Strategic Report 04 Wash Institute

8/8/2019 Strategic Report 04 Wash Institute

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/strategic-report-04-wash-institute 1/30

J. Scott Carpenter, Matthew Levitt,

Steven Simon, and Juan Zarate

Fighting the Ideological Battle

The Missing Link in U.S. Strategyto Counter Violent Extremism

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A WA s h i n g t on i n s t i t u t e s t r At e g i c r e p o rt





A WA s h i n g t on i n s t i t u t e s t r At e g i c r e p o rt

Fighting the Ideological Battle

The Missing Link in U.S. Strategy

to Counter Violent Extremism

z

J. Scott Carpenter, Matthew Levitt,

Steven Simon, and Juan Zarate



All rights reserved. Printed in the United States o America. No part o this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in

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system, without permission in writing rom the publisher.

© 2010 by Te Washington Institute or Near East Policy

Published in 2010 in the United States o America by the Washington Institute or Near East Policy,

1828 L Street NW, Suite 1050, Washington, DC 20036.

Design by Daniel Kohan, Sensical Design and Communication

Front cover: A live V broadcast showing President Barack Obama delivering his speech at Cairo University is reected in

the sunglasses o a man at a coeeshop in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, June 4, 2009. (AP Photo/Hassan Ammar)



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Acknowledgments / v

Preface / vii

Study Group Members / ix

The Growing Challenge / 1

The U.S. Approach to Countering Violent Extremism / 3

An Assessment / 6

Recommendations / 10

Notes / 14





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This sTudy was m ade possible by the support o the Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intel-ligence, named in honor o Michael Stein, coounder and chairman emeritus o Te Washington Institute; and byProject Fikra: Deeating Extremism through the Power o Ideas, a program that amplies the voices o mainstreamMuslims in the battle against extremism. Project Fikra owes its establishment to the vision, commitment, and gen-erosity o Linda, Michael, and James Keston.

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and discussion. In particular, administration ocialshave expressed concern about employing language thatcould be interpreted as an attack on Islam as a religion.However, unless government recognizes and articu-lates clearly the threat posed by the ideology o radicalIslamist extremism, its broader whole-o-governmenteorts will lack strategic ocus and will ail to addressthe varied root causes o domestic and oreign radical-ization. It is indeed possible to do this without deni-grating the Islamic religion in any way.

his new report recognizes the important stepsthe Obama administration has taken to address vio-lent extremism and suggests ways to address remain-ing gaps in U.S. homeland security and oreign policy.Te report has beneted rom a series o interviews with administration oicials at numerous cabinet-level agencies and the White House and has beenshaped by the impressive experience and wisdom o two ormer intelligence and counterterrorism oi-cials. It is the product o a small study group includ-ing two distinguished experts, Steve Simon and Juan

Zarate, and ourselves.Tis report was the collaborative eort o our our-

member study group and reects the broad consensuso its members. Members were asked to endorse thereport’s undamental ndings, not each and every oneo its judgments and recommendations. Members haveendorsed this report solely in their individual capaci-ties, and their endorsements do not necessarily reectthose o the institutions with which they are aliated.Finally, this report does not necessarily reect the viewso Te Washington Institute, its Board o rustees, or

its Board o Advisors.

J. Scott CarpenterMatthew LevittConvenors

in marCh 2009, Te Washington Institute releasedthe nal report o the bipartisan Presidential ask Forceon Conronting the Ideology o Radical Extremism.itled Rewriting the Narratie: An Integrated Strategy

for Counterradicalization, the report urged the Obamaadministration to adopt a multiaceted and integratedapproach to conronting the animating ideology o violent extremism both domestically and abroad. Tesuggested approach was comprehensive and includedstrategic, unctional, and structural recommendations

spanning all aspects o American power.Laudably, the administration has adopted a num-

ber o the unctional and structural recommendationssince that time. Te administration is also reportedlynearing the end o a number o policy reviews, includ-ing the new Quadrennial Diplomacy and DevelopmentReview headed by the deputy secretary o state andU.S. Agency or International Development admin-istrator, as well as Presidential Study Directive 7, ledby the National Security Council’s senior director orglobal development. Tese reviews may yet impact the

administration’s decision to implement urther recom-mendations. According to a leaked draf o Directive 7,the administration’s approach recognizes developmentas essential to U.S. security and places a premium oneconomic growth and democratic governance, both o which were key recommendations o Te WashingtonInstitute’s task orce or a long-term solution on miti-gating violent extremism.

At the same time, the administration remainsuncomortable with the core strategic recommenda-tion o the task orce report: that it go beyond counter-

ing violent extremism (CVE) to prevent and deter thespread o the ideology that nurtures and supports said violent extremism—radical Islamist extremism. Mem-bers o the administration articulate a number o ratio-nales or this approach, many o which merit attention





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J . sCoTT CarpenTer is the Keston Family ellow at he Washington Institute and director o Proj-ect Fikra: Deeating Extremism through the Power o Ideas, which ocuses on empowering Arab democratsin their struggle against extremism. Previously, he ser ved as deputy assistant secretary o state in the Bureau o Near Eastern Aairs and as coordinator o the State Department’s Broader Middle East and North AricaInitiatives. As ormer director o the governance group or the Coalition Provisional Authority in Bagh-dad, he helped guide Iraq’s postwar political transition and initiated a wide array o democracy initiatives.

maTThew leviTT is a senior ellow and director o the Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intel-ligence at he Washington Institute. He is also a proessorial lecturer in international relations and strate-gic studies at Johns Hopkins University’s Paul H. Nitze School o Advanced International Studies (SAIS).

From 2005 to early 2007, he served as deputy assistant secretary or intelligence and analysis at the rea-sury Department, where he played a central role in eorts to protect the U.S. inancial system rom abuseby terrorists, weapons prolierators, and other rogue actors. Prior to that, he served as a counterterrorismanalyst at the FBI, where he provided tactical and strategic analytical support or counterterrorism opera-tions and ocused on undraising and logistical support networks or Middle Eastern terrorist groups.

sTeven simon is a principal at Good Harbor Consulting, an adjunct senior ellow or Middle Eastern stud-ies at the Council on Foreign Relations, and an adjunct proessor o security studies at Georgetown University.Previously, he specialized in Middle Eastern aairs at the RAND Corporation. He came to RAND rom London, where he was deputy director o the International Institute or Strategic Studies and Carol Deane senior ellow inU.S. security studies. Beore moving to Britain in 1999, he served at the White House or ve years as director or

global issues and senior director or transnational threats. During this period, he was involved in U.S. counterter-rorism policy and operations as well as security policy in the Near East and South Asia. Tese assignments ol-lowed a feen-year career at the U.S. State Department, ocused on Middle Eastern security policy.

Juan ZaraTe is a senior advisor at the Center or Strategic and International Studies and the senior nationalsecurity analyst or CBS News. Previously, he served as deputy assistant to President George W. Bush and deputynational security advisor or combating terrorism rom 2005 to 2009. At the National Security Council, he wasresponsible or the ormulation and execution o U.S. counterterrorism and transnational threat policies, to includecountering violent Islamic extremism. He served at the U.S. reasury Department rom 2001 to 2005, where he was the rst assistant secretary or terrorist nancing and nancial crimes and oversaw the creation o the Oceo errorism and Financial Intelligence. Prior to that, he served as a ederal prosecutor at the Justice Department,

with involvement in terrorism cases such as the USS Cole investigation.





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be addressed. Missing are the policies and programsthat should suuse the space between these two poleson the counterradicalization spectrum, including eorts to contest the extremist narrative o radicalizers,empower and network mainstream voices countering extremism, promote diversity o ideas and means o expression, and challenge extremist voices and ideas inthe public domain. Contesting the radical Islamist nar-rative does not mean arresting or banning despicablebut protected speech; rather, it means openly contest-

ing extremist views by oering alternatives and oster-ing deeper ideological debate. Te objective in eithercase is to strengthen the moderate center against theextremist pole and help Muslim communities becomemore resilient in conronting the challenge.

Te United States aces diverse security challengesdirectly related to these core questions both at homeand abroad. At home, incidents o domestic radicaliza-tion have increased dramatically. According to a recentRAND report, there have been orty-six reportedcases o domestic radicalization and recruitment to

what it calls “jihadist terrorism” since September2001—30 percent o which occurred in 2009 alone.3 he most recent cases include the November 2009shooting at Fort Hood by U.S. Army major NidalMalik Hasan; the June 2009 killing and wounding o military recruiters in Little Rock by a Muslim convert,Carlos Bledsoe, who had returned rom Yemen; theOctober 2009 arrest o Colleen Renee LaRose, a.k.a.“Jihad Jane”; the March 2010 indictment o ve north-ern Virginia men in Pakistan accused o attempting to join al-aeda, the aliban, or both; and the May

2010 attempted car bombing in imes Square by anaturalized American citizen rom Pakistan. Accord-ing to Philip Mudd, ormer deputy director o theFBI’s National Security Branch, “Most individualsconnected to al-aeda-inspired activity in this coun-try are converts or native-born Muslims…. he mes-sage o venom has spread.”4 Some o these individuals

The ChallenGe of “waging a global campaignagainst al-aeda and its terrorist ailiates” remainsthe central objective o U.S. counterterrorism policy.1 Keeping this central goal narrowly dened has its mer-its, ocusing all elements o national power on a singu-lar aim without subordinating other elements o ournational security. Indeed, as the 2010 National SecurityStrategy made clear, “errorism is one o many threatsthat are more consequential in a global age.”2

Integral to a comprehensive counterterrorism strat-

egy, however, is a corresponding priority to counter the violent extremism underlying the terrorist threat weace today. And the scope o this eort extends beyondal-aeda and its immediate aliates to include “con- veyor belt” groups and other elements that purveyextremist ideologies and direct vulnerable youthsdown a path toward acts o terrorism and political violence. Te internet has accelerated the potential orthis ideology to reach beyond speciic communitiesand enables the perception o a virtual community o like-minded radicals.

Since 9/11, U.S. eorts to counter extremist ideol-ogy have spanned a spectrum that has included a mixo engagement, counterradicalization, and tacticalcounterterrorism eorts. oday, signicant programsand initiatives have been expanded at one end o thespectrum to advance global engagement and strategiccommunication objectives abroad and communityengagement and town hall meetings with immigrantcommunities at home. At the other end o the spec-trum, counterterrorism oicials have concentratedtheir attention not only on preventing the plots being

hatched today, but also on developing and deepening ssures within and among al-aeda, its aliated ter-rorist groups, and their supporters.

Tese eorts have borne ruit and are to be praised.But on their own, they all short. Engagement andcounterterrorism are key elements o this comprehen-sive strategy, but the wide space between them must



ighting the ideological battle

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networks is increasingly bringing the ront line o thestruggle against terrorism to our shores. Ideology, inother words, is the common strand that binds these plots and individuals and is a driver or this global

movement. o be at war with the network, thereore,requires both tactical eorts to thwart attacks andstrategic eorts to counter the extremist radicalizationthat uels its hatred and violence and undergirds itsstrategy and global appeal.

Whether in Baghdad or Berlin, Lahore or Lausanne,Minneapolis or Marrakesh, an ideological competi-tion within Islam is deepening around the world that

undermines U.S. national security. he competitionis between a modern, predominantly pluralistic viewo the world and an exclusionary, harsh, and equallymodern ideology that appeals to a glorious past, placesaspects o religious identity above all others, and relieson a distorted interpretation o Islam. Ironically, theideology, as articulated by either Sunni or Shiite radi-

cals, has little to do with traditional piety and is per-ceived as religiously unsound by the majority o Mus-lims, who have been its primary victims.

Te conict between these two visions constitutesa struggle or the hearts and minds o the majority o Muslims, who abhor violence, but who—out o sym- pathy, apathy, or ear—will not or cannot conront theextremists in their communities. Any strategy, there-ore, that does not skillully contest the claims andactions o radical extremism cannot succeed. Tis is notto suggest ideology is the sole or even the main driver

o violent Islamic extremism. Research shows that therationales individuals give or participating in violentacts are as diverse as the individuals themselves. Yetradical Islamist ideology provides a powerul justica-tion or political violence. By raming local grievancesin an extremist global narrative, it predisposes at-risk young people to radicalization. It cannot be ignored.

were inuenced by the teachings o Anwar al-Awlaki,a ugitive al-aeda cleric and U.S. citizen now living in Yemen. According to ocials, al-Awlaki has “movedup the terrorist supply chain” by virtue o his success as

a talent scout and radical ideologue.5

Although the United States has not encounteredEuropean levels o domestic radicalization, home-grown Islamic radicalism has accelerated recently. Insome cases, extremists have recruited and radicalized young Muslim Americans on the streets o major U.S.cities. A number o people have been indicted or radi-calizing Somali American youths in the Minneapolis

area and dispatching them to ght with the al-aeda-aliated al-Shabab in Somalia. Tese recruiters pro-duced the rst American suicide bombers: two SomaliAmericans, including Shirwa Ahmed, radicalized andrecruited in the United States, blew themselves up inan al-Shabab-related suicide attack in Somalia in Octo-ber 2008. In other cases, extremists like al-Awlaki have

radicalized and inspired new recruits through websitesand chat rooms. As one analyst concluded, “Tese casestell us that radicalization and recruitment to jihadistterrorism do happen here. Tey are clear indications o the terrorist intent. Te threat is real.”6

he threat to homeland security and spike inhomegrown radicalization are coupled with an evolv-ing threat abroad, where the United States acesmyriad, complex security challenges inspired by vari-ous strands o Islamist extremist ideology. he lat-est National Security Strategy accurately described

Aghanistan and Pakistan as “the rontline” o “a waragainst a ar-reaching network o hatred and vio-lence.”7 But the Detroit Christmas 2009 plotter UmarFarouq Abdulmutallab, New York subway plotterNajibullah Zazi, and Chicago-based Lashkar-e-aibaoperative David Headley provide recent examples o how the transnational threat posed by global terrorist

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Tr adiTionally, The uniTed sTaTes has placed violent extremism at home or overseas primar-ily within law enorcement and diplomatic paradigms,ignoring ideology altogether. Te logic o this approachhas been straightorward: since what people think andsay is not a crime, the state can only act i and when a violent act occurs.

Overseas, the principal approaches that havedominated the eort to conront violent extremisminclude public diplomacy, military counterinsurgencyoperations, and intelligence-driven counterterrorism

eorts. Domestically, “engagement” with the Muslimcommunity has been the key strategy, though it hasbeen poorly dened and driven not by a mutual inter-est to conront extremist ideology, but by a desire toredress specic group or community grievances, bothreal and perceived.

Te rst and most prominent has been the publicdiplomacy approach, whose primary bureaucratic homeis the State Department. Tis approach suggests that i the United States can improve its image overseas, theresultant goodwill can serve as a bulwark against anti-American claims and create space or explicit alliancesbetween the United States and other governments.he goodwill generated through the public diplo-macy approach can also be used to urge acceptance o

American-generated policy prescriptions and ideals.Tis approach accentuates universal or shared values

and seeks to explain American values in that context.It has also ocused on promoting alternative, positive visions o political and social organization as a coun-ter to violent extremist ideology. Programmatically, theapproach tries to bring America to as many people as

possible, either through an array o exchange programsor through international broadcasting assets and newmedia tools. ogether, these methods seek to exposeoreigners to the United States in ways that oster amore positive image o America.

he Deense Department, meanwhile, continuesto ollow a second approach best summarized as theglobal counterinsurgency approach. Shaped largely bythe U.S. military’s experience in Iraq and Aghanistan,this approach inds nation-states worldwide under varying degrees o threat by militant extremists who

seek to undermine them. It relies heavily on the alliedhost nation, particularly on its military, and tends toconcentrate on increasing the eiciency, rather thanthe legitimacy, o existing government institutions within the host nation. Te global counterinsurgencyapproach covers a range o activities. In Aghanistan,

or example, the U.S. military is active in all aspectso implementation. Yet in the rans-Sahara region o North Arica, the primary goal is to “shape” the envi-ronment so that “ungoverned spaces” shrink ratherthan expand.

Due to its association with America’s armed orces,this approach unintentionally casts a military auraaround U.S. interactions with oreign publics and can,at times, undercut the State Department’s public diplo-

macy approach. At the same time, the act that it is aDeense Department approach ensures that it is wellunded within the Combatant Commands. Its pro-grams, however, have been relatively opaque.

he third approach has been the counterterror-ism approach, which seeks to leverage all elements o national power to counter the threat o global terror-

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interests and mutual respect” with the peoples o the“Muslim world” and “an extended hand” to govern-ments with which the United States has had limitedor no diplomatic relations, particularly Syria and Iran.11

Both his June 2009 Cairo speech and the recentlyreleased National Security Strategy have accentuatedand extended these themes.

A year and a hal into the administration, the pub-lic diplomacy approach has made signicant headwayregarding one core objective: in many parts o the world, anti-Americanism is down to pre-2003 levels.President Obama’s personal story clearly captured theimaginations o millions worldwide, and his election isa testament to the resilience, dynamism, and reality o the American experiment. Te Cairo speech, delivered

on June 4, 2009, in the “heart o the Muslim world,”clearly had deep resonance with many Middle Eastern-ers as well as or Muslims in other parts o the world.According to the latest BBC World Survey Poll, viewso U.S. inuence in the world are positive or the rsttime since 2005, and negative responses in twenty o the twenty-eight countries polled dropped nine per-centage points.12 Furthermore, the June 17, 2010, PewGlobal Attitudes Survey reported a 20 percent increasein avorable views o the United States rom 2007 to2010.13 As the research director or the BBC poll com-

mented, “Afer a year, it appears the ‘Obama eect’ isreal. Its inuence on people’s views worldwide, though,is to sofen the negative aspects o the United States’image, while positive aspects are not yet coming intostrong ocus.”14

In March 2010, Undersecretary o State or Pub-lic Diplomacy and Public Aairs Judith McHaleintroduced a “new global strategic ramework or public diplomacy” in an eort “to more closely align[America’s public diplomacy] activities with thenation’s oreign policy objectives.”15 Te ramework

as outlined included “combating violent extremism”as one o its ive strategic objectives and created adeputy assistant secretary o state or public diplo-macy in each o the regional bureaus. Despite suchlaudable eorts, however, the exact methods or inte-grating public diplomacy priorities at the regionallevel remain unclear.

ism. As a result, it seeks coordinated action to targetroot causes o violent extremism, strengthen states,undermine the terrorist narrative, and contest theunderlying ideolog y. Te counterterrorism approach

emerged rom the 9-11 Commission ndings and led,among other things, to the creation o the NationalCounterterrorism Center. In the wake o the 9/11attacks, and apart rom the invasions o Aghanistanand Iraq, this approach largely dened national secu-rity priorities in the rst hal o the Bush administra-tion, though as various national security documentsmake clear, the administration held an expansive viewo what counterterrorism eorts comprised.9

Tese approaches have operated in tandem with oneanother or a decade, ofen complementing but some-

times conicting with one another.

om amsr apprSince President Obama took oce, the administrationhas broadly maintained a mix o the three approaches,marking a telling continuation o a core Bush admin-istration policy. Te major policy change has been torhetorically narrow the denition o counterterrorism while pursuing an expansive public diplomacy eort to“restore America’s image” in the world, primarily theso-called Muslim world.

he latest National Security Strategy reiterated anumber o times in dierent contexts that the best way or the United States “to promote our values is tolive them.”10 Aspects o this approach have includedannouncing the imminent closure o the prison acilityat Guantanamo Bay, investing heavily in resolving globalgrievances such as the Palestinian and broader Arab-Israeli conict, and banning rom the government’s lexi-con language construed to be divisive, such as “jihadist,”“Islamist,” “Islamist extremism,” or even, or a period, the word “terrorism.” In addition, the administration has

struggled to nd a way to describe its commitment todemocracy promotion as a goal o U.S. policy, excluding it rom the “three Ds” o its national security objectives:diplomacy, development, and deense.

Te overall theme o the administration’s approachto countering extremism emanates rom the president’sinaugural address, in which he emphasized “mutual



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egy to identiy, isolate, and address pockets o violentextremism around the world. Emphasis across the gov-ernment, thereore, has been placed on collecting dataon violent extremist activities, both domestically and

abroad, so that hotspots o violence can be mappedglobally. In theory, once hotspots are identied, urtherresearch can determine the specic actors that prompt violence, and resources can be directed to addressthose causes in an eort to mitigate the violence.Te National Counterterrorism Center, or example,

includes a “global engagement group” that is respon-sible or inorming, enabling, and supporting govern-ment eorts to counter radicalization. his oice is planning a pilot program over the next year in a num-ber o Muslim-majority countries where hotspots havebeen identied to conrm that the strategy will work.

Partly as a result o insucient bureaucratic over-lap, and partly as a result o not having a single pointo coordination at the White House, eorts at coun-

tering violent extremism abroad are slipping betweenthe cracks. It remains unclear which agency or depart-ment has overall responsibility or combating violentextremism. As one analyst recently put it, “Who inact is responsible in the U.S. government to identiyradicalization when it is occurring and then interdictattempts at recruitment?”17 Within the State Depart-ment alone, these eorts are loosely shared by theambassador-at-large or counterterrorism, the Oceo the Special Representative to Muslim Communities,and, to a more limited extent, individuals within the

secretary o state’s Policy Planning Sta, which is nottypically an operational oice. Yet despite relativelysuccessul eorts on the new media ront,18 eorts tocounter violent extremism remain ad hoc and ocused primarily on countering specic violent extremists asopposed to the underlying ideology that nurtures andsupports violence.

Complementing the administration’s public diplo-macy approach has been a rhetorical narrowing o counterterrorism objectives. he administration hassought to make clear that our principal enemy is al-

aeda and its ailiates. Counterterrorism eorts,thereore, have ocused on capturing and killing itsleadership, principally in the Federally Administeredribal Areas (FAA) o Pakistan. Tere, the presidenthas ordered an unprecedented number o drone strikesagainst senior leaders o the Aghani and Pakistani

aliban as well as al-aeda. Te strikes have resultedin conrmed killings o dozens o lower-ranking mili-tants and at least ten mid- and upper-level leaders within al-aeda or the aliban, including longstand-ing al-aeda leader, nancier, and Usama bin Ladencondant Mustaa Abu Yazid (a.k.a. Said al-Masri or just “Sheikh Said”).

According to intelligence ocials, improved oen-sive counterterrorism eorts have taken the ight to

al-aeda along the Aghan-Pakistani border andreduced its capabilities and those o its ailiates tocarry out spectacular attacks in the West. At the sametime, counterterrorism eorts to undermine extremistideology have been limited to undermining al-aeda’smessage, leaving the challenge o countering broaderextremist ideology largely unaddressed. A member o the Pakistani parliament recently captured the heart o the problem by pointing out that there are more than2 million unemployed men between ages twenty andorty in the FAA: “I only 2 percent o that 2 million

are coerced into militancy, this would mean 40,000new militants” with “disastrous eects.”16

Although the Obama administration continuesmany o the practices o the previous administration,including indenite detentions and deensive screen-ing measures, it has rejected the Bush administration’s“global war on terror.” Instead, it has conceived a strat-

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a l T h o u G h T h e o b a m a administration’sNational Security Strategy recognizes the threat o homegrown extremism, it remains ocused on “eortsto prevent and deter attacks [at home] by identiying and interdicting threats, denying hostile actors theability to operate within our borders, protecting thenation’s critical inrastructure and key resources, andsecuring cyberspace.”19 Lacking is a ull-throated rec-ognition o the degree to which ideology uels violentextremism, especially as international borders becomeless relevant due to the internet and other technologies.

Eradicating specic outbreaks o violent extremism willnot prevent its virulent spread unless the underlying challenge o extremist ideology is addressed. Te real-ity is that although al-aeda’s leadership is increasinglydegraded and its global reach attenuated, the ideol-ogy that uels it continues to spread and gain tractionamong vulnerable populations. Some argue rather convincingly that al-aeda has done more to harm itsel than any Western action, by killing more Muslims thannon-Muslims, targeting mosques, and oering no real-istic alternative to the Western models o governance it

rejects. Regardless, the ideological tenets o al-aedathrive, and other, arguably smarter, adversaries con-tinue to exploit its “ideological package,” a phenom-enon amplied by a ballooning youth bulge in Muslim-majority countries. In Pakistan, or example, 44 percento the population in 2008 was under eighteen years o age, creating a large reservoir o potential jihadists.20

Radicalization through the internet is becoming an increasingly prevalent phenomenon, as seen in thedomestic plots mentioned in the irst chapter. heinternet provides a channel or clerics such as Amer-

ican-born Anwar al-Awlaki to traverse borders withradical rhetoric and reach well-educated demograph-ics.21 Deputy Assistant Secretary o Deense GarryReid, in a March 2010 hearing, asserted that “extrem-ists have optimized the use o Internet chat rooms, Websites, and email chains to spread their virulent messagesand reach a global audience o potential recruits.”22

Umar Farouq Abdulmutallab, the attempted Christ-mas 2009 airline bomber, was allegedly “identiied,contacted, recruited, and trained all within six weeks” via the internet.23 Radicalization over the internet alsomakes it acutely more diicult to track who is being radicalized, and over what distances.24 Te potential o internet radicalization is chilling; indeed, a May 2010Department o Homeland Security memo warned thatal-Awlaki’s support or violence against U.S. targetsmay “inspire terrorist groups or individuals to conductattacks in the United States.”25

oday’s global engagement and public diplomacyapproach may be eective in signiicant ways, but ithas done demonstrably little to impact the spread andappeal o radical Islamist extremism. Recent Wash-ington Institute research exploring Arab behavior atgovernment and public levels generally corroboratesthe 2010 BBC World Survey Poll and Pew Global Atti-tudes Survey mentioned in the second chapter, whosendings pointed to improvements in regional views o the United States. Yet the data also makes clear thatArab attitudes have never prooundly constrained

Washington’s ability to act in the region.26 Moreover,the more sanguine eelings toward the United Stateshave not translated in any real way into empowering mainstream voices at the oreront o the struggle withradical extremism. he decision to prioritize globalgrievances such as the Israeli-Palestinian conlict,rather than working with Arab governments on accel-erating political and economic reorm that contributesto local grievance resolution, has helped to erode thecondence o potential U.S. partners in the region. Tede-emphasis on reorm has convinced democracy activ-

ists in the region that the Obama administration is notserious about advancing human rights and democracyin their countries.

In sum, a narrowly deined, i aggressively imple-mented, counterterrorism approach, when coupled with a broad “engagement” policy, can only achieveso much. Tis approach inevitably creates gaps in U.S.





eorts to intervene early enough in the radicaliza-tion process, either domestically or abroad, to preventindividuals or subcommunities rom becoming vio-lent. Afer a person crosses the line into violence, law

enorcement intervention or military action becomesthe only alternative. Tis policy combination, more-over, does little to empower those in the trenches seek-ing to deend their communities rom extremist subversion by making them more resilient.

Going orward, the primary challenge or theadministration is complementing the latest NationalSecurity Strategy with an approach that ocuses onthe threat posed by the ideology o radical extrem-ism and articulates a systemic, whole-o-governmentapproach to dealing with it. Government agencies cur-

rently involved in various aspects o the countering vio-

lent extremism mission do not complain o a systemicailure, but rather the lack o a system. Absent cleardirectives instructing them how to distribute and coor-

dinate aspects o the mission, individual ocials andtheir oices simply improvise programs and actions.In doing so, they practically guarantee an episodic andhaphazard approach to dealing with the underlying orce driving today’s terrorist threat.

o give but one example, the National SecurityStrategy appropriately highlights the need to empowercommunities to counter radicalization, stating, “Ourbest deenses against this threat are well inormedand equipped amilies, local communities, and insti-tutions.” It commits intelligence resources to better

understand this threat and promises to “expand com-munity engagement and development programs toempower local communities.” But as a broad policydocument, it does not dene in detail these actions orindicate who precisely is to carry them out, and how,and with whom.

As mentioned previously, there are many paths to

radicalization, and there are no cookie-cutter explana-tions or shared underlying conditions that explain allcases o radicalization. But it is clear that better inte-gration o immigrant communities and a greater sense

o social cohesion are certainly essential to redress localgrievances and can lower the susceptibility o thesecommunities to radicalization. At the same time, chal-lenging and deeating the extremist ideology being peddled by the radicalizers is necessary as well.

Fallout rom the nearly successul Christmas 2009bombing attempt o Delta Flight 253 has ocusedalmost exclusively on the wrong questions. o positionourselves so that we can be more condent o prevent-ing uture attacks, we need to ask not only how thebomb got on the plane and how government agen-

cies ailed to watch-list the bomber, but why a young,

wealthy, Western-educated Nigerian was radicalizedand made the decision to become a terrorist. Te sono a prominent banker, Abdulmutallab lived in a posh

London neighborhood while studying mechanicalengineering at the prestigious University College Lon-don. But instead o pursuing a career afer graduation,he moved to Egypt, and then to Dubai, dropped outo an MBA program there, and lef to pursue Arabic-language and Islamic studies in Yemen.

Fortiying our deenses at home and pursuing ouradversaries abroad is simply not enough. Our ultimateadversary is not the individual bomber, but the radicalideology that propels him to carry out an act o terror-ism. Why did Abdulmutallab abandon wealth, educa-

tion, and opportunity or violent global jihad? What prompted Maj. Nidal Malik Hasan, an Army doctor,to reach out to known extremists and ultimately shoothis ellow soldiers at Fort Hood?

Te reasons the extremist narrative nds ertile soilin diverse Muslim communities across the globe are as varied as the societies themselves. Some young Mus-

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v s wys, u s msry

mp spr pp r isms xrmsm.





lims respond to a radicalizer’s message because theyeel excluded rom their societies, trapped in poverty orhopelessness by authoritarian regimes. Others, well-o and well-educated, live in Western democratic nations

but struggle with issues o belonging and identity andnd the message that resonates with their experienceand circumstances. Radicalizers enjoy great success byconnecting a recruit’s local grievance to a radical globalnarrative that combines Islamist extremism with “clasho civilizations” rhetoric, pitting the West against theMuslim world. In nearly all cases, radicalizers suggestthat many aspects o a person’s identity can be—indeedmust be—reduced to being “Muslim,” to the exclusiono other identities. And what it means to be Muslimis dened, o course, by the radicalizer. Tis has pro-

ound policy and programmatic implications, giventhat emphasizing other aspects o identity and con-

structing alternative narratives are key elements in an

eort to short-circuit the radicalization process.Unortunately, despite the sharp rise in terrorist

plots and cases o homegrown radicalization, specic policies and programs aimed squarely at counter-ing the radical narrative remain ew and ar between.he Obama administration’s eorts to close theGuantanamo Bay prison, eliminate certain interroga-tion techniques, and change the tone o U.S. engage-ment with Muslim communities worldwide have met with a generally positive response abroad. According to the June 2010 Pew survey, conidence in the U.S.

president increased 43 percent rom 2007 to 2010. 27 Yet such eorts do little to address the immediacy o violent extremism. Even the targeted killings o al-aeda leaders plotting attacks today may in the long run create new recruits hungry or revenge. It is axiom-atic that the United States cannot simply kill its wayout o the problem; it must ind ways to take on the

extremist ideology directly. o date, however, ocial policy as articulated in the National Security Strategylimits U.S. eorts to “combating violent extremism”— which, although necessary, is not sucient or creating

an acceptable end-state in which both the violence andthe ideology that uels it are taboo within Muslim-majority nations around the world, and are no longeranimating the global terrorist threat o most concernto the United States. Once individuals cross over into violence their radicalization is complete; the last stepin a process has been reached. Even as law enorce-ment, military, and intelligence successes against al-aeda grow, the ideological challenge, unless activelyconronted, will continue to metastasize.

Te National Security Strategy states that America

is “ighting a war against a ar-reaching network o hatred and violence,” going on to reer exclusively to

al-aeda and its aliates. Recognizing that the more

“kinetic” side o counterterrorism gets the lion’s shareo the administration’s attention—especially with U.S.troops still deployed in Iraq and Aghanistan and ter-rorists trying to attack us at home—the White Houseneeds to direct more attention to combating the ideol-ogy that animates the violent groups. Te governmentshould assign bureaucratic priority to this endeavorand raise public consciousness o the need to stemthe spread o radical extremist ideology. o be sure,ocials need to make very clear that they do not con-sider Islam itsel a danger, only the distorted version

o Islam perpetrated by radical extremists. But they—and, in particular, the president—must also come toterms with the act that individuals implicated in eacho the recently exposed plots in the United States wereimbued with a common radical ethos.

Counterradicalization in all its orms is an essentialcomplement to counterterrorism. Te latter we do rela-

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tively well, the ailure to connect the dots prior to theattempted bombing o Flight 253 notwithstanding; theormer we barely do at all. Te result: a group o middleclass Muslim Americans rom northern Virginia vid-

eotape a militant message, leaves or jihad at the adviceo a aliban recruiter, and is arrested in the home o aknown militant in Pakistan. “We are not terrorists,” oneo them said as he entered a Pakistani courtroom, “Weare jihadists, and jihad is not terrorism.”28 All elements o

national power should be used to counter this proposi-tion and its myriad implications, so that the very notionthat Muslims have a religious duty to commit acts o terror is challenged and debunked.29 Tere are no guar-

antees that i the United States had been ully engagedin this eort or the past ten years, the young Virginiamen would not have boarded that ight to Pakistan. Butunless we accelerate and expand our eorts now, we canbe assured that others will ollow in their ootsteps.




rct

cr Rmms

1.1 expy rz mp y s

ky rvr rm, mv, jusy v

xrmsm.

1.2 esur ismsm— r p -

y spr rm ism s r—s rz

ry w U.S. vrm s ky -

rvr v xrms r ps

y -Q r r isms rups. Mean-

while, U.S. public diplomacy eorts should sharpenthe distinction between the Muslim aith and the vio-lent political ideology o Islamism.

1.3 Mz vrm ur mp

y mvs juss r isms

xrmsm v. his will require a moreexplicit expression o the ideological challenge thatindividual agencies and oces are trying to tackle. Oth-erwise, the unity o purpose and whole-o-governmentintegration essential to counter radicalization will

prove elusive.1.4 br xp U.S. vrm p-

r w r vrms, vrm

rzs, vss, pps ru wr

mpwr r Musm vs to marginalizethe purveyors o radical Islamist ideology and win thecontest or control o public space, public institutions,and public debate in Muslim communities.

Sr Rmms

2.1 iy rzrs w mmus mpwr rv fus mp w

m. Both at home and abroad, the United States mustmore eectively identiy and support Muslim activists,entrepreneurs, writers, businesspeople, media personali-ties, students, and others who lead opinion within theircommunities, particularly at the local level.

2.2 h vrs vs, rm sur r-

us. Religious piety is not synonymous with radi-calization. U.S. policy should be to recognize that reli-gious diversity and education can be a bulwark againstextremism. In its engagement with Muslims, at homeand abroad, the administration should reach out to abroad spectrum o groups and individuals, rom the pious to the secular.

2.3 cs r rrv. When extremistspeech articulates a threat o imminent violence, whichcould qualiy as criminal hate speech, law enorcementauthorities should take appropriate action. Short o such an imminent threat, however, extremist speechshould not be banned but contested. Given FirstAmendment and Establishment Clause considerations,silencing objectionable views or arresting their proponents is anathema to American democracy. In con-trast, debate is a cornerstone o the American project. Without banning violent extremist views, responsibleleadership demands debating them. Short o arresting their proponents, authorities must be aware o who theradicalizers are and oster alternative inuences pro-moting moderate ideas more in line with traditionalAmerican tolerance.

2.4 M sr ss v

mpr um rs mr vr-

wrw, spy ar M-

es. he National Security Strategy articulates aclear rationale or why the United States should supportdemocracy and human rights around the world. headministration, however, has so ar not demonstrated

convincingly to the governments or the peoples o theregion that these issues are real priorities. Te upcom-ing political transition in Egypt will be a key test or theadministration’s approach. In this regard, the UnitedStates should be clear that progress toward economic prosperity and political liberalization should go hand inhand and not be pursued in sequence.





2.9 bu up s susm

m rks r xrmss, including or-mer al-aeda members and other ex-jihadists suchas “Dr. Fadl,” an Eg yptian ideologue who broke with

al-aeda afer years o justiying the group’s radicalideology and tactics.

2.10 dmsy, y, , mpwr

Musm p rs mp w

mss r xrmss w U

Ss. Tese are the voices al-aeda leaders ear most. We should reach out to a broad spectrum o Muslimgroups and individuals, pious and secular, ollowing the successul examples o groups such as LibForAll, anIndonesia-based nongovernmental organization that

partnered with a local rock star to produce a bestsell-ing album, Laskar Cinta (Warriors o love), condemn-ing radical Islamist extremism. he United States isengaged in such eorts abroad, but not domestically.

2.11 tr Musm amrs s u-f prrs

ppy ssus, r ms, w

w w amr sy s r,

sy s r cVe. U.S. governmen-tal interaction with the Muslim American communityshould be broad-based and reect the diversity o thecommunity.

2.12 e y w ms v rups,

u s w ms rprsv. Ensuring maximum diversity in U.S. government outreach—especially at home but abroad as well—is critical.Domestically, this applies not only to determining which groups are invited to attend government unc-tions and host major addresses by senior ocials, butalso to the organizations that train and certiy chap-lains in U.S. prisons and in the armed orces. Some prominent Muslim American groups have question-

able links to banned groups that should disqualiythem as trusted government partners in the eort tocombat extremism. Others, perhaps less vocal andofen active at a more local level, warrant greater insti-tutional recognition and support.

2.5 esur urrrrsm urr-

z py s r u m rs

rm w wr U.S. r vp-

m s surs. Te National Security Strategy

currently states that the administration is “ensuring that our policy instruments are aligned in support o development objectives.” Tis should be claried in theorthcoming Quadrennial Diplomacy and Developmentreport, and the relationship o policy instruments todevelopment objectives should be inverted.

2.6 eur S dprm us s -

v pwr prm rr vvm U.S.

prv vrm srs ur

v xrmsm (cVe). Te absence o various institu-

tional actors is part o the reason why the military domi-nates eorts to combat violent extremism.

2.7 bu xp w m rs, mpw-

r msrm Musms s ismss (

urrs) yrsp. Te administration hasmade signicant strides in encouraging the use o newmedia tools to connect people with ideas, with other people, and, increasingly, with resources to providemyriad alternatives to extremist narratives. oo ofen,however, these eorts have been tied directly to U.S. public diplomacy goals and not to contesting Islamist

ideology per se.

2.8 d r, u sr rm-

wrk r mry r rs. Teadministration has so ar completely ignored this ele-ment o national power that has an annual budget o $700 million. Undersecretary o State Judith McHale’sMarch 2010 “Strategic Framework” discussed in somedetail eorts to work through traditional oreignmedia and new media but ailed to mention how theadministration sees international broadcasting it-

ting into its CVE eorts. Te Broadcasting Board o Governors encompasses all U.S. civilian internationalbroadcasting, and its programming inuences viewers via television, the internet, and new media tools. Tus,the administration should work urgently with Con-gress to speciy CVE as a critical mission objective.





community development programs aimed at protect-ing vulnerable youths rom recruitment into violentgangs. Such programs—which provide ederal grantsthat are executed at the local, grassroots level based on

knowledge o the local community—should be dis-bursed locally in coordination with the Department o Homeland Security.

3.5 dvp ury- r v y-sp srs

sr msrm vs r srus

w urrsm xrms y.

Increased unding or the Middle East Partnership Ini-tiative (MEPI) and innovative eorts such as the Presi-dential Summit on Entrepreneurship are commend-able. However, the administration must also developdiplomatic strategies to encourage allied authoritarian

governments, primarily Eg ypt and Saudi Arabia, toimplement policies and adopt legal rameworks that would encourage pluralism or, in the case o entrepre-neurs, allow them to thrive. o achieve this goal, thesecretary o state should require embassies to dratcountry-specic counterradicalization plans with mea-surable targets and goals.

3.6 “cvz” cVe vs msy

vrss. Domestically, law enorcement agencies in particular remain the primary interlocutors with the

Muslim American community. own hall meetings andother orms o local engagement should be expandedto include representatives rom service agencies as well,such as Housing and Urban Development, the Depart-ment o Education, and others. Integration programsshould include reasury Department nancial literacycourses and other means o acilitating smooth integra-tion into American society.

3.7 t srry s su rm vsry

r us w U.S. vrm p

vp, sus, suppr urmv-

m y v xrmsm. Such anadvisory board should be composed o experts roma variety o ields—rom technology and media toIslamic scholarship, anthropology, and national secu-rity experts—to provide the secretary with a broadrange o expertise in support o U.S. government eorts

Sruur Rmms

3.1 ds s rss r r

U.S. pu pmy, sr mmu,

urrz sry w W

hus. Empowering someone close to the president toorchestrate the overall eort to combat radicalizationboth at home and abroad is critical to maintaining stra-tegic ocus over the longer term. Te deputy nationalsecurity advisor or combating terrorism (DNSA)should remain ocused on the president’s stated goalto “disrupt, dismantle, and deeat” al-aeda and otherterrorist groups. Meanwhile, a new senior director postshould be created, with the appointee reporting to theDNSA and devoting his or her ull time and attention

to the ideological components o this struggle.3.2 empwr o Sp Rprs-

v Musm cmmus ry s m.

Although this oice has been a tremendous innova-tion o the Obama administration, the lack o inter-agency acceptance o the concept reduces its eective-ness. ogether with the Oce o the Coordinator orCounterterrorism, this oice should be recast along more ambitious lines because it is the only one in theU.S. government whose mandate calls or strengthen-ing mainstream voices that oppose extremists. It shouldalso be consulted, in coordination with the Depart-ment o Homeland Security, on domestic outreach toMuslim American communities at home.

3.3 b v mry rsurs. Te militarycontinues to engage in public diplomacy and counter-radicalization eorts both in combat areas and non-combat zones. Although some progress has been made,addressing the imbalanced allocation o resourcesbetween military and civilian agencies—particularlythe State Department—needs to be a top priority

reected in uture administration budgets.

3.4 ex rs s r rrv

w s vs, wr s

kw r mmus s. Federal aid will be criti-cal to support such eorts and could be modeled on thelongstanding and highly successul Justice Department





to make Muslim-majority communities around the world more resilient to attempted Islamist subversion.

4.3 Mk us v sr msrm

vs sk rs fu mmus

wrw r ry mp w xrmss

r s fu. Funding should surpass programssuch as MEPI that can have ancillary counterterror-ism benets but are designed primarily or alternative purposes.

4.4 Rz p r rvrs

U.S. vrm rz ppus

m r r s m r, u pr-

vy prpr pu pmy ps m

pss u. Predator missile attacks in the Feder-ally Administered ribal Areas o Pakistan, or example, have become increasingly precise in their targeting and eective in disrupting al-aeda activities even asthey have raised concerns about creating more terror-ists than they have killed. Te anticipated outcry over aSeptember 2009 U.S. Special Operations strike againstan al-aeda operative in Somalia did not materialize,though it was a consideration in the interagency debatethat preceded the operation. Proactively developing public diplomacy campaigns to mitigate potential all-out rom the kind o “hard counterterrorism” actionsthat are sometimes necessary is critical.

to counter the ideology o violent extremism.

3.8 t xuv r su wrk w c-

rss ss wm, similar to theNational Endowment or Democracy, that would provide a exible pool o unds to seed or support cred-ible groups and individuals who are countering violentextremist ideology. Te objective would be to stimulatethe growth o networks o credible voices to counterextremist ideology in a variety o elds and contexts.

u Rmms

4.1 t n currrrsm cr su

mpm sps v

vy, m r, w pr rs

rk rz sps wr y us v s p vur yus. Analysis that identies critical tipping points, geolo-cates clusters o radicalization incidents, and spots at-risk communities is critical. Such analysis should enlistsocial scientists, anthropologists, and eld researchersto understand particular nodes and conduits leading toradicalization. Tat said, timely analysis should inormnear-term programming instead o leading to “analysis paralysis.”

4.2 r “rsy” vpm s

U.S. ay r ir dvpm’s

o cf Mm M in orderto make clear that policies and programs are developed




nt

U.S. National Security Strategy, May , http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/deault/les/rss_viewer/national_secu-.

rity_strategy.pd.

Ibid..

Brian Michael Jenkins,. Would-Be Warriors: Incidents of Jihadist Terrorist Radicalization in the United States since Septem-

ber 11, 2001 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, ).

Philip Mudd, testimony beore the House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Inorma-.

tion Sharing, and errorism Risk Assessment, May , .

“Ocials: ‘Credible Intelligence’ on error Attack Planning against U.S.,” FoxNews.com, January , , http://www..

oxnews.com/politics////ocials-credible-intelligence-collected-terror-attack-planning.

Brian Michael Jenkins, testimony beore the House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Intelligence,.

Inormation Sharing, and errorism Risk Assessment, May , .U.S. National Security Strategy, May , http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/deault/les/rss_viewer/national_secu-.

rity_strategy.pd.

Lt. Col. Mary Jo Choate, U.S. Marine Corps, “rans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative: Balance o Power?” U.S. Army.

War College, March , , http://pd.usaid.gov/pd_docs/PCAAB.pd.

National Security Strategy, March , available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss//;.

National Strategy or Combating errorism, September , available at http://www.cbsnews.com/htdocs/pd/

NSC.pd; National Implementation Plan or the War on error, September .


rity_strategy.pd.

Full text o the January , , inaugural address available on the White House website, http://www.whitehouse.gov/.

blog/inaugural-address.“World Warming to U.S. under Obama, BBC Poll Suggests,” BBC News, April , , http://news.bbc.co.uk//hi/.

in_depth/.stm.

“Muslim Disappointment: Obama More Popular Abroad Tan at Home, Global Image o U.S. Continues to Benet,”.

Pew Research Center, Global Attitudes Project, June , , p. , http://pewglobal.org/les/pd/Pew-Global-Atti-

tudes-Spring--Report.pd.

Steven Kull, director o the Program on International Policy Attitudes and the Center on Policy Attitudes, quoted in.

“World Warming to U.S.”

Judith A. McHale, “Future o U.S. Public Diplomacy,” remarks beore the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on.

International Operations and Organizations, Human Rights, Democracy, and Global Women’s Issues, March , ,

http://www.state.gov/r/remarks/.htm.

Hedieh Mirahmadi, Mehreen Farooq, and Waleed Ziad, “raditional Muslim Networks: Pakistan’s Untapped Resource.in the Fight against errorism,” WORDE Initiative Report, May .

Bruce Homan, testimony beore the House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Inor-.

mation Sharing, and errorism Risk Assessment, May , .

As presented in Secretary o State Hillary Clinton’s January internet speech, the U.S. Civil Society . Initiative.

implements new media tools to counter violent extremism at the grassroots level. Eorts include bringing mobile bank-

ing to Aghanistan and creating a social mobile networking group called “Our Voice” to connect individuals in Pakistan





who wish to counter violent extremism. See Secretary o State Hillary Clinton, “Remarks on Internet Freedom,” January

, , http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/ //.htm.


rity_strategy.pd.

UNICEF, “Pakistan: Statistics,” http://www.unice.org/inobycountry/pakistan_pakistan_statistics.html. Percentage. calculated by dividing “Population (thousands), , under ” (,) by “otal population (thousands), ”

(,).

Gordon Lubold, “Internet Aids errorist Recruiting, Radicalization, Pentagon Says,”. Christian Science Monitor , March

, , http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Military///Internet-aids-terrorist-recruiting-radicalization-

Pentagon-says.

Deputy Assistant Secretary o Deense Garry Reid, statement or the record, Senate Armed Ser vices Subcommittee on.

Emerging Treats and Capabilities, March , .

Lubold, “Internet Aids.”.

Reid, statement or the record..

“Anwar Aulaqi Justies Violence against U.S. Military and Civilian argets in Interview,” Oce o Intelligence and.

Analysis Note, Department o Homeland Security, May , , http://www.oxnews.com/projects/pd/_. pd.

David Pollock with Cole Bunzel and Curtis Cannon,. Actions, Not Just Attitudes: A New Paradigm for U.S.-Arab Rela-

tions, Policy Focus (Washington, DC: Washington Institute or Near East Policy, June ), http://www.washing-

toninstitute.org/templateC.php?CID=.

“Muslim Disappointment: Obama More Popular Abroad Tan at Home, Global Image o U.S. Continues to Benet,”.

Pew Research Center, Global Attitudes Project, June , , p. , http://pewglobal.org/les/pd/Pew-Global-Atti-

tudes-Spring--Report.pd.

Jerry Markon, Pamela Constable, and Shaiq Hussein, “VA Suspects in Pakistan Say Mission Was Jihad, Not error-.

ism,” Washington Post , January , , http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article////

AR.html.

Although Washington must adopt an activist stance, it must do so subtly, since overt government involvement could.taint the counterradicalization narrative. Indeed, this is a struggle that emerged rom within Muslim societies, with

al-aeda pulling America in rom the sidelines. Given these challenges, it is pivotal that Washington determine how

best to engage in this battle without eeding the enemy’s narrative (e.g., not providing opportunities to cast America as

anti-Islamic or imperialist).



T wgt ittt n et pc

Next Generation Leadership Council

Jill AbramsonAnthony Beyer, cochair

David Eigen Jonathan S. GilbertAdam Herz James KestonZachary Schreiber, cochair

Whitney Skibell Jonathan orop

br avsrs

Warren ChristopherLawrence S. EagleburgerMax M. KampelmanHenry A. KissingerSamuel W. LewisEdward LuttwakMichael Mandelbaum

Robert C. McFarlaneMartin PeretzRichard Perle James G. RocheGeorge P. ShultzR. James WoolseyMortimer Zuckerman

br drrs

President

Martin J. Gross

Chairman

Howard P. Berkowitz

Chairmen Emeriti

Fred S. LaerMichael Stein

Founding President and Chairman EmeritaBarbi Weinberg

Senior Vice Presidents

Bernard LeventhalPeter Lowy James Schreiber

Vice Presidents

Charles AdlerBenjamin Breslauer Walter P. Stern

SecretaryRichard S. Abramson

Treasurer

Dimitri Sogolo

Board Members

Anthony BeyerRichard BorowRobert FromerMichael GelmanRoger Hertog, emeritus

Shelly KassenMichael KestonDaniel MintzZachary SchreiberFred SchwartzMerryl ischGary Wexler





“Integral to a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy isa corresponding priority to counter the violent extremism

underlying the terrorist threat we face today.”

z

Documents

Strategic Report 04 Wash Institute