Stephen M. Sohinki

Director

Office of Price-Anderson Enforcement

ASQ 2005 NationalEnergy and Environmental

Conference

September 18-22, 2005

Price-Anderson History

Price-Anderson Act enacted in 1957 provided

prompt compensation for a nuclear incident

Provided broad financial coverage for damage, injury, and costs of evacuation (up to statutory limit

of $9.43 billion per incident)

Required DOE to indemnify contractors

1

Price-Anderson Amendment Act (1988) extended indemnification for 15 years and required DOE to establish and enforce nuclear safety rules

Nuclear safety rules for radiological protection, quality assurance, safety basis and contractor employee protection have been issued by DOE

Price-Anderson History (cont’d)

2

Price-Anderson Amendment Reauthorization

Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act extended current indemnification levels until December 31, 2004.

It also required DOE to promulgate final rules by December 2003 to enforce Occupational Safety and Health requirements.

Price-Anderson History (cont’d)

3

Ronald Reagan National Defense Authorization Act extended indemnification until December 2006 Proposal to repeal remission of Civil Penalties for not-for-profits deferred Proposal to increase coverage to $10 billion per incident deferred All enforcement requirements were unchanged

Price-Anderson History (cont’d)

4

Price-Anderson History (cont’d)

Energy Policy Act of 2005 Indemnifies DOE contractors until December 2025 Increases coverage to $10 billion per incident, subject to

adjustment for inflation. Repeals remission of civil penalties for nonprofits upon

signing of new contract. Civil penalties limited to total feespaid to contractor in year of violation.

No reimbursement for legal expenses in retaliation cases in which employee wins, unless required by contract signed prior

to statute’s effective date

5

Enforcement Philosophy

Relationship with contractors different from NRC’s arms-length relationship with regulated utilities

Use of program as a tool to promote proactive contractor behavior resulting in safety performance improvement

Emphasis on promoting contractor timely identification, reporting, and correction of noncompliances

Noncompliance Tracking System

Mitigation6

The Big Picture Problems

OE perception: Lack of progress being made in nuclear safety performance improvement

Complex still event-driven

Too many recurring violations

7

The Big Picture Problems (cont’d)

Failure to learn from operating experience – thismeans inadequate:

Corrective Actions Root Cause Extent of Condition Performance Assessment

Real senior management commitment lacking

It all comes down to culture

8

INPO Nuclear Safety Culture Definition

An organization’s values and behaviors – modeled by its leaders and internalized by its members – that serve to make nuclear safety the overriding priority (emphasis added)

9

INPO Principles

Everyone is personally responsible for nuclear safety

Leaders demonstrate commitment to safety

Trust permeates the organization

Decision-making reflects safety first

10

INPO Principles (cont’d)

Nuclear technology is recognized as special and unique

A questioning attitude is cultivated

Organizational learning is embraced

Nuclear safety undergoes constant examination

11

EFCOG Assessment Guide Highlights obstacles and approach to overcome

obstacles Available at the following address: http://www.efocg.org/workgroup/paaa

EFCOG PAAA Working Group developing extent of condition guidance

Improvement Initiatives

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OE will examine all options available to encourage senior management to address recurring violations: Use of full authority in 2004 Escalation for recurring violations expected to be a continuing trend Compliance audits?

Improvement Initiatives (cont’d)

13

Nuclear Safety Excellence Model

Strong Human Performance Effective

Operational Processes

Supporting Programs & Safety Features

SAFE OPERATIONS

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Nuclear Safety Excellence Model

Safe Operations

No serious or potentially serious nuclear safety events

Only rare occurrences of other important events with lesser nuclear safety consequences

Safe Operations

No serious or potentially serious nuclear safety events

Only rare occurrences of other important events with lesser nuclear safety consequences

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Safe Operations

Serious Events

Loss of all criticality contingencies

TSR safety limit violation

Fire in primary confinement/containment

Explosive safety (ORPS Category 1)

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Safe Operations

Serious Events (cont’d)

Radiation exposure (any ORPS reportable)

Radioactive area contamination (100 x 835 value)

Radioactive material loss (100 x 835 value)

Any unplanned offsite release of radioactive material

Personnel contamination requiring medical assistance

17

Safe Operations

Other Important Events

Loss of one or more criticality controls

TSR and DSA violations (non safety limit)

Actuation of an SSC

Fire (other ORPS reportable)

18

Other Important Events (cont’d)

Explosive safety (other ORPS reportable)

Radioactive area contamination (10-100 x 835 value)

Radioactive material loss (<100 x 835 value)

Personnel contamination (other ORPS reportable)

Safe Operations

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Nuclear Safety Excellence Model

Human Performance

Management demonstrates effective leadership and commitment to nuclear safety

Workers exhibit a sound nuclear safety culture

Contractor personnel are well qualified

Human Performance

Management demonstrates effective leadership and commitment to nuclear safety

Workers exhibit a sound nuclear safety culture

Contractor personnel are well qualified

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Nuclear Safety Excellence Model

Effective Operational Processes

Broad and effective efforts to identify safety and quality problems

Problems effectively resolved & corrected

Excellence in work management and conduct of operations

Effective Operational Processes

Broad and effective efforts to identify safety and quality problems

Problems effectively resolved & corrected

Excellence in work management and conduct of operations

21

Nuclear Safety Excellence Model

Strong Supporting Programs & Safety Features

Safety Basis & Criticality Safety Controls

Radiological Program Controls

Other Quality Assurance Programs

Facility & Safety Condition

Strong Supporting Programs & Safety Features

Safety Basis & Criticality Safety Controls

Radiological Program Controls

Other Quality Assurance Programs

Facility & Safety Condition

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0

5

10

15

20

25

30

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

Old ORPS New ORPS

Serious Nuclear Safety Events

Note: Dominated by Radiation Exposure Events23

050

100150200250300350400

Old ORPS New ORPS

Other Important Nuclear Safety Events

Note: Dominated by SB Noncompliance, Spread of Contamination, and Personnel Contamination Events

24

64%

60%63%

67% 68%

57%

69%

65% 64%

71%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

Identifying Problems (NTS W/ORPS)

25

Worker Safety and Health Rule10 CFR 851

Supplemental Proposal issued January 26, 2005

Comment period ended April 26, 2005

Comment resolution essentially complete

Final Rule package to Office of Management and Budget by September 30, 2005

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Enforcement philosophy same as nuclear

Enforcement process similar to nuclear

Contractors have 180 days from final publication to submit Safety and Health Program

DOE has 90 days to review and comment

Enforcement starts one year from final issuance

Worker Safety and Health Rule10 CFR 851

27

Civil Penalties $70,000 per day per violation potential maximum No exemption for not-for-profits Contract or Civil Penalty but not both

Noncompliances Severity Level I Serious Severity Level II Other than serious

NTS Reporting Thresholds to be established

Worker Safety and Health Rule10 CFR 851

28