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STATUS, CONFLICT, AND WAR: THE
MAJOR POWERS, 1820-1970
by
Char les Samuel Gochman
A d i s s e r t a t i o n submit ted i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l l m e n t of the requirements f o r the degree of
Doctor of P h i l o s o p h y ( P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e )
i n The U n i v e r s i t y of M i c h i g a n 1975
Doctoral Committee:
P r o f e s s o r J . David S i n g e r , Chairman A s s i s t a n t P r o f e s s o r S t u a r t A. Bremer P r o f e s s o r Harold K. Jacobson A s s o c i a t e P r o f e s s o r C a t h e r i n e M. K e l l e h e r P r o f e s s o r John W. Shy
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Many i n d i v i d u a l s have c o n t r i b u t e d to the development
and complet ion of t h i s t h e s i s . As w i t h any r e s e a r c h endeavor,
i t i s not p o s s i b l e to acknowledge a l l of them. There a r e ,
however, two groups of people t h a t loom very p r o m i n e n t l y in
my mind. F i r s t , there are the members of my d i s s e r t a t i o n
c o m m i t t e e — S t u a r t Bremer, Harold J a c o b s o n , C a t h e r i n e K e l l e h e r ,
John Shy, and J . David S i n g e r — t o whom I wish to express my
a p p r e c i a t i o n . Second, there are the members of the C o r r e l a t e s
of War P r o j e c t at the U n i v e r s i t y of M i c h i g a n — J . David S i n g e r ,
M e l v i n S m a l l , S t u a r t Bremer, John S t u c k e y , Hugh Wheeler, Lar ry
A r n o l d , and a number of younger c o l l e a g u e s — w h o have c o n t i n u a l l y
been a f o n t of i n t e l l e c t u a l s t i m u l a t i o n . To a l l these p e o p l e ,
I express my g r a t i t u d e .
Two n a m e s — t h o s e o f J . David S i n g e r and S t u a r t B r e m e r —
appear i n both these groups, and m e r i t s p e c i a l a t t e n t i o n .
J . David S i n g e r has undoubtedly had a g r e a t e r i n f l u e n c e than
any o t h e r person on my academic development. He has been
— a n d cont inues to b e — a c r e a t i v e t e a c h e r , a d e d i c a t e d a d v i s o r ,
and, e q u a l l y i m p o r t a n t l y , an e v e r - e n c o u r a g i n g and always h e l p f u l
f r i e n d . I am a l s o f o r t u n a t e to count among my f r i e n d s ,
S t u a r t Bremer. Over the past s e v e r a l y e a r s , he has been an
i n d e f a t i g a b l e source of i m a g i n a t i v e i d e a s , from whom I have
l e a r n e d much, and have much more to l e a r n . To both these
men, I owe a s p e c i a l debt of thanks.
v
TABLE OF CONTENTS
DEDICATION i i i
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS iv
LIST OF TABLES ix
LIST OF FIGURES x i i i
LIST OF APPENDICES x i v
CHAPTER
I. THE THEORETICAL ARGUMENT 1
Toward War: D i s s a t i s f a c t i o n as a Source of Aggressive Behavior 5
The F r u s t r a t i o n - A g g r e s s i o n Hypothesis i n Psychology
The Status I n c o n s i s t e n c y Debate i n S o c i o l o g y
The R e l a t i v e D e p r i v a t i o n Hypothesis i n P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e
A N a t i o n - S t a t e Analogy Away from War: C o n s t r a i n t s on N a t i o n - S t a t e
Behavior 16 The L i m i t s of C a p a b i l i t y Learning from Exper ience The S t r u c t u r e o f the System
Summarizing the P r o p o s i t i o n s and P o s i t i n g a Model 28
I I . THE RESEARCH DESIGN 34
The Referent World 34 S p a t i a l Domain Temporal Domain
C o n s t r u c t i n g the I n d i c a t o r s 38 The P r e d i c t o r V a r i a b l e : S t a t u s
I n c o n s i s t e n c y The Int er v ening V a r i a b l e s : P h y s i c a l ,
P s y c h o l o g i c a l , and S t r u c t u r a l The Outcome V a r i a b l e : I n t e r s t a t e
M i l i t a r y C o n f l i c t A n a l y z i n g the Data 68
v i
CHAPTER
I I I . FROM STATUS INCONSISTENCY TO MILITARY CONFRONTATION: THE BIVARIATE RELATIONSHIP . . . . 73
Assuming Homogeneity among the Major Powers . 73 M a n i p u l a t i n g the Time F a c t o r A l t e r i n g the Level of Measurement
Examining the I n d i v i d u a l S t a t e s 83 Summarizing the F i n d i n g s 94
IV. FROM STATUS INCONSISTENCY TO MILITARY CONFRONTATION: INTRODUCING THE INTERVENING VARIABLES 95
The Nineteenth Century 104 A n a l y z i n g the Data I n t e r p r e t i n g the R e s u l t s Examining the " R e s i d u a l s " Summarizing the N i n e t e e n t h - C e n t u r y
F indings The Twentieth Century 125
A n a l y z i n g the Data I n t e r p r e t i n g the R e s u l t s Examining the " R e s i d u a l s " Summarizing the T w e n t i e t h - C e n t u r y
F indings
V. FROM MILITARY CONFRONTATION TO INTERSTATE WAR . . 152
The Nineteenth Century 157 The I n d i c a t o r s of R e a c h a b i l i t y The I n d i c a t o r of War Exper ience The I n d i c a t o r s of S t r u c t u r a l
R e l a t i o n s h i p s The M u l t i v a r i a t e R e l a t i o n s h i p
The Twentieth Century 168 The I n d i c a t o r s of R e a c h a b i l i t y The I n d i c a t o r of War Exper ience The I n d i c a t o r s of S t r u c t u r a l
R e l a t i o n s h i p s The M u l t i v a r i a t e R e l a t i o n s h i p
The Major Power/Major Power C o n f l i c t Dyads . 184 Summarizing the R e s u l t s of the Second Stage . 189
vi i
CHAPTER
VI . STATUS, CONFLICT, AND WAR 191
Status I n c o n s i s t e n c y and M i l i t a r y C o n f l i c t . 191 U n d e r r e c o g n i t i o n and C o n f r o n t a t i o n U n d e r r e c o g n i t i o n and War
The Intervening V a r i a b l e s and M i l i t a r y C o n f l i c t . 200
P h y s i c a l A t t r i b u t e s The P s y c h o l o g i c a l F a c t o r S t r u c t u r a l R e l a t i o n s h i p s
General Observat ions f o r Peace Research . . . 209
APPENDICES 215
BIBLIOGRAPHY 254
SPECIAL BIBLIOGRAPHY OF CONFLICT DATA SOURCES 271
v i i i
LIST OF TABLES
Table Page
1. S t a t u s I n c o n s i s t e n c y vs Involvement i n I n t e r s t a t e M i l i t a r y C o n f r o n t a t i o n s , 1820-1970 74
2 . Q-scores from Contingency Table A n a l y s i s of Major Power Status I n c o n s i s t e n c y vs. Involvement i n I n t e r s t a t e M i l i t a r y C o n f r o n t a t i o n s , 1820-1970 (One- to F i v e - y e a r Time Lags) 76
3. S t a t u s I n c o n s i s t e n c y v s . Involvement in I n t e r s t a t e M i l i t a r y C o n f r o n t a t i o n s , by Century 77
4. Q-scores from Contingency Table A n a l y s i s of Major Power Status I n c o n s i s t e n c y vs. Involvement i n I n t e r s t a t e M i l i t a r y C o n f r o n t a t i o n s , by Century (One- to F i v e - y e a r Time Lags) 78
5. Observed and Expected Frequency of Major Power P a r t i c i p a t i o n i n I n t e r s t a t e M i l i t a r y C o n f r o n t a t i o n s at D i f f e r e n t Ranks of S t a t u s I n c o n s i s t e n c y , f o r 1820-1970 and by Century (One- to Three-year Time Lags) 81
6. Observed and Expected Frequency of Major Power I n i t i a t i o n of I n t e r s t a t e M i l i t a r y C o n f r o n t a t i o n s a t D i f f e r e n t Ranks of S t a t u s I n c o n s i s t e n c y , f o r 1820-1970 and by Century (One- to Three-year Time Lags) 81
7. Analyses of Var iance and B i s e r i a l C o r r e l a t i o n s of Status I n c o n s i s t e n c y v s . I n t e r s t a t e M i l i t a r y C o n f r o n t a t i o n s , f o r 1820-1970 and by Century (One- to Three-year Time Lags) 82
8. American and German S t a t u s I n c o n s i s t e n c y v s . Involvement i n I n t e r s t a t e M i l i t a r y C o n f r o n t a t i o n s . 84
i x
Table Page
9. Q-scores from Contingency Table A n a l y s i s of Each Major Power's Status I n c o n s i s t e n c y vs . Involvement i n I n t e r s t a t e M i l i t a r y C o n f r o n t a t i o n s , f o r 1820-1970 Per iod and by Century (One- to Three-year Time Lags) 85
10. Analyses of Variance and B i s e r i a l C o r r e l a t i o n s of Each Major Power's S t a t u s I n c o n s i s t e n c y vs . I n t e r s t a t e M i l i t a r y C o n f r o n t a t i o n s , by Century (One- to Three-year Time Lags) 90
1 1 . B i s e r i a l C o r r e l a t i o n s between Each Major Power's Involvement i n M i l i t a r y C o n f r o n t a t i o n s and the Three Intervening V a r i a b l e s , f o r the 19th Century (One- to Three-year Time Lags) 105
12. S t a n d a r d i z e d P r o b i t C o e f f i c i e n t s f o r the Three I n t e r v e n i n g V a r i a b l e s when P r e d i c t i n g Each Major Power's Involvement i n M i l i t a r y C o n f r o n t a t i o n s , f o r the 19th Century (One- to Three-year Time Lags) 109
13. P o i n t B i s e r i a l C o r r e l a t i o n s between Each Major Power's Status I n c o n s i s t e n c y Scores and the Three Intervening V a r i a b l e s , f o r the 19th Century (One- to Three-year Time Lags) 113
14. Number of C o n f l i c t - y e a r s I n v o l v i n g Major Powers and the P r o p o r t i o n of these C o n f l i c t - y e a r s t h a t Is C o r r e c t l y P r e d i c t e d by the P r o b i t E q u a t i o n , f o r the 19th Century (One- to Three-year Time Lags) 121
15. B i s e r i a l C o r r e l a t i o n s between Each Major Power's Involvement i n M i l i t a r y C o n f r o n t a t i o n s and the Four Intervening V a r i a b l e s , f o r the 20th Century (One- to Three-year Time Lags) 126
16. S t a n d a r d i z e d P r o b i t C o e f f i c i e n t s and the I n t e r -c o r r e l a t i o n M a t r i x f o r the Four I n t e r v e n i n g V a r i a b l e s when P r e d i c t i n g Each Major Power's P a r t i c i p a t i o n i n M i l i t a r y C o n f r o n t a t i o n s , f o r the 20th Century (Subset of Underrecognized Cases, Three-year Time Lag) 132
x
Table Page
17. Standardized P r o b i t C o e f f i c i e n t s f o r the Four Intervening V a r i a b l e s when P r e d i c t i n g Each Major Power's Involvement i n M i l i t a r y C o n f r o n t a t i o n s , f o r the 20th Century (One- to Three-year Time Lags) 135
18. Number of C o n f l i c t - y e a r s I n v o l v i n g Major Powers and the P r o p o r t i o n of these C o n f l i c t - y e a r s t h a t Is C o r r e c t l y P r e d i c t e d by the P r o b i t E q u a t i o n , f o r the 20th Century (One- to Three-year Time Lags) 149
19. Cramer's Phi-square between Each Major Power's War Involvement and the Two I n d i c a t o r s of R e a c h a b i l i t y , f o r 19th Century C o n f l i c t Dyads . . . 159
20. B i s e r i a l C o r r e l a t i o n s between Each Major Power's War Involvement and P r i o r War E x p e r i e n c e , f o r 19th Century C o n f l i c t Dyads 162
2 1 . B i s e r i a l C o r r e l a t i o n s between Each Major Power's War Involvement and System P o l a r i t y , f o r 19th Century C o n f l i c t Dyads 164
2 2 . C o r r e l a t i o n and S t a n d a r d i z e d Probit. C o e f f i c i e n t s f o r the Four Intervening V a r i a b l e s when P r e d i c t i n g to Pooled Major Power War Involvements, f o r 19th Century C o n f l i c t Dyads 166
2 3 . Cramer's P h i - s q u a r e between Each Major Power's War Involvement and the Two I n d i c a t o r s of R e a c h a b i l i t y , f o r 20th Century C o n f l i c t Dyads . . . 169
24. B i s e r i a l C o r r e l a t i o n s between Each Major Power's War Involvement and P r i o r War E x p e r i e n c e , f o r 20th Century C o n f l i c t Dyads 172
2 5 . B i s e r i a l C o r r e l a t i o n s and Cramer P h i - s q u a r e s between Each Major Power's War Involvement and Two I n d i c a t o r s of S t r u c t u r a l R e l a t i o n s h i p s , f o r 20th Century C o n f l i c t Dyads 175
26. C o r r e l a t i o n and S t a n d a r d i z e d P r o b i t C o e f f i c i e n t s f o r the Five I n t e r v e n i n g V a r i a b l e s when P r e d i c t i n g to Pooled Major Power War Involvements, f o r 20th Century C o n f l i c t Dyads 180
xi
Table Page
27. T o t a l Number of Major Power/Major Power and Major Power/Minor Power C o n f l i c t Dyads t h a t Terminate i n War and the P r o p o r t i o n of Each Type that Is C o r r e c t l y P r e d i c t e d by the P r o b i t E q u a t i o n , f o r the 20th Century 184
28. C o r r e l a t i o n and Standardized P r o b i t C o e f f i c i e n t s f o r the Intervening V a r i a b l e s when P r e d i c t i n g to Pooled Major Power War Involvements, f o r A l l 19th and 20th Century Major/Major C o n f l i c t Dyads 186
29. General Summary of F i n d i n g s from Chapters Three through F i v e 210
30. Number of Years as Major Power d u r i n g the 1820-1899 and 1900-1970 Time P e r i o d s 252
31. N a t i o n a l Involvements i n M i l i t a r y C o n f l i c t s per N a t i o n - Y e a r 253
32. P r o p o r t i o n of N a t i o n a l Involvements i n M i l i t a r y C o n f l i c t s R e s u l t i n g i n War 253
xi i
LIST OF FIGURES
F i g u r e Page
1. Number of M i l i t a r y C o n f l i c t s per 10-Year P e r i o d . . 247
2. Number of M i l i t a r y C o n f l i c t s (at Var ious L e v e l s of V i o l e n c e ) per 10-Year P e r i o d 248
3. D i s t r i b u t i o n of the Occurrence of M i l i t a r y C o n f l i c t s w i t h i n 5-Year P e r i o d s 250
4 . D i s t r i b u t i o n of the Occurrence of M i l i t a r y C o n f l i c t s (at Var ious L e v e l s of V i o l e n c e ) w i t h i n 5-Year Per iods 251
x i i i
LIST OF APPENDICES
Appendix Page
A. Data Sources 215
B. I n t e r s t a t e System Members 216
C. I d e n t i f y i n g I n t e r s t a t e C o n f l i c t s 222
D. Summary P r e s e n t a t i o n of M i l i t a r y C o n f l i c t Data . . . 245
x i v
CHAPTER I
THE THEORETICAL ARGUMENT
N a t i o n a l p o l i c y makers . . . can always be r e l i e d upon . . . to ignore t h e i r commitments to r e f r a i n from aggress ion whenever they b e l i e v e t h a t r e s o r t to f o r c e w i l l serve t h e i r purposes.
Schuman, 1968, p. 176
S o c i a l c o n f l i c t can be d e f i n e d as "a s t r u g g l e over values
or c l a i m s to s t a t u s , power, and s c a r c e r e s o u r c e s , i n which the aims
of the c o n f l i c t i n g p a r t i e s are not only to g a i n the d e s i r e d values
but a l s o to n e u t r a l i z e , i n j u r e , or e l i m i n a t e t h e i r r i v a l s " (Coser,
1968, p. 232). A p a r t i c u l a r l y b r u t a l form of such c o n f l i c t i s the
o r g a n i z e d group v i o l e n c e known as war; i t i s one of the most
d e s t r u c t i v e types of human b e h a v i o r , y e t i t i s a l s o one of the
most p o o r l y understood. This dearth of knowledge about the causes
of war has d i r e i m p l i c a t i o n s i f our hope i s f o r w o r l d peace,
because an understanding of why wars occur i s a p r e r e q u i s i t e to
the development of e f f e c t i v e measures f o r p r e v e n t i n g them.
Despite the importance of such knowledge, the s y s t e m a t i c
study of war i s a r a t h e r recent phenomenon. P r i o r to 1914, there
were o n l y i s o l a t e d examples of r i g o r o u s i n v e s t i g a t i o n , e . g . ,
Bloch's The Future of War (1899). C a r r (1964, p. 1) notes t h a t
1
2
"war was s t i l l regarded mainly as the business of s o l d i e r s ; and
the c o r o l l a r y of t h i s was t h a t i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s were the
b u s i n e s s of d i p l o m a t s . " The F i r s t World War d i s s i p a t e d these
i l l u s i o n s . In the post-war y e a r s there were attempts at
c o l l e c t i n g and a n a l y z i n g data by such s c h o l a r s as Richardson
(1960a, 1960b) and Sorokin (1937). And, of c o u r s e , there was
W r i g h t ' s massive volume, A Study of War (1942). However, i t has
o n l y been i n the l a s t f i f t e e n to twenty years t h a t war has become
a r e s p e c t a b l e research t o p i c f o r s i g n i f i c a n t numbers of s o c i a l
s c i e n t i s t s ( P r u i t t and Snyder, 1 9 6 9 ) , and we have w i t n e s s e d the
r i s e o f peace-research i n s t i t u t e s and p r o j e c t s , and a m u l t i t u d e
of new j o u r n a l s . 1
Over the past two decades, the l i t e r a t u r e on war has
become voluminous, encompassing t h e o r e t i c a l e s s a y s , s c i e n t i f i c
2 r e s e a r c h , s t r a t e g i c a n a l y s e s , and c o n f l i c t - r e s o l u t i o n p r o p o s a l s ,
There are i n s t i t u t e s l o c a t e d , f o r example, i n B e r l i n , B o u l d e r ( C o l o r a d o ) , H e l l e r u p (Denmark), P h i l a d e l p h i a , C l a r k s o n ( O n t a r i o ) , O s l o , S t . L o u i s , S t o c k h o l m , Tampere, and Tokyo. Major q u a n t i t a t i v e p r o j e c t s are M c C l e l l a n d ' s World Event I n t e r a c t i o n Survey ( 1 9 7 1 ) , North's S t u d i e s i n C o n f l i c t and I n t e g r a t i o n ( f o r t h c o m i n g ) , Rummel's D i m e n s i o n a l i t y of N a t i o n s (Rummel, 1972; H i l t o n , 1973), and S i n g e r ' s C o r r e l a t e s o_f War ( S i n g e r , 1 972; S i n g e r and S m a l l , 1972). Leading j o u r n a l s are Peace Science S o c i e t y Papers ( f o r m e r l y , Peace Research S o c i e t y P a p e r s ) , Journal of C o n f l i c t R e s o l u t i o n , and Journal of Peace Research.
2 For r e p r e s e n t a t i v e works of the t h e o r i s t s , see Aron
(1958, 1966), Boulding (1962) , Knorr ( 1 9 6 6 ) , Rapoport (1960, 1964), Waltz ( 1 9 5 9 ) , and Wolfers ( 1 9 6 2 ) ; o f the s t r a t e g i s t s , B r o d i e (1958, 1959, 1966), Kahn (1961, 1962, 1 9 6 5 ) , K i s s i n g e r ( 1 9 5 7 ) , S c h e l l i n g (1959, 1963, 1966), and Snyder (1959, 1 9 6 1 ) ; and f o r r e s o l u t i o n p r o p o s a l s , Melman (1962), M i t r a n y ( 1 9 6 6 ) , Osgood ( 1 9 6 2 ) , R u s s e l l ( 1 9 5 9 ) , S i n g e r (1962) , and St rachey (1962).
3
but a s i d e from a consensus t h a t u n i c a u s a l e x p l a n a t i o n s are
i n a d e q u a t e , there i s l i t t l e agreement on e x a c t l y why n a t i o n s
become i n v o l v e d i n war. N e v e r t h e l e s s , the e x p l a n a t i o n s t h a t
have been o f f e r e d can be d i v i d e d i n t o two broad c a t e g o r i e s .
Some s c h o l a r s emphasize the f o r c e s t h a t d r i v e s t a t e s i n t o c o n f l i c t ;
o t h e r s s t r e s s the c o n s t r a i n t s t h a t bar the paths of war-prone
s t a t e s .
According to Organski (1968) , the major d r i v i n g f o r c e i s
d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n 1 w i t h the e x i s t i n g i n t e r s t a t e o r d e r , and a
pr imary cause of d i s c o n t e n t i s the f r u s t r a t i o n of being unable to
reach valued g o a l s . A n a l o g i e s to t h i s can be found in s i s t e r
s o c i a l s c i e n c e s . P s y c h o l o g i s t s , f o r example, have shown t h a t there
is good reason to expect t h a t f r u s t r a t e d i n d i v i d u a l s w i l l behave
a g g r e s s i v e l y . And s o c i o l o g i s t s have found t h a t i n s t r a t i f i e d
s o c i a l systems there are groups whose members f e e l r e l a t i v e l y
d e p r i v e d , and they s p e c u l a t e t h a t the members of these groups
are prone to a g g r e s s i v e b e h a v i o r .
I t i s q u i t e e v i d e n t , however, t h a t all d i s s a t i s f i e d a c t o r s
do not behave a g g r e s s i v e l y . Thus, i f we are to account f o r
a g g r e s s i v e b e h a v i o r , we must look not o n l y at d r i v i n g f o r c e s ,
but a l s o at those f a c t o r s t h a t may serve to c o n s t r a i n b e h a v i o r .
1 D i s s a t i s f a c t i o n i s a p s y c h o l o g i c a l concept and, t h u s , i t w o u l d be most a c c u r a t e to say t h a t " d e c i s i o n makers of the s t a t e " a r e d i s s a t i s f i e d w i t h the b e n e f i t s t h e i r s t a t e d e r i v e s given the extant. i n t e r s t a t e o r d e r . For reasons of s t y l e and c l a r i t y , h o w e v e r , I w i l l , i n the remainder of t h i s paper, r e f e r to the state's d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n , but anthropomorphism i s not i n t e n d e d .
4
One such f a c t o r i s p r i o r e x p e r i e n c e . That i s to s a y , the behavior
of a person (or a s t a t e ) i s l i k e l y to be m o d i f i e d i f p r i o r
e x p e r i e n c e s have been unrewarding. Another c o n s t r a i n i n g f a c t o r
is a l a c k of c a p a b i l i t y . Regardless of t h e i r f r u s t r a t i o n or
e x p e r i e n c e , a c t o r s (whether they be p e r s o n s , groups, or n a t i o n -
s t a t e s ) cannot s t r i k e out unless they have s u f f i c i e n t resources
to do s o . Thus, Organski argues t h a t i t i s not merely the
d i s s a t i s f i e d s t a t e s , but the d i s s a t i s f i e d and r e l a t i v e l y p o w e r f u l ,
that are l i k e l y to become i n v o l v e d i n m i l i t a r y c o n f l i c t s .
In a d d i t i o n to these p s y c h o l o g i c a l and p h y s i c a l a t t r i b u t e s ,
there are s t r u c t u r a l f e a t u r e s t h a t r e s t r a i n b e h a v i o r , the most
important of which are the bonds t h a t u n i t e s t a t e s and weave a
network of commitments. We may again t u r n to our s i s t e r s c i e n c e s
f o r a n a l o g i e s . P s y c h o l o g i s t s b e l i e v e t h a t people who have
competing commitments attempt to a v o i d open c o n f l i c t s which might
c r e a t e c o g n i t i v e d i s s o n a n c e . S o c i o l o g i s t s h y p o t h e s i z e t h a t
people who have many competing a f f i l i a t i o n s f e e l c r o s s - p r e s s u r e d ,
find t h a t these c r o s s - p r e s s u r e s serve to m i t i g a t e c o n f l i c t s among
these p e o p l e . Thus, a complementary premise to the Organski
argument i s t h a t s t a t e s d r i v e n toward war may be c o n s t r a i n e d by
the s t r u c t u r a l c o n f i g u r a t i o n of i n t e r s t a t e r e l a t i o n s .
I t should be s t r e s s e d t h a t , i n the set of ideas sketched
in t h e paragraphs above, I have t r i e d to capture o n l y one of a
number of i m p l i c i t models t h a t permeate the l i t e r a t u r e on war,
but one t h a t I and others f i n d extremely p l a u s i b l e . I t i s my
5
b e l i e f t h a t by making these models e x p l i c i t and s u b j e c t i n g them
to s y s t e m a t i c e m p i r i c a l a n a l y s i s , we can s i g n i f i c a n t l y i n c r e a s e
our understanding of why n a t i o n s become i n v o l v e d i n m i l i t a r y
c o n f r o n t a t i o n s and, u l t i m a t e l y , wars.
With these few p r e l i m i n a r y thoughts o u t l i n e d , l e t me
now:
(1) Present some l i t e r a t u r e to i l l u m i n a t e the p r e c e d i n g
d i s c u s s i o n ;
(2) Develop and o p e r a t i o n a l i z e s e v e r a l hypotheses on the
d r i v i n g f o r c e s t h a t lead t o , and the c o n s t r a i n i n g f o r c e s t h a t
l e a d away from, war; and
(3) Test these hypotheses i n a r e f e r e n t w o r l d .
Toward War: Dissatisfaction as a Source of Aggressive Behavior
I begin w i t h an extremely b r i e f review o f some of the
hypotheses and research f i n d i n g s i n the s o c i a l s c i e n c e l i t e r a t u r e
concerned w i t h i n d i v i d u a l and group responses to d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n ,
and then d i s c u s s i n more d e t a i l a few of the i n v e s t i g a t i o n s t h a t
have been undertaken in the area of peace r e s e a r c h . Let us turn
f i r s t to work being done i n the f i e l d o f psychology.
The F r u s t r a t i o n - A g g r e s s i o n Hypothesis i n Psychology
D o l l a r d et a l . (1939) argue t h a t f r u s t r a t e d people may
become a g g r e s s i v e and t h a t t h e i r h o s t i l i t y w i l l be d i r e c t e d
p r i m a r i l y toward the p e r c e i v e d source of t h e i r f r u s t r a t i o n .
6
S i m i l a r l y , Feshbach (1964) p o s i t s t h a t f r u s t r a t i o n t h r e a t e n s an
i n d i v i d u a l ' s s e l f - e s t e e m , and P e p i t o n e (1964) suggests t h a t a
r e a l or imagined t h r e a t of l o s s of s t a t u s or s e c u r i t y may l e a d to
h o s t i l i t y and a g g r e s s i o n . An o u t p o u r i n g of l a b o r a t o r y and f i e l d
experiments has, to a large e x t e n t , supported these p r o p o s i t i o n s
( A l l i s o n and Hunt, 1 959; B e r k o w i t z , 1960; Geen, 1968; Worchel ,
I960) .
Researchers have found, however, t h a t the intensity of
a person's f r u s t r a t i o n i s not r e l a t e d to the a g g r e s s i v e n e s s of
h i s or her behavior (Buss, 1966; C u t t e r , 1963; Jegard and W a l t e r s ,
I960) . They a l s o maintain t h a t o n l y p a r t i c u l a r types of
f r u s t r a t i o n breed h o s t i l i t y , and t h a t an i n d i v i d u a l ' s r e a c t i o n to
annoying events depends upon how he or she i n t e r p r e t s the
s i t u a t i o n (Maslow, 1943; P a s t o r e , 1952; Rosenzweig, 1944). One
l e a d i n g a u t h o r i t y ( B e r k o w i t z , 1962) h y p o t h e s i z e s t h a t f r u s t r a t i o n
merely i n c r e a s e s the p o t e n t i a l f o r a g g r e s s i o n ; whether t h i s
p o t e n t i a l becomes mani fest depends upon s e v e r a l f a c t o r s , among
which are c a p a b i l i t y , l e a r n i n g , and the p e r c e p t i o n of s o c i e t a l
constraints. The r e s u l t s of experiments by B e r k o w i t z and Geen
give credence to the importance of these i n t e r v e n i n g f a c t o r s
( B e r k o w i t z , 1965; Berkowitz and Geen, 1966; Geen and B e r k o w i t z ,
1966; Geen and O'Neal, 1969).
In s h o r t , p s y c h o l o g i s t s have demonstrated t h a t f r u s t r a t e d
people may become a g g r e s s i v e . But f r u s t r a t i o n i s not the o n l y
cause o f a g g r e s s i v e behavior a n d , when people are f r u s t r a t e d ,
7
t h e i r behavior may be i n h i b i t e d by o t h e r f a c t o r s .
The S t a t u s Inconsistency Debate i n S o c i o l o g y
S i m i l a r l y , there i s a concern i n the s o c i o l o g i c a l
l i t e r a t u r e w i t h human responses to one type of s o c i a l f r u s t r a t i o n ,
t h a t a s s o c i a t e d with s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y . S o c i o l o g i s t s assume
t h a t s t r a t i f i c a t i o n i n complex s o c i e t i e s i s m u l t i - d i m e n s i o n a l and
t h a t an i n d i v i d u a l ' s rank i n one s t a t u s h i e r a r c h y does not
n e c e s s a r i l y c o i n c i d e with h i s or her p o s i t i o n i n another ( S o r o k i n ,
1927; Weber, 1968). Lenski (1966) and o t h e r s h y p o t h e s i z e t h a t
t h i s s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y i s a source of s t r e s s , and support f o r
t h i s i s found i n Jackson (1962) , who a d d i t i o n a l l y argues t h a t such
i n c o n s i s t e n c y leads to f r u s t r a t i o n . The c l a s s i c example from
American s o c i e t y i s the c o n f r o n t a t i o n between a b lack d o c t o r and
a w h i t e l a b o r e r . The former wishes to be t r e a t e d i n accordance
w i t h h i s or her p r o f e s s i o n a l s t a n d i n g , the l a t t e r i n s i s t s on
r a c i a l comparisons.
A number of r e s e a r c h e r s have examined the r e l a t i o n s h i p
between s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y , on the one hand, and support f o r
p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l reform on the o t h e r . The r e s u l t s have been
ambiguous; some f i n d i n g l i t t l e or no support (Brandmeyer, 1965;
K e l l y and C h a m b l i s s , 1966; K e n k e l , 1956; Laumann and S e g a l , 1971;
Olsen and T u l l y , 1972), and o t h e r s uncover ing a t l e a s t l i m i t e d
support (Goffman, 1957; Jackson and B u r k e , 1965; L e n s k i , 1954,
1956, 1967). I t has been argued t h a t the d i s c r e p a n c i e s i n these
8
f i n d i n g s c a n , to a l a r g e e x t e n t , be a t t r i b u t e d to the i m p r e c i s i o n
of the d e f i n i t i o n and the i n c o m p a r a b i l i t y of the dimensions and
s c a l e s used to t e s t the s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y concept (Hartman,
1974). Three general c o n c l u s i o n s may, however, be drawn from
the s o c i o l o g i c a l l i t e r a t u r e :
(1) Only people w i t h c e r t a i n types of s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y
seek p o l i t i c a l change. The r e l a t i o n s h i p e x i s t s p r i m a r i l y when
there are sharp d i s c r e p a n c i e s between i n d i v i d u a l s ' a s c r i b e d and
t h e i r achieved s t a t u s e s , i . e . , between s t a t u s e s to which people
are a s s i g n e d on the b a s i s o f i n a l t e r a b l e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ( e . g . ,
race or n a t i o n a l o r i g i n ) and those which they a t t a i n on the b a s i s
of achievement ( e . g . , e d u c a t i o n or income) ( J a c k s o n , 1962; L e n s k i ,
1964; Segal and Knoke, 1968; Treiman, 1966). To e x p l a i n t h i s ,
s o c i o l o g i s t s p o i n t out t h a t achieved s t a t u s can be r a i s e d (or
lowered) through i n d i v i d u a l e f f o r t , but changes i n ascribed s t a t u s
n e c e s s i t a t e a l t e r a t i o n s i n the c u l t u r e and s t r u c t u r e of the s o c i o
p o l i t i c a l system.
(2) A person's response to s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y v a r i e s
w i t h the d i r e c t i o n of the i n c o n s i s t e n c y ( J a c k s o n , 1962; Treiman,
1966). I n d i v i d u a l s who have high a s c r i b e d but low achieved s t a t u s e s
respond i n t r a - p u n i t i v e l y , o f t e n a v o i d i n g i n t e r p e r s o n a l i n t e r a c t i o n .
People w i t h high achieved but low a s c r i b e d s t a t u s e s respond i n an
a g g r e s s i v e , e x t r a - p u n i t i v e manner.
(3) People are l i k e l y to become a g g r e s s i v e o n l y when t h e i r
l o w a s c r i p t i v e s t a t u s i s s o c i a l l y v i s i b l e (Box and F o r d , 1969;
9
M a l e w s k i , 1963; S e g a l , 1969). Thus, s o c i o l o g i s t s suggest t h a t
the e f f e c t s of s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y are g r e a t e s t i n s o c i a l systems
where p r e s t i g e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s are very important and where the
a v a i l a b i l i t y of s t r e s s - r e d u c i n g mechanisms i s minimal (Broom and
J o n e s , 1970; Jackson and C u r t i s , 1972).
The R e l a t i v e D e p r i v a t i o n Hypothesis i n P o l i t i c a l Science
In s t u d i e s on r e v o l u t i o n , p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t s have
drawn upon the f i n d i n g s of p s y c h o l o g i s t s and s o c i o l o g i s t s , and
have hypothesized that a vast d i s c r e p a n c y between expected
achievement and e x i s t i n g c o n d i t i o n s causes people to become
d i s c o n t e n t and motivates v i o l e n t b e h a v i o r . Davies (1962, p. 8)
w r i t e s : "A r e v o l u t i o n a r y s t a t e of mind r e q u i r e s the . . .
e x p e c t a t i o n of g r e a t e r o p p o r t u n i t y to s a t i s f y b a s i c needs, which
may range from merely p h y s i c a l . . . to the need f o r equal
d i g n i t y and j u s t i c e . But the necessary a d d i t i o n a l i n g r e d i e n t i s
a p e r s i s t e n t , u n r e l e n t i n g t h r e a t to the s a t i s f a c t i o n of these
needs." Tanter and M i d l a r s k y (1967) p o s i t t h a t the d i s t a n c e
between a people's a s p i r a t i o n s , based on l o n g - t e r m performance,
and t h e i r e x p e c t a t i o n s , based on immediate c o n d i t i o n s , i s a
measure of the p o t e n t i a l f o r v i o l e n t r e v o l u t i o n . And Gurr (1970,
p. 13) s t a t e s t h a t " d i s c o n t e n t a r i s i n g from the p e r c e p t i o n of
r e l a t i v e d e p r i v a t i o n i s the b a s i c , i n s t i g a t i n g c o n d i t i o n f o r
p a r t i c i p a n t s i n c o l l e c t i v e v i o l e n c e . "
10
In sum, the r e l a t i v e d e p r i v a t i o n h y p o t h e s i s p o s t u l a t e s
t h a t , from experience or through example, people develop
e x p e c t a t i o n s of what they b e l i e v e to be t h e i r " f a i r s h a r e . "
And, i f they perceive that they are not a c c r u i n g the b e n e f i t s
to which they are " e n t i t l e d , " d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n i s aroused and
a b a s i s f o r v i o l e n t c o n f l i c t i s e s t a b l i s h e d .
A N a t i o n - S t a t e Analogy
These i d e a s , c u l l e d from l i t e r a t u r e on i n d i v i d u a l and
group b e h a v i o r , can be a n a l o g i z e d to account f o r n a t i o n - s t a t e
b e h a v i o r . F o l l o w i n g Galtung ( 1 9 6 4 ) , the i n t e r s t a t e system can
be e n v i s i o n e d as a set of i n t e r a c t i n g u n i t s s t r a t i f i e d i n m u l t i
d i m e n s i o n a l space. A s t a t e i s "status i n c o n s i s t e n t " when i t s
rank on one dimension does not c o r r e l a t e s t r o n g l y w i t h i t s
p o s i t i o n on other dimensions. I t i s reasoned t h a t d i f f e r e n t i a l
t r e a t m e n t , r e s u l t i n g from s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y , leads to
f r u s t r a t i o n . "States which f e e l h u m i l i a t e d , hampered, and
oppressed by the s t a t u s quo seek . . . to modify i t " (Schuman,
1948, p. 378). I f a s t a t e i s high on power c a p a b i l i t y i t may
possess the wherewithal to improve i t s low rank on o t h e r
d i m e n s i o n s . In p a r t i c u l a r , a s t a t e w i t h low " s o c i a l s t a t u s " in
the i n t e r s t a t e system may t r y to r a i s e i t s s t a t u s by demonstrat ing
i t s p h y s i c a l prowess. Thus, Organski (1968, p. 371) p o s t u l a t e s
t h a t the l i k e l i h o o d of major war i s g r e a t e s t "when a d i s s a t i s f i e d
c h a l l e n g e r achieves an approximate balance of power w i t h the
dominant s t a t e . " Drawing upon the s o c i o l o g i c a l argument,
11
i n c o n s i s t e n t s t a t e s which rank h i g h e r on c a p a b i l i t y than on s t a t u s
may be prone to e x t r a - p u n i t i v e , v i o l e n t b e h a v i o r , i . e . , i n t e r s t a t e
m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n . 1 On the o t h e r hand, s t a t e s which rank
h i g h e r on s t a t u s than on c a p a b i l i t y are l i k e l y to a v o i d
demonstrat ing t h e i r p h y s i c a l weakness, and w i l l attempt to
i n c r e a s e c a p a b i l i t y through i n t e r n a l development or c o l o n i a l
e x p a n s i o n .
System-Level Analyses
Several p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t s have, i n one form or a n o t h e r ,
i n v e s t i g a t e d "status i n c o n s i s t e n c y leads to war" p r o p o s i t i o n s .
East (1972) generates data f o r 130 s t a t e s f o r the y e a r s 1946-1964
and c o n s t r u c t s a t h r e e - d i m e n s i o n a l s t r a t i f i c a t i o n model of
p r e s t i g e , economic p o s i t i o n , and p o l i t i c o - m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t y .
Many h i s t o r i c a l accounts have a t t r i b u t e d involvement i n i n t e r s t a t e c o n f l i c t to the p e r c e i v e d need of powerful s t a t e s to m a i n t a i n t h e i r n a t i o n a l p r e s t i g e . T a y l o r (1954, p. 4 3 3 ) , d i s c u s s i n g the F i r s t Moroccan C r i s i s , c i t e s Bulow o v e r r u l i n g H o l s t e i n : " A l l t h a t matters i s to get out of t h i s muddle over Morocco so as to preserve our p r e s t i g e in the world . . . " A l b r e c h t - C a r r i e (1959, p. 148) accounts f o r the T r i p o l i t a n War by s t a t i n g t h a t " T r i p o l i had no economic v a l u e , but to have i t f a l l to any o t h e r power would c e r t a i n l y have been a s e r i o u s blow to I t a l i a n p r e s t i g e . " T a y l o r (1954, p. 494) r e l a t e s t h a t Franz Ferdinand t o l d W i l l i a m II c o n c e r n i n g the Balkan s i t u a t i o n i n 1913: "As soon as our p r e s t i g e demands, we must intervene in S e r b i a w i t h v i g o u r . " W o h l s t e t t e r (1962, p. 355) remarks on Japanese motives f o r the Pear l Harbor a t t a c k : "War w i t h the United S t a t e s was not chosen. The d e c i s i o n f o r war was r a t h e r f o r c e d by the d e s i r e to a v o i d the more t e r r i b l e a l t e r n a t i v e of l o s i n g s t a t u s or abandoning the n a t i o n a l o b j e c t i v e s . " And a g a i n , a few pages l a t e r : "The r i s k of doing n o t h i n g about the U n i t e d S t a t e s , w h i l e a t t a c k i n g the B r i t i s h and Dutch, and, s t i l l more, the r i s k of not a t t a c k i n g the B r i t i s h and Dutch, seemed overwhelming and u n t h i n k a b l e — the acceptance of s t a t u s as a t e n t h - r a t e power" (p. 357).
12
Using Pearson product-moment c o e f f i c i e n t s , he f i n d s t h a t the
amount o f s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y i n the system i s p o s i t i v e l y
r e l a t e d to the number of v i o l e n t i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n f l i c t s i n the
system, and that the a s s o c i a t i o n becomes s t r o n g e r w i t h time lags
of one and two y e a r s .
Wallace (1973b) s e l e c t s the s t a t e s of a E u r o - c e n t r i c
subsystem from 1825 to 1964 as h i s s p a t i a l - t e m p o r a l domain and
aggregates h i s measures at f i v e - y e a r i n t e r v a l s f o r the subsystem
as a whole. He d e f i n e s s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y as the d i s p a r i t y
between the rank order of s t a t e s on the dimensions of power
c a p a b i l i t y and d i p l o m a t i c importance. Using s imple b i v a r i a t e
c o r r e l a t i o n s , stepwise m u l t i p l e r e g r e s s i o n , and a form of
dependence a n a l y s i s , Wallace concludes t h a t (1) i n c o n s i s t e n c y has
a d i r e c t and s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h i n t e r n a t i o n a l
war, (2) the r e l a t i o n s h i p grows s t r o n g e r w i t h i n c r e a s e d time l a g s ,
and (3) more v a r i a n c e can be accounted f o r when the 140-year
temporal domain i s broken i n t o s m a l l e r s u b - p e r i o d s .
Both East and Wallace aggregate n a t i o n - s t a t e - l e v e l data
i n o r d e r to avoid a methodological d i f f i c u l t y t h a t would a r i s e
i f the d e r i v e d s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y measure i s l i n e a r l y dependent
upon the measures f o r a s c r i b e d and a c h i e v e d s t a t u s ( B l a l o c k , 1966a,
1966b, 1967a, 1967b; Hyman, 1966; M i t c h e l l , 1964). As a r e s u l t ,
t h e i r f i n d i n g s permit no i n f e r e n c e s to be drawn c o n c e r n i n g the
r e l a t i o n s h i p between s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y and war at the n a t i o n -
s t a t e l e v e l (Ray, f o r t h c o m i n g ; S i n g e r , 1961). C o n s i d e r , f o r example,
13
a system comprised of four s t a t e s , each having an i n c o n s i s t e n c y
and a war involvement s c o r e . I f we observe the system members at
three p o i n t s i n t i m e , we may f i n d t h e i r p r o f i l e s to be as f o l l o w s :
PEARSON INCONSISTENCY WAR INVOLVEMENT r
Tau1 Tau2 Tau3 Tau1 Tau2 Tau3
STATE A 20.00 40.00 20.00 35.00 15.00 35 .00 - i .00
STATE P. 5.00 30.00 55.00 20.00 15.00 10 .00 -1 .00
STATE C 20.00 15.00 10.00 5.00 30.00 55 .00 -1 .00
STATE D 35.00 15.00 35.00 20.00 40.00 20 .00. -1 .00
SYSTEM TOTAL
80.00 100.00 120.00 8 0 . 0 0 100.00 120 .00 +1 .00
C o r r e l a t i n g the i n c o n s i s t e n c y w i t h the war involvement scores f o r
each s t a t e , we uncover a p e r f e c t n e g a t i v e a s s o c i a t i o n , i . e . , when
t h e i r i n c o n s i s t e n c y scores go up, t h e i r war scores go down, and
v i c e v e r s a . For the e n t i r e system, on the o t h e r hand, the r e l a t i o n
i s p o s i t i v e . Thus, w h i l e East and Wal lace f i n d a r e l a t i o n s h i p
between s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y and war involvement at the system and
subsystem l e v e l , we cannot d i s c e r n from t h e i r a n a l y s e s whether i t
is the most i n c o n s i s t e n t s t a t e s t h a t are most war prone. Only when
a l l s t a t e s i n the p o p u l a t i o n have, c o n c u r r e n t l y , the same p r o f i l e
as one another can a s y s t e m - l e v e l a n a l y s i s r e s u l t i n p r e c i s e l y the
same f i n d i n g s as a n a t i o n - s t a t e - l e v e l a n a l y s i s . 1
1 In the l i m i t e d c a s e , we c o u l d t h i n k of a l l s t a t e s having the same scores as one another at each p o i n t in t i m e ; more g e n e r a l l y ,
since t o t a l c o v a r i a n c e i s the sum of between- and w i t h i n - g r o u p
14
N a t i o n - S t a t e - L e v e l Analyses
M i d l a r s k y (1969) examines the s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y
h y p o t h e s i s at the n a t i o n - s t a t e l e v e l f o r the years 1870-1945
and uncovers a s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t r e l a t i o n s h i p . His
measure of i n c o n s i s t e n c y i s b a s i c a l l y the mean d i f f e r e n c e between
a s t a t e ' s score f o r n a t i o n a l power c a p a b i l i t y and i t s score f o r
d i p l o m a t i c importance. M i d l a r s k y ' s a n a l y t i c technique i s not
l o n g i t u d i n a l time s e r i e s , but c r o s s - s e c t i o n a l "time exposure."
Rather than measure the rank i n c o n s i s t e n c y of each s t a t e at
d i f f e r e n t p o i n t s w i t h i n the temporal domain, he c a l c u l a t e s the
s t a t e ' s mean score f o r the e n t i r e 75-year p e r i o d . An attempt
to i n f e r from h i s f i n d i n g s to the behavior of i n c o n s i s t e n t a c t o r s
r a i s e s t i m e - s p e c i f i c d i f f i c u l t i e s t h a t are somewhat analogous to
those which r e s u l t i f one attempts to draw s t a t e - s p e c i f i c
i n f e r e n c e s from the East and Wallace a n a l y s e s . Because M i d l a r s k y ' s
study i s c r o s s - s e c t i o n a l , i t i s i m p o s s i b l e to a s c e r t a i n whether
s t a t e s are most war prone at that p o i n t in time when they are,
t h e m s e l v e s , most i n c o n s i s t e n t . To i l l u s t r a t e t h i s , assume that
we have observed the same i n t e r s t a t e system as b e f o r e , but at
d i f f e r e n t p o i n t s i n time than we had e a r l i e r . We might d i s c o v e r
the f o l l o w i n g :
c o v a r i a n c e , we are saying t h a t between-group c o v a r i a n c e i s z e r o . An i n t r o d u c t i o n to the problems a s s o c i a t e d w i t h c r o s s - l e v e l i n f e r e n c e can be found in A l k e r (1965, pp. 1 0 1 - 0 6 ; 1969), Goodman (1953, 1959), Robinson ( 1 9 5 0 ) , and S h i v e l y (1969) .
15
PEARSON INCONSISTENCY WAR INVOLVEMENT r
tau1 tau2 tau3 tau1 tau2 tau3
Time S e r i e s
STATE A 10.00 5.00 0.00 0.00 5.00 10.00 -1 .00
STATE Beta 15.00 10.00 5.00 5.00 10.00 15.00 -1 .00
STATE C 30.00 20.00 10.00 10.00 20.00 30.00 -1 .00
STATE D 40.00 30.00
Mean
20.00 20.00 30.00
Mean
40.00 - 1 . 0 0
Time Exposure
STATE A 5.00 5.00
STATE
STATE
B
C
10.00
20.00
10.00
20.00 + 1 .00
STATE D 30.00 30.00
C o r r e l a t i n g the i n c o n s i s t e n c y w i t h the war involvement score f o r
each s t a t e at each p o i n t i n t i m e , there i s a p e r f e c t n e g a t i v e
a s s o c i a t i o n ; but f o r the mean score of a l l s t a t e s over the e n t i r e
time p e r i o d , the r e l a t i o n i s p o s i t i v e . Thus, we are l e f t wi thout
t i m e - s p e c i f i c i n f o r m a t i o n c o n c e r n i n g the a s s o c i a t i o n of a s t a t e ' s
s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y and i t s war i n v o l v e m e n t .
Ray (1974) has a l s o undertaken an examinat ion of the s t a t u s
i n c o n s i s t e n c y i s s u e at the n a t i o n - s t a t e l e v e l . He, however, employs
a l o n g i t u d i n a l design and, t h e r e b y , a v o i d s the d i f f i c u l t i e s
a s s o c i a t e d with "time exposure" a n a l y s i s . Using data from 1816 to
1970 f o r ten major European s t a t e s , Ray measures i n c o n s i s t e n c y as
a f u n c t i o n of the d i f f e r e n c e between the s t a t e s ' power c a p a b i l i t i e s
and t h e i r d i p l o m a t i c importance s c o r e s . B i v a r i a t e c o r r e l a t i o n s ,
16
m u l t i p l e r e g r e s s i o n , and d i s c r i m i n a n t f u n c t i o n a n a l y s i s are
employed as wel l as c o n t r o l s f o r s e v e r a l i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s .
Ray uncovers no p a t t e r n o f s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t r e l a t i o n s h i p
between the s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y of these s t a t e s and the number,
magnitude, and s e v e r i t y of t h e i r i n t e r n a t i o n a l wars, nor does he
f i n d any between i n c o n s i s t e n c y and the initiation of wars.
In l i g h t of Ray's f i n d i n g s , one f u r t h e r e m p i r i c a l
i n v e s t i g a t i o n should be mentioned. Von R i e k h o f f (1973) completed
a p a r a l l e l study to Ray's, f o c u s i n g on major powers from 1815 to
1965. He develops several a l t e r n a t i v e i n d i c a t o r s of s t a t u s
i n c o n s i s t e n c y , a l l based upon d i p l o m a t i c importance and power
c a p a b i l i t y . Von R i e k h o f f uses r e g r e s s i o n and c a n o n i c a l a n a l y s i s
to p r e d i c t the number, magnitude, and s e v e r i t y of i n t e r n a t i o n a l
wars. He does not d i s c o v e r any r e l a t i o n s h i p s t h a t are s t r o n g e r
than those uncovered by Ray, but s i n c e they are g e n e r a l l y i n the
p r e d i c t e d d i r e c t i o n , von R i e k h o f f concludes t h a t some t e n t a t i v e
ev idence e x i s t s f o r an a s s o c i a t i o n between s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y
and war.
Away from War: C o n s t r a i n t s on N a t i o n - S t a t e Behavior
A l l the peace research t h a t we have thus f a r reviewed
f o c u s e s on only a p o r t i o n of the "status i n c o n s i s t e n c y l e a d s to
war" q u e s t i o n . The r e s e a r c h e r s have l o o k e d , f o r the most p a r t ,
a t the f o r c e s t h a t d r i v e s t a t e s i n t o war. Y e t , as the p s y c h o l o g i c a l
and s o c i o l o g i c a l l i t e r a t u r e s u g g e s t s , there are a l s o f a c t o r s that
17
i n h i b i t o r , at l e a s t , p lace l i m i t s on a g g r e s s i v e b e h a v i o r . I t
may w e l l be that s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y i n c l i n e s s t a t e s toward
behaving a g g r e s s i v e l y , but whether t h a t behavior becomes m a n i f e s t
and subsequently e s c a l a t e s i n t o war may depend on a d d i t i o n a l
f a c t o r s . I f t h i s i s so. our research needs to be t w o - s t a g e .
We must f i r s t i n v e s t i g a t e whether s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y i s
a s s o c i a t e d w i t h , l e t us s a y , m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s . Then
we must ask "under what c o n d i t i o n s are these c o n f r o n t a t i o n s
l i k e l y to r e s u l t i n wars?" I t i s to the c o n s t r a i n t s on a g g r e s s i v e
b e h a v i o r (both m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n and war) t h a t we now t u r n .
The L i m i t s of C a p a b i l i t y
Berkowitz (1962) h y p o t h e s i z e s t h a t f r u s t r a t e d i n d i v i d u a l s ,
who are r e l a t i v e l y p o w e r l e s s , f e e l v u l n e r a b l e . I f they are
unable to c o n t r o l or punish t h e i r t o r m e n t o r s , they become f e a r f u l
and a v o i d c o n f r o n t a t i o n . D o l l a r d et a l . (1939) p o i n t out t h a t
the g r e a t e r the a n t i c i p a t e d punishment, the l e s s a g g r e s s i v e l y
people w i l l behave. And Coser (1968, p. 233) notes t h a t
" p o t e n t i a l c l a i m a n t s f o r g r e a t e r income, s t a t u s , d e f e r e n c e , or
power may be d e t e r r e d from c o n f l i c t because of f e a r of consequences."
L a b o r a t o r y experiments support these c o n t e n t i o n s (Graham et a l . ,
1951; Hokanson, 1961).
A s i m i l a r p r o p o s i t i o n may be made about n a t i o n - s t a t e s , i . e . ,
whether a d i s s a t i s f i e d s t a t e w i l l r e s o r t to the use of m i l i t a r y
f o r c e depends, i n p a r t , upon i t s r e l a t i v e c a p a b i l i t y . The complete
underdog, n e a r l y i n c a p a b l e of a c t i n g , i s not l i k e l y to i n i t i a t e a
18
m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n ; i t i s the d i s c o n t e n t e d s t a t e which has
a v a i l a b l e resources that i s most a g g r e s s i v e ( G a l t u n g , 1964).
Organski (1968, p. 371) comments: "World peace i s guaranteed
when the nat ions s a t i s f i e d w i t h the e x i s t i n g i n t e r n a t i o n a l order
enjoy an unchallenged supremacy of power." And North (1968,
p. 231) presents p r e c i s e l y t h i s argument when d i s c u s s i n g the
v i a b i l i t y of i n t e g r a t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p s : "Reduced to s i m p l e s t
terms, the d u r a b i l i t y of a given compact or o t h e r i n t e g r a t i v e
r e l a t i o n s h i p w i l l depend upon two main v a r i a b l e s : (1) the
r e l a t i v e c a p a b i l i t y of each p a r t y , . . . and (2) the amount of
d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n evoked, or p e n a l t y demanded, by the r e l a t i o n s h i p . "
The a s s o c i a t i o n between r e l a t i v e c a p a b i l i t y and the use
of m i l i t a r y f o r c e has been examined by F e r r i s and by S i n g e r and
h i s c o l l e a g u e s . T h e i r analyses have produced mixed r e s u l t s .
F e r r i s (1973) f i n d s that the power d i s p a r i t y between s t a t e s ,
and changes i n t h a t d i s p a r i t y , are not good p r e d i c t o r s of
whether i n t e r s t a t e d i s p u t e s w i l l i n v o l v e military hostilities.
But he does uncover moderate support f o r the p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t
these p r e d i c t o r s are p o s i t i v e l y r e l a t e d to intense conflicts.
S i n g e r and Small (1974) f i n d t h a t major powers experience war
more o f t e n when t h e i r c a p a b i l i t y i s below the mean f o r a l l major
powers, and t h a t major power wars are o f t e n i n i t i a t e d by s t a t e s
t h a t are r e l a t i v e l y i n f e r i o r but g a i n i n g i n c a p a b i l i t y . However,
i n a r e l a t e d study t h a t i n c l u d e d non-major s t a t e s , Stuckey and
S i n g e r (1973) show t h a t the more powerful s t a t e s ( i n terms of
19
demographic, i n d u s t r i a l , and m i l i t a r y s t r e n g t h ) are i n v o l v e d in
a g r e a t e r number and more severe wars than the l e s s powerful ones,
and t h a t powerful s t a t e s are a l s o more l i k e l y to i n i t i a t e wars.
The f i n d i n g s of t h i s l a t t e r study have been supported by
subsequent analyses (Bremer, f o r t h c o m i n g ) .
M i n d f u l of the l i t e r a t u r e review i n the preceding s e c t i o n ,
I h y p o t h e s i z e t h a t s tatus i n c o n s i s t e n t 1 s t a t e s are d i s s a t i s f i e d
w i t h the e x i s t i n g i n t e r s t a t e order and are prone to involvement i n
i n t e r s t a t e m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s . I f t h e i r power c a p a b i l i t i e s
are i n c r e a s i n g , then c o n f r o n t a t i o n s become even more p r o b a b l e .
But whether these c o n f r o n t a t i o n s e r u p t i n t o war depends upon
a d d i t i o n a l f a c t o r s , one of which i s r e l a t i v e c a p a b i l i t y .
F o l l o w i n g Organski (1968), i f the opposing s t a t e s are r e l a t i v e l y
equal i n power c a p a b i l i t i e s , the l i k e l i h o o d of war i s g r e a t ; i f
u n e q u a l , the l i k e l i h o o d i s s m a l l e r because the more powerful s t a t e
i s more l i k e l y to be able to o b t a i n i t s ends w i t h o u t r e s o r t i n g to
s u b s t a n t i a l m i l i t a r y f o r c e , w h i l e the l e s s powerful country i s
l e s s l i k e l y to be able to defend i t s i n t e r e s t s .
However, another f a c t o r needs to be c o n s i d e r e d — n a m e l y ,
t h a t the c a p a c i t y to employ armed f o r c e tends to d i m i n i s h w i t h
d i s t a n c e from the t a r g e t ( B o u l d i n g , 1962). Thus, G l e d i t s c h and
S i n g e r (1975) f i n d that w h i l e the average geographic d i s t a n c e
between opponents i n i n t e r s t a t e wars i n c r e a s e s between 1816 and
For the remainder of t h i s s t u d y , "status i n c o n s i s t e n t " w i l l r e f e r only to those s i t u a t i o n s i n which a s t a t e i s a t t r i b u t e d l e s s importance than would be e x p e c t e d , g iven i t s power c a p a b i l i t y .
20
1965, t h a t d i s t a n c e i s c o n s i d e r a b l y l e s s than the average i n t e r -
c a p i t a l d i s t a n c e between a l l c o u n t r i e s i n the i n t e r s t a t e system.
Pearson (1974), l o o k i n g a t only post-WW II d a t a , notes t h a t there
are few h o s t i l e m i l i t a r y i n t e r v e n t i o n s when the d i s t a n c e between
i n t e r v e n e r and t a r g e t country i s g r e a t (> 1500 m i l e s ) . Russett
(1967, p. 198) d i s c o v e r s t h a t n e a r l y t w o - t h i r d s of the s t a t e s
i n m i l i t a r y c o n f l i c t s d u r i n g the p e r i o d 1946-1965 are
g e o g r a p h i c a l l y proximate to one a n o t h e r . And Richardson (1960b,
p. 297) demonstrates t h a t , from 1820 to 1945, s i x t y - f i v e percent
of a l l deadly q u a r r e l s k i l l i n g 317 or more people are between
n e i g h b o r i n g opponents. None of these r e s e a r c h e r s would argue
t h a t s t a t e s become i n v o l v e d i n m i l i t a r y c o n f l i c t s because they
are prox imate. Rather , geographic nearness makes s t a t e s s a l i e n t
to one another and o f f e r s them the o p p o r t u n i t y to e f f e c t i v e l y
u t i l i z e t h e i r m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t i e s . In l i g h t of t h i s e v i d e n c e ,
i t i s a d d i t i o n a l l y hypothesized t h a t wars are more l i k e l y to
o c c u r i f the p a r t i e s to the c o n f r o n t a t i o n s are cont iguous than
i f they are d i s t a n t .
L e a r n i n g from Experience
Another i n t e r v e n i n g f a c t o r between s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y
and war involvement i s l e a r n i n g . Exper ience serves as a source
of e x p e c t a t i o n concerning the consequences of f u t u r e b e h a v i o r .
B e r k o w i t z (1962) s t r e s s e s t h a t people's r e a c t i o n s to f r u s t r a t i o n
can be a l t e r e d by t r a i n i n g , and t h a t t h e i r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of an
event and t h e i r responses to i t can be moderated or a m p l i f i e d .
21
P s y c h o l o g i c a l experiments have shown t h a t unrewarded a g g r e s s i v e
b e h a v i o r as w e l l as rewarded ami c a b l e behavior produce non-
a g g r e s s i v e responses (Brown and E l l i o t t , 1965; H o r t o n , 1970).
In c o n t r a s t , w i t n e s s i n g unpunished or rewarded a g g r e s s i v e
b e h a v i o r can reduce people's i n h i b i t i o n s a g a i n s t o v e r t v i o l e n c e
(Bandura, Ross, and Ross, 1961, 1963) . Indeed, Bandura (1965)
f i n d s t h a t rewarded b e l l i g e r e n c e serves as an i n c e n t i v e f o r
f u t u r e a c t s of v i o l e n c e , and o t h e r s t u d i e s conclude t h a t such
r e i n f o r c e m e n t not only i n c r e a s e s the i n c i d e n c e , but a l s o the
i n t e n s i t y of a g g r e s s i v e behavior (Geen and P i g g , 1970; Geen
and S t o n n e r , 1971).
At the n a t i o n - s t a t e l e v e l , North (1968, p. 231) suggests
t h a t "the d u r a b i l i t y of an i n t e g r a t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p w i l l depend
. . . upon the p r e c e d e n t s , t h a t i s , upon whether or not prev ious
agreements have worked to the s a t i s f a c t i o n of the p a r t i e s . " And
Raser (1965, p. 2 2 5 ) , in a s p e c u l a t i v e essay on the i m p l i c a t i o n
f o r i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s of Mowrer's two f a c t o r l e a r n i n g t h e o r y ,
c o n c l u d e s t h a t "behavior can be a l t e r e d by the c o n s c i o u s m a n i p u l a t i o n
o f reward and punishment." But S i n g e r and Small (1974) d i s c o v e r
t h a t n a t i o n - s t a t e s do not l e a r n from the war e x p e r i e n c e of o t h e r
s t a t e s . For example, they f i n d t h a t p u n i s h i n g a war i n i t i a t o r
by d e f e a t i n g i t does not reduce the l i k e l i h o o d t h a t another s t a t e
w i l l i n i t i a t e a war w i t h i n the same or subsequent y e a r . I t
should however be noted t h a t S i n g e r and Small are not examining
the q u e s t i o n of whether a s t a t e l e a r n s from i t s own e x p e r i e n c e .
22
T h e i r f i n d i n g s do not c h a l l e n g e the c o n t e n t i o n t h a t a s t a t e
which wages a s e r i e s of d i s a s t r o u s wars i s not l i k e l y to soon
resume i t s a g g r e s s i v e behavior (Shy, 1971). Indeed, r e s e a r c h
on major powers, c u r r e n t l y underway at the C o r r e l a t e s of War
P r o j e c t , shows t h a t , s i n c e 1816, the g r e a t e r the number of
b a t t l e f i e l d f a t a l i t i e s s u s t a i n e d by a major power i n war,
the l o n g e r the time i n t e r v a l before i t becomes i n v o l v e d i n
another war.
Every war i s a p u n i s h i n g e x p e r i e n c e , some more c o s t l y
than o t h e r s . I would surmise t h a t d e c i s i o n makers c o n s i d e r
t h e i r l o s s e s i n p r i o r wars before p l u n g i n g i n t o a n o t h e r . And
I p o s i t that the more c o s t l y these p r i o r wars, the l e s s l i k e l y
are d e c i s i o n makers to press f o r subsequent c o n f r o n t a t i o n s and
the s m a l l e r the l i k e l i h o o d t h a t such c o n f r o n t a t i o n s w i l l s p i l l
over i n t o war.
The Structure of the System
A f i n a l set of i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s can be found among
the s t r u c t u r a l p r o p e r t i e s of the i n t e r s t a t e system. As every
b e g i n n i n g student i n wor ld p o l i t i c s l e a r n s , i n t e r - s t a t e r e l a t i o n s
d i f f e r fundamental ly from i n t r a - s t a t e r e l a t i o n s i n t h a t the
former has — inter a l i a — n o e f f e c t i v e c e n t r a l i z e d government
(Herz , 1 959; P u c h a l a , 1971; Ranney, 1966). Rousseau ( c i r c a 1756)
t e l l s us that wars occur because there i s n o t h i n g to prevent them.
H o l s t i (1967, p. 348) w r i t e s : "A more general reason f o r the use
o f v i o l e n c e i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s i s the absence of systemic
23
c o n s t r a i n t s on i t s use." And Waltz (1959, p. 234) concludes
t h a t i f war r e s u l t s because s t a t e A has something t h a t s t a t e B
wants, "the e f f i c i e n t cause of war i s the d e s i r e of s t a t e B [, but]
the p e r m i s s i v e cause i s the f a c t t h a t there i s n o t h i n g to prevent
s t a t e B from undertaking the r i s k s of war."
However, a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s have found t h a t v i a b l e and
s t a b l e s o c i e t i e s e x i s t which l a c k both c e n t r a l government and
s p e c i a l i z e d p o l i t i c a l r o l e s . Colson (1953) d e s c r i b e s one
p a r t i c u l a r s o c i e t y in which the p e o p l e ' s l o y a l t i e s are d i v i d e d
between t e r r i t o r i a l and k i n s h i p groups. Each i n d i v i d u a l i s
i n t e g r a t e d i n t o a system of o v e r l a p p i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p s . When
a person a c t s to f u l f i l l an o b l i g a t i o n to one group, he or she
i s faced by c o u n t e r c l a i m s from o t h e r groups. "In a s o c i e t y of
t h i s t y p e , i t i s i m p o s s i b l e to have the development of the feud
and the i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n of repeated a c t s of vengeance,
f o r each a c t of vengeance, l i k e each o r i g i n a l i n c i d e n t , m o b i l i z e s
d i f f e r e n t groups whose i n t e r e s t s are concerned i n the p a r t i c u l a r
case and t h a t alone" (p. 2 1 0 ) .
Although the " i m p o s s i b i l i t y o f the feud" i s perhaps over
emphasized, Colson's study accords w e l l w i t h the p s y c h o l o g i s t s '
f i n d i n g s that people who f e a r t h a t t h e i r a c t i o n s may i n c u r s o c i a l
d i s a p p r o v a l are o f t e n i n h i b i t e d from behaving a g g r e s s i v e l y or
are l i k e l y to d i s p l a c e t h e i r h o s t i l i t y onto s u b s t i t u t e t a r g e t s
(Rule and P e r c i v a l , 1971; Worchel , 1966). S i m i l a r l y , C o l s o n ' s
e x p l a n a t i o n f i n d s support in the s o c i o l o g i c a l l i t e r a t u r e . Indeed,
24
the e x p l a n a t i o n i s e q u i v a l e n t to the " c r o s s - c u t t i n g c l e a v a g e s "
p r o p o s i t i o n (Coser, 1956, 1968) . Simply s t a t e d , i n a s o c i e t y
i n which there are many c r o s s - c u t t i n g a s s o c i a t i o n s , c r o s s -
p r e s s u r e s on the i n d i v i d u a l a l o n g a p l u r a l i t y of f r o n t s l e s s e n
the l i k e l i h o o d t h a t any s i n g l e c o n f l i c t might become o v e r l y
i n t e n s e . (The term " c r o s s - c u t t i n g " r e f e r s to the " p h y s i c a l "
e x i s t e n c e of competing commitments; the term " c r o s s - p r e s s u r e "
r e f e r s to the " p s y c h o l o g i c a l " e f f e c t s of these commitments.)
Gal tung (1968, p. 490) a p p l i e s t h i s " c r o s s - c u t t i n g c l e a v a g e s "
p r o p o s i t i o n to the behavior of n a t i o n - s t a t e s : "If two n a t i o n s
are a l l i e s i n one c o n f l i c t ( f o r i n s t a n c e , between East and
West, i n the language of the c o l d w a r ) , they may n e v e r t h e l e s s
be a n t a g o n i s t s i n another c o n f l i c t ( f o r i n s t a n c e , between r i c h
and poor n a t i o n s ) , and t h i s s u b j e c t s them to c r o s s p r e s s u r e s . "
He reasons t h a t c r o s s - c u t t i n g a s s o c i a t i o n s prevent complete
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n and involvement i n any c o n f l i c t , and t h a t c r o s s -
p r e s s u r e d s t a t e s tend to serve as mediators between s t a t e s t h a t
are not c r o s s - p r e s s u r e d .
There has been very l i t t l e e m p i r i c a l r e s e a r c h on the
r e l a t i o n of c r o s s - c u t t i n g to war and, to my knowledge, none
a t the n a t i o n - s t a t e l e v e l . The most prominent s y s t e m - l e v e l
a n a l y s i s has been done by Wal lace (1973a). He examines data f o r
a l l members of the i n t e r s t a t e system ( S i n g e r and S m a l l , 1972)
d u r i n g the p e r i o d 1815-1964, and uses s m a l l e s t space a n a l y s i s
to c l u s t e r s t a t e s , at f i v e - y e a r i n t e r v a l s , on m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e ,
25
i n t e r n a t i o n a l governmental o r g a n i z a t i o n , and d i p l o m a t i c
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n dimensions. Al though the e x p l a n a t o r y power
of the v a r i a b l e i s s m a l l , Wal lace f i n d s t h a t a g r e a t e r amount
of war i n the system i s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h both very low and very
high l e v e l s of c r o s s - c u t t i n g i n the system, and r e l a t i v e l y
l e s s war w i t h moderate c r o s s - c u t t i n g . He s p e c u l a t e s t h a t ,
at the one extreme, a h e a v i l y c r o s s - c u t i n t e r s t a t e system
generates c o n f u s i o n as to the i d e n t i t y of a l l i e s and a d v e r s a r i e s
and t h a t t h i s , in t u r n , leads to l e s s p r e d i c t a b l e c o n f l i c t
b e h a v i o r ; and t h a t , at the o t h e r extreme, a system which i s not
c r o s s - c u t l a c k s the c o u n t e r v a i l i n g l i n k s t h a t serve to temper
b e h a v i o r .
Although Wal lace's f i n d i n g s at the system l e v e l may tempt
us to p o s i t the same c u r v i l i n e a r i t y at the n a t i o n - s t a t e l e v e l ,
I need o n l y c a u t i o n the reader about the dangers of c r o s s - l e v e l
i n f e r e n c e . The important q u e s t i o n i s whether W a l l a c e ' s
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the r e l a t i o n s h i p , i . e . , t h a t high l e v e l s of
c r o s s - c u t t i n g i n the system lead to c o n f u s i o n and i n c r e a s e d war
i n the system, suggests a p a r a l l e l h y p o t h e s i s concerning the
behavior of h e a v i l y " c r o s s - p r e s s u r e d " s t a t e s . I t h i n k t h a t ,
at the n a t i o n - s t a t e l e v e l , the c u r v i l i n e a r r e l a t i o n s h i p i s
somewhat l e s s p l a u s i b l e than the s i m p l e r l i n e a r r e l a t i o n s h i p
t h a t accords w i t h the a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l and s o c i o l o g i c a l l i t e r a t u r e .
Thus, I p o s t u l a t e that the more c r o s s - c u t a s t a t e ' s bonds, the
more c o n s t r a i n e d i t i s and the l e s s l i k e l y i t i s to become i n v o l v e d
26
i n a m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n . And i f such a c o n f r o n t a t i o n does
o c c u r , the p r o b a b i l i t y that i t w i l l r e s u l t in war w i l l be reduced
i f the opposing s t a t e s have bonds wi th one a n o t h e r .
The " c r o s s - c u t t i n g " l i t e r a t u r e , w i t h i t s emphasis upon
the moderating i n f l u e n c e of m u l t i p l e a f f i l i a t i o n s , suggests to
me t h a t the mere opportunity to have m u l t i p l e a f f i l i a t i o n s may
have a s i m i l a r e f f e c t . And t h i s leads me to s p e c u l a t e about a
second s t r u c t u r a l v a r i a b l e , one t h a t i s concerned w i t h the
o p p o r t u n i t y f o r new al ignments w i t h i n the system. This second
v a r i a b l e i s polarity. The l i t e r a t u r e u s u s a l l y c o n t r a s t s
b i - p o l a r i t y , a s i t u a t i o n i n which two opposing camps leave l i t t l e
room f o r r e - a l i g n m e n t , wi th more f l e x i b l e m u l t i - p o l a r systems.
There i s , however, no consensus in the t h e o r e t i c a l l i t e r a t u r e
on whether b i - p o l a r i t y (Waltz , 1964, 1 9 6 7 ) , m u l t i - p o l a r i t y (Deutsch
and S i n g e r , 1964), or some mixture of the two (Rosecrance, 1966)
i s most conducive to peace, a l though the advocates of m u l t i -
p o l a r i t y a r e , perhaps, more numerous.
To d a t e , e m p i r i c a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n has not served to i n c r e a s e
the l i k e l i h o o d of consensus. S i n g e r and Small (1968) f i n d p o s i t i v e
c o r r e l a t i o n s between b i - p o l a r i t y and the number, magnitude, and
s e v e r i t y of wars in the i n t e r s t a t e system d u r i n g the 19th c e n t u r y ,
but m a i n l y negat ive r e l a t i o n s h i p s i n the 2 0 t h . Haas (1970) looks
a t twenty-one h i s t o r i c a l systems i n Europe, A s i a , and Hawaii f o r
the y e a r s 1649-1963 and concludes t h a t the number of poles i n the
system i s n e g a t i v e l y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the number, magnitude, and
27
s e v e r i t y of wars in the system. And Wallace (1973a) examines
the i n t e r n a t i o n a l system from 1815 to 1964 and f i n d s a c u r v i
l i n e a r r e l a t i o n s h i p in which the amount of war i n the system i s
g r e a t e s t when b i - p o l a r i t y i s very pronounced or not d i s c e r n i b l e
and, c o n v e r s e l y , i s l e a s t i n a moderately p o l a r i z e d system.
I t should be noted t h a t these l a t t e r e m p i r i c a l s t u d i e s
i n v e s t i g a t e the amount of war i n the system. To my knowledge,
there has been no systematic e m p i r i c a l research examining the
e f f e c t s o f b i - p o l a r i t y on n a t i o n a l b e h a v i o r . I f , f o r example,
we found that b i - p o l a r i t y was a s s o c i a t e d w i t h more war i n the
system, we s t i l l would not know whether all n a t i o n s become more
war p r o n e , only p a r t i c u l a r types of n a t i o n s ( e . g . , major powers),
or o n l y n a t i o n s i n p a r t i c u l a r p o s i t i o n s ( e . g . , the most p e r i p h e r a l
n a t i o n s ) . In a d d i t i o n , the research to date has tended to focus
on whether wars are l i k e l y to be l o n g e r or s h o r t e r , b l o o d i e r or
l e s s d e a d l y , given that the system i s b i - p o l a r , r a t h e r than on
whether or not a war w i l l o c c u r . 1
While being s e n s i t i v e to the p o s s i b i l i t y of a c u r v i l i n e a r
r e l a t i o n s h i p between b i - p o l a r i t y and the i n c i d e n c e of war, I s h a l l
n e v e r t h e l e s s hypothesize a l i n e a r r e l a t i o n s h i p t h a t complements
1One f u r t h e r point might be made. I f one i s i n v e s t i g a t i n g q u e s t i o n s concerned wi th the amount of war r a t h e r than the o c c u r r e n c e of war, one's u n i t of a n a l y s i s would more p r o p e r l y be the war than the y e a r . That i s , i f one were i n t e r e s t e d i n d i s c o v e r i n g what v a r i a b l e s best account f o r the s i z e of a war, i t would be best to look at only those s i t u a t i o n s i n which wars occur and then determine what v a r i a b l e s account f o r the s i z e of those wars' ( D u v a l l , 1974; Z i n n e s , 1967).
28
t h a t p o s t u l a t e d f o r c r o s s - c u t t i n g . I p o s i t t h a t the l e s s b i - p o l a r
the system, the g r e a t e r the o p p o r t u n i t y f o r m u l t i p l e competing
a f f i l i a t i o n s and the l e s s the l i k e l i h o o d of s e r i o u s m i l i t a r y
c o n f r o n t a t i o n s . I f such c o n f r o n t a t i o n s do a r i s e , the l e s s b i - p o l a r
the system, the s m a l l e r the p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t they w i l l erupt, i n t o
war.
Summarizing the P r o p o s i t i o n s and Positing a Model
Before becoming more deeply committed to t h i s r e s e a r c h ,
we s h o u l d c o n f r o n t one l i n g e r i n g doubt c o n c e r n i n g i t s p r o f i t a b i l i t y .
The reader probably has noted t h a t , i n the e m p i r i c a l s t u d i e s we
have r e v i e w e d , there i s o f t e n a l a c k of agreement from one set of
r e s u l t s to the next. Depending on the l e v e l of a n a l y s i s , the
methodology, or the o p e r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of the v a r i a b l e s , some of
the s t u d i e s support the p r o p o s i t i o n s under i n v e s t i g a t i o n w h i l e
o t h e r s do not . W a l l a c e , E a s t , M i d l a r s k y , and von R i e k h o f f uncover
a r e l a t i o n s h i p between s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y and war; Ray does not.
Stuckey and S i n g e r f i n d a r e l a t i o n s h i p between c a p a b i l i t y and war;
F e r r i s , f o r the most p a r t , does not . And so f o r t h . Can i t be
p r o f i t a b l e t o , a g a i n , examine these same v a r i a b l e s ? I would say
"yes." In a d d i t i o n to the usual arguments t h a t v a r i a b l e s were not
a d e q u a t e l y o p e r a t i o n a l i z e d and that b e t t e r data i s now a v a i l a b l e ,
t h e r e are more s u b t l e and i n t r i g u i n g r e a s o n s . F i r s t , the analyses
to date have r e s t e d mainly upon the search f o r cont inuous l i n e a r
f u n c t i o n s . Yet , the u n d e r l y i n g a s s o c i a t i o n may be c u r v i l i n e a r or
29
show t h r e s h o l d p r o p e r t i e s which would not be captured by a l i n e a r
r e g r e s s i o n or a product-moment c o e f f i c i e n t . Second, the absence
of s t r o n g evidence s u p p o r t i n g a r e l a t i o n s h i p , f o r example,
between s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y or r e l a t i v e c a p a b i l i t y , on the one
hand, and war involvement on the o t h e r does not negate the
p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t i n c o n s i s t e n c y and r e l a t i v e c a p a b i l i t y are
s i g n i f i c a n t l y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h war. I f we t h i n k about s t a t i s t i c a l
s i g n i f i c a n c e i n terms of "necessary" and " s u f f i c i e n t " c o n d i t i o n s ,
i t becomes c l e a r that an i n s i g n i f i c a n t b i v a r i a t e r e l a t i o n s h i p does
not imply that a v a r i a b l e i s w i t h o u t e x p l a n a t o r y power when placed
i n a m u l t i v a r i a t e c o n t e x t . As an example, suppose t h a t a
dependent v a r i a b l e i s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h r e e p r e d i c t o r v a r i a b l e s ,
t h a t are d i s t r i b u t e d as f o l l o w s : 1
OBS # PRED 1 PRED 2 PRED 3 DEP VAR
1 25. 00 24. 00 23.00 4. 00
2 2 23. 00 22. 00 21 .00 5. 00
3 21. 00 20. 00 19.00 10. 00
4 19. 00 18. 00 17.00 15. 00
5 17. 00 16. 00 15.00 20. 00
6 15. 00 14. 00 13.00 24. 00
7 99. 00 98. 00 97.00 75. 00
8 99. 00 10. 00 9.00 75. 00
I am i l l u s t r a t i o n of
indebted to John Stuckey f o r s u g g e s t i n g a s i m i l a r t h i s p r i n c i p l e .
30
OBS # PRED 1 PRED 2 PRED 3 DEP VAR
9 98.00 10.00 97. 00 76, .00
10 9.00 95.00 8. 00 77 .00
11 8.00 7.00 92. 00 78, .00
12 7.00 92.00 90. 00 79, .00
13 93.00 90.00 7. 00 80. .00
14 6.00 6.00 8 8 . 00 85. ,00
15 87.00 5.00 6. 00 89. ,00
16 5.00 83.00 4. 00 91. ,00
17 4.00 79.00 3 . 00 94. 00
18 3.00 2. 00 76. 00 96. 00
19 75.00 1.00 2 . 00 99. 00
INTERCORRELATION MATRIX
PRED 1 1.00
PRED 2 - . 0 3 1.00
PRED 3 - . 0 0 - . 0 3 1. 00
DEP VAR .24 .26 • 24 1. 00
PRED 1 PRED 2 PRED 3 DEP VAR
I f we examine the b i v a r i a t e c o r r e l a t i o n s , we would probably
conclude that the r e l a t i o n s h i p s are not p a r t i c u l a r l y i m p o r t a n t ,
s i n c e no s i n g l e p r e d i c t o r v a r i a b l e accounts f o r more than seven
percent of the v a r i a n c e i n the dependent v a r i a b l e . However,
a s imple cont ingency t a b l e or a s c a t t e r p l o t of each p r e d i c t o r
v a r i a b l e a g a i n s t the dependent v a r i a b l e , and a comparison of the
31
t h r e e t a b l e s or p l o t s with one another would reveal a s t r i k i n g
r e l a t i o n s h i p : a high score ( > 5 0 . ) on any p r e d i c t o r v a r i a b l e
appears to be a s u f f i c i e n t , and may be even a n e c e s s a r y , c o n d i t i o n
f o r a high score on the dependent v a r i a b l e . This can be shown
s t a t i s t i c a l l y by combining the three p r e d i c t o r v a r i a b l e s i n t o a
new v a r i a b l e that i s given a score of "one" whenever any of the
t h r e e p r e d i c t o r s i s h i g h , and a score of "zero" o t h e r w i s e . A
one-way a n a l y s i s of v a r i a n c e , w i t h the dependent v a r i a b l e
s t r a t i f i e d by t h i s new dichotomous p r e d i c t o r v a r i a b l e , i s
s i g n i f i c a n t at the .00 l e v e l ; and a r e g r e s s i o n , w i t h the new
dichotomous v a r i a b l e as the p r e d i c t o r , accounts f o r almost
n i n e t y - f i v e percent of the v a r i a n c e i n the dependent v a r i a b l e .
A s i m p l e b i v a r i a t e a n a l y s i s , t h a t focused on the s e p a r a t e e f f e c t s
of the o r i g i n a l p r e d i c t o r v a r i a b l e s , would have f a i l e d to reveal
t h i s m u l t i - v a r i a b l e r e l a t i o n s h i p . Thus, the i n c l u s i o n of several
f a c t o r s i n an a n a l y s i s may demonstrate an a s s o c i a t i o n where fewer
v a r i a b l e s prove i n s u f f i c i e n t . The number and the i d e n t i t y o f
v a r i a b l e s to i n c l u d e , and the manner i n which they are to be
combined, of c o u r s e , must d e r i v e from one's t h e o r y , model, or
hypotheses.
Our t h e o r e t i c a l argument i s t h a t s t a t e s t h a t are
a t t r i b u t e d l e s s importance ( i . e . , have lower a s c r i b e d s t a t u s )
than would be expected on the b a s i s of t h e i r c a p a b i l i t i e s
are more prone to m i l i t a r y c o n f l i c t than s t a t e s t h a t have the
o p p o s i t e p r o f i l e or are s t a t u s - c o n g r u e n t . Whether these s t a t e s
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r e s o r t to a g g r e s s i v e b e h a v i o r , however, depends upon a d d i t i o n a l
f a c t o r s — some p h y s i c a l ( c a p a b i l i t y and c o n t i g u i t y ) , some
p s y c h o l o g i c a l ( p r i o r e x p e r i e n c e ) , and some s t r u c t u r a l ( c r o s s -
c u t t i n g and p o l a r i t y ) . We can p o r t r a y t h i s as a two-stage model
the f i r s t l e a d i n g from s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y to m i l i t a r y
c o n f r o n t a t i o n , the second from c o n f r o n t a t i o n to war.
STAGE 1: NATIONAL
Intervening variables
1) change in power
2) p r i o r war experience
3) cross-cutting bonds
4) p o l a r i t y
STAGE 2: DYADIC
i n t e r v e n i n g variables 1) d i f f e r e n c e
in power 2) c o n t i g u i t y 3) p r i o r war
e x p e r i e n c e 4) r e c i p r o c a l
bonds 5) p o l a r i t y
s t a t u s inconsistent
s t a t e s
l n t e r s t a t e military
c o n f r o n t a t i o n s
i n t e r s t a t e wars
In the f i r s t s t a g e , our u n i t of a n a l y s i s i s the year and
we undertake a n a t i o n - s t a t e - l e v e l a n a l y s i s . That i s to s a y , we
f i r s t i n v e s t i g a t e whether, g iven the i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s
hypothesized above, s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t n a t i o n - s t a t e s are
u n u s u a l l y a g g r e s s i v e . N a t u r a l l y , I do not expect all s t a t e s
engaged i n m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s to be s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t ,
but r a t h e r t h a t s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t s t a t e s w i l l be i n v o l v e d i n
m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s much more f r e q u e n t l y than would be expected
33
by chance. And, i f i t has not been e v i d e n t from what I have s a i d
p r e v i o u s l y , 1 would expect s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t s t a t e s to initiate
a d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e number of m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s .
In the second s t a g e , our u n i t of a n a l y s i s becomes the
c o n f l i c t . We now w i l l have a s e t of m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s and
w i l l have i d e n t i f i e d the dyads i n v o l v e d i n each of them. We w i l l
determine whether the i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s s p e c i f i e d above are
s u f f i c i e n t to d i s t i n g u i s h between those c o n f r o n t a t i o n s t h a t r e s u l t
i n war and those that do not . U n l i k e prev ious i n v e s t i g a t i o n s
t h a t sought a d i r e c t l i n k between s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y and
war i n v o l v e m e n t , no such c o n n e c t i o n i s p o s i t e d here. S t a t u s
i n c o n s i s t e n c y i s hypothesized to make s t a t e s prone to m i l i t a r y
c o n f r o n t a t i o n ; but once such a c o n f r o n t a t i o n o c c u r s , a d i f f e r e n t
s e t of dynamics i s i n v o l v e d and the l i k e l i h o o d of war depends
upon the p h y s i c a l , p s y c h o l o g i c a l , and s t r u c t u r a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s
of the p a r t i e s to the c o n f l i c t .
In c o n c l u d i n g t h i s c h a p t e r , I again emphasize t h a t the
model presented in the preceding pages i s o n l y one o f a number of
c o n t e n d i n g e x p l a n a t i o n s i m p l i c i t i n the l i t e r a t u r e . Having s a i d
t h i s , l e t us turn to the r e s e a r c h design w i t h which I hope to
t e s t the model.
CHAPTER II
THE RESEARCH DESIGN
The Referent World
Spatial Domain
To t e s t the p r o p o s i t i o n s p o s i t e d i n Chapter One, I have
s e l e c t e d the set of s t a t e s t h a t comprise the major power subsystem
from 1820 to 1970. Several f a c t o r s have guided t h i s c h o i c e .
There are those that might be l a b e l e d c o n c e p t u a l . "Status" i s
l i k e l y to be s a l i e n t to major powers, i n t h a t they have the
c a p a c i t y to gather and process i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t would make them
aware of t h e i r p o s i t i o n v i s - a - v i s o t h e r s t a t e s and t h a t they are
s u f f i c i e n t l y near the top of the "pecking order" to have a
prominent benchmark a g a i n s t which to compare t h e i r gains and
l o s s e s . In a d d i t i o n , the major powers i n t e r a c t amongst themselves
w i t h s u f f i c i e n t r e g u l a r i t y t h a t we can c o n s i d e r them members of
an i n t e r n a t i o n a l "system." S t r u c t u r a l concepts such as " c r o s s -
c u t t i n g " and " p o l a r i t y " are most l i k e l y to be meaningful under
such c o n d i t i o n s .
There i s a l s o a very p r a c t i c a l reason f o r s e l e c t i n g the
major power subsystem, namely, the a v a i l a b i l i t y of high q u a l i t y
34
35
d a t a . At l e a s t f o r the n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y , the most r e l i a b l e data
t h a t have been generated on n a t i o n a l a t t r i b u t e s and b e h a v i o r e x i s t
f o r the major powers.
F i n a l l y , there i s the q u e s t i o n of r e l e v a n c e : the need to
s e l e c t the set of s t a t e s t h a t accounts f o r most of the behavior
under i n v e s t i g a t i o n . As has been p o i n t e d out by many s c h o l a r s ,
war i s b a s i c a l l y a great power a c t i v i t y . Indeed, major powers
have a c t i v e l y p a r t i c i p a t e d i n s i x t y percent of the i n t e r s t a t e
wars s i n c e the Congress of V i e n n a . These s t a t e s have the a b i l i t y
to undertake independent a c t i o n and, i f s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y i s
a source of d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h e x i s t i n g arrangements, major
powers are more l i k e l y than o t h e r s t a t e s to b e l i e v e t h a t they
are capable of a l t e r i n g the i n t e r n a t i o n a l order by means of
armed c o n f l i c t . To quote Model s k i (1 972, p. 4 8 ) : "War i s the
p r i n c i p l e j u s t i f y i n g and l e g i t i m i z i n g the i n t e r n a t i o n a l s t a t u s
system at whose summit are the Great Powers; t h a t s t a t u s system
i n t u r n v a l i d a t e s war as the means of p r e s e r v i n g the s t a t u s
system." These c o n f l a g r a t i o n s are a t h r e a t to the e n t i r e i n t e r
s t a t e system and, to a l a r g e e x t e n t , wor ld peace depends upon
the e l i m i n a t i o n of major power involvement i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l war.
I used two c r i t e r i a to i d e n t i f y the t e s t p o p u l a t i o n .
F i r s t , the p o l i t i c a l e n t i t y had to be a member of the i n t e r s t a t e
system, i . e . , i t had to be a n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l e n t i t y t h a t
i n d e p e n d e n t l y c o n t r o l l e d i t s own armed f o r c e s and r e c e i v e d
d i p l o m a t i c r e c o g n i t i o n from any two s t a t e s t h a t f u l f i l l e d the
36
same requirements ( c f . S inger and S m a l l , 1966). A l i s t of system
members i s presented in Appendix C. Second, there had to be
h i s t o r i c a l consensus that the s t a t e was a major power. Whether
a s t a t e meets the f i r s t c r i t e r i o n i s r e l a t i v e l y s imple to
d e t e r m i n e ; the second i s more d i f f i c u l t . Even though we each
have a " f e e l " f o r which s t a t e s are major powers, there i s no
agreement on o b j e c t i v e i n d i c a t o r s . I t h e r e f o r e asked a number
of d i p l o m a t i c and m i l i t a r y h i s t o r i a n s to complete a q u e s t i o n n a i r e
aimed a t i d e n t i f y i n g the major powers and the a p p r o p r i a t e years
f o r membership i n t h i s e x c l u s i v e c l u b . Of twenty- four American
s c h o l a r s p o l l e d , twenty responded. The concensus of these
h i s t o r i a n s ( d e f i n e d as agreement among more than h a l f of the
respondents) f o l l o w s . With the e x c e p t i o n of Japan's " r e - i n c l u s i o n "
1960-1970, the consensus was n e a r l y unanimous.
State I n c l u s i v e Years
Aust r ia-Hungary 1820- 1918
Prussia/Germany 1820- 1918, 1 925- 1945
Russia/USSR 1820- 1917, 1 922- 1970
France 1820- 1940, 1 945-1970
United Kingdom 1820- 1970
I t a l y 1860- 1943
Japan 1895- 1 945, 1960- 1970
United States 1899- 1970
China 1950- 1970
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For the remainder of t h i s s t u d y , the term "major power" w i l l
r e f e r to these s t a t e s f o r the d e s i g n a t e d y e a r s . P a r e n t h e t i c a l l y ,
i t may be pointed out that the h i s t o r i a n s ' judgment c o i n c i d e s
( e x c e p t i n g only Japan, 1960-1970) w i t h the c o u n t r i e s and dates
suggested by S i n g e r and Small (1972).
Temporal Domain
The temporal domain f o r t h i s study begins i n 1820,
s h o r t l y a f t e r the c l o s e of the Napoleonic Wars and the c o n c l u s i o n
of the Congress of Vienna. This was a time of important changes
i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s . The c i t i z e n army had been c a s t upon
the s t a g e , a l t e r i n g the means of m i l i t a r y r e c r u i t m e n t f o r f u t u r e
wars and i n c r e a s i n g the p o s s i b i l i t y of massive i n t e r n a t i o n a l
c o n f l a g r a t i o n s . The major powers of Europe had j o i n e d t o g e t h e r
to d e f e a t Napoleon and to r e s t r u c t u r e the p o l i t i c a l face of the
c o n t i n e n t . A s o - c a l l e d "century of peace" was c o n s t r u c t e d ,
shaken to i t s roots by the r e v o l u t i o n s of 1848, j a r r e d i n 1853
by the Crimean War and in 1870 by the F r a n c o - P r u s s i a n , and f i n a l l y
s h a t t e r e d i n 1914. The turn of the t w e n t i e t h century saw a new
wave of s o c i a l r e v o l u t i o n s and the ascendancy of new major powers.
In the course of the t w e n t i e t h century have come f o u r of the f i v e
b l o o d i e s t i n t e r s t a t e wars i n recorded h i s t o r y and, i n i t s wake,
l i e the remnants of s e v e r a l major powers and t h e i r e m p i r e s . The
century and a h a l f s i n c e 1820 has been t r u l y e v e n t f u l , and an
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of today's c o n f l i c t s may be informed by an
understanding of these h i s t o r i c a l o c c u r r e n c e s .
38
There a r e , however, some who suggest t h a t h i s t o r i c a l events
and system t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s d u r i n g the past 151 years have so
permanently a l t e r e d r e l a t i o n s h i p s among p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l
v a r i a b l e s that f i n d i n g s from the past can have no r e l e v a n c e f o r
the p r e s e n t . The i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of temporal d i s c o n t i n u i t i e s and
a t t e n d a n t changes in the i n t e r - v a r i a b l e r e l a t i o n s h i p s i s , of
c o u r s e , an e m p i r i c a l q u e s t i o n ; and, s i n c e r e l i a b l e data on the
major powers are a v a i l a b l e , i t i s a q u e s t i o n t h a t we s h a l l
i n v e s t i g a t e in t h i s study.
C o n s t r u c t i n g the I n d i c a t o r s
The P r e d i c t o r V a r i a b l e : S t a t u s Inconsistency
Before we can t e s t the hypotheses t h a t are p o s i t e d in
Chapter One, we w i l l have to c o n s t r u c t o p e r a t i o n a l i n d i c a t o r s
f o r the key concepts c o n t a i n e d in these hypotheses. A number
of the concepts ( e . g . , s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y and c r o s s - c u t t i n g )
have been borrowed from s i s t e r s o c i a l s c i e n c e s , i n which they
have been t r a d i t i o n a l l y a p p l i e d to i n d i v i d u a l s . I t w i l l be no
easy f e a t to c o n s t r u c t ( f o r these concepts) i n d i c a t o r s t h a t can
be a p p r o p r i a t e l y a p p l i e d to n a t i o n - s t a t e s .
F i t t i n g l y , we begin wi th the most d i f f i c u l t c o n c e p t :
s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y . The reader w i l l r e c a l l from Chapter One
t h a t a n a t i o n i s s a i d to be s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t when i t f a i l s
to r e c e i v e a t t r i b u t e d importance commensurate w i t h i t s power
c a p a b i l i t i e s . Hence, s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y has two components:
39
power c a p a b i l i t y and a t t r i b u t e d importance. In the pages t h a t
f o l l o w , I w i l l f i r s t c o n s t r u c t an i n d i c a t o r of power c a p a b i l i t y ,
then one of a t t r i b u t e d importance, and, f i n a l l y , I w i l l combine
the two i n t o a s i n g l e index of s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y .
Measur ing Power C a p a b i l i t y
Although p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t s have never concurred on
how power c a p a b i l i t y should be measured, i t i s agreed t h a t the
concept i s m u l t i d i m e n s i o n a l . For the c u r r e n t i n v e s t i g a t i o n ,
I tap three of these dimensions ( c f . Small and B e n n e t t ,
f o r t h c o m i n g ) . F i r s t , there i s the demographic. The sheer
number of people p o p u l a t i n g a country i s one i n d i c a t o r of a
n a t i o n ' s power because people are f u e l f o r i n d u s t r i a l f i r e s
and fodder f o r m i l i t a r y cannons, and as s u c h , they p r o v i d e
the b a s i c "raw m a t e r i a l " f o r n a t i o n a l m i g h t . But w h i l e l a r g e
numbers of people are an a s s e t to the c o n s t r u c t i o n of a
powerful n a t i o n , they are so o n l y to the extent t h a t they can
be e f f e c t i v e l y m o b i l i z e d . The i n d u s t r i a l r e v o l u t i o n brought
people i n t o the c i t i e s and these urban d w e l l e r s came to comprise
the s e c t o r of s o c i e t y t h a t was best educated and most f a m i l i a r
w i t h t e c h n o l o g i c a l advances. In s h o r t , these urban c i t i z e n s
became the most m o b i l i z a b l e s e c t o r of modern i n d u s t r i a l s o c i e t y .
T h e r e f o r e , I use two i n d i c a t o r s of the demographic dimension
of power: one i s t o t a l p o p u l a t i o n and the o t h e r i s urban
p o p u l a t i o n .
40
A second dimension of n a t i o n a l c a p a b i l i t i e s i s economic.
Here too I use m u l t i p l e i n d i c a t o r s : f u e l consumption 2 and
2
i r o n and steel p r o d u c t i o n . These are probably the most
comparable c r o s s - n a t i o n a l i n d i c a t o r s a v a i l a b l e to measure
the i n d u s t r i a l base of s t a t e s a c r o s s the span of the n i n e t e e n t h
and t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r i e s . Without f u e l and i r o n / s t e e l , i n d u s t r y
cannot f u n c t i o n and n e i t h e r machines of war nor those of peace
can be produced.
F i n a l l y , no measure of n a t i o n a l power i n the "modern"
i n t e r s t a t e system would be complete w i t h o u t a m i l i t a r y component,
f o r m i l i t a r y might serves as the u l t i m a t e a r b i t e r . The b a s i c
i n d i c a t o r s of t h i s dimension are the number of m i l i t a r y personnel
and the amount of money i n v e s t e d i n military expenditure.
Having s e l e c t e d these s i x i n d i c a t o r s , we are faced w i t h
q u e s t i o n s of t h e i r c o m p a r a b i l i t y and t h e i r l e v e l of measurement.
Do the r e l a t i o n s h i p s among the i n d i c a t o r s remain c o n s t a n t a c r o s s
the century and a h a l f under i n v e s t i g a t i o n and should each
i n d i c a t o r c o n t r i b u t e e q u a l l y i n d e t e r m i n i n g n a t i o n a l power?
Is there an i n t e r v a l - s c a l e isomorphism between the i n d i c a t o r s
and the c o n c e p t , e . g . , i s the i n c r e a s e i n power p r o p o r t i o n a t e
to i n c r e a s e s on the i n d i c a t o r s and do u n i t i n c r e a s e s on the
1 Coal consumption i s used p r i o r to 1860; c o a l , o i l , h y d r o e l e c t r i c , s o l a r , and n u c l e a r e n e r g i e s are i n c l u d e d i n subsequent r e a d i n g s .
2 P i g - i r o n p r o d u c t i o n i s used p r i o r to 1900; s t e e l
p o d u c t i o n i s i n c l u d e d f o r the t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y .
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i n d i c a t o r s correspond to u n i t i n c r e a s e s i n power r e g a r d l e s s of
the e x i s t i n g l e v e l of power?
The answer to the above q u e s t i o n s i s "probably n o t . "
C e r t a i n l y , we make a h e r o i c assumption i f we s i m p l y accept
premises of i n t e r - v a r i a b l e c o m p a r a b i l i t y and i n t e r v a l - s c a l e
isomorphism. We should be a b l e to do b e t t e r .
Let us make two "not very h e r o i c " assumpt ions. F i r s t ,
we w i l l p o s i t that the s i x i n d i c a t o r s do indeed tap the concept
we wish to measure. Second, we w i l l p o s i t t h a t the i n d i c a t o r s
are at l e a s t o r d i n a l l y - s c a l e d and have d i r e c t i o n a l i t y ; t h a t ,
f o r example, spending more money on defense i n c r e a s e s , c e t e r i s
p a r i b u s , a n a t i o n ' s power c a p a b i l i t y , a l though not n e c e s s a r i l y
p r o p o r t i o n a t e to the i n c r e a s e d c o s t . S i n c e a l l o f the i n d i c a t o r s
are supposed to tap some f a c e t o f "power," we c o u l d r e s c a l e the
i n d i c a t o r s so as to maximize t h e i r i n t e r c o r r e l a t i o n . I f the
o r i g i n a l scores on the i n d i c a t o r s were h i g h l y c o r r e l a t e d , we
would not expect the transformed scores to be very d i f f e r e n t ;
i f the o r i g i n a l scores were more weakly c o r r e l a t e d , the t ransformed
scores would be a b e t t e r i n t e r v a l a p p r o x i m a t i o n . We may t h i n k of
t h i s procedure as r e g r e s s i n g power (the outcome v a r i a b l e ) on i t s
six i n d i c a t o r s (the p r e d i c t o r v a r i a b l e s ) so as to maximize the
f i t ( R 2 ) .
I subjec ted a l l c a p a b i l i t y data to t h i s t r a n s f o r m a t i o n
on an annual b a s i s using Guttman-Lingoes' CM-III ( L i n g o e s , 1972,
42
1973). This c o n j o i n t measurement a l g o r i t h m r e s c a l e s v a r i a b l e s
so t h a t the average i n t e r c o r r e l a t i o n among them i s maximized,
s u b j e c t to the r e s t r i c t i o n t h a t rank o r d e r be p r e s e r v e d . In the
p r o c e s s , m i l d n o n - l i n e a r i t i e s are minimized or e l i m i n a t e d ,
thereby producing transformed scores t h a t can be more a p p r o p r i a t e l y
used w i t h l i n e a r a n a l y t i c techniques such as o r d i n a r y l e a s t -
squares (OLS) r e g r e s s i o n .
The a p p l i c a b i l i t y of Guttman-Lingoes' CM-III to r e s c a l i n g c a p a b i l i t y data was p o i n t e d out to me by Michael M i h a l k a .
2 The Guttman-Lingoes' CM-III a l g o r i t h m permits v a r i a b l e s
to be " r e f l e c t e d , " i . e . , m u l t i p l i e d by - 1 , i n order to maximize the average i n t e r c o r r e l a t i o n c o e f f i c i e n t . While t h i s i s r e a s o n a b l e f o r some types of p s y c h o l o g i c a l t e s t s ( e . g . , most p r e f e r a b l e <—> l e a s t p r e f e r a b l e ) where d i r e c t i o n a l i t y i s an e m p i r i c a l phenomenon best determined by i n t e r c o r r e l a t i o n s , i t i s not b e n e f i c i a l when d i r e c t i o n a l i t y i s known a p r i o r i . In 20 of the 139 years submitted to CM-III t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s , the m i l i t a r y personnel v e c t o r was r e f l e c t e d (and, i n f i v e of these i n s t a n c e s , t o t a l p o p u l a t i o n was a l s o r e f l e c t e d ) . F i f t e e n of these years occurred between the two wor ld wars, when i t seems unreasonable to assume that g r e a t e r numbers of personnel d e t r a c t e d from a n a t i o n ' s c a p a b i l i t y . I, t h e r e f o r e , wrote a o n e - i t e r a t i o n a l g o r i t h m analogous to GL/CM-III and r e s u b m i t t e d the o r i g i n a l data f o r the twenty years that had had v a r i a b l e s r e f l e c t e d . For s i x t e e n o f these years (1854, 1 9 1 9 - 1 9 3 3 ) , no s i g n i f i c a n t improvement over the i n t e r c o r r e l a t i o n s produced by the o r i g i n a l data scores was achieved by r e s c a l i n g w i t h o u t r e f l e c t i n g , and so the standard scores of the o r i g i n a l data values were used in subsequent a n a l y s e s . In f o u r years (1823, 1826, 1843, 1871), the t ransformed scores from my CM-III analogue were used f o r subsequent a n a l y s e s . Due to the small number of s t a t e s i n my p o p u l a t i o n , the data f o r f i v e a d d i t i o n a l years had s u f f i c i e n t l y p e c u l i a r rank p r o f i l e s that GL/CM-III s c o r e s v i o l a t e d s t r i c t m o n o t o n i c i t y (1947-1949) or produced an average i n t e r c o r r e l a t i o n c o e f f i c i e n t s i g n i f i c a n t l y lower than t h a t f o r the o r i g i n a l data values (1868, 1935). In the former c a s e , my one i t e r a t i o n CM-III scores ( m a i n t a i n i n g s t r i c t m o n o t o n i c i t y ) were used, and, in the l a t t e r , standard scores o f the o r i g i n a l values were used d u r i n g subsequent a n a l y s e s .
43
While the use of CM-III t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s addresses i t s e l f
d i r e c t l y to the l e v e l of measurement q u e s t i o n , i t o n l y p a r t l y
answers the q u e s t i o n of c o m p a r a b i l i t y among i n d i c a t o r s . The
i n d i c a t o r s are comparable to the extent t h a t t h e i r average
i n t e r c o r r e l a t i o n i s maximized, but CM-III does not a s s i g n
a p p r o p r i a t e weights to each i n d i c a t o r . Although the output
from t h i s a l g o r i t h m does i n c l u d e a " s i n g l e best s c o r e , " t h i s
i s s i m p l y the mean transformed score f o r a given n a t i o n , i . e . ,
equal weights are assigned to each v a r i a b l e . The problem of
w e i g h t i n g i n d i c a t o r s w i l l be addressed i n subsequent s e c t i o n s .
Measuring A t t r i b u t e d Importance
Having thus s e l e c t e d and r e s c a l e d i n d i c a t o r s of power
c a p a b i l i t y , we turn to the second component of s t a t u s
i n c o n s i s t e n c y : a t t r i b u t e d importance. We need to determine
each s t a t e ' s " s o c i a l s t a t u s " as a s s i g n e d by o t h e r s t a t e s i n
the system. The i n d i c a t o r of s t a t u s t h a t I have s e l e c t e d i s
d i p l o m a t i c importance, based on the number of permanent m i s s i o n s
a t the rank of d i p l o m a t i c agent or h i g h e r r e c e i v e d by each s t a t e
i n my s t u d y . Before d i s c u s s i n g the manner i n which the i n d i c a t o r
i s c o n s t r u c t e d , l e t me b r i e f l y o f f e r some of the reasons t h a t led
to t h i s s e l e c t i o n .
F i r s t , i n t e r n a t i o n a l diplomacy p l a y s a c e n t r a l r o l e i n
major power i n t e r a c t i o n . I t i s not s i m p l y a means of
communication; i t i s an arena f o r p o l i t i c a l power. Diplomacy
44
i s the cornerstone of a g l o b a l p o l i t i c a l network, the primary
nodes o f which are l o c a t e d i n the c a p i t a l s of the major powers.
Because the Powers s i t a s t r i d e these channels of communication,
wor ld diplomacy becomes an instrument s u b j e c t to t h e i r
m a n i p u l a t i o n .
Second, the sending o f d i p l o m a t i c m i s s i o n s may be
thought of as a system-wide p l e b i s c i t e on a t t r i b u t e d importance
(Small and S i n g e r , 1973). The c r e a t i o n and maintenance of such
m i s s i o n s e n t a i l both economic and p o l i t i c a l c o s t s and b e n e f i t s ,
and as a r e s u l t are f a r from u n i v e r s a l l y d i s t r i b u t e d . Between
1817 and 1970, f o r example, the number of m i s s i o n s r e c e i v e d by
the average s t a t e was only o n e - t h i r d of the t o t a l p o s s i b l e .
Thus, i n sending d i p l o m a t i c m i s s i o n s , a s t a t e c o n f e r s a degree
of importance on the r e c i p i e n t and thereby enhances the
r e c i p i e n t ' s s t a t u r e . The degree to which the r e c e i p t of a
m i s s i o n enhances a s t a t e ' s s t a t u r e depends, i n t u r n , on the
importance of the sender. The more c e n t r a l the sender's
p o s i t i o n i n the d i p l o m a t i c network, the g r e a t e r i s the import
of i t s m i s s i o n s .
F i n a l l y , the elemental nature of t h i s s e l e c t i o n process
has been recognized by a number of p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t s ; every
study of s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y i n the i n t e r s t a t e system c i t e d in
Chapter One uses as an i n d i c a t o r of a t t r i b u t e d importance some
v a r i a n t of a d i p l o m a t i c exchange i n d e x . But t h i s cumulat iveness
a l s o has a negat ive a s p e c t . N e i t h e r I nor any of my c o l l e a g u e s
45
have been able to o f f e r another o b j e c t i v e measure of a t t r i b u t e d
importance that e conomical ly permits r e g u l a r ( i n d e e d , annual)
o b s e r v a t i o n s throughout the n i n e t e e n t h and t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r i e s .
To t h i s e x t e n t , we are "stuck" w i t h t h i s i n d i c a t o r , for which
data i s both a v a i l a b l e and r e l i a b l e .
What we thus have i s "choice d a t a " : i n f o r m a t i o n as to
which s t a t e s s e l e c t which o t h e r s t a t e s because they are
d i p l o m a t i c a l l y important to the s e l e c t i n g s t a t e s . There i s
a c o n s i d e r a b l e body of s o c i o m e t r i c and psychometr ic l i t e r a t u r e
t h a t d e a l s with j u s t such data. 1 I w i l l use a s o c i o m e t r i c
t e c h n i q u e (as opposed to a psychometr ic one) to compute
d i p l o m a t i c importance scores f o r the major powers because the
s o c i o m e t r i c technique produces a unique s o l u t i o n , i t i s
c o m p u t a t i o n a l l y l e s s e x p e n s i v e , and i t s mathematical r e a s o n i n g
more d i r e c t l y p a r a l l e l s t h a t o f the s t a t u s argument. D i p l o m a t i c
importance scores w i l l be d e r i v e d by s i m p l y summing the d i p l o m a t i c
m i s s i o n s (at the rank of d i p l o m a t i c agent or h i g h e r ) t h a t each
major power r e c e i v e s , where each m i s s i o n i s weighted i n
accordance wi th the " c e n t r a l i t y " of the sending s t a t e . I t i s
assumed that the more c e n t r a l the sending s t a t e ' s p o s i t i o n i n
the d i p l o m a t i c network, the g r e a t e r i s the import o f i t s m i s s i o n s .
For an i n t r o d u c t i o n to the s o c i o m e t r i c l i t e r a t u r e see Coleman (1964), Hol land and Steuer ( 1 9 7 0 ) , Moreno (1960) , and the m a t e r i a l c i t e d below. For an i n t r o d u c t i o n to the psychometr ic l i t e r a t u r e see Bloombaum ( 1 9 7 0 ) , Coombs (1964), Green and Carmone (1970), Guttman ( 1 9 6 8 ) , Kruskal (1964a, 1964b), Shepard (1962, 1 9 7 4 ) , and Shepard et a l . (1972).
46
Thus, I f i r s t compute (on the b a s i s o f d i r e c t and
i n d i r e c t d i p l o m a t i c l i n k s ) c e n t r a l i t y scores f o r a l l s t a t e s
i n the i n t e r s t a t e system. This i s done by d e p i c t i n g the
(asymmetric) d i p l o m a t i c bonds by " d i r e c t e d graphs"
(Harary, Norman, and C a r t w i g h t , 1965), which a r e , i n t u r n ,
d i s p l a y e d in matr ix form, where the c e l l e n t r i e s (zero or
one) of the r e s u l t i n g matr ix i n d i c a t e the direct links
between the s t a t e s represented by the c o r r e s p o n d i n g rows
and columns (Forsyth and K a t z , 1946). The number of
i n d i r e c t l i n k s ( s o - c a l l e d h i g h e r - o r d e r c h a i n s ) between any
two s t a t e s i s determined by r a i s i n g the m a t r i x to higher
powers ( F e s t i n g e r , 1949)."' The h i g h e r the power, the more
i n d i r e c t are the l i n k s .
Let us t a k e , as an example, the f o l l o w i n g d i r e c t e d
graph:
W --> X
which can be represented by the c h o i c e m a t r i x C:
A review of matr ix a l g e b r a can be found i n Johnston (1972) and in Kemeny, S n e l l , and Thompson (1966).
47
Sender
Receiver W X Y Z
W 0 0 0 1
X 1 0 0 1
c Y 0 1 0 0
Z 1 0 1 0
By m u l t i p l y i n g the matr ix C by i t s e l f , we o b t a i n the squared
2 2 matix C .2 This m a t r i x , C2, g i v e s the number and l o c a t i o n of
a l l 2 - c h a i n s ( i . e . , 2 - l i n k c h a i n s ) between s t a t e s W, X, Y, and Z,
Sender
Receiver W X Y Z
W 1 0 1 0
X 1 0 1 1
c Y 1 0 0 1
Z 0 1 0 1
From the matr ix C2 (presented above) , we see t h a t there i s one
2 - c h a i n l e a d i n g from W to i t s e l f (W — > Z —> W), one 2 - c h a i n
from Y to W (Y —> Z —> W), and so f o r t h . I f there are n
2 - c h a i n s between two s t a t e s , then the c o r r e s p o n d i n g c e l l entry
would c o n t a i n the number n. R a i s i n g the m a t r i x to the t h i r d
power, C 3, enables one to determine the number and l o c a t i o n of
3 - c h a i n s ; in g e n e r a l , the m a t r i x Ck has as elements the number
o f k - c h a i n s between each p a i r of s t a t e s . In o r d e r to prevent
48
s e l f - c h o i c e , we need only p l a c e zeroes along the p r i n c i p a l
d i a g o n a l .
This r a t h e r simple s o c i o m e t r i c a l g o r i t h m can be used
to measure the d i p l o m a t i c c e n t r a l i t y of a s t a t e , where c e n t r a l i t y
i s computed as an inverse f u n c t i o n of each s t a t e ' s d i s t a n c e from
a l l o t h e r s t a t e s . 1 In other words, i f I i s " c l o s e r " than J to
a l l o t h e r s t a t e s , then I r e c e i v e s a h i g h e r c e n t r a l i t y score
than J . To carry out these c o m p u t a t i o n s , a l l that need be found
i s the s h o r t e s t path between every p a i r o f s t a t e s . And we know,
from the d i s c u s s i o n i n the p r e c e d i n g two paragraphs, t h a t the
s h o r t e s t path between the s t a t e s I and J i s p i i , the power to
which the matr ix C (the m a t r i x of d i p l o m a t i c c h o i c e data) must
be r a i s e d in order f o r c e l l cij ( c o r r e s p o n d i n g to s t a t e s I and J)
to be n o n - z e r o . Since higher powers correspond to l o n g e r ( l e s s
d i r e c t ) p a t h s , an a t t e n u a t i o n f a c t o r , a , i s i n t r o d u c e d so t h a t
these longer paths c o n t r i b u t e l e s s to a s t a t e ' s c e n t r a l i t y score
than do s h o r t e r p a t h s . I f a i s a c o n s t a n t between 0 and 1,
where the former corresponds to complete a t t e n u a t i o n and the
l a t t e r to the absence of any a t t e n u a t i o n , then the d i p l o m a t i c n pii
a , where n i s the number j = l
of s t a t e s in the system. To b r i e f l y r e i t e r a t e , the c e n t r a l i t y
of each s t a t e i s i n v e r s e l y r e l a t e d to i t s d i s t a n c e from a l l
1 This measure of c e n t r a l i t y i s s i m i l a r to i n d i c a t o r s of s t a t u s suggested by Arney (1973) , Coleman (1964, pp. 4 4 4 - 5 5 ) , and Katz (1953).
49
o t h e r s t a t e s , so that the one t h a t i s most c l o s e l y t i e d
d i p l o m a t i c a l l y to a l l others i s most c e n t r a l .
C e n t r a l i t y scores were computed (with the a t t e n u a t i o n
f a c t o r set to .5) f o r the p e r i o d 1817-1970 f o r a l l s t a t e s
r e c e i v i n g two or more d i p l o m a t i c m i s s i o n s i n the g iven y e a r .
D i p l o m a t i c importance scores were then d e r i v e d f o r the major
powers by w e i g h t i n g each m i s s i o n t h a t they r e c e i v e d by the
c e n t r a l i t y of the sending s t a t e , and then summing these
weighted m i s s i o n s . 1 The importance scores were n o r m a l i z e d
as a p r o p o r t i o n of the maximum p o s s i b l e score t h a t c o u l d be
a t t a i n e d . C a l c u l a t i o n s were done a p p r o x i m a t e l y every f i f t h
y e a r , other years being i n t e r p o l a t e d . The v a r i a n c e i n the
q u i n q u e n n i a l data was s u f f i c i e n t l y low to a s s u r e t h a t l i t t l e
d i s t o r t i o n was int roduced by i n t e r p o l a t i n g the annual s c o r e s .
M u l t i p l e m i s s i o n s to major powers were removed from the m a t r i x before computing d i p l o m a t i c importance s c o r e s . I f a s i n g l e emissary was sent by one s t a t e to s e v e r a l d i f f e r e n t major powers, each major power was c r e d i t e d w i t h 1/N p o r t i o n of the m i s s i o n , where N i s the number of r e c i p i e n t s . C o n v e r s e l y , i f a j o i n t m i s s i o n from s e v e r a l s t a t e s was sent to a s i n g l e s t a t e , the r e c i p i e n t was c r e d i t e d w i t h one m i s s i o n from the most c e n t r a l sender r a t h e r than a m i s s i o n from each of the j o i n t s e n d e r s . E m i s s a r i e s from a contiguous minor power to i t s n e i g h b o r i n g major power were a l s o d i s c o u n t e d . I t was f e l t t h a t such s t a t e s had l i t t l e c h o i c e i n sending m i s s i o n s and thereby i n f l a t e d the scores of the n e i g h b o r i n g major power, w h i l e s i g n i f i c a n t l y d e f l a t i n g the scores of other major powers. For the p e r i o d 1817-1970, minor powers sent m i s s i o n s to t h e i r bordering major powers n inety- two percent of the t i m e — a c o n s i d e r a b l e d e v i a t i o n from t h e i r behavior wi th other major powers. This would not have been a s e r i o u s problem i f each major power had an a p p r o x i m a t e l y equal number of small n e i g h b o r s , but u n f o r t u n a t e l y t h i s was not the case (witness P r u s s i a as opposed to B r i t a i n ) .
50
Below are l i s t e d the normal ized importance scores f o r the major
powers f o r approximately every t e n t h y e a r .
1817 1824 1833 1844 2854 1864 1874 _1_884
UK .34 .31 .2? .19 .25 .23 .43 .46
FRN .29 .30 .25 .22 .29 .27 .44 .48
GMY .25 .27 .22 .18 .19 .18 .35 .43
A-H .29 .31 .23 .21 .26 .22 .32 .33
ITA .17 .32 .36
USR .28 .28 .21 .13 .16 .16 .23 .25
1894 1904 1914 1925 1935 1950 1960 1970
USA .48 .54 .58 .62 .48 .51 .61
UK .47 .48 .52 .62 .62 .49 .49 .59
FRN .43 .45 .49 .58 .63 .45 .45 .55
GMY .43 .41 .41 .47 .49
A-H .28 .31 .40
ITA .35 .41 .48 .52 .58
USR .25 .27 .32 .18 .24 .25 .28 .49
CHN .05 .16 .20
JPN .26 .33 .36 .40 .40 .48
The q u e s t i o n a r i s e s as to whether these "complex"
d i p l o m a t i c importance scores are any d i f f e r e n t than those
we would o b t a i n i f we merely summed (without w e i g h t i n g ) the
number of m i s s i o n s r e c e i v e d by each major power. In an e a r l i e r
51
paper , Small and Singer (1973) r e p o r t t h a t , f o r the i n t e r s t a t e
system as a whole, the mean rank order c o r r e l a t i o n between the
number of m i s s i o n s each s t a t e r e c e i v e s and an index t h a t weights
these m i s s i o n s by the importance of the sending s t a t e i s . 9 4 .
I computed a K e n d a l l ' s tau-b between the number of m i s s i o n s
r e c e i v e d by the major powers and the q u i n q u e n n i a l "weighted"
scores d e r i v e d from the s o c i o m e t r i c m a t r i x t e c h n i q u e . The
rank order c o r r e l a t i o n f o r t h i s s m a l l e r subset was o n l y . 5 9 .
Thus, to the extent that i n f o r m a t i o n c o n c e r n i n g the " c e n t r a l i t y "
o f the sending s t a t e s c o n t r i b u t e s to the v a l i d i t y of the
d i p l o m a t i c importance scores f o r the major powers, the weighted
i n d i c a t o r i s worth i t s added c o m p l e x i t y .
The Index of Status I n c o n s i s t e n c y
We now have s i x i n t e r v a l - s e a l e d i n d i c a t o r s of power
c a p a b i l i t y and a s i n g l e i n d i c a t o r of d i p l o m a t i c importance.
We seek to combine these i n d i c a t o r s i n t o an index of s t a t u s
i n c o n s i s t e n c y . I have argued t h a t s t a t e s expect to be a t t r i b u t e d
importance commensurate w i t h t h e i r power c a p a b i l i t i e s and,
to the extent that they are a t t r i b u t e d l e s s importance, they
are s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t . Nowhere in the s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y
l i t e r a t u r e , however, i s the form of the f u n c t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p
between c a p a b i l i t y and a t t r i b u t e d importance s p e c i f i e d . E a r l y
s t u d i e s s imply o p e r a t i o n a l i z e d s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y as the
a r i t h m e t i c d i f f e r e n c e between the achieved and a s c r i b e d s t a t u s
52
i n d i c a t o r s . T h i s , however, produced p e r f e c t l i n e a r dependence
and the i m p o s s i b i l i t y of u n t a n g l i n g the i n f l u e n c e of i n c o n s i s t e n c y
from the two elements that comprised i t . L a t e r s t u d i e s ( e . g . ,
Ray, 1974) have o p e r a t i o n a l i z e d s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y as a
n o n - l i n e a r , but " a r b i t r a r i l y " s p e c i f i e d , f u n c t i o n .
Let us t ry to do b e t t e r . 1 We expect c a p a b i l i t y and
a t t r i b u t e d importance to be h i g h l y r e l a t e d to one another and
t h a t there w i l l be a f u n c t i o n to d e s c r i b e t h a t r e l a t i o n s h i p .
By s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y we mean d e v i a t i o n s from the scores
p r e d i c t e d by that f u n c t i o n . This immediately suggests a
r e g r e s s i o n s t r a t e g y where the r e s i d u a l s r e p r e s e n t these
d e v i a t i o n s . Thus, we s imply r e g r e s s d i p l o m a t i c importance
on the s i x n o n - l i n e a r l y t ransformed (CM-II I ) c a p a b i l i t y s c o r e s .
The r e s u l t i n g equat ion w i l l g i v e us the p r e d i c t e d "importance
s c o r e " f o r a s t a t e , given i t s c a p a b i l i t y scores and the
c a p a b i l i t y / i m p o r t a n c e r e l a t i o n s h i p f o r a l l the s t a t e s i n the
subsystem. A s t a t e ' s i n c o n s i s t e n c y i s the d i f f e r e n c e (the
r e s i d u a l ) between the score we would p r e d i c t and the one we observe
f o r i t .
A f u r t h e r i s s u e needs to be r e s o l v e d before we employ t h i s
r e g r e s s i o n s t r a t e g y . To my knowledge, a l l p r e v i o u s s t u d i e s of
s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y assumed t h a t the r e l a t i o n s h i p between
importance and c a p a b i l i t y remained c o n s t a n t both a c r o s s time and
a c r o s s space. While I accept the l a t t e r as i n h e r e n t in the
1 I would l i k e to thank S t u a r t Bremer f o r s u g g e s t i n g the f o l l o w i n g index c o n s t r u c t i o n procedure.
53
r e l a t i v e nature of the c o n c e p t , I do not a p r i o r i accept the
former s u p p o s i t i o n . That i s , at a g iven p o i n t i n t i m e , a s t a t e ' s
d e c i s i o n makers p e r c e i v e t h a t t h e i r country i s s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t
because they expect i t to be a t t r i b u t e d a degree of importance
commensurate wi th i t s c a p a b i l i t i e s and to be t r e a t e d j u s t as
o t h e r s t a t e s a r e ; however, the c o n t r i b u t i o n to power of the
v a r i o u s c a p a b i l i t y i n d i c a t o r s i s l i k e l y to vary over time as
some dimensions ( e . g . , t o t a l p o p u l a t i o n ) become l e s s important
and o t h e r s ( e . g . , f u e l consumption) more. Thus, I would not
expect a constant w e i g h t i n g scheme to e x i s t f o r the e n t i r e century
and a h a l f ; or put another way, I would expect t h a t a s i n g l e
r e g r e s s i o n equation f o r the e n t i r e p e r i o d would produce l a r g e
r e s i d u a l s .
A n a l y s i s of c o v a r i a n c e was used to t e s t whether a s i n g l e
w e i g h t i n g scheme was a p p r o p r i a t e . D i p l o m a t i c importance was the
outcome v a r i a b l e , the s i x c a p a b i l i t y scores were the c o v a r i a t e s ,
and time i d e n t i f i e d the c a t e g o r i e s w i t h i n which the r e g r e s s i o n s
were performed. Since f o r any given y e a r , the number of
c o v a r i a t e s might be l a r g e r than the number of o b s e r v a t i o n s
( n a t i o n s ) , approximate t e n - y e a r time s l i c e s were used. This
produced, on the average, s i x t y o b s e r v a t i o n s per p e r i o d and
a f f o r d e d s u f f i c i e n t degrees of freedom. F - t e s t s showed t h a t ,
f o r any combination of s e q u e n t i a l t e n - y e a r time s l i c e s , w i t h i n
c a t e g o r y r e g r e s s i o n s were s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t from an o v e r
a l l c a t e g o r y r e g r e s s i o n . This should be i n t e r p r e t e d as s a y i n g
54
t h a t the c o n t r i b u t i o n of the s i x c a p a b i l i t y i n d i c a t o r s v a r i e s
s u f f i c i e n t l y across ten-year time s l i c e s to make any s i n g l e
r e g r e s s i o n equation f o r the e n t i r e 151-year p e r i o d i n a p p r o p r i a t e .
The mean within category m u l t i p l e R was .9 ( i . e . , c a p a b i l i t y i s
an e x c e l l e n t p r e d i c t o r of importance w i t h i n each of the time
s l i c e s ) and, as would be e x p e c t e d , l a b o r - i n t e n s i v e i n d i c a t o r s
c o n t r i b u t e d l e s s and c a p i t a l - i n t e n s i v e i n d i c a t o r s more as time
p r o g r e s s e d . Ordinary l e a s t - s q u a r e s (OLS) r e g r e s s i o n , w i t h i n
each of the time s l i c e s , proved a p p r o p r i a t e , as the r e s i d u a l s
were homogeneously d i s t r i b u t e d . Regressions were performed
on s t a n d a r d s c o r e s , thus producing r e s i d u a l s t h a t are comparable
a c r o s s t i m e .
To again r e i t e r a t e what we have done. We have r e g r e s s e d ,
w i t h i n approximate ten-year time s l i c e s , the d i p l o m a t i c
importance scores ( that we d e r i v e d i n the p r e c e d i n g s e c t i o n )
on the c a p a b i l i t y scores t h a t we had e a r l i e r d e v e l o p e d . The
r e s i d u a l s from these r e g r e s s i o n s , i . e . , the d i f f e r e n c e between
the d i p l o m a t i c importance scores ( t h a t we d e r i v e d i n the
p r e c e d i n g s e c t i o n ) and the scores t h a t we now p r e d i c t upon the
b a s i s of these r e g r e s s i o n s , are the s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y scores
for the s t a t e s . Below are found the i n c o n s i s t e n c y scores f o r
the major powers, approx imately every t e n t h y e a r . Negat ive
values denote u n d e r r e c o g n i t i o n , and p o s i t i v e va lues i n d i c a t e
o v o r r e c o g n i t i o n .
55
1824 lj 833 1844 1854 1864 l j 374 1884 1894
UK 0. 62 - 0 . 3 8 0. .03 - 0 . ,36 - 0 . ,68 - 0 .29 - 0 . 1 0 0.10
FRN - 0 . 69 0 .36 - 0 . .15 1 . .25 0. 60 0 .80 0.41 0.04
GMY - 0 . 33 - 0 .02 0. .15 0. 57 - 0 . 36 - 0 .13 0.83 0.46
A-H 0 . 50 - 0 .13 0. .19 0. 10 0. 76 0, . 18 0.17 - 0 . 2 9
ITA 0. 18 0 .05 - 0 . 6 8 - 0 . 2 1
USR - 0 . 09 0 .18 - 0 . ,22 - 1 . 55 - 0 . 50 - 0 .62 - 0 . 6 3 - 0 . 1 0
1904 1913 1925 1935 1950 I960 1970
USA 0 . 17 0 .15 - 0 . 23 0. 10 - 0 . 08 - 0 , .06 0.24
UK - 0 . 03 - 0 .31 - 0 . 06 0. 24 0. 52 0, .05 0.28
FRN - 0 . 08 0 .19 - 0 . 05 0. 31 - 0 . 51 0. .07 - 0 . 0 1
GMY 0 . 17 - 0 , .17 0. 12 - 0 . 39
A-H - 0 . 10 0, .60
ITA - 0 . 00 0, .20 0. 34 0. 19
USR - 0 . 44 - 0 , .36 0. 15 0. 10 0. 37 - 0 . .30 0.38
CHN - 0 . 30 0. .09 - 0 . 5 7
JPN 0 . 31 - 0 . .29 - 0 . 26 - 0 . 56 0. .15 - 0 . 3 2
Some p a t t e r n s i n the data are r e v e a l e d by the s t a t u s
i n c o n s i s t e n c y s c o r e s . The Uni ted S t a t e s , which i s as o f t e n
under- as o v e r r e c o g n i z e d , i s most underrecognized d u r i n g her
p e r i o d o f s e l f - i m p o s e d i s o l a t i o n i s m f o l l o w i n g World War One;
B r i t a i n i s more o f t e n than not underrecognized p r i o r to 1935,
b u t , as would be expected, i s o v e r r e c o g n i z e d f o l l o w i n g the
Second World War; and France, which tends to be o v e r r e c o g n i z e d ,
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i s j u s t that preceding both world wars. As the h i s t o r i a n s t e l l
u s , Prussia/Germany i s underrecognized d u r i n g her p e r i o d of
u n i f i c a t i o n (1864-1870) and preceding the two wor ld wars;
whereas both Austr ia-Hungary and I t a l y tend to be o v e r r e c o g n i z e d ,
e s p e c i a l l y before the world wars. R u s s i a / S o v i e t Union i s
p r i m a r i l y an underrecognized s t a t e , her p e r i o d s of maximum
o v e r r e c o g n i t i o n o c c u r r i n g a f t e r the Second World War; and
a l t h o u g h somewhat, concealed i n the t a b l e above, China i s
underrecognized dur ing only about h a l f of her major power y e a r s .
F i n a l l y , as we would e x p e c t , Japan i s by and l a r g e u n d e r r e c o g n i z e d ,
being most s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t j u s t p r i o r to World War Two.
The I n t e r v e n i n g V a r i a b l e s : P h y s i c a l , P s y c h o l o g i c a l , and S t r u c t u r a l
Having c o n s t r u c t e d an index of s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y and
d e r i v e d a p p r o p r i a t e s c o r e s , we t u r n next to the i n t e r v e n i n g
v a r i a b l e s . In Chapter One I p o s i t e d t h a t s e v e r a l f a c t o r s might
serve to c o n s t r a i n s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t s t a t e s from becoming
i n v o l v e d i n m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s and, s u b s e q u e n t l y , wars.
These were c o n t i g u i t y , power c a p a b i l i t y , p r i o r war e x p e r i e n c e ,
c r o s s - c u t t i n g bonds, and p o l a r i t y .
" R e a c h a b i l i t y "
The f i r s t two of these f a c t o r s concern whether a
d i s s a t i s f i e d s t a t e can "reach" another s t a t e m i l i t a r i l y . The
i n d i c a t o r of c o n t i g u i t y i s the e a s i e r of the two to d e s c r i b e .
I have determined the c o n t i g u i t i e s f o r a l l s t a t e s s i n c e 1816
57
and, f o r the purpose of t h i s s t u d y , w i l l say that two s t a t e s are
c o n t i g u o u s to one another i f t h e i r land f r o n t i e r s i n t e r s e c t at
any p o i n t or they are separated by not more than s i x n a u t i c a l
m i l e s of water. S i x n a u t i c a l m i l e s was s e l e c t e d because i t
i s the maximum d i s t a n c e between s t a t e s t h a t s t i l l permits the
i n t e r s e c t i o n of t e r r i t o r i a l w a t e r s , given the t h r e e - m i l e l i m i t
t h a t (at l e a s t u n t i l very r e c e n t l y ) has been g e n e r a l l y accepted
i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. Thus, the i n d i c a t o r of c o n t i g u i t y i s a
s i m p l e dichotomy; s t a t e s e i t h e r share common land or water
f r o n t i e r s , or they do not.
The second " r e a c h a b i l i t y " f a c t o r i s power c a p a b i l i t y .
The procedure f o r c o n s t r u c t i n g an index f o r t h i s v a r i a b l e i s a
b i t more complex than the one employed i n the p r e c e d i n g
p a r a g r a p h . The reader w i l l r e c a l l that we have a l r e a d y d e r i v e d
s i x t ransformed i n d i c a t o r s of power, but have no a p r i o r i
w e i g h t i n g scheme f o r combining them. With no i n f o r m a t i o n ,
the best s i n g l e index of a s t a t e ' s power would be i t s mean on
the s i x i n d i c a t o r s , i . e . , equal weight f o r each. But as I have
mentioned p r e v i o u s l y , I would suspect t h a t the i n d i c a t o r s do not
c o n t r i b u t e e q u a l l y to the f o r m a t i o n of n a t i o n a l power and t h a t
the c o n t r i b u t i o n from each i n d i c a t o r v a r i e s a c r o s s t i m e . This
suggests a f a c t o r a n a l y t i c approach 1 to index c o n s t r u c t i o n
s i m i l a r to F e r r i s ' (1973).
1 For an i n t r o d u c t i o n to f a c t o r a n a l y s i s see Cooley and Lohnes ( 1 9 6 2 ) , Harman (1967), O v e r a l l and K l e t t ( 1 9 7 2 ) , and Rummel (1967, 1970).
58
I f our s i x c a p a b i l i t y i n d i c a t o r s a l l tap some f a c e t of
power, then the degree to which they are i n t e r c o r r e l a t e d
i d e n t i f i e s a common l a t e n t s t r u c t u r e . A o n e - i t e r a t i o n
p r i n c i p a l - a x i s f a c t o r a n a l y s i s ( i n t h i s c a s e , u s i n g the
c o r r e l a t i o n matr ix of the i n d i c a t o r s w i t h 1.0 a long the main
d i a g o n a l ) produces a p r i n c i p a l component s o l u t i o n . This
s o l u t i o n maximizes the amount of v a r i a n c e i n the l a t e n t s t r u c t u r e
accounted f o r by each independent f a c t o r , where each f a c t o r
accounts f o r l e s s v a r i a n c e than the one t h a t precedes i t . Thus,
the f i r s t f a c t o r accounts f o r the most v a r i a n c e i n the i n t e r -
c o r r e l a t i o n (or v a r i a n c e - c o v a r i a n c e ) m a t r i x of the c a p a b i l i t y
i n d i c a t o r s . This f i r s t f a c t o r i s , i n a s e n s e , what we mean
by "power" s i n c e i t p u l l s from the c o r r e l a t i o n m a t r i x the
maximum v a r i a n c e t h a t our i n d i c a t o r s have i n common.
I t i s not the more f r e q u e n t l y r e p o r t e d f a c t o r l o a d i n g s
(the squares of which are the amounts o f v a r i a n c e in the v a r i a b l e s
t h a t are accounted f o r by the f a c t o r s ) t h a t now i n t e r e s t u s ,
but r a t h e r the f a c t o r s c o r e s . Each f a c t o r i s a l i n e a r
combinat ion of the v a r i a b l e s a n a l y z e d . F a c t o r score c o e f f i c i e n t s
are weights that represent the r e l a t i v e c o n t r i b u t i o n of each
v a r i a b l e to the c o n s t r u c t i o n of t h a t f a c t o r . F a c t o r scores are
no more than the o r i g i n a l data f o r the v a r i a b l e s , weighted by the
a p p r o p r i a t e c o e f f i c i e n t s . The f a c t o r scores from the f i r s t f a c t o r
of the p r i n c i p a l component s o l u t i o n are the "best" l i n e a r
combinat ion of each s t a t e ' s s i x c a p a b i l i t y i n d i c a t o r s .
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1 subjected each s t a t e ' s CM-III t ransformed c a p a b i l i t y
indicators"' to a p r i n c i p a l component a n a l y s i s , employing the
same t h i r t e e n time s l i c e s used when computing s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y .
The mean v a r i a n c e accounted f o r by the f i r s t f a c t o r was 64.1
p e r c e n t . Factor score c o e f f i c i e n t s showed t h a t , a c r o s s t i m e ,
l a b o r - i n t e n s i v e v a r i a b l e s c o n t r i b u t e d l e s s and c a p i t a l - i n t e n s i v e
v a r i a b l e s more to the composi t ion of the n a t i o n a l power i n d e x .
The f a c t o r scores c o r r e l a t e d .97 (Pearson r) w i t h the mean CM-III
t ransformed s c o r e s , d e s p i t e the f a c t t h a t f a c t o r score c o e f f i c i e n t s
were d i f f e r e n t f o r each v a r i a b l e and changed over t i m e , i n d i c a t i n g
t h a t the major powers are h i g h l y ordered on a c a p a b i l i t y d imension.
P r i o r War Experience
A second category of i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s i s p r i o r war
e x p e r i e n c e . Here we are i n t e r e s t e d i n whether p a r t i c i p a t i o n in
a p r e v i o u s war may c o n s t r a i n a s t a t e ' s behavior i n subsequent
c o n f l i c t s i t u a t i o n s .
1 The e f f e c t of using the t ransformed scores i s to produce a maximal non-metr ic p r i n c i p a l component a n a l y s i s f o r the o r i g i n a l capability s c o r e s .
2 The r e g r e s s i o n c o e f f i c i e n t s from d i p l o m a t i c importance
on c a p a b i l i t y were not the same as the f a c t o r score c o e f f i c i e n t s . Indeed, a r e g r e s s i o n of d i p l o m a t i c importance on the p r i n c i p a l component f a c t o r scores d i d not produce a p a r t i c u l a r l y high R . Thus, the l i n e a r combination of c a p a b i l i t y scores that maximizes the amount of t o t a l v a r i a n c e among these scores t h a t can be accounted f o r by a s i n g l e dimension i s not the same as the c o m b i n a t i o n that best p r e d i c t s d i p l o m a t i c importance.
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P s y c h o l o g i s t s i n t e r e s t e d i n l e a r n i n g behavior have
c o n c e n t r a t e d mainly on s h o r t - t e r m memory processes ( K i n t s c h , 1970;
McGeoch, 1952; M e l t o n , 1964). What l i t e r a t u r e does e x i s t on
l o n g - t e r m memory decay ( W i c k e l g r e n , 1972) a p p e a r s , i n g e n e r a l ,
to support J o s t ' s (1897, p. 472) second law: "Given two
a s s o c i a t i o n s of the same s t r e n g t h , but of d i f f e r e n t ages, the
o l d e r f a l l s o f f l e s s r a p i d l y i n a g iven l e n g t h of t i m e . "
Hovland (1951), however, r e p o r t s t h a t there i s evidence that
r e t e n t i o n remains high f o r a s h o r t p e r i o d before d e c a y i n g .
T h i s s u g g e s t s , to me, the S-shaped l o g i s t i c curve t h a t has been
found to a c c u r a t e l y d e p i c t scores of b i o l o g i c a l , economic,
s o c i o l o g i c a l , and h i s t o r i c a l phenomena ( B a i l e y , 1967, pp. 1 6 - 1 8 ;
Coleman, 1964, pp. 4 1 - 4 6 ; H a r t , 1945; L o t k a , 1956, pp. 6 4 - 7 6 ;
Taagepera, 1968). Lotka p o s i t s t h a t these l o g i s t i c r e g u l a r i t i e s
may be a s s o c i a t e d w i t h processes i n which the substance o r
s t r u c t u r e i t s e l f acts as the nucleus f o r i t s own growth or
d e c o m p o s i t i o n , e . g . , c e l l r e p r o d u c t i o n and decay. The decay of
l o n g - t e r m memory would seem to be such a p r o c e s s .
There i s l i t t l e l i t e r a t u r e i n p o l i t i c a l s c i e n c e or h i s t o r y
to help us decide what l e n g t h of time would be necessary f o r a
people to "forget" a war e x p e r i e n c e , but most h i s t o r i a n s would
suggest about ten to twenty years 1 — t h e l e n g t h of time a s s o c i a t e d
1 This est imate d e r i v e s from s e v e r a l i n f o r m a t i v e c o n v e r s a t i o n s w i t h M e l v i n S m a l l . He suggested t h a t an i n d i c a t o r of the length of time necessary f o r f o r g e t t i n g may be the number of y e a r s that must pass before one's enemies i n the l a s t war can
61
w i t h the r i s e of new " p o l i t i c a l g e n e r a t i o n s . " I f , f o r our
p u r p o s e s , we view "nat ional f o r g e t t i n g " as the e r o s i o n of memory
concerned w i t h the s a c r i f i c e s of war, we can see t h a t t h i s
i n v o l v e s more than the f a d i n g of images held by o l d e r n a t i o n a l
l e a d e r s ; i t a l s o i n v o l v e s the e v o l u t i o n of a new " p o l i t i c a l
g e n e r a t i o n " which views the past wars as h i s t o r y , not personal
e x p e r i e n c e . Taking t h i s i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n , I have c o n s t r u c t e d
a f i f t e e n - y e a r decay f u n c t i o n based on a s imple l o g i s t i c
f o r g e t t i n g model. I assume t h a t the g r e a t e r the b a t t l e deaths
p r o p o r t i o n a t e to p o p u l a t i o n s u f f e r e d by n a t i o n s a t war, the more
p u n i s h i n g i s the exper ience ( c f . R i c h a r d s o n , 1960b, p. 298; Rosen,
1971, 1972). With the p a s s i n g of t i m e , b a t t l e deaths per m i l l i o n
p o p u l a t i o n are d iscounted a c c o r d i n g to the ( i n v e r s e ) l o g i s t i c
f u n c t i o n pt= ^3(t 7.5) , where pt is punishment as p e r c e i v e d
t y e a r s a f t e r the war's end and max i s the upper l i m i t o f the
l o g i s t i c curve."' There i s an i n f l e c t i o n p o i n t a t 7.5 y e a r s , and
the curve approaches zero a f t e r f i f t e e n y e a r s .
The decay f u n c t i o n i s assumed to be the same f o r a l l wars,
a l l p e r i o d s , and a l l n a t i o n s . This i s o b v i o u s l y an o v e r
s i m p l i f i c a t i o n , but i t i s not u n r e a l i s t i c . Using a u n i v e r s a l
be viewed as comic, r a t h e r than s i n i s t e r , f i g u r e s — t h e fourteen y e a r s before the p r o d u c t i o n of the t e l e v i s i o n program "Hogan's Heroes" perhaps being a case i n p o i n t .
1 In order f o r punishment at time zero (p0) to equal b a t t l e deaths per m i l l i o n p o p u l a t i o n a t a war's end, max i s s e t to ^ , - 3 . 7 5 ) .
p n (1 + e
62
decay f u n c t i o n f o r a l l wars does not mean t h a t the punishment
brought about by l a r g e wars i s the "same" as t h a t caused by
s m a l l e r wars. I t i s q u i t e p o s s i b l e (and, i n f a c t , occurs on
numerous o c c a s i o n s ) that the punishment score from a s i z a b l e
war i s g r e a t e r , even a f t e r f i f t e e n y e a r s o f d e c a y i n g , than
t h a t f o r a small war before decay. Nor i s i t an unreasonable
s t r a t e g y to use a u n i v e r s a l decay f u n c t i o n f o r a l l time p e r i o d s ,
d e s p i t e the p o s s i b i l i t y that the f o r g e t t i n g f u n c t i o n might have
been d i f f e r e n t when the means of communication were l e s s developed
and the d i s s e m i n a t i o n of i n f o r m a t i o n l e s s w i d e s p r e a d , because
weapons technology was a l s o l e s s s o p h i s t i c a t e d and major power
wars g e n e r a l l y l e s s deadly. And f o r l e s s deadly wars, the form
of the decay f u n c t i o n i s not of as great importance, s i n c e the
punishment scores are a l r e a d y nearer to z e r o . F i n a l l y , u s i n g a
u n i v e r s a l decay f u n c t i o n f o r a l l n a t i o n s i s not u n t e n a b l e ; the
assumption of s i g n i f i c a n t n a t i o n a l d i f f e r e n c e s i n f o r g e t t i n g has
no more support than the assumption of n a t i o n a l s i m i l a r i t i e s ,
and the l a t t e r has, at l e a s t , the m e r i t of parsimony.
I n t e r - s t a t e S t r u c t u r e
The t h i r d set of i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s concerns the
c r o s s - p r e s s u r e s that r e s u l t from the i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s among
the s t a t e s . One v a r i a b l e t h a t i s purported to produce c r o s s -
pressure i s l a b e l e d c r o s s - c u t t i n g bonds. Here we determine
whether a s t a t e i s bonded to the same or to d i f f e r e n t s t a t e s
63
on r e l e v a n t dimensions. I have s e l e c t e d two important dimensions
of n a t i o n a l interdependence: the m i l i t a r y and the economic. These
two dimensions are h i g h l y v i s i b l e , they l i e at the heart of
i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n t e r a c t i o n s , and they are major f a c e t s i n the
c r e d i b i l i t y of n a t i o n a l commitments ( R u s s e t t , 1963). For each
major power, I c o n s t r u c t an annual "trade x a l l i a n c e " cont ingency
t a b l e , r e p r e s e n t i n g i t s p r i n c i p a l t rade partnerships'' and formal
m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e s w i t h the o t h e r major powers,
formal alliance partner
p r i n c i p a l t rade p a r t n e r
yes no
yes
no
and compute a K e n d a l l ' s tau-b s t a t i s t i c . The r e s u l t i n g tau-b
P r i n c i p a l t rade p a r t n e r s are those t h a t account f o r a minimum of f i v e percent of the t o t a l value of a s t a t e ' s imports and exports ( c f . W a l l e n s t e e n , 1973, p. 6 7 ) . Trade data c o u l d not be o b t a i n e d f o r the f i r s t s i x t y years o f t h i s s t u d y ; the c r o s s -c u t t i n g index i s , t h u s , c o n s t r u c t e d f o r o n l y the 1879-1970 p e r i o d . And, because of the immensity and c o n d i t i o n of the t rade data s e t , the index was computed every f i f t h y e a r , o t h e r y e a r s being i n t e r p o l a t e d . The r e l a t i v e s t a b i l i t y o f both a l l i a n c e and trade p a r t n e r s h i p s , however, suggests t h a t l i t t l e i n f o r m a t i o n i s l o s t when i n t e r p o l a t i n g .
2 K e n d a l l ' s t a u - b , when a p p l i e d to f o u r - f o l d t a b l e s , i s
e q u i v a l e n t to a 0 or a Pearson r. I t can be viewed as a measure o f the independence of c e l l s , r e a c h i n g i t s maximum o n l y under c o n d i t i o n s of s t rong m o n o t o n i c i t y . The s t a t i s t i c i s undef ined i f a row or column of the 2 x 2 t a b l e i s empty, t h a t i s , i f a s t a t e does not have a major power a l l y or t rade p a r t n e r . In order
64
(with i t s s i g n reversed) i s the measure of c r o s s - c u t t i n g . A
c o m p l e t e l y "cross-cut" s t a t e would be one t h a t i s "bonded" to
a l l s t a t e s i n the subsystem, but i s n e i t h e r a l l i e d to any of
i t s p r i n c i p a l t r a d i n g partners nor t rades p r i n c i p a l l y w i t h any
of i t s a l l i e s . I t s "trade x a l l i a n c e " m a t r i x would have empty
c e l l s a l o n g the major d i a g o n a l , i . e . , i n the u p p e r - l e f t (a)
and l o w e r - r i g h t (d) c o r n e r s . This would produce a score of +1.0.
A s t a t e t h a t i s not at a l l c r o s s - c u t would be one t h a t i s not
a l l i e d to a l l subsystem members, but has a m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e w i t h
a l l o f i t s p r i n c i p a l t rade p a r t n e r s . Such a s t a t e would have
empty c e l l s along the minor d i a g o n a l ( i . e . , c e l l s b and c) of i t s
"trade x a l l i a n c e " m a t r i x , producing a score of - 1 . 0 .
The second i n t e r v e n i n g s t r u c t u r a l v a r i a b l e i s bi-polarity,
f o r which I adopt a measure proposed by S i n g e r and Small (1968).
The measure i s computed s o l e l y on the b a s i s of those m i l i t a r y
defense pacts among major powers t h a t are aimed a g a i n s t o t h e r
major powers. 1 The r e s u l t i n g index r e f l e c t s the degree of freedom
t h a t major powers have to form new, l o g i c a l l y - c o n s i s t e n t a l l i a n c e s
i n a g i v e n y e a r . Let us take an example. Assume t h a t t h e r e are
f i v e s t a t e s i n a system, d i v i d e d i n t o two opposing dyads (A-B and
to compute t a u - b , 0.01 was added to each of the f o u r c e l l s of the m a t r i x whenever such a s i t u a t i o n a r o s e . For the r a t i o n a l e behind the s e l e c t i o n of "measures of a s s o c i a t i o n " f o r 2 x 2 c o n t i n g e n c y t a b l e s , see Weisberg (1974).
1 I have used Melv in S m a l l ' s ( C o r r e l a t e s of War P r o j e c t ) coding o f the t a r g e t s of a l l i a n c e s ( S i n g e r and S m a l l , 1 9 6 8 ) .
65
C-D) and one unal igned s t a t e ( E ) . How much freedom e x i s t s i n t h i s
system to form new, l o g i c a l l y - c o n s i s t e n t a l l i a n c e dyads? D i s
a l r e a d y a l l i e d to C and cannot l o g i c a l l y a l l y w i t h i t s enemies
A and B. The same reasoning holds f o r A, B, and C. Only E i s
f r e e to form a l l i a n c e s , and i t can form the dyads A-E and B-E
or C-E and D-E, but no o t h e r s . Hence, of the maximum number of
ten dyads ( N(N-1 )/2 dyads ) t h a t might be formed i n a system of
f i v e s t a t e s , only two a l l i a n c e c h o i c e s remain unmade. The system
i s , t h u s , n e a r l y b i - p o l a r — 8 / 1 0 of i t s p o s s i b l e dyads having been
used u p — a n d we a s s i g n t h i s c o n f i g u r a t i o n a score of 0 . 8 . The
index ranges from 1.0 f o r p e r f e c t b i - p o l a r i t y to 0 . 0 f o r t o t a l
non-al ignment i n the system."'
The Outcome V a r i a b l e : I n t e r s t a t e Military Conflict
We turn now to the outcome v a r i a b l e , major power i n t e r s t a t e
m i l i t a r y c o n f l i c t , d e f i n e d as an e x p l i c i t t h r e a t or use o f m i l i t a r y
f o r c e by a major power, a g a i n s t a member of the i n t e r s t a t e system.
Appendix C c o n t a i n s a d e t a i l e d d e s c r i p t i o n of the data c o l l e c t i o n
p r o c e d u r e , as w e l l as a l i s t i n g of the c o n f l i c t c a s e s ; below, I
s h a l l merely present the c a t e g o r i e s i n t o which the c o n f l i c t s have
been d i v i d e d .
1 An a l l i a n c e of all the major powers, i . e . , u n i - p o l a r i t y (as o c c u r s in 1820), r e s u l t s i n a score of 0 . 0 , s i n c e there are no major power t a r g e t s f o r the a l l i a n c e . Thus, the b i - p o l a r i t y index equates an a l l i a n c e of " a l l a g a i n s t none" w i t h "no a l l i a n c e , " t h e r e being in both i n s t a n c e s no opposing a l ignments of major powers.
66
In the c u r r e n t i n v e s t i g a t i o n , m i l i t a r y c o n f l i c t s are
c l a s s i f i e d under two broad h e a d i n g s : (1) i n t e r s t a t e m i l i t a r y
c o n f r o n t a t i o n s and (2) i n t e r s t a t e wars. I n t e r s t a t e military c o n f r o n t a t i o n s (or IMCs) encompass two l e v e l s of m i l i t a r y
c o n f l i c t :
i n t e r s t a t e t h r e a t : e x p l i c i t verbal s tatement , by a high o f f i c i a l on b e h a l f o f a member s t a t e ' s government, d e c l a r i n g an i n t e n t to use m i l i t a r y f o r c e a g a i n s t another member s t a t e f o r other than s t r i c t l y d e f e n s i v e purposes; o r , o v e r t m o b i l i z a t i o n o f armed f o r c e s by a member s t a t e , f o r other than s t r i c t l y d e f e n s i v e p u r p o s e s , d u r i n g p e r i o d s of d i s p u t e or high t e n s i o n . In case o f e i t h e r v e r b a l statement or m o b i l i z a t i o n , the t a r g e t s t a t e must be c l e a r l y s p e c i f i e d or e a s i l y i d e n t i f i a b l e . And,
i n t e r s t a t e m i l i t a r y a c t i o n : the use of armed f o r c e s by a member s t a t e , d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t the t e r r i t o r y and people of another member s t a t e ; o r , combat between armed f o r c e s , i n v o l v i n g at l e a s t one member of the i n t e r s t a t e system on each s i d e . M i l i t a r y a c t i o n taken by one s t a t e ( e . g . , the s e i z u r e of land or b l o c k a d i n g of t e r r i t o r y ) may f a i l to provoke the t a r g e t s t a t e i n t o m i l i t a r y a c t i o n ; i f the t a r g e t s t a t e remains p a s s i v e , the c o n f r o n t a t i o n i s l a b e l e d " u n r e c i p r o c a t e d m i l i t a r y a c t i o n . " M i l i t a r y a c t i o n may, however, provoke the t a r g e t s t a t e to engage the f i r s t a c t o r i n m i l i t a r y combat; so long as the subsequent combat r e s u l t s i n fewer than one thousand b a t t l e -connected deaths to the armed f o r c e s and/or l a s t s f o r l e s s than t w e n t y - f o u r h o u r s , i t i s l a b e l e d " h o s t i l i t i e s . "
Sometimes, however, h o s t i l i t i e s e s c a l a t e to h i g h e r l e v e l s of
m i l i t a r y v i o l e n c e . These s u s t a i n e d , more v i o l e n t m i l i t a r y c o n f l i c t s
are c l a s s i f i e d as i n t e r s t a t e wars, and d e f i n e d a s :
combat between armed f o r c e s , i n v o l v i n g at l e a s t one member of the i n t e r s t a t e system on each s i d e , r e s u l t i n g i n a t o t a l of one thousand or more b a t t l e - c o n n e c t e d deaths to the armed f o r c e s , and l a s t i n g f o r more than t w e n t y - f o u r hours.
67
Thus, i n t e r s t a t e t h r e a t i s d i s t i n g u i s h e d from i n t e r s t a t e military
a c t i o n i n that the former does not i n v o l v e the a c t u a l use of
m i l i t a r y f o r c e . And i n t e r s t a t e m i l i t a r y a c t i o n i s , in t u r n ,
d i s t i n g u i s h e d from i n t e r s t a t e war i n t h a t the l a t t e r , but not
the former , r e s u l t s i n a t o t a l of one thousand or more b a t t l e
f a t a l i t i e s (whi le l a s t i n g more than t w e n t y - f o u r h o u r s ) .
The outcome v a r i a b l e i n the subsequent a n a l y s e s w i l l be
the i n c i d e n c e of e i t h e r i n t e r s t a t e m i l i t a r y confrontation
(Chapters Three and Four) or i n t e r s t a t e war (Chapter F i v e ) .
As has a l r e a d y been s t a t e d , s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y i s hypothesized
to make s t a t e s prone to involvement i n m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n ;
b u t , once such a c o n f r o n t a t i o n o c c u r s , a d i f f e r e n t s e t o f
dynamics i s i n v o l v e d and the l i k e l i h o o d of war i s h y p o t h e s i z e d
to be a s s o c i a t e d wi th p r o p e r t i e s more immediate to the c o n f l i c t
i t s e l f — p r o p e r t i e s that are most f r u i t f u l l y sought i n the
d y a d i c r e l a t i o n s h i p of the s p e c i f i c p r o t a g o n i s t s to the c o n f l i c t .
The i n v e s t i g a t i o n s t h a t f o l l o w focus upon o n l y i n t e r s t a t e
c o n f l i c t s . Such e x t r a - s y s t e m i c combat as i m p e r i a l or c o l o n i a l
wars are o m i t t e d , as are i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z e d c i v i l c o n f l i c t s and
p u r e l y i n t e r n a l c i v i l wars. At t i m e s , some p a r t i e s to the c o n f l i c t s
under examination w i l l be designated " i n i t i a t o r s . " This i s not
meant to assess blame, but r a t h e r to i d e n t i f y the s t a t e t h a t
f i r s t makes s e r i o u s t h r e a t s or f i r s t a t t a c k s i n s t r e n g t h i t s
opponent's armies or t e r r i t o r y .
68
A n a l y z i n g the Data
The s p e c i f i c a t i o n o f the s p a t i a l - t e m p o r a l domain, the
g e n e r a t i o n of d a t a , and the c o n s t r u c t i o n of i n d i c a t o r s are
necessary elements of any r e s e a r c h endeavor, but they are
h a r d l y s u f f i c i e n t . The f i n a l and c r i t i c a l element i s t h a t of
data a n a l y s i s and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . In the c u r r e n t i n v e s t i g a t i o n ,
we seek to d i s c o v e r whether underrecognized s t a t e s , d i s s a t i s f i e d
w i t h t h e i r p o s i t i o n i n the extant i n t e r s t a t e o r d e r , t r y to
i n c r e a s e t h e i r a t t r i b u t e d importance by b e l l i c o s e l y demonstrat ing
t h e i r power c a p a b i l i t i e s . We a l s o wish to determine the c o n d i t i o n s
under which the r e s u l t i n g i n t e r s t a t e m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s (IMCs)
e s c a l a t e i n t o war. The data a n a l y s e s are d i v i d e d i n t o two s e c t i o n s .
In the f i r s t (Chapters Three and F o u r ) , n a t i o n - s t a t e s are the
u n i t s of a n a l y s i s ; in the second (Chapter F i v e ) , m i l i t a r y
c o n f r o n t a t i o n s . The research design w i l l i n c o r p o r a t e both c r o s s -
s e c t i o n a l and l o n g i t u d i n a l a s p e c t s . For i n s t a n c e , we w i l l be
a s k i n g whether "in those years i n which c o n f r o n t a t i o n s i n v o l v i n g
major powers b e g i n , are the major powers t h a t e n t e r and/or
i n i t i a t e the c o n f r o n t a t i o n s more s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t than those
t h a t do not?" Y e t , at the same t i m e , we w i l l be e x p l i c i t l y
l a g g i n g the s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y v a r i a b l e i n order to a s c e r t a i n
whether or not a p e r i o d of time must e l a p s e before s t a t u s
i n c o n s i s t e n c y i s manifested as a g g r e s s i v e b e h a v i o r .
The p r i n c i p a l means of a n a l y z i n g the data w i l l be
c o n t i n g e n c y t a b l e , b i s e r i a l c o r r e l a t i o n , and p r o b i t a n a l y s i s .
69
Cont ingency t a b l e a n a l y s i s seeks to determine whether the
d i s t r i b u t i o n of data i n t o c a t e g o r i e s d e f i n e d by the i n t e r s e c t i o n
o f two n o m i n a l - or o r d i n a l - s c a l e d v a r i a b l e s i s l i k e l y to have
o c c u r r e d by chance. Of the v a r i e t y of c o e f f i c i e n t s a v a i l a b l e
to measure the s t a t i s t i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h i n a c o n t i n g e n c y
t a b l e (Weisberg, 1974), we w i l l r e l y h e a v i l y upon Y u l e ' s Q
and Cramer's 0.
B i s e r i a l c o r r e l a t i o n s (McNemar, 1969) are a p p r o x i m a t i o n s
of Pearson product moment c o e f f i c i e n t s , employed when we wish to
a s c e r t a i n the a s s o c i a t i o n between two v a r i a b l e s , one of which
i s measured on a continuous s c a l e and the o t h e r as a dichotomy.
The use of the b i s e r i a l c o e f f i c i e n t , r b , assumes t h a t u n d e r l y i n g
the dichotomy i s a n o r m a l l y - d i s t r i b u t e d cont inuous v a r i a b l e .
Thus, i n the case of our a n a l y s e s , we are p o s i t i n g t h a t c o n f l i c t
i s a matter of degree, and t h a t the c a t e g o r i z a t i o n (IMC/no IMC)
o f the outcome v a r i a b l e i s a r e s u l t of our d e f i n i t i o n or
measurement procedure r a t h e r than being i n h e r e n t i n the c o n c e p t .
F i n a l l y , p r o b i t a n a l y s i s i s one of a f a m i l y of a l g o r i t h m s
designed f o r r e g r e s s i o n on n-chotomous outcome v a r i a b l e s . 1 In the
1 Although p r o b i t a n a l y s i s ( F i n n e y , 1971; Frank, 1971; McKelvey and Z a v o i n a , f o r t h c o m i n g ; T o b i n , 1955; Zavoina and McKelvey , 1969) i s the most w i d e l y used of these t e c h n i q u e s , i t has been shown, both e m p i r i c a l l y and m a t h e m a t i c a l l y (Mokken, 1971, pp. 1 0 5 - 1 1 ) , t h a t the s i m p l e r l o g i s t i c p r o b a b i l i t y d i s t r i b u t i o n ( l o g i t ) a f f o r d s an e x c e l l e n t a p p r o x i m a t i o n o f the c u m u l a t i v e normal d i s t r i b u t i o n ( p r o b i t ) and i s , f o r a lmost a l l p u r p o s e s , i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e . For a d i s c u s s i o n of t h i s and an i n t r o d u c t i o n to l o g i t , see Berkson (1944, 1946, 1949, 1953, 1 9 5 5 ) , DuMouchel (1974), G r i z z l e (1971) , and T h e i l (1967,
70
normal r e g r e s s i o n s i t u a t i o n , there i s a c o n t i n u o u s outcome
v a r i a b l e , Y, which i s to be p r e d i c t e d by a g iven s e t of
v a r i a b l e s , X1 . . . X n , where the u n d e r l y i n g assumption i s
t h a t Y i s approximately normal ly d i s t r i b u t e d i n the sub-
p o p u l a t i o n s d e f i n e d by the values of X1 . . . Xn . I f , however,
as i n the present s t u d y , the outcome v a r i a b l e i s dichotomous
(IMC/no IMC), then the l e a s t - s q u a r e s assumption — t h a t the
e r r o r term be normal ly d i s t r i b u t e d about the r e g r e s s i o n l i n e
w i t h mean zero and constant v a r i a n c e — i s v i o l a t e d . But suppose,
as was done i n the preceding paragraph, t h a t the dichotomous
nature of the outcome v a r i a b l e r e s u l t s from measurement or
d e f i n i t i o n a l i n a d e q u a c i e s , i . e . , there i s a c o n t i n u o u s
u n d e r l y i n g c o n f l i c t s c a l e of which our c a t e g o r i e s are merely
an i m p e r f e c t r e f l e c t i o n . What we wish to d e t e r m i n e , f o r a l l
v a l u e s of X1 . . . Xn , are the probabil i t ies o f a p a r t i c u l a r
case being in each of our two Y - c a t e g o r i e s .
Let us assume that there e x i s t s an index I = z 3 Q + / 4 1 ^ 1 + / * 2 ^ 2 +
. . . +^> n^ n t h a t i s the p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t a major power w i l l engage
i n an i n t e r s t a t e m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n . When I i s s m a l l , the
l i k e l i h o o d of IMC i s low; when l a r g e , the l i k e l i h o o d i s h i g h .
Let us a l s o assume t h a t f o r each major power t h e r e e x i s t s a
c r i t i c a l value of t h i s i n d e x , denoted I . I f the value of I
f o r a given major power i s l e s s than the c r i t i c a l value I ,
1972). For a comparison of p r o b i t w i t h r e g r e s s i o n and d i s c r i m i n a n t f u n c t i o n a n a l y s i s , see A l d r i c h and Cnudde (1975) .
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then t h a t major power does not engage i n i n t e r s t a t e m i l i t a r y
c o n f r o n t a t i o n (Y = 0 ) ; i f i t i s equal to or exceeds the c r i t i c a l
v a l u e , then the major power engages i n IMC (Y = 1 ) . That i s ,
0 i f K I *
1 i f I">I
Over the p o p u l a t i o n of major powers, the I s are assumed to be
n o r m a l l y d i s t r i b u t e d with mean zero and standard d e v i a t i o n one.
Then, f o r a major power, the p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t , given I, Y = 0 i s
/ ° 2 Pr(Y = o|l) = P r ( I < I * ) = — ( e " ( t _ I ) 1 2 dt (1)
-Mh2'2 dt (2) V2TT
= 9 ( - I ) (3)
where 9 ( - l ) i s the cumulat ive s tandard normal d i s t r i b u t i o n
= 1 - 0(1) (4)
= l - 9to 0 +/a 1 x 1 +/3 2 x 2 +.. . -»a n x n ) (5)
C o n v e r s e l y , the p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t Y = 1 i s
Pr (Y=l|l ) - 1 - Pr(Y=0|I) = 9(1) (1)
= 9(^ 0 + / S 1 X 1 +/i 2 X 2 +...+/2 n X n ) (2)
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The s i m i l a r i t y to the m u l t i p l e r e g r e s s i o n e q u a t i o n i s apparent .
As i n o r d i n a r y r e g r e s s i o n , we wish to e s t i m a t e the parameters
^ O ' ^ l ' ^ ' " * '^rf ^ n i t e r a t i v e maximum-l ike l ihood procedure A ^ A A
i s used to s e l e c t those parameter e s t i m a t o r s /3g , / 3 , . . . ^
t h a t make the p r o b a b i 1 i ty of Y=0 l a r g e f o r cases i n which Y = 0
and the probability of Y=1 l a r g e f o r cases i n which Y = 1. These
c o e f f i c i e n t s are r e l a t e d to the p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t u n i t changes
i n the p r e d i c t o r v a r i a b l e s w i l l a l t e r the category assignment
of the outcome v a r i a b l e , and have a "slope" i n t e r p r e t a t i o n
analogous to r e g r e s s i o n c o e f f i c i e n t s .
Having now completed the t e d i o u s , but n e c e s s a r y , process
of s p e c i f y i n g the s p a t i a l - t e m p o r a l domain, d e s c r i b i n g the data
s e t and the r e s u l t i n g i n d i c a t o r s , and i d e n t i f y i n g the modes of
a n a l y s i s , l e t us put the model to the t e s t .
CHAPTER III
FROM STATUS INCONSISTENCY TO MILITARY CONFRONTATION:
THE BIVARIATE RELATIONSHIP
We begin wi th an examinat ion of the f i r s t stage of the
model. In t h i s chapter we e x p l o r e o n l y the b i v a r i a t e r e l a t i o n s h i p
between s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y and c o n f l i c t , i n t r o d u c i n g the
i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s i n the next c h a p t e r . The reader w i l l r e c a l l
t h a t , i n f o r m u l a t i n g the model, I h y p o t h e s i z e d t h a t underrecognized
( i . e . , s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t ) c o u n t r i e s would be i n v o l v e d i n
i n t e r s t a t e m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s more f r e q u e n t l y than would be
expected by chance. D i a g r a m m a t i c a l l y ,
s t a t u s i n t e r s t a t e i n c o n s i s t e n t + military
s t a t e s c o n f r o n t a t i o n s
In the pages t h a t f o l l o w we w i l l examine the extent to which t h i s
p r o p o s i t i o n i s supported by e m p i r i c a l e v i d e n c e .
Assuming Homogeneity among the Major Powers
The most d i r e c t t e s t of the p o s i t e d a s s o c i a t i o n i s to
examine the e n t i r e 1820-1970 p e r i o d w i t h o u t d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g among
73
74
the major powers. As a f i r s t c u t , we s imply d i c h o t o m i z e the
c o u n t r i e s i n t o two groups: those t h a t are underrecognized i n a
g i v e n year and those that are n o t . Two cont ingency t a b l e s are
c o n s t r u c t e d . The f i r s t t a b l e , l a b e l e d " p a r t i c i p a t e , " i n c l u d e s
all major power involvements i n i n t e r s t a t e m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s ;
the second t a b l e , l a b e l e d " i n i t i a t e , " i n c l u d e s o n l y those
c o n f r o n t a t i o n s t h a t are i n i t i a t e d by a major power, i . e . , only
those i n which i t i s a major power t h a t f i r s t makes s e r i o u s
t h r e a t s or f i r s t a t t a c k s i n s t r e n g t h i t s opponent's armies or
t e r r i t o r y . S ince every war begins as a m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n
— i t i s coded as a "war" only a f t e r i t reaches one thousand
b a t t l e f a t a l i t i e s — the IMC o b s e r v a t i o n s i n the t a b l e s i n c l u d e
t h r e a t s , m i l i t a r y a c t i o n s , and "pre-war" combat.
TABLE 1
STATUS INCONSISTENCY VS. INVOLVEMENT IN INTERSTATE MILITARY CONFRONTATIONS, 1820-1970
P a r t i c i p a t e Initiate
no IMC IMC no IMC IMC
o v e r 79.9%: 20.1% o v e r 8 1 . 9 % 18.1% r e c o g n i z e d (318) ( 80) 398 r e c o g n i z e d (326) ( 72)
under 77.1% 22.9% under 79.2% 2 0 . 8 % r e c o g n i z e d (326) ( 97) 423 r e c o g n i z e d (335) ( 88)
644 177 621 160
Q = +.08 Q = +.09
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We can see (from Table 1) t h a t there i s l i t t l e a s s o c i a t i o n
between being s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t and p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n , or
i n i t i a t i n g , an i n t e r s t a t e m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n . In any given
y e a r , those major powers t h a t are underrecognized have o n l y a
s l i g h t l y g r e a t e r l i k e l i h o o d (22.9%) of p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n a
c o n f r o n t a t i o n than those major powers t h a t are o v e r r e c o g n i z e d
( 2 0 . 1 % ) . S i m i l a r l y , underrecognized s t a t e s are only s l i g h t l y more
l i k e l y (20.8%' vs. 18.1%) to i n i t i a t e a c o n f r o n t a t i o n . The
Y u l e ' s Q, a measure of the independence of c e l l f r e q u e n c i e s ,
c o n f i r m s t h i s p o i n t . The Q can range from +1.00 ( i f no- o v e r -
r e c o g n i z e d , or a l l u n d e r r e c o g n i z e d , s t a t e s p a r t i c i p a t e i n or
i n i t i a t e IMCs) to - 1 . 0 0 ( i f a l l o v e r r e c o g n i z e d , or no under-
r e c o g n i z e d , s t a t e s p a r t i c i p a t e i n or i n i t i a t e them). A Q-
c o e f f i c i e n t having a value near z e r o , l i k e the ones we o b t a i n ,
shows t h a t there i s l i t t l e r e l a t i o n s h i p between s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y
and involvement in i n t e r s t a t e c o n f r o n t a t i o n s d u r i n g the 1820-1970
p e r i o d when we do not (1) d i f f e r e n t i a t e among the major powers,
or (2) a l l o w f o r time l a g s .
M a n i p u l a t i n g the Time Factor
Let us m a i n t a i n , f o r the moment, the assumption t h a t a l l
major powers respond s i m i l a r l y when they e x p e r i e n c e s t a t u s
i n c o n s i s t e n c y , and e x p l o r e the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t time l a g s need
to be i n t r o d u c e d , i . e . , that i t r e q u i r e s a p e r i o d of t ime before
s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y i s mani fested as a g g r e s s i v e b e h a v i o r . The
76
reader w i l l r e c a l l t h a t the t h e o r e t i c a l argument set out i n
Chapter One p o s i t s that a g g r e s s i v e b e h a v i o r i s an e x p r e s s i o n of
d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n aimed at r e c t i f y i n g an e x i s t i n g arrangement.
Because we are concerned wi th e x i s t i n g arrangements and because
most of the m i l i t a r y a c t i v i t i e s upon which we are f o c u s i n g
( e . g . , t h r e a t s and s m a l l - s c a l e uses of f o r c e ) r e q u i r e only a
minimum of p r e p a r a t i o n , we need only e x p l o r e r a t h e r b r i e f time
l a g s . In order to t e s t f o r the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t some minimal
p e r i o d of time i s necessary , I i n t r o d u c e one- to f i v e - y e a r l a g s .
TABLE 2
Q-SCORES FROM CONTINGENCY TABLE ANALYSIS OF MAJOR POWER STATUS INCONSISTENCY VS. INVOLVEMENT IN INTERSTATE
MILITARY CONFRONTATIONS, 1820-1970 (0NE- TO FIVE-YEAR TIME LAGS)
1*3. P a r t i c i p a t e I n i t i a t e
0 + .08 + .09
-1 + .06 + .05
- 2 + .05 + .06
- 3 + .01 + .03
-4 - . 0 9 - . 0 6
- 5 - . 1 1 - . 0 5
As might be e x p e c t e d , Table 2 demonstrates t h a t the a l r e a d y weak
a s s o c i a t i o n between s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y and i n t e r s t a t e m i l i t a r y
c o n f r o n t a t i o n d i m i n i s h e s w i t h the passage of t i m e , a c t u a l l y
becoming n e g a t i v e as the l a g i s extended to f o u r y e a r s .
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C o n t i n u i n g to manipulate the time element, we e x p l o r e
the p o s s i b i l i t y of i n t e r - c e n t u r y d i f f e r e n c e s — a phenomenon t h a t
has r e c u r r e d i n several s t u d i e s of i n t e r s t a t e war ( c f . S i n g e r ,
1972). I f the a s s o c i a t i o n between s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y and
p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n , or i n i t i a t i o n o f , i n t e r s t a t e c o n f r o n t a t i o n s
i s d i f f e r e n t i n the n i n e t e e n t h than i n the t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y ,
we may be o b s c u r i n g t h i s important f i n d i n g by s i m u l t a n e o u s l y
a n a l y z i n g the e n t i r e 1820-1970 p e r i o d .
TABLE 3
STATUS INCONSISTENCY VS. INVOLVEMENT IN INTERSTATE MILITARY CONFRONTATIONS, BY CENTURY
P a r t i c i pate (19th century)
I n i t i a t e (19th century)
no IMC IMC no IMC IMC
o v e r 8 2 . 3 % 17.7% o v e r 84.2% 15.8% r e c o g n i z e d (172) ( 37) 209 r e c o g n i z e d (176) ( 33)
under 78.9% 21.1% under 80.6% 19.4% r e c o g n i z e d (187) ( 50) 237 recognized (191) ( 46)
359 87 367 79
P a r t i c i p a t e I n i t i a t e (20th century) (20th century )
no IMC IMC no IMC IMC
o v e r 77.2% 22.8% o v e r 79.4% 20.6% r e c o g n i z e d (146) ( 43) 189 r e c o g n i z e d (150) ( 39)
under 74.7% 25.3% under- 77.4% 22.6% r e c o g n i z e d (139) ( 47) 186 r e c o g n i z e d (144) ( 42)
285 90 294 81
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TABLE 4
Q-SCORES FROM CONTINGENCY TABLE ANALYSIS OF MAJOR POWER STATUS INCONSISTENCY VS. INVOLVEMENT IN INTERSTATE
MILITARY CONFRONTATIONS, BY CENTURY (ONE- TO FIVE-YEAR TIME LAGS)
Lag P a r t i c i p a t e I n i t i a t e Lag
t o t a l 19th 20th t o t a l 19th 20th p e r i o d century century p e r i o d century century
0 + .08 + .11 + .07 + .09 + .12 + .06
-1 + .06 + .00 + .14 + .05 + .01 + .11
- 2 + .05 - . 1 0 + .20 + .06 - . 1 0 + .22
- 3 + .01 - . 0 5 + .09 + .03 - . 0 5 + .11
- 4 - . 0 9 - . 1 5 - . 0 2 - . 0 6 - . 1 8 + .07
- 5 - . 1 1 - . 0 5 - . 1 5 - . 0 5 + .02 - . 1 2
The data presented i n Table 3 , and the c o r r e s p o n d i n g
Q - c o e f f i c i e n t s f o r these data ( r e p o r t e d i n the f i r s t row of
Table 4 ) , f a i l to support the s u p p o s i t i o n t h a t we are masking
i n t e r - c e n t u r y d i f f e r e n c e s . That i s to s a y , d i v i d i n g the cases
by c e n t u r y ( i . e . , 1820-1899 and 1900-1970) does not s u b s t a n t i a l l y
a l t e r the r e l a t i o n s h i p between s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y and
involvement i n m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s . In both the n i n e t e e n t h
and t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r i e s the s t a t u s - c o n f l i c t r e l a t i o n s h i p i s
weak, but i n the p r e d i c t e d d i r e c t i o n . I n t r o d u c i n g time lags
f o r each century (Table 4) produces, as i t d i d f o r the e n t i r e
1820-1970 p e r i o d , a general p a t t e r n of d i m i n i s h i n g a s s o c i a t i o n ,
a l t h o u g h there i s some meager evidence s u p p o r t i n g a r e l a t i o n s h i p
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between s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y and involvement i n m i l i t a r y
c o n f r o n t a t i o n s when a two-year l a g i s i n t r o d u c e d f o r the
t w e n t i e t h century .
A l t e r i n g the Level of Measurement
To t h i s p o i n t , we have merely manipulated the time
element and have found l i t t l e to suggest that, a s i g n i f i c a n t
b i v a r i a t e r e l a t i o n s h i p e x i s t s between s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y
and i n t e r s t a t e m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n . But the apparent
absence of such a r e l a t i o n s h i p may w e l l be a r e s u l t of my
d e c i s i o n to dichotomize the p r e d i c t o r v a r i a b l e . Another way
t h a t we might examine the data a t hand i s to a l t e r the l e v e l
of measurement of the p r e d i c t o r v a r i a b l e . For example, l e t
us rank the major powers each year on s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y ,
and then ask whether the h i g h e s t r a n k i n g n a t i o n s ( r e g a r d l e s s
of t h e i r i d e n t i t i e s ) are more o f t e n i n v o l v e d i n c o n f r o n t a t i o n s
than those nat ions t h a t have lower r a n k s . The p r i n c i p a l
d i f f e r e n c e between t h i s procedure and the one used i n the
p r e c e d i n g s e c t i o n i s that s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y i s now being
t r e a t e d as an ordered v a r i a b l e , r a t h e r than a dichotomous one.
Depending upon the time l a g s i n t r o d u c e d i n our data s e t ,
there are from 803 to 821 major power n a t i o n - y e a r s (where a
n a t i o n - y e a r equals one n a t i o n c l a s s i f i e d as a major power f o r
one y e a r ) and from 177 to 188 c o n f l i c t - y e a r s i n which major powers
become i n v o l v e d i n i n t e r s t a t e m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s . This gives
80
u s , f o r i n s t a n c e , an expected frequency of .22 c o n f l i c t - y e a r s
per n a t i o n - y e a r ( i . e . , 177/821) when no time lags are u s e d ,
o r a p p r o x i m a t e l y one c o n f l i c t - y e a r i n every f i f t h n a t i o n - y e a r .
Thus, i f there i s no r e l a t i o n s h i p between a n a t i o n ' s rank on
s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y and the frequency w i t h which i t becomes
i n v o l v e d i n i n t e r s t a t e m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s , we would expect
to observe at all ranks that s t a t e s become i n v o l v e d i n IMCs
i n a p p r o x i m a t e l y one of every f i v e years t h a t the rank i s
o c c u p i e d by a major power. On the o t h e r hand, i f s t a t u s
i n c o n s i s t e n c y i s p o s i t i v e l y r e l a t e d to involvement i n m i l i t a r y
c o n f r o n t a t i o n s , we should expect that the r e l a t i v e f requency of
IMC involvement should be g r e a t e s t f o r the h i g h e s t r a n k i n g s t a t e s ,
and d e c l i n e as we move toward lower r a n k s .
Looking at Tables 5 and 6, we can see t h a t the s t a t u s
i n c o n s i s t e n c y argument does r a t h e r p o o r l y i n the i n d i v i d u a l
c e n t u r i e s as w e l l as in the o v e r a l l p e r i o d . Indeed, w i t h longer
lags there i s a s l i g h t tendency f o r the more underrecognized s t a t e s
to be among the 1 east c o n f l i c t prone c o u n t r i e s . Only d u r i n g the
t w e n t i e t h century w i t h no l a g or a l a g of one y e a r , do the number
one-ranked s t a t e s d i s p l a y the h i g h e s t frequency of c o n f l i c t
involvement and, even t h e n , the a c t u a l number of years of involvement
turns out to be only one standard d e v i a t i o n above the mean f o r a l l
the n a t i o n s . Not only do Tables 5 and 6 f a i l to produce the
m o n o t o n i c a l l y d e c r e a s i n g frequency p a t t e r n t h a t would c h a r a c t e r i z e
a p e r f e c t f i t to the " u n d e r r e c o g n i t i o n leads to c o n f l i c t " h y p o t h e s i s ,
but they c l e a r l y f a i l to even approximate t h i s f i t .
81
TABLE 5
OBSERVED AND EXPECTED FREQUENCY OF MAJOR POWER PARTICIPATION IN INTERSTATE MILITARY CONFRONTATIONS AT DIFFERENT RANKS
OF STATUS INCONSISTENCY, FOR 1820-1970 AND BY CENTURY (ONE- TO THREE-YEAR TIME LAGS)
Rank Total Per iod 19th Century 20th Century
0 -1 -2 -3 0 -1 - 2 - 3 0 -1 - 2 - 3
1 .22 .24 .22 .22 .18 .18 .17 .19 .29 .32 .29 .25
2 .22 .21 .22 .21 .23 .18 .19 .18 .22 .25 .25 .25
3 .19 .24 .22 .26 .19 .23 .18 .19 .20 .25 .27 .36
4 .21 .27 .26 .23 .18 .25 .24 .19 .25 .29 .29 .27
5 .21 .21 .25 .24 .21 .15 .17 .22 .20 .29 .36 .27
6 .23 .23 .26 .23
Exp't F r e q . .22 .23 .23 .23 .20 .20 .20 .20 .24 .27 .28 .27
TABLE 6
OBSERVED AND EXPECTED FREQUENCY OF MAJOR POWER INITIATION OF INTERSTATE MILITARY CONFRONTATIONS AT DIFFERENT RANKS
OF STATUS INCONSISTENCY, FOR 1820-1970 AND BY CENTURY (ONE- TO THREE-YEAR TIME LAGS)
Rank Total P e r i o d 19th Century 20th Century
0 -1 -2 -3 0 -1 -2 - 3 0 -1 -2 - 3
1 .21 .22 .18 .18 .16 .16 .15 .17 .27 .29 .22 .19
2 .19 .17 .19 .19 .20 .15 .15 .17 .19 .20 .24 .22
3 .18 .22 .19 .22 .19 .23 .18 .18 .17 .20 .20 .27
4 .18 .22 .25 .19 .15 .22 .23 .17 .22 .24 .27 .22
5 .18 .19 .20 .22 .18 .14 .14 .21 .18 .25 .29 .25
6 .22 .19 .24 .21
Exp't F r e q . .19 .20 .20 .20 .18 .18 .18 .18 .22 .23 .23 .22
82
Moving to a s t i l l h igher l e v e l of measurement, i . e . ,
t r e a t i n g s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y as a cont inuous v a r i a b l e , s t i l l
does not a l t e r the p a t t e r n of our f i n d i n g s . To see t h i s ,
we need o n l y view the r e s u l t s of analyses of v a r i a n c e and
b i s e r i a l c o r r e l a t i o n s presented i n Table 7.
TABLE 7
ANALYSES OF VARIANCE AND BISERIAL CORRELATIONS OF STATUS INCONSISTENCY VS. INTERSTATE MILITARY CONFRONTATIONS,
FOR 1820-1970 AND BY CENTURY (ONE- TO THREE-YEAR TIME LAGS)
P a r t i c i p a t e
Lag T o t a l P e r i o d 19th Century 20th Century
N rb rb eta N
r b r2
eta2 N r b r b eta2
0 821 + .00 .00 446 + .00 .00 375 + .00 .00
-1 815 + .00 .00 438 + .00 .00 377 + .00 .00
-2 809 + .00 .00 431 - .00 .00 378 + .01 .00
- 3 802 + .00 .00 424 - .00 .00 378 + .00 .00
I n i t i a t e
Lag T o t a l P e r i o d 19th Century 20th Century
N r, b
2 r b
f 2 eta N r b
2 r b eta N 2
r b . 2 eta
0 821 + .00 .00 446 + .00 .00 375 + .00 .00
-1 815 + .00 .00 438 + .00 .00 377 + .00 .00
-2 809 + .00 .00 431 - .00 .00 378 .01 .00
- 3 802 + .00 .00 424 - .00 .00 378 .00 .00
NOTE: Status inconsistency scores were m u l t i p l i e d by - 1 . 0 so t h a t p o s i t i v e rbs denote t h a t i n c o n s i s t e n c y i s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h more IMC involvement.
83
The weakness of the b i v a r i a t e r e l a t i o n s h i p between s t a t u s
i n c o n s i s t e n c y and involvement i n m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s (both
p a r t i c i p a t i o n and i n i t i a t i o n ) , d u r i n g the e n t i r e p e r i o d and
f o r the i n d i v i d u a l c e n t u r i e s , i s amply demonstrated. Whi le
we do f i n d that u n d e r r e c o g n i t i o n g e n e r a l l y c o v a r i e s (rb)
p o s i t i v e l y w i t h IMC involvement, the squares of both the
b i s e r i a l c o r r e l a t i o n c o e f f i c i e n t s ( i n t e r p r e t e d as a p p r o x i m a t i o n s
of the amount of var iance i n IMC involvement accounted f o r by
the v a r i a n c e i n the s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y s c o r e s ) and the etas
( i n t e r p r e t e d as the degree to which the s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y
s c o r e s f o r s t a t e s t h a t become i n v o l v e d i n c o n f r o n t a t i o n s are
d i s t i n c t from the scores f o r s t a t e s t h a t do not become i n v o l v e d )
a r e , f o r a l l p r a c t i c a l purposes, z e r o .
Examining the I n d i v i d u a l S t a t e s
The major c o n c l u s i o n t h a t can be drawn from a l l the
f o r e g o i n g analyses i s that f o r the major powers as a whole
— r e g a r d l e s s of whether we look a t the e n t i r e p e r i o d or the
i n d i v i d u a l c e n t u r i e s , and i r r e s p e c t i v e of time l a g s , l e v e l s
of measurement, or a n a l y t i c t e c h n i q u e — o n l y a tenuous b i v a r i a t e
r e l a t i o n s h i p e x i s t s between s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y and p a r t i c i p a t i o n
i n , or i n i t i a t i o n o f , i n t e r s t a t e m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s . This
c o n c l u s i o n i s p r e d i c a t e d upon an o r i g i n a l assumption t h a t a l l
major powers r e a c t s i m i l a r l y to being s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t — a n d
i f t h i s assumption i s c o r r e c t , we might b e t t e r expend our energy
examining other v a r i a b l e s . I t may be, however, t h a t by "lumping"
84
t o g e t h e r the data f o r a l l s t a t e s we are masking s u b s t a n t i a l
n a t i o n a l d i f f e r e n c e s . And, i n d e e d , t h i s t u r n s out to be the
c a s e . For example, i f we dichotomize the p r e d i c t o r v a r i a b l e
and look at i n d i v i d u a l c o u n t r i e s , we f i n d t h a t the United
S t a t e s i s c o n s i d e r a b l y more l i k e l y to become engaged i n
m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s d u r i n g those t w e n t i e t h century years
i n which i t i s u n d e r r e c o g n i z e d , w h i l e Germany i n the n i n e t e e n t h
century i s somewhat more i n c l i n e d to i n i t i a t e c o n f r o n t a t i o n s
when i t i s o v e r r e c o g n i z e d .
TABLE 8
AMERICAN AND GERMAN STATUS INCONSISTENCY VS. INVOLVEMENT IN INTERSTATE MILITARY CONFRONTATIONS
P a r t i c i p a t e I n i t i a t e (USA 20th Century) (GMY 19th Century)
no IMC IMC no IMC IMC
o v e r 97.1% 2.9% o v e r 87.5% 12.5% r e c o g n i z e d ( 34) ( 1 ) 35 recogni zed ( 28) ( 4)
under- 70.8% 29.2% under 91.7% 8.3% r e c o g n i z e d ( 17) ( 7) 24 recognized ( 44) ( 4)
51 8 72 8
Q = +.87 Q = -- .22
In Table 9, I present the Q - c o e f f i c i e n t s f o r a l l nine major
powers, examining the i n d i v i d u a l c e n t u r i e s as w e l l as the e n t i r e
1820-1970 p e r i o d , and i n t r o d u c i n g one- to t h r e e - year time l a g s .
85
TABLE 9
Q-SCORES FROM CONTINGENCY TABLE ANALYSIS OF EACH MAJOR POWER'S STATUS INCONSISTENCY VS. INVOLVEMENT IN INTERSTATE MILITARY
CONFRONTATIONS, FOR 1820-1970 PERIOD AND BY CENTURY (ONE- TO THREE-YEAR TIME LAGS)
N a t i o n Lag P a r t i c i p a t e I n i t i a t e
t o t a l p e r i o d
19th century
20th century
t o t a l p e r i o d
19th century
20th century
USA N=60 N=59 N=60 N = 59
0 + .86 ***
+ .87 **
+ .83 + .84
-1
- 2
+ .53
+ .16
+ .46
+ .18
*•
+ .67
+ .31
•
+ .62
+ .33 - 3 + .01 + .04 + .30 + .32
UK N = 139 N=80 N = 59 N = 139 N = 80 N = 59
0 + .08 + .20 - . 0 4 + .18 + .22 + .16
-1 + .15 - . 0 8 + .55 - . 0 8 - . 2 2 + .21
- 2 + .21 - . 0 7 **
+ .54 + .24 - . 0 7 **
+ .56
- 3 + .06 - . 0 9 •
+ .44 + .03 - . 0 8 + .34
FRN N=139 N=80 N = 59 N = 139 N = 80 N = 59
0 + .06 + .30 - . 1 6 + .10 + . 4 0 * - . 2 7
-1 - . 0 8 + .20 - . 4 5 + .11 + .30 - . 1 2
-2 + .01 + .09 - . 0 3 + .04 + .05 + .18
- 3 + .05 + .12 + .10 + .08 + .08 + .40
86
TABLE 9 - - - C o n t i n u e d
N a t i o n Lag P a r t i c i p a t e I n i t i a t e
t o t a l 19th 20th t o t a l 19th 20th p e r i o d century century p e r i o d century century
GMY N-108 N = 80 N = 28 N = 108 N=80 N=28
0 - . 0 7 .00 - . 3 1 - . 2 1 - . 2 2 - . 3 1
-1 + .05 - . 0 2 + .39 - . 0 7 - . 2 4 + .39
- 2 - . 0 9 - . 2 6 + .39 - . 2 2 - . 5 0 + .39
- 3 - . 0 9 - . 0 6 + .25 - . 2 2 - . 2 8 + .25
A-H N = 94 N--80 N = 14 N = 94 N=80 N = 14
0 - . 0 7 - . 0 8 - . 3 0 - . 2 5 - . 1 8 - . 6 4
-1 + .03 + .11 - . 3 0 + .03 + .25 - . 6 4
- 2 + .03 - . 0 6 - . 3 0 + .03 + .07 - . 6 4
- 3 + .03 - . 2 6 + .30 + .03 - . 1 4 .00
ITA N=74 N = 40 N-34 N = 74 N = 40 N-34
0 - . 0 3 + .63 - . 2 0 - . 0 3 + .63 - . 2 0
-1 - . 1 5 + .02 + .47 - . 1 5 + .02 + .47
- 2 - . 4 2 - . 4 5 + .33 - . 3 7 - . 4 5 + .40
- 3 + .28 + .51 + . 8 2 * + .34 + .51 **
+ .85
87
TABLE 9 - - - C o n t i n u e d
N a t i o n Lag P a r t i c i pate I n i t i a t e
t o t a l 19th p e r i o d century
20th century
t o t a l p e r i o d
19th century
20th century
USR N=136 N=80 N=56 N=136 N = 80 N = 56
0 +.35 +.34 **
+ .58 + .41 + .34 + .60
-1 k k
+.50 4.35 ***
+ .74 **
+ .56 + .35 •k-kk
+ .75
-2 •kk u
+.49 +1.00 •kk
+ .63 •kk
+ .55 +1.00* **
+ .62
- 3 - . 1 1 +.33 - . 0 2 - . 0 3 + .33 - . 0 4
CHN N-21 N=21 N = 21 N = 21
0 + .43 + .43 + .43 + .43
-1 - . 5 0 - . 5 0 - . 5 0 - . 5 0
-2 + .02 + .02 + .02 + .02
- 3 - . 3 3 - . 3 3 - . 3 3 - . 3 3
JPN N-50 N = 45 N = 50 N=45
0 - . 3 5 - . 4 1 - . 3 5 - . 4 1
-1 - . 1 5 +1.00* - . 2 4 +1.00*
-2 - . 0 5 +1.00^ - . 1 3 + i .oo? i
- 3 + .43 +1.00* + .36 +1.00*
NOTE : The N's f o r each country are those f o r zero time l a g .
# The Q i s equal to +1. 00 because the country i s never i n v o l v e d i n an IMC when i t i s o v e r r e c o g n i z e d . However, Russia i s o v e r r e c o g n i z e d f o r only ten years d u r i n g the n i n e t e e n t h century and Japan f o r only f o u r years d u r i n g the t w e n t i e t h .
F i s h e r exact t e s t : *** < . O K ** <" . 0 5 < * <".10
88
No c l e a r p a t t e r n emerges from Table 9, a l t h o u g h the s t a t u s
i n c o n s i s t e n c y argument appears to most a p p l i c a b l e to the
t w e n t i e t h century ( i n g e n e r a l , w i t h a one- or two-year l a g )
and to best f i t the two superpowers — the U n i t e d S t a t e s and
the S o v i e t Union. There does not seem to be much d i f f e r e n c e
between the e f f e c t of s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y on c o n f l i c t
p a r t i c i p a t i o n and i t s e f f e c t on c o n f l i c t i n i t i a t i o n , but t h i s
i s not s u r p r i s i n g s i n c e major powers are coded as the i n i t i a t o r s
i n e i g h t y - s i x percent of t h e i r c o n f l i c t i n v o l v e m e n t s . Looking
at the i n d i v i d u a l s t a t e s : the U n i t e d S t a t e s ' p a t t e r n has the
s t r o n g e s t f i t w i t h the s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y h y p o t h e s i s , the
r e l a t i o n s h i p between i n c o n s i s t e n c y and m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n
d i m i n i s h i n g as time lags are i n t r o d u c e d . The U n i t e d Kingdom's
e x p e r i e n c e does not support the h y p o t h e s i s i n the n i n e t e e n t h
c e n t u r y , but i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of i t when l a g s are i n t r o d u c e d
i n the t w e n t i e t h . There i s a weak a s s o c i a t i o n between s t a t u s
i n c o n s i s t e n c y and m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n i n the n i n e t e e n t h
century f o r F rance, but even t h a t r e l a t i o n s h i p does not hold
i n the t w e n t i e t h century . Germany, somewhat l i k e B r i t a i n ,
does not support the hypothesis i n the n i n e t e e n t h , b u t , w i t h
the i n t r o d u c t i o n of time l a g s , produces a weak a s s o c i a t i o n i n
the t w e n t i e t h . A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y appears not to support the
h y p o t h e s i s in e i t h e r c e n t u r y ; and I t a l y c u r i o u s l y may support
i t i n the n i n e t e e n t h when there i s no time l a g , and a l s o i n the
t w e n t i e t h when lags are i n t r o d u c e d . R u s s i a supports the h y p o t h e s i s
89
i n both c e n t u r i e s , though more s t r o n g l y i n the t w e n t i e t h ; and
China and Japan produce very u n s t a b l e c o e f f i c i e n t s due to the
small number of observat ions i n the former case and the
i n f r e q u e n t i n c i d e n c e of " o v e r r e c o g n i t i o n " i n the l a t t e r .
In s h o r t , the b i v a r i a t e r e l a t i o n s h i p between i n c o n s i s t e n c y and
m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n i s not overwhelming, but there does
appear to be s o m e — a n d at t i m e s , a s i z a b l e — a s s o c i a t i o n f o r
s e l e c t e d s t a t e s . Other than the f a c t t h a t the weakest f i t s
are a s s o c i a t e d with the t r a d i t i o n a l powers of c e n t r a l Europe
( F r a n c e , Germany, and A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y ) and the s t r o n g e s t
a s s o c i a t i o n s occur i n the t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y , there does not
seem to be any prominent r a t i o n a l e f o r the d i s p a r i t y i n the
f i n d i n g s .
I n t e r e s t i n g l y , these c o u n t r y - s p e c i f i c f i n d i n g s are
g r e a t l y d i m i n i s h e d i f s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y i s t r e a t e d as a
c o n t i n u o u s v a r i a b l e . In Table 10, we can see t h a t the
a s s o c i a t i o n s f o r the United S t a t e s , B r i t a i n , I t a l y , and the
S o v i e t Union l a r g e l y v a n i s h , making i t q u i t e v i s i b l e t h a t the
" i n t e r v a l - l e v e l " c o r r e l a t i o n c o e f f i c i e n t s r e f l e c t s i g n i f i c a n t l y
l e s s powerful r e l a t i o n s h i p s between s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y and
involvement in c o n f r o n t a t i o n s than were uncovered i n the
c o n t i n g e n c y t a b l e a n a l y s i s . F u l l y c o g n i z a n t of the f a c t t h a t
Q-scores tend to be l a r g e r than o t h e r c o n t i n g e n c y t a b l e
c o e f f i c i e n t s , t h i s f i n d i n g n e v e r t h e l e s s suggests an i n t r i g u i n g
i n f e r e n c e — s i m p l y s t a t e d , the a s s o c i a t i o n between u n d e r r e c o g n i t i o n
TABLE 10
ANALYSES OF VARIANCE AND BISERIAL CORRELATIONS OF EACH MAJOR POWER'S STATUS INCONSISTENCY VS INTERSTATE MILITARY CONFRONTATIONS, BY CENTURY (ONE- TO THREE-YEAR TIME LAGS)
Nation Lag P a r t i c i p a t e Nation Lag
19th century 20th century
2 2 N r, r, eta b b n 2 + 2
r b r b e
USA 0 -1 -2 - 3
X X X X X X X X
59 + .13 . 0 5 * 59 + 58 + 57 - .01
UK 0 -1 -2 - 3
80 + .02 .01 79 + 78 + 77 +
59 + .01 59 + .03 .01 59 + .04 .02 59 + .12 .07**
FRN 0 -1 - 2 - 3
80 + 79 + .03 .02 78 + .01 .01 77 + .01 .01
59 -59 -59 -58 -
GMY 0 -1 -2 - 3
80 + 79 + 78 - .03 .01 77 - .01
28 - .12 .07 29 - .01 .01 30 - .05 .03 31 - .03 .02
I n i t i a t e
19th century 20th century
r, 2 , 2 N r, r, eta b b 2 2 N r̂ r̂ eta
X X X X X X X X
59 + .13 . 0 5 * 59 + .03 .01 58 + .03 .01 57 + .02 .01
80 + .02 .01 79 + 78 -77 +
59 + .01 .01 59 + 59 + .02 .01 59 + .05 .02
80 + .01 79 + .05 .03 78 + .01 77 + .01
59 -59 + .06 .03 59 + 58 + .04 .01
80 - .02 .01 79 - .03 .01 73 - .10 .94* 77 - .05 .02
28 - .12 .07 29 - .01 .01 30 - .05 .03 31 - .03 .02
TABLE 1 0 - - - C o n t i n u e d
Nation Lag P a r t i c i p a t e Nation Lag
19th century 20th century
Nation Lag
N r, r, 2 eta^ b b 2 2 N r, r, eta b b
A-H 0 -1 -2 - 3
80 - .01 79 -78 -77 -
14 -15 - .04 .03 16 + .06 .04 17 + .06 .04
ITA 0 -1 -2 - 3
40 + .13 .06 39 -38 - .02 .01 37 + .03 .01
34 + 35 + .01 36 + .08 .05 37 + .09 .06
USR 0 -1 - 2 - 3
80 -79 -78 + .02 .01 77 +
56 + .06 .03 56 + .10 . 0 6 * 56 + .03 .02 56 - .01 .01
CHN 0 -1 - 2 - 3
X X X X X X X X
21 + .03 .02 20 - .01 .01 19 + .01 .01 18 - .08 .05
I n i t i a t e
19th century 20th century
2 2 N r̂ eta 2 2 N r, r, eta b b
80 - .02 .01 79 + .01 78 + 77 +
14 - .06 .04 15 - .18 .11 16 + .01 17 +
40 + .13 .06 39 -38 - .02 .01 37 + .03 .01
34 + 35 + .01 36 + .07 .05 37 + .19 . 1 1 * *
80 -79 -78 + .02 .01 77 +
56 + .04 .02 56 + .06 .04 56 + .02 .01 56 - .02 .01
X X X X X X X X
21 + .03 .02 20 - .01 .01 19 + .01 .01 18 - .08 .05
TABLE 1 0 - - - C o n t i n u e d
Nation Lag P a r t i c i pate Nation Lag
19th century 20th century
Nation Lag
2 2 N r, r, eta b b N r, rj~ eta^ b b
JPN 0 -1 -2 - 3
X X X X X X X X
45 - .02 .01 45 + .12 .06 45 + .02 .01 45 + .01 .01
I n i t i a t e . . . . . . T
19th century j 3th century
e t a 2 | N r b
2 • + 2 r b eta
X X 45 _ .02 .01 X X 45 + .15 . 0 6 * X X 45 + .03 .01 X X 45 + .03 .01
NOTE: In t h i s t a b l e , a "blank" designates a c o e f f i c i e n t w i t h a value of . 0 0 , w h i l e an "x" d e s i g n a t e s t h a t a country i s not a major power f o r a s u f f i c i e n t number of years dur ing the n i n e t e e n t h century f o r c o e f f i c i e n t s to be m e a n i n g f u l . In a d d i t i o n , s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y scores have been m u l t i p l i e d by - 1 . 0 so that p o s i t i v e rbs denote t h a t i n c o n s i s t e n c y i s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h more IMC involvement.
F - t e s t from a n a l y s i s of v a r i a n c e (anova): ** < . 0 5 < * < . 1 0 s i g n i f i c a n c e l e v e l
93
and involvement in m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s may b e t t e r be d e s c r i b e d
as a t h r e s h o l d than as a continuous l i n e a r r e l a t i o n s h i p . 1
l n the l i t e r a t u r e on s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y among i n d i v i d u a l s , some s o c i o l o g i s t s ( e . g . , Treiman, 1966; Wesolowski , 1966) have speculated t h a t , over t i m e , i n d i v i d u a l s may come to a c c e p t t h e i r s t a t u s d i s c r e p a n t p o s i t i o n s . This suggests a p a r a l l e l hypothesis t h a t , over t i m e , s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t s t a t e s may come to accept t h e i r s i t u a t i o n . Put another way, the average l e v e l of s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y may be i n t e r n a l i z e d and serve as a benchmark a g a i n s t which to measure c u r r e n t p o s i t i o n . The q u e s t i o n then becomes whether a s t a t e i s more l i k e l y to p a r t i c i p a t e i n , or i n i t i a t e , a c o n f r o n t a t i o n (not when i t i s u n d e r r e c o g n i z e d , but) when i t i s more s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t than usual . In order to examine t h i s q u e s t i o n , I computed a t e n - y e a r moving average on s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y f o r each major power, and then c o n s t r u c t e d a dichotomous i n d i c a t o r t h a t had a value of "one" i f a s t a t e ' s s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y score f o r a g i v e n y e a r was above i t s moving average f o r that y e a r , and "zero" i f i t was below. By means of cont ingency t a b l e s , 1 compared t h i s dichotomous "moving average" i n d i c a t o r w i t h the dichotomous "absolute" measure of s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y t h a t has been used i n a l l the preceding a n a l y s e s . The Q-scores and F i s h e r exact t e s t s comparing these two i n d i c a t o r s wi th one another are r e p o r t e d below:
N a t i o n 19th Century 20th Century N Q-score F i s h e r N Q- score F i s h e r
Exact Exact
USA 33 + .96 .00 UK 71 + .96 .00 41 + .97 .00 FRN 71 + .69 .00 41 .77 .01 GMY 71 + .50 .03 19 + .71 .18 A-H 71 + .90 .00 14 + 1 .00 .00 ITA 31 + .34 .28 25 + .73 .22 USR 71 + .92 .00 38 + .95 .00 CHN 12 4 .96 .01 JPN 21 + .79 .17
S u r p r i s i n g l y , the moving average i n d i c a t o r proved to be q u i t e h i g h l y c o r r e l a t e d with the a b s o l u t e measure of s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y . And, as a consequence, when the analyses ( t h a t have been reported i n t h i s chapter ) were r e - r u n , u s i n g the moving average i n d i c a t o r , the r e l a t i o n s h i p between i n c o n s i s t e n c y and m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n d i d not m a t e r i a l l y a l t e r . In subsequent c h a p t e r s , t h e r e f o r e , only the a b s o l u t e measure of s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y i s used.
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Summarizing the F i n d i n g s
To summarize, we have found t h a t the b i v a r i a t e r e l a t i o n s h i p
between s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y and major power involvement i n
m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s i s , f o r a l l p r a c t i c a l purposes, non
e x i s t e n t when we f a i l to d i f f e r e n t i a t e among the c o u n t r i e s i n
our s p a t i a l domain. N e i t h e r the i n t r o d u c t i o n of time l a g s nor
the d i v i s i o n of the data s e t i n t o separate c e n t u r i e s a l t e r s
t h i s r e s u l t . However, by examining the r e l a t i o n s h i p f o r the
i n d i v i d u a l s t a t e s , we d i s c o v e r t h a t some major powers — i n
p a r t i c u l a r , the United States and the S o v i e t U n i o n — a r e d e c i d e d l y
more prone to involvement i n c o n f r o n t a t i o n s when under- r a t h e r
than o v e r r e c o g n i z e d . Several o t h e r s t a t e s a l s o e x h i b i t t h i s
tendency, but not very s t r o n g l y . By and l a r g e , the a s s o c i a t i o n
between s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y and p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n , or i n i t i a t i o n
o f , i n t e r s t a t e m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s i s g r e a t e r i n the t w e n t i e t h
century than i n the n i n e t e e n t h . And f i n a l l y , i t appears t h a t the
r e l a t i o n s h i p between u n d e r r e c o g n i t i o n and m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n
i s most e v i d e n t when the s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y v a r i a b l e i s t r e a t e d
d i c h o t o m o u s l y .
CHAPTER IV
FROM STATUS INCONSISTENCY TO MILITARY CONFRONTATION:
INTRODUCING THE INTERVENING VARIABLES
In an attempt to uncover a s t r o n g b i v a r i a t e a s s o c i a t i o n
between s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y and i n t e r s t a t e m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n
(IMC), we int roduced time l a g s and i n t e r - c e n t u r y d i f f e r e n c e s ,
a l t e r e d the l e v e l of measurement of the p r e d i c t o r v a r i a b l e ,
and d i s c a r d e d the assumption o f homogeneous b e h a v i o r . However,
the f i n d i n g s were l e s s than d r a m a t i c . We d i d uncover a number
of s i z a b l e r e l a t i o n s h i p s i n the t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y , but even those
s t a t e s t h a t e x h i b i t the s t r o n g e s t a s s o c i a t i o n do not g e n e r a l l y
become i n v o l v e d i n m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s when they are
u n d e r r e c o g n i z e d . We may take the Uni ted S t a t e s as an example
(Table 8 ) . Seven of the e i g h t m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s i n our
data s e t i n which the United S t a t e s becomes i n v o l v e d d u r i n g the
twent ieth century occur w h i l e she i s s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t . Y e t ,
seventy percent of the time t h a t she i s u n d e r r e c o g n i z e d , the US
is not i n v o l v e d i n IMCs. T h i s suggests t h a t , a t b e s t , the p o s i t e d
b i v a r i a t e a s s o c i a t i o n between u n d e r r e c o g n i t i o n and m i l i t a r y
c o n f r o n t a t i o n does not c o n s t i t u t e a f u l l y - s p e c i f i e d model, i . e . ,
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96
s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y alone i s inadequate to account f o r
major power c o n f l i c t involvement. This should not s u r p r i s e
us, f o r i n the t h e o r e t i c a l chapter I h y p o t h e s i z e d t h a t
c e r t a i n p h y s i c a l , p s y c h o l o g i c a l , and s t r u c t u r a l v a r i a b l e s
i n t e r v e n e between s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y and a g g r e s s i v e
b e h a v i o r .
Let us r e f r e s h our memories as to the nature of
these v a r i a b l e s and the p r e d i c t e d d i r e c t i o n of t h e i r e f f e c t
on the s t a t u s - c o n f l i c t r e l a t i o n s h i p . I h y p o t h e s i z e d t h a t i f
a s t a t e i s predisposed to involvement i n m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s
( i . e . , i t i s u n d e r r e c o g n i z e d ) , an i n c r e a s e i n i t s power
c a p a b i l i t i e s w i l l i n c r e a s e the l i k e l i h o o d t h a t i t w i l l
m a n i f e s t a g g r e s s i v e behavior . On the o t h e r hand, I h y p o t h e s i z e d
t h a t the more deadly and more r e c e n t a s t a t e ' s p r i o r war
e x p e r i e n c e , the lower the p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t i t w i l l d e s i r e
to engage i n a new a l t e r c a t i o n . F i n a l l y , I p o s i t e d t h a t a
h i g h l y p o l a r i z e d major power system w i l l decrease the
o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r m u l t i p l e competing a f f i l i a t i o n s and thereby
i n c r e a s e the l i k e l i h o o d of c o n f r o n t a t i o n ; whereas, the more
c r o s s - c u t a s t a t e ' s bonds, the more c r o s s - p r e s s u r e d i t w i l l be
and the less l i k e l y i t w i l l engage i n a g g r e s s i v e b e h a v i o r .
S c h e m a t i c a l l y ,
97
s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t
s t a t e s
i n t e r s t a t e military
c o n f r o n t a t i o n s
used only i n 20th century runs (not measured p r i o r to 1879)
+ = i n c r e a s e s l i k e l i h o o d of IMC - = decreases l i k e l i h o o d of IMC
Since we a l r e a d y have evidence to suggest the e x i s t e n c e
of i n t e r - c e n t u r y d i f f e r e n c e s , I s h a l l examine the e f f e c t s of the
i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s on the s t a t u s - c o n f l i c t r e l a t i o n s h i p
s e p a r a t e l y f o r each of the c e n t u r i e s i n our temporal domain.
B i s e r i a l c o r r e l a t i o n and p r o b i t a n a l y s i s w i l l be used i n t h i s
i n v e s t i g a t i o n . Before t u r n i n g to the r e s u l t s , s e v e r a l caveats
need to be made.
F i r s t , a l though the model presented i n Chapter One purports
to " e x p l a i n " only the behavior of underrecognized s t a t e s , I
n e v e r t h e l e s s b e l i e v e i t inadequate to examine the e f f e c t s of the
i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s on merely that subset of c a s e s . For example,
i f we were to d i s c o v e r that our model has high p r e d i c t i v e power
f o r the subset of underrecognized s t a t e s , we would not know
whether the g o o d n e s s - o f - f i t (1) was a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the f a c t that
underrecognized s t a t e s are prone to involvement i n m i l i t a r y
c o n f r o n t a t i o n s or (2) was a general f i n d i n g a p p l i c a b l e to the
major powers r e g a r d l e s s o f s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y . I f the l a t t e r
98
were t r u e , i . e . , the f i n d i n g was not a s s o c i a t e d w i t h s t a t u s
i n c o n s i s t e n c y , we could view the subset of underrecognized
s t a t e s s imply as a random sample from a known p o p u l a t i o n .
A h y p o t h e s i s congruent wi th the l a t t e r f i n d i n g would be t h a t
major powers r e s i d e in an a n a r c h i s t i c world i n which s t a t e s
are a t a l l times prone to c o n f r o n t a t i o n s , s u b j e c t to c o n t e x t u a l
c o n s t r a i n t s . In order to d i s t i n g u i s h between the "status
i n c o n s i s t e n c y " and "anarchy" hypotheses, we need to examine
the e f f e c t s of the i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s on both the subset
of underrecognized s t a t e s and on the e n t i r e p o p u l a t i o n of c a s e s ,
and determine whether the r e s u l t i n g c o e f f i c i e n t s f o r the former
c o u l d have occurred by chance, given the d e s c r i p t i v e parameters
f o r the l a t t e r , i . e . , could we have randomly s e l e c t e d a sample
of cases wi th c o e f f i c i e n t s t h a t are t h i s d i f f e r e n t from the
p o p u l a t i o n parameters?
A second c a v e a t , c o n c e r n i n g the r e l e v a n c e of s i g n i f i c a n c e
l e v e l s and conf idence i n t e r v a l s , f o l l o w s from t h i s f i r s t , p o i n t .
S t r i c t l y s p e a k i n g , n e i t h e r t e s t s of s i g n i f i c a n c e nor c o n f i d e n c e
i n t e r v a l s are a p p r o p r i a t e when a n a l y z i n g non-sampled d a t a . In
p a r t i c u l a r , the c o e f f i c i e n t s from a n a l y s e s on a p o p u l a t i o n of
cases ( e . g . , a l l major power IMCs) are d e s c r i p t i v e parameters
and i t i s not meaningful to ask whether these c o e f f i c i e n t s could
have o c c u r r e d by chance. However, I r e p o r t standard e r r o r s and
s i g n i f i c a n c e l e v e l s f o r two r e a s o n s . One, whether the subset of
underrecognized s t a t e s i s a p o p u l a t i o n or a random sample i s a
99
q u e s t i o n that we hope to answer; and i f i t i s the l a t t e r , then
sample s t a t i s t i c s are a p p r o p r i a t e . Two, some readers may take
the unorthodox view t h a t , even f o r a p o p u l a t i o n of c a s e s , l e v e l s
of s i g n i f i c a n c e are an a i d f o r j u d g i n g the s t a b i l i t y of an
e s t i m a t e , e s p e c i a l l y i f there i s the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t one may
subsequent ly sample from t h a t p o p u l a t i o n (Winch and C a m p b e l l ,
1 9 7 0 ) . Both these reasons are g iven a d v i s e d l y ; u l t i m a t e l y ,
the reader must decide upon t h e i r soundness.
A t h i r d caveat concerns the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of p r o b i t
c o e f f i c i e n t s . The c o e f f i c i e n t s r e p r e s e n t the amount of change
i n the outcome v a r i a b l e (as "measured" on i t s h y p o t h e s i z e d
u n d e r l y i n g s c a l e ) brought about by u n i t changes i n the p r e d i c t o r
v a r i a b l e s o r , a n a l o g o u s l y , the increment i n the p r o b a b i l i t y of
the observed outcome v a r i a b l e being i n a d i f f e r e n t response
c a t e g o r y , given u n i t changes i n the p r e d i c t o r v a r i a b l e s (McKelvey
and Z a v o i n a , f o r t h c o m i n g ) . The p a r a l l e l to the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of
r e g r e s s i o n c o e f f i c i e n t s i s e v i d e n t . However, s i n c e r e g r e s s i o n
c o e f f i c i e n t s represent the amount of change i n the observed
outcome v a r i a b l e brought about by u n i t changes i n the p r e d i c t o r
v a r i a b l e s , the c o e f f i c i e n t s from p r o b i t and u n s t a n d a r d i z e d
r e g r e s s i o n are not d i r e c t l y comparable.
F o u r t h , we know t h a t r e g r e s s i o n c o e f f i c i e n t s may be
t ransformed i n t o beta weights by n o r m a l i z i n g the c o e f f i c i e n t s
by a r a t i o of standard d e v i a t i o n s (sx/sy , where x i s the p r e d i c t o r
and y the outcome v a r i a b l e ) . In p r o b i t a n a l y s i s , however, the
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v a r i a n c e of the outcome v a r i a b l e on i t s u n d e r l y i n g i n t e r v a l s c a l e
i s not known. This i s unimportant i f we are merely i n t e r e s t e d i n
(1) p r e d i c t i n g the p r o b a b i l i t y of a p a r t i c u l a r outcome ( i n which
case we would use the raw c o e f f i c i e n t s ) , or (2) d e t e r m i n i n g the
r e l a t i v e importance of p r e d i c t o r s w i t h i n a s i n g l e e q u a t i o n ( i n
which case we need only n o r m a l i z e f o r the v a r i a n c e i n the
p r e d i c t o r v a r i a b l e s ) . However, i f we wish to make comparisons
a c r o s s e q u a t i o n s , we need to c o n t r o l f o r the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t the
outcome v a r i a b l e s w i l l have d i f f e r e n t v a r i a n c e s . I have used the
square r o o t of the "estimated t o t a l sum of squares d i v i d e d by the
degrees of freedom," i . e . , y TSS/df , as an a p p r o x i m a t i o n of the
s t a n d a r d d e v i a t i o n of the outcome v a r i a b l e ( I v e r s e n , 1 9 7 1 ; McKelvey
and Z a v o i n a , f o r t h c o m i n g ) . The degree to which t h i s may b i a s
small sample p r o p e r t i e s of m u l t i v a r i a t e p r o b i t a n a l y s i s . My own
work suggests t h a t , w i t h dichotomous outcome v a r i a b l e s , the p r o b i t
c o e f f i c i e n t s are of ten c o n s i d e r a b l y l a r g e r than r e g r e s s i o n
c o e f f i c i e n t s est imated on the same d a t a . The standard e r r o r s of
the p r o b i t c o e f f i c i e n t s a l s o tend to be l a r g e r . Comparisons of
r e g r e s s i o n and p r o b i t on known d i s t r i b u t i o n s c o n f i r m these p o i n t s
and show that the p r o b i t c o e f f i c i e n t s more c l o s e l y approximate the
true parameters t h a t generate the u n d e r l y i n g d i s t r i b u t i o n of the
observed l i m i t e d (non-continuous) outcome v a r i a b l e (Zechman, 1974).
F i n a l l y , the reported R2 from p r o b i t a n a l y s i s i s o n l y an
e s t i m a t e of the p r o p o r t i o n of the v a r i a n c e i n the h y p o t h e s i z e d
the e s t i m a t e of b i s not known. Nor i s much known about the
101
u n d e r l y i n g outcome v a r i a b l e accounted f o r by the p r e d i c t o r s .
S i n c e p r o b i t uses a maximum l i k e l i h o o d r a t h e r than a l e a s t
squares t e c h n i q u e , the p r o b i t c o e f f i c i e n t s are those t h a t
maximize the p r o b a b i l i t y of o b t a i n i n g the values of the
outcome v a r i a b l e , r a t h e r than m i n i m i z i n g squared d e v i a t i o n s
between p r e d i c t e d and observed v a l u e s . Thus, the R2 must be
e s t i m a t e d r a t h e r than d i r e c t l y d e r i v e d and may tend to be
s l i g h t l y l a r g e r than the "true" value (McKelvey and Z a v o i n a ,
f o r t h c o m i n g ; Zechman, 1974). On the other hand, s i n c e r e g r e s s i o n
tends to u n d e r e s t i m a t e — a n d , at t i m e s , may g r e a t l y under
e s t i m a t e — the t rue parameters of the p r e d i c t o r v a r i a b l e s
when the outcome v a r i a b l e i s l i m i t e d ( n o n - c o n t i n u o u s ) , the
R2 from p r o b i t i s l i k e l y to more a c c u r a t e l y r e f l e c t the
p r e d i c t o r s ' g o o d n e s s - o f - f i t . N e v e r t h e l e s s , s i n c e the d i s t r i b u t i o n
of R2 i s unknown, we should be c a r e f u l not to o v e r - i n t e r p r e t
the s t a t i s t i c and perhaps may want to develop another measure
based upon the p r e d i c t e d p r o b a b i l i t i e s of the outcome v a r i a b l e
d e r i v e d from the raw p r o b i t c o e f f i c i e n t s .
The s i m p l e s t such measure, the percent of c o r r e c t
p r e d i c t i o n s , i s u n s a t i s f a c t o r y f o r our purposes. The reason i s
r a t h e r s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d . I f the model proves to be a poor
p r o g n o s t i c a t o r of i n t e r s t a t e m i l i t a r y c o n f l i c t s , then the p r o b i t
a l g o r i t h m w i l l c o n t i n u a l l y p r e d i c t a p p r o x i m a t e l y the mean of the
outcome v a r i a b l e ; and s i n c e m i l i t a r y c o n f l i c t s are r e l a t i v e l y
rare e v e n t s , i t w i l l , i n e f f e c t , r e p e a t e d l y f o r e c a s t "no c o n f l i c t . "
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But "no c o n f l i c t " w i l l in a l l l i k e l i h o o d be a " c o r r e c t " p r e d i c t i o n ,
g i v e n the d i s t r i b u t i o n of the outcome v a r i a b l e . Thus, the percent
o f c o r r e c t p r e d i c t i o n s might w e l l prove to be a h i g h l y - i n f l a t e d
summary measure.
Rather than use such a s t a t i s t i c , I i n t r o d u c e a d i f f e r e n t ,
and r a t h e r c o n s e r v a t i v e , measure of the p r o b i t e q u a t i o n ' s power
to make p o i n t p r e d i c t i o n s . I t i s , of c o u r s e , p r e d i c a t e d upon
the assumption that i n t e r s t a t e c o n f l i c t i s a r a r e event and,
t h a t at any given p o i n t i n t i m e , one would be more o f t e n r i g h t
to p r e d i c t that a s t a t e would not become i n v o l v e d i n a c o n f l i c t
than t h a t i t would. The new measure, the p o i n t p r e d i c t i v e power
of the e q u a t i o n , r e f l e c t s the degree to which the model improves
our p r e d i c t i o n s as a g a i n s t the n u l l h y p o t h e s i s t h a t a s t a t e w i l l
not become i n v o l v e d in c o n f l i c t . 1 The r a t i o n a l e upon which
the s t a t i s t i c r e s t s i s s i m p l e . When a t t e m p t i n g to p r e d i c t a
s t a t e ' s involvement i n c o n f l i c t , one can make two types of e r r o r s .
F i r s t , one can f a i l to p r e d i c t c o n f l i c t involvements that o c c u r ;
a n d , s e c o n d , one can p r e d i c t c o n f l i c t involvements t h a t do not
o c c u r . We would say that we had a powerful p r e d i c t o r i f we had
a model t h a t could minimize both types of e r r o r s . For example,
i f the model p r e d i c t s e i g h t of a n a t i o n ' s ten c o n f l i c t i n v o l v e m e n t s ,
we would say that i t i n c r e a s e s our p r e d i c t i v e power by e i g h t y
1 I t i s important to r e c o g n i z e t h a t I am p o s t u l a t i n g a n u l l hypothesis of no c o n f l i c t involvement ( r a t h e r than the known p r o p o r t i o n of c o n f l i c t involvements) and, hence, t h i s i s not a measure of the p r o b a b i l i t y of c o r r e c t p r e d i c t i o n v i s - a - v i s a c t u a l involvements.
1 0 3
p e r c e n t i f and only i f these e i g h t o c c a s i o n s are the only t imes
i t p r e d i c t s c o n f l i c t . I f , on the o t h e r hand, the model had
p r e d i c t e d c o n f l i c t involvement on f o r t y o c c a s i o n s — only e i g h t
of which had been c o r r e c t — t h e p r e d i c t i v e power of the model
would be only o n e - f i f t h as good as we o r i g i n a l l y had thought.
Thus, i n s t e a d of e i g h t y percent p r e d i c t i v e power, i t would have
s i x t e e n percent p r e d i c t i v e power. P o i n t p r e d i c t i v e power, P,
i s d e f i n e d to be the p r o p o r t i o n of c o n f l i c t involvements
c o r r e c t l y p r e d i c t e d , m u l t i p l i e d by the p r o p o r t i o n of " c o n f l i c t
involvement" p r e d i c t i o n s that are c o r r e c t . The s t a t i s t i c ranges
from zero (no improvement over the n u l l h y p o t h e s i s ) to one
( p e r f e c t p r e d i c t i o n ) . In c a l c u l a t i n g P, I have c o n s i d e r e d t h a t
i f the p r e d i c t e d p r o b a b i l i t y of the outcome v a r i a b l e d e r i v e d from
the raw p r o b i t c o e f f i c i e n t s i s equal to or g r e a t e r than . 5 , then
t h i s i s a p r e d i c t i o n that the s t a t e w i l l become i n v o l v e d i n
c o n f l i c t ; i f l e s s than . 5 , i t i s a p r e d i c t i o n t h a t the s t a t e
w i l l not become i n v o l v e d . 1
1 If we used the a c t u a l p r o p o r t i o n of c o n f l i c t i n v o l v e m e n t s , p a , as our HQ ( r a t h e r than the h y p o t h e s i s of no c o n f l i c t i n v o l v e ment), we would want to s u b t r a c t from P a f a c t o r , P a , t h a t r e f l e c t s how many c o n f l i c t involvements we would get i f we randomly s e l e c t e d p a cases from our p o p u l a t i o n . For example, i t there are one hundred cases i n our p o p u l a t i o n — o f which ten are c o n f l i c t involvements — then we would expect that o n e - t e n t h of the cases drawn at random would be c o n f l i c t involvements. Now, i f we had an urn w i t h one hundred b a l l s (n inety white and ten red) and we s e l e c t e d randomly w i t h replacement ten b a l l s , we would expect to draw nine white b a l l s and one red b a l l . Our c o r r e c t i o n f a c t o r P a — t o be s u b t r a c t e d from our p r e d i c t i v e power P — w o u l d be . 0 1 ; t h a t i s , the p r o p o r t i o n of c o n f l i c t involvements c o r r e c t l y p r e d i c t e d (one red b a l l of ten red b a l l s i n the urn) m u l t i p l i e d by the p r o p o r t i o n of " c o n f l i c t
104
The N i n e t e e n t h Century
A n a l y z i n g the Data
Let us now r e t u r n to the f i n d i n g s . Table 11 d i s p l a y s the
b i s e r i a l c o r r e l a t i o n s between each of the i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s
and involvement in m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s d u r i n g the n i n e t e e n t h
c e n t u r y . For each major power there are f i v e rows of c o r r e l a t i o n
c o e f f i c i e n t s . The f i r s t row corresponds to the "anarchy"
h y p o t h e s i s ; i t c o n t a i n s the d i r e c t i o n of the a s s o c i a t i o n s ( p o s i t i v e
or n e g a t i v e ) and the squares of the c o r r e l a t i o n c o e f f i c i e n t s
(approx imat ions of the amount of v a r i a n c e i n a n a t i o n ' s IMC
involvements accounted f o r by v a r i a n c e i n each of the i n t e r v e n i n g
v a r i a b l e s ) f o r a l l annual o b s e r v a t i o n s of a major power d u r i n g
the n i n e t e e n t h century . For example, the f i r s t row of c o r r e l a t i o n s
i n Table 11 t e l l s us that B r i t a i n i s i n our data s e t f o r e i g h t y
y e a r s i n the n ineteenth c e n t u r y . During t h a t t i m e , i n c r e a s e s i n
her c a p a b i l i t i e s ( i . e . , p o s i t i v e delta power), the s e v e r i t y of her
p r i o r war e x p e r i e n c e , and the p o l a r i t y of the major power system
a l l covary p o s i t i v e l y wi th her p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n i n t e r s t a t e m i l i t a r y
c o n f r o n t a t i o n s , al though war e x p e r i e n c e c o v a r i e s n e g a t i v e l y (though
very weakly) wi th her i n i t i a t i o n of c o n f r o n t a t i o n s . The o n l y
s i z a b l e a s s o c i a t i o n s are those of systemic p o l a r i t y w i t h IMC
p a r t i c i p a t i o n (.30) and IMC i n i t i a t i o n ( . 2 3 ) , though a l l but one
involvement" p r e d i c t i o n s t h a t are c o r r e c t (one red b a l l out of ten b a l l s drawn from the u r n ) . P - P a c o u l d a t t a i n n e g a t i v e values and would never reach 1.0 as long as there was one c o n f l i c t involvement.
TABLE 11
BISERIAL CORRELATIONS BETWEEN EACH MAJOR POWER'S INVOLVEMENT IN MILITARY CONFRONTATIONS AND THE THREE INTERVENING VARIABLES, FOR THE 19th CENTURY (ONE- TO THREE-YEAR TIME LAGS)
Nat ion Lag N P a r t i c i pate I n i t i a t e
Power War Exp. P o l a r i t y A Power War Exp. P o l a r i t y
P r e d i c t e d ---> + 2 r b - 2
r b + 2
r b + 2
r b - 2 r b
+ 2 r b
0 .01 00 .03 .00 *** UK 0 80 + .01 + 00 + .30 + .03 - .00 + .23 0 42 + .04 - 00 + •<* + .07 - .02 + .10
under -1 42 + .06 + 0 1 * + .13 + .13 - .00 + .05 recognized -2 41 + .06 16* + .17** + .08 + .06 +
. - 3 41 + .05 + 02 + .29 + .09 - .00 + .23
FRN 0 80 + .00 _ 00 + .00 + .00 _ .01 + .00 ' 0 28 + • 0 0 * + 01 + .01 + • 0 0 * + .01 + .01
under -1 27 + .22 + .00 + .01 + .22 + .00 + .01 recognized - 2 26 + .11 + 14 + .16 + .12 + .01 + . 2 1 *
. - 3 25 + .27** + 13 + .03 + .36** + .00 + .05
00 .01 .01 GMY 0 80 - .00 - 00 + .14 - .01 - .01 + .31 0 48 - .07 - 01 + . 2 8 * * - .19* - .02 + . 7 3 * * *
under -1 48 - .06 - .00 + . 1 5 * - .12 - .00 + . 4 3 * * * recognized - 2 48 - .05 + 00 + .01 - .13 + .00 + .12
- 3 48 - .05 - 00 + .08 - .13 - .00 + .29**
TABLE 1 1 - — C o n t i n u e d
Nat ion Lag N
P r e d i c t e d »-
P a r t i c i p a t e I n i t i a t e Nat ion Lag N
P r e d i c t e d »-
Delta Power War Exp. P o l a r i t y A Power War Exp. P o l a r i t y
Nat ion Lag N
P r e d i c t e d »- 2 2 2 b o b
2 2 2 + r b " r b + r b
A-H
underr e c o g n i z e d
0 30 0 25
-1 25 - 2 24
k - 3 23
+ .00 + .01 + . 0 8 * + .00 - .09 + .04 + .01 - .03 - .00 - .01 - .00 - .00 - .02 - .00 + .47
- .00 - .00 + . 1 0 * - .00 - .07 + .19 + .01 - .03 - .00 - .01 - .00 - .00 - .02 - .00 + .47**
ITA
underrecognized
0 40 0 23
-1 23 . - 3 22
+ .03 - .00 + .02 + .00 + .03 - .01 + .07 + .00 + .04 + .04 - .00 + .09
+ .03 - .00 + .02 + .00 + .03 - .01 + .07 + .00 + .04 + .04 - .00 + .09
USR
underrecognized
0 80 0 70
-1 69 -2 68 - 3 67
+ .03 - .05 + .04 + .03 - . 0 4 ^ + .04 + .07 - .12 + .01 + .02 - .05 + .03 + .02 - .04 + .06
+ .03 - .05 + .04 + .03 - .04 + .04 + .07 - . 1 2 * * + .01 + .02 - .05 + .03 + .02 - .04 + .06
NOTE: I t a l y (with a l a g of two y e a r s ) engages i n c o n f r o n t a t i o n too i n f r e q u e n t l y when underrecognized to compute s t a b l e e s t i m a t e s .
F - t e s t from a n a l y s i s of v a r i a n c e : *** < .01 < ** < .05 < * < .10 s i g n i f i c a n c e l e v e l
107
of her c o r r e l a t i o n s (and that i m p e r c e p t i b l e ) are i n the d i r e c t i o n
p r e d i c t e d by the model. The next f o u r rows correspond to the
" s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y " model; here we look o n l y at the subset
o f cases i n which the major power i s u n d e r r e c o g n i z e d . The l a t t e r
t h r e e rows ( lags one, two, and three) examine the c o v a r i a t i o n
between the i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s and involvement i n i n t e r s t a t e
m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s one, two, and three years a f t e r the s t a t e
i s u n d e r r e c o g n i z e d . In other words, the c o n s t a i n i n g f a c t o r s are
always c o r r e l a t e d w i t h the IMC o b s e r v a t i o n f o r the same y e a r ;
what i s lagged i s the p u t a t i v e m o t i v a t i n g f o r c e ( i . e . , s t a t u s
i n c o n s i s t e n c y ) . Thus, i n the t h i r d row of c o r r e l a t i o n s i n
Table 11 (UK, one-year l a g ) , i f B r i t a i n i s underrecognized i n
1822, 1827, e t c . , we wish to know whether the i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s
are such as to permit or c o n s t r a i n c o n f r o n t a t i o n s one year l a t e r ,
i . e . , 1823, 1828, e t c .
I t appears from Table 11 t h a t the i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s
( i n p a r t i c u l a r , p o l a r i t y ) are most e f f i c a c i o u s f o r B r i t a i n and
Germany. For these two s t a t e s , p o l a r i t y c o v a r i e s p o s i t i v e l y and
s t r o n g l y w i t h both p a r t i c i p a t i o n and i n i t i a t i o n of c o n f r o n t a t i o n s ;
p a r t i c u l a r l y s t r o n g i s the a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h IMC i n i t i a t i o n when
Germany i s underrecognized (no time l a g ) . At the other extreme,
I t a l y d i s p l a y s no s i z a b l e a s s o c i a t i o n s and R u s s i a has only two
moderate b i s e r i a l c o r r e l a t i o n s (war e x p e r i e n c e w i t h IMC p a r t i c i p a
t i o n , one-year l a g , and IMC i n i t i a t i o n , one-year l a g ) . The
a s s o c i a t i o n s f o r A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y and France l i e between those
108
f o r the f i r s t two s t a t e s and those f o r the l a t t e r two s t a t e s .
For A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y , p o l a r i t y ( t h r e e - y e a r l a g ) c o v a r i e s s t r o n g l y
w i t h IMC involvement and, f o r F r a n c e , there are s e v e r a l
" r e s p e c t a b l e " b i s e r i a l c o r r e l a t i o n s (mostly i n v o l v i n g i n c r e a s e s
i n power) when lags are i n t r o d u c e d . I t may be noted t h a t almost
a l l s i z a b l e c o r r e l a t i o n s are i n the d i r e c t i o n p r e d i c t e d by the
model .
Looking at the p r o b i t c o e f f i c i e n t s and measures of
g o o d n e s s - o f - f i t in Table 12, we f i n d p r e c i s e l y the p a t t e r n of
a s s o c i a t i o n s d i s p l a y e d i n Table 11. There are very few s i g n
r e v e r s a l s and those a s s o c i a t i o n s t h a t p r e v i o u s l y produced
s t r o n g b i s e r i a l s now show good " c o e f f i c i e n t to e r r o r " r a t i o s .
This c o n s i s t e n t p a t t e r n in the beta weights (which are p a r t i a l
c o e f f i c i e n t s " c o n t r o l l i n g " f o r the o t h e r i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s )
i s s i m p l y a r e f l e c t i o n of the moderately low l e v e l of r n u l t i -
c o l l i n e a r i t y i n the n i n e t e e n t h century among the p h y s i c a l ,
p s y c h o l o g i c a l , and s t r u c t u r a l v a r i a b l e s used i n the a n a l y s i s .
For the United Kingdom and Germany, f o r France w i t h l a g s of
one, two, and three y e a r s , and f o r A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y w i t h a
t h r e e - y e a r l a g , the est imated m u l t i p l e c o r r e l a t i o n c o e f f i c i e n t s
(R ) and measures of p o i n t p r e d i c t i v e power (P) are not
i n c o n s i d e r a b l e .
TABLE 12
STANDARDIZED PROBIT COEFFICIENTS FOR THE THREE INTERVENING VARIABLES WHEN PREDICTING EACH MAJOR POWER'S INVOLVEMENT IN MILITARY CONFRONTATIONS, FOR THE 19th CENTURY
(ONE- TO THREE-YEAR TIME LAGS)
Nat ion Lag N
P r e d i c t e d »~
P a r t i c i p a t e I n i t i a t e Nat ion Lag N
P r e d i c t e d »~
Delta Power War Exp. P o l a r i t y ___
R 2 P A Power War Exp. P o l a r i t y *2 R P
Nat ion Lag N
P r e d i c t e d »~ + - + + - +
*2 R P
UK
under-r e c o g .
0 80 0 42
-1 42 -2 41 - 3 41
11(15) 07(14) 49(14) 13(21) 03(20) 36(20) 25(22) 13(19) 33(21) 28(24) 33(18) 34(20) 26(21) 12(19) 51(21)
25 27 16 25 21 05 3 C 2 3
30 50
16(16) 00(15) 42(14) 24(22) -14(22) 23(21) 37(24) -03(20) 20(22) 32(26) 22(18) 28(21) 29(22) -01(20) 46(21)
20** 17 14 09 17 13 23 22 27* 22
FRN
under-recog.
0 30 0 28
-1 27 -2 26
_-3 25
04(15) -01(15) 04(15) 06(25) 10(24) 07(25) 62(30) -12(24) 28(24) 40(28) 24(21) ^8(26) 66(32) 18(20) 36(26)
00 00 02 00 35 40 39* 40 53 23
05(16) -11(16) 03(15) 06(25) 10(24) 07(25) 62(30) -12(24) 28(24) 53(29) -03(23) 53(27) 82(33) -16(25) 41(28)
01 00 02 00 35 40 42 43 61 46
GMY
under-r e c o g .
0 80 0 48
-1 48 -2 48 - 3 48
-04(22) -04(19) 34(17) -34(47) -28(28) 38(21) -47(48) -20(26) 32(20) -51(49) 06(26) 10(23) -47(42) -13(25) 23(19)
12 00 31* 22
' 3 4 17 28 00. 30 00
-13(29) -09(21) 49(18) -82(46) -30(25) 23(11) -85(43) -24(18) 31(13) -88(46) -20(19) 22(13)
• -83(39) -23(19) 29(13)
27** 00 88 56 88*** 50 86* 33 85*** 50
TABLE 12 — C o n t i n u e d
Nat ion Lag N
P r e d i c t e d * -
P a r t i c i p a t e I n i t i a t e Nat ion Lag N
P r e d i c t e d * -
A Power War Exp. P o l a r i t y K2 i R P
i
A Power War Exp. P o l a r i t y A 2 R P
Nat ion Lag N
P r e d i c t e d * - + - +
K2 i R P
i + - +
A 2 R P
A-H
under-r e c o g .
. 0 80 0 25
-1 25 -2 24
_-3 23
03(17) 13(16) 27(16) 28(32) -93(117) -02(18) 22(37) -41(51) -18(31)
-11(36) -03(36) -05(31) 03(27) 27(28) 98(46)
08 00 76 00 15 00 01 00 90 44
-02(19) 01(19) 23(16) 14(49) -40(118) 36(39) 22(37) -41(51) -18(31)
-11(36) -03(36) -05(31) 03(27) 27(28) 98(46)
08 00 40 00 15 00 01 00 90** 44
ITA
under-r e c o g .
0 40 0 23
-1 23 - 3 22
14(28) 16(34) 24(37) -01(31) 28(43) 14(44)
19(32) 20(39) 36(49) -00(41) 19(33) 57(57)
06 00 04 00 14 00 23 00
14(28) 16(34) 24(37) -01(31) 28(43) 14(44)
19(32) 20(39) 36(49) -00(41) 19(33) 57(57)
06 00 04 00 14 00 23 00
USR
under-r e c o g .
0 80 " 0 70 -1 69 -2 68 - 3 67
15(17) -24(17) 19(15) 17(18) -19(18) 19(17) 28(17) -42(21) 09(15) 14(18) -22(18) 17(17) 11(18) -19(19) 23(17)
13 00 11 00 28** 00 11 00 11 00
15(17) -24(17) 19(15) 17(18) -19(18) 19(17) 28(17) -42(21) 09(15) 14(18) -22(18) 17(17) 11(18) -19(19) 23(17)
13 00 11 00 28** 00 11 00 11 00
NOTE: A l l c o e f f i c i e n t s have been m u l t i p l i e d by one hundred so as to e l i m i n a t e decimal p o i n t s . Numbers w i t h i n parentheses are standard e r r o r s .
X* from p r o b i t {yj w i t h 3 d f ) : *** < .01 < ** < .05 < * < .10 s i g n i f i c a n c e l e v e l
I l l
I n t e r p r e t i n g the R e s u l t s
These l a t e s t f i n d i n g s c o n t r a s t r a t h e r s h a r p l y w i t h the
f i n d i n g s f o r the n ineteenth century presented i n Table 9. The
reader w i l l r e c a l l that the b i v a r i a t e r e l a t i o n s h i p s between
s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y and m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s i n the n i n e t e e n t h
century were not at a l l s t r o n g , and t h a t B r i t a i n and Germany
— the c o u n t r i e s that now produce the s t r o n g e s t a s s o c i a t i o n s —
e a r l i e r d i s p l a y e d the poorest f i t s to the " u n d e r r e c o g n i t i o n
l e a d s to c o n f l i c t " h y p o t h e s i s . In l i g h t of our c u r r e n t r e s u l t s ,
two q u e s t i o n s come r e a d i l y to mind:
(1) Is i t p o s s i b l e t h a t some s i g n i f i c a n t b i v a r i a t e
r e l a t i o n s h i p s between s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y and m i l i t a r y
c o n f r o n t a t i o n were "masked" i n our e a r l i e r a n a l y s i s (Table 9)?
And,
(2) Do the a s s o c i a t i o n s t h a t we now uncover, having
i n t r o d u c e d the i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s , a p p l y to the t o t a l
p o p u l a t i o n of cases f o r a g iven s t a t e or do they hold only f o r
the subset of underrecognized cases? I f the former i s t r u e ,
then i t i s the i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s a l o n e , and not s t a t u s
i n c o n s i s t e n c y , that are i m p o r t a n t .
As f o r the f i r s t q u e s t i o n , one manner by which the
b i v a r i a t e r e l a t i o n s h i p s might have been masked i s t h a t our
i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s — changes i n power, p r i o r war e x p e r i e n c e ,
and p o l a r i t y — m a y be c o r r e l a t e d w i t h s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y such
t h a t the c o n s t r a i n i n g e f f e c t s of these v a r i a b l e s occur
112
c o t e r m i n o u s l y w i t h u n d e r r e c o g n i t i o n . That i s to s a y , i f i t i s
o f t e n the case t h a t , when a p a r t i c u l a r s t a t e i s u n d e r r e c o g n i z e d ,
i t s c a p a b i l i t i e s are d e c l i n i n g , i t s war e x p e r i e n c e s are
d e v a s t a t i n g , and system p o l a r i t y i s l o w — i . e . , s t a t u s
i n c o n s i s t e n c y i s n e g a t i v e l y c o r r e l a t e d w i t h Delta power, p o s i t i v e l y
c o r r e l a t e d w i t h p r i o r war e x p e r i e n c e , and n e g a t i v e l y c o r r e l a t e d
w i t h p o l a r i t y — t h e n we would not expect to f i n d a s t r o n g
p o s i t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p between s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y and m i l i t a r y
c o n f r o n t a t i o n . P o i n t b i s e r i a l c o r r e l a t i o n s (McNemar, 1969) can
be used to examine the r e l a t i o n s h i p between each c o n t i n u o u s l y -
measured i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e and the d i c h o t o m i z e d s t a t u s
i n c o n s i s t e n c y i n d i c a t o r . The use of p o i n t b i s e r i a l c o r r e l a t i o n s ,
r a t h e r than b i s e r i a l , i s a p p r o p r i a t e i f we wish to m a i n t a i n the
assumption ( s t a t e d at the end of the p r e c e d i n g c h a p t e r ) t h a t the
a s s o c i a t i o n between u n d e r r e c o g n i t i o n and involvement i n m i l i t a r y
c o n f r o n t a t i o n may b e t t e r be d e s c r i b e d as a t h r e s h o l d than as a
c o n t i n u o u s l i n e a r r e l a t i o n s h i p , and i s thus consonant w i t h the
s t r a t e g y of grouping the underrecognized cases as d i s t i n c t from
the o v e r r e c o g n i z e d o n e s — a s t r a t e g y employed throughout the
c u r r e n t c h a p t e r .
We see from the p o i n t b i s e r i a l c o r r e l a t i o n s r e p o r t e d i n
Table 13 that f o r only one s t a t e — G e r m a n y — i s the masking
phenomenon l i k e l y . For n i n e t e e n t h century Germany, both war
e x p e r i e n c e and p o l a r i t y are such as might c o n s t r a i n c o n f l i c t i v e
b e h a v i o r when she i s underrecognized ( i . e . , war e x p e r i e n c e i s
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TABLE 13
POINT BISERIAL CORRELATIONS BETWEEN EACH MAJOR POWER'S STATUS INCONSISTENCY SCORES AND THE
THREE INTERVENING VARIABLES, FOR THE 19th CENTURY (ONE- TO THREE-YEAR TIME LAGS)
N a t i o n Lay N S t a t u s I n c o n s i s t e n c y
& Power War Exp. P o l a r i t y
pb pb pb
UK 0 80 -1 79 -2 78 - 3 77
+.16 +.08 +.02 +.07 +.01 +.14 - . 2 2 * * +.03 +.16 +.06 +.04 +.22*
FRN 0 80 -1 79 -2 78 - 3 77
+.13 - . 3 8 * * * - . 1 4 - . 0 4 - . 3 2 - . 2 7 * * - . 0 1 - . 3 2 * * * - . 3 9 * * * +.07 - . 3 1 * * * - . 4 5 * * *
GMY 0 80 -1 79 -2 78 - 3 77
*** *** -•02 + . 3 0 , , , - . 5 1 , , ,
+.20 +.35 - . 5 1 +.03 +.36*** - . 4 1 * * *
A-H 0 80 -1 79 -2 78 - 3 77
+.13 - . 0 1 +.22** +.io -.04 +.27::, - . 0 3 - . 0 8 + . 3 7 ^ +.05 - . 1 2 +.47
ITA 0 40 -1 39 -2 38 - 3 37
+.25 - . 1 4 +.16 +.33** - . 1 2 +.31** +.14 - . 1 1 + . 3 1 , +.06 - . 0 5 +.30
USR 0 80 -1 79 -2 78 - 3 77
- . 0 4 - . 0 9 + . 2 5 „ - . 1 3 - . 0 6 + - 2 5 „ +.07 - . 0 3 +.26, +.03 +.00 +.19
F - t e s t from a n a l y s i s of v a r i a n c e : *** < .01 < ** < .05 < * < .10 s i g n i f i c a n c e l e v e l
114
p o s i t i v e l y , and p o l a r i t y i s n e g a t i v e l y , c o r r e l a t e d w i t h s t a t u s
i n c o n s i s t e n c y ) . Given the absence of any s i z a b l e r e l a t i o n s h i p
between war exper ience and German involvement i n m i l i t a r y
c o n f r o n t a t i o n s (Table 1 1 ) , however, i t i s the p o l a r i t y v a r i a b l e
t h a t i s important . For one o t h e r major p o w e r — F r a n c e —
t h e r e i s the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t the s t a t u s - c o n f l i c t r e l a t i o n s h i p
might be masked. H y p o t h e t i c a l l y , system p o l a r i t y may c o n s t r a i n
France when she i s u n d e r r e c o g n i z e d , but there i s l i t t l e evidence
i n Table 11 t h a t t h i s i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e a p p r e c i a b l y a f f e c t s
her c o n f l i c t b e h a v i o r . For the remaining major powers — B r i t a i n ,
A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y , I t a l y , and R u s s i a — the i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s
do not i n t r o d u c e confounding e f f e c t s , and, f o r them, the f i n d i n g
t h a t there are no s i g n i f i c a n t b i v a r i a t e r e l a t i o n s h i p s remains
u n a l t e r e d .
This then b r i n g s us to the second q u e s t i o n — t h e crux
of the m a t t e r : do the a s s o c i a t i o n s t h a t we uncover , having
i n t r o d u c e d the i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s , apply to the t o t a l
p o p u l a t i o n or j u s t the subset of underrecognized c a s e s , i . e . ,
does s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y make a d i f f e r e n c e i n the n i n e t e e n t h
c e n t u r y ? The evidence that we have compiled i s not amenable to
a s i m p l e , unambiguous i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . There would appear to be
t h r e e crude c a t e g o r i e s in which to c l a s s i f y the n i n e t e e n t h century
major powers. F i r s t there i s the s i t u a t i o n i n which s t a t u s
i n c o n s i s t e n c y i s not i m p o r t a n t , but the i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s a r e .
Next i s the category i n which s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y i s i m p o r t a n t ,
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but the i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s are not . F i n a l l y there i s the
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n i n which the i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s are important
when a s t a t e i s s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t .
The United Kingdom f a l l s i n t o the f i r s t category i n
t h a t the evidence f a i l s to support the c o n t e n t i o n t h a t s t a t u s
i n c o n s i s t e n c y i s an important f a c t o r i n B r i t a i n ' s involvement
i n m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s d u r i n g the n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y . In
Table 9 we were unable to uncover f o r her a s i g n i f i c a n t s t a t u s -
c o n f l i c t r e l a t i o n s h i p and we subsequent ly demonstrated (Table 13)
t h a t the r e l a t i o n s h i p i s not being masked by any of the
i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s . We now f i n d (Table 12) that the o v e r a l l
f i t of the i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s and the p o i n t p r e d i c t i v e power
of the p r o b i t equations when B r i t a i n i s underrecognized are not A O
a p p r e c i a b l y d i f f e r e n t from the R and P f o r B r i t a i n d u r i n g the
e n t i r e n i n e t e e n t h century , and v i r t u a l l y a l l the s t a n d a r d i z e d
p r o b i t c o e f f i c i e n t s f o r the i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s ( r e g a r d l e s s of
time l a g ) are w i t h i n one standard e r r o r of the c o e f f i c i e n t s f o r
the e n t i r e c e n t u r y . This does not mean t h a t our i n t e r v e n i n g
v a r i a b l e s have no p r e d i c t i v e power, f o r they account f o r
a p p r o x i m a t e l y twenty to t w e n t y - f i v e percent of the "var iance"
i n B r i t a i n ' s involvement in m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s , w i t h
p o l a r i t y being by f a r the most c o n s i s t e n t and powerful i n f l u e n c e .
We have s imply found t h a t the i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s — o r , a t l e a s t ,
p o l a r i t y — a r e a p p l i c a b l e to the e n t i r e p o p u l a t i o n of cases and
1 1 6
t h a t s t r a t i f y i n g the p o p u l a t i o n a c c o r d i n g to s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y
i s no more than a means of "random" s a m p l i n g .
The p l i g h t s of I t a l y and Russia d u r i n g the n i n e t e e n t h
c e n t u r y are somewhat o p p o s i t e t h a t of B r i t a i n ; they f a l l i n t o the
second c a t e g o r y — t h e category t h a t r e p r e s e n t s the unmediated
a s s o c i a t i o n between our p r e d i c t o r and outcome v a r i a b l e s . Both
I t a l y and Russia are more l i k e l y to p a r t i c i p a t e i n , and i n i t i a t e ,
m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s when they are under- r a t h e r than o v e r -
r e c o g n i z e d (Table 9 ) . However, n e i t h e r country i s l i k e l y to
become i n v o l v e d i n an IMC more than twenty-two p e r c e n t of the
t ime t h a t i t i s s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t . Thus, i f we were asked to
p r e d i c t , f o r a p a r t i c u l a r y e a r , whether or not e i t h e r of these
c o u n t r i e s would become i n v o l v e d i n a m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n ,
g i v e n t h a t i t was u n d e r r e c o g n i z e d , we would do best to say "no."
Having a d d i t i o n a l i n f o r m a t i o n c o n c e r n i n g the s t a t e ' s power
c a p a b i l i t i e s , p r i o r war e x p e r i e n c e , and the p o l a r i t y of the
major power system w i l l n o t , f o r the most p a r t , improve our
p r e d i c t i v e power.
F i n a l l y , France and Germany, and perhaps A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y ,
f a l l i n t o the t h i r d c a t e g o r y — t h e category to which our p o s i t e d
model a p p l i e s . S t a t e s in t h i s t h i r d category are c o n f l i c t - p r o n e
when u n d e r r e c o g n i z e d , but are c o n s t r a i n e d from involvement i n
c o n f r o n t a t i o n s by i n t e r v e n i n g f a c t o r s . Taking France as a case
i n p o i n t , f o r the e i g h t y - y e a r p e r i o d d u r i n g the n i n e t e e n t h century
when she i s a major power, none of the h y p o t h e s i z e d i n t e r v e n i n g
117
v a r i a b l e s are a s s o i c a t e d wi th her p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n , or i n i t i a t i o n
o f , i n t e r s t a t e m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s . However, d u r i n g the
n e a r l y t h i r t y years in which France i s underrecognized (with a
lag of one, two, or e s p e c i a l l y three y e a r s ) , the i n t e r v e n i n g
v a r i a b l e s g ive us r a t h e r s i z a b l e f i t s and p r e d i c t i v e power.
Increases i n French power c a p a b i l i t i e s would appear to be most
i m p o r t a n t , al though the p o l a r i t y of the major power system may
play some r o l e ; p r i o r war exper ience c o n t r i b u t e s l i t t l e to our
a b i l i t y to p r e d i c t French involvement i n m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s .
The c o e f f i c i e n t s f o r changes i n power (when time lags are
i n t r o d u c e d ) are u s u a l l y two to three standard e r r o r s removed
from the parameters f o r the e n t i r e e i g h t y - y e a r p e r i o d , and the
c o e f f i c i e n t s f o r p o l a r i t y are g e n e r a l l y one to two standard e r r o r s
removed. I t i s noteworthy t h a t the e f f e c t s of both these
i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s are i n the d i r e c t i o n p r e d i c t e d by the model.
For Germany, i n t e r p r e t i n g the r e s u l t s i s a b i t more
d i f f i c u l t . For the subset of cases i n which Germany i s under-
r e c o g n i z e d , we f i n d t h a t , w i t h no time l a g and a lag of one y e a r , A O
both the R and P a s s o c i a t e d w i t h IMC p a r t i c i p a t i o n ( i . e . , all
IMCs i n which Germany i s i n v o l v e d ) are c o n s i d e r a b l y l a r g e r than
the c o r r e s p o n d i n g s t a t i s t i c s f o r the e n t i r e e i g h t y - y e a r p e r i o d
(Table 1 2 ) . However, the standard e r r o r s of the p r o b i t
c o e f f i c i e n t s are of such magnitude as to make i t p r o b l e m a t i c to
argue t h a t , f o r IMC p a r t i c i p a t i o n , the p r o b i t c o e f f i c i e n t s f o r the
underrecognized subset are s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t than the
118
c o e f f i c i e n t s f o r the e n t i r e p e r i o d . On the o t h e r hand, when
l o o k i n g at German c o n f l i c t i n i t i a t i o n ( i . e . , o n l y those IMCs
t h a t Germany i n i t i a t e s ) , such doubts are l e s s j u s t i f i e d . The
c o e f f i c i e n t s f o r changes i n power and p o l a r i t y f o r the
underrecognized subset are q u i t e d i s t i n c t (about two standard
e r r o r s removed) from the c o e f f i c i e n t s f o r the e n t i r e p e r i o d ,
*2
and the R~s and Ps are a l s o q u i t e d i f f e r e n t and r e s p e c t a b l y
r o b u s t . I t should be noted, however, t h a t w h i l e the e f f e c t
of p o l a r i t y i s i n the p r e d i c t e d d i r e c t i o n , t h a t f o r changes
i n power i s not .
F i n a l l y , A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y presents the most d i f f i c u l t
case to i n t e r p r e t . There appears not to be any b i v a r i a t e
r e l a t i o n s h i p between s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y and m i l i t a r y
c o n f r o n t a t i o n (Table 9 ) , nor do the i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s
seem to have much p r e d i c t i v e p o w e r — w i t h one e x c e p t i o n .
For the subset of underrecognized cases w i t h a t h r e e - y e a r l a g , *2
we uncover a s i z a b l e R and r e s p e c t a b l e P. From Tables 11 and 12
i t i s e v i d e n t t h a t t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p i s accounted f o r almost
e n t i r e l y by the l a r g e p o s i t i v e a s s o c i a t i o n between system p o l a r i t y
and IMC involvement. S ince f o r A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y t h i s i s the s i n g l e
i n s t a n c e of any a s s o c i a t i o n among the v a r i a b l e s and i s based upon
o n l y t h r e e c o n f l i c t i n v o l v e m e n t s , I am s k e p t i c a l about p l a c i n g
much c o n f i d e n c e in t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p .
I t i s not c l e a r to me what d i s t i n g u i s h e s the major powers
i n t h i s l a s t category from those i n the o t h e r two c a t e g o r i e s . I t
119
i s not t h e i r scores on s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y ; f o r example, Germany
d u r i n g the n ineteenth century i s , on the average, s l i g h t l y more
s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t than B r i t a i n , but France i s l e s s . Nor i s the
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n based upon n a t i o n a l power c a p a b i l i t i e s ; F r a n c e ,
on the average, being s l i g h t l y more powerful than B r i t a i n ,
Germany l e s s p o w e r f u l . N e i t h e r do I see any reason to suggest
a g e o p o l i t i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n t h a t would emphasize the c e n t r a l
l o c a l e of Germany, France, and A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y in the n i n e t e e n t h
c e n t u r y major power system, and the p e r i p h e r a l l o c a t i o n of B r i t a i n ,
R u s s i a , and I t a l y . What may account f o r Germany's and France's
adherence to the s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y model i s t h e i r p o s i t i o n
i n the m i l i t a r y - p o l i t i c a l s t r u c t u r e of n i n e t e e n t h century Europe.
Germany's years of s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y are c o n c e n t r a t e d i n the
1820 to mid-1870s p e r i o d ; F r a n c e ' s , p r i o r to 1860. This i s the
time of Germany's ( P r u s s i a ' s ) s p e c t a c u l a r r i s e and of the r a p i d ,
i f tumultuous, r e b u i l d i n g of p o s t - N a p o l e o n i c France. The
h i s t o r i e s of P r u s s i a and France d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d are ones of
c a r e f u l s c r u t i n y of European al ignments accompanied by opportunism.
At the same t ime, we f i n d B r i t a i n a l o o f from c o n t i n e n t a l a f f a i r s ,
Russia expanding eastward a g a i n s t non-major power e n t i t i e s , and
A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y , under M e t t e r n i c h and u n t i l the Seven Weeks War
( 1 8 6 6 ) , t r y i n g to m a i n t a i n the major power s t a t u s quo. I t may
thus be s p e c u l a t e d t h a t German and French adherence to the model
is a s s o c i a t e d wi th t h e i r c a r e f u l l y - o r c h e s t r a t e d c l i m b s to
prominence, dur ing which n e i t h e r i s s u f f i c i e n t l y powerful to
120
h e e d l e s s l y vent her f r u s t r a t i o n , but both are w i l l i n g to a c t when
the o p p o r t u n i t y presents i t s e l f . (In keeping w i t h t h i s s c e n a r i o ,
the absence of any r e l a t i o n s h i p between s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y and
c o n f l i c t involvement f o r B r i t a i n i s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h her p o l i t i c a l
i s o l a t i o n from the "European" major powers.) This argument,
however, does not account f o r A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y ' s f i t to the model
— o n e t h a t i s l a r g e l y dependent upon her c o n c e n t r a t i o n of s t a t u s
i n c o n s i s t e n t years dur ing the 1880s and 1890s; b u t , as noted above,
i t may w e l l be m i s l e a d i n g to draw i n f e r e n c e s from an a s s o c i a t i o n
based upon only three c o n f l i c t i n v o l v e m e n t s .
Examining the "Residuals"
Before moving on to the t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y , we should
b r i e f l y examine one f u r t h e r i t e m . Does our model more a c c u r a t e l y
p r e d i c t c e r t a i n l e v e l s or types of c o n f l i c t and are our r a t h e r
modest f i n d i n g s the r e s u l t of our f a i l u r e to d i f f e r e n t i a t e among
these l e v e l s and types? Table 14 o f f e r s a means of s y s t e m a t i c a l l y
examining t h i s q u e s t i o n . I have d i v i d e d each major power's
c o n f l i c t s i n two d i f f e r e n t ways. F i r s t , I have d i v i d e d the
c o n f l i c t s by l e v e l of v i o l e n c e , t h a t i s , as to whether they are
wars, m i l i t a r y a c t i o n s short of war, or merely t h r e a t s to use
force."' Second, I have d i s t i n g u i s h e d c o n f l i c t s by t y p e , i n t h i s
p a r t i c u l a r c a s e , between those c o n f l i c t s t h a t c o n f r o n t one major
^See Chapter Two and Appendix C f o r the d e f i n i t i o n s of war, m i l i t a r y a c t i o n , and t h r e a t .
TABLE 14
NUMBER OF CONFLICT-YEARS INVOLVING MAJOR POWERS AND THE PROPORTION OF THESE CONFLICT-YEARS THAT IS CORRECTLY PREDICTED BY THE PROBIT EQUATION, FOR THE 19th CENTURY (ONE- TO THREE-YEAR TIME LAGS)
Nat ion Lag Part i c i pate I n i t i a t e
Level of C o n f l i c t Type of C o n f l i c t Level of C o n f l i c t Type of C o n f l i c t
N War N M i l . N Thr't N Maj/ N Maj/ N War N M i l . N Thr't N Maj/ N Maj/ A c t . M a j . Mi n. A c t . Maj . M i n .
UK 0 2 .50 12 .33 6 .33 5 .60 15 .27 1 1 .00 11 .09 6 17 5 .40 13 .08 1" 0 1 1.00 7 .00 4 .50 3 .67 9 .11 1 1 .00 6 .00 4 00 5 .20 12 .00
under- -1 2 .50 6 .00 2 .00 3 .33 7 .00 1 1 .00 5 .00 1 00 3 .33 5 .00 r e c o g . - 2 1 1 .00 6 .33 3 .00 3 .33 7 .29 1 1 .00 5 .20 3 00 3 .33 6 .17
L-3 1 1.00 4 .50 5 .40 3 .67 7 .43 1 1 .00 3 .00 5 20 3 .67 6 .00
FRN 0 7 .00 11 .00 4 .00 7 .00 15 .00 6 .00 10 .00 4 00 6 .00 14 .00 ' 0 1 .00 6 .00 3 .00 3 .00 7 .00 1 .00 6 .00 3 00 3 .00 7 .00
under- -1 1 1.00 6 .50 2 .50 2 .50 7 .57 1 1 .00 6 .50 2 50 2 .50 7 .57 r e c o g . -2 2 .50 4 .50 2 .50 2 .50 6 .50 1 .00 4 .50 2 50 1 .00 6 .50
. -3 3 .33 3 .33 2 .50 4 .50 4 .25 2 1 .00 3 .33 2 50 3 .67 4 .50
GMY 0 4 .00 2 .00 4 .00 4 . 00 6 .00 3 .00 2 .00 3 00 2 .00 6 .00 0 4 .25 0 2 .50 3 .00 3 .67 1 .00 1 1.00 2 1'. 00 2 .50 2 1.00
under- -1 4 .25 0 2 .00 3 .00 3 .33 3 .67 0 1 00 1 1.00 .33 r e c o g . -2 3 .00 0 2 .00 3 .00 2 .00 2 .50 0 1 00 1 1 .00 2 .00
.-3 3 .00 0 3 .00 3 .00 3 .00 2 .50 0 2 50 1 1.00 3 .33
TABLE 1 4 - - - C o n t i n u e d
Nat ion Lag P a r t i c i p a t e I n i t i a t e
Level of C o n f l i c t Type of C o n f l i c t Level of Conflict Typ e of C o n f l i c t
N War N M i l . N Thr't N Maj/ N Maj/ N War N M i l . N Thr' t N Maj/ N Maj/ A c t . Ma j . M i n . A c t . M a j . M i n .
A-H 0 5 .00 3 .00 6 00 5 .00 9 .00 3 .00 3 .00 6 00 4 .00 8 .00 r 0 1 .00 1 .00 2 00 0 4 .00 0 1 .00 2 00 0 3 .00
under- -1 • 1 .00 2 .00 2 00 0 5 .00 1 .00 2 .00 2 00 0 5 .00 r e c o g . -2 0 1 .00 3 00 2 .00 2 .00 0 1 .00 3 00 2 .00 2 .00
L - 3 0 1 .00 2 1 00 2 1.00 1 .00 0 1 .00 2 1 00 2 1 .00 1 .00
ITA r o 2 .00 2 .00 2 00 1 .00 5 .00 2 .00 2 .00 2 00 1 .00 5 .00 0 2 .00 1 .00 1 00 1 .00 3 .00 2 .00 1 .00 1 00 1 .00 3 .00
under- -1 1 .00 1 .00 1 00 1 .00 2 .00 1 .00 1 .00 1 00 1 .00 2 .00 r e c o g . - 3 1 .00 2 .00 1 00 1 .00 3 .00 1 .00 2 .00 1 00 1 .00 3 .00
USR 0 3 .00 4 .00 7 00 2 .00 12 .00 3 .00 4 .00 7 00 2 .00 12 .00 0 3 .00 4 .00 6 .00 2 .00 11 .00 3 .00 4 .00 6 00 2 .00 11 .00
under- -I 3 .00 4 .00 6 00 2 .00 11 .00 3 .00 4 .00 6 00 2 .00 11 .00 recog. -2 3 .00 4 .00 6 00 o
L .00 11 .00 3 .00 4 .00 6 00 2 .00 11 .00 1 -3 2 .00 4 .00 6 .00 1 .00 11 .00 2 .00 4 .00 6 .00 1 .00 11 .00
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power w i t h another major power and those t h a t p i t a major power
a g a i n s t only non-major powers.
S i n c e , dur ing the f i r s t stage of the r e s e a r c h d e s i g n ,
the u n i t of a n a l y s i s i s the y e a r , we can a s s i g n o n l y one l e v e l
or type of c o n f l i c t to a given y e a r . B e l i e v i n g t h a t the model
should be more capable of p r e d i c t i n g the s e v e r e r l e v e l s and t y p e s ,
I have so assigned c o n f l i c t s when more than one of them occur
i n a g iven y e a r . Thus, i f a war, m i l i t a r y a c t i o n , and t h r e a t
a l l occur i n the same y e a r , the country i s " c r e d i t e d " w i t h a
war involvement. I f there i s no war, then the country r e c e i v e s
a " m i l i t a r y a c t i o n " f o r that y e a r , e t c . S i m i l a r l y , i f a country
i s i n v o l v e d i n a c o n f l i c t w i t h a major power and one w i t h a
minor power in the same y e a r , t h a t year i s a s s i g n e d a major power
c o n f l i c t . The p r o p o r t i o n s in the t a b l e r e p r e s e n t the f r a c t i o n
of t imes t h a t the model c o r r e c t l y p r e d i c t s the year i n which a
p a r t i c u l a r l e v e l or type of c o n f l i c t o c c u r s . Thus, i n the f i r s t
row of Table 14 we see that f o r the t o t a l p e r i o d d u r i n g which
B r i t a i n i s a n i n e t e e n t h century major power, there are twenty
years i n which she p a r t i c i p a t e s i n m i l i t a r y c o n f l i c t s . There
are two w a r - y e a r s , of which the model c o r r e c t l y p r e d i c t s one ( . 5 0 ) ;
twelve m i l i t a r y a c t i o n - y e a r s , of which we p r e d i c t f o u r ( . 3 3 ) ; and
s i x years d u r i n g which her a c t i v i t i e s are l i m i t e d to t h r e a t s ,
of which we p r e d i c t two ( . 3 3 ) . These twenty c o n f l i c t - y e a r s can
a l s o be d i v i d e d i n t o f i v e years d u r i n g which B r i t a i n p a r t i c i p a t e s
in a t l e a s t one c o n f l i c t a g a i n s t another major p o w e r — t h r e e (.60)
124
of which wo c o r r e c t l y p r e d i c t ; and f i f t e e n years i n which her
c o n f l i c t s are with non-majors — f o u r (.27) a c c u r a t e l y p r e d i c t e d .
The r i g h t - h a n d s ide of the t a b l e repeats the same i n f o r m a t i o n ,
o n l y t h i s time i t i s f o r o n l y those c o n f l i c t s t h a t a country
i n i t i a t e s . As i s our usual p r o c e d u r e , rows two through f i v e
f o r each n a t i o n represent the y e a r s i n which i t i s u n d e r r e c o g n i z e d ,
the l a s t three rows encompassing time l a g s . The number of IMCs
may vary from row to row depending on the time s l i c e s .
From Table 14 i t i s f a i r l y obvious t h a t the model does
not p r e d i c t war-years more a c c u r a t e l y than m i l i t a r y a c t i o n - or
t h r e a t - y e a r s . Nor does i t do a p p r e c i a b l y b e t t e r i n f o r e c a s t i n g
major power/major power r a t h e r than major power/minor power
c o n f l i c t s . Put another way, the modest f i n d i n g s f o r the n i n e t e e n t h
c e n t u r y are not the r e s u l t of any obvious s y s t e m a t i c b i a s i n the
l e v e l s or types of c o n f l i c t to which the model p r e d i c t s .
Summarizing the Nineteenth-Century F i n d i n g s
Thus, to summarize our r e s u l t s f o r the n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y :
the " u n d e r r e c o g n i t i o n leads to c o n f l i c t " model as p o s t u l a t e d w i t h
i t s m e d i a t i n g f a c t o r s i n Chapter One i s not u n i v e r s a l l y supported
by the e v i d e n c e — e i t h e r f o r c o n f l i c t s as a whole or f o r v a r i o u s
l e v e l s and types of c o n f l i c t . We f i n d t h a t , f o r one major power
( B r i t a i n ) , s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y p l a y s no r o l e ; and, f o r two others
( I t a l y and R u s s i a ) , the p u t a t i v e m e d i a t i n g f a c t o r s have n e g l i g i b l e
e f f e c t s . But we do uncover some evidence f o r three s t a t e s (France,
Germany, and Austr ia-Hungary) i n support of the model. And we
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suggest t h a t the f a c t o r that d i s t i n g u i s h e s the behavior of some
s t a t e s from t h a t of others may be t h e i r p o s i t i o n ( e . g . , c h a l l e n g e r ,
m a i n t a i n e r of the s t a t u s quo, o u t s i d e r ) w i t h i n the m i l i t a r y -
p o l i t i c a l s t r u c t u r e of the major power system. We d i s c o v e r
t h a t , i n g e n e r a l , the model best f i t s the data when a l a g of
three years i s int roduced and when we are p r e d i c t i n g the
i n i t i a t i o n of m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s . But we a l s o f i n d t h a t ,
i n the n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y , only two of three m e d i a t i n g f a c t o r s
appear o p e r a t i v e , those being p o l a r i t y and changes i n power.
The e f f e c t s of p o l a r i t y are c o n s i s t e n t l y i n the p r e d i c t e d
d i r e c t i o n , i . e . , the more p o l a r i z e d the major power system,
the more l i k e l y a country w i l l engage i n c o n f l i c t i v e b e h a v i o r .
On the o t h e r hand, f o r the two c o u n t r i e s f o r which changes in
power are r e l e v a n t , one (France) i s more c o n f l i c t i v e when i t s
power c a p a b i l i t i e s i n c r e a s e and the o t h e r (Germany) when i t s
c a p a b i l i t i e s decrease.
The Twentieth Century
A n a l y z i n g the Data
The f i n d i n g s f o r the t w e n t i e t h century are both more
powerful and more complex than those f o r the p r e c e d i n g c e n t u r y .
An overview of the b i s e r i a l c o r r e l a t i o n s between the i n t e r v e n i n g
v a r i a b l e s and involvement i n m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s (Table 15)
o f f e r s us an i n t r o d u c t i o n to the c o m p l e x i t y . By and l a r g e ,
there are many more s i z a b l e a s s o c i a t i o n s i n the l a t e r than i n
TABLE 15
BISERIAL CORRELATIONS BETWEEN EACH MAJOR POWER'S INVOLVEMENT IN MILITARY CONFRONTATIONS AND THE FOUR INTERVENING VARIABLES, FOR THE 20th CENTURY (ONE- TO THREE-YEAR TIME LAGS)
Nation Lag N
P r e d i c t e d -->
P a r t i c i pate Initiate Nation Lag N
P r e d i c t e d -->
A Power War Exp. P o l a r i t y X - C u t t i n g Delta Power War Exp. Polarity X - C u t t i n g
Nation Lag N
P r e d i c t e d --> 2 " r b • ^ 2
" r b 2
" r b 2
" r b
USA
un.der-r e c o g .
0 59 0 24
-1 25 -2 25
. - 3 25
- .00 - .01 - .00 - .21 - .12
+ .05 + .11 + .02
+ .44
: > + .29 + .22 + . 3 5 * *
- .05 - .09 - .03 - .22
%%** - .39
- .00 - .10 - .00 - .21 - .12
+ .01 - .00 + .02 + 20 + .44
+ .08** + .28 + . 2 9 * *
+ .35
- .01 - .00 - .03
" '11** - .39
UK
under-r e c o g .
0 59 0 18
-1 16 -2 15
. - 3 13
+ .00 - .10 - .14 - .00 + .11
+ . 0 8 * + .06 + .00 - .12 + .09
- .01 - .00 + .03 + .16 - .09
** '+ .11 + .00 - .03 + .06 + .08
+ .01 - .10 - .09 - .00 + .11
** + .14 + .06 + .05 - .12 + .09
- .05 - .00 - .03 + .16 - .09
+ .30 + .00 + .19 + .06 + .08
FRN
under-r e c o g .
0 59 0 36
-1 36 -2 36
. - 3 36
- .09 - .09 - .10 - .io* - .16
+ .22 + 'l\*** + .60 + .37 + .12
- .00 + .00\ - . 1 6 * - .02 + .00
+ .11
+ .33 + .12 + .09
- .07 - .04 - .10 - .08 - .13
*** + 29
* + .20 + .60 + .50 + . 1 8 *
- .01 - .01 - .16* - .07 - .00
+ .09 + .09 + . 3 3 ^ + .17 + .14
GMY 0 28 - .01 - .12 + .31 + .04 - .01 - .12 + .31 + .04
A-H 0 14 + .41 - .08 - .01 + .34 - .03 - .04
TABLE 1 5 — Continued
Nat ion Lag N P a r t i c i p a t e I n i t i a t e
Delta Power War Exp. Polarity X- C u t t i n g A Power War Exp. Polarity X- C u t t i n g
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 P r e d i c t e d — + r tT - r b 4-
r b - r b 4- r b — r b 4- r b r b
ITA 0 34 4- .06 4- 09 4- .00 - .04 4- .06 4- .09 4- .00 - .04
USR 0 56 _ .05 _ 04 4- .14** + .00 _ .05 _ .01 4- .16** _ .02 * " 0 31 - .00 - 07 4- .03 4- .00 - .00 - .03 4- .05 - .04
under- -1 30 - .02 - 08 4- .01 4- .03 - .03 - .03 + .03 - .01 r e c o g . -2 29 - .02 - 04 + .09 4- .04 - .03 - .01 4- . 1 5 * - .01
. -3 28 - .04 - 10 4- .11 4- .00 - .05 - .07 4- .11 - .01
CHN 0 21 _ .05 4- 01 _ .00 _ .00 _ .05 4- .01 _ .00 _ .00 under- [ o 9 + .07 4- 31 4- .21 - .17 4- .07 4- .31 + .21 - .17
JPN 0 45 + . 1 9 * _ 08 _ .01 4- .07 + . 1 9 * _ .08 _ .01 4- .07 0 41 4- .04 - .06 - .03 4- .17* 4- .04 - .06 - .03 4- . 1 7 *
under- -1 38 4- .34 - 06 - .02 - .01 4- - .06 - .02 - .01 r e c o g . - 2 35 4-
• 3 3 * - 07 - .02 - .01 4- . 3 3 , - .07 - .02 - .01 . -3 32 4- . 2 5 * - 09 - .02 - .00 4- .25 - .09 - .02 - .00
NOTE: Germany, A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y , and I t a l y are underrecognized on too few o c c a s i o n s and/or engage in c o n f r o n t a t i o n too i n f r e q u e n t l y when underrecognized to compute s t a b l e e s t i m a t e s . In a d d i t i o n , China i s too i n f r e q u e n t l y underrecognized to o b t a i n s t a b l e e s t i m a t e s when time lags are i n t r o d u c e d .
F - t e s t from a n a l y s i s of v a r i a n c e : * * * < . 0 1 < * * < .05*^ * .10 s i g n i f i c a n c e l e v e l
128
the e a r l i e r century . B u t , u n l i k e the n i n e t e e n t h , some of the
m e d i a t i n g e f f e c t s of the i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s i n the c u r r e n t
c e n t u r y appear to be q u i t e d i f f e r e n t from those t h a t were
h y p o t h e s i z e d i n Chapter One. In p a r t i c u l a r , p r i o r war
e x p e r i e n c e would seem to be p o s i t i v e l y r e l a t e d to involvement
i n subsequent m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s f o r the U n i t e d S t a t e s ,
B r i t a i n , France, and, perhaps, I t a l y and C h i n a , a l though not
f o r Germany, the S o v i e t Union, and Japan. And c r o s s - c u t t i n g
bonds, l e s s important because o f the smal lness of the b i s e r i a l
c o r r e l a t i o n s , a l s o appear to d e v i a t e from the d i r e c t i o n
h y p o t h e s i z e d i n the m o d e l — a t l e a s t f o r France and, perhaps,
B r i t a i n and Japan, w i t h only the United S t a t e s c l e a r l y e x h i b i t i n g
the n e g a t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p p o s i t e d i n the model. The e f f e c t s of
the two remaining i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s , p o l a r i t y and changes i n
power, a r e , however, g e n e r a l l y i n the h y p o t h e s i z e d d i r e c t i o n
when s i z a b l e ; y e t , a g a i n , France may be an e x c e p t i o n .
Before attempting to e x p l a i n why these c o e f f i c i e n t s d e v i a t e
from the e x p e c t e d , we would l i k e to know i f the d i r e c t i o n s of the
b i v a r i a t e b i s e r i a l s i n Table 15 remain u n a l t e r e d when we " c o n t r o l "
f o r the e f f e c t s of the o t h e r v a r i a b l e s . For example, i s p r i o r war
e x p e r i e n c e s t i l l p o s i t i v e l y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h involvement i n
subsequent c o n f r o n t a t i o n s a f t e r we have a l l o w e d changes i n
c a p a b i l i t y , l e v e l of system p o l a r i t y , and c r o s s - c u t t i n g to account
for a l l the "variance" t h a t they can? The p r o b i t c o e f f i c i e n t s
would normal ly help us to answer t h i s q u e s t i o n s i n c e the "variance"
129
accounted f o r by the other v a r i a b l e s i s " p a r t i a l l e d o u t . " B u t ,
as we s h a l l see below, there are c o n d i t i o n s under which these
e s t i m a t o r s are i m p r e c i s e .
When we examine the s t a n d a r d i z e d p r o b i t c o e f f i c i e n t s
i n Table 17 (p. 135), we f i n d , i n a number of i n s t a n c e s , that
there are s i g n r e v e r s a l s and t h a t the r e l a t i v e s i z e of the
betas are a good deal d i f f e r e n t than we might expect based upon
the b i s e r i a l s . What we are w i t n e s s i n g , however, may not be the
e f f e c t s of p a r t i a l l i n g out " v a r i a n c e , " but r a t h e r the suppressor
e f f e c t s t h a t can r e s u l t from m u l t i c o l i n e a r i t y among the
i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s . That i s to s a y , i f two or more of the
i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s are h i g h l y c o r r e l a t e d w i t h one another
and s i m u l t a n e o u s l y employed i n an e q u a t i o n , the importance
( i . e . , the c o e f f i c i e n t f o r ) one or more of these v a r i a b l e s
may be i n f l a t e d w h i l e that f o r o t h e r s i s , c o r r e s p o n d i n g l y ,
d e f l a t e d . Under these c o n d i t i o n s i t i s not p o s s i b l e to have
much f a i t h i n the d i r e c t i o n or magnitude of the p r o b i t
c o e f f i c i e n t s . I t i s p o s s i b l e , however, to p a r t i a l l y d i s e n t a n g l e
the e f f e c t s of the i n t e r c o r r e l a t e d i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s ( i . e . ,
to s p e c i f y which v a r i a b l e s are most powerful in p r e d i c t i n g c o n f l i c t
i n v o l v e m e n t ) . The c a p a b i l i t y to do so i s based upon the f a c t that
the m u l t i p l e c o r r e l a t i o n c o e f f i c i e n t s are not a f f e c t e d by m u l t i -
c o l l i n e a r i t y . A s imple way to view t h i s i s t h a t the p r o b i t
c o e f f i c i e n t s f o r some of the c o l l i n e a r v a r i a b l e s are being d e f l a t e d
to compensate f o r the i n f l a t i o n of o t h e r c o e f f i c i e n t s , but the
130
o v e r a l l s t r e n g t h of a s s o c i a t i o n i s u n a l t e r e d . Based upon t h i s
f a c t , we can re- run the p r o b i t a n a l y s i s , a l t e r n a t e l y removing
one i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e a t a t i m e . Great care should be taken
when i n t e r p r e t i n g the r e s u l t s of t h i s procedure. I f the
c o r r e c t l y - s p e c i f i e d model n e c e s s i t a t e s the i n c l u s i o n of a l l
f o u r i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s , of which two or more happen to be
s i g n i f i c a n t l y c o r r e l a t e d , then the e s t i m a t e d parameters w i l l be
i n e f f i c i e n t ( i . e . , have l a r g e e r r o r terms) but they w i l l not be
b i a s e d ( i . e . , the expected value w i l l be the t r u e p o p u l a t i o n
parameter ) . The more h i g h l y c o l l i n e a r the i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s ,
the more i n e f f i c i e n t the e s t i m a t o r s . However, when we omit
h i g h l y c o r r e l a t e d — b u t n e c e s s a r y — v a r i a b l e s , the r e s u l t i n g
e s t i m a t e s will be b iased (al though they w i l l a l s o be more
e f f i c i e n t ) . That i s to say, i f and X^ are two c o r r e l a t e d
v a r i a b l e s that are necessary to account f o r an outcome v a r i a b l e Y,
then by o m i t t i n g X-j from the a n a l y s i s , we c r e d i t X̂ w i t h the
"explanatory power" unique to X̂ and t h a t shared j o i n t l y w i t h .
Thus, to the extent that X-j and X̂ are c o r r e l a t e d , the c o e f f i c i e n t
f o r X^ i s b i a s e d . However, we do gain some i n f o r m a t i o n . I f K2 Ry-x X 1 S *^i the multiple c o r r e l a t i o n c o e f f i c i e n t r e s u l t i n g from
1 2 A p the p r e d i c t i o n of Y from X-j and X^, and Ry.^ i s t h a t from Y on
A 2 A 2 2
X,, a l o n e , then R y ^ ^ - R y ^ i s t h a t p o r t i o n of Y t h a t i s
u n i q u e l y accounted f o r by X-j. In t h i s manner we can i d e n t i f y
the most powerful v a r i a b l e s — the ones t h a t c o n t r i b u t e most to
131
the d e c l i n e i n the s t rength of r e l a t i o n s h i p m e a s u r e s — e v e n though
we cannot get an unbiased e s t i m a t e of the parameters.
T h i s i s an expensive and t ime-consuming process and,
f o r e x p l o r a t o r y purposes, I decided to s e l e c t only one s e t of
cases f o r each major power. To maximize c o m p a r a b i l i t y , I chose
(when p o s s i b l e ) the same cases f o r each s t a t e : the subset of
underrecognized cases wi th a t h r e e - y e a r l a g . This subset of
cases produced the s t r o n g e s t f i t s d u r i n g the n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y
and, as we s h a l l see below i n Table 17, i t g e n e r a l l y c o n t a i n s
the best f i t s in the t w e n t i e t h century as w e l l . For one major
p o w e r — C h i n a — a s o l u t i o n f o r the underrecognized subset c o u l d
only be o b t a i n e d when there was no time l a g . Three o t h e r powers
— G e r m a n y , A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y , and I t a l y — w e r e too i n f r e q u e n t l y
i n v o l v e d i n c o n f r o n t a t i o n s when underrecognized to permit the
p r o b i t a l g o r i t h m to converge a n d , as a r e s u l t , were not examined.
By and l a r g e we f i n d t h a t the p r o b i t e s t i m a t e s o b t a i n e d
from the " c o m p l e t e l y - s p e c i f i e d " model (the f i r s t row f o r each
country i n Table 16) are upheld when we a l t e r n a t e l y e x c l u d e
i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s (rows two through f i v e f o r each c o u n t r y ) .
Of c o u r s e , the i n o r d i n a t e l y i n f l a t e d beta weights ( > 1 . 0 ) from
I he " c o m p l e t e l y - s p e c i f i e d " model are reduced when c o l l i n e a r
v a r i a b l e s are excluded (as seen f o r France and C h i n a ) , but the
d i r e c t i o n s of the c o e f f i c i e n t s remain q u i t e s t a b l e , and the
omiss ion of the v a r i a b l e s w i t h the l a r g e r beta weights i n row one
i'. a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the most p r e c i p i t o u s d e c l i n e i n the R s i n
TABLE 16
STANDARDIZED PROBIT COEFFICIENTS AND THE INTERCORRELATION MATRIX FOR THE FOUR INTERVENING VARIABLES WHEN PREDICTING EACH MAJOR POWER'S PARTICIPATION IN MILITARY CONFRONTATIONS, FOR THE 20th CENTURY
(SUBSET OF UNDERRECOGNIZED CASES, THREE-YEAR TIME LAG)
Nat ion Lag N
P r e d i c t e d
A Power War Exp. P o l a r i t y X-Cut. R 2 Nation Lag N
P r e d i c t e d + - +
R 2
USA -3 24 -62(48) 26(57) 52(60) 15(51) 27(62) 65(69) 09(54)
-54(43) 68(62) -04(20) -74(51) 40(44) 09(42) -59(47) 10(26) 58(73)
69* 54* 76** 72* 72**
UK - 3 12 35(28) 02(34) -55(69) 62(76) 18(55) -20(66) 52(59)
35(27) -57(52) 62(72) 37(35) 42(35) 41(48) 51(40) 10(55) -35(60)
80 37 80 46 30
FRN -3 33 -13(14) 100(45) 153(73) 58(26) 101(50) 161(30) 60(28)
-43(39) 30(32) 49(33) -66(34) 28(19) 06(22) -53(27) 71(35) 64(45)
-k-r-k
? K k *
94 3 4 * * 52 61**
A Power War Exp. P o l a r i t y X-Cut
War Exp. Polarity X-Cut. IMC
War Exp. Polarity X-Cut . IMC
War Exp. Polarity X-Cut. IMC
-17 06 43 21 -87
-34 66
- 2 3 ^ 34 -81 30 -11 33 31
02 -06 -66
07 42 -39 35
-62
29
31
TABLE 1 6 - - - C o n t i n u e d
Nat ion Lag N
P r e d i c t e d
Delta Power War Exp. P o l a r i t y X-Cut . - 2 R̂ Nat ion Lag N
P r e d i c t e d + - +
- 2 R̂
USR - 3 25 -13(18) -77(97) 69(45) -06(28) -85(112) 64(43) -06(29)
-11(19) 79(57) 27(23) -21(25) -74(64) -29(30) -13(18) -67(57) 74(45)
75 54 39 69
CHN^ 0 9 35(41) 154(148) 157(246) 235(297) 198(133) 185(215) 318(258)
57(41) 155(330) 74(283) 49(42) 129(139) 53(126) 59(41) 80(96) 00(90)
65 68 64 60 56
JPN - 3 32 74(36) -27(29) -29(22) 13(19) -66(57) 02(26) -29(31)
82(41) -41(28) 21(22) 63(35) -45(39) 06(26) 71(37) -35(32) -28(23)
88 29 83** 73* 86
A Power War Exp. P o l a r i t y X-Cut
War Exp. Polarity X-Cut. IMC
War Exp. Polarity X-Cut . IMC
War Exp. Polarity X-Cut. IMC
-46 -49 89
54 -94 -97 26 55 45 -42
-18 11 52
-05 -56 -18 50 -29 -13 06
NOTE: A l l c o e f f i c i e n t s have been m u l t i p l i e d by one hundred so as to e l i m i n a t e decimal p o i n t s . Numbers w i t h i n parentheses are standard e r r o r s . (̂ ) The c o e f f i c i e n t s f o r China are est imated on the subset of underrecognized cases w i t h no time l a g .
k O >
X L from p r o b i t (% w i t h 3/4 d f ) : *** < .01 < ** < .05 < * <_.10 s i g n i f i c a n c e l e v e l
134
rows two through f i v e . Thus we see t h a t changes i n power
account f o r a l a r g e p r o p o r t i o n of unique "var iance" i n
A m e r i c a n , B r i t i s h , and Japanese p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n m i l i t a r y
c o n f r o n t a t i o n s ; war exper ience i s s a l i e n t f o r French and S o v i e t
p a r t i c i p a t i o n ; p o l a r i t y has i t s g r e a t e s t unique e f f e c t on B r i t i s h ,
F r e n c h , and S o v i e t c o n f l i c t b e h a v i o r ; and c r o s s - c u t t i n g i s
important f o r B r i t i s h and French b e h a v i o r . Due to the very high
degree of m u l t i c o l l i n e a r i t y among the i n d i c a t o r s f o r C h i n a ,
the e x c l u s i o n of any p a r t i c u l a r v a r i a b l e does l i t t l e to reduce K 2
her R (although c r o s s - c u t t i n g does the most ) .
Emboldened by the r e s u l t s r e p o r t e d i n Table 16, I w i l l
move on to a d e s c r i p t i o n of the r e l a t i o n s h i p s uncovered by the
p r o b i t runs as d e p i c t e d i n Table 17. I t should be kept c l e a r l y
in mind, however, t h a t such d e s c r i p t i o n and any subsequent
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the e f f e c t s of the i n d i v i d u a l i n t e r v e n i n g
v a r i a b l e s are h i g h l y tenuous, a l though the o v e r a l l f i t s of the
p r o b i t equat ions are not.
We can see from Table 17 t h a t the f i r s t i n t e r v e n i n g
v a r i a b l e — c h a n g e s i n p o w e r — i s n o t , i n g e n e r a l , very p o w e r f u l .
For the two s t a t e s f o r which i t i s most i m p o r t a n t — A u s t r i a -
Hungary and J a p a n — a n d f o r a t h i r d s t a t e — I t a l y — i t i s
p o s i t i v e l y a s s o c i a t e d wi th involvement i n m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s ,
1 Since R i s merely as e s t i m a t e of the "true" m u l t i p l e c o r r e l a t i o n c o e f f i c i e n t , the e x c l u s i o n of a v a r i a b l e may be accompanied, from time to t i m e , by a s l i g h t i n c r e a s e in the s t a t i s t i c .
TABLE 17
STANDARDIZED PROBIT COEFFICIENTS FOR THE FOUR INTERVENING VARIABLES WHEN PREDICTING EACH MAJOR POWER'S INVOLVEMENT IN MILITARY CONFRONTATIONS, FOR THE 20th CENTURY (ONE- TO THREE-YEAR TIME LAGS)
Nation Lag N
Predi cted »-
P a r t i c i pate Initiate Nation Lag N
Predi cted »-
A Power War Exp. P o l a r i t y X-Cut. R P A Power War Exp. P o l a r i t y X-Cut . A 2 R P
Nation Lag N
Predi cted »- + - + -
R P
+ - +
A 2 R P
USA
under-r e c o g .
0 59 * 0 24 -1 24 - 2 24 - 3 24
-03(20) 21(35) 34(24) 09(37) -55(47) 77(55) 90(40) 101(66)
02(23) 53(67) 88(51) 67(74) -63(46) 18(60) 54(43) 21(65) -62(48) 26(57) 52(60) 15(51)
14 00 63** 26 50 27 5 6 , 13 69 33
-05(21) 08(38) 32(25) 08(38) -72(52) 39(58) 86(42) 37(71)
02(23) 53(67) 88(51) 67(74) -63(46) 18(60) 54(43) 21(65) -62(48) 26(57) 52(60) 15(51)
10 00 70 30 50 27 5 6 , 13 69 33
UK
under-recog.
0 59 " 0 18 -1 16 -2 14
.-3 12
-05(17) 34(21) 27(23) 33(17) -51(43) 46(50) 30(50) -21(35) -43(36) 69(52) 73(53) -07(31)
04(33) -03(64) 32(60) 17(31) 35(28) 02(34) -55(61) 62(76)
18 11 34 10 35 46 16 44 80 33
02(17) 26(20) 13(23) 48(17) -51(48) 46(50) 30(50) -21(35) -37(33) 10(26) -41(60) 94(117)
04(33) -03(64) 32(60) 17(31) 35(23) 02(34) -55(61) 62(76)
•k -k
29 11 34 10 92* 36 16 44 80 33
FRN
under-r e c o g .
0 59 ' 0 36 -1 35 -2 34 - 3 33
-22(14) 91(39) 117(59) 44(22) -10(11) 111(65) 156(99) 50(31) -26(15) 141(107) 143(141) 36(42) -19(10) 122(59) 162(83) 43(22) -18(14) 100(45) 158(73) '58(26)
77*** 16 •k k
37 17 89*** 64 98*** 60 96*** 46
-22(16) 88(38) 107(57) 47(24) -10(17) 104(66) 135(97) 49(35) -26(15) 141(107) 143(141) 36(42) -26(17) 125(87) 145(124) 40(36) -22(19) 99(64) 149(104) 61(37)
69*** 27 70* 27 89*** 64 90*** 44 *** 88 38
GMY 0 28 00(00) -101(84) -02(02) 00(00) •k k
99 22 00(00) -101(84) -02(02) 00(00) go,*** 22
A-H 0 14 74(47) -41(35) -19(29) 71* 36 64(45) -32(36) -24(31) 54 50
TABLE 1 7 - - - C o n t i n u e d
Nat ion Lag N
P r e d i c t e d
P a r t i c i pate Initiate Nat ion Lag N
P r e d i c t e d
A Power War E X D . P o l a r i t y X-Cut. P/ P A Power War Exp. P o l a r i t y X-Cut. A 2 R P
Nat ion Lag N
P r e d i c t e d + - + -
P/ P
+ - + -
A 2 R P
ITA 0 34 20(21) 57(27) 22(31) -32(26) 30 25 20(21) 57(27) 22(31) -32(26) 30 25
USR
under-r e c o g .
0 56 r 0 31 -1 29 -2 27
.-3 25
-14(16) -30(23) 48(21) 01(21) -04(23) -39(31) 16(26) -14(30) -03(26) -30(30) 19(27) 04(32) -10(23) -15(26) 55(35) 31(29) -13(18) -77(97) 69(45) -06(28)
31 09 14 21 11 42 32 41 72* 26
-16(17) -31(23) 43(23) -14(22) -04(23) -46(30) 09(26) -44(31) -20(26) -35(30) 10(27) -35(33) -11(21) -20(25) 63(46) 03(29) -21(20) -86(107) 58(46) -27(31)
29* 13 19 25 14 18 39 36 70* 30
CHN 0 21 under- [ 0 9
-21(30) 50(62) -05(71) 41(87) 35(41) 154(148) 157(246) 235(297)
10 20 65 64
-21(30) 50(62) -05(71) 41(87) 35(41) 154(148) 157(246) 235(297)
10 20 65 64
JPN
under-recog.
0 45 0 41
-1 38 -2 35
.-3 32
71(28) -21(28) -33(20) 39(18) 65(34) -19(32) -35(21) 41(19) 87(40) 11(45) -44(30) 20(20) 77(35) -34(39) -43(29) 27(26) 74(36) -27(29) -29(22) 13(19)
87 17 84 07 83** 27
k k
76 20 •kk
88 20
71(28) -21(28) -33(20) 39(18) 65(34) -19(32) -35(21) 41(19) 87(40) 11(45) -44(30) 20(20) 77(35) -34(39) -43(29) 27(26) 74(36) -27(29) -29(22) 13(19)
87*** 17 •kk
84 07 83** 27 76** 20 88** 20
NOTE: A l l c o e f f i c i e n t s have been m u l t i p l i e d by one hundred so as to e l i m i n a t e decimal p o i n t s . Numbers w i t h i n parentheses are standard e r r o r s .
from p r o b i t ( 7 . w i t h 4 d f ) : *** < .01 < ** <• . 0 5 < * ^ .10 s i g n i f i c a n c e l e v e l
137
as h y p o t h e s i z e d in Chapter One. However, f o r f o u r o t h e r s t a t e s
— m o s t n o t i c e a b l y the United S t a t e s and B r i t a i n , but a l s o France
and the S o v i e t U n i o n — t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p may be n e g a t i v e , al though
the l a r g e e r r o r terms make i t d i f f i c u l t to say. The e f f e c t s of
the second i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e — p r i o r war e x p e r i e n c e — a r e the
same as we found wi th the b i s e r i a l c o r r e l a t i o n s . Contrary to
what i s hypothesized i n Chapter One, t h i s v a r i a b l e i s g e n e r a l l y
p o s i t i v e l y a s s o c i a t e d wi th p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n , and i n i t i a t i o n o f ,
i n t e r s t a t e m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s . A g a i n , Germany, the S o v i e t
U n i o n , and perhaps Japan are e x c e p t i o n s . For almost a l l major
powers, the t h i r d i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e — p o l a r i t y — i s p o s i t i v e l y
r e l a t e d to involvement in c o n f r o n t a t i o n s as p o s i t e d i n the model.
The two anomalies are A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y and J a p a n , f o r n e i t h e r of
which i s p o l a r i t y a p a r t i c u l a r l y s t r o n g i n t e r v e n i n g f o r c e . And
f i n a l l y , the c o e f f i c i e n t s f o r the f o u r t h i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e
— c r o s s - c u t t i n g — d o not support the h y p o t h e s i s p o s i t e d in the
model . By and l a r g e we f i n d t h a t the more c r o s s - c u t a s t a t e ' s
bonds, the g r e a t e r the p r o b a b i l i t y of m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n .
While the S o v i e t Union, I t a l y , and A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y g e n e r a l l y
d i s p l a y the p o s i t e d negat ive r e l a t i o n s h i p , the magnitude of the
s t a n d a r d e r r o r s suggests t h a t these e s t i m a t e s may not be s t a b l e .
Despite our seeming i n a b i l i t y to c o r r e c t l y p r e d i c t the
d i r e c t i o n of the a s s o c i a t i o n s between the i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s
and involvement in m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n f o r many s t a t e s , the
p r o b i t equations produce very good f i t s to the d a t a . The m u l t i p l e
138
c o r r e l a t i o n c o e f f i c i e n t s and measures of p o i n t p r e d i c t i v e power
are q u i t e s i z a b l e f o r a l l the major powers, p a r t i c u l a r l y f o r
France and Japan. And as we found when we examined the b i v a r i a t e
r e l a t i o n s h i p between s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y and IMC involvement
i n Chapter Three, the s t r e n g t h s of a s s o c i a t i o n s i n the t w e n t i e t h
c e n t u r y are d e c i d e d l y g r e a t e r than those f o r the n i n e t e e n t h
c e n t u r y .
I n t e r p r e t i n g the R e s u l t s
The f i n d i n g s presented above r a i s e two b a s i c i s s u e s :
*2
(1) While the R s and Ps from the p r o b i t equat ions
demonstrate t h a t we have i d e n t i f i e d some very potent i n f l u e n c e s
on major power c o n f l i c t b e h a v i o r , we may n e v e r t h e l e s s have
i n c o r r e c t l y s p e c i f i e d the d i r e c t i o n of the a s s o c i a t i o n f o r a
number of c o u n t r i e s . We, t h e r e f o r e , need to ask whether there
are p l a u s i b l e a l t e r n a t i v e e x p l a n a t i o n s f o r these a s s o c i a t i o n s .
And,
(2) While we have o b t a i n e d much s t r o n g e r f i t s to the data
i n the t w e n t i e t h century than we had i n the n i n e t e e n t h , we need
to a s c e r t a i n whether knowing t h a t a major power i s s t a t u s
i n c o n s i s t e n t s i g n i f i c a n t l y enhances our a b i l i t y to p r e d i c t
i t s c o n f l i c t behavior in the c u r r e n t c e n t u r y .
Let us turn to the f i r s t i s s u e c o n c e r n i n g a l t e r n a t i v e
e x p l a n a t i o n s f o r the s ign r e v e r s a l s i n the probit. c o e f f i c i e n t s .
Given the small N and the degree of m u l t i c o l l i n e a r i t y among the
i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s , the s i m p l e s t e x p l a n a t i o n f o r these r e v e r s a l s
139
i s t h a t the c o e f f i c i e n t s are u n s t a b l e . As we can s e e , the
s t a n d a r d e r r o r s of the p r o b i t c o e f f i c i e n t s are g e n e r a l l y q u i t e
l a r g e and i t i s not d i f f i c u l t to imagine what would happen i f
a few data p o i n t s were d i f f e r e n t . Indeed, i f our R s had
turned out to be s m a l l , t h i s s e c t i o n of the c h a p t e r would
have been q u i t e b r i e f , as I would have probably i n t e r p r e t e d
the s i g n r e v e r s a l s to be randomly-generated " n o i s e . " However,
the c o n s i s t e n t l y high R's n e c e s s i t a t e t h a t I at l e a s t s p e c u l a t e about h i s t o r i c a l , i f not t h e o r e t i c a l , reasons t h a t might account f o r the numerous d i s c r e p a n c i e s between our l a t e s t f i n d i n g s and the r e l a t i o n s h i p s that I p o s t u l a t e d i n Chapter One. A g a i n , I wish to make i t c l e a r that I am assuming i n the e x p l i c a t i o n below t h a t the v a r i a b l e s w i t h the l a r g e s t p r o b i t c o e f f i c i e n t s g e n e r a l l y account f o r the most unique "var iance" i n the outcome v a r i a b l e and have s igns t h a t a c c u r a t e l y r e f l e c t the d i r e c t i o n of t h e i r a s s o c i a t i o n s (see Table 1 6 ) , but the reader i s c a u t i o n e d about the tenuous nature of t h i s assumption.
The f i r s t i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e — c h a n g e i n p o w e r — i s
h y p o t h e s i z e d to be p o s i t i v e l y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h involvement i n
m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s . Although we f i n d t h a t t h i s hypothesized
r e l a t i o n s h i p i s g e n e r a l l y supported by the b i s e r i a l c o r r e l a t i o n s ,
we d i s c o v e r that the p a r t i a l ( p r o b i t ) c o e f f i c i e n t s f o r the
U n i t e d S t a t e s , B r i t a i n , F r a n c e , and, to a l e s s e r e x t e n t , the
S o v i e t Union are n e g a t i v e , i . e . , c o n t r o l l i n g f o r the o t h e r
i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s , these s t a t e s are more c o n f l i c t - p r o n e when
140
t h e i r power c a p a b i l i t i e s are d e c r e a s i n g . This does not appear
to be a s s o c i a t e d wi th any s y s t e m a t i c d i f f e r e n c e between the
n a t i o n a l power scores f o r these s t a t e s and the scores f o r the
o t h e r major powers. What, t h e n , do the f o u r aforementioned
s t a t e s have in common that might account f o r the s i g n r e v e r s a l s ?
I would contend t h a t , f o r most of the y e a r s d u r i n g the t w e n t i e t h
c e n t u r y i n which they are i n our data s e t , the US, UK, F r a n c e ,
a n d , to a l e s s e r e x t e n t , Russia/USSR are s t a t u s quo powers.
By t h i s I mean that they have f a i r l y c l e a r l y d e f i n e d spheres
of i n f l u e n c e and are more or l e s s s a t i s f i e d w i t h the e x i s t i n g
demarcations of these boundar ies. I would p o s t u l a t e t h a t
s t a t u s quo powers perceive t h e i r p r e f e r e n t i a l p o s i t i o n s to be
t h r e a t e n e d when t h e i r r e l a t i v e c a p a b i l i t i e s d e c l i n e and,
under such c i r c u m s t a n c e s , b e l l i c o s e b e h a v i o r becomes a mechanism
f o r warning a d v e r s a r i e s and u n d e r l i n g s about the dangers of
adventurous p o l i c i e s . I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note t h a t , i n the
t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y , the three s t a t e s — A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y , J a p a n ,
and, to a l e s s e r e x t e n t , I t a l y — t h a t e x h i b i t the p o s i t e d p o s i t i v e
a s s o c i a t i o n are a l l " d i s s a t i s f i e d " powers. Both Japan and I t a l y
openly pursue e x p a n s i o n i s t p o l i c i e s i n d e f i a n c e of the s t a t u s quo
powers; and A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y , which i s i n our data set f o r only
a very few y e a r s , can a c c u r a t e l y be d e s c r i b e d d u r i n g these years
1 S i n g e r and Small (1974) f i n d , when l o o k i n g at wars between major powers, t h a t the United S t a t e s i s d e c l i n i n g i n power p r i o r to each of i t s involvements. This f i n d i n g , however, i s based upon only t h r e e war exper iences (WW I, WW I I , and the Korean).
141
as d i s s a t i s f i e d wi th e x i s t i n g spheres of i n f l u e n c e and i n t e n t on
r e a s s e r t i n g her c o n t r o l over the B a l k a n s . In s h o r t , the e f f e c t of
changes i n power on c o n f l i c t behavior may w e l l depend on whether
or not a n a t i o n i s a s t a t u s quo power.
The second i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e — p r i o r war e x p e r i e n c e —
was o r i g i n a l l y hypothesized to be n e g a t i v e l y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h
involvement in m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s , but most of the b i s e r i a l
c o r r e l a t i o n s and p r o b i t c o e f f i c i e n t s f o r the t w e n t i e t h century
are p o s i t i v e . This leads me to surmise t h a t f o r these s t a t e s
( i n p a r t i c u l a r France and C h i n a , but a l s o the U n i t e d S t a t e s ,
B r i t a i n , and I t a l y ) war l o s s e s are not s u f f i c i e n t l y severe to
outweigh perceived gains from m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n . In f a c t ,
i t i s to be argued t h a t , f o r these s t a t e s , wars a c t u a l l y serve
to enhance the b e l i e f that m i l i t a r y f o r c e i s a u s e f u l means of
o b t a i n i n g one's ends. What we appear to have i s o l a t e d are the
v i c t o r s ( o r , at l e a s t , the undefeated p r o t a g o n i s t s ) of l a r g e wars.
A l l these s t a t e s a l s o become i n v o l v e d i n the use of m i l i t a r y f o r c e
to p r e s e r v e o r d e r , or to e n f o r c e c l a i m s , s h o r t l y a f t e r the
c e s s a t i o n of major wars. On the o t h e r hand, the three s t a t e s
— G e r m a n y , the S o v i e t U n i o n , and J a p a n — t h a t d i s p l a y the p o s i t e d
1 The a t t e n t i v e reader may have boggled a t the d i f f e r e n c e between the z e r o - o r d e r b i s e r i a l c o r r e l a t i o n (Table 15) and the p a r t i a l c o e f f i c i e n t (Table 17) f o r p r i o r German war e x p e r i e n c e when p r e d i c t i n g IMC involvement. The f i g u r e s below should demonstrate the importance of the war e x p e r i e n c e v a r i a b l e , as w e l l as the extent to which the c o e f f i c i e n t f o r the h i g h l y c o l l i n e a r p o l a r i t y v a r i a b l e i s i n c r e a s e d when war e x p e r i e n c e i s omit ted from a run. On the r i g h t i s presented the i n t e r c o r r e l a t i o n
142
n e g a t i v e a s s o c i a t i o n between war e x p e r i e n c e and involvement i n
subsequent c o n f r o n t a t i o n s are a l l c o u n t r i e s t h a t are denied
t a n g i b l e gains and/or s u f f e r c a t a s t r o p h i c l o s s e s as a r e s u l t
of p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n l a r g e - s c a l e wars. C o n c o m i t a n t l y , f o r e i g n
o c c u p a t i o n (Germany a f t e r WW I ) , c i v i l war (USSR a f t e r WW I ) ,
and m i l i t a r y and economic e x h a u s t i o n (Japan a f t e r Russo-Japanese)
o f t e n make i t i m p o s s i b l e f o r these s t a t e s to engage i n renewed
h o s t i l i t i e s . I t i s , t h e r e f o r e , not too u n l i k e l y that these
two s e t s of s t a t e s have very d i f f e r e n t c o n c e p t i o n s about the
u s e f u l n e s s of m i l i t a r y f o r c e — t h e former p e r c e i v i n g t h a t the
m a t r i x a n d , on the l e f t , the s t a n d a r d i z e d p r o b i t c o e f f i c i e n t s f o r the f o u r i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s when p r e d i c t i n g German involvement i n m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s (no time lag) d u r i n g the t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y . J u s t as i n Table 16, the p r o b i t c o e f f i c i e n t s f o r the " c o m p l e t e l y - s p e c i f i e d " model (see Germany, Table 17) are given i n the f i r s t row, w h i l e , i n each subsequent row, one i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e i s a l t e r n a t e l y o m i t t e d . When ( i n row three) war exper ience i s o m i t t e d , the R̂ d e c l i n e s p r e c i p i t o u s l y , y e t , at the same t i m e , the c o e f f i c i e n t f o r the h i g h l y c o r r e l a t e d p o l a r i t y i n d i c a t o r d r a m a t i c a l l y i n c r e a s e s . The d e c l i n e i n the R̂ i l l u s t r a t e s the importance of the war e x p e r i e n c e v a r i a b l e . The i n c r e a s e i n the p o l a r i t y c o e f f i c i e n t i s due to the f a c t t h a t , i n row t h r e e , the c o e f f i c i e n t r e f l e c t s both the "explanatory power" unique to p o l a r i t y and t h a t shared j o i n t l y w i t h the omitted war e x p e r i e n c e v a r i a b l e .
A Power War Exp. P o l a r . X-Cut .
00(00) -101(84) -02(02) 00(00) -101(84) -02(02) 00(00)
-06(22) 62(34) 13(22) -00(01) -100(142) 01(01) -00(00) -101(113) -02(02)
A 0
99 99 42 99 99'
A War 3ower Exp
War Exp. -lT^ P o l a r . -02 - 6 2 X - C u t . -11 20 IMC -11 - 3 5
Po- X-
(NOTE: A l l c o e f f i c i e n t s have been m u l t i p l i e d by one hundred so as to e l i m i n a t e decimal p o i n t s . Two a s t e r i s k s (**) denote " s i g n i f i c a n t at the .05 l e v e l . " )
143
f r u i t s of combat may w e l l outweigh p o s s i b l e l o s s e s , the l a t t e r
having much lower e x p e c t a t i o n s concerning the u t i l i t y of f o r c e .
The t h i r d i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e — p o l a r i t y — i s p o s i t e d
to be p o s i t i v e l y r e l a t e d to involvement i n c o n f r o n t a t i o n s , and
t h i s hypothesized r e l a t i o n s h i p i s s t r o n g l y supported by the d a t a .
There are some s ign r e v e r s a l s w i t h the b i s e r i a l s , but the p a r t i a l
c o e f f i c i e n t s c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e a p o s i t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p f o r most
major powers. There a r e , however, two e x c e p t i o n s to t h i s f i n d i n g
— A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y and J a p a n — a l t h o u g h f o r n e i t h e r of these s t a t e s
i s p o l a r i t y a very important i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e . The s i g n
r e v e r s a l f o r A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y i s somewhat m i s l e a d i n g , being
accounted f o r by a s h i f t i n p o l a r i t y of o n l y f o u r percent d u r i n g
the f o u r t e e n years i n which she i s a major power; t h a t f o r Japan
i s more complex. I would argue t h a t , u n l i k e the o t h e r major powers,
Japan p e r c e i v e s h e r s e l f to be excluded from the a l l i a n c e network
d u r i n g most of her years as a major power. When the system i s
h i g h l y p o l a r i z e d , Japan's i n t e r a c t i o n o p p o r t u n i t i e s are n o t ,
as p o s i t e d f o r other s t a t e s , s e v e r e l y r e d u c e d ; i n d e e d , Japan's
c o o p e r a t i o n i s a c t i v e l y pursued by the competing a l l i a n c e s . When
the system i s l e s s p o l a r i z e d , Japan has somewhat more numerous
i n t e r a c t i o n o p p o r t u n i t i e s , b u t , at the same t i m e , her support i s
l e s s v i g o r o u s l y sought. I t may be hypothesized t h a t , under such
c i r c u m s t a n c e s , Japan employs demonstrat ions of f o r c e to "prop up"
her sagging p r e s t i g e , an a c t i o n not needed when she i s being
"courted" i n the b i - p o l a r w o r l d .
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F i n a l l y , the c o e f f i c i e n t s f o r the f o u r t h i n t e r v e n i n g
v a r i a b l e — c r o s s - c u t t i n g — d o n o t , f o r the most p a r t , support
the h y p o t h e s i z e d negative a s s o c i a t i o n p o s i t e d i n the model.
Even the United S t a t e s , which e x h i b i t s n e g a t i v e b i s e r i a l
c o r r e l a t i o n s , has p o s i t i v e p a r t i a l c o e f f i c i e n t s . (The three
major p o w e r s — A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y , I t a l y , and the S o v i e t Union —
t h a t d i s p l a y the p o s i t e d negat ive p a r t i a l s a l s o have l a r g e
s t a n d a r d e r r o r s , suggest ing t h a t these c o e f f i c i e n t s are probably
not s t a b l e . ) The repeated ev idence s u p p o r t i n g a p o s i t i v e
r e l a t i o n s h i p between the c r o s s - c u t t i n g i n d i c a t o r and the outcome
v a r i a b l e suggests two p o s s i b l e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . One i s t h a t
major powers are s imply not c r o s s - p r e s s u r e d . As e x p l a i n e d in
Chapter Two, the c r o s s - c u t t i n g i n d i c a t o r ranges from - 1 . 0 (no
c r o s s - c u t t i n g bonds) to +1.0 ( c o m p l e t e l y c r o s s - c u t bonds) .
However, d e s c r i p t i v e s t a t i s t i c s r e v e a l t h a t the mean c r o s s -
c u t t i n g score f o r a major power, r e g a r d l e s s of time l a g , i s
n e a r l y always n e g a t i v e — t h e h i g h e s t mean score being +.03.
What we seem to be tapping i n the t w e n t i e t h century i s the
p r o p o r t i o n of m i l i t a r y a l l i e s w i t h which a major power t r a d e s .
That i s , the s t a t e s w i t h the h i g h e s t c r o s s - c u t t i n g scores t u r n out
to be those t h a t do not trade ( h e a v i l y ) w i t h a l l t h e i r major power
a l l i e s , r a t h e r than those t h a t have d i s t i n c t l y d i f f e r e n t s e t s of
t rade and a l l i a n c e p a r t n e r s . Thus, i t may be argued t h a t these
s t a t e s (having the h ighest c r o s s - c u t t i n g s c o r e s ) are not more
c r o s s - p r e s s u r e d , but s imply l e s s r e i n f o r c e d and, c o n s e q u e n t l y ,
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the c r o s s - c u t t i n g hypothesis may not be r e l e v a n t . The other
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s that our measure of c r o s s - c u t t i n g i s q u i t e
s a t i s f a c t o r y , but that our hypothesis i s i n c o r r e c t . That i s
to s a y , w h i l e s t a t e s that have more c r o s s - c u t bonds are
more c r o s s - p r e s s u r e d , c r o s s - p r e s s u r e s may not m i t i g a t e c o n f l i c t s .
I t may be argued that c r o s s - p r e s s u r e s produce t e n s i o n and
u n c e r t a i n t y , and thereby exacerbate p o t e n t i a l l y c o n f l i c t f u l
s i t u a t i o n s .
Having suggested i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s f o r the unexpected
e f f e c t s of some of our i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s , we are brought to
the second of the two issues r a i s e d at the b e g i n n i n g of t h i s
s e c t i o n — the one concerning the importance of s t a t u s
i n c o n s i s t e n c y i n the t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y . In p a r t i c u l a r , to what
e x t e n t do the r e s u l t s from the p r o b i t runs on the subset of
underrecognized cases d i f f e r from the runs on a l l t w e n t i e t h
c e n t u r y cases f o r a given major power? S i n c e , as we have noted
(and not w i t h s t a n d i n g the preceding i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s ) , the
s t a n d a r d i z e d p r o b i t c o e f f i c i e n t s f o r the t w e n t i e t h century
may be u n r e l i a b l e guides to s i g n i f i c a n t changes, i . e . , they may
be i n e f f i c i e n t e s t i m a t o r s , we w i l l r e l y upon the R s and Ps to
address t h i s q u e s t i o n .
Somewhat o v e r s t a t i n g our answer, I would say t h a t the
ev idence f o r the t w e n t i e t h century demonstrates t h a t we can more
a c c u r a t e l y p r e d i c t the years i n which a major power w i l l engage
in m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s i f we know t h a t i t i s underrecognized
146
than we can i f we d i d not know. Put another way, the m e d i a t i n g
e f f e c t s o f the i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s are g r e a t e r f o r most major
powers when they are underrecognized and, by e x t e n s i o n from our
model , are g r e a t e r when they are prone to c o n f r o n t a t i o n . More
s p e c i f i c a l l y , there are two major powers — the U n i t e d S t a t e s and A?
China — t h a t d i s p l a y dramatic i n c r e a s e s i n R s and Ps when we
s t r a t i f y by s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y . The Uni ted S t a t e s , which was
e a r l i e r shown to have e i g h t y - s e v e n percent of i t s c o n f l i c t s w h i l e
underrecognized (Table 8 ) , now appears to be a f f e c t e d by the
i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s only when i t i s s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t .
S i m i l a r l y , C h i n a , a major power f o r which we were unable to
i d e n t i f y a c o n s i s t e n t b i v a r i a t e a s s o c i a t i o n between u n d e r r e c o g n i t i o n
and m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n , a l s o appears to have q u i t e p r e d i c t a b l e
c o n f l i c t behavior when s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t . For t h r e e o t h e r s t a t e s
— B r i t a i n , France, and the S o v i e t U n i o n — w e appear to have more
p r e d i c t a b l e behavior when they are s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t , but perhaps
not s i g n i f i c a n t l y so. B r i t a i n and the S o v i e t Union both e x h i b i t
moderate R s f o r t h e i r t o t a l y e a r s i n the t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y major
power subsystem. When lags are i n t r o d u c e d f o r underrecognized A 2
B r i t a i n , we get c o n s i d e r a b l y improved R~s and P s ; and f o r the
S o v i e t U n i o n , wi th a l a g of t h r e e y e a r s , we a l s o get h e f t y i n c r e a s e s .
For F r a n c e , we have a r a t h e r s i z a b l e f i t f o r a l l f i f t y - n i n e major
power y e a r s , yet o b t a i n s t i l l g r e a t e r p r e d i c t i v e power when we
examine o n l y her s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t y e a r s . However, f o r a l l three
c o u n t r i e s , the improvements i n R s and Ps are probably not
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s u f f i c i e n t l y l a r g e to warrant a statement t h a t the subsets of
underrecognized cases a r e , w i t h c e r t a i n t y , d i f f e r e n t from the
s e t of a l l y e a r s — o u r i n a b i l i t y to determine whether the
d i f f e r e n c e s are s i g n i f i c a n t being a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the f a c t
t h a t the d i s t r i b u t i o n of the R s t a t i s t i c i s unknown.
The f i n d i n g s f o r Japan c o n t r a d i c t the statement t h a t
we can more a c c u r a t e l y p r e d i c t the years i n which a major power
w i l l engage i n m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n i f we know t h a t i t i s
s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t , f o r we can p r e d i c t Japanese c o n f l i c t
b e h a v i o r e q u a l l y w e l l f o r a l l years i n which she i s i n our data
s e t . T h i s , however, should be expected s i n c e Japan i s s t a t u s
i n c o n s i s t e n t i n f o r t y - o n e of the f o r t y - f i v e years d u r i n g which
she i s a major power. We a r e , t h e r e f o r e , r e a l l y o n l y examining
underrecogni zed J a p a n — a n d , f o r under r ecogniz ed J a p a n , our model
produces s i z a b l e f i t s to the d a t a .
F i n a l l y , there are three s t a t e s — G e r m a n y , A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y ,
and I t a l y — t h a t are too i n f r e q u e n t l y i n v o l v e d i n m i l i t a r y
c o n f r o n t a t i o n when s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t f o r the p r o b i t a l g o r i t h m
to converge on a s o l u t i o n . A l l three have weak, n e g a t i v e b i v a r i a t e
r e l a t i o n s h i p s between s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y and c o n f r o n t a t i o n when
there i s no time l a g (Table 9 ) , a l t h o u g h Germany and I t a l y have
p o s i t i v e a s s o c i a t i o n s when l a g s are i n t r o d u c e d . S i n c e we have
too few cases to make the comparisons between under r ecogniz ed years
and a l l years f o r these s t a t e s (and, hence, should pr obably say
that the d i f f e r e n c e i s u n i m p o r t a n t ) , I s h a l l only comment t h a t the
148
i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s produce s i g n i f i c a n t R s f o r Germany and
A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y , but are l e s s powerful f o r I t a l y .
Examining the "Residuals"
Before summarizing the r e s u l t s f o r the t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y ,
l e t us again b r i e f l y examine the " r e s i d u a l s " — a s we d i d f o r the
n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y — t o d i s c o v e r whether our model i s p r e d i c t i n g
d i f f e r e n t i a l l y f o r var ious l e v e l s or types of c o n f l i c t s . We
d i s c o v e r , when we look at Table 18, t h a t i t i s n o t . We do not
s y s t e m a t i c a l l y p r e d i c t b e t t e r f o r war-years than f o r m i l i t a r y
a c t i o n - or t h r e a t - y e a r s . Nor do we p r e d i c t major power/
major power c o n f l i c t s more a c c u r a t e l y than major power/
minor power c o n f l i c t s . Although there are some d i f f e r e n c e s
from country to c o u n t r y , there i s n o t h i n g t h a t I would be w i l l i n g
to c a l l a p a t t e r n .
Summarizing the Twentieth-Century F i n d i n g s
We have found i t r a t h e r d i f f i c u l t to i n t e r p r e t the
f i n d i n g s f o r the t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y . For a l though we d i s c o v e r e d
t h a t each of the i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s accounts f o r some "unique
v a r i a n c e " i n the involvement of major powers i n m i l i t a r y
c o n f r o n t a t i o n s and t h a t the e n t i r e set of v a r i a b l e s , i n c o n j u n c t i o n
w i t h our measure of s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y , p r o v i d e s us w i t h
c o n s i d e r a b l e p r e d i c t i v e power, the d i r e c t i o n s of the a s s o c i a t i o n s
between the mediat ing and outcome v a r i a b l e s are o f t e n d i f f e r e n t
than those p o s i t e d i n Chapter One. Consequent ly , I have suggested
TABLE 18
NUMBER OF CONFLICT-YEARS INVOLVING MAJOR POWERS AND THE PROPORTION OF THESE CONFLICT-YEARS THAT IS CORRECTLY PREDICTED BY THE PROBIT EQUATION, FOR THE 20th CENTURY (ONE- TO THREE-YEAR TIME LAGS)
Nation Lag P a r t i c i pate Initiate
Level of Conflict Type of C o n f 1 i c t Level of C o n f l i c t Type of C o n f l i c t
N War N M i l . N Thr't N Maj/ N Maj/ N War N M i l . I N Thr't N Maj/ N Maj/ A c t . M a j . M i n . A c t . M a j . M i n .
USA 0 2 .00 2 .00 4 .00 5 .00 3 .00 1 .00 2 .00 4 .00 4 .00 3 .00 0 2 .00 2 .00 3 1.00 5 .60 2 .00 1 .00 2 .00 3 1 .00 4 .75 2 .00
under- -1 1 .00 1 , .00 3 .67 4 .50 1 .00 1 .00 1 .00 3 .67 4 .50 1 .00 r e c o g . -2 1 .00 1 .00 2 .50 3 .33 1 .00 1 .00 1 .00 2 .50 3 .33 1 .00
. - 3 1 .00 0 3 .67 3 .67 1 .00 1 .00 0 3 .67 3 .67 1 .00
UK 0 1 .00 11 .18 5 .20 1 .00 16 .19 1 .00 8 .25 5 .20 1 .00 13 .23 0 1 .00 2 .50 2 .00 1 .00 4 .25 1 .00 2 .50 2 .00 1 .00 4 .25
under- -1 0 5 .80 2 .00 1 .00 6 .67 0 3 .67 2 .50 1 .00 4 .75 recog. -2 0 3 .67 3 .67 1 1.00 5 .60 0 3 .67 3 .67 1 1 .00 5 .60 recog.
. - 3 0 1 .00 3 .67 0 4 .50 0 1 .00 3 .67 0 4 .50
FRN 0 ! .00 9 .33 1 .00 0 11 .27 ] .00 8 .38 1 1 .00 0 10 .40 0 1 .00 5 .40 0 0 6 .33 1 .00 4 .50 0 0 5 .40
under- -1 1 .00 3 1 .00 1 1.00 0 5 .80 1 .00 3 1 .00 1 1.00 0 5 .80 r e c o g . -2 1 .00 5 .80 1 1.00 0 7 .71 1 .00 4 .75 1 1.00 0 6 .67
. - 3 .00 5 .60 1 1.00 0 7 .57 1 .00 4 .50 1 1.00 0 6 .50
GMY 0 4 .50 2 .00 1 .00 5 .40 0 4 .50 2 .00 1 .00 5 .40
TABLE 1 8 - - - C o n t i n u e d
Nat ion Lag P a r t i c i pate I n i t i a t e
Level of Conflict Type of Conflict Level of Conflict Type of Conflict
N War N M i l . N Thr't N Maj/ N Maj/ N War N M i l . N Thr't N Maj/ I n Maj/ A c t . Maj . Mi n. A c t . M a j . i Mi n.
A-H 0 0 3 .67 2 .50 0 5 .60 0 3 .67 1 .00 0 i
.50
ITA 0 2 .50 7 .29 2 1 .00 0 11 .45 2 .50 6 .33 3 .67 0 h i i
.45
USR 0 2 .50 9 .11 6 .17 7 .29 10 .10 1 1 .00 7 .14 6 .17 4 .50 1 10 .10 r o 2 .50 5 .20 6 .50 6 .33 7 .43 1 1 .00 4 .00 6 .67 4 .75 7 .29
under- -1 2 1 .00 5 .40 6 .83 6 .50 7 .86 1 1 .00 4 .25 6 33 4 .50 7 .29 r e c o g . -2 2 1 .00 4 .50 6 .67 6 .50 6 .83 1 1 .00 3 .33 6 50 4 .50 6 .50
. - 3 1 .00 1 1 .00 5 .40 3 .33 4 .50 0 1 1 .00 5 40 2 .50 4 .50
CHN 0 2 .50 6 .33 1 .00 2 .50 7 .29 2 .50 6 .33 1 .00 2 .50 7 .29 under- [ o 1 1 .00 3 .67 1 1.00 2 .50 3 1.00 1 1 .00 3 .67 1 1 00 2 .50 3 1.00
JPN 0 3 .67 3 .00 0 2 .50 4 .25 3 .67 3 .00 0 2 .50 4 .25 0 2 .00 3 .33 0 1 .00 4 .25 2 .00 3 .33 0 1 .00 4 .25
under- -1 3 .67 2 .00 0 2 .50 3 .33 3 .67 2 .00 0 2 .50 3 .33 r e c o g . -2 3 .67 2 .00 0 2 .50 3 .33 3 .67 2 .00 0 2 .50 3 .33
. - 3 3 .67 2 .00 0 2 .50 3 .33 3 .67 2 .00 0 2 .50 3 .33
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s e v e r a l f a c t o r s — i n c l u d i n g s t a t u s quo f o r e i g n p o l i c i e s , v i c t o r i e s
i n major wars, and perceived e x c l u s i o n from i n t e r n a t i o n a l
a l i g n m e n t s — that might " e x p l a i n " these d i s c r e p a n c i e s . We have
d i s c o v e r e d that the s t r o n g e s t evidence l i n k i n g u n d e r r e c o g n i t i o n ,
i n the presence of c e r t a i n c o n t e x t u a l v a r i a b l e s , to involvement
i n m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s i s found f o r the United S t a t e s and
C h i n a ; t h i s connect ion a l s o tends to e x i s t f o r B r i t a i n , F r a n c e ,
the S o v i e t Union, and Japan. And f u r t h e r m o r e , the r e l a t i o n s h i p
i s best supported when a t h r e e - y e a r time l a g i s i n t r o d u c e d .
F i n a l l y , there does not appear to be much d i f f e r e n c e between
our a b i l i t y to p r e d i c t p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n c o n f r o n t a t i o n s and our
a b i l i t y to f o r e c a s t the i n i t i a t i o n of c o n f r o n t a t i o n s ; nor do we
more a c c u r a t e l y f o r e c a s t war-years than m i l i t a r y a c t i o n - or
t h r e a t - y e a r s , or c o n f r o n t a t i o n s w i t h major powers more a c c u r a t e l y
than those w i t h minor powers.
CHAPTER V
FROM MILITARY CONFRONTATION TO INTERSTATE WAR
Having examined the f i r s t stage of the m o d e l — a n d having
d i s c o v e r e d a l a r g e number of d i s c r e p a n c i e s 'between what the
l i t e r a t u r e suggests and the data r e v e a l — w e turn our a t t e n t i o n
to the second s t a g e . Here the u n i t of a n a l y s i s becomes the
c o n f l i c t , r a t h e r than the year , and we focus upon dyadic
r e l a t i o n s h i p s . We have a p o p u l a t i o n of c o n f r o n t a t i o n s ; some
e v e n t u a t i n g in war, and others not . We are i n t e r e s t e d i n knowing
whether we can a c c u r a t e l y p r e d i c t which i n t e r s t a t e m i l i t a r y
c o n f r o n t a t i o n s (IMCs) w i l l e s c a l a t e i n t o these more severe and
s u s t a i n e d c o n f l a g r a t i o n s .
In Chapter One i t i s argued t h a t the same i n t e r v e n i n g
v a r i a b l e s t h a t account f o r changes i n the p r o b a b i l i t y of a
c o n f r o n t a t i o n o c c u r r i n g a l s o l a r g e l y account f o r the e s c a l a t i o n
of m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s i n t o f u l l - s c a l e wars. However,
r a t h e r than viewing these v a r i a b l e s as a t t r i b u t e s of n a t i o n s ,
it i s necessary to now see them as p r o p e r t i e s of c o n f l i c t i n g dyads.
Thus, i t i s hypothesized that the g r e a t e r the d i s c r e p a n c y between
the n a t i o n a l power of opposing p a r t i e s , the J e s s the l i k e l i h o o d
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153
that the c o n f r o n t a t i o n w i l l e rupt i n t o war. C o n c o m i t a n t l y ,
s i n c e the o p p o r t u n i t y to employ l a r g e - s c a l e m i l i t a r y f o r c e i s
g r e a t e s t when c o u n t r i e s are cont iguous to one a n o t h e r , non-
n e i g h b o r i n g opponents are l e s s l i k e l y to become i n v o l v e d i n war,
w h i l e cont iguous s t a t e s are more l i k e l y . A t h i r d f a c t o r i n the
p o s i t e d c o n f l i c t s p i r a l i s past e x p e r i e n c e , and i t i s hypothesized
i n Chapter One t h a t the g r e a t e r the j o i n t s u f f e r i n g of the p a r t i e s
i n p r i o r war encounters ( r e g a r d l e s s of the i d e n t i t y of t h e i r
o p p o n e n t s ) , the less probable i t w i l l be that they w i l l push
c u r r e n t c o n f r o n t a t i o n to open w a r f a r e . F i n a l l y , the s t r u c t u r a l
i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s among the component u n i t s are important.. The
g r e a t e r the b i - p o l a r i t y of the major power subsystem, the more
l i k e l y the occurrence of war; b u t , i f the opponents are major trade
p a r t n e r s or m i l i t a r y a l l i e s , the p r o b a b i l i t y of war i s reduced.
S c h e m a t i c a l l y , the second stage appears as below:
i n t e r s t a t e m i l i t a r y
c o n f r o n t a t i o n s
TRADE* & ALLIANCES
i n t e r s t a t e wars
*used only i n 20th century runs (not measured p r i o r to 1879)
+ = i n c r e a s e s l i k e l i h o o d of IMC - = decreases l i k e l i h o o d of INC
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The procedures f o r the b a s i c index c o n s t r u c t i o n of the
i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s are d e t a i l e d i n Chapter Two and i t would
be redundant to r e i t e r a t e them here. I t s h a l l s u f f i c e f o r me
to o u t l i n e the manner by which these measures of n a t i o n a l
a t t r i b u t e s are converted i n t o i n d i c a t o r s of dyadic r e l a t i o n s h i p s .
F i r s t , the i n d i c a t o r of d i f f e r e n c e s i n n a t i o n a l power
c a p a b i l i t i e s between opposing s t a t e s (PWRDIF) i s formulated as
a s i m p l e dichotomy. This i s necessary because we used data f o r
o n l y the major powers when we computed power c a p a b i l i t y scores
i n Chapter Two. As a r e s u l t , we do not have scores f o r non-major
powers. We c a n , however, make a s i m p l i f y i n g assumption t h a t
major powers are more or l e s s equal to one another i n terms of
power c a p a b i l i t i e s , but t h a t they are c o n s i d e r a b l y more powerful
than o t h e r s t a t e s . Thus, i f a m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n i s between
two major powers, PWRDIF i s scored "zero"; i f between a major and
minor power, i t i s scored "one." I t should be r e c o g n i z e d , however,
t h a t w h i l e t h i s dichotomous i n d i c a t o r r e f l e c t s d i f f e r e n c e s i n power,
i t a l s o taps a host of other d i f f e r e n c e s between major and non-major
powers, e . g . , the g r e a t e r number and d i v e r s i t y of major power
i n t e r a c t i o n s , the s y s t e m a t i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t treatment of major powers
by o t h e r s t a t e s , the d i f f e r e n t p e r c e p t i o n s of d e c i s i o n makers
c o n c e r n i n g the r o l e and a b i l i t y of major powers, the use of major
power languages as i n t e r n a t i o n a l languages and major power
c u r r e n c i e s as i n t e r n a t i o n a l c u r r e n c i e s , the l a r g e c o n c e n t r a t i o n of
home o f f i c e s of m u l t i n a t i o n a l c o r p o r a t i o n s i n major powers, and the
155
p r e f e r e n t i a l vot ing s t r u c t u r e i n most u n i v e r s a l i n t e r n a t i o n a l
governmental o r g a n i z a t i o n s t h a t accords g r e a t e r weight to
major power v o t e s . While d i f f e r e n c e s i n n a t i o n a l c a p a b i l i t y
are probably the most fundamental d i s t i n c t i o n between major
and non-major powers, and w h i l e I w i l l c o n t i n u e to l a b e l the
i n d i c a t o r "PWRDIF," the reader would do w e l l to keep i n mind
the assortment of d i f f e r e n c e s housed under t h i s r u b r i c .
The i n d i c a t o r of the second v a r i a b l e — c o n t i g u i t y —
i s a l s o dichotomously scored and, as o u t l i n e d i n Chapter Two,
r e f l e c t s common land boundaries and o v e r l a p p i n g t e r r i t o r i a l
w a t e r s . The i n d i c a t o r of the t h i r d v a r i a b l e — p r i o r war
e x p e r i e n c e - - - i s simply the sum of the b a t t l e deaths per m i l l i o n
p o p u l a t i o n (modif ied by the i n v e r s e l o g i s t i c decay f u n c t i o n ) of
the opposing s t a t e s . The i n d i c a t o r of system b i - p o l a r i t y i s the
same as t h a t used i n the p r e c e d i n g c h a p t e r s . And f i n a l l y , t rade
and a l l i a n c e s are dichotomous i n d i c a t o r s , measured as d e t a i l e d
in Chapter Two. In the c u r r e n t c h a p t e r , we are i n t e r e s t e d i n
whether the s t a t e s i n c o n f l i c t are major t rade p a r t n e r s or
have mutual defense pacts w i t h one a n o t h e r .
The primary problem a s s o c i a t e d w i t h these r u l e s f o r
i n d i c a t o r c o n s t r u c t i o n i s t h a t they assume t h a t a l l c o n f r o n t a t i o n s
are s t r i c t l y d y a d i c . But , s i n c e t h i r t y percent of the i n t e r s t a t e
m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s (IMCs) i n the c u r r e n t data s e t i n v o l v e
more than one s t a t e on a g iven s i d e , a r u l e had to be adopted
In o r d e r to i n c l u d e these cases i n the a n a l y s e s . I decided to
156
t r e a t these "n-nat ion" c o n f r o n t a t i o n s as a set of dyadic encounters
between each major power i n v o l v e d i n the IMC and the s t a t e on the
opposing s i d e that would maximize the e f f e c t of a p a r t i c u l a r
v a r i a b l e . This coding r u l e r e f l e c t s my hunch that n a t i o n a l
d e c i s i o n makers, l i k e p o l i t i c a l r e s e a r c h e r s , do not have an
adequate c a l c u l u s f o r aggregat ing the a t t r i b u t e s of t h e i r opponents.
They are t h e r e f o r e l i k e l y to make "worst case" e s t i m a t e s on a
d y a d i c b a s i s . That i s , i f any of t h e i r opponents are c o n t i g u o u s ,
the most l i k e l y s i t e f o r an a t t a c k i s from or a g a i n s t the
c o n t i g u o u s a d v e r s a r y ; i f any opponent i s more p o w e r f u l , then t h a t
a d v e r s a r y i s most f e a r e d ; i f any opponent i s an a l l y , then the
g r e a t e s t t h r e a t to the a l l i a n c e i s a c o n f l i c t w i t h t h a t a d v e r s a r y ;
and so f o r t h . In a d d i t i o n , the d e c i s i o n to maximize the e f f e c t s
o f the i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s means t h a t each major power i s
i n c l u d e d only once i n each n - n a t i o n IMC a n d , t h e r e f o r e , the
importance of n-nat ion c o n f r o n t a t i o n s i s not a r t i f i c i a l l y i n f l a t e d
as i t might be i f a s t r a t e g y was adopted such as i n c l u d i n g a l l
p o s s i b l e c o n f l i c t dyads that c o n t a i n at l e a s t one major power
member. Thus, a c c o r d i n g to the "maximizing" d e c i s i o n r u l e , a major
power i s coded as p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n a major/major c o n f r o n t a t i o n
i f any s t a t e i n the opposing c o a l i t i o n i s a l s o a major power.
S i m i l a r l y , i f any s t a t e in the opposing c o a l i t i o n i s cont iguous
to a p a r t i c i p a t i n g major power, then the major power i s r e p o r t e d
to be i n a c o n f r o n t a t i o n w i t h a cont iguous c o u n t r y . The war
e x p e r i e n c e score i s computed as the sum of the war e x p e r i e n c e
157
of a g i v e n major power and the s t a t e i n the opposing c o a l i t i o n
having the most severe war e x p e r i e n c e . And a major power i s
s a i d to be i n a c o n f r o n t a t i o n w i t h a t r a d e p a r t n e r or a l l y
i f i t has t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h any s t a t e i n the opposing
c o a l i t i o n . The b i - p o l a r i t y i n d i c a t o r i s , of c o u r s e , u n a f f e c t e d
by n - n a t i o n c o n f r o n t a t i o n s .
The d e c i s i o n to t r e a t these c o a l i t i o n IMCs as a s e t of
d y a d i c d i s p u t e s does no v i o l e n c e to the a n a l y t i c r e s u l t s f o r
the n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y ; a r e - a n a l y s i s of the d a t a , o m i t t i n g
the n - n a t i o n c a s e s , does not produce any s i g n i f i c a n t changes.
In the t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y , however, o m i t t i n g n - n a t i o n c o n f r o n t a t i o n s
n e c e s s i t a t e s that we exclude the h o s t i l i t i e s t h a t e s c a l a t e i n t o
the two wor ld wars. These two c o n f l a g r a t i o n s i n c o r p o r a t e more
than h a l f of a l l t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y war dyads i n our data set
and an even l a r g e r p r o p o r t i o n o f the major power/major power
war dyads. T h e i r omission e l i m i n a t e s a l l German and a l l A u s t r o -
Hungarian war dyads, and reduces by a s i z a b l e amount the "variance"
i n the outcome v a r i a b l e f o r a l l o t h e r major powers. In s h o r t ,
s i n c e the wor ld wars exer t such an a p p r e c i a b l e i n f l u e n c e on the
t w e n t i e t h century r e l a t i o n s h i p s r e p o r t e d below, the d e c i s i o n to
t r e a t n - n a t i o n c o n f r o n t a t i o n s as a set of dyadic encounters has
more import f o r the l a t e r than f o r the e a r l i e r c e n t u r y .
The N i n e t e e n t h Century
The o b j e c t of the f o l l o w i n g data a n a l y s e s i s to a s c e r t a i n ,
for a l l c o n f l i c t dyads t h a t c o n t a i n at l e a s t one major power member,
158
whether or not the i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s — as they e x i s t at the
time of the c o n f r o n t a t i o n — s e r v e to enhance or c o n s t r a i n the
o c c u r r e n c e of war. For t h i s reason no time lags are i n t r o d u c e d .
P a r a l l e l analyses are undertaken on o v e r l a p p i n g sets of d a t a .
One data set i n c l u d e s the e n t i r e p o p u l a t i o n of c o n f l i c t dyads;
the o t h e r , only s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t dyads, i . e . , dyads i n which
at l e a s t one major power member i s s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t . In t h i s
manner, we s h a l l be able to determine (1) whether a p a r t i c u l a r
i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e a p p r e c i a b l y enhances our a b i l i t y to account
f o r the occurrence of war and (2) whether knowing t h a t the
c o n f l i c t dyad c o n t a i n s a s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t s t a t e i n c r e a s e s
our a b i l i t y to c o r r e c t l y p r e d i c t the outbreak of war. I t should
be remembered t h a t , in the model p o s t u l a t e d i n Chapter One,
i t i s p o s i t e d t h a t (1) a r e l a t i o n s h i p does e x i s t between
i n c o n s i s t e n c y and c o n f r o n t a t i o n , but t h a t (2) no d i r e c t a s s o c i a t i o n
e x i s t s between i n c o n s i s t e n c y and war.
We s h a l l cont inue to d i f f e r e n t i a t e between n i n e t e e n t h and
t w e n t i e t h century r e l a t i o n s h i p s and to examine the e f f e c t s of the
i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s s e p a r a t e l y f o r each major power. C o r r e l a t i o n a l
and p r o b i t techniques are employed as the primary modes o f data
a n a l y s i s . S ince there a r e , i n g e n e r a l , too few o b s e r v a t i o n s f o r
each n a t i o n to c a r r y out m u l t i v a r i a t e a n a l y s i s , we begin by
examining b i v a r i a t e a s s o c i a t i o n s .
159
The I n d i c a t o r s of Reachability
Let us look f i r s t a t the two dichotomously-measured
i n d i c a t o r s of r e a c h a b i l i t y ( d i f f e r e n c e i n power and presence of
c o n t i g u i t y ) to see whether or not they help us to account f o r
the outcome v a r i a b l e (no war/war). As a measure of the s t r e n g t h
o f a s s o c i a t i o n between the r e a c h a b i l i t y i n d i c a t o r s and the outcome
v a r i a b l e , I use the contingency t a b l e s t a t i s t i c Cramer's 0.
Phi i s a c h i - s q u a r e - b a s e d measure t h a t , i n the 2 x 2 t a b l e , i s
e q u i v a l e n t to the Pearson product moment c o e f f i c i e n t r (Hays, 1963).
TABLE 19
CRAMER'S PHI-SQUARE BETWEEN EACH MAJOR POWER'S WAR INVOLVEMENT AND THE TWO INDICATORS OF REACHABILITY,
FOR 19th CENTURY CONFLICT DYADS
A l l Dyads S t a t . Inc. Dyads
PwrDif Con t i g PwrDif C o n t i g
P r e d i c t e d —> - N - 0 2 + 0
2 N 0 - r
+ 0 2
UK 27 - .01 19 - .12
FRN 29 - .07 - .00 17 - .06 + .00
GMY 11 - .05 + .15 6 .00 .00
A-H 14 - .00 - .00 8 .00 + .11
ITA 7 - .22 + .53 6 - .20 + .50
USR 16 - .09 - .00 15 - .09 - .00
F i s h e r exact t e s t : *** < .01 < ** < .05 < * < .10 s i g n i f i c a n c e lev
160
As can be seen from the 0 s r e p o r t e d i n Table 19, the
d i r e c t i o n s of the r e l a t i o n s h i p s between the two r e a c h a b i l i t y
i n d i c a t o r s and war involvement are g e n e r a l l y as p r e d i c t e d ;
t h a t i s , d i f f e r e n c e i n power i s f o r the most p a r t n e g a t i v e l y
c o r r e l a t e d , and c o n t i g u i t y p o s i t i v e l y a s s o c i a t e d , w i t h war
i n v o l v e m e n t . However, n e i t h e r r e a c h a b i l i t y i n d i c a t o r i s
p a r t i c u l a r l y p o w e r f u l . Indeed, i t i s o n l y f o r the smal l subset
of I t a l i a n cases that we f i n d s i z a b l e 0^ s .
Having found that the a s s o c i a t i o n s r e p o r t e d i n Table 19
are not very p o w e r f u l , we n e v e r t h e l e s s ask whether the
r e l a t i o n s h i p s between the r e a c h a b i l i t y i n d i c a t o r s and war
involvement are d i f f e r e n t f o r the subset of s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t
dyads than f o r the set of a l l c o n f l i c t dyads. C h i - s q u a r e t e s t s
are used to i n v e s t i g a t e t h i s q u e s t i o n . The l o g i c u n d e r l y i n g the
t e s t s i s as f o l l o w s : i f s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y i s u n a s s o c i a t e d w i t h
war i n v o l v e m e n t , then we would expect t h a t the p r o p o r t i o n of
s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t dyads t h a t r e s u l t s i n war would be the same
as the p r o p o r t i o n of all dyads t h a t r e s u l t s i n war. Thus, f o r
each major power, the d i s t r i b u t i o n of cases f o r s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t
dyads (the observed frequency) i s compared w i t h the d i s t r i b u t i o n
of cases f o r a l l dyads (the expected f r e q u e n c y ) . Due to the small
number o f cases in t h i s p a r t i c u l a r i n v e s t i g a t i o n , the observed
f requency i s a d j u s t e d by 0.5 u n i t s , so as to reduce the d i f f e r e n c e
between the expected and observed f r e q u e n c i e s i n each c e l l of the
t a b l e ( c f . B l a l o c k , 1960). Not a s i n g l e X proves to be
161
s i g n i f i c a n t at the .10 l e v e l , demonstrat ing t h a t the 0 s f o r the
underrecognized dyads are not a p p r e c i a b l y d i f f e r e n t from those
f o r a l l c o n f l i c t dyads.
On the b a s i s of the preceding p a r a g r a p h s , I conclude t h a t ,
f o r major powers dur ing the n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y — w h e t h e r or not
they are i n s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t dyads — there i s a weak n e g a t i v e
z e r o - o r d e r r e l a t i o n s h i p between d i f f e r e n c e i n power and war
i n v o l v e m e n t , and a weak p o s i t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p between c o n t i g u i t y
and involvement. Thus, a c o n f r o n t a t i o n between two major powers
i s s l i g h t l y more l i k e l y to erupt i n t o war than one between a major
and a minor power; i n d e e d , t h i r t y percent of major-major as compared
to e i g h t e e n percent of major-minor c o n f r o n t a t i o n s d u r i n g the
n i n e t e e n t h century r e s u l t i n war. And, s i m i l a r l y , a c o n f r o n t a t i o n
between n e i g h b o r i n g s t a t e s (at l e a s t one of which i s a major power)
i s more v o l a t i l e than one between noncontiguous s t a t e s — t h i r t y
p e r c e n t of the former as compared to seventeen percent of the
l a t t e r ending i n war.
The I n d i c a t o r of War Experience
Turning to the i n d i c a t o r of war e x p e r i e n c e , not much needs
to be s a i d . As we found when examining the f i r s t stage of the
model , there i s very l i t t l e r e l a t i o n s h i p d u r i n g the n i n e t e e n t h
century between p r i o r war e x p e r i e n c e and subsequent c o n f l i c t
( i n t h i s i n s t a n c e , war) involvement.
162
TABLE 20
BISERIAL CORRELATIONS BETWEEN EACH MAJOR POWER'S WAR INVOLVEMENT AND PRIOR WAR EXPERIENCE,
FOR 19th CENTURY CONFLICT DYADS
A l l Dyads S t a t . Inc. Dyads
War Exp. War Exp.
2 2 P r e d i c t e d —>- N r " N r, " b__ b_
UK 27 - .01 19 - .08
FRN 29 - .00 1 7 - .01
GMY 11 - .00 6 + .23
A-H 14 + .01 8 - .01
ITA 7 + .00 6 .02
USR 16 - .08 15 - .09
F - t e s t from anova: *** < .01 < ** < .05 *̂ * £ .10 s i g n i f i c a n c e l e v e l
B i s e r i a l c o r r e l a t i o n s between the c o n t i n u o u s l y - m e a s u r e d
war e x p e r i e n c e i n d i c a t o r and the dichotomously-measured outcome
v a r i a b l e (no war/war) are presented i n Table 20. We can see t h a t ,
f o r the s e t of a l l c o n f l i c t dyads, t h e r e i s no r e l a t i o n s h i p very
d i f f e r e n t from z e r o . For the subset of c o n f l i c t dyads having
at l e a s t one s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t major power member, o n l y Germany
has a squared b i s e r i a l c o r r e l a t i o n of any s i z e , but the magnitude
of the sampling e r r o r of the b i s e r i a l r suggests t h a t t h i s i s
probably not s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t from the .00 c o r r e l a t i o n f o r
a l l German c o n f l i c t dyads. Indeed, none of the b i s e r i a l
163
c o r r e l a t i o n s f o r the s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t c o n f l i c t dyads i s
s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t from the r b s f o r a l l c o n f l i c t dyads.
Thus, whether we examine a l l c o n f l i c t dyads or o n l y s t a t u s
i n c o n s i s t e n t c o n f l i c t dyads, there i s , f o r the n i n e t e e n t h
c e n t u r y major powers, no meaningful b i v a r i a t e r e l a t i o n s h i p
between p r i o r war exper ience and the e s c a l a t i o n of subsequent
c o n f r o n t a t i o n s i n t o wars.
The I n d i c a t o r s of S t r u c t u r a l R e l a t i o n s h i p s
F i n a l l y , we look a t the i n d i c a t o r s of s t r u c t u r a l
r e l a t i o n s h i p s — p o l a r i t y and r e c i p r o c a l i n t e r s t a t e bonds. From
the b i s e r i a l c o r r e l a t i o n s i n Table 2 1 , we see t h a t major power
p o l a r i t y appears to b e — a s i t was i n the f i r s t stage of the
m o d e l — t h e most powerful i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e i n the n i n e t e e n t h
c e n t u r y . However, u n l i k e our e a r l i e r f i n d i n g s , p o l a r i t y i s now
c o n s i s t e n t l y n e g a t i v e l y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h war i n v o l v e m e n t , and
the magnitude of the sampling e r r o r of the b i s e r i a l r suggests
t h a t t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p e x i s t s r e g a r d l e s s of whether or not
s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t major powers are i n v o l v e d i n the c o n f l i c t
dyads. Other r e s e a r c h e r s have a l s o uncovered t h i s n e g a t i v e
a s s o c i a t i o n between major power b i - p o l a r i t y a n d , in t h e i r
i n v e s t i g a t i o n , the magnitude and s e v e r i t y , as w e l l as f requency
of war i n the n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y i n t e r s t a t e system ( S i n g e r and
S m a l l , 1968). These f i n d i n g s of a n e g a t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p between
b i - p o l a r i t y and w a r — i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h the p o s i t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p
164
between b i - p o l a r i t y and m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n , u n v e i l e d i n the
p r e c e d i n g c h a p t e r — o f f e r e m p i r i c a l support d u r i n g the n i n e t e e n t h
c e n t u r y f o r Waltz' (1964, 1967) c o n t e n t i o n t h a t b i - p o l a r i t y i s
a s s o c i a t e d w i t h r e c u r r e n t c r i s e s and c o n f r o n t a t i o n s , but t h a t
these c o n f l i c t s remain l i m i t e d and do not evolve i n t o wars.
TABLE 21
BISERIAL CORRELATIONS BETWEEN EACH MAJOR POWER'S WAR INVOLVEMENT AND SYSTEM POLARITY,
FOR 19th CENTURY CONFLICT DYADS
A l l Dyads S t a t . , Inc. Dyads
Polarity Polarity
P r e d i c t e d — N + r, 2
b N • ^
UK 27 - .00 19 - .37
FRN 29 - .17 17 - .22
GMY 11 - .33 6 - .04
A-H 14 - .17 8 - .38
ITA 7 - . 7 7 * * 6 - . 8 3 *
USR 16 - .26 15 - .34
from anova: *** < .01 < ** "5 .Ob"^ * 5 10 s i g n i f i c a n c e
As f o r the measures of r e c i p r o c a l i n t e r s t a t e bonds, i t
has a l r e a d y been mentioned t h a t r e l i a b l e t rade data are not
a v a i l a b l e f o r the n i n e t e e n t h century major powers, and c o n s e q u e n t l y
we cannot examine the r e l a t i o n s h i p between t rade p a r t n e r s h i p s and
165
war involvement. The a l l i a n c e d a t a , however, do produce an
i n t e r e s t i n g r e s u l t . There are o n l y f o u r i n s t a n c e s (Convention
of Olmutz , 1850; Seven Weeks War, 1866; Montenegrin T r o u b l e s ,
1880; and China Concessions to R u s s i a , 1898) d u r i n g t h i s
e a r l i e r century when major powers t h r e a t e n to use or a c t u a l l y
employ m i l i t a r y f o r c e a g a i n s t a s t a t e w i t h which they have a
mutual defense p a c t , one of these c o n f r o n t a t i o n s r e s u l t i n g i n
war. Thus, w h i l e the number of o b s e r v a t i o n s i s o b v i o u s l y too
smal l f o r us to c o n f i d e n t l y d e s c r i b e the r e l a t i o n s h i p between
a l l i a n c e s and war involvement, we can say t h a t m i l i t a r y
c o n f r o n t a t i o n s between n i n e t e e n t h century a l l i a n c e p a r t n e r s
are q u i t e r a r e . This should i n c r e a s e our c o n f i d e n c e t h a t
the r e l a t i o n s h i p between b i - p o l a r i t y and war involvement i s
not b e i n g d i s t o r t e d by m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s w i t h i n the
p o l e s .
The M u l t i v a r i a t e R e l a t i o n s h i p
Although we have too few o b s e r v a t i o n s to examine the
" c o m p l e t e l y - s p e c i f i e d " second stage of the model f o r the
i n d i v i d u a l major powers, we have the f o r t u n a t e s i t u a t i o n t h a t
the d i r e c t i o n s of the z e r o - o r d e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s are g e n e r a l l y
c o n s i s t e n t across s t a t e s . Thus, i t i s p o s s i b l e to pool our
cases and to c a u t i o u s l y i n t e r p r e t the r e s u l t s as a p p l i c a b l e
to a l l n i n e t e e n t h century c o n f l i c t dyads c o n t a i n i n g major
powers.
TABLE 22
CORRELATION AND STANDARDIZED PROBIT COEFFICIENTS FOR THE FOUR INTERVENING VARIABLES WHEN PREDICTING TO POOLED MAJOR POWER
WAR 1 INVOLVEMENTS, FOR 19th CENTURY CONFLICT DYADS
PwrDif
A l l
C o n t i g
Dyads
War Exp. Polarity K2 R P
P r e d i c t e d - 4- - +
0 or r̂ 98 - . 1 1 + .14 - . 0 6 _ 38***
98 - . 1 7 + .07 - . 1 5 - . 3 6 .18** .00
S t a t . I nc. Dyads
0 or r, b 67 - . 1 1 + .20 - . 0 5 (. 1 8) - , 5 0 ( . 1 5 ) * * *
b* 67 - . 2 2 ( . 1 7 ) +.21(.16) - . 2 7 ( . 2 5 ) - . 5 0 ( . 1 8 ) .36*** .17
NOTE: Numbers w i t h i n parentheses are standard e r r o r s . F i s h e r exact t e s t ( f o r 0 ) , f - t e s t from anova ( f o r r, ) , and ^ from p r o b i t {yJ- w i t h 4 df) *** < .01 < ** < .05 < * < .10 s i g n i f i c a n c e l e v e l .
167
When we do so (Table 2 2 ) , there are no r e a l s u r p r i s e s .
The z e r o - o r d e r c o r r e l a t i o n s (0 and r^) are in the same d i r e c t i o n
and are approximately of the same magnitude as the p a r t i a l p r o b i t
c o e f f i c i e n t s (b ) . This i s a r e f l e c t i o n of the low l e v e l of
m u l t i c o l l i n e a r i t y among the f o u r i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s . The only
c o e f f i c i e n t that d i f f e r s f o r the pooled data from that f o r the
i n d i v i d u a l s t a t e s i s war e x p e r i e n c e , and i t w i l l be r e c a l l e d
that t h i s v a r i a b l e i s b a s i c a l l y u n c o r r e l a t e d w i t h war involvement
except f o r a p o s i t i v e a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h Germany i n underrecognized
c o n f l i c t dyads. S i n c e , however, t h a t p o s i t i v e c o r r e l a t i o n i s
based upon only s i x c a s e s , i t i s not s u r p r i s i n g t h a t i t e x e r t s
l i t t l e i n f l u e n c e on the pooled d a t a .
With the except ion of b i - p o l a r i t y , the e f f e c t s of the
i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s are i n the p r e d i c t e d d i r e c t i o n , but account
for l i t t l e "variance" i n major power war i n v o l v e m e n t ; the b i - p o l a r i t y
v a r i a b l e produces a moderately s t r o n g c o r r e l a t i o n , but one o p p o s i t e
to t h a t which we hypothesized in Chapter One. A l though the
measures of both s t r e n g t h of a s s o c i a t i o n and p r e d i c t i v e power
i n c r e a s e when we examine only those c o n f l i c t dyads c o n t a i n i n g
s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t major powers, "X2--tests on the 0 s , the e r r o r
of the sampling d i s t r i b u t i o n of the r^s, and the s tandard e r r o r s
of the I) s , a l l suggest t h a t the r e p o r t e d c o r r e l a t i o n s and
p r o b i t c o e f f i c i e n t s f o r the s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t dyads are not
s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t from those f o r a l l n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y
c o n f l i c t dyads.
168
And f i n a l l y , from the p r o b i t " r e s i d u a l s " i t appears that
we come nearest to p r e d i c t i n g wars between major powers
(as opposed to ones between major and minor powers) . B u t , given
the smal l number of war involvements t h a t we can c o r r e c t l y p r e d i c t
i n the n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y , i t seems somewhat t r i v i a l to l i n g e r
on t h i s p o i n t .
The Twentieth Century
There a r e , a g a i n , i n the t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y , too few
o b s e r v a t i o n s f o r the i n d i v i d u a l major powers to permit m u l t i
v a r i a t e a n a l y s i s . Thus, we once more t u r n to the examinat ion
of b i v a r i a t e a s s o c i a t i o n s .
The I n d i c a t o r s of Reachability
We f i n d f o r the r e a c h a b i l i t y i n d i c a t o r s (Table 23)
c o n s i d e r a b l e convergence between the n i n e t e e n t h and t w e n t i e t h
c e n t u r y r e s u l t s . As i n the n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y , the d i r e c t i o n s
of the r e l a t i o n s h i p s between the i n t e r v e n i n g and outcome
v a r i a b l e s a r e , by and l a r g e , those t h a t are p o s i t e d i n the
model .
D i f f e r e n c e s i n power are i n v e r s e l y r e l a t e d to war
involvement; that i s , c o n f r o n t a t i o n s between major powers are
more l i k e l y to r e s u l t in war than are c o n f r o n t a t i o n s between
major and minor powers. A p p r o x i m a t e l y h a l f of the major-major
c o n f r o n t a t i o n s end i n these more severe c o n f l a g r a t i o n s ,
whereas only s l i g h t l y more than ten percent of the major-minor
169
TABLE 23
CRAMER'S PHI-SQUARE BETWEEN EACH MAJOR POWER'S WAR INVOLVEMENT AND THE TWO INDICATORS OF REACHABILITY,
FOR 20th CENTURY CONFLICT DYADS
A l l Dyads
PwrDif C o n t i g
S t a t . Inc. Dyads
PwrDif C o n t i g
Predicted — N - 0 2 + N - i + 0 2
USA 14 - .12 - .22 10 .00 - .25
UK 22 - . 3 5 * * 10 - .17
FRN 15 - .34* + .20 9 - .25 + .25
GMY 11 - .59** + .13 8 - .56 + .05
A-H 7 - 1.00 + .03 3 - 1.00
ITA 15 - .20 + . 4 2 * 4 - .33 + 1 .00
USR 32 - .17** + .00 29 - . 1 5 * * + .00
CHN 11 - .15 - .45 6 - .40 - 1 .00
JPN 13 - .01 + .00 13 - .01 + .00
F i s h e r exact t e s t : *** < .01 < ** < .05 < • *L .10 s i g n i f i c a n c e le<
170
c o n f r o n t a t i o n s e s c a l a t e i n t o war. The negat ive r e l a t i o n s h i p
between d i f f e r e n c e in power and war involvement appears to
c o n t r a d i c t F e r r i s ' (1973) f i n d i n g t h a t , f o r the 1850-1965 p e r i o d ,
there i s some evidence to suggest a positive a s s o c i a t i o n between
power d i s p a r i t y and involvement i n i n t e n s e m i l i t a r y c o n f l i c t .
However, s i n c e F e r r i s i s working w i t h a d i f f e r e n t p o p u l a t i o n
of c a s e s , a d i f f e r e n t i n d i c a t o r of power, and, most i m p o r t a n t l y ,
i s not c o n t r o l l i n g f o r the average power d i s p a r i t y in c o n f l i c t ,
dyads, the d i s c r e p a n c y may be more apparent than r e a l . In
a d d i t i o n , i t should be remembered t h a t the dichotomous PWRDIF
i n d i c a t o r used i n the c u r r e n t study i s tapping not only d i f f e r e n c e s
i n power, but a l s o the host of other a t t r i b u t e s t h a t d i s t i n g u i s h
major powers from minor powers.
The second r e a c h a b i l i t y v a r i a b l e — c o n t i g u i t y — i s not
s t r o n g l y a s s o c i a t e d wi th war involvement. Almost a l l the
c o e f f i c i e n t s are p o s i t i v e , but weak; the few s i z a b l e c o e f f i c i e n t s
are g e n e r a l l y based upon a very small number of c a s e s . Two
c o u n t r i e s — the United States and China — a c t u a l l y have n e g a t i v e
c o r r e l a t i o n s . The negat ive f i n d i n g s f o r the United S t a t e s
1 I f the two world wars were coded to r e f l e c t , all p o s s i b l e c o n f l i c t dyads, r a t h e r than one c o n f l i c t dyad f o r each major power p a r t i c i p a n t , then the p r o p o r t i o n of major-minor c o n f r o n t a t i o n s ending in war would i n c r e a s e to a p p r o x i m a t e l y one in t h r e e . T h i s , however, would i n t r o d u c e a number of dyads t h a t were o n l y p e r i p h e r a l l y engaged i n combat, as w e l l as some that o c c u r r e d s imply because minor powers were i n the path of onrushing a r m i e s . In a d d i t i o n , the i n c l u s i o n of a l l p o s s i b l e c o n f l i c t dyads would c r e a t e a s i t u a t i o n i n which the two wor ld wars would t o t a l l y dominate the t w e n t i e t h century s t a t i s t i c a l r e s u l t s .
171
l e g i t i m a t e l y r e f l e c t the f a c t t h a t a l l American war involvements
i n the t w e n t i e t h century (WW I, WW I I , Korea, and Vietnam) take
p l a c e a b r o a d , w h i l e the negat ive c o r r e l a t i o n s f o r China are
somewhat m i s l e a d i n g . China i s i n v o l v e d i n e leven m i l i t a r y
c o n f l i c t s — i n c l u d i n g two wars — s i n c e becoming a major power;
o n l y one of these c o n f l i c t s (the Korean War) i s fought a g a i n s t
noncontiguous a d v e r s a r i e s . And i n t h a t war, d i r e c t Chinese
i n t e r v e n t i o n occurs only a f t e r a cont iguous country (People's
R e p u b l i c of Korea) has been invaded. Thus, f o r most major powers
d u r i n g the t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y , c o n t i g u i t y i s p o s i t i v e l y r e l a t e d
to war involvement, but the a s s o c i a t i o n i s g e n e r a l l y weak.
Indeed, i f we combine the data f o r a l l major powers, we d i s c o v e r
t h a t the same p r o p o r t i o n ( t w e n t y - f o u r percent ) of m i l i t a r y
c o n f r o n t a t i o n s between noncontiguous c o u n t r i e s , as between
n e i g h b o r i n g c o u n t r i e s , e s c a l a t e s i n t o wars.
2
In the t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y , as i n the n i n e t e e n t h , - t e s t s
demonstrate t h a t , f o r both r e a c h a b i l i t y i n d i c a t o r s , the c o r r e l a t i o n s
f o r c o n f l i c t dyads c o n t a i n i n g s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t major power
members are not s i g n i f i c a n t l y (at the .10 l e v e l ) d i f f e r e n t from
those f o r a l l c o n f l i c t dyads. On the whole, t h e n , the r e s u l t s
f o r the two c e n t u r i e s are q u i t e s i m i l a r — a l t h o u g h , d u r i n g the
c u r r e n t c e n t u r y , the c o r r e l a t i o n s between d i f f e r e n c e i n power
and war involvement are s t r o n g e r than those f o r the p r e c e d i n g
e i g h t y y e a r s , w h i l e the a s s o c i a t i o n between c o n t i g u i t y and
involvement i s probably somewhat weaker.
172
The I n d i c a t o r of War Experience
The t h i r d i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e i n our m o d e l — p r i o r war
e x p e r i e n c e — t u r n s out to be important f o r o n l y a very few major
powers i n the t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y . The g r e a t e s t s u r p r i s e s i n
Table 24 are the exceedingly l a r g e p o s i t i v e a s s o c i a t i o n s between
German, A u s t r o - H u n g a r i a n , and Chinese war e x p e r i e n c e and
subsequent war involvement.
TABLE 24
BISERIAL CORRELATIONS BETWEEN EACH MAJOR POWER'S WAR INVOLVEMENT AND PRIOR WAR EXPERIENCE,
FOR 20th CENTURY CONFLICT DYADS
A l l Dyads S t a t . Inc. Dyads
War Exp. War Exp.
Predicted — N 2 - r b N 2
" r b
USA 14 - .03 10 - .34
UK 22 - .10 10 - .20
FRN 15 - .17 9 - .22
GMY 11 + . 9 9 * * * 8 + . 9 9 * *
A-H 7 - .05 3 + .99
ITA 15 - .20 4 - .37
USR 32 + .08 29 + .07
CHN 11 + .25 6 + .99**
JPN 13 - .04 13 - .04
from anova: *** <. 01 < ** < .05 < • < .10 s i g n i f i c a n c e l e v e l
173
The c o r r e l a t i o n s f o r Germany and A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y are not
o n l y s u r p r i s i n g , they are a l s o somewhat d e c e i v i n g . For example,
d u r i n g the t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y , Germany i s i n v o l v e d i n two wars
(WW I and WW II ) out of e leven i n s t a n c e s of m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n .
In 1914, the German war exper ience score i s zero and, i n 1939,
i t i s a l s o extremely low. S i m i l a r l y , Germany's opponents i n
1914 ( R u s s i a ) and 1939 (France) have r e l a t i v e l y low war exper ience
s c o r e s . Y e t , d e s p i t e the very small a b s o l u t e v a l u e s of the dyads'
j o i n t war e x p e r i e n c e s , the Russo-German (1914) and Franco-German
(1 939) dyads have r e l a t i v e l y l a r g e sums when compared w i t h the
o t h e r nine war exper ience scores i n v o l v i n g German c o n f l i c t dyads
— i n d e e d , these are the h i g h e s t war e x p e r i e n c e s c o r e s of any
German c o n f l i c t dyads. Hence, very small a b s o l u t e values
2
n e v e r t h e l e s s produce very l a r g e r^'s. I d e n t i c a l l y , the A u s t r o -
Hungarian c o r r e l a t i o n f o r s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t c o n f l i c t dyads
(based on only three o b s e r v a t i o n s ) a l s o r e f l e c t s the f a c t t h a t
a very smal l war exper ience score ( A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y / R u s s i a , 1914)
can n e v e r t h e l e s s be the l a r g e s t score f o r a subset o f dyads. On
the o t h e r hand, the c o r r e l a t i o n f o r Chinese s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t
dyads a c c u r a t e l y r e f l e c t s t h a t her one war involvement w h i l e
underrecognized (Korean War, 1950) occurs not o n l y f o r the Chinese
dyad having the l a r g e s t war exper ience v a l u e , but a l s o when both
she and her opponent (the U n i t e d S t a t e s ) have c o n s i d e r a b l e n a t i o n a l
war e x p e r i e n c e s c o r e s . Thus, d e s p i t e the somewhat v a r i e d
d i r e c t i o n of the war experience/war involvement r e l a t i o n s h i p s
174
f o r the i n d i v i d u a l major powers, i t i s o n l y the Chinese t h a t
appear to be a p p r e c i a b l y more war prone under c o n d i t i o n s of
high b a t t l e l o s s e s i n p r i o r c o n f l a g r a t i o n s .
F i n a l l y , the magnitude of the e r r o r s of the sampling
d i s t r i b u t i o n suggests that there are no s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e s
i n the r^s f o r s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t dyads as compared to a l l
c o n f l i c t dyads, wi th the e x c e p t i o n of those f o r A u s t r i a -
Hungary and C h i n a . However, due to the smal l number of
o b s e r v a t i o n s f o r these l a t t e r two s t a t e s ( three and s i x
r e s p e c t i v e l y ) , I am indeed s k e p t i c a l about the " s i g n i f i c a n c e "
of these d i f f e r e n c e s .
The I n d i c a t o r s of S t r u c t u r a l R e l a t i o n s h i p s
The set of s t r u c t u r a l i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s produces some
i n t e r e s t i n g f i n d i n g s (Table 2 5 ) . F i r s t , p o l a r i t y appears to be
p o s i t i v e l y r e l a t e d to war involvement i n the t w e n t i e t h century
(the o n l y s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e between the c o e f f i c i e n t s f o r
s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t dyads and those f o r a l l c o n f l i c t dyads being
f o r the f o u r I t a l i a n o b s e r v a t i o n s ) . The c o r r e l a t i o n s are not
g e n e r a l l y very p o w e r f u l , but they are d r a m a t i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t
from the f i n d i n g s f o r the n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y . Thus, whereas
i n the e a r l i e r century we uncovered support f o r W a l t z 1 (1964, 1967)
argument t h a t b i - p o l a r i t y may i n c r e a s e the p r o b a b i l i t y of
c o n f r o n t a t i o n but w i l l reduce the p r o b a b i l i t y of war, we see t h a t
the t w e n t i e t h century b e t t e r approximates the Deutsch and S i n g e r
175
TABLE 25
BISERIAL CORRELATIONS AND CRAMER PHI-SQUARES BETWEEN EACH MAJOR POWER'S WAR INVOLVEMENT AND TWO
INDICATORS OF STRUCTURAL RELATIONSHIPS, FOR 20th CENTURY CONFLICT DYADS
A l l Dyads S t a t . Inc. Dyads
Polarity Trade Polarity Trade
Predicted — N + 2 r b - N 2
r b - i USA 14 .00 + . 49** 10 - .14 + . 4 3 *
UK 22 + .15 + .09 10 + .25 + .03
FRN 15 + .20 + .34* 9 + .12 + .25
GMY 11 + .09 + .59** 8 + .17 + .56
A-H 7 - .07 + 1.00 3 - .31 + 1.00
ITA 15 + .36* + .10 4 + mgg*** + .33
USR 32 + .03 - .00 29 + .02 + .00
CHN 11 - .00 6 + .18
JPN 13 _ .01 + .15 13 _ .01 + .15
F - t e s t from anova ( f o r r, ) and F i s h e r exact t e s t ( f o r 0 ): *** <; mQi < ** < .05 < * < .10 s i g n i f i c a n c e t e s t
176
(1964) c o n t e n t i o n t h a t b i - p o l a r i t y i n c r e a s e s the p r o b a b i l i t y of
both c o n f l i c t and war.
Second, we f i n d t h a t , c o n t r a r y to e x p e c t a t i o n , t r a d e
c o n s i s t e n t l y c o r r e l a t e s p o s i t i v e l y w i t h war involvement. That
i s to s a y , i f the opposing c o u n t r i e s i n a c o n f l i c t dyad are
major t r a d i n g p a r t n e r s , then t h a t c o n f r o n t a t i o n i s more l i k e l y
to erupt i n t o war than one between n o n - t r a d e p a r t n e r s . Indeed,
a p p r o x i m a t e l y h a l f of the c o n f r o n t a t i o n s i n v o l v i n g t rade p a r t n e r s ,
as compared to f i f t e e n percent of those i n v o l v i n g n o n - t r a d e
p a r t n e r s , r e s u l t i n war. (And, a g a i n , there are no s i g n i f i c a n t
d i f f e r e n c e s between the c o e f f i c i e n t s f o r the s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t
dyads and those f o r a l l c o n f l i c t d y a d s . ) T h i s a s s o c i a t i o n between
t rade and war may not be as c o u n t e r i n t u i t i v e as i f f i r s t a p p e a r s .
W a l l e n s t e e n (1973) reports t h a t , d u r i n g 1920-1965, n e a r l y a l l
m i l i t a r y c o n f l i c t s between topdogs and underdogs occur i n areas
i n which the i n t e r v e n i n g topdog has s i z a b l e t r a d i n g i n t e r e s t s
(a l though t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p does not hold f o r topdog-topdog
c o n f r o n t a t i o n s ) . And Russett (1967) f i n d s t h a t f o r p a i r s of
c o u n t r i e s i n v o l v e d i n c o n f l i c t s r e s u l t i n g i n over one hundred
b a t t l e - r e l a t e d f a t a l i t i e s between 1946 and 1965, those t h a t
belong to the same trade group are more than twice as l i k e l y
to f i g h t one another than are n a t i o n s t h a t belong to d i f f e r e n t
groups or to no group.
One p l a u s i b l e e x p l a n a t i o n f o r t h i s p o s i t i v e a s s o c i a t i o n
between t rade and war involvement i s t h a t economic exchange
177
makes t r a d e partners more s a l i e n t to one another and i n c r e a s e s
the o p p o r t u n i t y f o r d i f f e r e n c e s on economic i s s u e s to p l a c e
s t r a i n s on the b i l a t e r a l r e l a t i o n s h i p . I t may be t h a t common
economic i n t e r e s t s o f t e n serve to l e s s e n these s t r a i n s ; however,
once a c o n f l i c t between trade p a r t n e r s reaches the l e v e l of
m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n (the l e v e l on which our a n a l y s i s f o c u s e s ) ,
the c o n f l i c t may have a l r e a d y exceeded t h a t p o i n t at which these
mutual economic i n t e r e s t s might m i t i g a t e n a t i o n a l b e h a v i o r . A
second p l a u s i b l e e x p l a n a t i o n — p a r t i a l l y incongruent w i t h the
f i r s t — i s t h a t , w h i l e major t rade p a r t n e r s are l i k e l y to be
s a l i e n t to (and i n t e r a c t o f t e n w i t h ) one another and to thereby
become more a t t e n t i v e to i n c o m p a t i b i l i t i e s , t rade r e p r e s e n t s
such a smal l f r a c t i o n of a n a t i o n ' s gross n a t i o n a l product t h a t
i t i s u n l i k e l y to f o s t e r that degree of economic interdependence
that might m i t i g a t e c o n f l i c t a t any l e v e l .
While the f i r s t two e x p l a n a t i o n s focus upon the i n c r e a s e d
o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r i n c o m p a t i b i l i t i e s to a r i s e between major t r a d e
p a r t n e r s , a t h i r d p o s s i b l e e x p l a n a t i o n i s t h a t we might s i m p l y
be drawing a spur ious i n f e r e n c e from the p o s i t i v e c o r r e l a t i o n s
between t r a d e and war involvement. Linnemann ( 1 9 6 6 ) , i n a
c r o s s - n a t i o n a l study of i n t e r n a t i o n a l t rade p a t t e r n s i n 1959,
f i n d s t h a t the amount of t rade between c o u n t r i e s i s p o s i t i v e l y
r e l a t e d to the s i z e of t h e i r gross n a t i o n a l products and
n e g a t i v e l y r e l a t e d to the geographic d i s t a n c e between them.
Thus, Linnemann's f i n d i n g s would suggest t h a t major powers are
178
most likely to trade with other major powers and with countries
that are geographically proximate. If this is so, the positive
correlations between trade and war involvement may reflect no
more than that both these variables are associated with the
relative capabilities of, and geographic distance between, states.
When looking simply at bivariate relationships (as we are presently
doing), we are unable to eliminate these possibly confounding
effects. We shall, however, reconsider this problem below
when we examine the multivariate relationships.
Finally, let us look at the third indicator of structural
relationships—military alliances. As in the previous century,
there are too few instances in the twentieth century when a major
power becomes involved in a military confrontation with a defense
pact ally to say anything definitive. Of the eight occasions
on which states having mutual defense pacts oppose one another,
two (Italy-Germany, 1915; the Soviet Union-Hungary, 1956) result
in war, the remaining six do not. This is approximately the same
proportion of confrontations/wars as found for the entire
population of cases. Thus, once a confrontation occurs, the fact
that the opposing states have a mutual defense pact with one another
does not appear to alter the likelihood that the confrontation will
escalate into war. However, the fact that there are only eight
confrontations between allies strongly suggests that countries that
have mutual defense pacts rarely become involved in military
confrontations with their cosignatories.
1 7 9
The M u l t i v a r i a t e R e l a t i o n s h i p
S i n c e we once more f i n d a g r e a t deal of s i m i l a r i t y a c r o s s
major power c o n f l i c t dyads, we s h a l l a g a i n pool our o b s e r v a t i o n s
and proceed w i t h m u l t i v a r i a t e a n a l y s i s . Caut ion i s , of c o u r s e ,
a p p r o p r i a t e when i n t e r p r e t i n g the r e s u l t i n g c o e f f i c i e n t s .
We see i n Table 26 t h a t the z e r o - o r d e r c o r r e l a t i o n s
(0 and r^) are i n the same d i r e c t i o n and are of a p p r o x i m a t e l y
the same magnitude as the p a r t i a l p r o b i t c o e f f i c i e n t s (b ) .
In a d d i t i o n , the c o e f f i c i e n t s f o r the s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t dyads
are not s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t from the c o e f f i c i e n t s f o r a l l
t w e n t i e t h century c o n f l i c t dyads.
There are no r e a l s u r p r i s e s i n the d i r e c t i o n or magnitude
of the c o e f f i c i e n t s from the pooled d a t a . As would be expected
from the a n a l y s e s on the "by n a t i o n " c o n f l i c t dyads, d i f f e r e n c e s
in power and trade are the most powerful i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s .
We see t h a t major power/major power c o n f r o n t a t i o n s are more
l i k e l y to evolve i n t o war than are major power/minor power
c o n f r o n t a t i o n s and, s i m i l a r l y , c o n f r o n t a t i o n s between t rade
p a r t n e r s are more v o l a t i l e than those between n o n - t r a d i n g s t a t e s .
The q u e s t i o n t h a t comes immediately to mind i s , of c o u r s e ,
how best to i n t e r p r e t the p o s i t i v e a s s o c i a t i o n between t r a d e and
war involvement . The reader w i l l r e c a l l t h a t i t was suggested above
that the t r a d e v a r i a b l e may s i m p l y be t a p p i n g power c a p a b i l i t y
awl geographic p r o x i m i t y , and t h a t i t i s these l a t t e r two f a c t o r s ,
r a t h e r than t rade per s e , t h a t are a s s o c i a t e d w i t h war involvement .
CORRELATION AND STANDARDIZED PROBIT COEFFICIENTS FOR THE FIVE INTERVENING VARIABLES WHEN PREDICTING TO POOLED MAJOR POWER
WAR INVOLVEMENTS, FOR 20th CENTURY CONFLICT DYADS
A l l Dyads
*2 PwrDif C o n t i g War Exp. P o l a r i t y Trade R
P r e d i c t e d —>- N + - +
or r, 130 - . 4 5 * * * +.01 - . 1 3 +.17 +.38*** D
b* 130 - . 3 6 - . 0 3 - . 1 0 +.17 +.30 . 3 5 * * * .32 § j
S t a t . Inc. Dyads
0 or r b 82 - . 4 0 * * * - . 1 0 - . 0 9 ( . 1 5 ) + . ! ! ( . 1 5 ) +.37***
b* 82 - . 3 3 ( . 1 3 ) - . 0 6 ( . 1 3 ) - . 0 3 ( . 1 4 ) +.20(.15) +.36(.14) . 3 5 * * * .34
NOTE: Numbers w i t h i n parentheses are standard e r r o r s . F i s h e r exact t e s t ( f o r 0 ) , f - t e s t from anova ( f o r r b ) , and ^ * from p r o b i t ( X 2 w i t h 5 d f ) : *** < .01 < * * < . 0 5 < * < .10 s i g n i f i c a n c e l e v e l .
181
To r u l e out the p o s s i b i l i t y of s p u r i o u s i n f e r e n c e , we would have
to " c o n t r o l " f o r power and p r o x i m i t y . The p r o b i t a l g o r i t h m does
j u s t t h a t ; the b*s reported i n Table 26 are p a r t i a l c o e f f i c i e n t s ,
i . e . , the p r o b i t c o e f f i c i e n t f o r each v a r i a b l e r e f l e c t s the
a s s o c i a t i o n between t h a t v a r i a b l e and war involvement , a f t e r
the e f f e c t s of the other v a r i a b l e s i n the e q u a t i o n have been
removed. Thus, the p o s i t i v e p r o b i t c o e f f i c i e n t s f o r t rade
(Table 26) d e p i c t the r e l a t i o n s h i p between t rade and war
involvement when d i f f e r e n c e s i n power and geographic c o n t i g u i t y
are c o n t r o l l e d . To t h i s e x t e n t , the i n f e r e n c e t h a t t rade i s
p o s i t i v e l y r e l a t e d to war involvement i s not s p u r i o u s . However,
i t s h o u l d be recognized that t h i s i s not a f u l l y s a t i s f a c t o r y
c o n t r o l f o r the f a c t o r s that Linnemann (1966) c l a i m s to be
important f o r i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r a d e f l o w s . This i s because
the measures of c a p a b i l i t y and p r o x i m i t y t h a t I use are both
dichotomously s c a l e d ; c o n t i n u o u s l y - s c a l e d measures would o f f e r
s t r o n g e r evidence as to whether s p u r i o u s n e s s may be r u l e d o u t .
However, the f a c t that we have, a t l e a s t i n a crude manner,
c o n t r o l l e d f o r both p o t e n t i a l l y confounding v a r i a b l e s and s t i l l
uncovered a p o s i t i v e a s s o c i a t i o n between t rade and war involvement
should reduce the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t we might draw i n c o r r e c t
i n f e r e n c e s from the s t a t i s t i c a l r e s u l t s .
Returning to Table 2 6 , we see t h a t p o l a r i t y i s the t h i r d
most powerful i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e — t h e more b i - p o l a r the major
power subsystem, the more p r o b a b l e the outbreak of war. C o n t i g u i t y ,
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on the o t h e r hand, i s b a s i c a l l y u n r e l a t e d to war involvement .
The near zero c o e f f i c i e n t i s , i n small p a r t , due to the
d i f f e r e n t i a l e f f e c t s t h a t v a r i a b l e has f o r d i f f e r e n t n a t i o n s
i n c o n f l i c t dyads; but even i n the "by n a t i o n " a n a l y s e s ,
c o n t i g u i t y d i d not prove to be a p a r t i c u l a r l y powerful
d i s c r i m i n a t o r . This i s a s u b s t a n t i v e l y i n t e r e s t i n g f i n d i n g .
N e a r l y t w e n t y - e i g h t percent of the dyads i n v o l v e d i n c o n f r o n t a t i o n s
d u r i n g the n i n e t e e n t h century and more than f o r t y - t w o percent of
the dyads i n the t w e n t i e t h century c o n t a i n cont iguous n a t i o n -
s t a t e s , phenomenally high percentages given the much s m a l l e r
p r o p o r t i o n of s t a t e s i n the i n t e r s t a t e system t h a t are cont iguous
to major powers. In the n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y , f i f t e e n percent of
a l l p o s s i b l e dyads t h a t c o n t a i n at l e a s t one major power are
comprised of g e o g r a p h i c a l l y cont iguous s t a t e s . During the
t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y , t h i s f i g u r e d e c l i n e s to e i g h t p e r c e n t .
Standard scores ( i . e . , z - s c o r e s ) can be computed to determine
the l i k e l i h o o d t h a t we c o u l d o b t a i n as high a p r o p o r t i o n of
cont iguous dyads i n v o l v e d i n c o n f r o n t a t i o n s ( .28 i n the n i n e t e e n t h
century and .42 i n the t w e n t i e t h ) as we do, g iven the known
p r o p o r t i o n of contiguous dyads (.15 i n the n i n e t e e n t h century
and .08 i n the t w e n t i e t h ) . The standard score f o r the n i n e t e e n t h
century (N=98) i s 3 . 4 8 ; f o r the t w e n t i e t h century (N=130), 1 4 . 4 3 .
Thus, the p r o p o r t i o n of cont iguous c o n f l i c t dyads i n the n i n e t e e n t h
century i s about three and o n e - h a l f s tandard d e v i a t i o n s l a r g e r than
would be e x p e c t e d — a s i t u a t i o n t h a t would a r i s e by chance about
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f i v e t imes i n ten thousand. The p r o p o r t i o n of cont iguous
c o n f l i c t dyads i n the t w e n t i e t h century i s a p p r o x i m a t e l y
f o u r t e e n and o n e - h a l f standard d e v i a t i o n s l a r g e r than would be
e x p e c t e d — a s i t u a t i o n that approaches s t a t i s t i c a l i m p o s s i b i l i t y
i f geographic c o n t i g u i t y i s u n r e l a t e d to involvement i n m i l i t a r y
c o n f r o n t a t i o n s . I t can only be c o n c l u d e d , t h e n , t h a t c o n t i g u i t y
o f f e r s a very l a r g e number of o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r m i l i t a r y
c o n f r o n t a t i o n . However, the f i n d i n g s i n the c u r r e n t c h a p t e r
demonstrate t h a t , once a c o n f r o n t a t i o n has been i n i t i a t e d , major
powers are no more l i k e l y to go to war w i t h n e i g h b o r i n g a d v e r s a r i e s
than w i t h more d i s t a n t opponents — s u g g e s t i n g t h a t , f o r major powers,
geographic d i s t a n c e does not p l a c e very great c o n s t r a i n t s on the
u s a b i l i t y of l a r g e - s c a l e m i l i t a r y f o r c e .
Turning to the f i f t h of our i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s — p r i o r
war e x p e r i e n c e — t h e near zero c o e f f i c i e n t s are e x p e c t e d . As has
a l r e a d y been n o t e d , the only s i z a b l e c o r r e l a t i o n s i n the "by
n a t i o n " a n a l y s e s are f o r China ( r e f l e c t i n g a s i n g l e high s c o r e )
and f o r Germany and A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y (having e x c e e d i n g l y smal l
a b s o l u t e s c o r e s ) . Thus, when these o b s e r v a t i o n s are pooled wi th
those f o r other major power dyads, the Chinese case has l i t t l e
i n f l u e n c e and the German and A u s t r o - H u n g a r i a n ones appear
r e l a t i v e l y small ( a c t u a l l y i n c r e a s i n g the a s s o c i a t i o n between low
scores and war involvement) .
F i n a l l y , the q u e s t i o n a r i s e s as to whether we are b e t t e r
able to p r e d i c t that war w i l l erupt g i v e n c e r t a i n types of
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c o n f l i c t dyads; i n our p a r t i c u l a r a n a l y s e s , whether we can p r e d i c t
b e t t e r f o r major power/major power c o n f l i c t s ( i . e . , PWRDIF = 0)
than f o r those between major and minor powers ( i . e . , PWRDIF = 1 ) .
For an answer, we look at the " r e s i d u a l s " from the t w e n t i e t h
c e n t u r y p r o b i t a n a l y s e s .
TABLE 27
TOTAL NUMBER OF MAJOR POWER/MAJOR POWER AND MAJOR POWER/MINOR POWER CONFLICT DYADS THAT TERMINATE IN WAR AND THE PROPORTION OF EACH
TYPE THAT IS CORRECTLY PREDICTED BY THE PROBIT EQUATION, FOR THE 20th CENTURY
A l l Dyads S t a t . Inc. Dyads
N P r o p o r t i o n N P r o p o r t i o n
major/major dyads 18 .67 18 .67
major/minor dyads 10 .00 7 .00
I t i s q u i t e e v i d e n t from Table 27 t h a t we are not a b l e to
p r e d i c t the occurrence of major power/minor power wars. On the
o t h e r hand, we can a c c u r a t e l y f o r e c a s t t w o - t h i r d s of major power/
major power wars. Given t h i s s t a r k f i n d i n g , I look a t the data
f o r the second stage of the model one f i n a l t i m e , o m i t t i n g a l l
cases of major/minor c o n f r o n t a t i o n .
The Major Power/Major Power Conflict Dyads
In r e - a n a l y z i n g the d a t a , u s i n g o n l y the major power/
major power c o n f l i c t s , we c o n f r o n t the most severe s m a l l - N problem
185
to d a t e . The maximum number of c o n f l i c t dyads i n v o l v i n g any
p a r t i c u l a r major power dur ing the n i n e t e e n t h century i s e i g h t
( f o r F r a n c e ) , and the number i s as smal l as one ( f o r I t a l y ) .
With these few o b s e r v a t i o n s i t makes l i t t l e sense to examine
the data by n a t i o n , and we are f o r c e d to pool the o b s e r v a t i o n s
f o r a l l major/major c o n f l i c t dyads. E l i m i n a t i n g d u p l i c a t e c a s e s ,
we o b t a i n the r e s u l t s reported i n the top h a l f of Table 28.
The top h a l f of Table 28 r e v e a l s t h a t , i n g e n e r a l ,
p o l a r i t y and d i f f e r e n c e i n power are s t r o n g l y and i n v e r s e l y
r e l a t e d to the e r u p t i o n of war i n n i n e t e e n t h century major power/
major power c o n f l i c t dyads; w h i l e c o n t i g u i t y and p r i o r war
e x p e r i e n c e are more weakly and p o s i t i v e l y r e l a t e d . The e f f e c t of
the war exper ience f a c t o r i s o p p o s i t e t h a t which we found when
examining a l l n ineteenth century c o n f l i c t dyads (Table 2 2 ) ,
s u g g e s t i n g t h a t involvement i n major/major dyads may o v e r r i d e A 2
past e x p e r i e n c e . The R f o r the t o t a l p r o b i t e q u a t i o n i s a
phenomenal . 9 8 , the measure of p o i n t p r e d i c t i v e power a s t r o n g . 4 4 .
In e f f e c t , we c o r r e c t l y p r e d i c t f o u r of s i x major/major war
i n v o l v e m e n t s , m i s s i n g only the B r i t i s h / R u s s i a n c o n f l i c t i n Crimea
and the A u s t r o - H u n g a r i a n / P r u s s i a n c o n f l a g r a t i o n i n the Seven Weeks
*2
War. The high R r e f l e c t s the f a c t t h a t we b a r e l y f a i l to
f o r e c a s t (">.50) these l a t t e r two war i n v o l v e m e n t s ; the p r e d i c t e d
p r o b a b i l i t y f o r B r i t a i n / R u s s i a being .46 and t h a t f o r A u s t r i a -
Hungary/Prussia . 4 7 . S i n c e we l o s e but two o b s e r v a t i o n s (France/
A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y i n the War of I t a l i a n U n i f i c a t i o n , 1859, and
TABLE 28
CORRELATION AND STANDARDIZED PROBIT COEFFICIENTS FOR THE INTERVENING VARIABLES WHEN PREDICTING TO POOLED MAJOR POWER WAR INVOLVEMENTS, FOR
ALL 19th AND 20th CENTURY MAJOR/MAJOR CONFLICT DYADS
19th C e n t u r y — A l l Major/Major Dyads A 2
PwrDif C o n t i g War Exp. P o l a r i t y Trade R P
P r e d i c t e d — * - _N_ - + - + -
0 or r b 20 - . 3 3 +.09 +.30 - . 7 3 * * *
b* 20 - . 6 9 +.21 +.23 - . 6 7 .98*** .44
20th C e n t u r y — A l l Major/Major Dyads
34 +.17 +.19 - . 0 5 +.02 +.42**
34 +.15 +.22 +.07 +.17 +.54 .34 .59
F i s h e r exact t e s t ( f o r 0 ) , f - t e s t from anova ( f o r r. ) , and \ from p r o b i t ( 7 - w i t h 4/5 df) *** < .01 < ** < .05 < * < .10 s i g n i f i c a n c e l e v e l
0 or r.
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Germany/Japan in the T r i p l e I n t e r v e n t i o n , 18.95) when we examine
o n l y s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t dyads, the c o e f f i c i e n t s f o r t h i s subset
of cases prove to be n e a r l y i d e n t i c a l to those recorded i n
Table 28 and a r e , thus, not r e p o r t e d . What t h i s does t e l l us ,
however, i s that almost every major power/major power c o n f l i c t
dyad d u r i n g the n ineteenth century c o n t a i n s a s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t
member.
In the twentieth century we a l s o have the s m a l l - N problem
that conf ronted us i n the e a r l i e r c e n t u r y . Major power
c o n f r o n t a t i o n s wi th other major powers range from a maximum of
e l e v e n ( f o r the S o v i e t Union) to a minimum of one ( f o r A u s t r i a -
Hungary). Thus, we once more pool the o b s e r v a t i o n s f o r c o n f l i c t
dyads (bottom h a l f of Table 2 8 ) .
We f i n d t h a t , i n the t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y , only the t rade
v a r i a b l e has a s i g n i f i c a n t impact on war involvement, again
s u g g e s t i n g that the trade i n d i c a t o r may be more s t r o n g l y r e f l e c t i n g
i n t e r s t a t e s a l i e n c e than economic interdependence. The e f f e c t s of
both d i f f e r e n c e i n power and c o n t i g u i t y d e v i a t e from what we
uncovered f o r a l l t w e n t i e t h century c o n f l i c t dyads (Table 2 6 ) .
C o n t i g u i t y i s , as o r i g i n a l l y h y p o t h e s i z e d , p o s i t i v e l y a s s o c i a t e d
wi th war involvement (a l though the a s s o c i a t i o n i s weak). But
PWRDIF i s a l s o , though u n e x p e c t e d l y , p o s i t i v e l y c o r r e l a t e d . The
PWRDIF i n d i c a t o r being used i n the a n a l y s i s of major power/
major power dyads i s not the same as the one used i n p r e v i o u s
a n a l y s e s ; s i n c e we are now examining only major (lowers,
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i n t e r v a l - s c a l e scores (as opposed to dichotomous measures) of
power c a p a b i l i t y are being a n a l y z e d . I t might be argued that
these i n t e r v a l - s c a l e scores o f f e r a s t r o n g e r t e s t of the
" d i f f e r e n c e i n power" h y p o t h e s i s . As we have a l r e a d y n o t e d ,
the n i n e t e e n t h century PWRDIF c o e f f i c i e n t s , presented i n the
top h a l f of Table 2 8 , s t r o n g l y support the h y p o t h e s i s t h a t
war i s more l i k e l y when opposing s t a t e s are r e l a t i v e l y equal
i n power. The t w e n t i e t h century c o e f f i c i e n t s , presented i n
the bottom h a l f of the t a b l e , do not. Indeed, f o r major power/
major power c o n f l i c t dyads d u r i n g the t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y , the
g r e a t e r the d i s p a r i t y i n power c a p a b i l i t i e s , the g r e a t e r the
l i k e l i h o o d of war. The r e l a t i o n s h i p i s , of c o u r s e , a very
weak one — the square of the b i s e r i a l c o r r e l a t i o n c o e f f i c i e n t
demonstrates t h a t " d i f f e r e n c e i n power" accounts f o r o n l y
three percent of the "variance" i n the outcome v a r i a b l e .
The c o e f f i c i e n t s f o r the remaining two v a r i a b l e s — b i - p o l a r i t y
and p r i o r war e x p e r i e n c e — a r e a l s o very weak. B i - p o l a r i t y i s ,
as we found e a r l i e r , p o s i t i v e l y r e l a t e d to war involvement i n the
t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y ; p r i o r war e x p e r i e n c e i s , f o r a l l p r a c t i c a l
p u r p o s e s , u n r e l a t e d to subsequent war i n v o l v e m e n t . A 2
The R from the p r o b i t a n a l y s i s i s not as s i z a b l e as we
might have e x p e c t e d , r e f l e c t i n g the f a c t t h a t a l a r g e number of
p r e d i c t i o n s l i e around the .50 p r o b a b i l i t y mark. The measure of
p o i n t p r e d i c t i v e power i s q u i t e r o b u s t , as we c o r r e c t l y f o r e c a s t
t h i r t e e n of e ighteen war involvements. We do, however, f a i l to
189
p r e d i c t some rather c r u c i a l c o n f l a g r a t i o n s , e . g . , the Russo-
Japanese War (1904), the German i n v a s i o n of the S o v i e t Union (1941),
and the Korean f i g h t i n g between China and the U n i t e d S t a t e s (1950).
F i n a l l y , i t should be noted t h a t a l l major power/major power
c o n f l i c t dyads i n the t w e n t i e t h century c o n t a i n at l e a s t one
s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t member a n d , t h e r e f o r e , the c o e f f i c i e n t s f o r
t h a t subset of cases are i d e n t i c a l to those r e p o r t e d i n the
bottom h a l f of Table 28.
Summarizing the R e s u l t s of the Second Stage
The analyses of dyadic r e l a t i o n s h i p s i n the c u r r e n t chapter
produce much more c o n s i s t e n t r e s u l t s a c r o s s s t a t e s than d i d the
n a t i o n a l - l e v e l analyses in Chapters Three and Four. During both
the n i n e t e e n t h and the t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r i e s we f i n d , as p r e d i c t e d ,
t h a t (1) c o n f r o n t a t i o n s between major powers are more l i k e l y to
e v o l v e i n t o wars than are c o n f r o n t a t i o n s between major and minor
powers, (2) the more severe the p r e v i o u s war e x p e r i e n c e s of the
p a r t i e s to the c o n f r o n t a t i o n , the s m a l l e r the p r o b a b i l i t y of war
(a l though t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p i s ext remely weak and has s e v e r a l
e x c e p t i o n s ) , and (3) c o u n t r i e s l i n k e d by mutual defense pacts
r a r e l y become i n v o l v e d in m i l i t a r y c o n f l i c t w i t h one a n o t h e r . In
the e a r l i e r century we d i s c o v e r , as h y p o t h e s i z e d , t h a t
c o n f r o n t a t i o n s between cont iguous s t a t e s are more l i k e l y to erupt
into war than those between n o n - n e i g h b o r i n g c o u n t r i e s ; a l t h o u g h
no c o n s i s t e n t r e l a t i o n s h i p f o r t h i s v a r i a b l e i s uncovered i n the
190
l a t e r c e n t u r y . We f i n d a n e g a t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p between b i - p o l a r i t y
and war i n the n ineteenth c e n t u r y ; a p o s i t i v e a s s o c i a t i o n i n the
t w e n t i e t h . And c o n t r a r y to e x p e c t a t i o n , t r a d e i s shown to be
p o s i t i v e l y r e l a t e d to war involvement i n the present c e n t u r y .
I t i s demonstrated t h a t the e f f e c t s of the i n t e r v e n i n g
v a r i a b l e s are the same f o r c o n f l i c t dyads c o n t a i n i n g s t a t u s
i n c o n s i s t e n t major powers as they are f o r the e n t i r e p o p u l a t i o n
o f c o n f l i c t dyads. And f i n a l l y , we d i s c o v e r t h a t a l t h o u g h the
p o s i t e d model does not help us to p r e d i c t whether or not
major power/mi nor power c o n f l i c t dyads w i l l eventuate i n war,
r a t h e r good p r e d i c t i o n i s o b t a i n e d f o r major power/major power
dyads.
CHAPTER VI
STATUS, CONFLICT, AND WAR
We have completed our i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f the r e l a t i o n s h i p s
p o s i t e d i n Chapter One. I t i s now time to "take s t o c k " — t o
r e c a p i t u l a t e and i n t e g r a t e the f i n d i n g s , and to a s c e r t a i n what
i m p l i c a t i o n s may be drawn from the preceding a n a l y s e s . I s h a l l
f i r s t proceed s y s t e m a t i c a l l y through the hypotheses t h a t comprise
the model t e s t e d i n t h i s t h e s i s , r e s t a t i n g the expected r e l a t i o n s h i p s
and r e i t e r a t i n g the e m p i r i c a l a s s o c i a t i o n s t h a t have been uncovered.
I s h a l l then conclude w i t h a few o b s e r v a t i o n s f o r peace r e s e a r c h
i n g e n e r a l .
Status I n c o n s i s t e n c y and Military C o n f l i c t
I o r i g i n a l l y hypothesized t h a t s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t s t a t e s
are prone to involvement i n i n t e r s t a t e m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s ,
but argued t h a t no d i r e c t l i n k e x i s t s between u n d e r r e c o g n i t i o n
( i . e . , s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y ) and war involvement . Subsequent
analyses l e a d to the f o l l o w i n g general c o n c l u s i o n s :
(1) S t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y i s not u n i v e r s a l l y a s s o c i a t e d
w i t h c o n f l i c t proneness; al though u n d e r r e c o g n i t i o n has some import
191
192
i n the n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y , i t s e f f e c t on c o n f l i c t behavior i s
l a r g e l y a t w e n t i e t h century phenomenon. And,
(2) While we f i n d t h a t s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y i s a s s o c i a t e d
w i t h major power m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s (at l e a s t d u r i n g the
t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y ) , i t has no a d d i t i o n a l e f f e c t on war involvement.
U n d e r r e c o g n i t i o n and C o n f r o n t a t i o n
There i s a c o n s i d e r a b l e amount of e m p i r i c a l evidence t h a t ,
i f s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y i s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n ,
i t i s m a i n l y a t w e n t i e t h century r e l a t i o n s h i p . To begin w i t h ,
b i v a r i a t e analyses r e v e a l , a t b e s t , o n l y a few moderate
a s s o c i a t i o n s between s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y and involvement i n
m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s dur ing the n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y . And
m u l t i v a r i a t e analyses demonstrate t h a t knowing which s t a t e s are
underrecognized d e c i d e d l y improves our a b i l i t y to p r e d i c t the
o c c u r r e n c e of i n t e r s t a t e c o n f r o n t a t i o n s f o r o n l y two (France and
Germany) of s i x major powers. In a d d i t i o n to t h i s , we f i n d t h a t
e i g h t e e n of twenty major power/major power c o n f l i c t dyads i n the
n i n e t e e n t h century c o n t a i n a t l e a s t one u n d e r r e c o g n i z e d s t a t e
and o n l y o n e - f o u r t h of the twenty dyads a c t u a l l y c o n t a i n two
s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t members. A c c o r d i n g to the b i n o m i a l p r o b a b i l i t y
d i s t r i b u t i o n , the l i k e l i h o o d t h a t e i t h e r of these c o u l d occur by
chance i s l a r g e — t h e former would be expected to o c c u r one i n
t h r e e t imes and, the l a t t e r , n e a r l y two i n three t i m e s . To p i c t u r e
t h i s , imagine that we have an urn c o n t a i n i n g red ( s t a t u s
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i n c o n s i s t e n t ) and white ( n o n - s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t ) b a l l s , where
t h e r e i s one b a l l f o r each major power and the d i s t r i b u t i o n of
c o l o r s i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e to the d i s t r i b u t i o n of s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t
s t a t e s . I f there i s a t o t a l of T b a l l s , W of which are white and
R r e d , then the p r o b a b i l i t y P-j o f s i m u l t a n e o u s l y drawing from
the urn two b a l l s , at l e a s t one o f which i s red ( i . e . , not
drawing two w h i t e ) , i s
(T(T-l)/2) - (W(W-l)/2) W(W-l) = i >
T(T-l)/2 T (T- l )
and the p r o b a b i l i t y P̂ of s e l e c t i n g two b a l l s , both of which are
r e d , i s
R ( R - l ) / 2 R ( R - l )
T(T-l )/2 T (T- l )
The c l a s s i c binomial problem would be to determine the l i k e l i h o o d
of drawing K or more p a i r s c o n t a i n i n g at l e a s t one red b a l l i n N
t r i a l s , g iven the expected p r o b a b i l i t y P-j ( o r , s i m i l a r l y , the
l i k e l i h o o d of drawing K or more p a i r s c o n t a i n i n g two red b a l l s ,
g i v e n the p r o b a b i l i t y P 0 ) . To p l a c e t h i s example back i n t o c o n t e x t ,
we are a s k i n g "what i s the l i k e l i h o o d of s e l e c t i n g , a t random,
e i g h t e e n or more c o n f l i c t dyads c o n t a i n i n g at. 1 e a s t one s t a t u s
i n c o n s i s t e n t member from a group o f twenty c o n f l i c t dyads, g i v e n
t h a t the p r o b a b i l i t y of s e l e c t i n g such a dyad i s P-j?" Or,
s i m i l a r l y , "what i s the l i k e l i h o o d of s e l e c t i n g f i v e or more
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conflict dyads in which both members are status inconsistent,
given that the probability of selecting such a dyad is P0?"
With the data that we have, however, we need to make a minor
adjustment. Since the number of major powers and the proportion
of underrecognized states vary from one year to the next, we
really have N urns, each with its own expected probability.
The question becomes, "what is the likelihood that from these
N urns we could draw K or more pairs having at least one red
ball (or K or more pairs having two red balls), given the mean
expected probability P-j (or P̂ ) for the urns?" The likelihood
is expressed by the cumulative binomial formula
where Q = 1 - P. In the nineteenth century, the probability (P-j)
of selecting a conflict dyad containing at least one status
inconsistent member is .833, resulting in a likelihood of .32
that we could draw by chance eighteen or more dyads with at least
one underrecognized member in twenty attempts; and the probability
(P )̂ of selecting a conflict dyad in which both members are
status inconsistent is .264, giving a likelihood of .64 that we
could randomly select five or more dyads in which both members
are underrecognized. Thus, "all the empirical evidence—whether
i t be bivariate or multivariate, national level or dyadic—
N
k=K
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p o i n t s to the f a c t that there i s no consistent , a s s o c i a t i o n
between u n d e r r e c o g n i t i o n and m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n f o r major
powers i n t h i s e a r l i e r century .
On the other hand, there i s evidence s u p p o r t i n g a
p o s i t i v e a s s o c i a t i o n between u n d e r r e c o g n i t i o n and m i l i t a r y
c o n f r o n t a t i o n i n the t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y . The United S t a t e s ,
U n i t e d Kingdom, and Soviet Union a l l d i s p l a y s t a t i s t i c a l l y
s i g n i f i c a n t b i v a r i a t e r e l a t i o n s h i p s i n t h i s l a t e r c e n t u r y ,
and most o t h e r major powers (with the e x c e p t i o n of A u s t r i a -
Hungary, which i s dismembered i n 1918) a l s o show p o s i t i v e
c o e f f i c i e n t s . S i m i l a r l y , i n the m u l t i v a r i a t e a n a l y s e s ,
knowing which s t a t e s are underrecognized i n c r e a s e s our a b i l i t y
to f o r e c a s t the occurrence of i n t e r s t a t e c o n f r o n t a t i o n s a c r o s s
a l l major powers f o r which s u f f i c i e n t data o b s e r v a t i o n s are
a v a i l a b l e . ^ F i n a l l y , we d i s c o v e r t h a t a l l t h i r t y - f o u r
major power/major power c o n f l i c t dyads i n the t w e n t i e t h century
c o n t a i n a t l e a s t one s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t member, and twenty-two
of these dyads have underrecognized c o u n t r i e s on both s i d e s .
During the t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y , the expected p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t a
major power/major power c o n f l i c t dyad w i l l c o n t a i n at l e a s t one
s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t member i s . 8 3 3 ; the expected p r o b a b i l i t y that
i t w i l l c o n t a i n two such members i s . 2 6 5 . From the b i n o m i a l
d i s t r i b u t i o n , we can a s c e r t a i n t h a t the l i k e l i h o o d of s e l e c t i n g
1 There are three major powers — Germany, A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y , and I t a l y — t h a t are too i n f r e q u e n t l y i n v o l v e d in c o n f r o n t a t i o n when s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t to permit s t a b l e parameter e s t i m a t e s .
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by chance t h i r t y - f o u r dyads w i t h at l e a s t one s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t
member i s approximately two i n a thousand, and the l i k e l i h o o d of
s e l e c t i n g twenty-two or more dyads i n which both p a r t i e s are
underrecognized i s l e s s than f o u r i n a m i l l i o n . The reader may
f e e l t h a t these p r o b a b i l i t i e s underest imate the " r e a l " l i k e l i h o o d
t h a t major power c o n f l i c t dyads w i l l c o n t a i n s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t
members, and t h a t they are s imply an a r t i f a c t of the "maximizing"
d e c i s i o n r u l e a p p l i e d to n - n a t i o n c o n f r o n t a t i o n s . Under the
"maximizing" r u l e , i f any major power in a c o a l i t i o n i s
u n d e r r e c o g n i z e d , then s t a t e s i n the opposing c o a l i t i o n are
c o n s i d e r e d to be i n a c o n f r o n t a t i o n w i t h a s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t
s t a t e . A much more c o n s e r v a t i v e manner of d e a l i n g w i t h n - n a t i o n
c o n f r o n t a t i o n s i s to s e l e c t all p o s s i b l e p a i r s of opposing s t a t e s .
Then, f o r example, i f there are three s t a t e s on e i t h e r s i d e ,
there are nine c o n f l i c t dyads. Using t h i s d e c i s i o n r u l e f o r the
t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y , we f i n d t h a t f o r t y - o n e of f o r t y - s i x major power/
major power c o n f l i c t dyads c o n t a i n at l e a s t one s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t
major power, and twenty-two of f o r t y - s i x c o n t a i n two. With the
expected p r o b a b i l i t i e s being r e s p e c t i v e l y .834 and . 2 6 4 , the
l i k e l i h o o d s d e r i v e d from the binomial d i s t r i b u t i o n are .20 and
. 0 0 1 . Thus, w h i l e we could expect to randomly s e l e c t f o r t y - o n e
or more major power/major power dyads w i t h at l e a s t one s t a t u s
i n c o n s i s t e n t member o n e - f i f t h of the t i m e , the l i k e l i h o o d of
randomly s e l e c t i n g twenty-two or more dyads i n which both p a r t i e s
are underrecognized i s only one i n a thousand.
1 0 /
In s h o r t , there appears to bo a c o n s i s t e n t r e l a t i o n s h i p
between s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y and major power involvement in
m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n dur ing the t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y . This
r e l a t i o n s h i p i s p a r t i c u l a r l y s t rong f o r major power/major power
c o n f r o n t a t i o n s , suggesting t h a t underrecognized major powers
demonstrate t h e i r d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n by c o n f r o n t i n g o t h e r major
powers. To the extent that t h i s i s t r u e , p o l i c i e s of e x c l u s i o n
and d i p l o m a t i c i s o l a t i o n i s m l i k e those d i r e c t e d by the western
Powers a g a i n s t the S o v i e t Union and, l a t e r , the P e o p l e ' s R e p u b l i c
o f China are c o u n t e r - p r o d u c t i v e i n t h a t , c e t e r i s p a r i b u s , they
i n c r e a s e the l i k e l i h o o d of m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n . On the
o t h e r hand, p o l i c i e s e x p l i c i t l y aimed at f o s t e r i n g d i p l o m a t i c
rapprochement are no guarantee f o r more p e a c e f u l b e h a v i o r .
That i s to say, w h i l e the e f f e c t s of s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y are
p e r v a s i v e i n the twent ieth c e n t u r y , u n d e r r e c o g n i t i o n i s not
a s u f f i c i e n t cause of m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n nor a necessary
cause of major power/mi nor power c o n f r o n t a t i o n (though i t may
be a necessary f a c t o r i n major power/major power i n v o l v e m e n t ) .
U n d e r r e c o g n i t i o n and War
The second c o n c l u s i o n from the a n a l y s e s on s t a t u s
i n c o n s i s t e n c y i s that it. has no e f f e c t on major power war
involvement beyond i n c r e a s i n g (at l e a s t d u r i n g the t w e n t i e t h
century) the l i k e l i h o o d of m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n . For one t h i n g ,
knowing t h a t a c o n f l i c t dyad c o n t a i n s one or more s t a t u s
198
i n c o n s i s t e n t s t a t e s does not improve our a b i l i t y to p r e d i c t
whether or not a war w i l l e r u p t . This i s t r u e d u r i n g both
c e n t u r i e s and f o r a l l major powers.
A second piece of ev idence i s found f o r major power/
major power c o n f r o n t a t i o n s . In the n i n e t e e n t h century t h e r e
are s i x major power/major power war dyads, f o u r of which c o n t a i n
one s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t member and a f i f t h c o n t a i n s two s t a t u s
i n c o n s i s t e n t s t a t e s . The expected p r o b a b i l i t y of s e l e c t i n g
a dyad having at l e a s t one underrecognized member i s . 8 5 0 ;
and of s e l e c t i n g a dyad wi th two such members, . 2 5 0 . The
l i k e l i h o o d of o b t a i n i n g by chance f i v e or more dyads, each
c o n t a i n i n g at l e a s t one underrecognized major power i s . 7 8 ;
of o b t a i n i n g one or more dyads w i t h two underrecognized major
powers, . 8 2 . Thus, the a c t u a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t
s t a t e s i n n i n e t e e n t h century major power/major power war dyads
i s h i g h l y l i k e l y .
The most c o n v i n c i n g e v i d e n c e , however, i s found amongst
the t w e n t i e t h century r e s u l t s . Using the "maximizing" d e c i s i o n
r u l e f o r i n c l u d i n g n-nat ion c o n f l i c t s , t h e r e are e i g h t e e n
major power/major power war dyads. Seven of these c o n t a i n one
s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t s t a t e , and the o t h e r e leven c o n t a i n s t a t e s
t h a t are both underrecognized. Given the d i s t r i b u t i o n of s t a t u s
i n c o n s i s t e n t s t a t e s i n the years i n which these wars o c c u r ,
the expected p r o b a b i l i t y of s e l e c t i n g a war dyad having at l e a s t
one underrecognized member i s . 8 3 4 , and the p r o b a b i l i t y of
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s e l e c t i n g a dyad w i t h two such members i s . 2 6 3 . The l i k e l i h o o d s
of o b t a i n i n g by chance as many or more dyads i n each category
as we a c t u a l l y do a r e , r e s p e c t i v e l y , .04 and . 0 0 2 . That i s ,
g i v e n the expected p r o b a b i l i t i e s , the war dyads are u n l i k e l y
to be random c h o i c e s . However, once we c o n t r o l f o r the
d i s t r i b u t i o n of s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t s t a t e s i n conflict dyads
(as opposed to the d i s t r i b u t i o n w i t h i n the p o p u l a t i o n of
major powers i n war y e a r s ) , we r e c e i v e a very d i f f e r e n t p i c t u r e .
S i n c e a l l major power/major power conflict dyads i n the t w e n t i e t h
c e n t u r y have at l e a s t one underrecognized member, the p r o b a b i l i t y
i s u n i t y t h a t a l l war dyads (which are a subset of c o n f l i c t dyads)
w i l l a l s o c o n t a i n a s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t member. S i m i l a r l y ,
the p r o p o r t i o n of c o n f l i c t dyads having two u n d e r r e c o g n i z e d major
powers i s .647 and, as a r e s u l t , the l i k e l i h o o d o f randomly
s e l e c t i n g eleven or more of e i g h t e e n war dyads w i t h t h i s property
i s . 7 3 . I f we use a d e c i s i o n r u l e f o r n - n a t i o n wars t h a t i n c l u d e s
all p o s s i b l e major power/major power war p a i r s , the e f f e c t i s the
same. To summarize, t h e n , once we have c o n t r o l l e d f o r the
d i s t r i b u t i o n of underrecognized major powers i n c o n f l i c t dyads,
we f i n d t h a t the l i k e l i h o o d i s q u i t e l a r g e t h a t we w i l l o b t a i n
— s i m p l y by c h a n c e — a s many major power/major power war dyads
c o n t a i n i n g s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n t members as we do.
Thus, the overwhelming c o n c l u s i o n i s t h a t s t a t u s
i n c o n s i s t e n c y does not a l t e r the l i k e l i h o o d of major power war .
beyond i t s e f f e c t i n i n c r e a s i n g the p r o b a b i l i t y of i n t e r s t a t e
200
m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s . The i m p l i c a t i o n of t h i s f i n d i n g would
appear to be that once c o u n t r i e s engage i n c o n f r o n t a t i o n , a set
of dynamics q u i t e d i s t i n c t from the o r i g i n a l p r e c i p i t a t i n g f a c t o r s
may w e l l determine the l i k e l i h o o d of war. As a r e s u l t ,
a m e l i o r a t o r y procedures, designed to s a l v e the sources of the
p r e c i p i t a t i n g i n j u r y or prevent the development of the m o t i v a t i n g
f a c t o r s , may be i n e f f e c t i v e a f t e r a c o n f r o n t a t i o n has a l r e a d y
begun. Such procedures need to be enacted before the use of
m i l i t a r y f o r c e i s threatened or a c t u a l l y employed.
The Intervening V a r i a b l e s and Military C o n f l i c t
I t was o r i g i n a l l y hypothesized t h a t there are environmental
f a c t o r s — some p h y s i c a l , some p s y c h o l o g i c a l , and some s t r u c t u r a l —
t h a t , w h i l e not i n themselves causes of m i l i t a r y c o n f l i c t ,
n e v e r t h e l e s s serve to a l t e r the p r o b a b i l i t y that c o n f r o n t a t i o n s and
wars w i l l e r u p t . What have we d i s c o v e r e d about these i n t e r v e n i n g
v a r i a b l e s ?
P h y s i c a l A t t r i b u t e s
Three hypotheses concerning " r e a c h a b i l i t y " were p o s i t e d :
(1) Given that a s t a t e i s prone to c o n f l i c t , the
p r o b a b i l i t y that i t w i l l become i n v o l v e d i n a m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n
i n c r e a s e s i f i t s power c a p a b i l i t i e s are i n c r e a s i n g and decreases i f
i t s c a p a b i l i t i e s are d e c r e a s i n g .
(2) Given t h a t s t a t e s are engaged i n m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n ,
the l i k e l i h o o d of war i s great i f the opposing s t a t e s are r e l a t i v e l y
201
equal i n power c a p a b i l i t i e s and the l i k e l i h o o d i s s m a l l e r i f the
s t a t e s are very unequal i n c a p a b i l i t i e s . And,
(3) Given t h a t s t a t e s are engaged i n m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n ,
wars are more l i k e l y to occur i f the p a r t i e s to the c o n f r o n t a t i o n
are cont iguous than i f they are d i s t a n t .
We f i n d t h a t the f i r s t hypothesis i s o n l y p a r t i a l l y
supported by the e m p i r i c a l e v i d e n c e . For n i n e t e e n t h century
major powers, the r e l a t i o n s h i p between change i n power and
involvement i n m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n i s g e n e r a l l y q u i t e weak,
but i n the p r e d i c t e d d i r e c t i o n (with o n l y Prussia/Germany
d i s p l a y i n g a s i z a b l e negat ive a s s o c i a t i o n ) . In the t w e n t i e t h
c e n t u r y , change i n power i s again weakly a s s o c i a t e d w i t h
involvement i n c o n f r o n t a t i o n f o r most major powers, but n e a r l y
every s i g n i f i c a n t c o e f f i c i e n t i s i n the p r e d i c t e d p o s i t i v e
d i r e c t i o n . The s t a t e s d i s p l a y i n g these p o s i t i v e c o e f f i c i e n t s
appear to espouse g e n e r a l l y e x p a n s i o n i s t f o r e i g n p o l i c i e s , w h i l e
t h e r e i s a n o t i c e a b l e tendency f o r the s t a t u s quo major powers
to have s m a l l e r , but negat ive c o e f f i c i e n t s . Thus, those p o l i c y
makers who f e a r the growth of power c a p a b i l i t i e s i n e x p a n s i o n i s t
s t a t e s have grounds f o r c o n c e r n . On the other hand, at l e a s t
f o r the t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y , we should be wary about the d e s t a b i l i z i n g
e f f e c t s o f any p r e c i p i t o u s d e c l i n e i n the c a p a b i l i t i e s of the
s t a t u s quo major powers.
Once a major power becomes engaged i n m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n ,
there i s a very c o n s i s t e n t r e l a t i o n s h i p between the r e l a t i v e
2 0 2
c a p a b i l i t i e s of the p a r t i e s i n v o l v e d and the l i k e l i h o o d of war.
The f i n d i n g s from the dyadic a n a l y s e s demonstrate t h a t
c o n f r o n t a t i o n s between major powers tend toward war, w h i l e
c o n f r o n t a t i o n s between major and minor powers are more l i k e l y
to a v o i d t h i s outcome. The r e l a t i o n s h i p between r e l a t i v e
e q u a l i t y i n c a p a b i l i t i e s and war involvement i s p a r t i c u l a r l y
pronounced i n the twent ieth c e n t u r y . When we focus e x c l u s i v e l y
on c o n f r o n t a t i o n s among major powers, we f i n d t h a t the p o s i t e d
r e l a t i o n s h i p between i n e q u a l i t y i n power and the decreased
p r o b a b i l i t y of war i s q u i t e s t r o n g l y supported i n the e a r l i e r
c e n t u r y , a l though there i s a weak r e l a t i o n s h i p between i n e q u a l i t y
and i n c r e a s e d l i k e l i h o o d of major power/major power war i n the
c u r r e n t c e n t u r y . O v e r a l l , however, the i m p l i c a t i o n of the
f i n d i n g s from the second h y p o t h e s i s on c a p a b i l i t i e s seems c l e a r ,
i f ominous: given the c a t a s t r o p h i c e f f e c t s of t w e n t i e t h century
major power wars, m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n between the major' powers
— e v e n the t h r e a t to use f o r c e — m u s t be a v o i d e d .
F i n a l l y , we f i n d o n l y scanty support f o r the t h i r d
r e a c h a b i l i t y h y p o t h e s i s , t h a t c o n c e r n i n g geographic p r o p i n q u i t y
and war. In the n ineteenth century the r e l a t i o n s h i p i s p o s i t i v e
as p r e d i c t e d , but very weak; i n the t w e n t i e t h , i t i s g e n e r a l l y
n o n e x i s t e n t . Focusing e x c l u s i v e l y on major power/major power
c o n f l i c t dyads, c o n t i g u i t y has a weak p o s i t i v e a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h
war involvement i n both c e n t u r i e s . S i n c e the data r e v e a l ,
e s p e c i a l l y f o r the t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y , t h a t a l a r g e number of the
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m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s in which major powers engage i n v o l v e
n e i g h b o r i n g s t a t e s , the absence of any a p p r e c i a b l e a s s o c i a t i o n
between c o n t i g u i t y and war involvement i s of c o n s i d e r a b l e i n t e r e s t .
In e s s e n c e , the data analyses support the p r o p o s i t i o n s t h a t
b o r d e r i n g s t a t e s are s a l i e n t to one a n o t h e r , and t h a t the
l a r g e number of i n t e r a c t i o n o p p o r t u n i t i e s a v a i l a b l e to cont iguous
s t a t e s a f f o r d c o n s i d e r a b l e l a t i t u d e f o r m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n .
B u t ; c o n t r o l l i n g f o r t h i s l a t t e r f a c t , major powers are n e a r l y
as l i k e l y to wage war a g a i n s t more d i s t a n t opponents as a g a i n s t
b o r d e r i n g c o u n t r i e s . In s h o r t , major powers are capable of
(and do) reach out w i t h s u b s t a n t i a l m i l i t a r y f o r c e beyond t h e i r
immediate n e i g h b o r s , r a i n i n g death and d e s t r u c t i o n almost as
r e a d i l y on the more d i s t a n t as on the c o n t i g u o u s . Indeed, i t i s
t h i s very a b i l i t y to reach out t h a t l a r g e l y i d e n t i f i e s t h a t c l a s s
of s t a t e s t h a t we designate "major powers."
The P s y c h o l o g i c a l Factor
In a d d i t i o n to the p r e c e d i n g p h y s i c a l a t t r i b u t e s , a
p s y c h o l o g i c a l f a c t o r was p o s i t e d to comprise a p o r t i o n of a s t a t e ' s
d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g m i l i e u . I t was h y p o t h e s i z e d t h a t :
(1) The more c o s t l y p r e v i o u s wars ( o p e r a t i o n a l i z e d i n
terms of b a t t l e d e a t h s ) , the l e s s l i k e l y i s a s t a t e to become
i n v o l v e d i n , or to i n i t i a t e , subsequent m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s .
And,
(2) Given t h a t such a c o n f r o n t a t i o n does n e v e r t h e l e s s
o c c u r , the g r e a t e r the l o s s e s s u f f e r e d by the p a r t i e s to the
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c o n f r o n t a t i o n in t h e i r previous war encounters ( r e g a r d l e s s of
the i d e n t i t y of t h e i r p r i o r opponents) , the s m a l l e r the
p r o b a b i l i t y that the c o n f r o n t a t i o n w i l l e r u p t i n t o war.
The data f o r the n i n e t e e n t h century o f f e r weak to
n e g l i g i b l e support f o r the f i r s t p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t war l o s s e s
reduce the p r o b a b i l i t y of subsequent c o n f l i c t i n v o l v e m e n t s .
A n a l y s e s on the t w e n t i e t h century data y i e l d more s i z a b l e
c o e f f i c i e n t s . However, the c o e f f i c i e n t s f o r most t w e n t i e t h
c e n t u r y major powers are p o s i t i v e , s u g g e s t i n g a r e v a n c h i s t
syndrome. The only s t a t e s r e v e a l i n g the p r e d i c t e d n e g a t i v e
c o e f f i c i e n t s are those t h a t , d u r i n g the c u r r e n t c e n t u r y , s u f f e r
c a t a s t r o p h i c m i l i t a r y and a s s o c i a t e d economic l o s s e s w i t h o u t
t a n g i b l e gain ( i . e . , Japan i n the Russo-Japanese War; Germany
and R u s s i a i n WW I ) . This r a i s e s the q u e s t i o n of what, i f
a n y t h i n g , n a t i o n s "learn" from p r i o r war e x p e r i e n c e s . I t appears
t h a t the t w e n t i e t h century major powers have d i s c o v e r e d t h a t
m i l i t a r y adventurism can be a p r o f i t a b l e t a c t i c f o r o b t a i n i n g
n a t i o n a l ends; only the most ravaging war e x p e r i e n c e s seem to
d e t e r these c o u n t r i e s from subsequent involvements i n m i l i t a r y
c o n f r o n t a t i o n s .
Given the gloomy i m p l i c a t i o n t h a t war l o s s e s do not deter
subsequent conflict involvement, do they n e v e r t h e l e s s d issuade
s t a t e s from e s c a l a t i n g c o n f r o n t a t i o n i n t o war? The a n a l y s e s
r e v e a l t h a t , f o r the most p a r t , b a t t l e l o s s e s a r e , as p r e d i c t e d ,
i n v e r s e l y r e l a t e d to subsequent war involvement. However, i t i s
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an ext remely weak r e l a t i o n s h i p , and the s i g n s become p o s i t i v e
when we look only at n ineteenth century major power/major power
c o n f l i c t dyads. By and l a r g e t h e n , w h i l e i n c r e a s e d b a t t l e l o s s e s
do have a tendency to reduce the p r o b a b i l i t y of subsequent war
i n v o l v e m e n t , the e f f e c t i s n e g l i g i b l e .
S t r u c t u r a l R e l a t i o n s h i p s
The l a s t set of i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s are concerned w i t h
s t r u c t u r a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s . I t was h y p o t h e s i z e d t h a t :
(1) The l e s s b i - p o l a r the major power subsystem, the
s m a l l e r the p r o b a b i l i t y of both m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n and war.
(2) The more c r o s s - c u t a s t a t e ' s bonds, the l e s s l i k e l y
i t i s to become i n v o l v e d i n m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n . And,
(3) Given t h a t such a c o n f r o n t a t i o n does o c c u r , the
p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t i t w i l l r e s u l t i n war w i l l be reduced i f the
opposing s t a t e s have bonds w i t h one a n o t h e r .
The f i r s t h y p o t h e s i s , a s s o c i a t i n g b i - p o l a r i t y w i t h m i l i t a r y
c o n f r o n t a t i o n and war, i s o n l y p a r t i a l l y c o r r o b o r a t e d i n the
n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y , but f i n d s more c o n s i s t e n t support i n the
t w e n t i e t h . During the n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y , b i - p o l a r i t y i s r e g u l a r l y
( i f o n l y moderately) a s s o c i a t e d w i t h g r e a t e r involvement i n
m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n . At the same t i m e , however, b i - p o l a r i t y i s
s t r o n g l y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h l e s s war involvement . Thus, i n the
n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y , b i - p o l a r i t y leads to probing and s p a r r i n g ,
but not war. In the t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y , b i - p o l a r i t y i s n e a r l y
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always a s s o c i a t e d wi th both a h igher l i k e l i h o o d of m i l i t a r y
c o n f r o n t a t i o n and a g r e a t e r p r o b a b i l i t y of war. T h i s i m p l i e s ,
f o r the c u r r e n t c e n t u r y , t h a t p o l i c i e s t h a t l e a d to the l o o s e n i n g
of b l o c t i e s serve to m i t i g a t e the p o s s i b i l i t y of o v e r t m i l i t a r y
c o n f l i c t . I t should be made c l e a r , however, t h a t the l o o s e n i n g
of these t i e s w i l l n o t , i n i t s e l f , prevent c o n f l i c t ; r a t h e r ,
the demise of r i g i d al ignments s i m p l y e l i m i n a t e s a c leavage
t h a t tends to focus and exacerbate e x i s t i n g i n t e r n a t i o n a l t e n s i o n s .
As f o r the second h y p o t h e s i s — p o s i t i n g a n e g a t i v e
a s s o c i a t i o n between c r o s s - c u t t i n g and involvement i n m i l i t a r y
c o n f r o n t a t i o n — i t i s d i s c o n f i r m e d . The r e l a t i o n s h i p i s o n l y
examined f o r the t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y , but d u r i n g t h i s c e n t u r y
the m a j o r i t y of the c r o s s - c u t t i n g c o e f f i c i e n t s are p o s i t i v e ,
though g e n e r a l l y weak. As e x p l a i n e d i n Chapter Four, one
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the p o s i t i v e ( i f weak) a s s o c i a t i o n between
c r o s s - c u t t i n g and m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n i s t h a t , d u r i n g the
t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y , major powers s imply do not have enough c r o s s -
c u t t i n g bonds to produce c r o s s - p r e s s u r e s a n d , t h e r e f o r e , the
c r o s s - c u t t i n g hypothesis i s j u s t not a p p l i c a b l e to i n t e r n a t i o n a l
i n t e r a c t i o n s i n the c u r r e n t c e n t u r y . A judgment as to the v a l i d i t y
of t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n must await a more p r e c i s e s p e c i f i c a t i o n of
what d o e s , and what does n o t , c o n s t i t u t e c r o s s - c u t t i n g . However,
an i n t e l l e c t u a l l y a t t r a c t i v e c o u n t e r - i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the
p o s i t i v e a s s o c i a t i o n between c r o s s - c u t t i n g and m i l i t a r y
c o n f r o n t a t i o n i s t h a t the s t a t e s t h a t have the most c r o s s - c u t bonds
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are (as hypothesized) the most c r o s s - p r e s s u r e d , but t h a t
( c o n t r a r y to e x p e c t a t i o n ) c r o s s - p r e s s u r e s produce t e n s i o n and
u n c e r t a i n t y , and thereby exacerbate p o t e n t i a l l y c o n f l i c t f u l
s i t u a t i o n s . At the present t i m e , i t i s i m p o s s i b l e to choose
between these a l t e r n a t i v e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . T h i s , however,
i s not a major problem, s i n c e i t appears t h a t c r o s s - c u t t i n g
i s o n l y p e r i p h e r a l l y r e l a t e d to major power involvement i n
m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s .
F i n a l l y , the t h i r d s t r u c t u r a l h y p o t h e s i s p o s i t s t h a t
i n t e r s t a t e bonds serve to l e s s e n the l i k e l i h o o d of war. Looking
f i r s t a t the e f f e c t s of m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e s , we f i n d t h a t ,
d u r i n g both c e n t u r i e s , m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s and wars r a r e l y
i n v o l v e s t a t e s having mutual defense pacts w i t h one a n o t h e r .
Whi le t h i s i m p l i e s t h a t a l l i a n c e s make c o n f l i c t s among a l l i a n c e
members l e s s l i k e l y , we have seen t h a t d u r i n g the t w e n t i e t h
c e n t u r y they i n c r e a s e the p r o b a b i l i t y of wars between a l l i a n c e
b l o c s . Thus, if a l l i a n c e s are to be used as a mechanism f o r
p r e v e n t i n g wars, the evidence suggests t h a t a "grand a l l i a n c e "
of a l l a g a i n s t none would be maximal. The p o s t - N a p o l e o n i c
Concert of Europe may w e l l be an example of t h i s . However,
c u r r e n t p o l i t i c a l r e a l i t i e s would appear to p r e c l u d e such a
" s o l u t i o n . " I t should be remembered t h a t , between the two
w o r l d wars , " c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y " proved to be a dismal f a i l u r e
because governments were u n w i l l i n g to p l a c e common n a t i o n a l or
human i n t e r e s t s above t h e i r own n a t i o n - s p e c i f i c i n t e r e s t s .
208
Today, there i s l i t t l e evidence to suggest t h a t t h a t s i t u a t i o n
has changed.
Looking at a second type of i n t e r s t a t e bond, i . e . , t rade
p a r t n e r s h i p , we uncover q u i t e a d i f f e r e n t a s s o c i a t i o n from what
we f i n d f o r m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e s . During the t w e n t i e t h century
(the o n l y p e r i o d f o r which we have d a t a ) , t r a d e proves to be
positively and s t r o n g l y r e l a t e d to war i n v o l v e m e n t . Thus, i f
major t r a d i n g partners become i n v o l v e d i n a m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n
w i t h one a n o t h e r , then the p r o b a b i l i t y of war s h a r p l y i n c r e a s e s .
T h i s i m p l i e s t h a t t rade i s by no means a route to more peaceful
i n t e r a c t i o n among n a t i o n s . Trade appears to make n a t i o n s more
s a l i e n t to one a n o t h e r — p e r h a p s a m p l i f y i n g b i l a t e r a l t e n s i o n s —
w h i l e not c r e a t i n g s u f f i c i e n t economic interdependence to m i t i g a t e
c o n f l i c t b e h a v i o r . This f i n d i n g , i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h the f i n d i n g
r e p o r t e d i n the preceding p a r a g r a p h , s t r o n g l y suggests t h a t
( c o n t r a r y to our o r i g i n a l c r o s s - c u t t i n g h y p o t h e s i s ) having a
major t r a d e p a r t n e r s h i p , but not a m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e , w i t h another
country i s a p o t e n t i a l l y v o l a t i l e r e l a t i o n s h i p . I t may be t h a t
t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p a r i s e s most o f t e n between c o u n t r i e s t h a t have
few common i n t e r e s t s beyond p u r e l y economic ones, or between
c o u n t r i e s t h a t have a t r a d i t i o n of m i l i t a r y a n i m o s i t y , y e t possess
the raw m a t e r i a l s , manufactured goods, or t e c h n o l o g i c a l e x p e r t i s e
to make t r a d e e c o n o m i c a l l y a t t r a c t i v e . Whatever the reason f o r
the r e l a t i o n s h i p , having a major t r a d e p a r t n e r s h i p , but not a
m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e , wi th another n a t i o n appears to o f f e r an
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environment that i s conducive to the e s c a l a t i o n of m i l i t a r y
c o n f r o n t a t i o n s i n t o i n t e r s t a t e wars.
This completes the review of the hypotheses that we
examined i n t h i s t h e s i s and the e m p i r i c a l a s s o c i a t i o n s that
were uncovered. As a summary of t h i s c h a p t e r , I present
Table 29 (p. 210). The t a b l e i s devoid of a l l nuances and
e x c e p t i o n s ; i t c o n t a i n s only the most general t rends in our
d a t a . More d e t a i l e d r e s u l t s c a n , of c o u r s e , be found in
Chapters Three through F i v e .
General Observat ions f o r Peace Research
I conclude t h i s c h a p t e r , and the t h e s i s , by h i g h l i g h t i n g
some i m p l i c a t i o n s t h a t our f i n d i n g s hold f o r r e s e a r c h on war i n
g e n e r a l . In t h i s l i g h t , I see four p e r t i n e n t p o i n t s .
F i r s t , i t cannot be assumed (but r a t h e r should be e x p l i c i t l y
examined) that on any dimension the major powers, or any o t h e r
group of s t a t e s , comprise a homogeneous set of a c t o r s . This
suggests that there may be s e r i o u s problems i n drawing n a t i o n -
s p e c i f i c i n f e r e n c e s from analyses that have employed data pooled
a c r o s s s t a t e s . This i s true f o r s y s t e m - l e v e l s t u d i e s i n which
scores are aggregated over a l l c o u n t r i e s and from which n a t i o n -
s t a t e - l e v e l i n f e r e n c e s are subsequently drawn, and f o r "modal-
n a t i o n " analyses i n which, a f t e r p o o l i n g and s i m u l t a n e o u s l y
a n a l y z i n g scores from a number of d i f f e r e n t c o u n t r i e s , n a t i o n -
s p e c i f i c i n f e r e n c e s are drawn from what i s r e a l l y an examination
TABLE 29
GENERAL SUMMARY OF FINDINGS FROM CHAPTERS THREE THROUGH FIVE
Predicted
19th C
20th C
Predicted
19th C
20th C
Stage One: P r e d i c t i n g to M i l i t a r y C o n f r o n t a t i o n
S t a t . Inc. A Power War Exp. P o l a r i t y X - C u t t i n g
+ + - +
+
+/- +/-
Stage Two: P r e d i c t i n g to I n t e r s t a t e War
S t a t . Inc. PwrDif C o n t i g u i t y War Exp. P o l a r i t y
0 - + - +
o
A l l y : T r a d e
+ = i n c r e a s e s p r o b a b i l i t y of m i l i t a r y c o n f l i c t - = decreases p r o b a b i l i t y of m i l i t a r y c o n f l i c t 0 = does not a l t e r p r o b a b i l i t y of m i l i t a r y c o n f l i c t
211
of a composite "average" n a t i o n . In a s i m i l a r v e i n , t h i s l a c k
of homogeneity presents d i f f i c u l t i e s f o r p r o b a b i l i t y model ing
on data pooled from a number of s t a t e s . When p r o b a b i l i t y
d i s t r i b u t i o n s are compared to a c t u a l d i s t r i b u t i o n s of events
i n o r d e r to determine the presence or absence of such p r o p e r t i e s
as c o n t a g i o n or independence, an assumption i s made t h a t a c t o r s
d i s p l a y s i m i l a r p a t t e r n s of behavior on whatever dimension i s
being examined. I f t h i s assumption i s v i o l a t e d , no i n f e r e n c e s
can be drawn.
A second f i n d i n g of general importance i s the e x i s t e n c e
of i n t e r - c e n t u r y d i f f e r e n c e s . Whether or not the n i n e t e e n t h /
t w e n t i e t h century dichotomy i s the opt imal b r e a k - p o i n t cannot
be a s c e r t a i n e d from what we have done; to l o c a t e such a p o i n t
would n e c e s s i t a t e a much more thorough search p r o c e d u r e . I t i s ,
however, q u i t e e v i d e n t that the r e l a t i o n s h i p s among some of the
key v a r i a b l e s i n t h i s study d i f f e r from century to c e n t u r y . The
reason why there are i n t e r - c e n t u r y d i f f e r e n c e s i s , p r e s e n t l y ,
a m a t t e r of s p e c u l a t i o n . My s u s p i c i o n i s t h a t i t i s a s s o c i a t e d
w i t h a fundamental r e o r i e n t a t i o n o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s .
P o l i t i c s i n the n ineteenth century was dominated by a l i m i t e d
number o f Euro-centered a r i s t o c r a t i c r e g i m e s , having both f a m i l i a l
t i e s a n d , e q u a l l y i m p o r t a n t l y , v a s t areas of unclaimed t e r r i t o r y
i n t o which to expand. I n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s i n the t w e n t i e t h
c e n t u r y i s dominated by b o u r g e o i s - n a t i o n a l i s t governments, o p e r a t i n g
i n a w o r l d beset by a p r o l i f e r a t i n g number of "independent" a c t o r s ,
212
the concomitant disappearance o f unclaimed t e r r i t o r y f o r n a t i o n a l
e x p a n s i o n , and the development of r a t h e r r i g i d i d e o l o g i c a l schisms
— a l l tending toward making p o l i t i c s assume the a s p e c t s of a
"zero-sum game." T h i s , of c o u r s e , i s o n l y s p e c u l a t i o n . But
whatever the cause, the f a c t t h a t there e x i s t s t h i s n i n e t e e n t h /
t w e n t i e t h century dichotomy should g ive pause to anyone who would
i n d i s c r i m i n a t e l y s e l e c t a time s l i c e f o r a n a l y s i s . For what we
have d i s c o v e r e d i s an absence of temporal homogeneity t h a t can
produce the same types of i n f e r e n t i a l f a l l a c i e s as are generated
by a l a c k of s p a t i a l homogeneity. I t i s o n l y f a i r , however, to
i n s e r t a caveat : the more s u b - p e r i o d s i n t o which we d i v i d e a
t ime s e r i e s , the fewer o b s e r v a t i o n s w i t h i n each s u b - p e r i o d , and
the more l i k e l y we are to o b t a i n d i f f e r e n t r e l a t i o n s h i p s merely
by chance. C o m p l i c a t i n g the s i t u a t i o n i s the f a c t t h a t there i s
no c e r t a i n r u l e that informs us t h a t we have too few data p o i n t s .
T h i r d , t h i s study suggests t h a t the c o n f l i c t process i s
d i v i s i b l e i n t o f a i r l y d i s t i n c t s t a g e s . I have employed a s imple
two-stage model; perhaps a m u l t i - s t a g e t y p o l o g y , such as the one
used to c a t e g o r i z e the m i l i t a r y c o n f l i c t data presented i n
Appendix C, would be more adequate ( c f . B a r r i n g e r , 1972;
B l o o m f i e l d and B e a t t i e , 1971a, 1971b; B l o o m f i e l d and L e i s s , 1969;
and W r i g h t , 1965a). Using such a "stage" c o n c e p t i o n of the p r o c e s s ,
we s h o u l d be able to determine whether the same v a r i a b l e s t h a t
" e x p l a i n " the occurrence o f c o n f r o n t a t i o n s a l s o " e x p l a i n " the
o c c u r r e n c e of wars and, s i m i l a r l y , whether the same v a r i a b l e s
213
account f o r both the occurrence (yes/no) and the amount (magnitude,
s e v e r i t y , and i n t e n s i t y ) of m i l i t a r y c o n f l i c t . Moreover, the
f i n d i n g s from the present study suggest t h a t , w h i l e n a t i o n s may
become i n v o l v e d i n c o n f r o n t a t i o n s f o r a v a r i e t y of r e a s o n s , the
b e h a v i o r of c o n f l i c t dyads i s l i k e l y to be h i g h l y p r e d i c t a b l e .
Thus, f i e l d t h e o r e t i c approaches f o c u s i n g on dyadic i n t e r a c t i o n s
( e . g . , Rummel, 1969, 1971) may be very powerful techniques f o r
u n d e r s t a n d i n g how wars e v o l v e .
F i n a l l y , as i s c l e a r l y s t a t e d i n the opening c h a p t e r ,
i t has been my i n t e n t to combine i n t o a s i n g l e model some of the
more f r e q u e n t l y - p o s i t e d " e x p l a n a t i o n s " of why c o u n t r i e s become
i n v o l v e d i n m i l i t a r y c o n f l i c t and to e m p i r i c a l l y examine the
model's a b i l i t y to account f o r n a t i o n - s t a t e b e h a v i o r . I have
done t h i s . The c o n s t r u c t t e s t e d i n t h i s t h e s i s , however, o f f e r s
o n l y one of a number of p l a u s i b l e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . In the
l i t e r a t u r e on war we f i n d many f a c t o r s — a m o n g o t h e r s , power,
need f o r r e s o u r c e s , s e l f - p r e s e r v a t i o n , and the d e s i r e to r e g a i n
l o s t t e r r i t o r y — t h a t are a l l e g e d to c o n t r i b u t e to the e x i s t e n c e
of m i l i t a r y h o s t i l i t i e s . What needs to be done i s to c o n c i s e l y
s p e c i f y and t e s t competing models of c o n f l i c t involvement i n
o r d e r to i d e n t i f y those c o u n t r i e s , time p e r i o d s , and/or mixes
o f models t h a t best account f o r a n d , u l t i m a t e l y , e x p l a i n
c o n f l i c t i v e behavior among s t a t e s . To r e i t e r a t e the p o i n t w i t h
which I began t h i s t h e s i s , an u n d e r s t a n d i n g of why wars occur
i s a p r e r e q u i s i t e to the development of e f f e c t i v e measures f o r
214
p r e v e n t i n g them. I t i s my profound hope t h a t the p r e c e d i n g
c h a p t e r s have to some extent i n c r e a s e d t h i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g . Y e t ,
even i f they have, we are u n f o r t u n a t e l y s t i l l f a r removed from
the day when
they s h a l l beat t h e i r swords i n t o p l o w s h a r e s , and t h e i r spears i n t o pruninghooks: n a t i o n s h a l l not l i f t up sword a g a i n s t n a t i o n , n e i t h e r s h a l l they l e a r n war any more.
I s a i a h 2:4
APPENDIX A
DATA SOURCES
A l l the data used i n t h i s t h e s i s — w i t h the s i n g l e
e x c e p t i o n of the i n t e r s t a t e m i l i t a r y c o n f l i c t l i s t — h a v e been
a c q u i r e d from the C o r r e l a t e s of War P r o j e c t a t the U n i v e r s i t y
of M i c h i g a n . As an a s s o c i a t e of the p r o j e c t , I have, m y s e l f ,
spent many months c o m p i l i n g and r e - c o n s t r u c t i n g data s e t s of
i n t e r s t a t e c o n t i g u i t i e s and m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e s . And, f o r the
purpose of t h i s t h e s i s , I devoted an a d d i t i o n a l year to c o m p i l i n g
the l i s t of i n t e r s t a t e m i l i t a r y c o n f l i c t s t h a t appears i n
Appendix C. I, t h e r e f o r e , r e c o g n i z e and a p p r e c i a t e the e f f o r t
t h a t has been expended by my c o l l e a g u e s — b o t h past and p r e s e n t —
i n data g e n e r a t i o n , and I would l i k e to thank the p r o j e c t ' s
d i r e c t o r , J . David S i n g e r , f o r making p r o j e c t data s e t s a v a i l a b l e
to me.
215
APPENDIX B
INTERSTATE SYSTEM MEMBERS
On the f o l l o w i n g pages are l i s t e d those c o u n t r i e s t h a t
q u a l i f y as i n t e r s t a t e system members and the i n c l u s i v e years
d u r i n g which they are members. To q u a l i f y , a s t a t e must have
independent c o n t r o l over i t s own armed f o r c e s and r e c e i v e
d i p l o m a t i c r e c o g n i t i o n from any two s t a t e s t h a t f u l f i l l the
same requirements ( c f . S inger and S m a l l , 1972). The i n c l u s i v e
dates o f membership f o r some s t a t e s d i f f e r from those found i n
S i n g e r and S m a l l , and r e f l e c t the e x t e n s i o n of the temporal
domain to i n c l u d e 1970, as w e l l as some r e v i s e d e s t i m a t e s of
when c o u n t r i e s f u l f i l l e d , or f a i l e d to f u l f i l l , the q u a l i f i c a t i o n s
f o r system membership.
216
217
INCLUSIVE YEARS IN INTERSTATE
ABB. NATION SYSTEM
AFG A f g h a n i s t a n 1921-1970 ALB A l b a n i a 1913-1914
1920-1939 1944-1970
ALG A l g e r i a 1962-1970 ARG Argent ina 1825-1970 AUL A u s t r a l i a 1920-1970 AUS A u s t r i a 1919-1938
1955-1970 A-H Aust r ia-Hungary 1816-1918 BAD Baden 1816-1871 BAR Barbados 1966-1970 BAV Bavar ia 1816-1871 BEL Belgium 1831-1940 Belgium
1944-1970 BOL B o l i v i a 1839-1970 BOT Botswana 1966-1970 BRA Braz i l 1824-1970 BUL Bulgaria 1878-1970 BUR Burma 1948-1970 BUI Burundi 1962-1970 CAO Cameroun 1960-1970 CAN Canada 1920-1970 CEN C e n t r a l A f r i c a n R e p u b l i c 1960-1970 CHA Chad 1960-1970 CHL C h i l e 1827-1970 CHN China 1843-1970 COL Colombia 1825-1970 CON Congo 1960-1970 COS Costa Rica 1849-1970 CUB Cuba 1902-1906
1909-1970 CYP Cyprus 1960-1970 CZE C z e c h o s l o v a k i a 1919-1939
1945-1970 DAH Dahomey 1960-1970 DEN Denmark 1816-1943
1945-1970 DOM Dominican R e p u b l i c 1882-1888
1892-1916 1925-1970
ECU Ecuador 1837-1970 EGY Egypt/U.A.R. 1855-1882 Egypt/U.A.R.
1922-1970
218
INCLUSIVE YEARS IN INTERSTATE
ABB. NATION SYSTEM
EQG E q u a t o r i a l Guinea 1968-1 970 EST E s t o n i a 1920-1 940 ETH E t h i o p i a 1897-1 936
1941-1 970 FIJ F i j i 1970-1 970 FIN F i n l a n d 1918-1 970 FRN France 1816-1 942
1944-1 970 GAB Gabon 1960-1 970 GAM Gambia 1965-1 970 GDR German Democratic R e p u b l i c 1954-1 970 GFR German Federal R e p u b l i c 1955-1 970 GMY Germany/Prussia 1816-1 945 GHA Ghana 1957-1 970 GRC Greece 1831-1 941
1944-1 970 GUA Guatemala 1840-1 970 GUI Guinea 1958-1 970 GUY Guyana 1966-1 970 HA I H a i t i 1861-1 915
1934-1 970 HAN Hanover 1838-1 866 HSE Hesse E l e c t o r a l 1816-1 866 HSG Hesse Grand Ducal 1816-1 871 HON Honduras 1854-1 970 HUN Hungary 1919-1 970 ICE Iceland 1942-1 970 IND India 1947-1 970 INS Indonesia 1949-1 970 IRN Iran ( P e r s i a ) 1826-1 970 IRQ Iraq 1932-1 970 IRE I r e l a n d 1923-1 970 ISR I s r a e l 1949-1 970 ITA I t a l y / S a r d i n i a 1816-1 970 IVO Ivory Coast 1960-1 970 JAM Jamaica 1962-1 970 JPN Japan 1859-1 945
1952-1 970 JOR Jordan 1947-1 970 KEN Kenya 1963-1 970 KHM Khmer R e p u b l i c (Cambodia) 1954-1 970 KOR Korea 1883-1 905 PRK Korea, Dem. People's Rep. 1949-1 970 ROK Korea, Republ ic of 1949-1 970
219
INCLUSIVE YEARS IN INTERSTATE
ABB. NATION SYSTEM
KUW Kuwait 1961-1970 LAO Laos 1954-1970 LAT L a t v i a 1920-1940 LEB Lebanon 1945-1970 LES Lesotho 1966-1970 LBR L i b e r i a 1920-1970 LIB L i by a 1952-1970 LIT L i t h u a n i a 1921-1940 LUX Luxemburg 1891-1914
1918-1940 1944-1970
MAG Malagasy 1960-1970 MAW Malawi 1964-1970 MAL M a l a y s i a 1957-1970 MAD Maldive I s l a n d s 1965-1970 ML I M a l i 1960-1970 MLT Malta 1964-1970 MAU M a u r i t a n i a 1960-1970 MAS M a u r i t i u s 1968-1970 MEC Mecklenburg Schwerin 1816-1867 MEX Mexico 1823-1970 MOD Modena 1824-1860 MON Mongolia 1929-1943 Mongolia
1949-1970 MNT Montenegro 1877-1919 MOR Morocco 1839-1911
1956-1970 NEP Nepal 1948-1970 NTH Netherlands 1816-1940
1945-1970 NEW New Zealand 1920-1970 NIC Nicaragua 1854-1970 NIR Niger 1960-1970 NIG N i g e r i a 1960-1970 NOR Norway 1905-1940 Norway
1945-1970 PAK P a k i s t a n 1947-1970 PAN Panama 1904-1970 PAP Papal S t a t e s 1816-1860 PAR Paraguay 1846-1870 Paraguay
1876-1970 PMA Parma 1818-1860 PER Peru 1826-1880
1883-1970
220
INCLUSIVE YEARS IN INTERSTATE
ABB. NATION SYSTEM
PHI P h i l i p p i n e s 1947-1970 POL Poland 1919-1939
1945-1970 POR Portugal 1816-1970 RUM Rumania 1861-1970 RWA Rwanda 1962-1970 SAL Salvador 1854-1970 SAU Saudi A r a b i a 1930-1970 SAX Saxony 1816-1867 SEN Senegal 1960-1970 SIE S i e r r a Leone 1961-1970 SIN Singapore 1965-1970 SOM Somalia 1960-1970 SAF South A f r i c a 1920-1970 SPN Spain 1816-1970 SRI S r i Lanka (Ceylon) 1948-1970 SUD Sudan 1956-1970 SWA Swaziland 1968-1970 SWD Sweden 1816-1970 SWZ S w i t z e r l a n d 1816-1970 SYR S y r i a 1946-1958
1961-1970 TAW Taiwan 1949-1970 TAZ Tanzania/Tanganyika 1961-1970 THI Thai land 1881-1970 TOG Togo 1960-1970 TRN Transvaal 1889-1899 TRI T r i n i d a d 1962-1970 TUN T u n i s i a 1825-1881
1956-1970 TUR Turkey/Ottoman Empire 1816-1970 TUS Tuscany 1816-1860 SIC Two S i c i l i e s 1816-1860 USR U . S . S . R . (Russia) 1816-1970 UGA Uganda 1962-1970 UK United Kingdom 1816-1970 USA United S t a t e s of America 1816-1970 UPP Upper V o l t a 1960-1970 URU Uruguay 1843-1970 VEN Venezuela 1835-1970 DRV Vietnam, Democratic Rep. 1954-1970 RVN Vietnam, R e p u b l i c of 1954-1970 WRT Wuerttemburg 1816-1871
221
NATION
Yemen Arab R e p u b l i c Yemen People's R e p u b l i c Y u g o s l a v i a / S e r b i a
Z a i r e (Congo, Kinshasa) Zambia Zanzibar
INCLUSIVE YEARS IN INTERSTATE SYSTEM
1947-1970 1967-1970 1868-1941 1944-1970 1960-1970 1964-1970 1963-1964
APPENDIX C
IDENTIFYING INTERSTATE CONFLICTS
To t e s t the model p o s i t e d i n t h i s t h e s i s i t was necessary
to i d e n t i f y the s e r i o u s i n t e r s t a t e c o n f l i c t s and d i s p u t e s i n which
major powers have become engaged s i n c e 1820. The wor ld p o l i t i c s
l i t e r a t u r e suggests t h a t the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c t h a t i s common to a l l
such events i s the t h r e a t or use of m i l i t a r y f o r c e . Being unable
to l o c a t e any s a t i s f a c t o r y c o m p i l a t i o n o f i n t e r s t a t e m i l i t a r y
c o n f l i c t s t h a t encompassed the a p p r o p r i a t e s p a t i a l and temporal
domains, I expended the g r e a t e r p a r t of one year c o n s t r u c t i n g
such a data s e t .
C r i t e r i a f o r Inclusion
For a case to q u a l i f y f o r i n c l u s i o n i n t h i s data s e t , i t
had to f i r s t s a t i s f y three c r i t e r i a . One, the m i l i t a r y c o n f l i c t
had to be between 1 members of the i n t e r s t a t e system, i . e . , i t had
"4 have c o l l e c t e d one type of c o n f l i c t ( i . e . , i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z e d c i v i l c o n f l i c t ) t h a t i s b e t t e r d e s c r i b e d as " c r o s s - s t a t e " r a t h e r than " i n t e r - s t a t e " s i n c e i t i n v o l v e s i n t e r v e n t i o n w i t h i n , r a t h e r than between, system members. Al though these i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z e d c i v i l c o n f l i c t s are not i n c l u d e d i n the p r e c e d i n g a n a l y s e s , they are n e v e r t h e l e s s l i s t e d i n t h i s appendix .
2 2 2
223
to be between n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l e n t i t i e s t h a t had independent
c o n t r o l over t h e i r own armed f o r c e s and r e c e i v e d d i p l o m a t i c
r e c o g n i t i o n from any two members o f the i n t e r s t a t e system.
(Appendix B l i s t s the members o f the system and the years i n
which they hold membership.) I t was not necessary t h a t the
c o n f l i c t take place w i t h i n or a long the borders of a member
s t a t e ; i t was only necessary t h a t r e g u l a r m i l i t a r y f o r c e s
(or i r r e g u l a r f o r c e s under the d i r e c t command) o f a member s t a t e
be used.
The second c r i t e r i o n was t h a t one of the s t a t e s u s i n g ,
or t h r e a t e n i n g to use, m i l i t a r y f o r c e d u r i n g the c o n f l i c t had
to be a major power. Major powers and the y e a r s d u r i n g which
they h e l d t h a t s t a t u s were i d e n t i f i e d through a mai l q u e s t i o n n a i r e
sent to twenty- four d i p l o m a t i c and m i l i t a r y h i s t o r i a n s . (A l i s t
o f the major powers can be found i n Chapter Two.)
The t h i r d c r i t e r i o n was t h a t the c o n f l i c t be government-
d i r e c t e d , n o n - a c c i d e n t a l , and n o n - r o u t i n e . I was s e a r c h i n g f o r
cases i n which governments were making demands, backed by the
t h r e a t o r use of combat f o r c e s , on o t h e r governments. I f h o s t i l e
a c t i o n was c l e a r l y u n r e l a t e d to government p o l i c y but was r a t h e r
the r e s u l t of some a c c i d e n t ( e . g . , the i n a d v e r t e n t s i n k i n g of a
s h i p ) o r the a c t i v i t i e s of groups over which the government had
no e f f e c t i v e c o n t r o l ( e . g . , "independent" t r i b e s m e n , b a n d i t s , or
t e r r o r i s t s ) , the case was e x c l u d e d . S i m i l a r l y , i f n a t i o n a l f o r c e s
were c o n t r i b u t e d to an i n t e r n a t i o n a l governmental o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s
224
peace-keeping o p e r a t i o n and were thereby e f f e c t i v e l y removed from
the d i r e c t c o n t r o l of the s u p p l y i n g government, t h e i r p a r t i c i p a t i o n
i n m i l i t a r y a c t i v i t i e s was not i n c l u d e d . F i n a l l y , there were
r o u t i n e i n t e r a c t i o n s among both f r i e n d l y and h o s t i l e s t a t e s t h a t
would i n t r o d u c e much "noise" i f i n c l u d e d , e . g . , the s u p p l y i n g of
a d v i s o r s and noncombat support to a l l i e s , the s p o r a d i c (but non-
s u s t a i n e d ) border c l a s h by smal l numbers of t roops along a h o s t i l e
f r o n t i e r , or the downing of a s i n g l e a i r c r a f t t h a t had v i o l a t e d
n a t i o n a l a i r s p a c e .
Gather ing the Data
Several hundred books and a r t i c l e s were used i n c o l l e c t i n g
the cases t h a t comprise the major power i n t e r s t a t e c o n f l i c t data
s e t . I i n i t i a l l y combined e i g h t e e n l i s t s 1 c o v e r i n g v a r i o u s s p a t i a l
and temporal domains, s e l e c t i n g cases t h a t s a t i s f i e d my c r i t e r i a .
I then g r e a t l y expanded my c o l l e c t i o n by t h o r o u g h l y s e a r c h i n g
Langer's voluminous and h i g h l y - r e s p e c t e d E n c y c l o p e d i a of World
Hi s t o r y (1972 ) . A f t e r twice r e a d i n g Langer , I next garnered a l l
a p p r o p r i a t e cases from Dupuy and Dupuy's e x t e n s i v e survey,
E n c y c l o p e d i a of Military H i s t o r y ( 1 9 7 0 ) . Having c o n s t r u c t e d a
c a n d i d a t e l i s t , I proceeded to r e s e a r c h each case using annual
] Cady (1968) , C a r r o l l ( u n p u b l i s h e d ) , Deitchman ( 1 9 6 4 ) , Emerson (1972, 1973), Goldmann ( 1 9 7 1 ) , Greaves ( 1 9 6 2 ) , H o l s t i (1966), K e l l o g ( u n p u b l i s h e d ) , Kende (1968) , L e i s s and B l o o m f i e l d ( 1 9 6 7 ) , North ( 1 9 6 9 ) , Richardson ( 1 9 6 0 ) , Sabrosky and Morton ( u n p u b l i s h e d ) , S i n g e r and Small (1972), S o r o k i n ( 1 9 3 7 ) , Wainhouse (1966), Wood ( 1 9 6 8 ) , and Wright (1965).
225
r e g i s t e r s , o f f i c i a l documents, and newspaper r e p o r t s , as w e l l as
n a t i o n a l , r e g i o n a l , and general h i s t o r i e s . I compared my pruned
l i s t to two others that were being s i m u l t a n e o u s l y c o m p i l e d ,
Leng's unpubl ished c o l l e c t i o n of i n t e r s t a t e m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s
(1816-1945) and Jones and Bennett's unpubl ished l i s t of c i v i l wars
( 1 8 1 6 - 1 9 7 0 ) , and found no case i n e i t h e r of these that f u l f i l l e d
my t h r e e c r i t e r i a and, y e t , d i d not appear i n my c o l l e c t i o n .
F i n a l l y , I asked a d i p l o m a t i c h i s t o r i a n to review the c o n f l i c t
cases i n order to judge the m e r i t o f t h e i r i n c l u s i o n and to suggest
p o s s i b l e cases t h a t may have escaped my r e s e a r c h net .
The v a l i d a t i o n process i s s t i l l c o n t i n u i n g at t h i s t ime.
The B e h a v i o r a l C o r r e l a t e s of War P r o j e c t , under the d i r e c t i o n of
R u s s e l l Leng, i s i n the midst of c o l l e c t i n g a c o n f l i c t data set
f o r a l l members of the i n t e r s t a t e system s i n c e 1816. The Leng team
i s s y s t e m a t i c a l l y combing a s e l e c t e d set of n a t i o n a l h i s t o r i e s ,
w r i t t e n i n several languages. When t h e i r u n d e r t a k i n g i s completed,
my data set w i l l be compared w i t h the BCOW c o m p i l a t i o n i n order to
determine the r e l a t i v e m e r i t s of the two d i f f e r e n t search procedures.
C I a s s i f y i n g the Cases
I have s o r t e d the m i l i t a r y c o n f l i c t s t h a t I c o l l e c t e d i n t o
one o f f o u r c a t e g o r i e s . Only the f i r s t three of these c a t e g o r i e s
are s t r i c t l y i n t e r s t a t e , i . e . , c o n f l i c t between members of the
i n t e r s t a t e system. The f o u r t h category i s r e a l l y " c r o s s - s t a t e "
s i n c e i t c o n t a i n s cases i n which a member s t a t e i n t e r v e n e s i n a
226
c i v i l c o n f l i c t w i t h i n another member s t a t e . The c a t e g o r i e s are
as f o l l o w s :
(1) i n t e r s t a t e war: combat between armed f o r c e s , i n v o l v i n g at l e a s t one member of the i n t e r s t a t e system on each s i d e , r e s u l t i n g i n a t o t a l o f one thousand or more b a t t l e - c o n n e c t e d deaths to the armed f o r c e s , and l a s t i n g f o r more than t w e n t y - f o u r hours.
(2) i n t e r s t a t e military a c t i o n : combat between armed f o r c e s , i n v o l v i n g at l e a s t one member of the i n t e r s t a t e system on each s i d e ; o r , the use of armed f o r c e s by a member s t a t e , d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t the t e r r i t o r y and people of another member s t a t e . M i l i t a r y a c t i o n taken by one s t a t e may provoke the t a r g e t s t a t e to engage the f i r s t a c t o r i n m i l i t a r y combat; so long as the subsequent combat r e s u l t s in fewer than one thousand b a t t l e -connected deaths to the armed f o r c e s and/or l a s t s f o r l e s s than twenty- four h o u r s , i t i s l a b e l e d " h o s t i l i t i e s . " M i l i t a r y a c t i o n taken by one s t a t e ( e . g . , the s e i z u r e of land or b l o c k a d i n g of t e r r i t o r y ) may, however, f a i l to provoke the t a r g e t s t a t e i n t o m i l i t a r y a c t i o n ; i f the t a r g e t s t a t e remains p a s s i v e , the c o n f l i c t i s l a b e l e d "unreciprocated m i l i t a r y a c t i o n .
(3) i n t e r s t a t e t h r e a t : e x p l i c i t v e r b a l s t a t e m e n t , by a high o f f i c i a l on behal f of a member s t a t e ' s government, d e c l a r i n g an i n t e n t to use m i l i t a r y f o r c e a g a i n s t another member s t a t e f o r o t h e r than s t r i c t l y d e f e n s i v e purposes; o r , overt m o b i l i z a t i o n of armed f o r c e s by a member s t a t e , d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t another member s t a t e f o r other than s t r i c t l y d e f e n s i v e p u r p o s e s , d u r i n g p e r i o d s of d i s p u t e or high t e n s i o n . 2 In case of e i t h e r verbal statement or m o b i l i z a t i o n , the t a r g e t s t a t e must be c l e a r l y s p e c i f i e d or e a s i l y i d e n t i f i a b l e .
(4) i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z e d c i v i l c o n f l i c t : p h y s i c a l i n t e r v e n t i o n (with or without combat) by the armed f o r c e s of a member s t a t e in a c i v i l c o n f l i c t w i t h i n the t e r r i t o r y
Whether a m i l i t a r y a c t i o n i s r e c i p r o c a t e d u s u a l l y depends upon the t a r g e t s t a t e ' s w i l l i n g n e s s (or u n w i l l i n g n e s s ) to submit n o n v i o l e n t l y r a t h e r than upon any fundamental d i f f e r e n c e i n the i n i t i a t o r ' s a c t i o n s .
2 S h o w s - o f - f o r c e , by t h e m s e l v e s , are not s u f f i c i e n t l y
e x p l i c i t i n terms of i n t e n t to use armed f o r c e to be i n c l u d e d .
227
of another member s t a t e f o r the purpose of s u p p o r t i n g one s i d e to the c o n f l i c t or s u p p r e s s i n g the c o n f l i c t e n t i r e l y . I n t e r v e n t i o n t h a t i s f o r the purpose of p r o t e c t i n g the l i v e s and property of f o r e i g n n a t i o n a l s and does not s i g n i f i c a n t l y i n t e r f e r e i n the ongoing c i v i l c o n f l i c t i s e x c l u d e d . The c i v i l c o n f l i c t remains i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z e d , and does not s t r i c t l y become i n t e r s t a t e , so long as the combat remains c o n f i n e d to the t e r r i t o r y of the n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l u n i t i n which i t has erupted and so long as the major opposing f a c t i o n s i n the c i v i l c o n f l i c t do not j o i n i n common cause to r e s i s t the f o r c e s of the i n t e r v e n i n g s t a t e . 1
P r e s e n t i n g the Cases
My purpose in c o l l e c t i n g the c o n f l i c t data set was to
i d e n t i f y s e r i o u s i n t e r s t a t e d i s p u t e s i n v o l v i n g major powers,
o p e r a t i o n a l i z e d i n terms of the t h r e a t or use of m i l i t a r y f o r c e
by a major power. My c o n f i d e n c e i n the inclusiveness of the
c o m p i l a t i o n i s b o l s t e r e d by the f a c t s that (1) v i o l e n t i n t e r s t a t e
b e h a v i o r g e n e r a l l y leaves s u b s t a n t i a l t r a c e s and (2) the m i l i t a r y
a c t i v i t i e s of the major powers are p a r t i c u l a r l y l i k e l y to be
w e l l documented. I have kept the t h r e s h o l d of v i o l e n c e
r e a l i s t i c a l l y high so as to maximize the p r o b a b i l i t y that the
event would be r e p o r t e d . N a t u r a l l y , as the l e v e l of v i o l e n c e
d i m i n i s h e s , my conf idence i n the i n c l u s i v e n e s s of the data set
a l s o d e c l i n e s , i . e . , I am more c e r t a i n that I have c o l l e c t e d the
p o p u l a t i o n of cases t h a t , a c c o r d i n g to my coding r u l e s , q u a l i f i e s
as i n t e r s t a t e wars than I am that I have found a l l those cases
I n t e r v e n t i o n in a c i v i l c o n f l i c t , as d i s t i n c t from " i n t e r s t a t e m i l i t a r y a c t i o n , " i s c h a r a c t e r i z e d by the p r i o r e x i s t e n c e of f a c t i o n a l m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n w i t h i n the t a r g e t s t a t e , o t h e r than t h a t c r e a t e d by the i n t e r v e n i n g s t a t e as a p r e t e x t f o r i n t e r f e r i n g .
228
t h a t q u a l i f y as i n t e r s t a t e t h r e a t s . N e v e r t h e l e s s , having l a b o r e d
one y e a r on t h i s data s e t , I must express my s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h
i t s o v e r a l l q u a l i t y . In a s e p a r a t e volume, to be d e p o s i t e d w i t h
the Department of P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e a t the U n i v e r s i t y of M i c h i g a n ,
I have e x p l i c a t e d and c i t e d sources f o r each case i n the c o n f l i c t
data s e t — i n g e n e r a l , the more obscure the c a s e , the l o n g e r the
e x p l i c a t i o n and the more numerous the c i t a t i o n s .
Below can by found an enumeration of those cases that are
i n c l u d e d i n the i n t e r s t a t e m i l i t a r y c o n f l i c t data s e t and a l s o
those cases t h a t I l a b e l i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z e d c i v i l c o n f l i c t . For
each c a s e , I l i s t the date d u r i n g which major powers were i n v o l v e d ,
the name I have given to the c o n f l i c t , the major power p a r t i c i pants
and t h e i r opponents, as w e l l as the level o f v i o l e n c e t h a t the
c o n f l i c t a t t a i n e d . I f no major power was i n v o l v e d d u r i n g a p o r t i o n
o f a c o n f l i c t , then an i n c l u s i v e date (enclosed i n parentheses) i s
g i v e n f o r the e n t i r e c o n f l i c t f o l l o w i n g the c o n f l i c t name. In
l i s t i n g p a r t i c i p a n t s , the purported i n i t i a t o r i s g iven f i r s t ,
the "defender" i s given a f t e r the "vs." The coding of i n i t i a t o r /
defender was somewhat p o e t i c ; i t was an attempt to i d e n t i f y the
a c t o r s t h a t were r e s p o n s i b l e f o r b e g i n n i n g the m i l i t a r y
c o n f r o n t a t i o n , but when t h i s was i m p o s s i b l e to e s t a b l i s h , e . g . ,
both s i d e s exchanging minor f i r e , I i d e n t i f i e d as the i n i t i a t o r
the s i d e t h a t e s c a l a t e d the c o n f l i c t to a more s e r i o u s phase, e . g . ,
e s c a l a t e d the exchange of small arms f i r e to a major a t t a c k . In
column f o u r , f o l l o w i n g the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of some c o n f l i c t s as
229
e i t h e r "threats" or " u n r e c i p r o c a t e d m i l i t a r y a c t i o n s , " the reader
w i l l f i n d an a s t e r i s k (*). T h i s i s used o n l y f o r major power/
major power c o n f l i c t s , and denotes t h a t the t h r e a t or use of
m i l i t a r y f o r c e was u n r e c i p r o c a t e d , i . e . , the t a r g e t of the t h r e a t
or a c t i o n d i d not respond ( m i l i t a r i l y ) a g a i n s t the i n i t i a t o r .
The a s t e r i s k n o t a t i o n i s employed o n l y f o r major power/major power
c o n f l i c t s because the l i s t i s p r i m a r i l y designed to i d e n t i f y major
power conflict b e h a v i o r . (By and l a r g e , i t can be assumed t h a t
t h r e a t s by major powers a g a i n s t non-major powers are not
r e c i p r o c a t e d . )
The f o l l o w i n g are the cases t h a t s a t i s f y the c r i t e r i a f o r
major power i n t e r s t a t e m i l i t a r y c o n f l i c t s and i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z e d
c i v i l c o n f l i c t s . The a b b r e v i a t i o n " M . A c t . ( u ) " r e p r e s e n t s
" u n r e c i p r o c a t e d m i l i t a r y a c t i o n " ; the a b b r e v i a t i o n " M . A c t . ( r ) "
denotes " r e c i p r o c a t e d m i l i t a r y a c t i o n , " i . e . , h o s t i l i t i e s . A l l
o t h e r n o t a t i o n should be s e l f - e x p l a n a t o r y .
DATE CONFLICT MAJOR POWER PARTICIPANTS LEVEL
1820- 21 N e a p o l i t a n R e v o l u t i o n A-H i n t e r v e n t i o n C i v i l
1821 Piedmont U p r i s i n g A-H i n t e r v e n t i o n C i v i l
1821 Morea I n s u r r e c t i o n USR vs TUR Threat
1823 Spanish R e v o l u t i o n (1820-23) FRN i n t e r v e n t i o n C i v i l
1826 Danubian P r i n c i p a l i t i e s I n s u r r e c t i o n s USR vs TUR Threat
1827-•28 Portuguese C o n s t i t u t i o n R e b e l l i o n UK i n t e r v e n t i o n C i v i l
1827 B a t t l e of Navarino Bay UK,FRN,USR vs TUR,Egyptians M . A c t . ( r )
1828-1828-
29 29
Russo-Turk ish War Russo-Turk ish War
USR vs TUR FRN vs TUR,Egyptians
War M . A c t . ( r )
1831 1831
M i g u e l i t e Wars (1828-34) M i g u e l i t e Wars (1828-34)
UK i n t e r v e n t i o n FRN i n t e r v e n t i o n
C i v i l C i v i l
1831-1832
32 I t a l i a n U p r i s i n g s I t a l i a n U p r i s i n g s
A-H i n t e r v e n t i o n FRN i n t e r v e n t i o n
C i v i l C i v i l
1831 1832 1832- 33
B e l g i a n Independence R e v o l u t i o n (1830-33) B e l g i a n Independence R e v o l u t i o n (1830-33) B e l g i a n Independence R e v o l u t i o n (1830-33)
FRN i n t e r v e n t i o n FRN vs NTH FRN,UK vs NTH
C i v i l M . A c t . ( r ) M . A c t . ( u )
DATE CONFLICT MAJOR POWER PARTICIPANTS LEVEL
1835- 39 C a r l i s t War (1834-39) FRN i n t e r v e n t i o n C i v i l 1836- 39 C a r l i s t War (1834-39) UK i n t e r v e n t i o n C i v i l
1838-•39 Occupation of Vera Cruz FRN vs MEX M. A c t . ( r )
1838- 40 A r g e n t i n e A f f a i r FRN vs ARG M. A c t . ( r ) 1838- 40 A r g e n t i n e A f f a i r FRN i n t e r v e n t i o n C i v i l
1840 Second S y r i a n C r i s i s (1839-40) FRN vs UK,GMY Threat*
1845- 48 Wars of l a P l a t a (1843-52) FRN,UK(1845-47) vs ARG M . A c t . ( r ) 1845-•49 Wars of l a P l a t a (1843-52) FRN,UK i n t e r v e n t i o n C i v i l
1847 Occupation of F e r r a r a A-H vs PAP M . A c t . ( u )
1848-•49 A u s t r o - S a r d i n i a n War I T A , I t a l i a n S t a t e s vs A-H War
1848-•49 S i c i l i a n I n s u r r e c t i o n UK,FRN i n t e r v e n t i o n C i v i l
1848-•49 1st S c h l e s w i g - H o l s t e i n War GMY vs DEN War
1849 Hungarian I n s u r r e c t i o n (1848-49) USR i n t e r v e n t i o n C i v i l
1849 I n s u r r e c t i o n i n Tuscany (1848-49) A-H i n t e r v e n t i o n C i v i l
1849 War of the Roman R e p u b l i c FRN,A-H,SIC vs PAP War
1849 German S t a t e s I n s u r r e c t i o n s GMY i n t e r v e n t i o n C i v i l
DATE CONFLICT MAJOR 1 POWER PARTICIPANTS LEVEL
1850 Convention of Olmutz C r i s i s A-H ,BAV,GMY i n t e r v e n t i o n C i v i l 1850 Convention of Olmutz C r i s i s A-H vs GMY Threat
1850 Don P a c i f i c o A f f a i r UK vs GRC M . A c t . ( u )
1853 L e i n i n g e n M i s s i o n A-H vs TUR Threat
1853- 56 Crimean War (1853-56) USR vs TUR,FRN(1854-56), War UK(1854-56), ITA(1855-56)
1854 Crimean War (1853-56) A-H vs USR Threat* 1855 Crimean War (1853-56) A-H vs USR Threat*
1854- 57 Occupation of P i r a e u s UK,FRN vs GRC M . A c t . ( u )
1856- 57 Neuchatel A f f a i r GMY vs SWZ Threat
1856- 57 A n g l o - P e r s i a n War IRN vs UK War
1856-•60 2nd Opium "War" UK,FRN(1857-60) vs CHN M . A c t . ( r )
1859 War of I t a l i a n U n i f i c a t i o n A-H vs ITA,FRN War
1860 Italo-Roman War ITA vs PAP War 1860 Italo-Roman War FRN vs ITA Threat*
1860-•61 I t a l o - S i c i l i a n War ITA vs SIC War 1860-•61 I t a l o - S i c i l i a n War FRN vs ITA M . A c t . ( u ) *
DATE CONFLICT MAJOR POWER PARTICIPANTS LEVEL
1860-•64 T a i p i n g R e b e l l i o n (1851-64) UK,FRN i n t e r v e n t i o n C i v i l
1861 Occupation of Tsushima USR vs JPN M . A c t . ( u )
1861 Trent A f f a i r UK vs USA Threat
1861- 62 Mexican E x p e d i t i o n FRN,UK,SPN vs MEX M . A c t . ( u )
1862- 67 Franco-Mexican War FRN vs MEX War
1863- 65 A n t i - f o r e i g n Movement JPN vs USA,FRN,NTH,UK M . A c t . ( r )
1864 2nd S c h l e s w i g - H o l s t e i n War A-H,GMY vs DEN War
1866 Seven Weeks War GMY,ITA vs A-H,German A l l i e s War
1870 T i e n t s i n Massacre FRN,UK,USA vs CHN Threat
1870-•71 F r a n c o - P r u s s i a n War FRN vs GMY,German A l l i e s War
1876 1877-1878
•78 Russo-Turk ish War (1877-78) Russo-Turk ish War (1877-78) Russo-Turk ish War (1877-78)
USR vs TUR USR vs TUR UK vs USR
Threat War Threat*
1880 H i V a l l e y Dispute USR vs CHN Threat
1880 1880
Montenegrin Troubles Montenegrin Troubles
UK,FRN,USR,GMY,A-H,ITA vs TUR UK vs TUR
Threat Threat
DATE CONFLICT MAJOR POWER PARTICIPANTS LEVEL
CO CO OO CO
T u n i s i a n Adventure T u n i s i a n Adventure
FRN vs TUN TUR vs FRN
M . A c t . ( r ) Threat
1882 1882
A l e x a n d r i a A f f a i r A l e x a n d r i a A f f a i r
•UK,FRN i n t e r v e n t i o n UK vs EGY
C i v i l M . A c t . ( r )
1884-•85 Si no-French War FRN vs CHN War
1885-1885-
•86 •87
A n g l o - R u s s i a n Afghan C r i s i s A n g l o - R u s s i a n Afghan C r i s i s
UK vs USR UK vs KOR
Threat* M . A c t . ( u )
1885 Khevenhul ler M i s s i o n A-H vs BUL Threat
1886 G r e c o - T u r k i s h Dispute UK,A-H,GMY,USR,ITA vs GRC M . A c t . ( u )
1886-•87 B u l g a r i a n C r i s i s USR vs BUL Threat
1890 B r i t i s h - P o r t u g u e s e C o l o n i a l Dispute UK vs POR Threat
1893 Siamese C o n f l i c t FRN vs THI M . A c t . ( r )
1894 Mosquito Controversy UK vs NIC M . A c t . ( u )
1895 Delegoa Bay Rai lway Ultimatum UK vs TRN Threat
1895 The T r i p l e I n t e r v e n t i o n USR,GMY,FRN vs JPN Threat*
DATE CONFLICT MAJOR POWER PARTICIPANTS LEVEL
1897 Cretan I n s u r r e c t i o n USR,A-H,GMY,ITA,FRN,UK vs GRC M . A c t . ( u )
1397-1898 1898 1898
•98 China Concessions China Concessions China Concessions China Concessions
GMY vs CHN USR vs CHN UK vs CHN FRN vs CHN
M . A c t . ( u ) Threat Threat M . A c t . ( u )
1897 Chemulpo Naval Demonstration UK,JPN vs USR,KOR Threat*
1898 N i g e r i a n Dispute (1897-98) UK vs FRN Threat
1898 Evacuat ion of Crete UK,FRN,USR,ITA vs TUR Threat
1898 Fashoda C r i s i s UK vs FRN Threat*
1899-•02 Boer War TRN vs UK War
1899-1900
•00 Masampo Naval Base Concession Masampo Naval Base Concession
USR vs KOR JPN vs USR
Threat Threat*
1900-1900-
•01 •04
Boxer R e b e l l i o n (1900-01) Boxer R e b e l l i o n (1900-01)
USR,GMY,JPN,FRN,UK,USA,ITA,A-H vs CHN USR vs CHN
M . A c t . ( r ) M . A c t . ( r )
1900 Dominican Debt C r i s i s FRN vs DOM Threat
1902-•03 Venezuelan Debt Blockade UK,GMY,ITA vs VEN M . A c t . ( u )
1903 Dominican Debt Demonstration GMY vs DOM Threat
DATE CONFLICT MAJOR POWER PARTICIPANTS LEVEL
1903 Panama Canal Dispute USA i n t e r v e n t i o n C i v i l
1904- 05 Russo-Japanese War JPN vs USR War
1905 Macedonian Question A-H,USR,UK,FRN,ITA vs TUR M . A c t . ( u )
1906 S i n a i Ultimatum UK vs TUR Threat
1906- 09 Cuban I n t e r v e n t i o n USA i n t e r v e n t i o n C i v i l
1907- 10 French-Moroccan C o n f l i c t FRN vs MOR M . A c t . ( r )
1908- 09 Bosnian C r i s i s YUG,MNT vs A-H Threat
1908 P e r s i a n Indemnity R e t r i b u t i o n USR vs IRN M . A c t . ( u )
1909 P e r s i a n C i v i l War (1905-09) USR i n t e r v e n t i o n C i v i l
1910 A n t i - Z e l a y a R e v o l u t i o n (1909-10) USA i n t e r v e n t i o n C i v i l
1911-1911 1911
•12 2nd Moroccan C r i s i s 2nd Moroccan C r i s i s 2nd Moroccan C r i s i s
FRN GMY UK
i n t e r v e n t i o n vs FRN vs GMY
C i v i l Threat* Threat*
1911-•12 P e r s i a n Invasion USR vs IRN M . A c t . ( u )
1911-•12 I t a l o - T u r k i s h War ITA vs TUR War
DATE CONFLICT
1912 Nicaraguan I n t e r v e n t i o n
1912 1st Balkan War (1912-13) 1912-13 1st Balkan War (1912-13) 1913 1st Balkan War (1912-13) 1913 1st Balkan War (1912-13) 1913 1st Balkan War (1912-13)
1913 A l b a n i a n C o n f r o n t a t i o n
1914 Occupation of Vera Cruz
1914-16 Dominican R e p u b l i c I n t e r v e n t i o n 1916-24 Dominican R e p u b l i c I n t e r v e n t i o n
1914- 18 World War I
1915- 34 H a i t i a n Customs Dispute
1916- 17 P e r s h i n g Mexican E x p e d i t i o n
1917 Cuban R e v o l t
1917- 22 Russian C i v i l War (1917-22) 1918 Russian C i v i l War (1917-22) 1918- 19 Russian C i v i l War (1917-22)
MAJOR POWER PARTICIPANTS LEVEL
USA i n t e r v e n t i o n C i v i l
USR vs BUL Threat A-H vs YUG Threat USR vs TUR Threat A-H,ITA,UK,FRN,GMY vs MNT M.Act. (u) A-H vs MNT Threat
A-H vs YUG Threat
USA vs MEX M . A c t . ( r )
USA i n t e r v e n t i o n C i v i l USA vs DOM M . A c t . ( u )
A - H , GMY, A l l i e s War vs
UK,FRN,USR(1914-17),JPN, ITA(1915-18),USA( 1 9 1 7 - 1 8 ) , A l l i e s
USA i n t e r v e n t i o n C i v i l
USA vs MEX M . A c t . ( r )
USA i n t e r v e n t i o n C i v i l
JPN i n t e r v e n t i o n C i v i l GMY i n t e r v e n t i o n C i v i l FRN,UK,USA(1918-20) i n t e r v e n t i o n C i v i l
DATE CONFLICT MAJOR POWER PARTICIPANTS LEVEL
1918- 19 E s t o n i a n Independence F i g h t i n g USR vs Estonians,UK M.Act. (r)
1919-1920-1920-1922
21 21 23
T u r k i s h N a t i o n a l i s t Movement (1919-23) T u r k i s h N a t i o n a l i s t Movement (1919-23)' T u r k i s h N a t i o n a l i s t Movement (1919-23) T u r k i s h N a t i o n a l i s t Movement (1919-23)
ITA vs TUR FRN vs TUR UK,FRN,ITA vs TUR UK,FRN,ITA vs GRC
M.Act. M.Act. M.Act. Threat
(u) ( r ) (u)
1920 S p a r t a c i s t U p r i s i n g FRN i n t e r v e n t i o n C i v i l
1921 Panama-Costa R i c a Boundary Dispute USA vs PAN Threat
1921 1921- 25
London R e p a r a t i o n Ultimatums London Reparat ion Ultimatums
FRN,UK,BEL,ITA vs GMY FRN,UK(1921),BEL vs GMY
Threat M.Act. (u)
1923- 25 Ruhr Occupation FRN,BEL vs GMY M.Act. (u)
1923 Corfu I n c i d e n t ITA vs GRC M.Act. (u)
1924 Sudan Ultimatum UK vs EGY M.Act. (u)
1926- 33 Nicaraguan I n s u r r e c t i o n (1925-33) USA i n t e r v e n t i o n C i v i l
1927 Egyptian Army Ultimatum UK vs EGY Threat
1928-•29 Chinese C i v i l Wars (1920-49) JPN i n t e r v e n t i o n C i v i l
1928 Freedom of Assembly Ult imatum UK vs EGY Threat
1929 Chinese Eastern Railway Dispute USR vs CHN M.Act. (r)
DATE CONFLICT MAJOR POWER PARTICIPANTS LEVEL
1931- 33 Manchurian War JPN vs CHN War
1934 D o l l f u s s A f f a i r ITA vs GMY Threat*
1934 Durazzo Demonstration ITA vs ALB Threat
1934 1935- 36
I t a l o - E t h i o p i a n War (1935-36) I t a l o - E t h i o p i a n War (1935-36)
ETH ITA
vs ITA vs ETH
M . A c t . ( r ) War
1934- 37 Japanese Expansion i n North China JPN vs CHN M . A c t . ( u )
1934 1937
S i n k i a n g U p r i s i n g s (1931-37) S i n k i a n g U p r i s i n g s (1931-37)
USR USR
i n t e r v e n t i o n i n t e r v e n t i o n
C i v i l Civil
1935- 39 Spanish C i v i l War ITA,GMY i n t e r v e n t i o n C i v i l
1937- 41 Sino-Japanese War JPN vs CHN War
1938 Russo-Japanese Border C o n f l i c t JPN vs USR M . A c t . ( r )
1938-•40 T i e n t s i n C r i s i s JPN vs UK,FRN M . A c t . ( u ) *
1938 Anschluss GMY vs AUS M . A c t . ( u )
1938 Annexation of the Sudetenland GMY vs CZE M . A c t . ( u )
1939 Russo-Japanese War JPN vs USR.MON War
1939 D e s t r u c t i o n of C z e c h o s l o v a k i a GMY vs CZE M . A c t . ( u )
DATE CONFLICT
1939 Annexation of Memel
1939 Conquest of A l b a n i a
1939-45 World War II ( E u r o p e / A f r i c a )
1941-45 World War II ( P a c i f i c )
1939 Russian Invasion of Poland
1939 B a l t i c Bases Demand 1939 B a l t i c Bases Demand 1939 B a l t i c Bases Demand 1940 B a l t i c Bases Demand 1940 B a l t i c Bases Demand 1940 B a l t i c Bases Demand
1939- 40 R u s s o - F i n n i s h War 1940 R u s s o - F i n n i s h War
1940 C l o s i n g of the Burma Road
1940- 41 Japanese S e i z u r e of Indochina
1940 Rumanian Acquiescence
MAJOR POWER PARTICIPANTS LEVEL
GMY vs LIT M . A c t . ( u )
ITA vs ALB M . A c t . ( r )
ITA ( 1 9 4 0 - 4 3 ) , A l l i e s War vs
UK,FRN(1939-40,1944-45), USR(1941-45),USA(1941-45), I T A ( 1 9 4 3 - 4 5 ) , A l l i e s
JPN vs USA,UK,CHN,USR(1945),Al l ies War
USR vs POL M . A c t . ( r )
USR vs EST Threat USR vs LAT Threat USR vs. LIT Threat USR vs EST M . A c t . ( u ) USR vs LAT M . A c t . ( u ) USR vs LIT M . A c t . ( u )
USR vs FIN War FRN,UK vs USR Threat*
JPN vs UK Threat*
JPN vs FRN M . A c t . ( r )
USR vs RUM M . A c t . ( u )
DATE CONFLICT MAJOR POWER PARTICIPANTS LEVEL
1 944-4 5 Greek I n s u r r e c t i o n UK i n t e r v e n t i o n C i v i l
1945- 46 A z e r b a i j a n R e v o l t USR i n t e r v e n t i o n C i v i l
1943- 49 B e r l i n Blockade USR vs USA,UK,FRN M.Act. (u)*
1950 Peking-Taipeh C o n f l i c t CHN vs TAW M . A c t . ( r )
1950-•53 Korean War PRK, CHN vs ROK,USA,UN War
1951-•52 A n g l o - E g y p t i a n Clashes UK vs EGY M.Act . (u)**
1954-•55 Bombardment of Of fshore I s l a n d s CHN vs TAW M . A c t . ( r )
1955 Anglo-French I n t e r v e n t i o n i n S i n a i War UK,FRN vs EGY War 1956 Anglo-French I n t e r v e n t i o n i n S i n a i War USR vs UK,FRN Threat*
1956 Burma Border Dispute CHN vs BUR M . A c t . ( u )
1956 Russo-Hungarian War USR vs HUN War
1956 P o l i s h October C r i s i s USR vs POL Threat
1957 Yemen-Adenese Border C o n f l i c t YAR vs UK M . A c t . ( r )
1957 S y r i a n C r i s i s USR vs TUR Threat 1957 S y r i a n C r i s i s USA vs USR Threat*
1953 T u n i s i a n Border C o n f l i c t FRN vs TUN M.Act. (r)
DATE CONFLICT MAJOR POWER PARTICIPANTS LEVEL
1958 Lebanese C r i s i s USA i n t e r v e n t i o n C i v i l
1953 J o r d a n i a n C i v i l C o n f l i c t UK i n t e r v e n t i o n C i v i l
1958-1958
•59 Quemoy C r i s i s Quemoy C r i s i s
CHN USA.
vs TAW vs CHN
M . A c t . ( r ) Threat*
1959 S i n o - I n d i a n Border Clashes CHN vs IND M . A c t . ( r )
1960 U-2 I n c i d e n t (& RB-47 I n c i d e n t ) USR vs TUR,PAK,NOR Threat
1960-•63 Cameroun R e b e l l i o n FRN i n t e r v e n t i o n C i v i l
1961-1964-
64 •73
Vietnam War (1956-75) Vietnam War (1956-75)
USA i n t e r v e n t i o n R V N , U S A , A l l i e s vs NLF,DRV
C i v i l War
1961 B i z e r t a C r i s i s TUN vs FRN M . A c t . ( r )
1961 B e r l i n Wall C r i s i s USA vs USR Threat***
1962 Quemoy C o n f l i c t CHN vs TAW M . A c t . ( r )
1962 S i n o - I n d i a n War CHN vs IND War
1962 1962 1962
Cuban M i s s i l e C r i s i s Cuban M i s s i l e C r i s i s Cuban M i s s i l e C r i s i s
USR vs USA USA,OAS vs USR USA vs CUB
Threat* M . A c t . ( u ) * Threat
1-963- 65 "Crush M a l a y s i a " Campaign INS vs MAL,UK,AUL,NEW M . A c t . ( r )
DATE CONFLICT MAJOR POWER PARTICIPANTS LEVEL
1 963-•64 C y p r i o t C i v i l C o n f l i c t UK i n t e r v e n t i o n C i v i l
1964 Yemeni-Adenese Border A t t a c k UK vs YAR M . A c t . ( r )
1964 East A f r i c a n I n s u r r e c t i o n s UK i n t e r v e n t i o n C i v i l
1964 Gabon Coup FRN i n t e r v e n t i o n C i v i l
1964-•73 2nd L a o t i a n C i v i l War (1963- ) USA i n t e r v e n t i o n C i v i l
1965 Sikkam Border Dispute CHN vs IND Threat
1 965-66 Dominican R e p u b l i c C i v i l War USA(1965),OAS i n t e r v e n t i o n C i v i l
1967 Sikkam Border C o n f l i c t CHN vs IND M . A c t . ( r )
1968 Invasion of C z e c h o s l o v a k i a USR,Warsaw Pact A l l i e s vs CZE M.Act . (u)
1969- 71 Chad I n t e r v e n t i o n FRN i n t e r v e n t i o n C i v i l
1969 S i n o - S o v i e t Border Clashes CHN vs USR M . A c t . ( r )
1 970-73 Cambodian C i v i l War (1967-75) USA i n t e r v e n t i o n C i v i l
NOTE: Three c o n f l i c t s l i s t e d as "wars" by S i n g e r and Small (1972) are coded d i f f e r e n t l y above. F i r s t , the French-Spanish encounter i n 1823 i s coded as a French i n t e r v e n t i o n i n an ongoing Spanish c i v i l c o n f l i c t r a t h e r than as a war between France and S p a i n . Second, the B a t t l e o f Navarino Bay ( 1 8 2 7 ) — a s i n g l e naval engagement t h a t l a s t s l e s s than a d a y — i s coded as a " r e c i p r o c a t e d m i l i t a r y a c t i o n " r a t h e r than as a "war." And, f i n a l l y , the Boer War i s coded as an i n t e r s t a t e war ( r a t h e r than an e x t r a - s y s t e m i c war, as found i n S i n g e r and S m a l l ) because a more r e c e n t assessment of the membership of the i n t e r s t a t e system suggests t h a t the Transvaal i s a f u l l - f l e d g e d member of the system i n 1899, the year i n which the war b e g i n s .
In the t a b l e above, one a s t e r i s k (*) denotes t h a t a t h r e a t or m i l i t a r y a c t i o n i n i t i a t e d by a major power, and d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t another major power, i s not r e c i p r o c a t e d . Two a s t e r i s k s (**) denote t h a t n e i t h e r par ty to a c o n f l i c t i s coded as an i n i t i a t o r . This occurs i n the A n g l o - E g y p t i a n Clashes (1951-52) when B r i t i s h f o r c e s respond to a t t a c k s i n i t i a t e d by Wafd-supported g u e r r i l l a f o r c e s t h a t are not under the d i r e c t c o n t r o l of the Egypt ian government. Three a s t e r i s k s (***) denote s imultaneous i n i t i a t i o n . This occurs i n the B e r l i n Wall C r i s i s of 1 9 6 1 — b o t h the U n i t e d S t a t e s and the S o v i e t Union are coded as i n i t i a t o r s i n t h i s c o n f l i c t .
APPENDIX D
SUMMARY PRESENTATION OF MILITARY CONFLICT DATA
The f i g u r e s and t a b l e s on the f o l l o w i n g pages o f f e r a
p i c t o r i a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of the m i l i t a r y c o n f l i c t data presented
i n Appendix C. F igure One d e p i c t s the number of m i l i t a r y c o n f l i c t s
i n v o l v i n g major powers that occurs d u r i n g each decade from 1820
to 1 970. The s o l i d l i n e r e p r e s e n t s the number of i n t e r s t a t e
c o n f l i c t s (wars, m i l i t a r y a c t i o n s , and t h r e a t s ) , and the broken
l i n e g i v e s the same i n f o r m a t i o n f o r a 11 major power m i l i t a r y
c o n f l i c t s (wars, m i l i t a r y a c t i o n s , t h r e a t s , arid i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z e d
c i v i l c o n f l i c t s ) . F igure Two p r e s e n t s the number of m i l i t a r y
c o n f l i c t s at var ious l e v e l s of v i o l e n c e t h a t occurs d u r i n g each
decade. When d e p i c t i n g data on " m i l i t a r y a c t i o n , " both the number
of r e c i p r o c a t e d a c t i o n s and the number of u n r e c i p r o c a t e d a c t i o n s
are g i v e n , and then the sum of the two i s d i s p l a y e d as " a l l m i l i t a r y
a c t i o n . "
F igure Three c o n t a i n s bar graphs t h a t i n d i c a t e how many
of the t h i r t y f i v e - y e a r p e r i o d s i n the 1820-19/0 temporal domain
c o n t a i n no m i l i t a r y c o n f l i c t s , one c o n f l i c t , two c o n f l i c t s , three
c o n f l i c t s , and so f o r t h . The h e i g h t of the bar r e p r e s e n t s the
number of per iods in which 0 , 1, 2 , 3 , e t c . c o n f l i c t s o c c u r .
245
246
Once a g a i n , t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n i s presented f o r all major power
m i l i t a r y c o n f l i c t s and f o r i n t e r s t a t e c o n f l i c t s . F igure Four
o f f e r s the same i n f o r m a t i o n f o r the d i f f e r e n t l e v e l s of c o n f l i c t .
On the l a s t two pages of the a p p e n d i x , 1 present, the
t o t a l number of major power n a t i o n - y e a r s d u r i n g each century in
the 1820-1970 temporal domain (Table 3 0 ) , and a l s o , f o r each
l e v e l of m i l i t a r y v i o l e n c e , the p r o p o r t i o n of n a t i o n a l involvements
i n m i l i t a r y c o n f l i c t s per n a t i o n - y e a r (Table 3 1 ) . F i n a l l y , at.
the bottom of the l a s t page, I note the p r o p o r t i o n s of n a t i o n a l
involvements i n m i l i t a r y c o n f l i c t s t h a t r e s u l t i n war (Table 3 2 ) .
247
FIGURE 1
NUMBER OF MILITARY CONFLICTS PER 10-YEAR PERIOD
NOTE: For t h i s and the f o l l o w i n g graphs, each c o n f l i c t i s coded o n l y once. Since any c o n f l i c t may span s e v e r a l l e v e l s of v i o l e n c e , only the highest l e v e l (war > military a c t i o n > t h r e a t ) i s s e l e c t e d . For example, i f a c o n f l i c t c o n t a i n s a t h r e a t , m i l i t a r y a c t i o n , and war, only "war" i s coded. S i m i l a r l y , i f an i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z e d c i v i l c o n f l i c t e v o l v e s i n t o an i n t e r s t a t e c o n f l i c t , the c o n f l i c t i s coded as being i n t e r s t a t e .
249
FIGURE 2 - - - C o n t i n u e d
Number I n t e r s t a t e Threat
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 s s s s s s s s
I 2 0 0 s s
1 9
5 6 0 0
Year
Number
8
I n t e r n a t i o n a l i z e d C i v i l C o n f l i c t
3 4 0 0
5 6 7 8 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 s s s s s s s s
4 5 0 0 s s
Year
250
FIGURE 3
DISTRIBUTION OF THE OCCURRENCE OF MILITARY CONFLICTS WITHIN 5-YEAR PERIODS
frequency of occur rence A l l M i l i t a r y C o n f l i c t s
5 | 1
4 . 1
3 , 1 | r
2 1 | 1
1
0 I ' 1 1 1 ' 1 1 ' ' '
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 I'M number of c o n f l i c t s per 5-year p e r i o d
f requency of o c c u r r e n c e I n t e r s t a t e M i l i t a r y C o n f l i c t s
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
number of c o n f l i c t s per 5-year p e r i o d
10 1 M
251
FIGURE 4
DISTRIBUTION OF THE OCCURRENCE OF MILITARY CONFLICTS (AT VARIOUS LEVELS OF VIOLENCE) WITHIN 5-YEAR PERIODS
f requency of o c c u r r e n c e
12 11 10
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
I n t e r s t a t e War
0 1 2
number of c o n f l i c t s per 5-year p e r i o d
12 10
8 6 4 2
0
R e c i p -rocated
Unrecip-rocated
1 I 1 2 3 4 0 1 2 3 4 5+
I n t e r s t a t e Military
A c t i o n
1 2
number of conflicts 5-year p e r i o d
4 5
per
f requency of o c c u r r e n c e
I n t e r s t a t e Threat
0 1 2 4+
number of c o n f l i c t s per 5-year p e r i o d
11 10
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
I n t e r n a t i o n a l i z e d C i v i l
Conflict
0 1 2 3 4 5
number of c o n f l i c t s per 5-year p e r i o d
252
TABLE 30
NUMBER OF YEARS AS MAJOR POWER DURING THE 1820-1899 AND 1900-1970 TIME PERIODS
Major Powers 1820-1 899
1900-1970
USA '1899-1970) 1 71
UK 1820-1970) 80 71
FRN 4 820-1940, 1945- 1970) 80 67
GMY [1820-1918, 1925- 1 945) 80 40
A-H [1820-1918) 80 19
ITA (1860-1943) 40 44
USR [1820-1917, 1 922-1 970) 80 67
CHN [1950-1970) -- 21
JPN [1895-1945, 1960- 1 970) 5 57
Total Nat ion-Years 446 457
253
TABLE 31
NATIONAL INVOLVEMENTS IN MILITARY CONFLICTS PER NATION-YEAR
M i l i t a r y Years Wars A c t i o n s Threats C i v i l
1820-99 .05 (23) .08 (35) .07 (29) .03 (14)
1900-70 .07 (32) .13 (61) .05 (25) .05 (24)
I n t e r s t a t e A l l Years M i l i t a r y C o n f l i c t s Military C o n f l i c t s
1820-99 .20 (87) .23 (101)
1900-70 .26 (118) .31 (142)
NOTE: The number of c o n f l i c t s at each l e v e l of v i o l e n c e d u r i n g the 1820-99 and 1900-70 time p e r i o d s i s g iven i n parentheses
TABLE 32
PROPORTION OF NATIONAL INVOLVEMENTS IN MILITARY CONFLICTS RESULTING IN WAR
I n t e r s t a t e A l l Years M i l i t a r y C o n f l i c t s M i l i t a r y C o n f l i c t s
1820-99 .26 .23
1900-70 .27 .23
NOTE: For the purpose of p r e s e n t a t i o n i n the t a b l e s above, o n l y one l e v e l of c o n f l i c t i s coded f o r any n a t i o n in a g iven y e a r . S i n c e a n a t i o n may become i n v o l v e d i n c o n f l i c t at s e v e r a l l e v e l s of v i o l e n c e i n the same y e a r , o n l y the h i g h e s t l e v e l (war > m i l i t a r y a c t i o n s > t h r e a t ) i s s e l e c t e d . S i m i l a r l y , i f a n a t i o n i s i n v o l v e d i n both an i n t e r s t a t e and an i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z e d c i v i l c o n f l i c t in the same y e a r , only the i n t e r s t a t e c o n f l i c t i s s e l e c t e d .
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