Status Of Modern Aviation Security · 2019-11-12 · STATUS OF MODERN AVIATION SECURITY 10 INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION The Universal Security Audit Programme (USAP)

Status Of Modern Aviation Security

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE:

SECURITY AND FACILITATION

A specialized agency of the United Nations, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) was created

in 1944 to promote the safe and orderly development of international civil aviation throughout the world. It sets

standards and regulations necessary for aviation safety, security, efficiency and regularity, as well as for aviation

environmental protection.

The Organization serves as the forum for cooperation in all fields of civil aviation among its 191 Member States.

© 2016, International Civil Aviation Organization

Published in Montréal, Canada

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Disclaimer: This report makes use of information, including economic and air transport related statistics, which is furnished to the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) by third parties. All third party content was obtained from sources believed to be reliable and was accurately reproduced in the report at the time of printing. However, ICAO specifically does not make any warranties or representations as to the accuracy, completeness, or timeliness of such information and accepts no liability or responsibility arising from reliance upon or use of the same. The views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect individual or collective opinions or official positions of ICAO Member States.

3STATUS OF MODERN AVIATION SECURITY

INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION

List of Acronyms

ACI:

ASK:

AVSEC:

CAGR:

FAL:

FTK:

ICAO:

ITF:

LCC:

LF:

MDWG:

RPK:

UNWTO:

VFR:

YoY:

Airports Council International

Available Seat-Kilometres

Aviation Security

Compound Annual Growth Rate

Facilitation

Freight Tonnes-Kilometres

International Civil Aviation Organization

International Transport Forum, Organisation for

Economic Co-operation and Development

Low cost carrier

Load factor

Multi-disciplinary working group

Revenue Passenger-Kilometres

World Tourism Organization

Visiting friends and relatives

Year on Year



Table of Contents

Status of Modern Aviation Security

Security Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Universal Security Audit Programme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Securing the Air Cargo Supply Chain- ICAO Regulatory Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Cybersecurity/Cooperation with Other Organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Security Statistics



Security Statistics

In 2015, there were 14 acts of unlawful interference during

which 403 persons were killed and 6 were injured. This

compares with 21 acts of unlawful interference carried out

in 2014 during which 334 persons were killed and 44 injured.

Of the 14 acts of unlawful interference which took place in

2015, there were 3 each in Asia/Pacific, the Middle East and

North America, 2 each in Africa and South America and one

in Europe.

Chart 1 shows the number of actual and attempted acts of

unlawful interference carried out between 2006 and 2015.

These include seizures, facility and in-flight attacks, sabotage,

and other acts of unlawful interference.

Chart 1- Acts of unlawful interference

Chart 2 – Persons killed or injured

Universal Security Audit Programme

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The Universal Security Audit Programme (USAP)

In February 2002, a high-level Ministerial Conference on

Aviation Security convened by ICAO endorsed a global strategy

for strengthening aviation security worldwide with an ICAO

Aviation Security Plan of Action as its central element. The

Plan included regular, mandatory, systematic and harmonized

audits to enable the evaluation of aviation security in all

Member States. The Plan was adopted by the ICAO Council in

June 2002, with the first aviation security audit taking place

in November 2002.

The first cycle of USAP audits and follow-up visits

Between 2002 and 2007, 181 Member States and one Special

Administrative Region benefited from the ICAO security audits

under the first cycle of the USAP (nine Member States could

not be audited during the first cycle due to the United Nations

security phase in effect).

The objective of the Programme was to promote global aviation

security through the auditing of Member States, on a regular

basis, to determine the status of the implementation of ICAO

Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs). The USAP

first-cycle audits were designed to determine the degree of

compliance of a State in implementing Annex 17 Standards,

and to measure the extent to which a State’s implementation

of its aviation security system is sustainable through the

establishment of appropriate legislation, national policies

and an appropriate aviation security authority provided with

inspection and enforcement capabilities.

A programme of follow-up visits with respect to the first cycle

of audits was initiated in 2005 and completed in 2009. One

hundred and seventy-two follow-up visits were conducted

in order to validate the implementation of States’ Corrective

Action Plans (CAPs) to address the recommendations

resulting from the audits and to provide support to States

in remedying identified deficiencies. Several States did not

receive follow-up visits, either due to their security level, as

assigned by the United Nations Department of Safety and

Security (UNDSS), to the absence of a CAP, or to the lack of

progress in the implementation of the CAP.

The follow-up visits revealed significant improvement in the

rectification of the deficiencies that were identified during the

initial audits. However, a substantial amount of work remained

in order to achieve full compliance with all Annex 17 Standards.

To be highlighted, in particular, is the need for States to

continue their efforts in establishing comprehensive security

oversight systems to ensure the effective implementation

of national aviation security requirements and the SARPs

contained in Annex 17.

The second cycle of USAP audits

The results of the audit follow-up visits demonstrated that,

overall, States had made improvements in meeting their

Annex 17 Standards obligations. However, varying levels of

improvement were identified from region to region, and, in

many cases, from State to State within a region. States having

difficulties in addressing deficiencies identified during their

audit were offered the opportunity to request assistance from

ICAO through the Implementation Support and Development

Security (ISD-SEC) Programme in coordination with the

Technical Cooperation Programme.

Recognizing that the USAP had proven to be instrumental

in identifying aviation security concerns and in providing

recommendations for their resolution, the ICAO Council

moved to ensure the continuation of the USAP following the

initial cycle of audits, which ended in 2007.

Aviation security audits under the ongoing ICAO USAP second

cycle commenced in January 2008 and were completed in

June 2013. The primary objectives of the second-cycle audits

were to:

a) determine the State’s capability for aviation security

oversight by assessing whether the critical elements of an

aviation security oversight system had been implemented

effectively;

b) determine the State’s degree of compliance with Annex 17

Standards and the security related provisions of Annex 9;

c) assess the State’s adherence to security procedures,

guidance material and security related practices

associated with the relevant ICAO SARPs; and

d) provide recommendations to the audited State on how to

improve its aviation security system and security oversight

capabilities.

A total of 177 audits of ICAO Member States were conducted

under the second cycle of USAP audits, as well as an audit

of the Macao Special Administrative Region of China and an

assessment of the European Commission aviation security

inspection system. It should be noted that, as was the case in

the first cycle of USAP audits, it was not possible to conduct

a second-cycle audit of all ICAO Member States. Some States

were not audited due to their security level, as assigned by

the UNDSS. In other cases, an analysis of first-cycle audit



and follow-up mission results, and/or a review of CAPs and

information supplied in Pre-Audit Questionnaires (PAQs)

identified certain States that would benefit from referral to

the ISD-SEC Programme for the provision of appropriate

assistance prior to the conduct of a USAP audit.

The move to a USAP-CMA

In order to prepare for the completion of the second cycle of

Universal Security Audit Programme (USAP) audits in 2013, in

2012, ICAO recommended that the Programme move towards

a Continuous Monitoring Approach (CMA) specific to aviation

security while incorporating risk-management elements.

Following approval by the ICAO Council of the plan including

a transition period, full implementation of the USAP-CMA

began on 1 January 2015.

Current status

In 2015, a total of 26 States were audited under the USAP-CMA

during which four Significant Security Concerns (SSeCs) were

identified in one State. There are now ten unresolved SSeCs

in four States posted on the USAP secure website.

In the first half of 2016, ICAO carried out 14 USAP-CMA audits,

bringing the total number of USAP-CMA audits conducted to

10 documentation-based and 30 on-site audits. Figure 1 shows

the aggregated global audit results of the USAP second cycle

and the USAP-CMA at 30 June 2016 measuring the Effective

Implementation (EI) of States of the eight Critical Elements

(CEs) of an aviation security oversight system.

The chart above shows a global average EI of 71.75 per cent

over all of the CEs. These results indicate that there is still

significant room for improvement and that States’ quality

control obligations remain the critical element that is the least

effectively implemented.

One ICAO Validation Mission took place in 2016, validating

actions taken by one State to resolve its Significant Security

Concern (SSeC). Over the course of 2016, three new SSeCs

involving one State were posted on the USAP secure website,

and one SSeC in another State was removed. As at 30 June

2016, there remained twelve unresolved SSeCs in five States.

In conclusion, the ICAO USAP has successfully transitioned

to the Continuous Monitoring Approach. The engagement

of Member States in the USAP-CMA confirms States’

commitment to implement ICAO security-related Standards

and strengthen aviation security. USAP audits continue to play

ICAO WORLD CIVIL AVIATION REPORTINTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION

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cases, an analysis of first-cycle audit and follow-up mission results, and/or a review of CAPs and information supplied in Pre-Audit Questionnaires (PAQs) identified certain States that would benefit from referral to the ISD-SEC Programme for the provision of appropriate assistance prior to the conduct of a USAP audit.

The move to a USAP-CMA

In order to prepare for the completion of the second cycle of Universal Security Audit Programme (USAP) audits in 2013, in 2012, ICAO recommended that the Programme move towards a Continuous Monitoring Approach (CMA) specific to aviation security while incorporating risk-management elements. Following approval by the ICAO Council of the plan including a transition period, full implementation of the USAP-CMA began on 1 January 2015.

Current status

In 2015, a total of 26 States were audited under the USAP-CMA during which four Significant Security Concerns (SSeCs) were identified in one State. There are now ten unresolved SSeCs in four States posted on the USAP secure website.

In the first half of 2016, ICAO carried out 14 USAP-CMA audits, bringing the total number of USAP-CMA audits conducted to 10 documentation-based and 30 on-site audits. Figure 1 shows the aggregated global audit results of the USAP second cycle and the USAP-CMA at 30 June 2016 measuring the Effective Implementation (EI) of States of the eight Critical Elements (CEs) of an aviation security oversight system.

The chart above shows a global average EI of 71.75 per cent over all of the CEs. These results indicate that there is still significant room for improvement and that States’ quality control obligations remain the critical element that is the least effectively implemented.

One ICAO Validation Mission took place in 2016, validating actions taken by one State to resolve its Significant Security Concern (SSeC). Over the course of 2016, three new SSeCs involving one State were posted on the USAP secure website, and one SSeC in another State was removed. As at 30 June 2016, there remained twelve unresolved SSeCs in five States.

In conclusion, the ICAO USAP has successfully transitioned to the Continuous Monitoring Approach. The engagement of Member States in the USAP-CMA

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a central role in the identification of deficiencies, providing

useful information for the targeting of assistance activities

and the development of aviation security policy, thus serving

as a catalyst for Member States’ continued efforts to meet

their international obligations in the field of aviation security.

Nevertheless, the results of both the second-cycle audits and

USAP-CMA audits indicate that a number of States continue to

experience difficulties in meeting aviation security obligations.

Ongoing monitoring of progress made by States in this regard

will continue to be provided under the USAP-CMA.

Sovereignty. Every State has complete and exclusive

sovereignty over the airspace above its territory.

Accordingly, ICAO fully respects a sovereign State’s

responsibility and authority for oversight of aviation

security, including its decision-making powers with

respect to implementing corrective actions related to

identified deficiencies.

Universality. All Member States will be subject to

continuous audit and monitoring activities by ICAO,

in accordance with the principles, methodology,

processes and procedures established for conducting

such activities, and on the basis of the Memorandum of

Understanding (MoU) signed by ICAO and each Member

State.

Transparency of methodology. The USAP-CMA activity

procedures and processes will be made available to all

Member States.

Timeliness. Results of USAP-CMA activities will be

produced and submitted on a timely basis in accordance

with a predetermined schedule for the preparation and

submission of these results.

All-inclusiveness. The scope of the USAP-CMA

includes Annex 17 Standards and security-related

Standards of Annex 9. It is expected to expand the

scope of the USAP-CMA at appropriate times to include

other security-related provisions contained in other

Annexes to the Chicago Convention, in order to ensure

their effective implementation in Member States’ civil

aviation systems.

Consistency and objectivity. USAP-CMA activities will

be conducted in a consistent and objective manner.

Standardization and uniformity in the scope, depth and

quality of USAP-CMA activities will be assured through

training and certification of all auditors, the use of

standardized Protocol Questions and the provision of

relevant guidance material.

Fairness. USAP-CMA activities will be conducted

in a manner such that Member States are given the

opportunity to monitor, comment on and respond to the

USAP CMA processes within an established time frame.

Quality. The quality of USAP-CMA activities will be

ensured by assigning trained and certified auditors

to conduct USAP-CMA activities in accordance with

widely recognized auditing concepts, as well as by

implementing an internal quality control system within

ASA that continually monitors and evaluates feedback

received from USAP-CMA stakeholders to ensure their

ongoing satisfaction.

Confidentiality. Sensitive security information

collected as part of the USAP-CMA will be protected

from unauthorized disclosure. Accordingly, USAP-

CMA audit reports will be confidential and will only

be made available to the audited State and ICAO staff

on a need-to-know basis. However, in the interests of

promoting global aviation security, a limited level of

disclosure will apply whereby charts depicting the level

of implementation of the Critical Elements of an aviation

security oversight system by a Member State and an

indication of compliance by a Member State with Annex

17 Standards, as well as information pertaining to the

existence of unresolved Significant Security Concerns

(SSeCs) in a Member State, will be made available to all

Member States on the USAP secure website.

The Universal Security Audit Programme is based on the following nine principles:

Additional information on the ICAO Universal Security Audit Programme is available with the online subscription version

of this publication.

Securing the Air Cargo Supply Chain- ICAO Regulatory Framework

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Securing the Air Cargo Supply Chain - ICAO Regulatory Framework

The ICAO regulatory framework for the air cargo secure

supply chain has been developed incrementally over a

period of time and is set out in a series of Standards and

Recommended Practices (SARPs) in Annex 17 Security to

the Chicago Convention, supported by guidance material in

the Aviation Security Manual (Document 8973 – Restricted).

This regulatory framework remains under constant review

and is updated periodically to provide the best responses

to evolving threats. This section is based on standards and

guidance materials in force in July 2016.

The framework provides for the following entities in the supply

chain:

Aircraft operators

In principle, as shown in Figure 1, an aircraft operator can

bear the entire responsibility of applying security controls,

including screening of 100 per cent of cargo and mail before

loading on to an aircraft.

However, while all passengers and their baggage are

screened immediately before departure, this is generally

not a practical proposition for all outgoing cargo.

The alternative is a secure supply chain, where security

controls are applied at the point of origin or at an intermediate

point before the airport. This:

• respects existing obligations of businesses operating in

the air cargo supply chain;

• shares costs and responsibilities among all stakeholders

and allows cargo to be secured upstream in the supply

chain to reduce the burden of security controls imposed

on aircraft operators;

• facilitates the flow of cargo transported by air and

reduces or limits possible delays generated by the

application of security controls;

• applies appropriate security controls for specific

categories of cargo that cannot be screened by the usual

means due to their nature, packaging, size or volume; and

• preserves the primary advantages of the air transport

mode: speed, safety and security.

ICAO and its Member States have developed Standards to

support the implementation of a secure supply chain through

the regulated agent and known consignor regimes. These

entities are approved by the appropriate authority and may

apply security controls, including screening, upstream in

the air cargo supply chain. They ensure that the cargo and

mail to be carried on commercial aircraft is protected from

unauthorized interference from the point where screening

or other security controls are applied until departure of the

aircraft.

The implementation of the secure supply chain reduces the

burden on aircraft operators while facilitating the processing

of secure cargo when it arrives at an airport.

Regulated agents

A regulated agent is a freight forwarder or any other entity

(e.g. ground handler) that conducts business with an aircraft

operator and provides security controls that are accepted or

required for cargo or mail by the appropriate authority. Once

approved as a regulated agent, an entity may conduct security

controls for cargo, including the screening of goods (Figure 2).

An aircraft operator may receive cargo secured by a regulated

agent, which accounts for the security status of consignments.

Candidates for regulated agent status must meet specific

requirements determined by the appropriate authority.


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Securing the Air Cargo Supply Chain - ICAO Regulatory Framework

The ICAO regulatory framework for the air cargo secure supply chain has been developed incrementally over a period of time and is set out in a series of Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) in Annex 17 Security to the Chicago Convention, supported by guidance material in the Aviation Security Manual (Document 8973 – Restricted).

This regulatory framework remains under constant review and is updated periodically to provide the best responses to evolving threats. This section is based on standards and guidance materials in force in July 2016.

The framework provides for the following entities in the supply chain:

Aircraft operators

In principle, as shown in Figure 1, an aircraft operator can bear the entire responsibility of applying security controls, including screening of 100 per cent of cargo and mail before loading on to an aircraft.

However, while all passengers and their baggage are screened immediately before departure, this is generally not a practical proposition for all outgoing cargo.

The alternative is a secure supply chain, where security controls are applied at the point of origin or at an intermediate point before the airport. This:! respects existing obligations of businesses operating

in the air cargo supply chain;! shares costs and responsibilities among all

stakeholders and allows cargo to be secured upstream in the supply chain to reduce the burden of security controls imposed on aircraft operators;

! facilitates the flow of cargo transported by air and reduces or limits possible delays generated by the application of security controls;

! applies appropriate security controls for specific categories of cargo that cannot be screened by the usual means due to their nature, packaging, size or volume; and

! preserves the primary advantages of the air transport mode: speed, safety and security.

ICAO and its Member States have developed Standards to support the implementation of a secure supply chain through the regulated agent and known consignor regimes. These entities are approved by the appropriate authority and may apply security controls, including screening, upstream in the air cargo supply chain. They ensure that the cargo and mail to be carried on commercial aircraft is protected from unauthorized interference from the point where screening or other security controls are applied until departure of the aircraft.

The implementation of the secure supply chain reduces the burden on aircraft operators while facilitating the processing of secure cargo when it arrives at an airport.

Regulated agents

A regulated agent is a freight forwarder or any other entity (e.g. ground handler) that conducts business with an aircraft operator and provides security controls that are accepted or required for cargo or mail by the appropriate authority. Once approved as a regulated agent, an entity may conduct security controls for cargo, including the screening of goods (Figure 2). An aircraft operator may receive cargo secured by a regulated agent, which accounts for the security status of consignments.

Candidates for regulated agent status must meet specific requirements determined by the appropriate authority.

Figure 1 – Security controls applied by aircraft operators



The regulated agent must develop and maintain a security

programme that describes all the security measures

implemented on the premises and during all operations to

secure cargo and maintain its integrity until delivery to the

next entity. Such measures should include, inter alia: access

control to secure areas; monitoring of premises; protection

and surveillance of cargo against unauthorized access;

screening processes; delivery and reception processes;

security training for all staff who may access the premises;

and monitoring of subcontractors.

However, a regulated agent can only maintain the security

of a consignment or screen it, and there are some types of

cargo that are time-consuming to screen thoroughly. In these

instances the implementation of a known consignor regime

offers the possibility of conducting effective security controls

at the manufacturing/assembly/packing stage.

Known consignors

An entity may act as a known consignor when it originates

cargo or mail for its own account and when its procedures

meet common security rules and standards sufficient to allow

the carriage of cargo or mail on commercial aircraft. Once

a known consignor has accounted for the security status of

cargo, the consignment may be delivered to a regulated agent,

other approved entity, or directly to the aircraft operator, who

then takes over the responsibility for keeping it secure until

it is loaded on to an aircraft.

In order to be designated as a known consignor, an entity

such as a manufacturer or assembler should demonstrate

compliance with the known consignor security programme

under which business will be conducted, as recognized

and approved by the appropriate authority or other entity

authorized by the State to act on its behalf.

Known consignors should apply for designation, approval or

listing by the appropriate authority at regular intervals not

exceeding five years. Their placement in the supply chain is

shown in Figure 3 below.


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118

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The regulated agent must develop and maintain a security programme that describes all the security measures implemented on the premises and during all operations to secure cargo and maintain its integrity until delivery to the next entity. Such measures should include, inter alia: access control to secure areas; monitoring of premises; protection and surveillance of cargo against unauthorized access; screening processes; delivery and reception processes; security training for all staff who may access the premises; and monitoring of subcontractors.

However, a regulated agent can only maintain the security of a consignment or screen it, and there are some types of cargo that are time-consuming to screen thoroughly. In these instances the implementation of a known consignor regime offers the possibility of conduct ing effect ive security controls at the manufacturing/assembly/packing stage.

Known consignors

An entity may act as a known consignor when it originates cargo or mail for its own account and when its procedures

meet common security rules and standards sufficient to allow the carriage of cargo or mail on commercial aircraft. Once a known consignor has accounted for the security status of cargo, the consignment may be delivered to a regulated agent, other approved entity, or directly to the aircraft operator, who then takes over the responsibility for keeping it secure until it is loaded on to an aircraft.

In order to be designated as a known consignor, an entity such as a manufacturer or assembler should demonstrate compliance with the known consignor security programme under which business will be conducted, as recognized and approved by the appropriate authority or other entity authorized by the State to act on its behalf.

Known consignors should apply for designation, approval or listing by the appropriate authority at regular intervals not exceeding five years. Their placement in the supply chain is shown in Figure 3 below.

Figure 2 – Security controls applied by regulated agents

Figure 3 – Security controls applied by known consignors


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The regulated agent must develop and maintain a security programme that describes all the security measures implemented on the premises and during all operations to secure cargo and maintain its integrity until delivery to the next entity. Such measures should include, inter alia: access control to secure areas; monitoring of premises; protection and surveillance of cargo against unauthorized access; screening processes; delivery and reception processes; security training for all staff who may access the premises; and monitoring of subcontractors.

However, a regulated agent can only maintain the security of a consignment or screen it, and there are some types of cargo that are time-consuming to screen thoroughly. In these instances the implementation of a known consignor regime offers the possibility of conduct ing effect ive security controls at the manufacturing/assembly/packing stage.

Known consignors

An entity may act as a known consignor when it originates cargo or mail for its own account and when its procedures

meet common security rules and standards sufficient to allow the carriage of cargo or mail on commercial aircraft. Once a known consignor has accounted for the security status of cargo, the consignment may be delivered to a regulated agent, other approved entity, or directly to the aircraft operator, who then takes over the responsibility for keeping it secure until it is loaded on to an aircraft.

In order to be designated as a known consignor, an entity such as a manufacturer or assembler should demonstrate compliance with the known consignor security programme under which business will be conducted, as recognized and approved by the appropriate authority or other entity authorized by the State to act on its behalf.

Known consignors should apply for designation, approval or listing by the appropriate authority at regular intervals not exceeding five years. Their placement in the supply chain is shown in Figure 3 below.


Figure 3 – Security controls applied by known consignors




Screening

For aviation security purposes, screening is the application of

technical or other means which are intended to identify and/

or detect weapons, explosives or other dangerous devices,

articles or substances which may be used to commit an act of

unlawful interference. ICAO recognizes a range of screening

options, including hand search, x-ray and explosives trace

detection.

The entity that secures the cargo must ensure that screening

is carried out using an appropriate means or methods, taking

into account the nature of the consignment, as not all means

or methods will be suitable for all consignments. Also, some

consignments may be categorized as ‘high risk’, for instance

on the basis of intelligence information, and should in these

circumstances be subject to additional screening or other

security controls1.

Consignment Security Declaration (CSD)

All along the supply chain, including at transfer points, it is

crucial to share information about the security status of cargo

and mail to ensure that anything that needs to be secured or

re-secured is properly identified and screened.

To assure this transmission of information, an entity that

renders cargo secure should issue a Consignment Security

Declaration that specifies the security status of the cargo

and mail and displays other important security information.

This is transmitted to each party involved later in the secure

supply chain in order for them to apply the appropriate

security measures to the consignment and protect it from

unauthorized access.

The electronic version of the CSD (or eCSD) complements

the increasing automation of air cargo processes and allows

operators to exchange and store security information

electronically.

When accepting a consignment, a regulated agent or an

aircraft operator will automatically refer to the CSD in

order to determine the way to handle, prepare, store and, if

necessary, screen the cargo. The CSD should only be issued

once the appropriate security controls, have been applied. If

no security status is indicated, or no consignment security

declaration is issued, it should be deemed that no security

controls have been previously applied.

The CSD should be completed at each step along the secure

supply chain, to indicate that another authorized entity acting

within the secure supply chain is taking responsibility for the

security status of the cargo.

Only entities accredited by a State as regulated agents, known

consignors or aircraft operators are entitled to issue or

complete such a declaration, and their unique identification

number should be recorded, to indicate their responsibility

and administrative accreditation. The CSD can be transferred

either as a hard copy or in an electronic format.

In the express business model, the relevant cargo security

information is instead usually available in in-house

information technology systems. Postal consignments also

usually have different documentation.

Additional information on moving air cargo is available with

the online subscription version of this document.

1 Currently, the possibilities of electronically analysing shipment related data to identify shipments which may represent a higher risk are under consideration. Any consignments so identified would be subject to additional scrutiny and possibly extra security requirements. Such preloading advance cargo information (PLACI) systems have the potential to provide an additional layer of screening in the future.

Cybersecurity/Cooperation with Other Organizations



Cybersecurity

The December 2014 signing of the Industry High-level

Group (IHLG) Civil Aviation Cybersecurity Action Plan

by ICAO, Airports Council International (ACI), the Civil Air

Navigation Services Organization (CANSO), the International

Air Transport Association (IATA) and the International

Coordinating Council of Aerospace Industry Associations

(ICCAIA) represented an important development in efforts

to address cyber threats. This document establishes

clear timeframes for the achievement of goals and targets

facilitating the development of a common understanding of

cyber threats and risks and the development of information-

sharing mechanisms necessary fo r prompt communication

between government and industry stakeholders.

Throughout 2015, the IHLG continued to promote consistent

and coherent approaches in managing cyber threats and risks.

It also encouraged the development of a robust cybersecurity

culture in all organizations involved in international civil

aviation while identifying and sharing best practices.

Recognizing the importance of consolidating all relevant

publications on cybersecurity for the benefit of ICAO Member

States, the IHLG created a secure repository site entitled

“Cybersecurity”. It can be accessed from the ICAO Secure

Portal. The repository is continuously updated and currently

includes a number of publications addressing sector-specific

cybersecurity needs.

Cooperation with other United Nations Bodies and

International Organizations

ICAO worked closely with international organizations, such as

the United Nations Security Council and its Counter-Terrorism

Committee (CTC), the United Nations Counter-Terrorism

Executive Directorate (CTED) and the Counter-Terrorism

Implementation Task Force (CTITF). ICAO provided CTED

teams with expertise in aviation security for State visits and

supplied them with relevant, mission-specific information.

ICAO participated in the CTC’s Extraordinary Meeting in

Madrid regarding Security Council Resolution 2178 (2014) on

stemming the flow of Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs). Held

in July, this meeting was attended by over 400 experts and

Member State representatives, including those from States

most affected by foreign terrorist fighters. In order to advance

the follow-up on the Resolution, three principal themes were

discussed:

i) detection, intervention against, and prevention of

incitement, recruitment, and facilitation of foreign

terrorist fighters;

ii) prevention of foreign terrorist fighters’ travel, including

through operational measures, the use of Advance

Passenger Information (API), and strengthening border

security; and

iii) criminalization, prosecution (including prosecution

strategies for returnees) , international cooperation, and

the rehabilitation and reintegration of returnees.

The meeting recommended that Member States consider:

a) providing dedicated resources and automated tools,

including API, access to watch lists, and centralized

databases;

b) introducing measures and practices to enhance the

capacities of competent border authorities, including with

respect to the type of information required at the border,

the sources of information, and the methodologies for its

processing in order to detect potential FTFs, and consider

sharing this information with competent authorities;

c) as API is an essential source of information about

passengers, both prior to their departure and prior to

their arrival, standardizing the data transmitted and

the means of transmittal; establishing a single point of

collection of the information; and using interactive API.

ICAO is working closely with the International Air Transport

Association (IATA), the World Customs Organization (WCO)

and the CTED to establish the way forward, particularly with

regard to the implementation of those recommendations

relating to API.

Additional information on Cybersecurity is available with

the online subscription of this publication.

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Status Of Modern Aviation Security · 2019-11-12 · STATUS OF MODERN AVIATION SECURITY 10 INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION The Universal Security Audit Programme (USAP)