Strategy Implementation

Helsinki University of Technology

Department of Electrical and Communications Engineering

Saku Mantere

Sensemaking in Strategy Implementation

Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements

for the degree of Master of Science in Engineering

Espoo, November 1, 2000

Supervisor: Professor Veikko Teikari

Instructor: Doctor of Technology Miia Martinsuo

Table of contents

ABSTRACT

TIIVISTELMÄ

FOREWORD

1. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................................ 1

1.1 BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION FOR THE STUDY...................................................................... 1 1.2 WHAT IS STRATEGY?.................................................................................................................. 2

1.2.1 Mintzberg’s five P’s ......................................................................................................... 3 1.2.2 The linear, adaptive and interpretive model for strategy................................................. 4 1.2.3 The content and process paradigms in strategy research ................................................ 5

1.3 RESEARCH TASK AND SCOPE ...................................................................................................... 8

2. STRATEGY IMPLEMENTATION .............................................................................................. 11

2.1 STRATEGY IMPLEMENTATION IN STRATEGY RESEARCH LITERATURE ....................................... 11 2.1.1 General guidelines and problems .................................................................................. 12 2.1.2 Implementation through structure and systems.............................................................. 14 2.1.3 Holistic views on implementation: structure, systems and culture ................................ 16

2.2 CONTEXT, CONTENT AND PROCESS IN IMPLEMENTATION ......................................................... 21 2.3 ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE AS INTERNAL CONTEXT ............................................................... 26

2.3.1 Language as the medium of communicating organizational culture................................... 30 2.3.2 Meaning in organizations .............................................................................................. 36 2.3.3 Culture on different organizational levels ..................................................................... 42 2.3.4 Cultural implications for strategy implementation ........................................................ 42

2.4 THE PROCESSES OF ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE ........................................................................... 44 2.4.1 Cognitive processes........................................................................................................ 47 2.4.2 Organizational behavior ................................................................................................ 54 2.4.3 The role of organizational levels in change processes................................................... 59 2.4.4 Culture, organizational processes and the minimal model of strategy implementation augmented .................................................................................................................................... 59

2.5 SYNTHESIS: SENSEMAKING AS BRIDGE BETWEEN CONTEXT AND PROCESS ............................... 62

3. SENSEMAKING IN ORGANIZATIONS..................................................................................... 65

3.1 WHAT IS SENSEMAKING?.......................................................................................................... 65 3.1.1 Sensemaking and identity construction .......................................................................... 66 3.1.2 Sensemaking and retrospective ...................................................................................... 67 3.1.3 Sensemaking as enacting sensible environments ........................................................... 68 3.1.4 Sensemaking is social..................................................................................................... 68 3.1.5 Sensemaking is ongoing ................................................................................................. 69 3.1.6 Sensemaking is focused on and by extracted cues ......................................................... 70 3.1.7 Sensemaking is driven by plausibility rather than accuracy.......................................... 70

3.2 SENSEMAKING IN ORGANIZATIONS........................................................................................... 71 3.2.1 Sensemaking activities in organizations ........................................................................ 74 3.2.2 Sensemaking and the role of the manager ..................................................................... 78

3.3 SENSEMAKING IN STRATEGY IMPLEMENTATION ....................................................................... 82 3.3.1 Empirical evidence for sensemaking in strategic change .............................................. 82 3.3.2 Reflecting on sensemaking in strategy implementation................................................. 89 3.3.3 Conclusions: from linearity to plum-pudding ................................................................ 90

4. METHODS FOR SENSEMAKING IN STRATEGY IMPLEMENTATION ...................... 98

4.1 MOTIVATION AND BACKGROUND FOR SENSEMAKING METHODS IN STRATEGY IMPLEMENTATION 98 4.2 THE CATEGORIZATION CARD GAME........................................................................................ 102

4.2.1 Theoretical background of the method......................................................................... 102

4.2.2 Description of the method ............................................................................................ 103 4.2.3 Who should participate in the categorization card game? .......................................... 106 4.2.4 What is gained by using the categorization card game?.............................................. 106

4.3 THE STRATEGIC STORYTELLING SIMULATION......................................................................... 106 4.3.1 Theoretical background for the method ....................................................................... 107 4.3.2 Description of the method ............................................................................................ 108 4.3.3 Who should participate in the simulation? .................................................................. 111 4.3.4 What is gained by using the strategic storytelling simulation?.................................... 111

4.4 METAPHOR WORKSHOP FOR IDENTITY CONSTRUCTION .......................................................... 112 4.4.1 Theoretical background for the method ....................................................................... 112 4.4.2 Description of the method ............................................................................................ 112 4.4.3 Who should participate in the metaphor workshop?.................................................... 115 4.4.4 What is gained by the use of the metaphor workshop? ................................................ 116

5. CONCLUDING REMARKS................................................................................................... 117

5.1 DISCUSSION............................................................................................................................ 117 5.2 SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY ....................................................................................... 122

REFERENCES................................................................................................................................... 124

HELSINKI UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY ABSTRACT OF THE MASTER’S THESIS

Author and the name of the thesis: Saku Mantere

Sensemaking in Strategy Implementation

Date: November 1, 2000 Number of Pages: 136

Department: Department of Electrical and Communications Engineering

Professorship: Tuo-53 Work Psychology and Leadership

Supervisor of the thesis: Professor Veikko Teikari

Instructor of the thesis: Doctor of Technology Miia Martinsuo

Successful strategy implementation is an essential challenge for virtually any organization. Strategy implementation has not been a topic of active research, however. The small amount of relevant literature is mainly centered on the structural and systemic dimensions of implementation, whereas there is very little literature on implementation concerned with the communication and interpretation of strategy.

This thesis is concerned with strategy implementation from an organizational psychological standpoint. The emphasis is placed on understanding how culture and interpretation affect strategy implementation. The research task of the thesis is twofold: firstly to study literature and find out which factors are the most relevant ones in implementation, and secondly to create a few tentative implementation methods based on the discoveries made while studying literature.

After a brief exposition of basic strategy literature, strategy implementation literature is studied. The first discovery is that traditional strategy textbooks contribute to a planning-centered view on implementation, which neglects the role interpretation plays in implementation. Noble’s model of implementation based on the steps of communication, interpretation, adoption and enactment is studied next and deemed an insufficient account due to the weakness of its linear approach to human understanding.

A more realistic account is sought after in organizational psychological literature under two general concepts, namely those of organizational culture and change processes. Many useful notions are discovered, including metaphors, narratives, categories, identity beliefs and so on. The central discovery in literature is that culture and processes are not distinct entities and they require a link in strategy implementation. This link is found in the concept sensemaking, which is also the theoretical lens for this thesis.

Sensemaking is studied through the writings of Weick and others. Sensemaking proves to entail Noble’s concepts of communication, interpretation, adoption and enactment yet in a non-linear form. Sensemaking, while a realistic description, is weak if methods of providing strategic direction are sought after. This problem is approached by studying the concept sensegiving in association with sensemaking and then building a model that incorporates the findings of sensemaking in addition to those found in the earlier chapters in an organic, sensegiving-sensemaking cycle.

Three group methods for strategy implementation are developed based on the sensemaking. The categorization card game draws on the categorical nature of human cognition. The strategic storytelling simulation uses narratives in building and communicating a vision. The metaphor workshop uses metaphors as well as identity considerations in implementation.

TEKNILLINEN KORKEAKOULU DIPLOMITYÖN TIIVISTELMÄ

Tekijä ja työn nimi: Saku Mantere

Sensemaking in Strategy Implementation (Merkityksen rakentaminen strategian toimeenpanossa)

Päivämäärä: 1. marraskuuta, 2000 Sivumäärä: 136

Osasto: Sähkö- ja tietoliikennetekniikan osasto

Professuuri: Tuo-53 Työpsykologia ja johtaminen

Työn valvoja: Professori Veikko Teikari

Työn ohjaaja: Tekniikan tohtori Miia Martinsuo

Strategian toimeenpanon onnistuminen on keskeinen haaste organisaatioille. Strategian toimeenpanoon liittyvää tutkimusta on kuitenkin vähän. Vähäinen kirjallisuus keskittyy organisaation rakenteeseen ja järjestelmiin liittyviin toimeenpanon alueisiin. Strategian viestintään ja tulkintaan liittyvää keskustelua ei juuri ole käyty.

Tässä tutkielmassa strategian toimeenpanoa tarkastellaan työpsykologian näkökulmasta. Huomio kiinnitetään siihen, miten organisaation kulttuuri ja organisaation jäsenten tulkinta vaikuttavat toimeenpanoon. Tutkielman tutkimusongelma on kahtalainen: ensinnäkin etsitään työpsykologian kirjallisuudesta ne seikat, jotka vaikuttavat keskeisimmin strategian toimeenpanoon. Toiseksi kerätyn tiedon pohjalta kehitetään muutama menetelmäaihio strategian toimeenpanon avuksi.

Lyhyen yleisen strategian käsitteen esittelyn jälkeen tutustutaan strategiakirjallisuuden esitykseen toimeenpanosta. Perinteisten strategiakirjoittajien huomataan nojaavan suunnittelukeskeiseen näkökulmaan toimeenpanosta, joka jättää huomiotta toimeenpanoon vaikuttavat tulkintanäkökohdat. Seuraavaksi tarkastellaan Noblen lineaarista, viestintään, tulkintaan, omaksumiseen ja toimimiseen perustuvaan esitystä toimeenpanosta. Se havaitaan lineaarisuudessaan heikohkoksi esitykseksi strategian ymmärtämisen kokonaisuudesta.

Työpsykologian kirjallisuudesta etsitään realistisempaa näkökulmaa strategian ymmärtämiseen kahden käsitteen, organisaatiokulttuurin ja muutosprosessien avulla. Tarkastelu paljastaa muun muassa sellaisia hyödyllisiä käsitteitä kuin vertauskuvat, narratiivit, kategoriat ja organisaation identiteettiin liittyvät uskomukset. Keskeisenä havaintona nousee esiin, että kulttuuri ja muutosprosessit eivät ole toisistaan irrallisia, vaan ne tulee liittää toisiinsa strategian toimeenpanossa. Tutkielman teoreettisena linssinä toimiva sensemaking-käsite voi toimia tällaisena linkkinä.

Sensemaking-käsitettä tutkitaan muun muassa Karl Weickin kirjoituksiin nojaten. Sensemaking-käsitteen havaitaan sisältävän Noblen viestinnän, tulkinnan, omaksumisen ja toiminnan prosessit ei-lineaarisessa muodossa. Sensemaking on realistinen kuvaus ymmärtämisestä, mutta sen avulla on vaikea asettaa strategialle suuntaa. Ongelma yritetään ratkaista tutkimalla sensegiving-käsitettä ja yhdistämällä sensegiving ja sensemaking sykliseksi malliksi strategian toimeenpanosta.

Strategian toimeenpanon avuksi kehitetään opitun pohjalta kolme menetelmäaihiota. Kategoriakorttipeli hyödyntää luokittelua, kognition perusmekanismia. Tarinankerrontasimulaation avulla voidaan rakentaa organisaatiolle tarinan muotoinen visio. Metaforaverstas käyttää vertauskuvia identiteetin muokkauksen välineinä.

Foreword

This thesis is a product of the STRADA project at the Helsinki University of Technology. The objective of the STRADA project is the discovery of good practices and problems associated with strategy implementation in Finnish organizations. This thesis was conceived as serving as a theoretical foundation for the empirical research conducted by the project’s researchers.

This thesis also ends a six-year period in my life. It ends my days as a student of engineering. There was a time when I had very little faith in my ever completing my studies at HUT. For a long time studying philosophy seemed like the only option for me. The decision to do both now seems like one of the best decisions I have ever made.

A few thanks are in order. The most important person to this thesis has been my instructor, Dr. Miia Martinsuo. She has gone beyond all the duties of a good instructor, continuously providing insight, support and essential criticism, reading through one fumbling manuscript after another. If I ever get to instruct somebody else, I will aspire to follow in her footsteps. Professor Veikko Teikari has provided encouragement, leadership and support. Most important of all, he has made me feel at home as a researcher in his laboratory. Professor Mikko Sams of cognitive technology has provided me with a model of the expert natural scientist. Even though my master’s thesis took me to another track, I feel his example of a scientist engaged in research while finding the time to instruct his students will stay with me as a valued example. Heartfelt thanks belong also to philosopher, Professor Ilkka Niiniluoto for guiding me through my first master’s thesis.

The STRADA team: Petri Aaltonen, Heini Ikävalko, Mari Ventä and Heidi Währn have been an invaluable asset as colleagues and friends. I feel as though I have known them for a long time. I must count it as an incredible stroke of luck that my first full-time work experience can be shared with such exceptional people. I look forward to our next three years of carrying out STRADA.

The reason for my becoming a real member of the HUT scientific community is the Student union (TKY). Many of my fondest memories were born during my time as a member of TKY (teekkari), among its other members and employees.

I have discovered that there are three things that make life worthwhile: music, good discussions and love. Outi, my fiancée, thank you for sharing all three. There are many words yet none that adequately describe.

Espoo, November 1, 2000

Saku Mantere

Introduction

1

1. Introduction

1.1 Background and motivation for the study

Strategy is a central concern for practically any organization these days. In situations

where the organization’s environment is changing, the organization itself is faced with

a need to change. Even in relatively stable environments an organization is bound to

be faced with continuous choices to be made. It should be self-evident that every

possible choice made or all change is not for good. Organizational choices should

reflect a direction that will ensure the organization’s success or at least survival.

Strategy is intimately connected with organizational choices and change. This

connection is studied in the pages to follow. Whether this connection takes the form

of management control or alternatively some form of collective emergent action

involving a wide participation in the organization, this depends on the chosen

viewpoint. This focus of this thesis is on strategy implementation, the process in

which the change is brought about.

Why study strategy implementation as a research project in the field of organizational

psychology? Is this not the task for a strategy researcher? The answer is twofold. First

of all, it should be evident that in many cases it is imperative for the organization’s

personnel to know and understand the strategy to be implemented in order to

implement it at all. This calls for communication and interpretation as well as new

skills and knowledge to be learned. The organization’s culture is also a major factor in

determining how a strategic message is interpreted. These are questions best

answered, not by strategy researchers, but organizational psychology researchers.

Secondly, strategy researchers have not done much research on implementation, but

have in most cases preferred studying strategic planning.

There has not been much research on strategy implementation done from an

organizational psychological or organizational behaviour standpoint. Many of the

relevant themes for organizational psychology research, such as learning,

communication, cognition, etc. have an impact on strategy implementation but very

few attempts have been made to reflect this knowledge against strategy

Introduction

2

implementation problems and success stories. On the other hand, it has been widely

noticed in real-life organizations, that getting strategic plans, often created by the

management, to meet with existing operational activities, that is the work practices of

the organization’s personnel is a demanding task.

For all practical purposes, this thesis is concerned with the challenge of bringing

about the intended changes an organization’s everyday work practices. It is common

knowledge that there is a gap between strategy and work practices in many

organizations, as illustrated in figure 1. This thesis is an attempt of understanding the

nature of this gap and also finding the right methods to create a bridge across this

chasm.

Figure 1. The gap between strategic planning and operational activities.

1.2 What is strategy?

In order to understand strategy implementation, one must first understand strategy.

The task of defining the concept strategy is overwhelming. Since its tremendous

popularity in management literature it has become increasingly difficult to determine

which attributes of the concept are the defining ones and which are not. Historically,

the term strategy stems from the Greek word strategos, which is Greek for general.

The origins of strategy, therefore, lie in the art of war.1 It must be stressed, though that

the relevance of military strategy to today’s organizational strategy is a different

matter than the etymological origins of the term strategy.

Introduction

3

In strategy literature there is a gap between strategy formulation and implementation.

The nature and width of this gap is mainly determined by the held conception of

strategy. Therefore, to understand strategy implementation one must also understand

strategy as such.

1.2.1 Mintzberg’s five P’s

Mintzberg (1995, 13-14) has created a “five-P-model” for the definition of strategy,

which provides some clues to the rich meaning of the concept. The first P, strategy as

a plan reflects the classical conception of strategy. A plan is a consciously intended

course of action, or a guideline for dealing with a certain set of situations. The

classical conception of strategy can be seen in military strategy, in game theoretical

management literature (cf. Neumann and Morgenstern 1947) and in many content-

based management textbooks. According to Mintzberg (ibid. 14) is also possible to

view strategy as a ploy, a plan with a more narrow and specific scope or a certain

maneuver. A very influential writer in the planning-paradigm is Ansoff (cf. Ansoff,

1965, 1979).

A wholly different conception of strategy is to view it as a pattern of emerging

actions and behaviour. According to the pattern-view, strategy is not a preconceived

plan, but a consistency in behaviour. In a sense according to the pattern view, strategy

is not a proactive but a reactive concept. This view may be hard to accept, but it

reflects the reality of many organizations (Mintzberg 1995, 14-17.)

Mintzberg himself has been an influential proponent of the pattern-view. He has

argued that, in the complex reality experienced by the modern organization, the job of

the manager is not that of programming the employees but that of giving them a

strategic vision, created by hard data provided by the strategists (Mintzberg 1994,

107-114.) A similar argument is given by Bartlett and Ghoshal (1994) who emphasize

the need for managers to provide purpose for the members of their organizations.

The fourth P describes strategy as a position for the company in its environment.

Environment is the keyword here – the organization has to create a fit for itself in

1 For classical works of military strategy, see Sun Tzu (1980/600 BC) and von Clausewitz (1972/1832).

Introduction

4

relation to its competitors, external stakeholders and so on. A well-known principle in

this frame of mind is the SWOT-analysis, created by Andrews (1971). Another well-

known writer, perhaps the most influential modern strategist in general in the

position-paradigm is Porter (cf. Porter 1980). This conception of strategy can be seen

as either proactive or reactive, as planning-based or emergent (Mintzberg 1995, 17-

18.)

The final P for Mintzberg is strategy as perspective. According to the perspective-

view, strategy defines the way the organization’s members view the organization’s

environment, the organization’s identity and themselves as members of the

organization. This definition is very close to the cultural aspects I will explore in this

thesis (ibid. 18.)

1.2.2 The linear, adaptive and interpretive model for strategy

Mintzberg’s definition is an influential one. Chaffee has provided a simpler model

that categorizes strategy with three models. The linear model is planning-based and

proactive. In the linear model there is a clear demarcation line between strategy

formulation and implementation. Strategy is created and implemented in

preconceptualized, clear and discrete, consecutive steps. The linear model places its

attention to the managers and strategic planners (Chaffee 1985, 89-90.)

Chaffee’s second category is the adaptive model of strategy. The main bias of the

adaptive model is to achieve a match between the organization and its environment.

The keyword here is adaptation, not planning. The environment is viewed as complex

and dynamic and therefore it is necessary to keep the strategy partially open and

undecided, and also to allow for emergent properties. Therefore, in Chaffee’s model,

Andrews falls into the first category while Mintzberg falls into the second (Chaffee

1985, 91-93).

The interpretive model of strategy forms Chaffee’s third category. The third model

places its main bias on the organization’s culture, beginning with Berger and

Luckmann’s (1967) concept of socially constructed reality. This concept, if adopted,

makes the classical distinction between the organization and its environment obsolete.

The organization’s members perceive and conceptualize their environment in

Introduction

5

accordance to the organization’s culture and their personal structures for meaning and

knowledge. In the interpretive model the role of strategy is to provide and reflect

useful orienting metaphors (Chaffee 1985, 93-95.) The interpretive model is closest to

the viewpoint held in this thesis.

1.2.3 The content and process paradigms in strategy research

There are some differences between Chaffee and Mintzberg’s models, yet they both

seem to provide a rough distinction between the classical, planning-based approach,

and a more emergent, pattern-type view. A third, culture-based view is also present in

both models.

The formulation of the concept strategy projects forcefully on the research paradigm.

A classical distinction is the separation of content and process in strategy literature.

The content literature has held the center field for a long time and is more dominant in

quantity, while the process literature is a younger and more commencing field.

(Pettigrew 1992, 6-7.) The content literature is primarily concerned with the

development of competitive superiority by reconfiguring resources, competencies and

linkages. The main emphases of the process literature are the management processes

on which strategic change is accomplished (MacIntosh and MacLean 1999.)

The authors interested in the content of strategy have shown very little interest in the

implementation of strategy, while the process-type authors place their emphasis on the

strategy process: formulation, implementation and evaluation as a whole. The content

literature has been blamed of providing the organization the ways of determining the

destination yet failing to provide means of transport whereas the process literature

does the opposite: provides little direction while giving the idea how to reach a

destination (MacIntosh and MacLean 1999).

It should be evident how the formulations of the concept of strategy fall under the

paradigms of content and process. A strategy based on careful planning and conscious

positioning is more likely to be found on the pages of a content-driven book, while the

emergent and cultural aspects of strategy and implementation are more likely to be

covered by a process-driven strategy writer. According to Pettigrew, there have,

however, been signs of unification between the paradigms - for example Porter (cf.

Introduction

6

1991), a classical content-type writer has become interested in the time-dimension of

creating strategy, a step into the process direction (Pettigrew 1992, 6).

A more detailed model of the different schools within strategy research is provided by

Mintzberg, Ahlstrand and Lampel (1999). The two traditional schools, the design and

planning schools have both a cerebral and proactive basis. The design school, based

on the thoughts of the likes of Andrews is based on achieving an essential fit between

the organization and the environment. The design school is sometimes metaphorically

linked with architecture. The planning school resembles the design school, but is more

formal and linear in its approach to strategy. The planning school views strategy as

being divisible into single, consecutive steps and has drawn influences from system

theory and the like. The planning school’s primary architect is Ansoff (1965). The

positioning school is the third of the authors’ schools. It arose from Porter’s (1980)

writings and has strong roots in economic theory.

The first three schools are characterized by the authors of being prescriptive in nature,

in the sense that they tend to find what the strategist ought to do. The remaining seven

of the authors’ schools are in contrast descriptive by nature, which means that their

objective is to describe strategy and strategy practices instead of prescribing the right

strategy. The descriptive/prescriptive description is a useful one, and is parallel with

the previous distinction between a proactive and a reactive conception of strategy.

The remaining seven schools put their emphasis, therefore in the description of

strategy. The entrepreneurial school is a visionary approach based on the

entrepreneur’s intuition instead of careful, cerebral planning with vague roots in

economics. The cognitive school is interested on the cognitive process of creating

strategies and strategic decision making. Its roots lie in psychology. The learning

school is a process-based approach which views strategy as a process of strategic

thinking throughout the organization with roots in educational science. Many of the

authors I will be concerned with in the second chapter could be characterized as

belonging to the learning and cultural schools. The power school is a narrow field

concerning itself with the politics and the negotiation of the different factions of the

organization. The cultural school views strategy formation as a social process of

creating shared meaning. The environmental school draws its influences from biology

and stresses the importance and unpredictability of the organization’s environment.

Introduction

7

The tenth and last school, the configuration school sees the organization as being in

different stages during its history and being in need of different strategies from the

other schools (Mintzberg & Lampel 1999, 21-30).

The variety of Mintzberg’s schools shows the range of possibilities a strategy

researcher has to position herself. Four paradigmatic dimensions for viewing strategy

and strategy research have been covered thus far, namely:

• Mintzberg’s distinction between preconceived and emergent conceptions of strategy (or proactive and reactive concepts of strategy)

• Chaffee’s three models of strategy: linear, adaptive and interpretive

• The classical distinction between content and process literatures

• Mintzberg’s distinction between prescriptive and normative schools of strategy research.

The bias of this thesis is a cultural one. I will be concerned with those aspects of

strategy, which play a part in the work practices of an organization’s members. I have

sensemaking as a theoretical lens. Therefore, my bias is more emergent than planned,

more interpretive and adaptive than linear, more process than content, more

descriptive than prescriptive. It must be remembered, however, that these biases are

not dichotomies. Many classical strategic moves do have an impact in the

organization’s culture simply because many managers are classical strategists.

Based on the above considerations I will define strategy as a temporally coexistent

totality of those explicit or implicit choices that are made to direct the organizational

members’ actions, aimed at successfully fulfilling the organization’s mission in its

environment. By mission, I mean the totality of purposes the organization exists for.

By temporally coexistent I mean that these choices are made to affect a relatively

convergent time-period. If the strategic choices are voiced out in a plan, their

implementation is a question of turning them into action. If these choices are implicit,

they must at least generate a pattern of actions, in which some deliberate direction can

be observed. In the extreme emergent/implicit case there is little meaning in talking

about strategy implementation.

Introduction

8

1.3 Research task and scope

The research task for this study is twofold:

1) To study literature in order to identify the most relevant factors affecting implementation.

2) To create a few tentative methods for strategy implementation from an organizational psychological perspective.

My viewpoint on strategy implementation is a cultural one, instead of an approach

centered on organizational systems, structure, competitive situation, etc. The choice of

my main research questions affect the viewpoint of this study: since I am interested in

finding out those factors which best affect the behavior of the organizational

members, the natural way to start looking is the way the members themselves

perceive the strategy to be implemented. That is, if one is willing to refuse a

behaviorist view in psychology, which is a choice I am indeed willing to make.

Since my main interest is on the content of how the organizational members perceive

strategy and why they more or less act according to strategy, I must study the

mechanisms of communication, the creation of shared understanding and relevant

actions. Since covering all of these from all possible viewpoints is too wide a task for

this (or any) thesis, a theoretical lens is needed.

The theoretical lens for this study is sensemaking, the creation of meaning in

organizations. Sensemaking is an interesting viewpoint since it integrates

interpretation and activity into a single, nonlinear process. This seems reasonable,

taking into account the connections between action and learning as discovered by

educational scientists, or the discussion about the bounded rationality of human

decision-making in the field of decision theory, to name only two examples.

Sensemaking has also generated wide support in the field of organizational science.

Hence I will study strategy implementation through the theoretical lens provided by

sensemaking.

The task ahead consists of three parts, all of which require a different approach. I will

first do a wide scan of organizational literature with the intent of defining the concept

of strategy implementation from a cultural standpoint. Since the material is vast, as

well as rather fragmented from a strict strategy implementation standpoint, my

Introduction

9

approach will be survey-like. My second task is the study of sensemaking and the

reflection of its message to strategy implementation. This calls for an inquisitive

approach. My third task is creating a few tentative methods for strategy

implementation. This warrants a creative instead of a critical mode.

In studying the cultural view on implementation I will focus my attention to the

practical insights the cultural standpoints can offer. The function of the theory-laden

chapters is to service the method development chapter in addition to providing an

understanding on the theory. There are very few actual methods to strategy

implementation provided by culture/process-centered authors while the

structure/content-centered authors are more explicit on methods when they cover

strategy implementation (which is not often, however).

This study is in essence a literature review. There will be no firsthand empirical

evidence collected. The reason for this choice of method is based on both the current

need of the STRADA project at the Helsinki University of Technology, as well as the

lack of coherent literature on the subject. This thesis is in essence both an attempt to

provide the STRADA project with a well-needed theoretical foundation for its

empirical enquiry, as well as an attempt of gaining an understanding of the multi-

faceted reality of strategy implementation.

The methodology for a literature review has not been a very popular topic in research

methodology textbooks. The usual advice found on their pages is centered on how to

use a library and how to catalogue the literature. The method at hand resembles the

philosophical method in the sense that the material has to be weighed according to the

believability of its premises as well as the coherence of its argumentation. The

philosophical method is a method contained, in essence, in the whole of philosophy.

How should the literature be chosen for a study such as this? I will begin by looking

at what the basic strategy textbooks have to say about strategy implementation. I will

then take a look at the few process-oriented texts. These two sources should provide

me with an insight on the organization psychological themes relevant to strategy

implementation. I will then take a look at the most important sources attributed to

these themes.

Introduction

10

The next step is to introduce the theoretical lens, sensemaking. The relevant literature

for this topic should be manageable. After a thorough scrutiny of the concept I will

reflect on the view of implementation provided by the organization psychological

themes in the context of sensemaking. I hope to gain a vision on which kinds of

factors affect strategy implementation and how they can be utilized for better

implementation. This is the basis for the method development chapter. The fuel for

method development is provided by the insights gained in the theory chapters. I will

study some basic literature on games and simulations in order to gain a practical

understanding on group methods. These methods are thematically close to

sensemaking since they can in many cases be used in creating a shared understanding

of reality.

Since organizational psychology is an empirical science, the empirical evidence

provided by the researchers is a major issue. Therefore the material has to be

reviewed also according to the validity and relevance of the empirical evidence it

offers. I am not willing to take a stand in favor of either a quantitative or qualitative

approach to collecting data: each piece of reference literature will be scrutinized as a

whole.

Strategy implementation

11

2. Strategy implementation

In this chapter I will take a look at strategy implementation through relevant

literature. It will prove necessary to study strategy implementation through several

major themes found in organizational research literature. My scope will be survey-

like, although I will pay closer attention to those themes useful in the third chapter’s

exposition of sensemaking.

In the preceding chapter it was noted that one’s overall conception of strategy and

strategy research affects her conception of strategy implementation as well. A very

content-centered idea of strategy will at least entail a demarcation between

formulation and implementation if any mention of implementation is made at all. A

process-oriented approach, on the other hand, will entail an interest in implementation

aspects, yet in many cases it will be much harder to draw even a methodological

demarcation line between formulation and implementation. This will be taken into

account in the later chapters.

2.1 Strategy implementation in strategy research

literature

In implementation literature as in strategy literature in general, a rift seems to be

forming between structure/system-minded and culture-minded authors. Noble (1999)

has made a large review, one of the few of its kind, of strategy implementation related

literature. Noble makes a distinction between structure-minded and interpersonal

process minded views on strategy implementation. For the structure-minded authors

the important factors in strategy implementation are organizational structure and

control mechanisms. The interpersonal process minded authors are interested in such

things as strategic consensus, autonomous strategic behaviors, diffusion perspectives,

leadership and implementation processes and finally communication and interaction

processes (Noble 1999a, 119-134.)

A second distinction to be drawn in addition to Noble’s is that between those authors

interested in providing actual guidelines for implementation - actual do:s and don’t:s,

and those authors who provide a more thorough exposition of implementation before


12

going into prescriptions. I will begin my exposition from the shallow end of the pool,

so to speak - that is from the do:s and don’t:s, the guidelines and the problems.

2.1.1 General guidelines and problems

Beer and Eisenstat (1996) propose three essential factors for successful

implementation. First of all, the change process should be systemic. This means that

both the human and systemic aspects of the organization should fit with each other in

the organization. This is a very important point. It is easy to imagine a situation in

which severe motivation problems would arise in effect of a lack of interest in one of

these aspects. The second factor is the condition that the change process should

encourage the open discussion of barriers to effective strategy implementation and

adaptation. All impediments to strategy should be taken in to account and the most

reliable way to get the best information is to include the largest possible number of

the organization’s members into the discussion. This brings us to the third factor

proposed by the authors, which tells us that the change process should develop a

partnership among all relevant stakeholders (ibid. 598-601, see also Campbell &

Goold 2000 for collaboration across functional units.)

Beer and Eisenstat have elsewhere (2000) catalogued a group of relevant, inhibiting

factors to strategy implementation and learning. The factors are: either a top-down or

laissez-faire management style, unclear strategy and conflicting priorities, an

ineffective senior management team, poor vertical communication, poor coordination

across functions, plus inadequate down-the-line leadership skills and development.

The authors seem to clearly acknowledge the need for large-scale communication as

well as at least partial participation and on the other hand leadership and

organizational integrity.

The factors proposed by Beer and Eisenstat are present in a survey done by Alexander

(1985). The major problems present in strategy implementation: the implementation

taking more time than allocated, unanticipated, major problems surfacing during

implementation, poor coordination, competing activities, lacking competencies, etc.

(ibid. 91-95) speak of a poor fit between human resources and the organizations

structure and systems as well as poor vertical communication in both directions.

Alexander goes on promoting five guidelines to overcome the problems, not unlike


13

those proposed by Beer and Eisenstat. They are: communication, starting with a good

concept, providing sufficient resources, obtaining employee commitment and

developing an implementation plan (ibid. 96-97).

Noble (1999b) in turn speaks of barriers to effective implementation. The physical

distances hindering the necessary, cross-functional collaboration in the organization

form physical barriers. Turf barriers are the other side of this coin, representing the

differing interests of the distinct units. Interpretive barriers are formed by the different

ways different units interpret and comprehend the strategy. Communication barriers

need no explanation. Personality barriers reflect the personal characteristics of key

personnel, as well as between different groups in the organization's hierarchy.

Another important barrier is that of varied goals amidst the organization and its units.

Noble’s perspective, therefore, is that of the organization as consisting of different

units and functional groups. His novel contribution to the discussion of effective

implementation is that for effective implementation the strategist must create

unofficial communication networks2 (ibid. 19-28.)

The section above shed some light on the general guidelines offered for successful

implementation as well as common problems associated with implementation. The

joint sentiment of the authors seem to be that the implementation process should be

both systemic and participative, both encouraging discussion and rational. This may

be a difficult task, as the next sections will show.

The guidelines and problems provided a view on the surface of strategy

implementation, from a managerial or a consultant standpoint. Now it is time to dive

beneath the surface, into the realm of the models that to describe what actually takes

place in implementation. The natural starting point is found within basic strategy

textbooks.

2 Ibarra & Andrews (1993) have found empirical support for the assertion that informal networks have a significant role in the perceptions of influence among organizational members – above those of formal status and systems. The person located centrally in an informal network was perceived as having significant control over that of formal status (ibid. 295-300.)


14

2.1.2 Implementation through structure and systems

The starting point of implementation in many strategy textbooks (Ansoff 1984;

Higgins 1990; Pearce and Robinson 1996; Yavitz and Newman 1982; etc.) is the

selection and transformation of organizational structure. The basis of strategy

implementation, according to these, is the coordination of goals and tasks, resources

and control. The next concern in many textbooks is formed by the organization’s

systems, the budgeting being one of the most important concerns. Structure and

system interconnect in many cases since both are wide and abstract concepts that

nominate the rule-like, human-independent aspects of organizational life.

Many systems-oriented authors link implementation with goal setting practices. Goal

setting is a systemic practice very often associated with strategy in many real-life

organizations. Goal setting is closely associated with management by objectives

(MBO) and associated literature. Since this thesis’ scope is a cultural one, I will not

study goals any further: a reader with an interest in goal setting can find a starting

point with an organizational behaviour perspective in Carroll (2000) in which the

properties of successful goal-setting systems are studied.

Many textbooks (Mintzberg et al 1995; Johnson and Scholes 1999; Shrivastava 1994;

Thompson and Strickland 1995; Judson 1990) go on to mention a third variable for

strategy implementation in addition to structure and systems: the required cultural

measures in the organization. Many textbooks fail to address this issue much further –

in most cases a brief section follows, addressing the importance of leadership,

communication and learning with very little actual content.

In my opinion the textbooks fail to address the human condition that underlies the

cultural variable in implementation. The strategy textbook approach to culture is

either rather shallow or straightforward behaviorist, as in the case of Hrebniak and

Joyce (1984):

”Our view of motivation and the employment contract enables us to develop a straightforward

stimulus-response-reinforcement model of the application and use of incentives and controls in the

organization.” (ibid. 189)


15

Behaviorism was largely refuted in psychology in the 1950’s3. The fact that many

content-minded authors return to its ideals reflects an attempt to fit culture, or the

social lifeworld, into a technosystem framework4. This attempt is bound to fail. The

paradigmatic shift in psychology from behaviorism towards cognitivism and

constructivism in this century shows the problematic nature of mechanistic models of

human behaviour. To understand the cultural issues in strategy implementation one

must understand the cognition between human behaviour. Human beings are not

mindless automatons, which I think we can all agree on, at least on a personal level.

There have been attempts within the system/structure-camp to supplement their

implementation models with cultural elements. Simons (1995), for example writes

about four systems, or ”levers of control” of strategy implementation, at least one of

which, beliefs system, is inherently cultural in nature. A belief system is an explicit

set of definitions, formulated by the senior managers, which states the organization’s

purpose, basic values and direction. The purpose of the beliefs system is to inspire and

guide the organizations search, discovery and problem solving (Simons 1995, 33-39.)

Yavitz and Newman (1985/1982, 161) stress that simple programming the employees

is not sufficient in strategy implementation – the strategist must also take into account

the cultivation of the employees’ behavioral patterns and also constructive control.

These attempts, however, seem somewhat shallow.

It must be stressed that the criticism posed above is not directed to refute the

textbooks’ value in analyzing the systems and structure dimensions of strategy

implementation but to point out a missing perspective in their exposition of strategy

implementation. Due to their approach most textbooks simply fall out of the scope of

this thesis.

3 By behaviorism I refer mainly to the work of Skinner (cf. 1957), whose S-R-view on psychology was famously challenged, and largely refuted, by Chomsky (1959). 4 Lifeworld is a social philosophical term adopted (it was originally invented by Husserl) and contrasted with technosystem by Habermas (1989). Habermas’s theory stresses the primacy lifeworld (values, norms, etc.) in human decision making against the rationalistic technosystem. Habermas’s critical theory and the concept of communicative action have been adapted to organizational research by Alvesson (cf. Alvesson 1996; Alvesson & Willmott 1996).


16

2.1.3 Holistic views on implementation: structure, systems and

culture

Are there any other models for strategy implementation that could overcome the

deficiencies mentioned above? A successful model would have to take into account

the human factors in implementation as well as the structure and systems viewpoint.

Bourgeois and Brodwin (1984) have created a five-model system for strategy

implementation categorizing strategy implementation practices, which might fit our

description. It shows different positions or viewpoints one might assume while

implementing strategy.

The commander model draws its influences from the military life, in the sense that the

CEO wields absolute power. In this model the CEO is the rational agent behind the

strategy decisions and plays no role in implementation. The CEO-model’s works best

with a powerful executive with few personal biases and vast and accurate sources of

information (ibid. 243-245.) The entrepreneurial school in Mintzberg’s model might

subscribe to this model.

The change model is based on planned interventions in the organization’s structure

and systems, which will set off the desired behavioral outcomes. This model creates

the ability to carry out more complicated strategic plans than the commander model,

but also creates an additional inflexibility for unanticipated events and changes of

plan. Both of the two models may suffer from motivation problems (ibid. 246-248.)

The change-model resembles closely the behaviorist approach of Hrebniak and Joyce

and the views of many planning-minded authors.

The collaborative model extends the power of strategic decision-making from the

CEO to the organization’s management team. This model helps to motivate the

managers and also provides the strategic decision-making–process with more

information and cognitive capital. The problem of this model results from the fact that

collaboration does not reach beyond top management. More decision making also

means more politics and conflicts of interest, which may mean less rationality (ibid.

248-249.)

The cultural model is based on molding the organization’s culture to ensure the

acceptance of a shared vision. This model is based on all organizational members’


17

participating in decision making directed to perpetuate the vision. The main problem

of this model is the vast amount of time it requires. It also presupposes an intelligent

and responsible workforce and may lead to suppressing homogeneity in the

organization (ibid. 250-254.)

Taking into account the problems and strengths associated with the former four

models the authors suggest a fifth model called the crescive model. In this model the

strategic decisions are created bottom up by the organization’s members and the role

of the CEO is to act as judge and premise-setter and ensure an organizational context

(structure, systems and culture) that will promote openness and innovation (ibid. 256-

263.)

The crescive model offers a rather tempting standpoint from an organization

psychological perspective. It offers to make full use of the organizational members’

knowledge and effort in the strategy process, encouraging participation. The model

does not give a very thorough description of the processes affecting implementation,

however.

Quinn (1978) goes a bit deeper in describing the implementation mechanisms. He has

created an influential approach to strategy, which he calls logical incrementalism.

Quinn’s research indicated that neither the content/planning model nor the process

model was enough. The cognitive limits of the planners often involved in the critique

of the content paradigm are supplanted by process limits, the limits of the mere

emergent process to find the correct direction (ibid. 113-114.)

Logical incrementalism is a change model and is based on small steps. The steps are

summarized by Alexander (1991) as follows:

1) need sensing

2) amplifying understanding

3) building awareness

4) new symbols

5) legitimizing new views

6) partial solutions


18

7) broadening support

8) dealing with opposition

9) building comfort levels

10) building buffers

11) trial concepts

12) pockets of commitment

13) objective review

14) building consensus

15) announcing decisions.

The steps speak of a decision-based model, which is cerebral, yet need-sensing and

very interested in consensus. Its central characteristic is its incremental nature: the

decisions are made in gradual small steps, taking into account the emergent factors in

strategy.

Neither Quinn’s nor Bourgeous and Brodwin’s model goes very deep in explaining

the cultural and psychological factors in implementation. They are more centered on

the way to perform implementation instead of what actually happens in

implementation from a psychological perspective.

Noble (1999a) has also created a synthesis model from a vast amount of literature that

is quite fruitful from a cultural standpoint. He defines strategy implementation as the

communication, interpretation, adoption and enactment of strategic plans. Noble’s

model communicates a willingness to overcome the barriers between the content and

process paradigms. It combines the strict demarcation between implementation and

formulation with concepts from process orientated literature. This may not be the best

of ideas, since this kind of demarcation seems to overrule the possibility of

participation in the formulation stage of strategy: if strategy implementation starts

with communication, there seems to be some specific informational content to be

communicated, which implies a pre-made decision. The concept of enactment is not

very well suited to this kind of predestination either. A further problem of this model

is the apparent linearity of the stages of this model. If one uses the concepts

communication, interpretation, adoption and enactment as a succession of steps as the


19

writer would seem to implicitly suggest, one has created a top-down communication

model with a linear view on communication and human cognition, ending up in a

situation described in figure 2.

Figure 2. A linear model for strategy implementation.

These problems can be partly overcome by drawing feedback loops and interrelations

in the model’s flowchart, but to date I have failed to fully comprehend such a

construct. The model would seem to provide a classical exposition of communication,

understanding and action, but as will later be shown in the section concerning

communication (see section 2.4), the process of human communication is not a linear

process. A further concern is added when one tries to move on from the standpoint of

one person communicating the message and another person receiving and processing

it into the complex phenomena of the social world of multiple communicators and

receivers. The seeming failure of Noble’s models adds a further, process-minded

concern whether the formulation/implementation-distinction is fruitful at all.

Whereas Noble’s model as such seems to bear some problems, the components of the

model: communication, interpretation, adoption and enactment can serve well as

tentative frames of reference for my further study of implementation. It would seem

that these are the themes worth consideration and linkages to them can determine

whether the further themes one might encounter are worth studying. This is because


20

they are very much themes of common sense in strategy implementation from a

psychological standpoint of a single person: for a person to act as the strategy dictates,

she must at least

• be communicated the content of the strategy

• understand the content communicated

• accept the content in order to adopt it

• build her schemas concerning her work and her work environment to account for the strategy as well as of course to act accordingly.

I will therefore call Noble’s model the minimal model for implementation. The steps

described must at least take place in order the strategy to be implemented, since at the

end of the day it must all come down to the single individual. As for the nonlinear,

social and cultural complexities involved, the model does poorly with those in

addition to neglecting to mention the possibilities participation might offer for the

accomplishment of these steps.

During the course of this thesis I will hopefully find answers to the two pressing

problems facing the linear exposition of strategy implementation outlined above:

• Which factors affect the communication, interpretation, adoption and enactment in strategy implementation and how are these processes interrelated?

• What are the roles of different organizational members and groups in the implementation process? Who is the communicator and who the receiver in implementation?

One word on the concept of implementation before I continue. It is very important to

understand whose effort is meant when talking about implementation. Is strategy

implementation viewed as merely the action of the manager in charge of the

implementation effort or can the actual work effort all the organization’s members

effected by the strategy process viewed as strategy implementation? In this thesis I

will mean by implementation all the work effort or organizational activity that leads

to the realization of strategy. This is a clarifying notion and associated with the

cultural view on organizations adopted in this thesis.


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2.2 Context, content and process in implementation

Different situations call for different strategies. The organizational context: its internal

and external environment may affect the content and the process of strategy. An IT-

firm and a military organization may have very different needs for their strategies and

approaches for making strategy. Courtney et al (1997) have created a model for

strategy based on environmental uncertainty. In a predictable future a basic, analytical

toolkit will help the strategist to formulate a clear, strategic direction. In a situation

with alternative futures the strategist will be faced with a few, discrete possibilities. In

this case the strategist can use decision analysis, game theory and option valuation

models to determine the strategic direction (Courtney et al 1997, 67-70.)

A company with a range of futures is faced with a continuum of possibilities with a

more or less contained range. In this case it is not possible to value different

independent options, but it is still possible to use scenario planning, technology

forecasting and other methods. A company in a situation with a truly ambiguous

future is faced with no basis to forecast the future. For such a company there are still

some methods of anticipating a strategic direction. Pattern recognition and analogies

plus nonlinear dynamic models may be helpful (Courtney et al 1997, 70-71.)

Løvendahl and Revang (1998) have made an interesting proposition by stating that the

complexity of the postindustrial society will utterly transform organizational life: it

will become more a question of helping your friends than behaving in a uniform

manner.

How should a strategy be in each of these cases? The authors answer this question by

defining three strategic postures, the content of which varies in each case. The

shaping posture is directed to shape the future to the company’s ideal. The adapting

posture is taken if the company wants to adapt to its environment. The third posture,

reserving the right to play is a form of adaptation designed to get into a privileged

position. The postures vary according to the predictability of the company’s future: a

shaping posture in a predictable future is an attempt to create uncertainty in the

market in order to get it to change into a more lucrative direction. A shaping posture

in this case is risky and rare. A shaping posture in a more unpredictable future on the

other hand is usually an attempt to create stability in the market (Courtney et al 1997,

75-79.)


22

Ackoff (1981) proposes a similar model. He has catalogued organization types in

accordance to their approaches to change. Inactive organizations resist change.

Reactive organizations try to adapt quickly to changes in the environment, while

predictive organizations try to predict the changes in order to prepare for them and

interactive organizations deny the existence of a pre-set future and try to affect the

future itself.

So, the predictability of the future is a significant contextual factor for strategy. It

could be viewed as an environmental factor. Are there other significant factors to be

taken into account? Papadakis et al (1998) group the contextual factors into the

following seven dimensions:

• The decision perspective: how the decision itself is perceived by the organization’s members. Is it a response to a crisis or to an opportunity? Here we can see the strategic content itself becoming an important contextual factor. Waldersee and Sheather (1996) have found strong empirical evidence that support the influence of this perspective in strategy implementation.

• The strategic or management choice perspective: how the behaviour and characteristics of the decision makers determine the decision itself.

• The environmental determinism perspective: this is an adaptation perspective, reminiscent of Chaffee’s and Courtney’s thoughts.

The remaining four contextual groups belong to the firm characteristics and resource

availability perspective. They are:

• The internal systems perspective.

• The performance perspective.

• The firm size perspective.

• The corporate control perspective: the type of the organization’s ownership. Is it a public or a private firm?

The first two perspectives are in essence about the strategic content, the third is about

the organization’s external context, and the last four about the organization’s inner

context. Papadakis et al conducted an extensive, multi method field study in Greek

organizations. The most striking result was the influential role the decision

perspective played in strategic decision making. The way the nature of the strategic

decision was perceived: categorized and affected in the organization played an


23

important role in the forming actual decision itself (Papadakis et al 1997, 115-147.) In

essence, the study showed that the strategic content is a major contextual factor in

strategy implementation.

The nature of the strategy affects the strategic content and vice versa. What kinds of

strategies are there? This dimension to strategic contexts is provided by Mintzberg et

al (1995). The authors group the contexts into the entrepreneurial, mature, diversified,

professional, innovative, international and change contexts. Mintzberg goes on to

describe different varieties of strategy, a view which ties up some of the threads

created earlier:

• Planned strategy: clearly formulated by the management.

• Entrepreneurial strategy: the intentions of a single leader.

• Ideological strategy: the collective vision of the organization’s members.

• Umbrella strategy: partly centrally planned, partly emergent in organizations different parts.

• Process strategy: the process centrally controlled, the content is emergent.

• Disconnected strategy: different parts create different strategies.

• Consensus strategy: an emergent strategy through mutual adjustment.

• Imposed strategy: strategy dictated by the external environment (Mintzberg 1995, 16.)

The expositions of Papadakis, Mintzberg and others would seem to strongly suggest

that different contents and contexts call for different forms of implementation. Nutt

(1983) separates different climates (inner contexts) in order to demonstrate the

advantages and disadvantages of the implementation techniques he has presented (see

section 2.1). Participation-planning is beneficial in collegial (professional and

decentralized, high quality, low efficiency), professional (high intellectual capital,

high degree of freedom), nova (high output, less cost control, diverse skill mix),

consultative (high volume, low cost, less quality, diverse skill mix), and liberated

(homogenous work group, high quality, less regard on cost) environments.

Participation may also be useful in suspicious (centralized, high complexity, high

quality, less cost-control) environments (ibid. 604-607.)


24

The manipulative technique has two forms. A freeze-unfreeze-model is beneficial in

abdicated (homogenous skill mix, quality and cost control, little direction

requirements), delegated (high volume, low complexity, centralization), overmanaged

(centralization, diverse skill base, high volume) and standardized (centralization,

homogenous workforce, cost and quality emphasis). A game-type scenario technique

is advisable for suspicious (centralized, high complexity, high quality, less cost-

control), control (emphasis on cost optimization) and rigid (centralized, emphasis on

cost) environments (ibid. 604-606.)

The unilateral implementation technique has three basic forms. A persuasion

approach is useful in trust (centralization, volume, efficiency, complexity) and

distributive (centralized, high volume, low cost, homogenous skill base) climates. The

persuasion technique may also be useful in collegial climates. A demonstration

approach is recommended for neurotic (centralized, high quality, high efficiency,

diverse skill base) and totalitarian (controlled environment willing to be liberated)

environments. A simple edict approach may be useful in a totalitarian environment.

The two basic facets to strategy: the content and process have been covered in my

basic exposition of strategy (see section 1.2.3). A planning-type researcher is bound to

stress the importance of creating the right strategic content for the organization’s

survival and success while a process-minded researcher is more likely to stress the

importance of the actual process in which the strategy is created and implemented.

The section above has stressed that different organizations in different environments

call for different strategies. The strategic context is an important consideration in

strategy implementation and it will serve as the third facet to strategy in addition to

content and process. Pettigrew (1987, 657) has proposed a tripartite framework for the

study of strategy which integrates the content, context (inner and outer) and process

aspects of strategy. In Pettigrew’s model, each of the three concepts represents an

interdependent factor in strategy research. He uses the metaphor of a triangle to

demonstrate this (see figure 3).


25

Figure 3. Pettigrew’s tripartite conception of strategy.

What kinds of considerations of context have to be taken into account in

implementation? Pettigrew (1987, 657-658) makes a distinction between inner and

outer context of the organization. Outer context refers to the organization’s social,

political, competitive and economic environment. Inner context refers to the

organization’s structure, culture and political systems.

The models discussed this far have barely scratched the surface of organizational

context and process in terms of relevant themes. This is due to the fact discussed

earlier that one cannot look for relevant topics merely by looking at strategy

implementation texts. I will adopt Pettigrew’s model to help conceptualize the themes

to look for in organization psychological literature. I will adapt it to better suit my

purposes by placing strategy (or strategic content) in the middle, as a meeting point of

the organization’s context and processes (see figure 4).


26

Figure 4. Adaptation of Pettigrew’s framework.

This model reflects the view that effective implementation takes place by

accomplishing the essential fit between the relevant processes and contextual factors.

Strategy is either the cause of this alignment (a planning, proactive view) or the result

(an emergent, reactive view). Another way to put it is to say that strategy

implementation is a group of organizational processes taking place in the

organization’s inner context. The fact that my standpoint is that of organizational

psychology, the relevant context for me is the internal, cultural context and the

relevant processes are those present in the organization’s members’ perceptions.

The relevant themes in the literature should therefore be found under two general

themes: the organization’s inner, cultural context and the human processes involved in

strategy implementation and strategic change. I will thus categorize the relevant

themes for implementation as belonging to either organizational culture or

organizational change processes. I will cover these two concepts in the following two

sections.

2.3 Organizational culture as internal context

The kind of internal context most relevant to an organizational psychological

standpoint is best characterized by the concept organizational culture. Within this


27

concept one can place two relevant, strongly linked concepts, namely those of

language and meaning. Within these concepts one can place the relevant contextual

concepts in literature (see figure 5).

Figure 5. The relevant factors in the organization’s inner context.

It must be stressed that the conceptualization I have made is from one standpoint only,

that is, from a strategy implementation standpoint. The interrelations and hierarchies

formed by these concepts do not by large fit to the scope of this thesis. Many of the

relevant questions are left to, or answered by other sciences. The conception of

culture I have adopted is also implicitly present in the categorization: for me

organizational culture means something present in the minds and activities of the

organizational members, not so much on objects and artifacts.

What is culture? Numerous volumes have been written on the topic and to that effect,

the definitions are likewise numerous. A sufficient definition would be to characterize

culture as the totality of man-made meanings in the world. Meaning is carried by

symbols. The most significant system of symbols in human reality is called language.

Hence the two supporting concepts for culture in figure 5. Or, as written by Geertz

(1973, 5):


28

”The concept of culture I espouse… is essentially a semiotic one. Believing, with Max Weber,

that man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun, I take culture to

be those webs and the analysis of it to be therefore not an experimental science in search of

law, but an interpretive one in search of meaning.”

Organizational culture can be defined from a range of viewpoints. Smircich (1983,

342) classifies relevant themes to culture according to classical definitions of culture

in social sciences. She categorizes the themes by studying the assumptions on culture

that the researchers of these themes are often bound to make.

• Cross-cultural or comparative management. This theme is based on the (Malinowskian) assumption that cultures are social instruments for accomplishing tasks.

• Corporate culture. This theme is based on the (structuralist/functionalist) view that organizations are adaptive organisms, in the process of exchange with their environments.

• Organizational cognition. This theme is based on the assumption that organizations are systems of knowledge.

• Organizational symbolism. Organizations are patterns of symbolic discourse. This is Geertz’s view, and the view of this thesis as well in many contexts.

• Unconscious processes and organization. This theme is based on the (partly psychoanalytic) assumption that organizational processes are based on unconscious processes.

Schein (1985) has famously undertaken the bold task of defining organizational

culture. His model of culture is a three-level construct based on tacit, underlying

assumptions, which support the organization’s values, which again support various

artifacts present in the organizational reality. These three concepts are the

organization’s means of surviving in its environment (external context) and are tested

by their ability to ensure the organization’s survival. Schein’s model of culture is

therefore a dynamic one in the sense that there is traffic between the layers: a well-

tested value may become an underlying assumption, and may also produce artifacts,

etc (ibid. 6)

Hatch (1993) has criticized Schein’s (highly dominant) model, by claiming that it fails

to fully manifest the process and dynamic nature of culture. She has created a cyclical

model, in which values, assumptions and artifacts are supplanted by symbols and in


29

which the processes between the four concepts are defined. Assumptions turn into

values and vice versa by manifestation, values into artifacts and vice versa by

realization, artifacts into symbols and vice versa by symbolization and symbols into

assumptions and vice versa by interpretation (ibid. 660.) I will gladly adopt Hatch’s

improved model since it brings me closer to the sensemaking-themes covered in the

third chapter. I have decided to speak of beliefs instead of values and assumptions

since both can be covered under this same theme, which is also quite widely covered

in organizational literature. Artifacts are present in the concepts of metaphor and

narrative.

The fact that I have made a distinction between process and culture can be contested

in the light of Hatch’s model. It is still beneficial to view culture as a field of it own,

since the literature covering it is vast and also many times independent from pure

process-literature. Näsi and Giallourakis (1991) give four core-meanings for corporate

culture, which nicely incorporate the concept into a wider cultural framework:

• It consists of values, norms and action: what is valuable, what is allowed/prohibited, how one must behave.

• It is wide and pervasive: it penetrates the organization in explicit and tacit forms.

• It is a human creation: governed by special key persons or groups. It can be changed either by evolution or revolution.

• It is a part of general culture, and has a social function. It is connected to a certain time and place. It is learned and can be considered as both a producer and a product. Schein (1993) has also emphasized the role of dialogue in cultural learning. He has proposed that dialogue should be a central element in organizational transformation.

As was noted in chapter 2.1, organizational culture has been recognized as a central

factor in strategy implementation and organizational change. O’Reilly (1989, 19-24)

notes participation, the recognition of management as symbolic action, active social

construction of reality5 and extensive reward systems as strategic methods of

developing culture. Morgan (1993, 110), recognizes the need to move from the open

systems –model, in which the organization’s members are viewed as functional parts

5 The social construction of reality is a process first described by Berger & Luckmann (1967).


30

of a system, into a cultural model concerned with higher mental functions in

organization theory. Bates et al (1995, 1576-1577) have recorded a significant

correspondence between manufacturing strategy and organizational culture, in the

sense that a manufacturer with well-aligned and implemented manufacturing strategy

exhibited a clan-oriented organizational culture characterized by the use of teams, low

emphasis on hierarchy and a high sense of common purpose and motivation.

Is culture as pervasive as the preceding authors have assumed it to be? Is there truly a

common web of signification between all of the organization’s members? Martin

(1992, 13) contests this view. She presents three perspectives on cultures in

organizations. The integrative perspective indeed views organizational culture as a

common web of signification shared by the organization’s members. The

differentiation perspective contests this by describing the organization as consisting of

different subcultures represented by different interest groups. There is no common

divisor to these subcultures and their coexistence is filled with politics. The

fragmentation perspective refuses to admit that there exist even homogenous

subcultures. The backgrounds of the organizational members are too complex to

easily group them as belonging to discrete subcultures. There is no consensus, even

within subcultures. One should neither assign a negative tone to the fragmentation

perspective. Martin stresses that even though it lacks consensus, it may serve well in a

rapidly changing environment due to its dynamic nature.

The point Martin is trying to make is to point out the role of the researcher’s

standpoint in the result of organization studies. She uses OZCO, a real organization

hiding behind a pseudonym to demonstrate how a researcher may have results

corresponding to either perspective according to the bias of her perspective on culture.

According to Martin, social science is not value free.

2.3.1 Language as the medium of communicating organizational

culture

Language is the widest and most powerful system of signification available to man.

As an everyday phenomenon language would seem to be the medium through which

meaning is transmitted: singular terms (proper names) and universal concepts are built

into complete propositional sentences using the relevant syntax and again translated


31

into relevant mental contents by the receiver. Vast research in philosophy, logic and

linguistics has shown that the reality of language and language use might not be as

simple as the last description hinted at, however.6 Following the rising interest of

philosophers, most notably the logical positivists, in language in the beginning of the

20th century, also the social sciences have become to acknowledge language as the

most important factor in social systems. The term linguistic turn is often used to

describe this shift in paradigm.7 Since organizational research in the sense of this

thesis is a social science, many of the themes of interest fall under this category. But

what is language for the social sciences? Alvesson and Karreman (2000, 141) give the

following set of definitions:

• an active, autonomous and productive mode of expression

• the central object of study in the social sciences

• a rhetorical device for the creation of a credible research text

• the very stuff researchers work and struggle with

• a carrier of power through its ability to order and constitute the social world

• a vehicle for the potential critical clarification of social issues.

The diversity of the above definition indicates the immense complexity of language.

The study of many of the problems and questions concerning language do not fit the

scope of this thesis: I will limit my scope to a handful of relevant topics: namely those

concerning narratives, metaphors and semiotics in organizations.

The term narrative refers to story-telling practices, and has its roots in ancient Greek

plays: in the role of the narrator. Narratives have become a popular method of

studying various kinds of social activities containing communication, since they

provide the interpreter (the researcher) with the methods of literature research as

powerful means of understanding social contexts. This reflects the overall willingness

6 I will not delve into this any further. Those interested are encouraged to find further discussion in Hale & Wright (1997). 7 The concept linguistic turn is attributed to Rorty.


32

of the social scientist to work as an interpreter instead of a provider of simple causal

or behaviorist explanation (cf. von Wright 1971).

Czarniawska (1998) has worked on bringing narratives to organizational research. She

defines a narrative or a story as a group of event descriptions containing a plot: a

meaningful, connected order for these events and also a point: an insight that gives a

wider significance to the story. This point may be either explicitly defined as in many

educational stories, or more hidden or ambivalent. In the latter case the story leaves

openings for negotiation of meaning (ibid. 2-3.)

Czarniawska sees four roles narratives may play in organizational research. First of

all, there is research literature written in a narrative, story-like fashion. Secondly,

there is research that collects organizational stories. Thirdly, there is an interpretive

approach to organizational research that views organizational life as consisting of

storytelling and the role of organization research as story reading. The fourth role is a

disciplinary reflection taking the form of literary critique (ibid. 13-14.)

It is obvious that the role of narratives essential to strategy is the third, interpretive

form. According to this view it is possible to view strategy as a story. Lehtimäki

(2000) has written a whole thesis on the strategy story of the city of Tampere, which

is an interesting test to this approach. Barry and Elmes (1997, 433) claim that strategy

as a story stands somewhere between theatrical drama, futurist fantasy, a historical

novel and an autobiography. The future-oriented forms reflect a proactive view

whereas the historical forms a more reactive or emergent view on strategy. The

challenge of the writer of the story, or the strategist is to create an engaging,

compelling account, one that readers (or the organization’s strategy implementers) are

willing to buy into (ibid. 434). The narrative form of strategy would seem, therefore,

to rely more on visionary tactics than careful business planning.

In their study of business planning at 3M, Shaw et al (1998) studied the writing of

strategic stories in practice. According to the authors a good strategic story has three

central components. First, the writer needs to set the stage: describe the current

situation in an understandable way. The next stage is to introduce a dramatic conflict

that articulates and creates the need of organizational change, and anxiety in the

reader. The final step is resolution, which states the necessary steps to overcome the


33

conflict and achieve the necessary change (ibid. 6-7.) The role of strategy

implementation would seem to be to go through the necessary steps described in the

resolution-stage.

The approaches to narratives discussed this far seem to concentrate on management-

based models of visionary leadership. Is there any research done on organization-wide

storytelling? Beech (2000, 225) has found evidence that the storytelling actions of the

managers do have an effect on the cognitive models of the employees, but that effect

is significantly filtered by the storytelling styles of both the managers and employees.

Among the styles studied were the heroic director, the romantic ward manager and the

tragic, skilled worker. Boje (1991, 122) has found similar evidence that the

performance of stories is a key part of the members’ sensemaking of the environment.

The description of an organization as a storytelling collective is, however, a mightier

task than the simple, narrative description of an explicit, top-down strategy statement.

Moore (2000, 44-55) proposes narrative analysis as a tool for analyzing strategic

discourse and its effect on the organization. She emphasizes the notion that narrative

analysis may reveal different approaches to strategy emerging at different phases of

the strategy process. Moreover, she proposes narratives as a bridge between the

analytical, rational and content oriented planning paradigm; and the creative, vision-

based process paradigm. The power of narratives according to Moore is their ability to

transmit many layers of communication: from rational to emotional. The objective

should be narrative strategic discussion. Moore does not carry her discussion very far:

the idea is interesting but somewhat lacking in practical usability.

One interesting thread to be mentioned is the discussion of postmodernism in

organizational literature. Many postmodernists base their scientific assumptions on

the notion, that there are no more grand stories to be told – all that is left is a

fragmented world of separate stories that do not form a coherent, rational whole.8 On

narrative organizational research this would mean, that there is no meta-story to be

told for the organization, for example the vision and values provided by the

management – the relevant research takes place within the distinct, smaller stories

found on all organizational levels. The view represented by the postmodernists is

8 The end of the grand stories is a thought that originated from Lyotard, 1985.


34

reminiscent of Martin’s category of fragmented culture. I am not willing to accept

postmodernism as such. The possibility of writing some form of meta-narrative

should be open if one is willing to talk about any form of strategic change control, or

fruitful strategic interventions (see Kilduff and Mehra 1997; Alvesson 1995 for

further discussion.)

Many stories contain metaphors. Metaphors are concepts or expressions that describe

a thing or an event by using concepts from a conceptual system designed to describe

another thing. Metaphors are often found in poetry, literature and art, and this is the

use that is commonly attributed to them. If one takes a closer look at everyday

language and language use, one notices that the whole of language is filled with

metaphors.

Lakoff and Johnson (1980) have written a classical exposition on metaphors. Their

famous first example is the metaphor: ”argument is war”. We say that we can win an

argument or that we have deflected our opponent’s argument, to mention just two

common expressions. This use of metaphor not only helps to describe the

argumentation situation, but it also makes us think of argumentation in a combative

way. After all, it would be completely amicable to think of argumentation in terms of

say, building something together (ibid. 3-6).

The authors go on to describe whole systems of metaphors. Orientation metaphors, for

example, are based on physical orientation, up being good in most cases, for example:

”the atmosphere in the room was soaring, but my mood sunk.” The authors’ main

proposition is that metaphors are the key ingredient in our understanding different

events and expressions (ibid. 14-21; 115-125.)

Metaphors provide the researcher with a powerful way of understanding

organizational life. The way people conceptualize their reality is paved with

metaphors, so to speak. Morgan (1996) has based his theory of organizations on

metaphor. In Morgan’s mind metaphor is a way of thinking that produces a one-sided

insight that stresses the similarities between two concepts or conceptual systems, but

leaves the differences unnoticed (ibid. 4-5). Morgan stresses that the challenge for

managers and strategists is to creatively use metaphors in understanding and


35

communication, yet being able to escape being bound by a limited set of metaphors. I

will return to Morgan’s metaphorical taxonomy of organizations in association of the

topic organizational identity.

An important consideration in strategy implementation is the conflict of different

metaphorical systems among the organization’s member’s and units. It has already

been shown that metaphors represent a major faction in human understanding.

Therefore, if one wants to create a shared understanding of strategy, one has to be

able to cope with differences in metaphors, or metaphor conflicts. Palmer and

Dunford (1996, 698) propose three strategies for handling metaphor conflicts. A

supremacy approach tries to expose logical flaws in opposing views. An integrative

approach tries to form a synthesis between opposing views. A contingency approach

formulates conditions, on which each view is dominant.

In discussing organizational culture I adopted the idea that organizational culture can

in many ways be interpreted by studying the symbolic processes in organizations. The

study of symbols and symbol use is called semiotics9 and it will be the last facet to

language I will cover.

What can semiotics offer for organizational research? If one looks at culture as a

system of interpretation as proposed by Daft and Weick (1983), one must look at the

symbols and symbolic systems that are interpreted. This is a task for semiotics. In

their book on semiotics and management Broms and Gahmberg (1987, 3) place

semiotics as the science set to answer the central question in strategy: what happens

when one has to make wise decisions with inadequate information? The answer

should, according to the authors, be found within the symbols in the organization.

The study of semiotics is also simultaneously the study of communication, since

communication is done with symbols (Barley 1983, 393.) The central questions

concerning organizational communication, a central theme in strategy implementation

as was noted in section 2.2 with the minimal model for strategy implementation,

therefore lie in the field of semiotics as well. In general, the semiotic view on strategic

9 From Greek semeion, sign.


36

management is to emphasize the role of the manager to create shared meaning to

facilitate action in the organization. One could speak of the semiotics of management

as the management of meaning paradigm (Gahmberg, 1990, 153).

An interesting study on organizational symbolism was done by Schultz (1991), who

speaks of symbolic domains within the organization. She studied the different

conceptual work settings of a group of managers in a Danish ministry. Her main

proposition is that an organization’s members often have to switch between different,

disconnected symbolic domains in their work settings. She sets the conflicting roles of

managers as monks (doing their administrative tasks), fire fighters (in crisis

situations) and disciples (for the politically chosen minister) as examples of having to

fluctuate between symbolic domains. Schultz’s results make an interesting link

between symbolic domains and the perceived identity of the managers.

As one can see, many questions in this thesis lie in the field of interest of semiotics.

The field is a young one, however and much of the research done under its topics

have not been done using the keyword semiotics. The wideness of semiotics as a field

of interest also raises a doubt whether there can ever be one, unified field of

semiotics.

2.3.2 Meaning in organizations

Meaning is a central concept often employed but rarely defined outside philosophy or

linguistics. The central relation in semantics (the study of meaning in philosophy or

linguistics) is that of a sign (proper name, concept word or phrase) to its referent, that

is to that object the sign refers to. To deal with situations where for example two

words name the same thing (the cat and die Katze, for example), we say that the

words have a common meaning. In this sense meaning is the third factor in

signification in addition to the sign and the referent. A rather popular view is to place

meaning in the mind of a human being. Most (or all) signs appear in languages.

Therefore the strong bond between meaning and language in figure 5.

I have spoken earlier of organizational cultures as systems of meaning. I will now turn

to meaning in organizations through three popular themes in organizational literature,

namely those of categories, beliefs and identity.


37

The way the strategist or strategy implementer categorizes the data she gathers from

her environment is a central question on implementation. The categories she has are

located in her mind in the form of schemes or concepts. Dutton and Jackson (1987)

have drawn insight from cognitive science’s theory of concept formation10 as they

study the strategic decision-makers’ categorizations. The authors state that the process

of labeling organizational issues is central in strategy formation and implementation.

They seek to include both the cognitive and affective aspects of the mind in their

model as they implement a framework of opportunity and threat over the cognitive

labeling on strategic issues. If the organization’s members view an organizational

issue or a strategic theme as an opportunity, they will be more likely to participate in

its implementation (ibid. 76-83.) A similar labeling was discovered in a study done by

Gioia and Thomas (1996, 370) in U.S. colleges. Instead of opportunity or threat, the

managers interviewed labeled issues as either political or strategic.

The categories Dutton and Jackson propose fall into the extension of the theory of

cognitive schemas in psychology, as well as that of constructivism in educational

science. These disciplines are based on the assumption that every individual forms

unique cognitive structures from the knowledge she has. New information is likely to

be interpreted in terms of those structures, even in cases of slight conflict of content.

The schemas are themselves dynamic structures that constantly change in interaction

with the environment. This bears significance to strategy implementation in the sense

that a strategic message is likely to be interpreted from the standpoint of the

interpreter’s knowledge structures. Participation in the formation stage of strategy

may result in similarities in relevant knowledge structures and enhance successful

implementation.

Beliefs are mental states that contain a propositional content. Beliefs are intentional in

the sense that they are about something in the world. Beliefs could be stated to be

10 The authors rely mainly on Rosch’s theory of prototype concepts, which is hardly an unchallenged theory (see Laurence & Margolis 1999, 34-43). They move on a relatively general level, though, on which at least most of the critique Rosch has encountered is probably irrelevant.


38

propositional attitudes in the sense that they may be stated to contain an attitude, a

disposition to act in a certain way. An important property of beliefs is that they are

constituents of knowledge in the classical definition: knowledge as justified, true

belief (cf. Plato 1999, 340-342.)

Sproull (1981, 204) categorizes three types of beliefs in organizations.

Phenomenological beliefs describe simply the occurrence of something. Causal

beliefs express a causal relation between two phenomena or objects. The belief: the

Asian economic crisis caused the current state of our company, is a causal belief.

Normative beliefs on the other hand describe how things should be or how one should

act.

Björkman (1988) states that belief systems influence organizational behavior in

various forms: through concrete procedures and by guiding organizational behavior.

His main proposition is that fundamental strategic reorientation involves a radical

change in the organization’s belief systems (ibid. 30.)

Beliefs are related to paradigms in the sense that they form the basis on how the

organization’s members view their environment. Beliefs are distinct from paradigms

in the sense that with beliefs there is a possibility of change more incremental than the

radical revolutions involved with paradigms in Kuhn’s (1962) sense (ibid. 4-5).

Martinsuo (1999, 21-24) has proposed that values be viewed as a form of belief,

namely a strong tool for the management to induce organizational change. This fits

nicely with Sproull’s conception of normative belief.

One question of to be raised concerns the possibility of tacit belief. A belief is often

associated with a propositional content, which would seem to overrule the possibility

of the belief being tacit. If one is willing to allow for tacit knowledge and such

implicit structures to affect her organization, is it enough to speak of belief as a basis

for their members’ actions?

Many of the relevant beliefs in organizations concern the organization’s identity. The

organization’s identity forms the way in which the members of the organization view


39

the organizational whole. Albert and Whetten (1985, 264-266) give the following

three criteria for identity:

• It somehow contains the features that are viewed as essential for the organization, namely, the organization’s character.

• It shows how the organization is distinct from other organizations.

• It shows the features that have remained with the organization over time.

According to the authors the organization’s identity must not be singular – they also

discuss dual and multiple identities. A research organization is stated as an example of

dual identity, since it holds both the normative identity resembling a church and a

utilitarian identity of a business organization (ibid. 263-295.)

A powerful exposition of organizational identities is provided by Morgan (1996). He

classifies different identities using the metaphors organizations employ in self-

reflection. The machine-metaphor was the dominant model in classical Taylorist

organizations. It views the organization as a mechanistic structure functioning in

accordance to causal laws. The organism-metaphor describes the organization as

functioning like a natural organism in interaction with its environment. The brain-

metaphor views the organization as a processor of knowledge and a learner. The

culture-metaphor sees the organization as a cultural phenomenon creating its own

reality. The political system –metaphor views the organization in terms of power and

control in the hands of different interest groups. The psychic prison –metaphor is has

a psychoanalytic flavor, emphasizing the unconscious processes behind taken-for-

granted organizational issues. The transformation and flux –metaphor views the

organization as being in a constant state of change. A pessimistic view is presented by

the last, instrument of domination –metaphor, which presents the organization as a

method for unethical control of its members.

Morgan stresses that the metaphors describing organizational identities are merely

representations of a very complex reality. They can be used to give meaning, but one

must escape being bound by them (ibid. 355).

Huff and Sarason (ref: paper presented at the Academy of Management) provide

depth to the discussion of identity by linking the concept with three other concepts,

namely those of organizational culture, identification with an organization


40

(identification is defined clearly by Ashforth and Mael (1989, 21) as a ”perception of

oneness with a group of persons”) and strategy to explore the possibility of

organizational change. They envision organizational identity as a middle level process

in between of macro and micro –level processes such as strategy (macro) and

identification (micro). They see organizational identity as highly malleable through

intervention, as opposed to the organizational culture and strategy, which are harder to

change through intervention. This is because organizational identity is largely

depended only factors inherent to the organization and it is also relatively easy to

make identity explicit (ibid. 6.) This idea makes organizational identity a powerful

tool for the organization’s management. The sentiment is also present with

Markkanen (1998) who studied identity management at the Ahlström Corporation.

Dutton et al (1994) have studied the links between the members’ identification and

organizational identity. The authors state that identification with an organization is

determined by how the members incorporate the perceived characteristics of their

organization to their self-concepts. The authors propose that the similarity of the

organizational identity with a member’s self concept, along with distinctiveness,

attractiveness of the identity and the visibility of the member’s affiliation with the

organization among a few others are the positive determining factors of the member’s

identification with the organization. The stronger the identification, the more likely

the member is to cooperate with her organization’s other members as well as compete

with out-group members (ibid. 239-261.) It would be fair to say, therefore, that

organizational identification is a factor in gaining the organizational members’

motivated support in strategy implementation as well. This is also supported by a

result in the authors’ earlier (1991) study on the New York Port Authority. They

found evidence that organizational identity deeply affects the way the members

perceive their environment. A change in organizational identity reflected on changes

in the members’ perceptions and actions, in this case toward the homeless people

(ibid. 517-554). Gustafsson and Reger (1995) have in turn recognized the important

role identity can play in achieving stability as well as organizational change high

velocity environments (see section 2.2).

An interesting question concerning identification with the organization is at hand

when dealing with an organization in which strong, classical professions are


41

represented. Airaksinen (1991) defines a classical profession as a profession set to

fulfill a purpose publicly viewed as valuable in itself. A doctor and a teacher are the

basic examples of classical professions: one is set to promote health and save lives,

the other is set to educate the public. When we speak of an organization composed of

such classical professionals, say a hospital or a school, we are easily faced with

stronger identification with the profession and its values than the organization and its

values. Such is the reality in many public-sector organizations set to implement their

strategies, as described by McKevitt (2000, 96-107). After studying the Irish health

sector reflected with experiences from three other countries, he stresses that in many

public-sector organizations the professionals have the power to blunt any strategic

change effort at will. This requires a more emergent approach to strategy on the

leaders’ part as well as a careful examination on the context of the organization.

Organizational image is a concept often used in association with identity. An image of

an organization could be characterized as a perception of the organization’s identity to

somebody else. Managers can use images to change organizational identity and also

to affect the attitudes of non-organizational members (customers, legislators, etc.)

Images can be a method of communicating strategy, not very much unlike that of a

strategic story. Scott and Lane (2000, 51) state that:

”Organizational communication of desired organizational images

1) initiates increased stakeholder cognitive elaboration of a perceived organizational image

2) provides positive information on organizational attributes for stakeholders to assess identity overlap and

3) increases the accessibility and salience of an organizational social identity.”

The communication of desired organizational images is, therefore, a method of both

affecting organizational identity and of implementing (communicating) strategy.

There is also a link between narratives and organizational images. One can observe

two competing metaphors trying to achieve the same goal: one resembling a picture,

one resembling a story. Pictures differ from stories in the sense that they do not have a

linear structure (beginning-plot-end; set the stage-dramatic conflict-resolution), but

are in a way simultaneous presentations of information.


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2.3.3 Culture on different organizational levels

Does culture affect each organizational level in the same manner? It would be

tempting to state that the different cultural aspects are centered on either the

management or the personnel of the organization. One could say for example that

organizational beliefs are mainly held by the personnel and created by the

management or that narratives are used by the management to create understanding

among the personnel. With culture, however, there are relevant aspects for all groups

within the organization. It would seem completely valid to think that the management

also holds beliefs about the organization and the narrative form is also used in making

sense of past events by different personnel groups.

This makes the situation somewhat harder to grasp in the everyday context of an

organization. Martin (1992, 84) emphasizes this complexity by noting that the

integrative view on culture is emphasized by researchers with a managerial bias,

whereas the differentiation viewpoint is held by those biased to think along the lines

of representatives from groups lacking the power of the top management. According

to this view, the organization would seem to be more and more differentiated as we

move downwards in hierarchy and more and more integrated as we move upwards.

Martin does not state this but one could continue this line of reasoning by stating that

the managers hold the integrative perspective, middle managers the differentiation

perspective and the personnel the fragmentation perspective. This of course is a

simplification and would perhaps serve best as a worst-case scenario.

2.3.4 Cultural implications for strategy implementation

In section 2.1.2 I stated that strategy textbooks generally have very little to say about

the cultural aspects of strategy implementation. Has anything significant been learned

from my exposition of culture and related concepts to rectify this?

The bias of this thesis is centered on the way people understand strategy in order to

effectively implement it. This view is contrasted against the planning paradigm,

where the content of the strategy is viewed as absolute and implementation as only the

steps needed to implement the content. The discussion on culture has shown that

when dealing with human beings in strategy implementation the effect interpretation


43

has in the strategic content must always be taken into account. The same goes for the

external context of the organization, its environment. The environment is also

interpreted. If there is an objective view of the organization’s environment, the

organization itself is bound to a subjective view, based on its culture.

Section 2.2 was concluded with the exposition of Noble’s rather linear model of

implementation. During the study of cultural elements in the chapter above I have

come to the conclusion that my intuition of the linearity being a problem for Noble’s

model seems justified. The study of linguistic and meaning-creating elements in

literature has not at any point provided a linear view on interpretation. While

interpretation is ontologically done in the brain of an individual it cannot be isolated

from a larger cultural context. Therefore linear models such as Noble’s are bound to

have difficulties explaining the whole of activities between the strategic message

transmitted and the action that ensues.

From the standpoint of my adaptation of Pettigrew’s model in section 2.3 (see figure

4) I think the linear model is an attempt to replace the concept strategy as a bridge

between context and process with that of a strategic content. In this sense a linear

exposition of strategy implementation, even taking account the human interpretation

as a factor, is a content-based attempt to look at strategy implementation. I have

already stated that in my view the content is not enough, since it is an interpretation to

begin with and also bound to be interpreted in every step of the way. In my view the

best attempt to account for the described complexities is done not by a linear

exposition of implementation, but by authors engaged in the study of sensemaking,

which will be studied in chapter three.

So, what should be done to account for language and meaning in strategy

implementation? To begin with, by remembering that they are significant factors! For

example, it is not at all certain that e-mailing a complex memo is a method to be

understood. The textbooks, concerning themselves with complex structural and

systemic issues, as well as careful analysis on how to create the right content, have

virtually nothing to say about how to ensure the understanding of that content. This is

often shrugged of as a question of communication, yet communication is a very

complex phenomenon if the complexity of understanding is to be taken into account.


44

The significant question is in which situations different people from different parts of

the organization can be said to have shared understanding of issues communicated.

When do they share enough concepts and beliefs in order to interpret issues with

enough similarity in order to be said to have a shared understanding?

Linguistic insights concerning metaphors, narratives and semiotics can be utilized to

create shared frames of reference, for example by communicating strategy through

story telling, by using metaphors and realizing the symbolic dimensions contained by

the strategic message. Insights concerning meaning such as the importance of

categorizing the incoming data, the organizational beliefs and organizational identity

also affecting interpretation can be taken into account by a clever implementer. They

should also be taken into account in creating the actual strategy.

I have criticized the linear model of implementation and noted that the cultural

elements language and meaning are components to be taken into account in

implementing strategy. A deeper understanding of how culture can be taken into

account is sought after through the study of relevant organizational processes, done in

the next chapter.

2.4 The processes of organizational change

In my categorization (see figure 4) I have differentiated organizational processes and

organizational culture. This demarcation may be only instrumental since culture can

also be viewed as process, as proposed by Hatch (see section 2.4). It is, however,

helpful in clarifying the different themes involved.

In the prescriptive management literature there has traditionally been two competing

models for change: fundamental (or revolutionary), and incremental change. The

fundamental change-model, championed by the likes of Miller and Friesen (1980),

Pettigrew (1987) and Mintzberg (1978) is based on the notion of change as a

revolutionary process, which affects the organization in all levels of context, process

and culture (Mintzberg and Wesley 1992). The competing incremental model,

notoriously championed by Quinn (1980) takes organizational change to be a process

of slower transformation, based on small steps (see section 2.1).


45

An interesting third model, based, among other things on organizational identity is

proposed by Reger et al (1994). This model is called the tectonic change model and is

based on overcoming the resistance due to the content of the organization’s members’

mindsets. The authors state that this model is good for the turbulent environments

many organizations face today whereas the revolutionary model is good for crisis

situations and the incremental model for stable environments (ibid. 32.)

The tectonic model is based on the assumption (or fact) that the need of change is

interpreted through existing mental models. The tectonic interventions are designed to

build significant changes on existing mental models by invoking earthquake-like

cognitive tremors in the organization’s members. The most significant mental model

for change in organizations is the organization’s identity (ibid. 33-34.) The mental

models the authors propose bear a close resemblance to the organizational categories

and beliefs described in section 2.3.

The authors begin by defining two different cognitive barriers of resistance for

change. The first barrier results in passive resistance because of the members’ failure

to fully understand the change. The second barrier results in active resistance because

of cognitive opposition to change. This opposition is likely to appear because the

proposed change is in direct conflict with valued elements of the existing environment

(ibid. 34-35.) This is a very important point in strategy implementation as well. It is

not enough to communicate well enough to create an understanding of strategy – the

strategic message has also to form some sort of a fit with the members’ mental

models.

The authors give the following six propositions for overcoming the two barriers

described above:

1) Conduct an organizational audit before undertaking any major change, focusing on the members’ beliefs about the organization.

2) Tailor the change to fit the organization. This concerns for example the speed of the implementation.

3) Present the change as significant while tying it to valued aspects of organizational identity. In this stage it may be prudent to take into account the threat/opportunity –type affective conditions in mental labeling proposed by Dutton and Jackson (see section 2.3).


46

4) Introduce change in a series of mid-range steps. The authors speak of an identity gap, which can be widened by sensegiving practices (see chapter 3.3).

5) Take the path of least resistance.

6) Know how much change your organization can handle (ibid. 38-41.)

Change creates uncertainty in the organization – that much is certain. How do

organizations in general deal with this uncertainty? Hartley (2000, 112-113) has

proposed three strategic responses to uncertainty. The first is the contingency effect,

in which the organization’s structures are needed to become more flexible in order to

facilitate the unanticipated. The second approach, information seeking, is a strategy in

which the leaders and strategists in the organization struggle to find the best

information to increase the predictability of the environment. The third response is

sensemaking behaviors in which sense is created out of the environmental uncertainty.

This is the response promoted by Weick (1995) and it is studied in-depth in the third

chapter.

While studying strategy implementation this thesis is concerned with those processes

which affect organizational change. The models proposed above give a hint on the

variety of themes relevant to the change process. The relevant themes discussed in the

following sections are grouped around the concepts cognition, which is a process

taking place in the mind of a subject and behavior which is the activity of a subject

(see figure 6).


47

Figure 6. Change processes central to strategy implementation.

2.4.1 Cognitive processes

Cognition is a concept used in its original form to describe the mental processes of

knowing things. It has gained a wider sense to include all kinds of information

containing or –processing mental processes except for emotion and volition

(Guttenplan 1994, 167-168.) The scope of cognition has been made even wider by

some emotion researchers claiming that emotion is also a cognitive process (cf.

Oatley and Jenkins 1996, ch. 9).

The study of organizational cognition as well as associated themes such as

intelligence and rationality has been more and more influenced by the study of

unconscious processes. If I ignore recent emotion research and place emotion as a

counterpart to cognition, many researchers have claimed that emotional processes

play a significant part in organizational life an also should be taken into account in

strategy implementation. The considerations of emotion have been supplanted by


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discussion about such concepts as intuition, the intuitive expert, and personal

knowledge as a counterpart to objective knowledge.11 One of the reasons for this

critique of reason has been the concept of information overload – the fact that many

organizational members have to deal with loads of information, all of which they are

unable to analyze. Argyris studies on the impact of defenses on learning have also

provided an inspiration (Sparrow 2000, 15-28; O’Donnell 2000, 71-78.) The cognitive

processes I am interested in are contained under the themes of strategic thinking,

strategic decision making, knowledge diffusion and learning.

After the work of such authors as Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995), Senge (1990) and

classics like Argyris and Schön (1978) learning has come to be recognized as an

important process in organizations. But what is learning? To say that a subject has

learned something, one has at least to be able to say that she has changed in some

way: either in her behaviour or in her attitudes or knowledge structures (dispositions

to act in some way). But simple change is not enough. Puolimatka (1995) has

proposed three further conditions for learning.

First of all, the subject must have understood the content she is supposed to have

learned. It is very difficult to give a clear definition for understanding, but let it

suffice to say that the subject must have grasped the meaning of the before mentioned

content. Secondly, there must be a causal connection between the learning process

that is observed and the change observed. Thirdly, the process of learning should

affect the learner in a more comprehensive manner than just the acquisition of the

learned content – this involves changes in her schemas and attitudes, values, etc (ibid.

122-123.)

Puolimatka proposes further that learning should be defined as coming to know

something. In his view this would help to alleviate the fear of behaviorism, since

knowledge is intrinsically an internal property of the knowing subject and cannot be

traced back to her mere behaviour (ibid. 124.)

11 Personal knowledge is a concept associated with Polanyi (see 1958, 1966), the creator of the concept tacit knowledge. For a discussion of intuition and expertise, see Dreyfus & Dreyfus (1986). This topic is also present in my previous master’s thesis (Mantere 2000).


49

Learning thus defined is a useful concept for this culture-related study of strategy

implementation. If I accept the notion to accept the cognitive mechanisms of the

organization’s members into my study, I can utilize the vast amount of literature

available on learning.

Argyris (1989, 6) has defined learning as the detection and correction of error in our

conceptions of the world. Learning by this definition contains an element of

embarrassment due to the admitting of an existing error. Humans have a way to avoid

embarrassment by creating defensive routines. Argyris has studied the defensive

routines present in many organizations as barriers to strategy implementation.

Defensive routines are (often tacit) forms of behaviour intended to deal with a

potential threat. They are powerful psychological processes, yet there is a possibility

to change them. Their recognition and analysis are skills themselves (Argyris 1985,

337-343.)

Organizational learning is a process of constructing shared understanding, which is

also a central task in strategy implementation. Shared understanding requires shared

meaning. Dixon (1997) has made an interesting point of the hallways of learning, in

which people gather in informal problem solving and learning. According to Dixon,

this is the kind of activity that is most essential to organizational learning, since this

kind of informal activity is best in preparing the organization towards unaccounted

challenges (ibid. 23-24.)

Dixon begins by categorizing three sorts of meaning the organizational members

construct: private meaning, accessible meaning and collective meaning. Private

meaning exist only in the private office space and it is not shared. Because it is not

shared, it is also protected from the discovery that it may be wrong or limited in

perspective. Accessible meaning is not protected this way since it is willingly shared

and can be publicly challenged and examined. Accessible meaning is just the kind of

meaning which is shared, discussed and built into common knowledge in dialogue in

hallways. This is process of dialogue is also called learning (ibid. 24-26.) There is no

theoretical demarcation between private and accessible knowledge. This is up to the

people to decide. This brings forth the importance of trust as a theme of knowledge

management. Schein (1993) has also stressed that dialogue is the center element in

organizational learning.


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Collective meaning is the meaning that all members share and agree on. This is the

way things are –type information that is not discussed, since everybody agrees on it

anyway. Collective meaning can be a strength and a weakness: its is an advantage

that you do not have to discuss on basic things, but in a rapidly changing world

taking too many things at face value may make the organization obsolete (Dixon

1997, 26-32).

The hallways of learning –metaphor has lots to offer in strategy implementation.

Many models have stressed that testing the strategy by letting the organizational

members present their input would fit well with Dixon’s model. You could also see it

as a reflection of Nonaka and Takeuchi’s (1995) notions of taking advantage of the

tacit knowledge in organizations by letting the strategy be a question of open

discussion. The problems of information-security may pose a problem for making the

information accessible, but at least the implementation stage could in many cases be

open for dialogue.

Strategic thinking is a paradigm sometimes contrasted with strategic planning (or

strategic programming of the personnel). According to this view organizations exist in

such unpredictable environments, that precise, economics-based planning is not

prudent. Instead of planning, various members of an organization will have to be able

to think strategically in decision-making situations, however small. According to

Mintzberg (1994) strategic thinking is analysis, whereas strategic planning is

synthesis. The role of the strategist is to make summaries of the discussions of

different organizational members, as well as to ”dig deeply” into the organizations

underbrush in search of ”pieces of gold”, new ideas and strategic initiatives.

According to Mintzberg, this is how strategy is done in actual, successful

organizations (ibid. 107-114.) Mintzberg’s view is not unlike Bourgeous and

Brodwin’s crescive model for strategy implementation presented in section 2.1.3.

Crouch and Basch (1997) performed an interesting study on the real-life views of

managers on the nature of strategic thinking. They found out that the managers’

emphasis was on analysis.


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Liedtka and Rosenblum (1996) echo Mintzberg in their argumentation. They view

strategy as the cognitive component of change and emphasize the need for a

widespread diffusion of strategy-making capabilities throughout the organization.

This emphasis on cognitive capabilities on a larger scope leads me to the learning

organization paradigm. The authors state that change is achieved not by seeking total

fit (i.e. closing the gaps) with the environment as proposed by Andrews (see section

1.2), but by creating cognitive gaps in the organization in order to achieve the change

intended. The authors also emphasize strategic conversations as methods for strategic

thinking and also for creating shared understanding among the thinkers. The wider the

participation in the discussion, the better the quality of the strategic decisions. The

final objective is creating a organization-wide intent (ibid. 141-149, 153.)

There are three kinds of strategic thinking according to Liedtka and Rosenblum

designed to fit their cognitive gap–change schema. Problem solving is a gap-closing

process beginning with a set problem. This is the kind of thinking for classical

strategic planning. Problem finding in turn is a gap-opening activity that begins with a

ready-made solution and goes on to search for problems that this solution would

solve. Problem creating is a process in which no starting point in the form of a ready

problem or solution exists. It is a gap-opening, visionary process (ibid. 151-152.)

The authors also bring forth the role of strategic meta-capabilities as organizations’

core competencies. These are capabilities that facilitate strategic thinking. Learning is

one such capability. Collaboration is another. The ability to redesign processes is a

third (ibid. 149-150.)

Whereas strategic thinking is categorized as an operational process, strategic decision-

making is something typically attributed to managers and management. Another

cognitive theme of interest is provided by the nature of strategic decision-making.

According to Eisenhardt and Zbaracki (1992) there are three prominent paradigms in

decision-making literature. The literature focusing on rationality/bounded rationality

is mainly concerned with determining whether strategic decisions are rational in

nature and whether complete rationality is even possible. A rational approach begins

with an idea that human behaviour always has some purpose, which would mean in a


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sense that strategic decisions are made knowingly. The bounded rationality

perspective denies this possibility by showing various cognitive limitations inherent to

human beings (ibid. 17-22.)

The second thread in literature is concerned with the power and political processes

behind strategic decision making. The authors in this field view power as the most

important determining factor behind strategic decisions and the distribution and use of

power is done in politics. These authors do not willingly accept one single, rational or

non-rational will with ultimate power behind the organization’s decision-making, but

emphasize the role of different interest groups with limited power engaging in politics

to achieve their goals. Political theory provides these authors with insights and

methods (ibid. 22-27.)

The third stream of literature reflects the so-called garbage can model for strategic

decision-making. This model represents the organization as a virtual anarchy in which

actions happen by chance and occasionally intersect to form fragmented, emergent

strategies. Decision-making is largely irrational and fragmenting, occasionally

forming ”currents” amidst the chaos (ibid. 27-31.)

Shrivastava and Grant (1985) conducted a research on strategic decision-making in 32

business organizations in complex environments. They concluded that four

prototypical decision-making models emerged. These were:

• The management autocracy model

• the systemic bureaucracy model.

• the adaptive planning model and

• the political expediency model.

Most cases followed either the management autocracy model or the adaptive planning

model.

One further theme of interest for strategy implementation is posed by the study of

knowledge diffusion in organizations. Knowledge is in many ways a parallel theme of

meaning since knowledge is basically meaningful information. Sharing knowledge is


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the key to sharing an understanding. While the overall strategic message may not

contain vast amounts of information, the sharing of different aspects arising during its

implementation may prove to pose a challenge for knowledge management. By

studying how knowledge is diffused one can also observe how ways of thinking are

diffused and shared meaning and understanding is created. Understanding the

successful mechanisms of knowledge diffusion may thus provide additional insights

on implementation.

Communication would seem to be a major factor in knowledge diffusion. Ghoshal

and Bartlett (1988) conducted a wide, multi-method study in MNC:s. In that study the

only one factor to have a positive impact on almost all considerations was that of

inter- and intra-subsidiary communication. Communication is, however a complex

phenomenon. Fisher et al (1998) give a remainder of the dangers of information

overload and emphasize the efficient and clever use of a few communication channels

instead of all of them. The challenge is to get the sufficient amount of information,

not all of it (ibid. 178).

An even more difficult problem is posed by the concept of knowledge itself. In many

cases the relevant knowledge to be shared is not purely propositional, but resides in

skill-type contents. Fisher et al stress the fact that some people are better at explaining

what they know, that is: crystallizing their experiences and findings in language

understandable to others (ibid. 185.) This also bears a resemblance what Nonaka and

Takeuchi (1995) mean when talking about making tacit knowledge explicit. Koivula

(1998) covers related topics in his exposition of knowledge commercialization as well

as Pankakoski (1998) in her exposition of knowledge sharing. In many cases the

appropriate way of describing a valuable member of the organization may not be a

knowledgeable or skillful employee, but an expert employee able to explicate her

experiences. The concepts of tacit knowledge, expertise and skills played an

important part in my previous master’s thesis in philosophy (Mantere 2000).

The role of a group is an interesting element in knowledge diffusion. Different

techniques have been developed to facilitate knowledge sharing and the creation of

new innovations including for example different varieties of brainstorming

techniques. Massey and Clapper (1995) found in their study of an electronic

brainstorming system for groups that, while the amount of actual shared knowledge


54

did not increase with the use of a group support system, the amount of original ideas

proposed by the group increased significantly, suggesting wider sensemaking by the

group. The success of group methods in knowledge diffusion centered sensemaking

would suggest that group methods could prove successful in implementation

sensemaking.

2.4.2 Organizational behavior

Whereas cognition is a process attributed to the subject in the first person sense,

behavior is something others may observe. Behavior is defined by Huczynski and

Buchanan (1991, 22) as “the term given to the things that human beings do that can be

directly detected by the senses of the others.” In this thesis the behavior processes of

interest are those associated with communication and influence.

The classical definition of communication was given by Shannon in the form of a

communication system. In the communication system, a message is first coded in

some way, for example by first transforming the sound pressure produced by speech

into changes in voltage using a microphone and then using these voltage changes to

modulate the frequency of a carrier wave as it is done in FM-radio transmissions. This

signal is then transmitted using a channel, for example a cable or an optical fiber. The

coding process is reversed in the receiving end in the process of decoding the signal,

which gives the receiver access to the original message. In the channel a certain

amount of noise is added to the signal, transforming the signal somewhat (Niiniluoto

1989, 26-27.)

But what is this message that is transmitted? Could one view it as containing

information or perhaps knowledge? In this classical view communication could be

viewed as packaging meaningful information or knowledge into signals and

unpacking them in the other end. This, however is a very simplified version of the

whole story in the sense that there is no guarantee that the receiver is able or even

willing to grasp the sender’s original meaning. In linguistics and the philosophy of

language there are three main components to be considered. First of all, the sender

and receiver should have the same basic conception of syntax, that is, how the


55

symbols or words in the message are related forming propositional contents. This is

relatively simple in most cases. The next consideration is that of semantics, the

meaning of the individual symbols. To complicate things even further, one must also

consider pragmatics, the different variations of actual uses in different situations and

cultural contexts (ibid. 24-26.) The most significant problems in organizational

communication would seem to fall under pragmatics, the uses of language between

different cultural groups, for example between those of line-workers and the top

management.12

Communication has been recognized as both a key ingredient and a problem in

strategy implementation (see section 2.1) Organizational communication emerged as

an independent field in the 1950’s (Redding, 1985). Many of the questions in the field

have been defined before: for example the need for vertical communication in both

direction mentioned under many contexts, the problem of creating a shared

understanding, how the organization’s climate affects communication (cf. Poole 1985

for a detailed discussion), what kind of communication is required for creating a

learning organization (cf. Barker and Camarata 1998), how communication is used in

organizational control and use of power (cf. Tompkins and Cheney 1985), and so on.

Broms and Gahmberg (1983) provide an interesting semiotic perspective to the

classical Shannon communication model. They state that in addition to the sender-

receiver type of communication there is also another type of communication called

autocommunication, communication to self. The purpose of autocommunication is not

that of transmitting information but that of enhancing the self, as is done in religious

texts such as mantras. In autocommunication the transfer of information is qualitative

in nature, resulting in a qualitative change in the communicators self in the

communication process. The authors propose that the classical formulation-

implementation type strategy process would be a process of classical communication,

but a more organic form of strategy is reached if strategy is seen as the practice of

autocommunication, a change process of the organization’s self (ibid. 482-489.)

These are inspirational thoughts, presented on a relatively high abstraction level. It is

12 The chapter above is a very rough presentation of a highly complex and wide field of research. The interested reader is advised to look for further discussion for example in the Niiniluoto text used for reference.


56

somewhat hard to imagine what autocommunication would mean in practice without

resorting to stereotypes.

Åberg (2000) speaks a bit more clearly. He criticizes the Shannon-type process-

oriented, linear view on communication. The process-model pays no interest in the

context in which the message is interpreted. The only factor leading to differences in

interpretation in the process view is the amount of noise in the communication

channel. Åberg contrasts the process-view with a cultural-semiotic view on

communication, which concentrates on the different levels of interpretation.

Borrowing from Barthes (1968) he sketches three levels of interpretation. On the

denotation level there are exact and objective meanings to the message’s elements.

On the connotation level there are personal meanings attached to the objective

meanings. On the symbolic level there are societal meanings attached to the objective

and personal meanings. The symbolic level can also be called the mythical level

(Åberg 2000, 26-39.) Åberg provides useful clues to understanding the complexities

of communication.

Communication in organizations can be viewed as both a managerial and operational

process. Many operational tasks require communication as well as in many

managerial tasks it is essential to communicate the decided content to the

implementers.

Strategy implementation takes management and leadership. It would seem absurd to

study implementation without discussing the role of the manager, since strategy forms

the classical task for a manager. I have categorized management and leadership as

belonging to influence processes, a type of organizational behavior. By influence I

mean those behavioral processes that cause a change in somebody else’s cognition

and/or behavior. I mean by leadership as an influence process essentially social by

nature, whereas management can mean any influence process. I will study some

management and leadership issues related to strategy implementation.

Strategy implementation and project management are sometimes linked with

interesting results. Grundy (1998, 44-45) presents strategy implementation as project

management and proposes a cyclical, five-stage model of strategy. In the first stage of


57

deliberate strategy the project has a well-defined end goals, in the second phase the

goals become fluid, in the third phase the project has lost its way and the strategy is

submerging. A state of emergency is reached in the fourth phase and the project is

fragmenting and in the fifth phase the strategy is recognized as detergent and the

project as off-course. The project must be steered back into track and the cycle begins

again.

Nutt (1983, 600-602) proposes three implementation techniques for project

implementation. The unilateral technique is a top-down process, managed by a single

change agent. The implementer merely announces the plan and specifies the required

behavior. The manipulative technique takes active part in the forging of the

behavioral changes using more or less covert methods. The delegated, or

participatory technique allows all actors concerned with the plan to participate in its

creation and the planning of its implementation.

Human resources management is the answer of a classical strategist when talking

about such themes as motivation and commitment to strategy implementation. Galpin

(1998) contests this view in the sense that gaining the organizational members

commitment is a function of the top management, not the HRM-department. He

prescribes five ingredients to successful strategy implementation: focus, resources,

senior management commitment, time and effort.

Eisenstat (1993, 36) calls for ”rigorous causal analysis of the human barriers to

strategy implementation” as the cornerstone for strategic human resources

management. A wide study done in the U.S. categorizes five groups of drivers for

workforce commitment: work/life balance; benefits and compensation; organizational

culture, leadership and direction; management of change; and employee selection,

training and development (Stum 1999, 4-7). All in all, most studies done in the HRM-

field seem to use grand words such as culture, leadership and human barriers but little

in-depth research exists on these themes in the HRM-field itself.

In the leadership-minded literature the function of the top-management is often

envisioned as the explication of a shared vision and the definition and promotion of

corporate values. Kotter (1988) has famously placed vision as the basis for strategy.

In his model the vision is a desired future state of the organization, which is to be


58

achieved through an organizational change effort (ibid. 20). This closely resembles

the identity gap –concept presented in section 2.3. Kotter has later (1996) also

emphasized the need for learning and the need to empower the employees for broad-

range action. This position is strengthened by Larwood and Falbe (1999, 15), who

discovered in their study that greater perceived involvement in creating the corporate

vision was statistically related to both overall acceptance of the vision and the

perceived importance of the vision. A similar view to Kotter is promoted by Bartlett

and Ghoshal (1994) who emphasize the role of the top management in creating

purpose to the organization’s actions (see section 2.1.)

Values were defined by Schein to be the major cultural force behind organizational

action (see section 2.3.) They should define what is important and held valuable to the

organization. Martinsuo (1999) has conducted a study at Nokia, showing values to be

a powerful management tool, yet they must be explicated carefully and communicated

consistently through the organization. Martinsuo (ibid. 21) states that values, as a

managerial tool, can be used to influence the organizational members’ beliefs and

behavior. Beliefs guide the way the organization’s members perceive their

environment (see section 2.3). A related thought is that of corporate philosophy, as

presented by Ledford et al (1995). According to these authors, most corporate

philosophy statements have at best a negligible effect on organizational behaviour. At

best, though a philosophy statement may guide behaviour, provide inspiration and

transform organizational culture. For the philosophy statement to be successful, in

must be intrinsically compelling and implemented (communicated) efficiently. There

must in addition be strong linkages between the philosophy and organizational

systems plus a process of ongoing affirmation and renewal for the philosophy (ibid. 4-

10.)

The common message behind these views seems to be that the management in the

organization should bear the responsibility of providing purpose and guidelines for

the organization’s culture and members. If this is done in a participatory way, there

would seem to be a better chance of gaining organizational support.


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2.4.3 The role of organizational levels in change processes

The role of different organizational groups and functions in the strategy process form

a very important question in itself. The natural and traditional way to view the matter

is to see the management as the planners and the personnel as implementers. If we

delve even deeper into the realm of behaviorism, we may encounter a view of the

management as both the planner and the implementer, in the sense that it creates the

necessary systems to program the employees to do their work. On the other hand a

more process-minded approach is to see all organizational members as active strategic

thinkers in their work.

Many of the managerial and operational processes covered can be traced, back to the

roles of the management or the personnel. There is however the question of the

middle management, which is too important to be left unnoticed. While many authors

on strategic change (cf. Quinn 1992) view the middle management as a nuisance to be

avoided and promote the flattest possible organizational structure, others view the

middle management as an important communicator between the management and the

personnel, perhaps most notably Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995, chapter 5) who speak

of a middle-up-down management.

What is the role of the middle management in strategy implementation? Fenton-

O’Creevy (2000, 164-166) admits after a wide, quantitative study that the middle

management is often the source of resistance in strategy implementation, but

continues that the reasons are not the typical, power-based and personal ones often

presented. The actual reasons for middle-management resistance are often twofold:

conflicting signals and the restraints of the organizations systems. In this sense the

middle management is only the reminder of the need for restructuring the

organization’s systems to support the strategy.

2.4.4 Culture, organizational processes and the minimal model of

strategy implementation augmented

In section 2.1 I gave two criticisms to Noble’s rather linear view on strategy

implementation. The first was the actual linearity, which is not a very realistic view

even in the interpretation of a single person. Åberg’s three levels of interpretation


60

provided the necessary depth to Noble’s model. Åberg’s notions help me to augment

the minimal model of strategy implementation, as illustrated in figure 7.

The second concern was about the difficulty of determining who is the communicator

and who is the receiver in various stages of strategy implementation. Åberg gives a

partial answer to this social complexity by speaking of a web in which different levels

of interpretation assigns meanings to things and events (Åberg 2000, 54.) This is far

from being clear. What are the roles of managerial and operational processes in such a

network? Åberg’s levels of interpretation provide some sense for the interpretation

process but fail to fully address the complexity of the interrelations between

interpretation, adoption and enactment. I will have to return to addressing these after

my exposition of sensemaking, which should give me some answers.

Figure 7. The minimal model of strategy implementation evolved.

The concept of values, observed as consisting of organizational identity and cultural

beliefs can help me further elaborate the minimal model for strategy implementation,

which I began formulating with Noble and further elaborated with Åberg’s levels of

interpretation. I can now turn my attention to the adoption phase of strategy

implementation.


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I will do some conceptual analysis based on the concepts used this far and some

common sense. In order for a person to adapt an interpreted content, she must accept

the content. In addition to acceptance, the content must be relatively consistent with

her skills and abilities, in other words the subject’s skills and abilities must

sufficiently support the desired changes in behavior. So adoption is composed of two

factors, acceptance and abilities. By abilities I mean relevant knowledge and skills.

With some light-hearted spirit, this process may be described as done in figure 8.

Figure 8. Adoption exposed.

There seem to be, however, some interconnections between interpretation and

adoption. If one thinks about the three levels of interpretation presented by Åberg, one

notes that the factors essential to adoption would seem to be essential to the

connotative and symbolic levels of interpretation as well. Personal values play a role

in the connotative layer of interpretation. Organizational values on the other hand play

a role in the symbolic, interpersonal layer of interpretation. It might be prudent,

therefore not to speak of interpretation and acceptance as separate processes.

One further note concerning interrelations between structure, systems and culture. In

section 2.1 it was noted that there is a bias in strategy textbooks towards the structural

and systemic dimensions of strategy implementation. This thesis was set to

concentrate its effort on the third, cultural dimension. Along the way the structures


62

and systems have come to be recognized as important especially in cases where

structures and systems do not support the strategic messages, as is the case of the

middle management in the previous section.

It would seem that the structural and systemic dimensions can act as strong strategic

messages themselves in many cases, which means that if the structural and systemic

properties are not matched with communication practices (directly affecting the

lifeworlds of the organizational members), one is faced with conflicts in the cultural

dimension as well. To put it bluntly, if the structures and systems do not support the

change effort, it seems as if the organization (or the management) is saying one thing

and doing another. Therefore, when designing systems and changing structures to

support the strategy, one possible viewpoint would be to endeavor to package the

desired strategic message in the structures and systems. This could also be viewed as

creating shared meaning. It is, however, important not to confuse creating shared

meaning with the programming of the employees.

2.5 Synthesis: sensemaking as bridge between context

and process

A large amount of literature concerning strategy implementation has been studied

under two general themes: the culture as inner context and, on the other hand, the

processes of change from cognitive and behavioral viewpoints. In all of the themes

elements from the minimal model of strategy implementation (see chapter 2.1):

communication, shared understanding, adoption and enactment were present.

Contextual, cultural elements based on language are present in both communication

and also in shared meaning and enactment. Meaning is the central component of

understanding, so those cultural elements grouped underneath meaning are closely

tied to understanding as well as enactment and also in motivational processes such as

adoption (as in the case of organizational identity).

From the change/process standpoint the themes likewise correspond with the

components of the minimal model. Learning, strategic thinking and knowledge

diffusion are themes closely connected with communication, understanding and


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enactment. The influence approaches discussed fit with an intervention-based

approach to achieving motivation and support for strategy, that is: its adoption.

I based my exposition on the conceptual division of culture and process. Yet it was

noted in an early stage of this thesis that the process-culture distinction can be

challenged. The view of culture as a property or a system of the organization is a

classical one, but this does not correspond all that well with the fact that social

constructivism13 in organizational research seems to have made the demarcation line

between the organization and its environment extinct. This is because the

organization’s view of the environment is culturally guided or socially constructed.

This view ends up proposing culture as a process concept itself, as the process of

interacting with reality and actively shaping reality as proposed by Hatch (1993, see

section 2.3).

The keyword here is interpretation. All of the three building blocks of strategy:

content, context and process have a link to interpretation. Strategic content is always

an interpretation: both, an interpretation of the people who write it and by the people

who implement it. The external context is interpreted; culture as internal context can

be viewed as an interpretation process. Also the structural/systemic factors in the

internal context are subject to interpretation.

A link between context and process is needed. One can conceptualize the

constructivist way as forming a bridge across the gap between the concepts culture

and process (see figure 9.) This bridge can be named sensemaking, which is an

interpretation process also descendant of enactment and which will be studied in

depth in the next chapter.

13 As first proposed by Berger & Luckmann (1967) in the form of the social construction of reality and Weick (1969) in the form of enactment.


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Figure 9. Sensemaking as a bridge between culture and process.

Sensemaking in organizations

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3. Sensemaking in organizations

In this chapter I will take a close look at my theoretical lens for the study of strategy

implementation. Whereas in the first chapter I had a survey-like approach, my

approach on sensemaking will be more inquisitive and thorough. I will occasionally

reflect on the themes of interest for strategy made in the first chapter. The chapter will

close with normative propositions for strategy implementation from a sensemaking

standpoint as well as the presentation of a new “plum-pudding” model for strategy

implementation.

In the conclusion of the previous chapter some hints were present of sensemaking.

Sensemaking was presented as a process of the social construction of meaning, which

might serve as a conceptual bridge between culture and process in organizations.

Sensemaking is a concept often associated with Karl Weick. His work Sensemaking in

Organizations seems to have become a classic of its own right, so my investigation

will begin in its pages.

3.1 What is sensemaking?

Let us begin with the name. ”Sense” refers to meaning, ”making” is an activity of

creating or constructing something. Both words give important clues for Weick’s

definition. He stresses that sensemaking is creation as much as discovery.

Sensemaking is not just a process of interpreting the environment, it is as much the

creation of the environment itself, as much authoring as it is interpretation (Weick

1995, 1-8.) This notion of sensemaking as the creative, theorizing activity of the

individual is well characterized by Dervin (1995, 9):

”One way sensemaking differs markedly from other approaches is that it explicitly privileges

the ordinary person as a necessary theorist involved in the development of ideas not only for

understanding personal worlds but necessarily for understanding collective, historical and

social worlds as well.”

Weick closely associates sensemaking with such explanatory processes as

understanding, interpretation and attribution, yet he stresses the distinguishing


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properties that make sensemaking unique. He presents seven of these fundamental,

distinguishing properties as follows:

• Sensemaking is grounded in identity construction

• sensemaking is retrospective

• Sensemaking is enactive of sensible environments

• Sensemaking is social in nature

• Sensemaking is ongoing

• Sensemaking is focused on and by extracted cues

• Sensemaking is driven by plausibility rather than accuracy (ibid. 17.)

Each of the seven proposed characteristics will be studied using relevant literature as

well as relying on the gained understanding of the selected themes reviewed in the

previous chapter.

3.1.1 Sensemaking and identity construction

Weick states that sensemaking is based on identity construction. The identity of the

individual to be constructed is not a singular, atomic self that goes through changes,

but rather a dynamic construction of different identities in need of definition, as well

as a positive cognitive and affective state about oneself and of self-consistency.

Controlled, intentional sensemaking results from a failure do define one’s self (ibid.

18-22.)

An important phenomenon for sensemaking is that people learn about their identities

by projecting them into the environment and observing the consequences of this

projection. This is not to say that people accept the reactions of the environment at

face value – they also try to actively influence the environment (ibid. 22-24.)

The importance of organizational identity to that of its members has been noted

earlier (see chapter 2.3). Weick notices this too, which leads him to conclude that the

needs an individual has for her identity are reflected to her organization’s identity

(ibid. 20-21). This would seem to suggest that one is not bound to tolerate for large

inconsistencies in the values of her organization (or a large identity gap) for long: one


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either tries to influence the organization, finds a new organization, herself changes or

perhaps becomes passive and just ”does her job”.

Gioia and Thomas (1996) also emphasize this intimate relatedness of sensemaking

and organizational identity. They note that the concept of identity must be viewed as

malleable through intervention if the organization is wanted to change according to

strategy (ibid. 388.) This makes sense if changes are reflected to identity in

sensemaking as Weick proposes. The authors also bring the concept of image, often

associated with identity, into discussion. They have also found that image is a tool in

the conscious crafting of organizational image in the sensemaking process (ibid. 389.)

One further note on sensemaking and identity: there are situations, where

sensemaking takes place where there is less possibility of finding a common identity

for the relevant stakeholders. Such is the case of inquiry reports studied by Brown

(2000). He states that the sensemaking present in these cases is more about creating

social implications than creating identity. It is also about using power, which forms an

interesting link between power and sensemaking, less discussed by Weick. Let this be

a reminder that in a case of a more vague identity concerning a larger group, politics

may come into question (Brown 2000, 69.)

3.1.2 Sensemaking and retrospective

This point will be easier to demonstrate if one begins by examining two conceptions

of time, that of duration and that of experience. Duration is a stream that cannot be

divided into bits. Experience, on the other hand is always singular in nature and

placed in the past. We are conscious of our experiences, not of duration as such, and

our experiences are always in the past. Sensemaking is based on our experiences so

sensemaking is always retrospective in nature (Weick 1995, 24-30.)

Weick connects the notion of the retrospective nature of sensemaking to Mintzberg’s

(1978) notion of emergent strategy, which I called the reactive view on strategy (see

chapter 1.2). Reacting is also something that happens after the event or action reacted

to, so a reactive view on strategy is retrospective in nature. Weick notes his disliking

of the planning and position –paradigms in strategy literature, since they involve


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predicting the future. Sensemaking is directed to the past, not the future (Weick 1995,

29-30.)

3.1.3 Sensemaking as enacting sensible environments

In an earlier study done with Daft (1984) Weick described organizations as

interpretation systems. The interpretation of the environment was described as a stage

in organizational strategic activity between the scanning of the environment and the

learning process that follows. The two variables behind this model were proposed to

be the top managers’ (or strategy makers’) beliefs about the analyzability of the

external environment and the intrusiveness of the organization. The operation of

enactment was described as the creative activity of an intrusive organization with

managers with beliefs that the environment is unanalyzable (Daft and Weick 1984,

284-294.)

Enactment is based on the notion that experience is formed in doing things with and

in the environment. It contains interpretation but is more. Enactment is a practice of

creating reality by interacting with the environment. Weick has used Neisser’s

perceptual cycle to illustrate the fact that people ”bracket” their environment by their

existing schemas, which in turn also develop in interaction with the environment. It is

the creation of order out of chaos (Weick 1979, 148-157.)

Weick stresses that the environment should not be viewed as singular, fixed and

external to the enacting subject, but as a dynamic process including the subject. The

subject constructs reality by doing things in the world. Enactment constructs sensible

environments because it labels reality with concepts with meaning, with sense. That

meaning is created and discovered by acting in the world (Weick 1995, 30-38.)

3.1.4 Sensemaking is social

The creation of meaning is essentially social: done by a group of people instead of a

single subject. Wittgenstein made this point in an elegant way in his discussion of the

impossibility of a private language. The meaning of a concept is its use in language

and language is used in social contexts, in various language-games (Wittgenstein,

1951). According to Weick, in addition to the nature of sensemaking as the social


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construction of shared meaning one must also take into account the redirection of

people’s actions according to that social sensemaking. In addition to understanding

there is action in sensemaking (Weick 1995, 38-43.)

3.1.5 Sensemaking is ongoing

According to Weick, sensemaking is ongoing activity: it never starts and it never

stops. People are constantly acting in situations and their actions affect the situations

they are in – often against their will. This does not mean that the stream of action is

monotonous: there are situations of importance, that ”crystallize meaning”, for

example the launching of a new product in an organization (ibid. 43-45.) The most

important practical finding contained in this notion would seem to be that

sensemaking is bound to happen. The organizational members make sense if they are

not told to do so – even if they are told not to do so!

Weick conceptualizes this flow of events by referring to ”projects” people are in.

They see the events in relation to different projects. These projects link sensemaking

to human emotion. According to Weick, interruptions in the flow of events

concerning the projects causes emotional responses (Weick 1995, 43-49.) This point

is strengthened by Cannon (1999, 429-436) who found in his study that the

sensemaking process associated with making sense of failures are affected by the

strong negative emotions evoked by memories. The failure results in a sensemaking

process, which ends in the subject proving to herself that she has “learned her lesson”,

mastered the activity that previously, led to failure.

Occasionally it is hard not to become agitated by Weick’s use of words. He invents

concepts and often uses them in an off-hand way, sometimes with very little

justification for not using a more understandable concept. Weick’s exposition of

“interruptions in the flow of projects people are in the middle of” serves as a fine

example to this point.

So when does sensemaking occur: all the time, or in small, continuos leaps? Weick

has answered that the process is continuous, yet the role different key events, or

interruptions in the people’s projects, play a significant part. Weick also speaks of

“shocks” that interrupt the flow of events. Significant organizational events that


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trigger shocks of different sorts are categorized as ambiguity and uncertainty.

Ambiguity is the leading characteristic of those situations that are interpretable in

various ways. The shock associated with ambiguity is confusion (ibid. 91-94.)

Uncertainty is the characteristic of situations that lack precise estimates of the future

(or apparently the feeling that such estimates exist, since Weick does not believe in

planning). The shock associated with uncertainty is the shock of ignorance (ibid. 95-

99.)

Interruptions cause arousal, which enhances the process of sensemaking as such but

also uses up the sensemaker’s attention in such a way that many possible cues for

sensemaking are missed. This narrows the context in which sensemaking takes place

and thus lessens the possibility of dimensions to be observed (ibid. 100-105.)

3.1.6 Sensemaking is focused on and by extracted cues

Sensemaking is based on familiar points of reference that can be extracted from the

chaos. These cues act as seeds for new meaning, what is selected as a cue is depended

on context or culture. Here one can see for the fist time sensemaking forming a bridge

between culture and process. If culture is to be defined as the totality of meaning in

some context, then sensemaking, the creation of new meaning is dependent of

previous meaning and knowledge structures (or schemas) (Weick 1995, 49-52.)

Since sensemaking of cues is dependent on culture, sensemaking can be affected in a

profound way by miniature details. Weick notes that since small, recognized cues

form an uncertain starting point for sensemaking, this even decreases the role of

strategic planning in organizations. People can start enacting new reality from any

source that contains some familiar elements. “Any old map will do”, he states (ibid.

1995, 54-55.) Weick would seem to be a very process-minded strategy writer indeed.

3.1.7 Sensemaking is driven by plausibility rather than accuracy

Weick rests on the assumption that people are not looking for accurate accounts on

the meaning of concepts, they are looking for ones that they can believe and fit into

their larger schemas, the ones that serve them. Among the reasons for this are: the

high amount of information people are faced with, the ambivalence of meaning for


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many concepts, the need for speed in understanding new situations, the interpersonal

nature of sensemaking and the need for common understanding and also the role of

emotions in human decision making (ibid. 55-61.)

This is an important point. It is highly plausible that human beings do not make

completely rational and accurate decisions. By self-reflection one can easily

remember situations of decision, especially those done in groups, in which the

plausibility –point has been demonstrated. People need, especially in social situations

overall to believe that they are right, not so much to demonstrate the accuracy of their

rationale.

3.2 Sensemaking in organizations

I have observed the seven properties on sensemaking as proposed by Weick and other

accounts. Next I will need a further understanding of the properties of sensemaking in

organizations. Czarniawska-Joerges (1992, 120) has stated that organizational life is

taken much less for granted than everyday life in general. This is a believable

proposition, since in organizations the reality people are faced with is much more

cultural and thick in implicit meanings than for example our daily routines of making

porridge and taking out the trash. Sensemaking in organizations should be a more

complex phenomenon than that of a single subject’s micro-level sensemaking (Weick

1995, 63-64.)

Weick builds his analysis of organizational sensemaking atop Wiley’s (1988) three

levels of analysis above micro-level (or intrasubjective) analysis. The first level above

the intrasubjective is the intersubjective level. In this level meaning becomes

transformed from the thoughts, feelings, beliefs, etc of an ”I” into those of a ”we”, ie.

subjective meanings are transformed into intersubjective meanings through

conversation and interaction. This is a form of social reality, or social consciousness.

The next level is that of a social structure, for example an organization. In this level

all notions of individual selves are left behind, and are replaced with a generic, shared

self (perhaps one might call this the organizational identity). The final level of

analysis is that of extrasubjective analysis. There is no generic self any more, but

only, pure (in a sense objective) meanings (Wiley 1988; as described by Weick 1995,

72-73.)


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Weick pictures organizational activity (or organizing as he calls it) as lying atop the

movement between the intersubjective and the social structure, as a continuos

movement between those two levels of analysis. This is where the core of

organizational sensemaking takes place. The core of sensemaking is therefore a

movement between the intersubjective and structural level of beliefs, values and

attitudes; the ongoing transformation of meaning between a group self and the

organizational identity. Tensions between the innovations of intersubjectivity and the

generic control of structure create movement and communication (Weick 1995, 69-

76.)

Drazin has created a model relating sensemaking, organizational creativity and the

levels of analysis proposed. The sensemaking as the seed of creative action in this

model resides in the subjective level, the intersubjective level contains shared frames

of reference on which the creative activity is based and on the collective structure

level there exists a negotiated belief structure between parties with different belief

structures (Drazin 1999, 297-298.)

Let us take a break here. Weick’s levels of analysis in organizational life resemble the

three levels of interpretation in communication as presented by Åberg in chapter 2.4.

The extrasubjective level in Weick’s model would seem to resemble Åberg’s

denotative level, since the meaning is viewed as objective. The intrasubjective level

resembles the connotative level in Åberg’s model, since now there are personal

meanings attached. The symbolic level of interpretation is divided into two, into the

intersubjective and social structure levels of analysis.

The problem with the improved minimal model for implementation I created using

Åberg’s notion of interpretation levels was determining the actual communicator and

receiver in a social context of multiple subjects all of them communicating at once.

According to Weick, the totality of organizing is constant movement between the

intersubjective and the group levels of analysis. As such there are four types of

sensemaking according to each level of analysis. With Drazin, creative seeds on the

intrasubjective level were found, as well as shared frames of reference on the

intersubjective level and negotiated belief structures on the social context

(organizational) level. In the exposition of change (chapter 2.4) a view on

sensemaking as the third option for dealing with organizational uncertainty: the


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creation of social reality when the situation itself seems to provide little comfort was

proposed.

I seem to have come across something important here. I can at least partly overcome

the dilemma of multiple communicators and receivers in the minimal model of

implementation by adopting Weick’s levels of analysis and temporarily replacing the

communication, interpretation, adoption and enactment by sensemaking. I will study

whether I can really do this at the end of the chapter. One can see what happens in

figure 10.

Figure 10. Sensemaking and the levels of analysis.

In this figure the fourth level of sensemaking, that between the social context level

and the extrasubjective level as such is not shown as such. But, as you can see, I have

added the concept culture to the social context level. Weick characterizes the social

context level as being a merging of ”I” and ”we” of the previous levels and the

extrasubjective level is characterized by the absence of any subject as such. The

distinction of the final two levels is not totally clear in Weick’s model: he cites Wiley

as placing the organization on the social context level, yet there would seem to be

some difficulty of determining where the social context ends and the extrasubjective

starts: if one would for example take Schein’s model of culture where values and

artifacts can become underlying assumptions, have they become a part of the

extrasubjective or the social context level? If they have become an unconscious part


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of the social context, they seem to have become a part of a social unconscious, which

as a thought seems a bit dubious.

3.2.1 Sensemaking activities in organizations

Sense is made in language, from language and by using language. This is because

meaning and communication are intimately related to language use. There are features

in the organizational context that guide and control sensemaking. In a sense one might

view these features as the highest form of organizational control mechanisms, above

different control systems and the direct control practiced by a supervisor (Perrow

1986; as quoted by Weick 1995, 113). These highest control systems must thus be

linguistic in nature (Weick 1995, 106-113).

I have covered a variety of themes in the second chapter that are closely linked with

strategy implementation through associations with culture and change processes.

Weick states that these explicit or tacit ”premises” that guide organizational

sensemaking must have both a value content and a factual content. He chooses to talk

about organizational paradigms or premise controls that guide organizational

decision-making and problem solving, which brings me close to such themes covered

earlier as beliefs, identity, values and vision; as well as those of narrative, metaphor

and categories. The raw material for sensemaking is provided by the complex fabric

of existent conceptual content in the organization about itself and its actions in its

environment. This fabric is reflected in the organizational stories, beliefs, paradigms

and control premises. It is also important to recognize the context of action and

process instead of just speaking about properties. The features mentioned above fit

quite nicely to the overall concept of culture that has been defined and thus the bridge

formed by sensemaking between culture and process is strengthened (Weick 106-

132.)

A significant amount of sensemaking activities are driven by beliefs. As I observed in

chapter 2.3, many beliefs significant to strategy implementation concern

organizational identity. Sensemaking, as well as beliefs, is about states of affairs, not

about objects or relations as such. It would be absurd to hold a belief, of a cat as such:

I believe, that a cat is not among the sanest of statements. On the other hand, I believe

that there is a cat in the attic can make sense in lots of contexts.


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Weick (1995, 133) states that sensemaking is ”about the enlargement of small cues. It

is a search for contexts within which small details fit together to make sense.” This

reflects an implication that understanding as apart of sensemaking is the envisioning

of something in some context, as a part of a larger structure. Smaller cues, smaller

beliefs lead to larger ones. Beliefs are often like this: interconnected to form larger

structures. This reflects on cognitivist psychology as well as social constructivism in

the organizational sciences.

Arguing is a significant form of belief-driven sensemaking. The term argument leads

to two kinds of connotations: to that of conflict and to that of reasoning. Sensemaking

takes place in arguing in the reasoning sort, through explanations people offer to each

other thus adopting new beliefs and providing material for new beliefs for others in a

process of dialectical discussion (ibid. 133-144.)

Expecting is another significant process in belief-driven sensemaking. An expectation

in Weick’s sense is a kind of a self-fulfilling prophecy that is also self-correcting.

Expectations are resilient in the sense that they go on changing gradually if they seem

to be in danger not to be fulfilled (ibid. 145-154.) The role of expectation in belief-

driven sensemaking seems to enhance the nature of sensemaking as driven by

plausibility rather than accuracy. This might not be the case in sensemaking as mere

argument and dialectic.

Beliefs are found in cultures, ideologies and traditions. There are plenty of them to be

found in the cultural underbrush of an organization. But, according to Weick, actions

are as plentiful a source for sensemaking as beliefs in the processes of arguing and

expecting. The processes described in the context of belief, arguing and expecting

also tie belief and action together. This is why sensemaking is ongoing (ibid. 155-

156).

There are two sensemaking processes discussed that start with action instead of belief.

These are behavioral commitment and manipulation. Commitment is a process tied to

one action. Sensemaking starts from it because of the fact that people try very hard to

signify, to find meaning for those actions they take responsibility in, which they are

committed into doing, to answer why they did what they did. Commitment starts a


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rationalization process for action, which creates new meaning. This rationalization is

a process, which leads to justification in the form of beliefs (ibid. 156-162.)

Manipulation is a process of many actions tied to a purpose of manipulating the

environment. Sensemaking by means of manipulation is a process of acting in order to

create environments which people can comprehend and manage. This is constructing

reality as meant by social constructivists. Manipulation creates certainty in an

uncertain environment. It is a questions of what happened and an answers as well

(ibid. 162-168.)

The organization according to Weick is in a constant pressure of moving from

intersubjectivity into generic subjectivity, into social context. This is due to the

organizations’ inherent urge to better comprehend and control their environment. The

four processes of arguing, expecting, committing and manipulation result in greater

generic subjectivity because they create among other things arguments, expectations,

justifications and objects which form the premises for common action resulting in

greater interchangeability in the organization. The goal for this is swifter

socialization, greater resiliency towards changes in the organization’s members and

overall accountability in the eyes of the stakeholders (ibid. 170-171.) Louis (1980,

239-244) has found that sensemaking, especially with the elements of surprise and

contrast forms a significant factor in newcomer socialization. A significant need for

interpretation arises in these situations and this need can be fulfilled by the

organization’s experienced members by common sensemaking.

Weick’s emphasis on interchangeability is understandable in the light of his emphasis

on action, present in the first maxim. If the organization is to reach collective

sensemaking, its members have to be able to immerse themselves to a wide sector of

organizational activities. Weick has elsewhere (1993) also stressed the need for

disintegration of role structure in groups as a method of creating sensemaking more

resilient to error.

Boyce (1995) has made an interesting observation about organizations as structurally

open or closed systems for sensemaking. After a close study of the sensemaking

practices of a religious organization she proposes, that in a closed system the shared

meaning (one could call this cultural assumptions or beliefs) is so pre-determined, that


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there is no awareness amongst the members of collective sensemaking taking place.

Such collective sense evolves most easily by logical extension of the existing shared

ideas. In this kind of a culture, an idea deemed as fit is allowed to develop freely in

the collective sense and is in no need of protection, but on the other hand the

collective sense was very carefully protected from unfit ideas. In this kind of a close

setting, storytelling was found to be a very useful method of centering, or focusing the

group (ibid. 131-135.) An example of a culture with a very unitary conception of

reality is useful in reflecting on how less homogenous cultures deal with new ideas.

The less predetermined the collective assumptions, the more there would be a

consciousness of the sensemaking process as well as less a demarcation with fit or

unfit ideas.

After viewing the context and process of sensemaking I can return to the question

concerning which parts of the minimal model of strategy implementation, that is

communication, interpretation, adoption and enactment can be viewed as belonging to

sensemaking. I begin by noting that in Weick has himself included the concepts

interpretation and enactment (see section 3.1) to the extension of the concept. The

question is then left with communication and adoption.

Arguing and expecting are mentioned as the two belief-driven processes of

sensemaking. Arguing is a form of communication, so one can deduce that

communication is at least partly sensemaking and vice versa. To argue one needs to

communicate the argument. Adoption is somewhat trickier. I have noted that

accepting and abilities are two major factors leading to adoption. Accepting is

affected by identity and cultural beliefs as well a personal values, abilities are relevant

knowledge and skills. Sensemaking is also rooted in beliefs about organizational and

personal identity. Processes of sensemaking contain such things as behavioral

commitment and arguing and expecting based on beliefs. Therefore the acceptance

part of adoption would seem to be reflected in sensemaking.

The ability part is not something Weick pays a close attention to. He does not cover in

great detail in how the abilities of the sensemaker affect the sensemaking process.

This would seem to be a failing, since this is a worthwhile consideration in many

organizations. What new skills and knowledge structures should be learnt in order the

strategy implementation to succeed? This would seem to be the reason why Weick


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does not pay any close attention to organizational learning. It does not seem to fit his

system.

Therefore, keeping in mind the importance of learning, one can integrate sensemaking

as a process covering the minimal model of strategy implementation as presented in

figure 8. Strategy implementation from a sensemaking standpoint is composed of

three levels of sensemaking: the social context, the intersubjective and the subjective.

Strategy implementation means changing the social context level, the cultural

dimension. This must be reflected in the shared frames of reference (or shared

understanding) of the groups and private (occupational) lifeworlds of the

organizational members. That is, if the implementation is a top-down process. On the

other hand, if the process is bottom-up, then the creative seeds of the individual are

reflected on changes to the shared frames of reference of the intersubjective level, that

is, new shared meaning is created in the intersubjective level. As the intersubjective

changes the social context, the strategy is implemented.

The shortcoming of the sensemaking approach would seem to be that it provides few

answers on when the process should be top-down (planned strategy from the social

context to the individual) and when bottom-up (emergent strategy from the individual

or the shared frames to the social context). What is the role of the manager and the

employee in the strategy process? The approach presented thus far seems hopelessly

abstract.

3.2.2 Sensemaking and the role of the manager

The theory of sensemaking proposed by Weick is unusual to say the least. It does not

reflect very well on classical management literature, on which many managers are

trained. How should managers change their roles in light of what Weick has to say?

Weick offers seven maxims, which he proposes in a tentative way:

1) Talk the walk. This is a general maxim reminding managers that meaningful words are found through action. Many attempts to walk the talk have failed, because the actors have not found the words fitting.

2) Every manager an author. Talking the walk may not be enough, the choice of words and the command of language and nuance is important as well.


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3) Every manager a historian. A good decision is such that it has recognizable roots: something that explains the logical path to this decision. At times the process may be first the decision, then the history.

4) Meetings make sense. Sense is made in meetings. People need to meet more often, and most importantly, in a way that fosters conversation.

5) Stamp in verbs. Use language that recognizes the importance and role of action.

6) Encourage shared experience. Although shared meaning is hard to attain because of differences in the organizational members’ background, sharing experience is a viable way towards a shared understanding of relevant issues. To evoke culture is to tell stories of shared experiences.

7) Expectations are real. Take them seriously since they form the future.

Weick has taken a step towards discussing the role of a manager sensible to

sensemaking. How do his managerial commands correspond to conception of

managerial roles in general literature? The natural place to start is by looking at

Mintzberg’s classic exposition of managerial work. Mintzberg defines ten roles for a

manager. These are:

• Interpersonal roles

Figurehead role: the handling of symbolic and ceremonial functions for an organization.

Leadership role: the social aspect to managerial work (also see chapter 2.4).

Liaison role: the development of information sources inside and outside the organization.

• Informational roles

Monitor role: seeking and receiving information

Disseminator role: dissemination of the received information

Spokesperson role: dissemination of the received information outside the organization

• Decision roles

Entrepreneurial role: initiate projects and identify the need for change.

Disturbance handler role: solve conflicts, etc.

Resource allocator role


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Negotiator role: represent the organization in interacting with outsiders. (Mintzbeg 1973; as presented in Hellriegel et al 1995.)

What do Weick’s maxims mean in the light of Mintzberg’s model and in the light of

implementing strategy? I will examine each maxim reflected to managing strategy

implementation.

• Talk the walk.

The strategist should understand the nature of the work and activity performed by the

implementers. According to Weick, this means doing the work. If we follow this line

of reasoning to its logical conclusion, the strategist should spend time doing and

understanding the activities of all key members of the organization to ensure the

shared understanding, or at least the understandability of strategy.

There is another alternative to this. If we do not assume a single, commander-type

strategist but instead assume a cooperation between different stakeholders in the

strategy formulation, Weick’s condition is at least partly met. Hooray for

participation.

There does not seem to be a strictly corresponding role in Mintzberg’s list. The

informational roles may be seen to reflect on this proposition, yet Weick seems aim at

a further, more practical understanding on work practices than the simple receiving of

information would seem to offer.

• Every manager an author.

Authors are the masters of language and conveying meaning. Conveying meaning is

communication, and the author metaphor stresses the importance of skillful and

thoughtful use of language in communicating strategy. Authors write stories. Stories

are a powerful method of conveying meaning, since they offer a logical exposition of

a content featuring both cognitive and affective elements. The act of skillful

categorization and conceptualization is also done in language. This is also an

informational role in Mintzberg’s list.

• Every manager a historian.


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A strategy should be viewed as fit with the image of the organization, the essence of

what the organization is supposed to exist for. This essence is crafted in past

experience. The commitment to strategy is formed in the belief that it is a logical

continuation of the organization’s history. History is not an objective entity existing

independently of the interpreter: it is a discourse between the researcher and past

events. Every strategic decision should contain an interpretation of the organization’s

history with it, focusing on the values and beliefs the history can be viewed as

promoting.

• Meetings make sense.

In many an organization, a meeting represents a waste of time. This condition should

be counteracted by active measures affecting the content of meetings. Meetings

should be a place to discuss strategy and vision, to bring out novel considerations and

make sense. Meetings should play a part as sensegiving and sensemaking methods in

strategy implementation, since they are the places where culture is made. But, as

noted earlier, culture is made primarily in hallways. There should above all be the

possibility for informal meetings.

• Stamp in verbs.

The language of strategy should not contain only the description of a desired state, but

also the description of the kind of activity the strategy entails.

• Encourage shared experience.

Often the shared experience of a group of people is the side-effect of some other

intentional activity. The situations in which shared experience with both cognitive and

affective content is formed should be facilitated keeping in mind the cultural potential

shared experience has as the creator of shared frames of reference. The content of

strategy should contain references to shared experiences, as well as the

implementation process should create shared experience.

• Expectations are real.

Expectations have a habit of becoming true. The strategy process should be an effort

to actively reflect the desired expectations as well as to create and shape existent


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expectations. This presupposes communication between stakeholders and the

strategist as well as active scanning for expectations among the organization.

What roles in Mintzberg’s list does Weick emphasize in the light of his sensemaking

consideration? Weick would seem to place his emphasis on the interpersonal roles.

All of his considerations are in essence social. There are some informational roles

present, but Weick does not seem to view the manager as a meeting point of

information flows as described by Mintzbeg. This would seem to further elaborate

Weick’s resentment for managerial control of strategy. All in all, Weick’s

propositions do not reflect very well on Mintzberg’s.

3.3 Sensemaking in strategy implementation

The daunting task ahead is to determine the use of sensemaking, my theoretical lens

in strategy implementation. The task is highly demanding, since my major reference

has been Weick who moves on a rather high level of abstraction in his theorizing. His

final thoughts on management, though, were illuminating and among his theory, many

interesting notions arose. There are also other theorists of sensemaking to consider.

3.3.1 Empirical evidence for sensemaking in strategic change

Much of what was done in the first chapter was conceptual analysis: reflecting on

different issues present in organizational behaviour literature and how they are related

to strategy implementation from a cultural standpoint. The purpose of the second

chapter was to view this through the theoretical lens provided by sensemaking. In the

third chapter three methods for implementation were created. The final task still left is

to reflect on the validity of my standpoint. This validation should be provided by

empirical evidence.

Gioia and Chittipeddi (1991) see strategic change as involving the attempt to change

current modes of cognition and action in order to enable the organization to respond

to opportunities or threats. The role of the CEO in these change efforts is to act as a

sensegiver. The authors describe a change process they studied in a large, public

university.


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The process of sensegiving involves the creation of an abstract vision or a similar

construct that is communicated to the stakeholders in an effort to communicate that

the current interpretive scheme is no longer appropriate (ibid. 433-434.) The role of

sensemaking in this process is to craft meaning out of the given message, or the sense

given. In a sense one might interpret the sensegiving efforts of the CEO as the

provision of the cues acting as seeds as the stakeholders’ sensemaking. A process of

his sensemaking in which the vision is formed naturally precedes the sensegiving of

the CEO. The authors call this period of sensemaking the envisioning phase of the

strategic change effort. In the envisioning phase the CEO studies the historical and

current context also communication with various key personnel. The then forms an

“embryonic” vision of his on based on his interpretive scheme (ibid. 437-438.)

The signaling phase is next. In this phase the CEO communicates the need for change

and stirs up ambiguity in the stakeholders, awakening discussion. He also

communicates the need for action. He discusses the hopes, needs and visions with

various stakeholders creating an amount of goodwill. The signaling phase is followed

by the re-visioning phase in which the CEO becomes the center of the change effort, a

symbol of sorts. This is a phase for vivid discussion for the complete formulation of

the new vision and the different stakeholders’ roles in this vision. The stakeholders try

to comprehend the meaning of the vision. In the final, energizing phase an explicit

strategic planning task force is created in order to facilitate the desired continuation of

the change process. In the energizing phase the stakeholders also communicate their

thoughts on the change process to the CEO (ibid. 439-441.)

Sensemaking was present in the change process in many forms, in the initial

sensemaking of the CEO in the envisioning phase, in the sensemaking process of the

various stakeholders in the re-visioning phase. Sensegiving on the other hand was

present in both the signaling phase as the CEO communicated his vision to his

subordinates as well as in the energizing phase in which the subordinates

communicated their feedback on the vision. The fourth phase was also marked by the

emergence of a common commitment to the change process (ibid. 443.)

Weick did not adopt the dichotomy sensemaking-sensegiving in his exposition as the

study by Gioia and Chittipeddi was done prior to Weick’s book. In a sense the

properties of manipulation and partly those of expectation are reflected on the concept


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sensegiving, whereas sensemaking seems to be more a question of committing and

arguing in Gioia and Chittipeddi’s exposition. The dichotomy sensemaking-

sensegiving strongly implies a dichotomy in the actual organization as well in order to

this sequence of sensegiving-sensemaking to be possible between different parties.

This is indeed the case in Gioia and Chittipeddi, where there is a strong, visionary

leader present putting the change effort into action.

Weick seems to be unwilling to admit to this type of dichotomy, which may be a

deeper and more organic perspective, yet this kind of a dichotomy does seem to exist

in most real-life organizations. Leaders and managers in most cases start change

efforts and it is their job at least to facilitate the discussion on corporate vision.

Against this reflection sensegiving seems like a fruitful concept to use in actual

research. The problem of Weick’s sensemaking in strategy implementation is its

seeming inability to account for a desired strategic direction, especially one desired by

the management. Another problem with Weick’s sensemaking is that it does not

provide any indication on the abilities one needs in order to adopt the strategic

content. This is natural, since there does not seem to be a strategic content as such in

Weick’s sensemaking, which might also be natural since sensemaking is a never

beginning, never ending process. The concept of sensegiving is a fruitful one since it

allows us to envision a productive force creating sensemaking processes and thus

structure the implementation process into distinct phases. Sensegiving is preceded by

sensemaking in which the sense is created and followed by sensemaking in which

organizational reality is molded as a result of the sensegiving.

McCabe and Dutton (1993) discovered in their research that organizations with

managers holding a belief that their organization’s environment is uncertain achieved

better objective performance than those organizations with managers that believed the

environment to be relatively certain (ibid. 637-640.) This would seem to support

sensemaking in the sense that these kinds of managers could be viewed as likely to

put more effort into sensemaking practices.

Thomas et al (1993) on the other hand discovered a positive relation between the high

levels of information used by the managers in the scanning-stage to their perception

of the controllability of the strategic theme involved. The scanning stage is the first

stage of Weick’s prior model of organizations as interpretation systems (see section


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3.1). The perceived controllability of the issues acted positively on the strategic

outcome (ibid. 250-253.)

Sensemaking has been successfully used to interpret a variety of organizational

themes, among such complex themes as interpersonal conflicts at work (Volkema et

al 1996) and the rendezvous different of cultures in organizations (Osland et al 2000).

Sensemaking would therefore seem to be a useful framework for interpreting different

complex, culture-related issues in organizations. Weick’s theory is highly abstract in

its outlook and his language often disguised in metaphor, yet the issues at hand are

rather complex as well.

Sensemaking has also been used in interpreting concrete, smaller-scope change

situations in organizations, such as departmental restructuring, as done by Greenberg

(1995). She describes a case in which a department is split into two groups under two

managers and the conflict that follows the restructuring. The manager behind the split

fails to address the metaphorical questions associated with the change as well as fails

to actively shape and act as a symbolic force behind the change, which eventually

leads into conflicts over symbolical matters in the two groups. The conflict is seen as

resulting from the natural need of the group members to make sense of their

environment, which happens anyway: either guided and fueled by the manager or

autonomously possibly leading to unwanted results (ibid. 183-208.)

Another smaller-scope change situation interpreted through sensemaking is that of

geographic job transfers in organizations, studied by Jablin and Kramer (1999). The

authors found support for the notion that transferees often found themselves in a

conflict situation concerning their expectations of the change and the reality of their

situation and that this ambiguity is eased by the amount of knowledge they were able

to gather about communicating in their new situations. This creation of knowledge,

the authors propose, is explained by sensemaking (ibid. 165-168.)

On seeking relevant empirical evidence, Finnish organizations are important since

Finland will be the arena of research for the STRADA-project, my employer. I will

thus cover some empirical studies done in Finnish organizations.

In Lares-Mankki’s (1994, 104) study, the most notable problems in strategy

implementation were located at the awareness level of strategy implementation. This


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was emphasized more by the middle managers than the senior managers (the

personnel level was not interviewed). This would suggest a gap in awareness between

the management and middle management, and it would seem rational to deduce that

this gap is even intensified at the personnel level. Similar results were recently

obtained by Keskuskauppakamari (the Central Chamber of Commerce of Finland),

which concluded in a wide interview study that the central weakness in Finnish

organizational culture is the weak communication of values and central principles to

the personnel (Keskuskauppakamari 2000). So, according to Lares-Mankki’s results,

the creation of awareness, which could be interpreted as a combination of shared

understanding and communication should play a more significant part in real-life

strategy implementation. The interviewees in Lares-Mankki’s study also regarded the

commitment as a problematic level of implementation. The problems in the case

enterprise were regarded as being the result of lacking opportunities of participation in

the strategy process (ibid. 104-107).

Lillrank (1995) has come up with interesting results after studying the transfer of

management innovations from Japan into western companies. After studying two

quality-based cases he concluded, that it is essential to engage an intelligent learning

process in the receiving end of an innovation transfer instead of just copying a method

and trying to implement it as it is with no explanation (ibid. 981). The importance of

intelligent learning instead of mechanical repetition could also be interpreted as

speaking on behalf of the creation of a shared understanding on the implementing end

of the strategy process. This notion is echoed by Martinsuo (1999, 129) who presents

the ignorance of local culture as a failure factor in promoting values multinationally.

As I view culture as a way of assigning meaning to – in essence understanding – the

environment, Martinsuo’s results could also be interpreted as supporting the

importance of shared understanding in strategy implementation.

Lehtimäki’s (2000) studies on the narratives of strategic discourse in the city of

Tampere have presented a case example on which there is a discord between

traditional top-down strategic rhetoric and a variety of process-minded, participative

and communicative methods. In this writer’s few experiences on the field there have

also been elements present supporting this kind of a change situation, in which the old


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structures support a planning-based, yearly strategy process are impacted with the

realization that communication at least is an important element in the strategy process.

Much of the sensemaking literature as well as much of the literature relating to

meaning and language I have studied has spoken for the importance of establishing a

shared understanding in strategic change. The research contained in these studies

varies from universities (Gioia and Chittipeddi) to religious organizations (Boyce);

from firefighters (Weick 1993) to Port authorities (Dutton and Dukerich) and political

ministries (Schultz).

There are also texts that, while not strictly empirical, emphasize the usefulness of the

concept sensemaking by utilizing it in interesting areas of research. One such

consideration with sensemaking and the organization is that of organizational

knowledge and its relation to sensemaking. Choo (1996) has challenged the traditional

bounded rationality –model (see chapter 2.4) for organizational decision making. He

has created a hybrid model for a knowing organization containing Weick’s

sensemaking considerations as well as Nonaka and Takeuchi’s (1995) views on social

knowledge creation. In Choo’s model sensemaking is the first step of the process

leading to action in a knowing organization, the next step being knowledge creation

followed by decision making based on that knowledge and finally by decided action.

He mirrors these concepts with those of information interpretation, information

conversion and information processing (Choo 1996, 336-339.) The problem with

Choo’s model from Weick’s standpoint would seem to be the fact that Weick is not

willing to distinguish sensemaking from organizational action – it has been shown

that in Weick’s vision sensemaking is in essence organizational action and vice versa.

Dervin (1995) has implemented sensemaking in her model for information design in

organizations. She proposes an epistemological perspective based on the notion of

information being an entity primarily designed by human beings. Sensemaking is

pictured as the dialogically circling reality, creating information but never reaching

that reality itself (ibid. 13.) The view Dervin proposes is reminiscent of the

hermeneutic circle for understanding as proposed by Gadamer (cf. 1960) in

continental philosophy.


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Smircich and Stubbart (1985) call for change in strategic management following the

acceptance of enacted realities. They emphasize the role of managerial analysis: the

analysis of the underlying assumptions of the managers and their capability of self-

reflection over environmental analysis. This is because the environment is an enacted

one: not something you can analyze without at the same time analyzing yourself. The

interpretive perspective proposed by the authors is based on denying the distinction

between the organization and its environment in addition, and as a partial result of

embracing the multiple perspectives of the organization’s members (ibid. 724-733.)

This new notion of strategic management the authors propose is based on context-

creation instead of goal setting. The wise use of language and rhetoric are the tools for

context-creation. One could talk about managing culture instead of managing by

objectives. Managers should also actively encourage multiple interpretations of

situations, in a sense different realities, in their organization. Strategists should also

the ones to actively encourage and practice the testing of various limits in order to

find new alternatives to their mundane routines (ibid. 731-732.) The ideas of

managerial analysis and context creation proposed by the authors are quite parallel to

the notions of sensegiving proposed by Gioia and Chittipeddi.

The joint sentiment of these and many other authors covered seems to be that there is

indeed room for interpretation and sensemaking within organizations. The

implementation of organizational strategy is not merely about aligning systems and

structure and programming the employees. Their results support their sentiment. It

should be clear that since human beings tend to interpret things and not act like

computers, this activity is bound to take place in organizations as well. The

interesting question is how much effort should be placed on this cultural/sensemaking

aspect of strategy implementation, in addition to the traditional systems/structures

considerations.

This is likely to be dependent on what kind of an organization is at hand and the type

of strategy to be implemented. I have covered these questions in the context –section

(chapter 2.2). The empirical evidence concerning the actual problems of strategy

implementation is not very wide or deep, since researchers like Alexander do not

include such questions in their questionnaires and many researchers, notably Beer

and Eisenstat contend to speaking about poor vertical communication.


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The one notion to be found in the empirical studies is that in many organizations the

strategists and implementers of the management floor do not expend enough effort

into communication, sensegiving practices and actively providing forums for

sensemaking. How should this be done, this effort to be expended? I will give a

tentative account by providing three tentative methods for implementation in chapter

four.

3.3.2 Reflecting on sensemaking in strategy implementation

Sensemaking could be viewed as the opposite of the behaviorist, system-based

approaches to implementation described in chapter 2.2. It has its focus on human

understanding as the basis and component of activity. It is in essence activity, yet

guided by beliefs as well as actions. The vision of sensemaking as a bridge between

culture and process has not been contested by my new understanding but has evolved

(see figure 11).

Figure 11. The evolved view on sensemaking.

All in all, sensemaking would seem to be a fruitful approach for the aspects of

communication, interpretation, adoption and enactment for strategy implementation as

proposed by Noble, yet it takes the effort to understand the nonlinear, social


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complexities involved in human understanding and communication that Noble’s

model failed to discuss.

With the minimal account on strategy implementation as consisting of

communication, interpretation, adoption and enactment I was faced with two major

problems, namely:

• The problem of the seeming linearity of the communication-interpretation-adoption-enactment –chain concerning the single subject

• The problem of multiple communicators.

Sensemaking has dealt with many of the sub-problems associated with these two quite

nicely. The linearity is not a problem with sensemaking. Sense is made by actively

shaping the environment as a practical process in which the stages of interpreting

messages/input, as well as adopting and enacting them can be seen as an organic

whole. This would seem realistic. The second problem is also dealt by Weick as well

as Åberg’s notions of the different levels of analysis. If one views sensemaking as

two-way processes between the subjective, intersubjective and social context (or

organizational) levels of analysis, one can account for many of the complexities in

communicating strategies and turning them into action.

3.3.3 Conclusions: from linearity to plum-pudding

It is time to tie up the threads of thought I have encountered along the way. In the first

and second chapters a major distinction was drawn between the content and process

paradigms of strategy implementation. Sensemaking literature, especially that written

by Weick could be characterized as a rather extreme form of the process paradigm,

since it would seem to leave very little room for any kind of strategic direction. Yet its

representation of human understanding is deep and rather realistic, especially

compared to that offered by different linear models.

The linear model of implementation, first proposed by Chaffee in connection with the

classical planning paradigm, was augmented with the psychological notions of

communication, interpretation, adoption and enactment by Noble. The linear model’s

components were carried along as a minimal representation of implementation as I

studied organization psychological literature. I augmented the model with different


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notions along the way, yet there seemed to be no escape from the seeming linearity

between Noble’s concepts.

The strength of the linear model for implementation was its seeming clarity: it was

easy to place the manager as the communicator and the employee as the interpreter-

adapter-enactor. The model’s weakness is that it is not good for accounting to any

emergence in the strategy process – it is wholly top-down, wholly ignorant of the

intricacies of human understanding.

On the other hand, it is very hard to determine who does what, who gives direction in

which situation in Weick’s model. I for example noted that for a person to adapt her

behaviour according to a strategic content, in addition to accepting that content she

has to gain the relevant skills and knowledge to enact the message. In Weick’s model

there do not seem to be any relevant skills as such since there is no strategic direction.

The weaknesses I encountered with sensemaking as a theoretical lens for strategy

implementation were associated with the realization that sensemaking in Weick’s

sense does not match very well with any kind of goal-setting or leadership as such.

Weick provided some tentative maxims for management but there did not seem to be

a sufficient interrelation between the seemingly mundane maxims and Weick’s highly

abstract theory. There does not seem to be a reasonable (or at least understandable)

possibility for a strategic direction with Weick.

In attempting to decide between the linear and sensemaking model, it would seem

reasonable to recall what Mintzberg said about the difference between prescriptive

and descriptive schools of strategy (see chapter 1.2). I propose the strengths and

weaknesses encountered in association between different authors such as Noble and

Weick can be explained using this categorization. The linear model is concerned with

telling people how to influence their organization. The process models are good at

illustrating what really happens amidst the organizational underbrush. Since one of

the major objectives of this thesis is telling a realistic story on how to implement

strategy, I should be able to use the process notions studied to forge a more realistic,

yet also prescriptive model for implementing strategy.

An opportunity of combining descriptive and prescriptive elements in order to give a

realistic, yet prescriptive account for implementation is augmenting Weick’s notion of


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sensemaking with Gioia and Chittipeddi’s sensegiving. Sensegiving is a process in

which the strategic direction is communicated in a meaningful way. Sensemaking is

the process of communication, interpretation, adoption and enactment connected to

sensegiving. If one wants to account for the roles of different organizational members

in implementation, she can describe the sensegiving-sensemaking dialectic as a

cyclical process between the senior management, middle management and the

personnel (see figure 12.) The strength of this representation is the possibility of

providing strategic direction: be the source the manager (as in classical strategy), the

middle manager (as in Nonaka and Takeuchi’s middle-up-down management) or the

personnel (as in emergent strategy).

Figure 12. Strategy implementation according to the different parties: as a

sensemaking-sensegiving cycle.

In my view the sensegiving-sensemaking dialectic is the best answer to the challenge

of bridging the descriptive and prescriptive view on implementation. Its main strength

is its ability to overcome the difficulties of the linear model: it is cyclical instead of

linear, and it is based on sensemaking. On the other hand, it provides necessary

direction, often missing in Weick’s text. There is a causal process of sensegiving-

sensemaking, which could be viewed as communication-interpretation-adoption-

enactment in a sophisticated way.


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The illustration in figure 12 is rather general and does not say much about what

sensemaking really means. There are several ways to give a description of

sensegiving and sensemaking based on the previous chapters of this thesis. One

fruitful approach is viewing sensemaking as happening on and between the different

interpretation and cultural layers in the organization (see figure 10). The creative

seeds for new meaning are located in the individual mind, yet they become shared

frames of reference or even shared cultural symbols, which will in turn create new

creative seeds. One can see another dimension emerging alongside the sensemaking-

sensegiving cycle. There is little been said about who gives and who makes sense, but

the cultural levels are illustrated.

This brings me back to Pettigrew’s model, which proposed content, context and

process as the three significant viewpoints to strategy. Sensemaking bridges culture

and process (see figure 11.) It is a process that creates new meaning, new culture

while being based on culture. In the classical sense of strategy implementation the

creative seeds of the management are built into shared frames of reference and built

into the organizational, social context. In a less classical model allowing for

participation, the creative seeds of other organizational members (middle

management, personnel) can be utilized.

Weick’s cultural levels helped me to understand the role of culture and process in

strategy implementation. A complete representation that would both account for the

cultural dimension as well as giving a more in-depth description of the sensemaking-

sensegiving dialectic in strategy implementation still eludes me. The natural place to

continue looking is found in the study of different concepts done in chapter two.

Instead of trying to formulate a linear model, as I have done before (cf. chapter 2.4) in

augmenting the minimal model for implementation, I will try to form a more organic

representation.

I will draw on the history of physics for inspiration in formulating a new metaphor,

namely (the historical physicist) Thompson’s classical plum-pudding atomic model.

In this different subatomic particles are clustered together forming one whole atom,

interacting with each other (cf. Richards et al 1960, 730.) Transferred into the realm

of strategy implementation, the plum-pudding model describes the concepts of

sensemaking and sensegiving as plum-pudding atoms, consisting of several elements


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that interact organically instead of any particular linear order or specific causality. As

done earlier in figure 12, I have visualized the sensemaking-sensegiving dialectic as a

cyclical process (see figure 13.)

Figure 13. The Plum-pudding model for strategy implementation: descriptions for sensemaking and prescriptions for sensegiving.

Another notable feature in this representation - in addition to its organic nature - is the

presence of Mintzberg’s descriptive and prescriptive views on strategy. I have

conceptualized the sensemaking part of the figure as inevitable, drawing on Weick’s

notion of sensemaking being ongoing. Sense is bound to be made. It can be influenced

by sensegiving that draws on the descriptive notions of sensemaking, culture and

change processes I have discovered in chapters two and three. I have added a group

of these descriptive notions sensemaking as well as prescriptive maxims for

sensegiving based on these notions.

A part of sensegiving is always unintended. I propose that it is essential for successful

implementation to minimize this unintended part. A clear example from real life could

be a change in organizational structure. If left unexplained it is still a sensegiving act,

yet an unintended one, leading to unforeseeable sensemaking. The sensegiver would


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be better of explaining the change in meaningful language. Figure 13 can be studied

in the light of figures 10 and 12 in order to reflect on the roles of different

organizational members and social levels. Depending on the level of participation in

the organization’s strategy process different members of the middle management and

the personnel can also be sensegivers while the senior managers are in turn

sensemakers based on this sensegiving. This is what is meant by the should lead to –

prescription between sensegiving and sensemaking. The creative seeds of as many

organizational members as possible need to be collected as noted by such authors as

Mintzberg (see chapter 2.4) as well as Bourgeous and Brodwin with their crescive

model of implementation (see chapter 1.2.)

To conclude I will offer eight propositions for strategy implementation on the basis of

my studies.

Proposition 1: Implementation starts with communication.

In general one has to know something in order to behave accordingly. Knowing

consists of justified, true beliefs and beliefs take meaning, sense for fuel. There is

reason to assume that there are people in different stages of the strategy process who

know about the strategy to be implemented and those people who should know.

Communication is also an essential activity in sensemaking, since sensemaking is

social. All in all, communication is strategic sensegiving.

Proposition 2: Interpretation is a central issue in strategy implementation.

A strategic content is an interpretation. It is an interpretation by the people who write

it and the people who implement it interpret it as well. The strategic content, as well

as the organization’s structure and systems are strong symbolic messages of the

implicit valuations and beliefs in the organization and among its management.

Structural and systemic measures are bound to be interpreted as symbolic expressions

of the organizational will.

Proposition 3: Interpretation is essentially social.


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Interpretation is done in groups of people, in social contexts, in communication. The

creative seeds for new directions reside in the individual, but most of the interpretive

action is taken by creating shared frames of reference in the group and reflecting them

dynamically against the social context or culture.

Proposition 4: Interpretation is a complex, cultural process.

The symbol is powerful. Interpretation is not a linear process of the deciphering the

meaning out of a received message. It involves the connotative and symbolic

elements. People have a way of associating things in implicit ways, which forms one

of the cornerstones of culture. This is also associated with the power of metaphor. The

strategist should pay very close heed to the possible hidden metaphors hidden in her

message. The place to look for elements for these metaphors is the organization’s

culture: its values, artifacts and beliefs. Narrative is a powerful way of conveying a

message. The structure and system are powerful symbols. It is wise never to

underestimate the effect symbolical interpretations may have on seemingly mundane

issues.

Proposition 5: Interpretation is always guided by identity.

In interpretation, one is always reflecting the content against an identity – of herself,

of the organization or of herself as a member of the organization. Strategic change

should be initiated by creating a vision of the organization that retains enough of the

organizational identity.

Proposition 6: Learning is essential to the adoption of strategy.

Adopting strategy is not merely a question of acceptance. One also needs to gain new

abilities. People have a natural resistance towards change. Change involves learning

new things, which in turn involves effort and uncertainty, possibly embarrassment.

Therefore, the value placed for learning should be evident in the organizational

climate: in the speeches and especially in the actions of the managers. This should

also be reflected in the structure and systems of the organization.

The notion of sensemaking should not reduce strategic change to a process with no

desired goals. One major goal is gaining new abilities that ensure the adoption of the


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strategic message resulting in relevant behaviour. Leadership is needed. There can

and should be direction to what skills and knowledge areas are relevant to strategy.

Proposition 7: Acceptance of the strategy is needed in implementation.

Acceptance is guided by values: personal and organizational. Values are also a major

factor in identity construction.

Proposition 8: Interpretation is not enough. Meaning must be enacted.

It is not enough to understand and adopt the strategic content. It must also be enacted,

built integrated into everyday work practices. This is why sensemaking is the concept

used in this thesis, not interpretation. Sensemaking is an activity in which the

processes of interpretation, adoption and enactment are built into one single, non-

linear whole. Doing and enacting are linked with interpreting and adopting. The order

in which these processes occur is situation dependent.

Methods for sensemaking in strategy implementation

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4. Methods for sensemaking in strategy

implementation

In this chapter I will develop a few tentative methods for assisting and facilitating

sensemaking in strategy implementation based on the propositions offered in chapter

three. Though certain amounts of reference literature will be used, the overall

approach in this chapter will be inventive instead of argumentative.

The second task for this thesis was set to be the creation of a few tentative methods

for strategy implementation using the knowledge gained in the previous chapters. The

methods reflect the eight propositions I offered in the end of the previous chapter.

4.1 Motivation and background for sensemaking methods

in strategy implementation

The main motivation for creating new methods is provided by the STRADA project,

my employer and the orderer of the project, the task of which is for instance creating,

productizing and disseminating such methods. The practical interests of the science of

organizational psychology provide an additional motivation. In my view, which is not

a solitary sentiment, organizational science should aim to produce actual

improvements in organizational life in addition to gaining understanding of

organizational life.

The implementation methods proposed by strategy textbooks are centered on

transforming the organization’s structure and systems to realize strategy. They neglect

to take into account the importance of interpretation. It is essential that the

implementers realize what they are doing in order to understand what they should be

doing. It is also important that the message reflects favorably on the cultural and

identity beliefs held by the organizational members, as well as their personal values,

for the implementers to be willing to do what they should. Assisted sensemaking

practices should help in rectifying this failing.

The three methods I am about to present are based on the sensemaking notions in the

previous chapters. All three methods are group methods. This emphasis is based on


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the conception of strategy implementation as the creation of shared understanding.

The importance of the social context is explicated in proposition three. In the

conclusion of the third chapter I offered the following eight propositions for strategy

implementation:

• Proposition 1: Implementation starts with communication.

• Proposition 2: Interpretation is a central issue in strategy implementation.

• Proposition 3: Interpretation is essentially social.

• Proposition 4: Interpretation is a complex, cultural process.

• Proposition 5: Interpretation is always guided by identity.

• Proposition 6: Learning is essential to the adoption of strategy.

• Proposition 7: Acceptance of the strategy is needed in implementation.

• Proposition 8: Interpretation is not enough. Meaning must be enacted.

All three methods presented could be categorized as reflecting the propositions one

through four, since they are all communicative, social and dealing with interpretation,

taking into account its complex processes (metaphors, narratives, categories).

All three methods could be said to be aimed at creating a joined acceptance of

strategic change since all of them aim at consensus, which would mean that all of

them deal with proposition seven as well. The methods could be categorized are

corresponding to the rest of the proposition as follows:

• Proposition 5: Interpretation is always guided by identity.

The metaphor workshop (section 4.4) is directed at explicating an organizational

unit’s identity as well as the desired identity through the use of metaphors. The

strategic storytelling simulation (section 4.3) is also aimed at understanding the

narrative development of an organizational identity through the achieving of a vision.

• Proposition 6: Learning is essential to the adoption of strategy.


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Categorization is essential to understanding and learning new and complex things.

Categorization is the basis for new knowledge since meaning is the basis of

knowledge. The accumulation of new knowledge is in essence learning. The

categorization card game (section 4.2) is designed to utilize categorization in the

learning of a new strategic content.

• Proposition 8: Interpretation is not enough. Meaning must be enacted.

The strategic storytelling simulation (section 4.3) is aimed at acting out a strategic

story. This acting out is not done as a part of everyday work and is rather abstract, yet

could be said to partly reflect the concept enactment, the creation of reality in a group.

The following interrelations can be presented in the form of a matrix:

Method Issues emphasized Reflected in propositions

Categorization card game Categorization, learning a

new strategic content

(1, 2, 3, 4, 7), 6

Strategic storytelling

simulation

Narratives, vision-creation (1, 2, 3, 4, 7), 5, 8

Metaphor workshop Metaphors, identity (1, 2, 3, 4, 7), 5

What is the methodological background for these methods? I will approach the

subject by taking a look at three concepts relevant and influential in the field of group

methods. These three concepts that are useful in the theoretical scrutiny done for these

methods are role-playing, games and simulations. Simulation gaming has been a field

of considerable activity in organizational research. The concepts of simulation and

game are somewhat problematic to define and are often used in confusing and

normative ways as described by Greenblat (1988, 15):

“The confusion of terms is not simply the result of sloppy usage. It also results from users’

concerns that both terms – simulations and games – have problematic connotations they

dislike. For some people, simulations sound too complex, too mechanical, too mathematical.


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Hence they prefer the lighter-toned term games, which they think will be less frightening to

prospective users.”

Role-playing is a method first conceived as a hobby but which has later gained a

foothold in education as well as psychology: even as a form of therapy. Greenblat

(ibid. 15) views roleplaying as a form of simulation with static roles for the

participants (they can also be dynamic in other forms of simulation). The concept

game at least has been a topic of wide discussion in philosophy. I am not, however,

going to dwell on the definition of the concepts but aim to find fuel, that is useful

notions for the creation of functioning methods. I will give the following working

definitions here for the concepts simulation, game and role-playing:

• A game is an activity, governed by explicit or implicit rules, often found in groups

of people

• A simulation is an activity of imagining the possible course of events in a

relatively structured manner. Role-playing is a simulation in which the

participants assume or are assigned static (i.e. non-interchangeable) roles for the

course of the simulation.

Grendler (1992, 16-17) draws a rather useful distinction between tactical-decision

simulations and social-process simulations. The first is mainly concerned in making

the right decision in a simulated environment while the second is mainly based on a

group improving their social functionality. In this thesis conception of strategy

implementation it would be useful to create methods reflecting both of the former

simulation types.

Are simulations and games useful methods for strategy implementation? Greenblat

(1992, 16) has found the gaming-simulation methods useful for the following

purposes:

• Increasing motivation and interest

• Teaching, conveying information

• Skill development, for instance decision making, critical thinking, interaction, communication

• Attitude change, for instance social values


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• Self-evaluation and evaluation by others.

Each of these could be viewed as positively affecting implementation. It would seem,

that simulation- or game-type methods, created in the light of what has been said

about strategy implementation could be very potential methods for implementing

strategy.

4.2 The categorization card game

Categorization has been shown to be an essential process for understanding new

contents and messages (e.g. Dutton and Jackson 1987; Gioia and Thomas 1996; see

section 2.3.2). The category card game is designed to help categorizing, for instance

the different concepts associated with the content and implementation of a strategic

theme, along with analyzing the relations between them. This method is best suited

for the implementation of a formulated strategic content with a relatively logical basic

nature.

4.2.1 Theoretical background of the method

The card game is quite a typical game: it has rules and a physical gaming implement.

It is a cognitive method for improving strategic thinking among strategy

implementers, that is, those of the organization’s personnel involved in the activities

necessary for the implementation of the desired strategic change. It is based on the

notion of categorical thinking as the basis of human cognition. The hypothesis behind

this method is that of a cognitive view on culture and human behaviour: when a

person knows how to categorize a content, she can (at least in most cases) be said to

have understood the content.

The grouping of concepts represented by cards is hardly a novel idea in research. It

has been used by such notable researchers as Chatman (1991) in organizational

research and Kamppinen (1995) in cognitive ethnoscience. It has proven to be a

relevant method in studying the categorizations people make. The idea here is to turn

this notion around and use the card game as a method of learning new conceptual

schemas. I have also included the group dimension in order to use the learning


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process to create shared understanding of strategy, a central notion to my research on

implementation.

4.2.2 Description of the method

The deck of cards for the categorization card game contains the essential concepts for

the strategic change and its implementation. The objective of the game is for the

participants to understand how different words (or concepts) featured in strategic

messages interrelate. This is achieved by grouping these concepts in various ways.

Figure 14. The categorization card game process.

Since this method is context-dependent, there can be no single, universal deck of

cards – all such a thing would accomplish is to provide understanding of the general

problems of strategy implementation. Therefore the deck of cards must be unique and

customized separately for each organization.

There are, however, some general guidelines for the creation of the stack of cards.

The first guideline is to provide enough concepts to make the game interesting. This


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means at least dozen or more cards, up to the number of cards in a normal deck (52),14

depending on how obviously some concepts would seem to interrelate. This is

somewhat like the case of a puzzle: if you can find a group of pieces that obviously fit

together, you can deal with a larger amount of pieces.

The stack should be created by a group of people closely associated with the creation

of the strategy, perhaps in association with some representatives from the group of

potential players. This means of course that the players participating in the creation of

the stack should not be involved in playing the actual game. The creation of the stack

may not be an easy task, but can be helped with some guidelines.

Firstly, the most important concepts of the strategy must be determined. They should

be fairly obvious for the people who wrote the strategy. The concepts found should

mainly be specific to the organization’s strategy. General terms such as vision,

mission and values can be included if deemed necessary, but they should only form a

small minority in the stack. If possible, they should be replaced by the organization-

specific contents of the terms, for instance the things present in the organization’s

vision, values, etc.

Secondly, the next groups of concepts should be grouped around the need and

implementation of the central concepts mentioned above. Natural groups of concepts

to follow could be found from the environmental factors causing the need for the

strategy (factors making the strategic change necessary), the internal contextual

characteristics as well as processes involved in the implementation of the central

concepts. The concepts should be relatively general, but not overly so. The generality

allows for different possible interpretations in the game, which is needed to avoid

covertly manipulating the players (or at least avoid creating an atmosphere of

manipulation).

The game is best played in multiple, separated groups. Each group is presented with a

deck and the task of grouping the cards in different piles in accordance of their

similarity with each other. They can be provided with containers for these decks such

14 Chatman (1991) has used a deck of 110 cards in her study of person-organization fit. The study was done on individuals. One of this method’s objectives is the creation of consensus in a group, which would intuitively suggest a smaller deck since multiple viewpoints have to be discussed instead of one.


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as plastic bags of small boxes. The group may receive guidelines on the number of

piles if deemed necessary. The group is instructed to be prepared to present their

grouping of the cards and most importantly to describe the process of grouping the

cards (where did they begin, etc.) and the reasons behind their groups (why the

associated concepts resemble each other).

The presentations are held and discussion is allowed and facilitated. The groups have

been instructed to take notes that reflect the similarities and differences between their

grouping and those of the others. The next step of the process has the groups return to

work with the same deck. Now they are instructed, based on the discussion, to group

the cards in a hierarchical fashion. This is done by grouping the cards in such a way

that some cards belong to some other cards. This can be done for example by first

dividing the cards into piles, dividing these piles into sub-piles and so on until no

additional piles can be constructed. The objective is to form hierarchies that have

more than two levels. The group is instructed to draw their grouping on a sheet as a

tree-like structure, with as few roots as possible (this may be demonstrated if

necessary.) The group is also to mark each branch with an explanation (why the

branch concept belongs to the root concept). These explanations should be a short as

possible. The groups again present their categorizations and discussion ensues. The

goal is to create one conceptualization agreed on by all participants.

One further possible dimension could be offered by an additional opportunity-threat –

labeling to the concepts. This could serve as a way to reflect on the affective side of

the strategy and could serve as a very important bottom-up communication channel

for the management to gain valuable information as well as the personnel to get their

voices heard. This kind of discussion could also be used for alleviating unnecessary

fears as well as providing inspiration.

An additional creative feature to the game can be added by introducing blank cards in

the stack. After doing their pilings in each stage of the game the group can

supplement their piles with additional concepts. This will give the game, which in its

basic form is about interpreting an existing strategic content, a sensemaking twist: the

group can actually transform the content instead of just interpreting it.


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4.2.3 Who should participate in the categorization card game?

The categorization card game is most potentially worthwhile for two groups: the

group that designs the game deck and rules as well as that which plays the game. The

designers can use the design process for clarifying their thoughts on the corporate

strategy as well as use the actual game as a communication tool. The players can use

it to make sense of the strategy they are supposed to implement. The potential players

of the game are those of the organization’s members who are not very well versed on

the content of the strategy but play a role in its implementation.

4.2.4 What is gained by using the categorization card game?

The categorization card game is designed for creating an understanding of a complex,

yet logical strategic theme. The game is aimed at

• facilitating a learning process directed to acquisition of relevant knowledge structures for the adoption of a strategic theme

• creating a shared understanding of a desired strategic content in a group, as well as further elaborating the content if white cards are allowed

• creating a consensus within the group and also between several groups

• gaining access to new ideas through the use of white cards thus enabling the further development of strategy.

4.3 The strategic storytelling simulation

The idea behind the strategic storytelling simulation is twofold. First of all, it is a

method used for creating or formulating a vision. On the other hand the method can

be used to serve as a sensegiving method for an existing strategic or visionary content.


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4.3.1 Theoretical background for the method

The method draws its theoretical insight from narrative studies and can benefit from

methods created for a popular hobby: the branch of roleplaying called storytelling

games.15

The method bears a strong resemblance to the simulation gaming method. While it

can be discussed whether storytelling is simulation in the strictest sense, both methods

center on a group engaged in enacting reality by imagination. The simulation has

elements of both the social process and the tactical decision perspectives.

If rules are to be set as the defining characteristic of the concept game then the

storytelling simulation is not strictly a game – the referee, not some set of rules

determines the actual outcome of the events. Nor is there an emphasis of winning or

losing in the game as such, as required by Grendler (1992, 13-14.) The narrative form

is the structuring factor of the simulation. Yet there are many similarities in the

strategic storytelling simulation that correspond with simulation gaming. Using the

definitions given in the beginning of the chapter the storytelling simulation could be

stated to be the role-playing type of a simulation.

According to Pankakoski (1998, 8) there are universal games suitable for many

organizations and tailored simulation games suitable for one organization only. The

strategic storytelling simulation is universal in its general method, yet it requires a

large amount of preparation in the organization. In a sense most of the rules are at the

referee’s disgression and cannot be said to be universal in this sense.

The strength of the simulation gaming method in creating shared understanding is that

of creating understanding relevant to the practical work. The strategic storytelling

method is more suitable for creating understanding of larger, visionary or missionary

principles. By definition these are not as much tied to everyday work as many

processes simulated by simulation games, yet the resemblance in the methods should

allow more possibilities of understanding larger totalities in association with visionary

and missionary contents and also reflecting them to one’s own work.

15 The creation of method of role-playing as a hobby is often credited to Dave Arneson and Gary Gygax, the creators of the famous role-playing game Dungeons & Dragons.


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The storytelling simulation is based on a notion of telling a story together with

different players taking the roles of the characters in the story. One player acts as a

creator of context, a referee and a facilitator of the story. The storytelling simulation is

based on a scenario created by the referee, describing the initial situation with as well

as the situations of the characters, the main problem or the dramatic conflict ahead,

and the some possible outcomes to the actions of the characters. The objective of the

storytelling session is to go through a whole story: the beginning, the dramatic

conflict and the resolution by common imagination and discussion, the referee acting

as facilitator and judge for the characters’ actions.

Figure 15. The process of the strategic storytelling simulation.

The role of the referee is to represent the organization’s environment and possibly

some parts of its inner context as well, depending on how the roles of the players are

defined. The referee also creates the initial position for the simulation: the beginning

of the story, the initial roles of the players as well as the organization and its

environment. The suitable beginning for the story should contain the metaphorical

initial state of the organization. By initial I mean here either the organization’s present

or some point in its history – a natural point might be the founding moment of the

organization. Whether one chooses the present or some historical point as a beginning


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depends on the story one wishes to create. If a story which will help to form an

understanding of the organization’s present state (or the formation of its mission), one

should start in the past and play out the organization’s history. If one wants to create a

vision for a desired future state, one should start at the present.

The roles chosen for the players are of essence. One natural way to do this selection is

for each player to represent a part of the organization: perhaps a division or a

department – one player could be the CEO, one could be personnel, one marketing,

one product development, etc., depending on the organization. An alternative to the

divisionary distribution of roles is a distribution based on organizational hierarchy,

still another one is based on different professions within the organization. The

divisions can also be synthesized at the referee’s discretion.

If all of the roles deemed central to the organization by the referee are not manned by

live players, the referee can act them out in the form of non-player characters (NPC:

s). Each player represents a totality or a group of people as a one personality or a

”voice” in the simulation. It is the responsibility of the player to account for all the

internal forces within this totality and reflect their ”sum” as a metaphorical

personality. The player should prepare for the simulation by analyzing the different

viewpoints and forces within their character and also provide a short (one page

maximum) written exposition of these forces for her and the referee’s eyes only. This

report can take the form of for example a list of characteristics for the character and

internal factors present in the character.

The role of the referee is perhaps the most demanding. She must create the storyline

in addition to discussing the characters with the players, creating the necessary NPC:s

and and other possible requirements of the scenario for the gaming session. There is

naturally a variety of possibilities for a potential storyline. As a rule of thumb the

storyline should contain a beginning, the creation of conflict or a threat and a

resolution, either by success or failure. The scenario should also reflect an

understanding on the organization and its environment. It may be hard for the referee

to create such an understanding himself: in those cases it could be prudent to enlist the

help of organizational stakeholders or perhaps outside consultants. In no case should

the scenario of the simulation be discussed with the players prior to the gaming

session.


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The storyline present in the simulation should contain two kinds of events: events that

are caused by the players and events that are predestined, i.e. they are designed by the

referee and happen no matter what the characters do. Natural predestined events are

those present in the beginning of the simulation: that set the simulation in motion. The

trick for the referee is to keep the players from distinguishing which events happen

regardless of what they do – if they do, motivation for the simulation is bound to

decrease as the players feel they have no control of the storyline. All in all, the referee

should be prepared to improvise a lot - being prepared with ready-made events but

keeping the predestined events to the minimum.

The actual gaming session should take approximately one working day. The session

should be held in a setting ensuring minimal distractions. The event should be taped

(for the use of the referee) and the players should take notes. The actual story is acted

out, the referee acting as a facilitator and chairperson. The responsibility of retaining

the narrative storyline beginning-dramatic conflict-change effort-resolution falls to

the referee, who will have to balance between allowing freedom of movement for the

players as well as ensuring the unfolding of the story. The referee mainly determines

the nature of the resolution. Whether the story has a happy ending should be at least

somewhat proportional to the observed effort, ingenuity and team play presented by

the players.

After the gaming event, there is still the task of writing the actual story. This is best

done by writing multiple versions of the same story, according to the viewpoints

represented by the different parties, the players. The players are instructed to study

their notes and write the story according to their character’s viewpoint. The referee

uses her notes as well as the recording made of the gaming event to write a meta-

story, combining the description of the scenario, the events and the actions of the

characters from an objective standpoint. The written stories should be presented to the

organization, perhaps in a storytelling event.

It may be difficult for the players to find the time and motivation for writing the actual

stories. A lighter version would contain only the referee writing the meta-story and

the players commenting on it in the story-telling event. A sort of a midway model

would be set the each player to describe one situation in the story in which her

character played a major role. In this model the meta-story is enlivened by


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“eyewitness accounts” of certain events. The actual storytelling day would basically

be an unraveling of the created narrative to the rest of the organization. If the referee

is willing to improvise, the audience participation could be facilitated in the form of

questions from the audience.

4.3.3 Who should participate in the simulation?

The choice of the players in the simulation is dependent on its desired function. The

simulation can be used as a vision-creation tool or a method for introducing and

discussing strategic or visionary directions already decided on. For actual vision-

creation, the senior managers, perhaps with representatives from other organizational

groups should be the ones participating. If the organization is willing to put in the

resources, the simulation could be carried out with groups from various levels,

comparing the resulting stories. If the objective is more the discussion and

introduction of an existent strategic theme, the simulation can be used in a variety of

groups. Using the simulation for interpreting an existent strategic content could also

make the simulation a useful socialization method.

The referee is the key individual to the success of the simulation. It is essential for her

to have both strong social and performance abilities as well as a sufficient amount of

knowledge about the organization and its environment. These requirements are due to

the fact that for successful motivation of the players to go through the process takes

both a believable and realistic storyline and good group leadership. These properties

may well be found in an executive in the organization. On the other hand, a consultant

may provide additional credibility to the storyline by acting as a more neutral referee.

4.3.4 What is gained by using the strategic storytelling simulation?

The objective of the simulation is twofold: the actual creation of a corporate vision or

the creation of shared understanding and facilitation of a discussion concerning a

decided strategic content, vision or mission. The power of narratives has been

discussed in chapter 2.3 and it has been noted that they may be utilized in forming a

bridge between planning and process. The simulation could also be used as a powerful

tool in the socialization of new organizational members, especially if the starting


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point of the simulation is set to be in the organization’s history and the objective is

understanding the formation of the organization’s mission.

4.4 Metaphor workshop for identity construction

The metaphor workshop is concerned with shaping an organizational unit’s identity

through the use of metaphor. It is used to study the deeper perception within an

organizational unit of its identity and how that should change should a strategy be

implemented.

4.4.1 Theoretical background for the method

A metaphor is a linguistic entity of interest especially to the semiotic studies of

organizational communication (see section 2.3). As well as category cards, metaphors

have also been used as a research method. An example of this kind of a study is

provided by Martinsuo (1996) who used the animal metaphor system in her interviews

concerning Outokumpu, a large metals organization. Metaphors have been

demonstrated to be a powerful method of describing whole organizations as done by

Morgan (1986).

The purpose of this method is to use the connotative and symbolic power of

metaphors in constructing organizational identity. It has been shown that

organizational identity plays an important role in the interpretation and sensemaking

practices in strategy implementation and also that metaphors pose a powerful method

of communication. The main question of the workshop is how the organizational unit

is to change if it is to implement a strategic content in question. The answer to this

question is searched by examining by the use of metaphor on what the unit is to

resemble at a desired end state.


The objective of the metaphor workshop is to study the implementation of a strategic

theme by examining the change in the organizational unit’s identity needed to

implement the strategic theme. The overall process of the method is rather

straightforward. The group is first to determine the unit’s present identity by


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reflecting the unit: its culture, systems and structure against several metaphor systems

and then combining the metaphors to form one metaphor best resembling the present

situation. For all practical purposes, the group is to come up with words (adjectives,

nouns) that belong to a description of a particular metaphor system. The objective is

to produce a large amount of them and write them down.

Figure 16. Process of the metaphor workshop.

The group is then faced with the strategic change theme, which can be processed

using for example the categorization card game. The desired end state of the unit is

then determined by using the same metaphor systems and again synthesizing the

metaphors into one defining metaphor reflecting the desired end state. The two

metaphors are compared and the necessary changes in the unit’s identity are discussed

and recorded.

An alternative way is to divide the two assignments: the creation of the present state

metaphor and the desired end state metaphor to two distinct groups. After the tasks

have been done, the two groups, unknowing of the other group’s assignment gather to

discuss the differences in the metaphors they have created. The necessary changes in

the units identity are again discussed and recorded.


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While the process frame for the metaphor workshop is quite simple, the metaphors

themselves require attention. They may have to be tailored for different units,

depending on the social, cultural, professional and demographical background of the

unit’s members. Two kinds of metaphor systems are required: the raw metaphors of

which the synthesis metaphors are created. The raw metaphors should be rather

abstract and general and also reminiscent of the basic metaphors inherent to the

construction of meaning. This is because one needs to understand something basic

about the unit’s identity and also because one needs to use the raw metaphors to

construct more tangible and concrete metaphors.

Possible systems of raw metaphors:

• Orientation metaphors: is the unit high or low? This could mean for example soaring in spirit or high in esteem among the organization.

• Temperature and weather metaphors: hot/cold, stormy/placid, sunny/rainy…

• Journey metaphors: has the unit had a smooth or a bumpy ride, on a desert road or along a jungle path?

• Product metaphors: does the unit bear a resemblance to its products or services? This reflection should provide a few additional adjectives.

• The attributes of a person: how would the unit be if it was a person? This system is presented as a raw metaphor system since it is bound to produce useful and revealing adjectives yet perhaps is not interesting enough for a synthesis metaphor.

• Health metaphors: this is system similar to the person metaphor. The idea is to provide adjectives related to health such as fit, sound, frail, feeble, sneezing, etc.

• Energy metaphors: vibrant, energetic, tired, lazy, etc.

• Quality metaphors: cheap, high-class, etc.

The creation of the synthesis metaphor should, unless the group is a very active and

creative one, be facilitated by providing the group with a context. This synthesis

metaphor system should be very carefully chosen taking into account the presence of

this metaphor in the unit’s members’ lifeworlds. Possible systems of synthesis

metaphors include:


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• Animal and plant metaphors: is the unit an eagle because it is soaring and strong… or a tortoise because it is slow and rigid yet resilient? Perhaps it is an old, faithful packhorse, a bit old and frail yet content in general.16

• Vehicle metaphors: a shiny sports car or a muddy field engine? Or perhaps a bulldozer?17

• Profession metaphors: a caring yet grumpy nurse or a saucy and idealistic scientist?

• Food metaphors

• Building metaphors

• Music metaphors.

• Landscape metaphors

The most important consideration to the selection of the synthesis metaphor system is

that it should be something very tangible to the unit’s members. If prior information

about the unit cannot be obtained, it may be prudent to do the system selection at the

actual workshop by offering several alternatives to the group.

For strategy implementation, the main objective is providing the organizational unit

with a method of analyzing their current identity with the identity to be obtained if the

strategy is to be implemented. A secondary use for this method is its ability to reveal

the differences and similarities in observed identities across the organization.

4.4.3 Who should participate in the metaphor workshop?

The metaphor workshop can be used in a wide array of organizational settings: from

the senior managers to the personnel level. The only restriction is that the participants

should belong to a clear organizational whole: the senior management team, a

manufacturing team, etc. The workshop should be held in a group entailing the largest

possible amount of personnel in an organizational unit. The unit should have a clear,

shared function in the organization with associated goals.

16 The animal metaphor has been used by Martinsuo (1996) 17 I owe the car metaphor to my fellow researcher Leena Ilmola.


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4.4.4 What is gained by the use of the metaphor workshop?

It has been shown that the organizational identity is a major factor in the interpretation

and adoption of strategy. The metaphor workshop should thus be a powerful method

for shaping and discussing organizational identity.

Concluding remarks

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5. Concluding remarks

5.1 Discussion

The objectives of this thesis were defined as:

1) To study literature and find out which factors are the most relevant ones in affecting strategy implementation.

2) To create a few tentative methods for strategy implementation from an organizational psychological perspective.

I began looking for answers to the first question by studying basic literature on

strategy and strategy implementation. Especially after studying the works of

Mintzberg, one overall dichotomy began to form quite quickly. It became obvious that

most authors answered the hail of either a content- or a process-based paradigm on

viewing strategy. The first position, a planning-based paradigm is centered on the

creation of the right strategy content and views implementation as a linear process.

The second position, a process-based paradigm is centered on organizational

processes that enact new reality, the real strategy being emergent in actions.

I began by stating that interpretation forms the main critique to the first position. One

can simply not assume that planners have all the keys to the right strategic contents:

they are interpreters as much as the implementers are interpreters of the strategic

content they receive. Secondly, the fact that implementers interpret the strategic

content makes linear implementation impossible since human interpretation is a

complex, social process, intertwined with communication, adoption and enactment.

Such things as the organizational culture and identity have a major impact on how

strategy is interpreted. There is no single language to be used in communicating

strategy, but a multitude of linguistic choices have to be made.

Planning-based authors, when speaking about implementation, concern themselves

mostly with finding the right structural and systemic measures taken in order to

implement the strategy. While the structural and systemic measures are important,

neglecting the interpretation aspect and adhering to structure and systems is likely to

Concluding remarks

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result in the structural and systemic measures being interpreted in an unforeseeable

way - one of the basic problems of behaviorism.

It therefore seemed necessary to study the cultural condition affecting strategy

implementation, neglected by the content paradigm. For a while it seemed as though

Noble provided the view I sought after. His model on implementation (see figure 2)

seemed to account for interpretation, but while its building blocks (communication,

interpretation, adoption and enactment) were essential, the model’s linearity did not

strike me as a realistic model for human understanding. I needed to look at

organizational psychological literature not necessarily written under the banner of

strategy implementation to better understand what a deeper account of the cultural and

interpretation aspects of implementation might look like.

I adopted Pettigrew’s tripartite model for strategy (see figure 3, 4), based on content,

context and process. This model helped me to form a categorization of relevant

organizational psychological themes, based on the notions of inner context (culture)

and organizational change processes. It also helped me in studying the effect of

organizational climates and environments on implementation. Using the concepts of

culture and process I studied a variety of themes conceptually connected to these two

terms. The overall conclusion from this study was twofold: it stressed that mere

strategic content is not enough as a link between culture and process because of

interpretation, as well as emphasizing that culture and process needed to be linked.

They are not two separate things. The bridge was built by sensemaking, a concept also

useful in overcoming the linearity of Noble’s model (see figure 11).

Sensemaking is a concept that can be used in uniting Noble’s concepts of

communication, interpretation, adoption and enactment into one single, organic

whole. My studies of sensemaking were centered on Weick, the creator of this

concept. Weick’s account of sensemaking in organizations provided a deep and

realistic view on how meaning is constructed in organizations. It provided a further

critique of both the planning paradigm as well as Noble’s linear model.

The critique of the planning paradigm encountered might tempt one to neglect it

altogether. I was so tempted at first. The overall disregard for humanity of the

planning-based authors was alarming. The studies of sensemaking were also

Concluding remarks

119

somewhat laden with problems, however. A sensemaking perspective at its purest

does not allow for any kind of preconceived strategic direction or managerial action.

It also neglects learning and decision making. This view on implementation would in

my view reduce organizations into anarchies, which in most cases they are not, and

should not be. In my mind at least, the overall conception of an organization requires

some sort of joint purpose. This calls for leadership and direction.

It became evident that neither the planning nor the process paradigm could be used

alone in accomplishing the first part of the research task for this thesis. Some notion

transcending the boundaries of this dichotomy was needed. The notion sought after

was found by utilizing Mintzberg’s division between prescriptive and descriptive

schools of strategy. The realization that the planning authors are intent on telling

people what they should do while the process school was good at describing the

phenomena of interpretation taking place in organizations. What was needed was a

prescriptive account of implementation, based on the descriptive realism provided by

the process authors. This was especially needed for method creation, the second part

of my research task.

I set out to form this prescriptive account by augmenting sensemaking with its “sister-

concept” sensegiving. Sensegiving is a practice in which a meaningful strategic

content is communicated. If sensegiving practices are based on an understanding of

the cultural, social and individual intricacies of sensemaking they should be more

effective in conveying the intended strategic meaning. I constructed a model of

strategy implementation based on these two concepts, sensemaking being the model’s

descriptive part, while sensegiving contained prescriptions. In attempting to overcome

Noble’s model’s linearity I drew on the history of physics for inspiration. The

resulting model, the plum-pudding model for strategy implementation (see figure 13)

is based on Thompson’s classical atomic model in which the subatomic particles are

grouped in one whole, interacting with each other yet showing no particular internal

order. This way I could present many of the discoveries made in the second chapter

integrated into sensemaking. With the plum-pudding model I feel I have

accomplished in giving an account of strategy implementation that overcomes the

problem of lacking direction in the sensemaking account yet loses none of its

descriptive realism. I also explicated eight propositions concerning the nature of

Concluding remarks

120

strategy implementation, based on the perceptions made during the course of this

thesis.

In order to answer the second part of this thesis’s research task, as well as to put the

plum-pudding model and the propositions into good use, three tentative methods for

strategy implementation were created. The methods are all group methods. They also

bear a resemblance with simulations and games. They draw on different

considerations on interpretation, sensemaking and culture encountered during the

course of my study.

The categorization card game, my first method, draws its influence from the

methodology of cognitive cultural studies and is based on the fact that categorization

is a central component in cognition. The card game is good at assisting group

sensemaking associated with a complex, logical strategic theme. It is also a method of

gaining consensus. It can act as a method of innovation and further developing the

theme if the group is allowed to add their concepts in the categorizations. White cards

allow for the players to act as sensegivers for the strategists, closing the sensemaking-

sensegiving cycle the plum-pudding model is based on.

The strategic storytelling simulation, my second method, is based on the power of

narrative form in communication and understanding. The method is used in creating a

strategic story of resolving a crisis or answering to a challenge for an organization,

generally a story of reaching a vision. The simulation can be used either for actual

vision creation or the sensemaking process associated with the organization’s vision

in socialization processes.

The metaphor workshop, my third method, is useful for reflecting on an

organizational unit’s identity and the needed changes in identity called for in

implementing a strategic theme. The workshop makes use of the powerful presence of

metaphors in interpretation and their ability of conveying both cognitive and affective

meaning. This method is to be used with an organizational unit small enough for most

of its members to be able to participate. The smallness of the unit allows for the

discussion of actual work practices in connection with the metaphors.

The main question with the methods developed is how they well they are applicable in

practice. Each method is not well suited for each possible strategy implementation

Concluding remarks

121

context. The categorization card game is best applied to a fairly logical and complex

strategic theme. The kind of organization that comes to mind is an expert organization

with a substance-based theme to be implemented. The storytelling simulation is more

suited to a vision-based enterprise. Many kinds of organizations have and require a

vision. A vision would seem to be especially important to an organization in a

turbulent environment in which strict strategy formulation is not an option – a

growing IT-firm for example. The metaphor workshop would seem suitable to an

organizational unit with a joint purpose, as well as some experience in fulfilling that

purpose.

Motivation is a central question in using and further developing my three methods.

The methods call for active participation and thinking as well as some enthusiasm

from the participants. A sidestep from traditional thinking and imagination is called

for, especially in the storytelling simulation and the metaphor workshop. Some

participants may respond with resistance, viewing the methods as childish or as a

waste of time. Support from the management must be clearly communicated. At least

some charisma and confidence must be expected from the developers of the method.

A central question is how my methods should be marketed to the people who make

the decisions. Managers probably expect prescriptions on how to better implement

strategy. This motivates the effort of trying to transmute description into prescription

when results are discovered. The personnel are probably expecting to be heard and

also willing to understand the direction the organization is taking. Whether these

expectations are answered is basically a question of the overall quality of the methods,

since this is something they are designed to accomplish. All in all, creating the

methods have taught me to view theory from another angle.

I have absolutely no doubt that sensemaking is a real issue in organizations. Getting a

hold of sensemaking issues in empirical research should prove challenging, though.

The fact that creating a link between the languages of the management and the

personnel is challenging only emphasizes the fact that an outside researcher has to

understand both languages in every organization. Challenging, as this might be, it

sounds like fun.

Concluding remarks

122

5.2 Suggestions for further study

This was not an empirical study. My research material was written and not gathered

from the field. This has allowed me to create a conceptualization of the relevant

themes in strategy implementation and also create methods based on these

considerations.

However, if there has been one definitive conclusion to be made from my study this

far, it would state that conceptual analysis will not give all the definitive answers I am

after. Many of the answers, therefore, lie on the field. Interesting sensemaking

questions concerning strategy implementation include at least the following:

Firstly, is there a way to directly assist the enactment of new work practices? The

methods in chapter four are simulation-type methods that also affect everyday work

practices, yet Weick’s considerations of enactment seem to place a heavy emphasis on

doing the sensemaking in the actual work situations. The development of methods

that can be used while immersed in doing the actual work is an important challenge to

be studied by the STRADA project.

Secondly, what are the roles of management and personnel in sensemaking practices?

The only research on this subject that I encountered was done by Gioia and

Chittipeddi. Many of the sensemaking studies are concerned with management

sensemaking if any choice is made. This is a problematic deficit in the field since it

makes the study of real-life organizations much harder. How can sensemaking be

affected by management sensegiving? Can managers comprehend the sensemaking

processes on the operational level without having to become experts in the operational

activities? What is the role of the middle management in this context? This is

something essential to the second phase of the STRADA project.

Thirdly, how is sensemaking linked to the systems and structures of the organization?

Can this process be affected by management communication? How should this

communication be in different contexts? The scope of this thesis did not allow for an

in-depth investigation of the structural or systemic viewpoints. An interesting topic

for further research would be to investigate the way for instance goal-setting,

Concluding remarks

123

rewarding and changes in organizational structure and responsibilities are interpreted

and enacted.

Fourthly, is participation to strategic planning a positive factor affecting sensemaking

in strategy implementation? What level of participation is desired and what is the

most satisfactory level, taking into account the resources demanded by participation.

Fifthly, is the role of the tacit and explicit knowledge in sensemaking? How much of

the personal and cultural tacit knowledge affecting sensemaking can be made

explicit? This is a challenging area of special personal interest, which I will pursue in

the future.

Finally, a natural area of further research is the empirical testing and developing of

the methods I have created in this thesis. Experience in testing my methods in practice

should give the final word on the validity of the choices made in this thesis.

References

124

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