLesteareanintegral

partofwidersocialpoliciesputinplacetofostersocialcohesionandre-establish

publictrustinstateinstitutionsintheaftermathofcrisis.

Governmentsgenerallyincludecashtransferschemesinbroadersocialprotection

strategies,partlybecausearangeofstudiesindicatesthatsuchprogrammesareeectiveinincreasingpoorpeoplesdemandforservicesandimprovingtheir

educationandhealthoutcomes,therebycontributingtomeetingtheMDGs.22

Theseschemesarealsopoliticallypopularandhavethepotentialtoenhancethe

legitimacyofthestate.

IntheAfricancontext,mostofthisevidenceontheimpactofcashtransfersis

basedonndingsinlow-andmiddle-incomenon-fragilestates,particularlyin

SouthernAfrica.CountriessuchasBotswana,Lesotho,NamibiaandSouthAfrica

haveputinplacestate-fundedcashtransferprogrammes,includingsocialpensions

intheformofunconditionalcashtransferstargetedatolderpeople.Otherstate-

ownedprogrammesincludedisabilitygrantsinSouthAfricaandNamibia;poverty-

targetedsocialassistanceschemesinBotswana;andtheChildSupportGrantin

SouthAfrica.WhileSouthAfricaisclassiedasamiddle-incomecountry,it

increasedthescaleofitsnon-contributorypensionintheimmediatepost-apartheid

periodtocounteractsocialtensionsandthevastgapbetweentherichandthepoor.


22/48


InKenya,ZambiaandUganda,donorshaveplayedactiverolesinnancingand

providingtechnicalsupporttocashtransferpilotprojectsinKenya,theHunger

SafetyNetProgramme(HSNP);inZambia,anumberofpilotsocialcashtransfer

programmes;andinUganda,theSocialAssistanceGrantsforEmpowerment

(SAGE).Thesmall-scalenatureofthesepilotsallowsformanageablemonitoring

andevaluationsystems,whichhavebeenverypositive.However,thereare

legitimateconcernsaboutthelong-termviabilityandsustainabilityofsuchpilots,

especiallywhentheyarescaleduptothenationallevel.23

Moreover,thesegovernmentshavebeenreluctanttotakeresponsibilityforthenancingand

long-termsustainabilityoftheseprogrammes. 24

Thereisveryconsistentevidencethatcapturesrisinglivingstandardsofthepoor;

agrowingbodyofpositiveevidencethatcaptureshumandevelopment/human

capital;andastronglogictodatewithlimitedevidencewithregardstothe

economicimpactandgrowthinclusivenessofcashtransferprogrammes.

However,thereisextremelylittleevidencethatcapturestheimpactofcashtransfer

programmesonstate-buildinginfragilestates. 25Thenextsectionlooksbeyond

livingstandards,humancapitaldevelopmentandeconomicimpactsofcash

transferprogrammesbutfocusesontheirpotentialroleinstrengtheningstate-

citizenrelationsanimportantelementofstate-building.Thisisacritical

imperativeinmost,ifnotallfragilestates.Themainfocusisontwoexistingcashtransferprogrammesthatincludeolderpeopleasbeneciaries,inSierraLeone

andnorthernKenya,andthepotentialofacashtransferschemetobridgethegap

betweenreliefandrecoveryinwestDarfur,Sudan.


23/48

K

ateHolt/HelpAgeInternational


3. Case studies:

Sierra Leone,northern Kenyaand Sudan


24/48


3. Case Studies:Sierra Leone, northern Kenya and Sudan

3.1 Contexts: categories and attributes of fragility

Thethreecasestudieshavebeenselectedtoreectdierenttypesofstatefragility.

Itisdiculttoplacestatesexperiencingelementsoffragilityintoneatandrigid

categories.Fragilityisacomplexanduidconceptandstatescanmovefromonecategorytotheotherdependingonunpredictablecircumstances.Whilethereare

strikingdierencesbetweenthethreecasestudies,therearealsorevealing

similaritiesintheformsoffragilitytheyexhibit.

Dierences

SierraLeoneisapost-conictstatethatisworkingtowardsdeliveringservices

toitscitizensbutthecapacityofstateinstitutionstodeliverbasicservices

stillneedsfurtherstrengthening.Publicexpectationsofpeacedividends

arestillquitehighasmanyarestillrebuildingtheirlivesintheaftermathof

adevastatingcivilwar,whichnallyendedin2002.

Kenyaisarelativelystrongstatewithsignicantchallengesparticularlyinthe

northernpartsofthecountry.Theviolencethateruptedafterthe2008electionsalsoexposedtheunderlyingtensionsandfragilitiesbeneaththeapparently

peacefulsurface.Kenyaisthesub-regionalpowerinEastAfricabutavastarea

ofaridandsemi-aridland(ASAL)lagsbehindtherestofthecountryinsocio-

economicandinfrastructuraldevelopment.Thisareaisconsideredfragiledue

toitstopography,foodinsecurityandvulnerabilitytoviolentconictsparticularly

inTurkanainthenorthwest,borderingSouthSudanandnorthernUganda.

ThebordertownofMandera,overlookingSomaliaandEthiopiatothenortheast

alsoexperiencesperiodicoutbreaksofviolentconict.

Sudanisaconict-aectedstateinwhichtheNorthhasbeeninandoutof

conictwiththeSouthfordecades.TheSouthwillsoonbecomeanewcountry

asaresultoftherecentreferendum.Inrecentyears,conicthasalsoeruptedin

Darfur,westernSudan.Muchofthepopulationremainsatorbelowthepoverty

line.FollowingtwodecadesofcivilwarintheSouthandtheDarfurconict,large

areasofthecountrylackbasicinfrastructure,andmuchofthepopulationrelies

onsubsistenceagriculture.

Thethreecountriesareatdierentlevelsofinfrastructuraldevelopment.

WhilemanyareasinnorthernKenyaandinDarfurtowncentreshaveelectricity,

inSierraLeoneonlythecapitalcity,Freetowncurrentlyhaselectricity,though

plansareunderwaytosupplyotherpartsofthecountry.Atpresent,therestofthe

countryreliesongenerators(forthosethatcanaordthem)topowertheirhomes,

ocesandbusinesses.ComparedtonorthernKenyaandDarfur,mobilephone

coverageinruralcommunitiesinSierraLeoneisextremelylow.

TheconictinDarfurandinstabilityinnorthernKenyathatborderonSomalia,Ethiopia,SouthSudanandnorthernUgandahavegeneratedlargenumbersof

displacedpersons.Theseareeitherrefugees,whohavemanagedtocrossborders

orinternallydisplacedpersons(IDPs),whoremaindisplacedwithinKenyaor

Sudan.ForexamplethousandsofIDPsweredisplacedduringthe2008post-election

violenceinKenya.Incontrast,asapost-conictdevelopingstate,SierraLeoneno

longerhasaseriousproblemwithinternaldisplacement.


25/48


Similarities

Therearealsoregionalinequitiesinsocio-economicdevelopment.Forexample,

northernKenyaandDarfur,Sudanlagbehindotherpartsoftheirrespectivetwo

countriesinbothsocio-economicandinfrastructuraldevelopment.Someareasin

easternSudanareinfactpoorerthanthesouthandthewest(Darfur)andthey

alsoexperienceoutbreaksofviolentconict.InSierraLeone,povertylevelsare

higherintheeast(wherethecivilwarbeganandended)andinthenorthcompared

tothewestandsouth.Thereappearstobeacorrelationbetweenlowlevelsofdevelopmentandsusceptibilitytoeruptionofviolentconicts,particularlyinareas

withthelowesteconomicandinfrastructuraldevelopment.

Thethreecountriesalldependonprimarycommoditiesandtheirnaturalresources

togenerateexternalrevenue.Kenyareliesonseveralprimaryproducts(tea,coee,

etc)whosepricesremainlowintheinternationalcommoditymarket.75percentof

itslabourforceworksintheagriculturalsector.

SierraLeonereliesonalluvialdiamondandothermineralresourcesasthemajor

sourceofhardcurrencyearnings,accountingfornearlyhalfofSierraLeones

exports.50percentoftheworking-agepopulationisengagedinsubsistence

agriculture.

Sudanbeganexportingcrudeoilinthelastquarterof1999andtheeconomyboomedonthebackofincreasesinoilproduction,highoilprices,andsignicant

inowsofforeigndirectinvestmentuntilthesecondhalfof2008.80percent

ofthepopulationreliesonsubsistenceagriculture.

ServicedeliveryinnorthernKenya,westDarfurandmanyruralareasin

SierraLeoneismainlycarriedoutwiththesupportoflocalandinternational

non-governmentalorganisations.Anothersignicantsimilaritybetweenthethree

casestudycountriesthataectssocialprovisionispoorrecordkeepingincivil

registrationsystems,particularlyatlocalgovernmentlevel.Forexample,there

islackofreliabledataonthenumberofolderpeopleatthechiefdomlevelin

SierraLeone,andinremotecommunitiesinnorthernKenyaandwestDarfur.

3.2 The impact of fragility on citizens: the example ofolder women and their households

Basedonobservationduringtheeldworkforthisstudy,olderwomenand

childrenconstitutethemajorityintheruralareas.Theimpactsoffragilityonolder

womenandtheirhouseholdsvaryindegreeaccordingtothenatureandcontext

offragility.Thecommonchallengesfacingolderwomeninthethreecasestudies

aresimilartothosefoundinmanyotherlow-incomeAfricancountries.

Challenges facing older women

Lackofaregularsourceofincome

Declininghealthandphysicalstrength

Lackofaccesstofreemedicalservices

Foodinsecurity

Lackofproductiveassets

Intensiverural-urbanmigrationofable-bodiedmembersofthehousehold


26/48


Poverty,illhealthandfoodinsecurityamongolderwomengreatlyimpedetheirrole

ascaregiversfortheirgrandchildren.Manyolderwomen,especiallyinruralareas,

areresponsiblefortheirgrandchildrenbecausemostmaleandmiddle-agedfamily

memberstendtomigratetourbancentresandinmanycasesstruggletoremitcash

totheirfamiliesintheruralareas.

Olderwomengenerallyworktosupporttheirfamiliesbuttheprevailinginsecurity

infragilesituations,suchastheborderareasofnorthernKenya,restrictstheir

abilitytocontinueworkingasfarmersandpastoralists.Asaresult,theydonothavearegularsourceofincometosupportthemselvesandtheirgrandchildren.

Theyalsolackproductiveassets,whichmanyhavelostasaresultofon-going

conictorpreviousconicts.

Althoughtheyareavulnerablegroup,olderpeoplearenotincludedingovernment-

runprogrammesprovidingfreeaccesstohealthservices.InSierraLeone,for

example,olderwomenarenotincludedinthefreeaccesstohealthcare,unlike

pregnantwomen,lactatingmothersandchildrenunderveyearsold.Similarly,

Sudanprovidesfreedrugsforchildrenbutnotforolderpeople.Inthethreecase

studyareas,manyolderpeople,includingolderwomeninruralareas,suerfrom

issuesrelatedtomobility,non-communicablediseasesandpooreyesightallof

whichcanbetreatedatlowcost.

Intheconict-aectedareasofwestDarfur,olderwomeninIDPcampsface

signicantchallengesinreturningtotheiroriginalcommunities.Somendit

diculttoreturnduetofrailtyandfailinghealth.Manywouldliketoreturnbutare

worriedthattheywouldlosethebenetsandservicestheycurrentlyreceiveas

campresidents.Forexample,theirgrandchildrenwouldnothaveaccesstoschools

andprimaryhealthcareintheruralareas,iftheyreturnedtoareaswherebasic

socialservicesarepoorornon-existent.Apartfromthegeneralreluctancetoreturn,

manyolderwomeninIDPcampsinwestDarfurseetheOlderPeoplesSocial

Centres,(age-friendlyspacesinthecamps)asanimportantpartoftheirlives

becausetheyplayacriticalpsycho-socialrole.

3.3 Existing social protection measures targetingolder people

Withintheirwidersocialprotectionframeworksallthreecountrieshavesocial

insuranceschemeswhichmainlycoverworkersinformalemployment.However,

themajorityofworkers,includingolderpeople,operateintheinformalsector.

Thereare,therefore,hugegapsincoverage.

KenyaandSierraLeonehavecashtransfersocialassistanceprogrammeswhile

SudanreliesonZakat fundstoassistthepoorandneedy.Thecashtransfer

programmesinKenya(OPCTandHSNP)andSierraLeone(SSN)arepoverty-

targetedandapplyaformofmeanstestingtoselectbeneciaries.Theonly

exceptionistheHSNPssocialpensionmethodology.WhiletheOPCTandSSN

arefullyfundedandimplementedbythegovernment,theHSNPisadonor-funded

andNGO-implementedprogramme.TheHSNPsecretariat,locatedintheMinistryofNorthernKenyaandotherAridLands,isresponsiblefortheoverallcoordination

oftheprogramme,butisnotdirectlyinvolvedinimplementation.

I have six grand-

children under my

care because my twosons have abandoned

us in the village.

I have diculties

providing for them

[grandchildren].

Two have dropped

out of school because

they need to support

the rest of us. I amalso not feeling too

well and cant aord

to buy medicine

because I dont

have money.

AishatuBangura,80,older

womaninSierraLeone


27/48


3.3.1 Sudan26

ThemainsocialprotectionsysteminSudanistheNationalPensionFund(NPF)

whichcoverspublicserviceemployees.Apartfromcollectingcontributionsand

payingpensions,theNPFperformstwootherfunctionstoassistpensionersand

theirfamilies.ThesearethePensionersSocialDevelopmentSchemeand

PensionersSocialAidDirectorate.

TheIslamicsystemofZakatwherebyMuslimsearningover10,000Sudanese

pounds(US$3,575.26)perannumareobligatedbyIslamiclawtopay2.5percent

oftheirannualincomeintothefundprovidessocialassistance.Thisfundcaters

fortheneedsofthepoor,whichincludespoorolderpeople,peoplewithdisabilities

andthoseindireneedofhelp.TheZakatisadministeredthroughtheZakat

ChamberandisbasedonIslamiclaw.

ApartfromthecurrentroleplayedbytheNPFandZakatChamber,the

GovernmentofSudanhastheoverallresponsibilityforolderpeopleinthecountry

throughtheFederalMinistryofWelfareandSocialSecurity.Italsooerssome

formofsupporttospecialcategoriessuchasorphanedandvulnerablechildren,

peoplelivingwithdisabilityandveryfrailolderpeople.Ithasdevelopeda

comprehensivenationalstrategyonageingandestablishedaNationalCommittee

forOldAge.TheFederalMinistryinKhartoumformulatesandregulatesgeneral

policies.However,theMinistryofSocialWelfareineachstategovernmentcan

alsoarticulateandimplementpoliciesatthestatelevel.

Pensioners Social Development Scheme

toalleviatepovertyamongpensionersthroughtheprovisionof

interest-freelongtermloanstoestablishsmallbusinesses

numberofbeneciariesintheperiod2001-2009amountedtoaround

43,000pensioners

Pensioners Social Aid Directorate

toprovidepensionerswithnancialsupporttoalleviatetherising

costofliving

tosubsidisecostofmedicationandeducationfortheirchildren

Zakat

basedontheIslamiccode

thewealthycontributetoassistthepoor

We dont really

want to be here but

we cant go home

because we fear for

our lives. There is no

security back there.We are happy that

HelpAge has built

this social centre for

us and is helping us

with other items.

Aminat,76,olderwoman,

MedinatHujajIDPCamp


28/48


3.3.2 Sierra Leone

AsocialprotectionpolicyframeworkpreparedbyaTechnicalSteeringCommittee

wasrecentlyapprovedbytheCabinet.Akeyobjectiveofthepolicyframeworkis

topromoteastrongerstate-citizenrelationship.Inthispolicyframework,older

peopleareprioritisedasamongthemostvulnerablegroup,nexttochildrenand

peoplewithdisabilities.Thedocumentrecognisessocialprotectionasaneective

mechanismtoaddresschildhoodpovertyandtobreaktheintergenerational

cycleofpovertywithinfamilies.

NASSIT

compulsoryforallemployeesintheformalsector

coverslessthan5percentoftheworkingpopulation

SSN (pilot phase 2007 to 2008)

non-contributoryscheme

100percentgovernmentfunded

targeted16,291beneciaries

basedonpovertytargeting

agecriteria:60andabove

one-opaymentSLL200,000(US$47)

TheGovernmentofSierraLeoneisalsocommittedtoworkingwithnon-state

actorstostrengthenexistingsocialassistanceschemesbyincreasingcoverage

andimprovingoutcomes.ThesystemcomprisesasocialinsurancesystemmanagedbytheNationalSocial

SecurityInvestmentTrust(NASSIT).Membershipofthisschemeiscompulsory

forallformallyemployedworkers.TheNASSITistryingtoextendthebenetsof

theschemetoagreaternumberofself-employedworkers,inordertoincreasethe

numberofindividualsandfamiliesprotectedfromtheconsequencesoflossof

employmentthroughdeath,injuryorbusinessfailure.

TheSocialSafetyNet(SSN)programme(analysedinSection3.4.1)isanexample

ofasocialassistanceschemedesignedtotargetthepoorestofthepoorolder

people.Between2007and2008,over16,000olderpeoplereceivedaone-oor

two-cyclepaymentofSLL200,000(US$47).


29/48


3.3.3 Kenya

InKenya,socialinsuranceschemesconsistoftheNationalSocialSecurityFund

(NSSF),theCivilServicePensionSchemeandtheOccupationalPensionScheme.

Asaresultofinadequatesocialsecurityprovision,theMinistryofGender,Children

andSocialDevelopment(MGCSD)hasbeenleadingpolicydevelopmentthatwould

caterfortheprotectionofvulnerablegroupsexcludedfromtheaboveschemes.

TheOrphanandVulnerableChildrenCashTransfer(OVC-CT)supportedby

theWorldBankandUNICEFandtheOlderPersonsCashTransfer(OPCT)a100percentgovernment-fundedprogrammeareimplementedbythisministry.

TheOPCTspecicallytargetsolderpeople.Launchedin2009,ittargets32,250poor

andvulnerableolderpersonsaged65yearsandabovein44districts,covering750

householdsperdistrict.ThebeneciariesreceiveKShs1,500(US$18)permonth.

Duringtheyear2009/2010,theGovernmentallocatedKShs550m(US$6.6m)tothis

programme,whichwasrolledoutinallthetargeteddistricts.

ApartfromtheOPCT,thereistheHSNPajointGovernmentofKenya/DFID

initiative(analysedinSection3.4.3).Theprogrammeisbeingimplementedintwo

phases.TheobjectiveofPhaseI(April2007-March2011)istodesignandpilot

cost-eectivemechanismsforbeneciarytargeting,paymentdeliveryandgrievance

managementin13districtsacrossnorthernKenya,targeting60,000beneciaries.

Thefocusofthisphasewillbeacomparisonofthecost-eectivenessofthree

dierenttypesoftargetingmethodology:auniversalsocialpension(forpeopleaged

over55years);community-basedtargeting;andtargetingbasedonahousehold

dependencyratio.

PhaseII(2012-2017)isexpectedtoselectoneormoreofthesetargetingapproaches(basedonevidenceofcost-eectivenessandimpact)androllitout,alongwiththe

processesforpaymentsandgrievancemanagement,to300,000households.

NSSF

approximately800,000members

CivilPensionSchemeestimatedapproximately125,000persons(2003)

OccupationalPensionSchemecoveringapproximately1,352persons

OPCT

100percentgovernment-funded

targets32,250poorandvulnerableolderpeople

covers44districts

750householdsperdistrict

agecriteria65andaboveKShs1,500(US$18)permonth

HSNP (phase I 2007-2011)

donor-funded/NGO-implementedpilotproject

thethreemethodologiescombinedtargeted35,000olderpeople

13districtsacrossnorthernKenya

agecriteria55andabove

KShs2,150(US$25.90)everytwomonths


30/48


3.4 Cash transfers and state-citizen relations

Cashtransferprogrammescancontributetostrengtheningtherelationshipbetween

thestateanditscitizensand,intheprocess,enhancingthelegitimacyofthestate.

ThenextsectionsexaminetheimpactoftheSSNprogrammeinSierraLeoneand

theHSNPprogrammeinKenyaonstate-citizenrelations.Whatarethefactorsthat

inuencethenatureofstate-citizenrelationsinthecontextofacashtransfer

programme?Whatarethelimitationsandchallenges?IntheSudanesecontext,

whatrolecancashtransfersplayinaregionlikewestDarfur,wherethegovernmentanddonorsarekeentoshiftfromemergencyrelieftorecoveryandlonger-term

development?

3.4.1 Impact of the SSN on state-citizen relations in Sierra Leone

AcentralobjectiveoftheSSNinSierraLeonewastoassisttheoldandneedyin

suchawaythatitincreasestheirsenseofcitizenshipparticipationandreintegration

intocommunitylife. 27Theprogrammecovered65chiefdomsoutof149chiefdoms

intheprovinces,withatotalof16,291olderbeneciaries(60yearsandabove)

between2007/2008.TheconceptpaperfortheSSNschemeidentiedthemost

vulnerableinsocietyasintendedbeneciaries.Thebasicideawasnottogive

handouts,butahandup.Itdenedasocialsafetynetforolderpeopleandthe

needyasaschemeforpeoplewithnomeansofsupport,whohavenoregularincomeandareunabletowork.Theschemeisdescribedasnon-contributoryand

fullyfundedbyGovernment.

Implementation

Intermsofimplementation,acommunity-basedtargetingapproachwasseenasthe

bestwaytoidentifythosemeetingthecriteriaforeligibility.Thebeneciariesmust:

havenoregularincome

havenoothermeansofsupport

beunabletowork

aged60yearsoldandabove.

Data

analysis

SSN Sta + SSN ChiefdomCommittees

Verication and photo identication

Monitoring andEvaluation Unit

Monitor registration and payments

Chiefdom CommitteesIdentify beneciaries

Social Safety Net Ocers Collate and analyse the data

SSN StaDirectly deliver payments to beneciaries

(Hand-to-hand delivery)

Figure 3: SSN delivery owchart


31/48


Althoughthelackofviableorganisationalstructuresinthecommunitywas

identiedasamajorconstraintinimplementingtheprogramme,theestablishment

ofacommitteeineachcommunitybecameanabsolutenecessity.28Thoseliving

inparticularlocalgovernmentunits(chiefdoms)wereconsideredcollectivelyto

havegoodknowledgeofthecircumstancesofpersonsinthecommunity.Each

committeewasheadedbytheparamountchieforhisdesignatedrepresentative,

andthecommitteemembersweretocarryouttheirduties(identifyingbeneciaries)

voluntarilyandfreeofcharge.Thestudyexaminedtheimpactoftheprogrammeonstate-citizenrelations

howfaritcontributedtoenhancingcitizenstrustofthestate,andwhetherthe

programmewasviewedasempoweringordisempowering.Focusgroupdiscussions

withbeneciariesandnon-beneciariesandsemi-structuredinterviewswith

paramountchiefsandtheirdesignatedrepresentatives,includingsectionchiefs,

wereconductedin12selectedchiefdoms.

Beneciary and non-beneciaries responses

Whilethebeneciariesoftheprogrammeexperiencedapositivechangeintheir

economicandmaterialwellbeingasaresultofthecashtransfer,ndingsfrom

thefocusgroupdiscussionsshowedthatalmosteveryrespondentexpressedthebeliefthatthewaytheactualselectionofbeneciarieswascarriedoutwasunfair.

Forexample,therewasaconsensusin7chiefdomsthatthemembersofthelocal

committee,includingtheparamountchief,selectedmostofthebeneciaries

withoutrecoursetothecriteriaforeligibility.Inchiefdomswherethecriteria

wereused,somebeneciariesandnon-beneciariesdidnotunderstandthe

questionstheywereasked.Insomeinstances,committeemembersweresaidto

havebeengivenmoneybeforeputtingpeoplesnamesforwardasbeneciaries.

In10chiefdoms,beneciariessaidtheydidnotreceivetheexactamountof

moneytheywereentitledtoreceive.Insomechiefdoms,committeemembers

weresaidtohavedeductedbetween2.5and25percentfromthesumeach

beneciarywasentitledtoreceive. 29ForexampleinGbinti,focusgroupsreported

thateachbeneciarywastakentoaseparateroomafterreceivingpaymentandwasaskedgiveSLL20,000(US$4.70)astheircontributiontotheworkdoneby

Districts

PortLoko

Tonkolili

Bombali

Bo

Chiefdoms

Maforki

Dibia

Marampa

KholifaRowallah

Gbonkolenken

Gbonkolenken

GbendembuNgowahun

GbendembuNgowahunBombaliSheborah

BumpeNgao

BumpeNgao

BumpeNgao

Towns

PortLokoTown

Gbinti

Lunsar

Magburaka

Yele

Mayepo

Gbendembu

KalangbaMakeni

Bumpetown

Borgo

Serabu

Table 1: List of districts, chiefdoms and towns surveyed

Those who got the

money were lucky and

we that didnt get the

money were unlucky.

MohammedBangura,65,

olderman(non-beneciary)


32/48


localcommitteemembers.Itwasnotclearwhetherthesesidepaymentstolocal

committeemembersinGbintiweremadevoluntarilyornot,astherewasno

consensusamongthebeneciariesthatparticipatedinthefocusgroupdiscussion.

Twobeneciariessaidtheywerehappytopartwiththemoneywhiletwoothers

saidtheyhadnochoicebuttopaythecommitteemembersasrequested.

Inall12chiefdoms,thefocusgroupdiscussantsbelievedthatthegovernmenthad

verygoodintentionsinintroducingtheprogrammebutunfortunatelylocalpolitical

eliteshijackeditduringimplementation.

Severalbeneciariesandnon-beneciariesbelievedthattheselectionprocesswas

fraughtwithirregularities,asthemajorityofbeneciarieswerenotselectedbased

onthevulnerabilitycriteriasetbythegovernment.Rather,respondentsclaimed

selectionwasbasedonfavouritism.Forexample,inMagburukatown,respondents

reportedthateachsectionchiefpresentedtenpersonswithoutreferencetothe

selectioncriteriaandnoexplanationwasgiventothewidercommunity.

During registration I was asked whether I had anyone

supporting me in the house and I said yes. I was later told that

I did not qualify to receive the money because I have someonesupporting me. I say they are wrong. When I was asked the

question, I thought they were referring to my grandchildren who

I send on errands. I am the one looking after them and we cant

aord to even eat a good meal every day. How can they say

that because I have little children under my care that I dont

deserve the money? It is very unfair but I will keep praying to

God who is bigger than everyone.

AminaSesay,70,olderwoman

Afewpeoplebelowtheagecriteria(60andabove)alsobenetedfromthe

programme.Forinstance,inBumpetown,BorgoandSerabu(inBodistrict)

beneciariesandnon-beneciariessaidthatafewpersonsbelow60yearsold

receivedthecashbecausetheywereselectedbytheirsectionchiefs.

Afewnon-beneciariesalsobelievedthattheirexclusionfromtheprogrammewas

theresultofbadluckandlackoftimelyinformationregardingtheprogramme.

Manysaidtheywerenotawareoftheregistrationexercise.Severalhopedthatthey

wouldbeabletobenetfromtheprogrammewhennextitcametotheircommunity.

Problemswerealsoidentiedwithpaymentofbenets.Registrationoftentook

placebetween8amand5pmandlocalcommitteemembersworkedonarstcome

rstservebasis.Inmanycasesthosewhowereregistereddidnotreceivethe

money.TheyweretoldthattheocialsfromFreetownhadrunoutofmoneyand

wouldreturninthenearfuturetocontinuetheexercise.

I believe I didnt benet from the programme because the

people that did the selection accused me of supporting the

wrong political party. It was obvious that they were rewarding

those who support their preferred candidate.

AdamaKoroma,80,olderwoman


33/48


InanextremecaseinKalangbatown,localcommitteemembersweresaid

tohavecompletelydisregardedthepreviousregistrationlistandwereselecting

beneciariesbasedonwhowaswillingandabletopartwithmoney.Forexample,

threeofthenon-beneciarieswhoparticipatedinthefocusgroupdiscussionin

Kalangbatownwereregisteredbutdidnotreceivethemoneybecausetheywere

unabletomeetthedemandsofsomeofthelocalcommitteemembers.Inaddition,

over300peoplewhopaidSLL5,000(US$1.16)upfrontduringregistrationdidnot

receivethecashtransferonthedaypaymentsweremade.Yettheywerenot

refunded.Youthsbelievedtoberepresentingsomepowerfullocalelitesweresaidto

havehijackedtheprocesswithouttheknowledgeofprogrammestafromFreetown.

Inafewchiefdoms,manypoorandvulnerableolderpeoplewholiveinextremelyremotevillagesfarfromthemaintownofthechiefdomwereunabletoparticipate

duringregistration.Theyeithercouldnotaordtomakethejourneytothe

registrationcentre,ortheywerecompletelyunawareoftheexercise.Thesection

chiefswhorepresentedagroupofvillageswereblamedfornotinformingtheir

constituencies,despitethefactthatocialsinFreetownsentrepresentativesin

advanceatleasttwoweekspriortoregistrationandpaymenttoinformthe

communitiesabouttheprogramme.

On the day they distributed the money, the people in

charge demanded that we pay them before they give us

the money. These people are here in this town. One of

them is the former councillor. He said we had to pay for

the paper they are using and they also need the money

to entertain the ocials from Freetown. So those of us

that could not pay were unable to receive the money.

Olderwoman,Kalangbatown

The chiefs were responsible because they inuenced the

people that came from Freetown in order to favour some

people who are related to them or people they like but

they are still our brothers and sisters. I hope next time

I will be lucky to receive the money. I will keep praying.

MusaSesay,67,olderman

Forthosewhowereabletobenetfromtheprogramme,thetimeandeortspent

tryingtoregisterandsubsequentlyreceivepaymentwasdescribedasde-

humanising.Paymentdayswereparticularlychaoticandpoorlyorganised.Several

frailoldermenandwomenspentthewholedayinovercrowdedcommunitycentres

becauseasmanypeopleaspossibleweredeterminedtobenetfromthecash

transfer.Onpaymentday,beneciariesalsohadtopayforsecuritywhenreturning

totheirvillagesastheyfearedbeingattackedonthewayhome.Infact,therewere

noincidentsofrobberyorattacksreportedinanyofthe12chiefdomssurveyed.

Intermsofdesign,theprogrammehadnogrievancemechanismsinplacesothat

individualscouldregistercomplaints.Manyfeltpowerlessandfrustrated.They

couldonlyvoicethesefrustrationstotheirlocalchiefs,whommanypeoplebelieved

wereresponsiblefortheirexclusion.Inresponsetotheseallegations,afewchiefs

mentionedduringinterviewsthattheywereputinaverydicultposition,because

thelocalcommitteesfounditextremelychallengingtoselectthemostvulnerablein

asituationwheretheybelievedpracticallyeveryonewasvulnerableanddeserved

toreceivethemoney.Afewchiefswerealsounhappythattheprogrammeinitiators

didnotseettocompensatethemfortakingpartintheprocess.


34/48


Intermsofsocialcohesion,theprogrammerarelycausedconict.Intheareas

whereitwasimplemented,theethniccongurationinmanyofthechiefdomsis

fairlyhomogenous.Forexample,inseveralnorthernchiefdomsthepopulation

ismainlyTemne,whileinsouthernchiefdoms,theMendepeoplepredominate.

However,inBiriwachiefdominthenorthwest 30,therearetwoethnicgroupsand

theparamountchiefisfromtheminorityMandingotribe.Hewasneveraccepted

asthelegitimateleaderbytheLimbaswhoconstitutethemajorityinthechiefdom.

TheprogrammewasseverelydisruptedbecausethemajorityLimbatriberefused

toacceptthechiefasheadofthelocalcommittee.Asaresultofthedispute,only

77olderpeoplebenetedinsteadofthe450allocatedtoBiriwa.Severalvulnerable

LimbasrefusedtoturnupforregistrationbecausetheydidnottrusttheMandingochief.

Thelessonisthatpoverty-targetedprogrammesinahomogenouscommunity

arelesslikelytoleadtosocialtensionsbutthisisprobablynotthecaseina

heterogeneousanddividedcommunity.

When I went to plead with my section chief to add my name

as a beneciary he asked me to bring two chickens. I asked

him where he expected me to get them from, considering that

I am very poor and blind for that matter.

Joe,65,olderman,BumpeTown,BumpeNgaoChiefdom

As the head of the Chiefdom, the people always blame us

(the paramount chief and the section chiefs) irrespective of what

we do in such circumstances. Those that didnt receive the money

hold us responsible for their exclusion. It will make life much

easier for us if everyone benets from the programme.

Aparamountchief,SierraLeone

Thesendingsdemonstratethatpoverty-targetedprogrammescannotbe

guaranteedtobetransparentandfair.Furthermore,itisverychallengingtorely

oncommunitypowerstructuresforcredibleimplementation,particularlywhere

membersofthelocalcommitteesarealsopooranddesperatetobenetfromthe

cashtransfer.Itinevitablysubjectstheprogrammetotheriskoflocalelitecapture

andpatronage.

Thusapotentiallygoodprogrammeendeduplosingcredibilityandsupportfrom

thewidercommunity.Evenwithinremoteruralcommunities,thereareandwillalwaysbepowerrelationsatplayandtheseneededtobetakenintoconsideration.

Thoughsomeofthebeneciariesoftheprogrammeexperiencedachangeintheir

economicandmaterialwellbeingasaresultofthetransfer,manynon-beneciaries

feltcheatedandpowerless.

Itwasalsobelievedwithinthechiefdomswheretheprogrammeswereimplemented

thatthelocalelitesusedtheprogrammeasapoliticaltool.Therewer

Documents

Strengthening State-Citizen Relations in Fragile Contexts (full report)