MAINESUPREMEJUDICIALCOURT ReporterofDecisionsDecision: 2020ME83Docket: Aro-19-329SubmittedOnBriefs: April14,2020

Decided: June4,2020Panel: MEAD,GORMAN,JABAR,HUMPHREY,HORTON,andCONNORS,JJ.

STATEOFMAINEv.

JONATHANLIMARYHORTON,J.

[¶1] Jonathan Limary appeals from a judgment of conviction of

manslaughter(ClassA),17-AM.R.S.§203(1)(A)(2020),andaggravatedassault

(Class B), 17-AM.R.S. § 208(1)(A) (2020), entered by the court (Aroostook

County,Stewart,J.)afterajurytrial.Limaryarguesthatthecourtdeprivedhim

of a fair trial by denying his request during jury voir dire to pose certain

questionsinthejuryquestionnaire,andthattheevidencewasinsufficientto

support a finding that Limary’s actions—rather than subsequent medical

treatment—causedthevictim’sdeath.Weaffirmthejudgment.

I.BACKGROUND

[¶2] Viewingtheevidence inthelightmostfavorabletotheState,the

jurycouldrationallyhavefoundthefollowingfactsbeyondareasonabledoubt.

2

See State v. Asaad, 2020 ME 11, ¶ 8, 224 A.3d 596. Late on the night of

October29,2017,Limaryandsomefriendshadadispute,viatext-basedand

voice-basedsocialmedia,withthevictim—amanwhomnoneofthemhadmet.

Asaresult,Limaryandafriendofhis—withthreeothersinthevehicle—drove

fromPresque Isle toCaribou tomeetupwith thevictimandhis friend in a

parkinglottofight.WhileLimaryandthevictim’sfriendfought,Limary’sfriend

foughtwiththevictim.Limary’sfriendandthevictimendedupontheground,

andLimary’s friendeventuallygotupandbackedaway fromthevictim. By

then,anotherfriendofthevictimhadarrivedwithhisteenagesonandhadgone

overtohelpthevictimupofftheground.Beforethevictimcouldrisefromhis

knees,Limaryapproachedandforcefullykickedthevictimintheface,resulting

innumerous fractures to thevictim’snose,eyeorbits,upper jaw,andcheek

bones.

[¶3] The victim receivedmedical care in the early morning hours of

October30andwasreleased,buthereturnedtothehospitallaterthatdayand

wasadmitted.HewasreleasedonNovember2.Hethenhadtwosurgerieson

November9andwasreleasedonNovember17.Forpurposesofthesurgeries,

atracheostomytubewasinserted;thattubewasremovedtwodaysbeforethe

3

victim’sreleasefromthehospital,leavingthevictimwithahealingholeinhis

throatattheincisionsitewherethetracheostomytubehadbeen.

[¶4]Onthedaythatthevictimwasreleased,hisfriendandthefriend’s

sonbroughthimtotheirhouse.Thatevening,thevictimbeganbleedingfrom

theopeninginhisneck,andhisfriendcalled9-1-1.Undertheguidanceofthe

dispatcher,thevictim’sfriendperformedCPRuntiltheambulancearrived.The

victim bled profusely, and, despite the paramedics’ resuscitation efforts, he

died.Anautopsyrevealedthat,althoughatleastsomebloodexitedthevictim

throughthetracheostomysite,1moreextensivehemorrhagingoccurredinthe

victim’ssinuses.2

[¶5] In January 2018, Limary was charged by indictment with

manslaughter (Class A), 17-A M.R.S. § 203(1)(A), and aggravated assault

(ClassB),id.§208(1)(A).Hepleadednotguilty,andthematterproceededtoa

jurytrial.

1Therewasalsoevidenceofbleedingfromthenoseandofbloodhavingenteredthestomachand

lungs.

2Fromthesefacts,thejurycouldrationallyhavefoundbeyondareasonabledoubtthatLimarycommittedtheaggravatedassaultby“intentionally,knowinglyorrecklesslycaus[ing] . . .[b]odilyinjurytoanotherthatcreate[d]asubstantialriskofdeathorextendedconvalescencenecessaryforrecoveryofphysicalhealth.”17-AM.R.S.§208(1)(A)(2020);see17-AM.R.S.§35(1)-(3)(2020).Thesufficiencyoftheevidenceofmanslaughterisdiscussedbelow.

4

[¶6] Jury selectionwas held onMay 13, 2019. The court refused to

includeonthejuryquestionnairethreeofthequestionsthatLimaryproposed

relatingtoself-defenseanddefenseofanother:

• “[I]f during the trial Mr. Limary generates evidence that he acted inself-defenseorinthedefenseofanotherinusingphysicalforceagainst[the victim], the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt thatMr.Limarydidnotactinself-defenseordefenseofanother.Wouldyouhave any difficulty applying this burden on the State to disproveself-defenseordefenseofanotherbeyondareasonabledoubt?”

• “[W]ould you be willing to find Mr. Limary not guilty if he acted inself-defenseorindefenseofanotherinusingphysicalforceagainst[thevictim]?”

• “[D]oyouhaveanypersonal,religious,philosophicalorotherbeliefsthatapersonisneverjustifiedinusingphysicalforceagainstanotherhumanbeingevenifitisdoneinself-defenseordefenseofanother?”

The court reasoned that it was not evident that a self-defense or

defense-of-anotherinstructionwouldbegeneratedbytheevidence.Thecourt

indicatedthatitwouldask“whetherornotjurorswouldhave...anydifficulty

in being a fair and impartial juror when fighting has occurred.” The

questionnairepresentedtothepotential jurorsincludedsuchaquestionand

also asked the jurors if they would be able to “base their verdict upon the

evidence and according to the law” without allowing “any feelings of bias,

prejudice,pity,anger,sympathyorotheremotion[to]influencetheirverdictin

5

anyway”andiftheywouldbeabletofollowthelawasinstructedbythecourt

“evenif[they]d[id]notagreewiththelaw.”

[¶7] After thepotential jurors completed thequestionnaire, the court

conductedindividualvoirdire.BoththeStateandLimaryagreedthatthejury

thatwasultimatelyselectedwassatisfactory.

[¶8]Thejurytrialwasheldoverthecourseofthenextfourdays.The

Stateofferedtestimonyfromeyewitnesses,aparamedicwhotreatedthevictim

onthedayofhisdeath,apoliceofficer,andtheState’sChiefMedicalExaminer.

The State offered no evidence thatwould suggest that Limary had acted in

self-defenseordefenseofanother.Themedicalexaminertestifiedthat,before

performinganautopsyofthevictim,hereviewedhospitalrecordssummarizing

the multiple, serious fractures to the victim’s face. He also considered a

post-surgeryx-rayshowingthesurgeons’useofbracesandothermaterialsto

reconstruct thevictim’s face. Theautopsy revealed nohemorrhaging in the

areaofthetracheostomybutextensivehemorrhaginginthesinuses,wherethe

victim had sustained the injuries and undergone surgery. The medical

examiner concluded that the victim died of blood loss—specifically,

“hemorrhagiccomplicationsfollowingmultiplefracturesoffacialbonesdueto

thebluntforcetraumaofhishead.”

6

[¶9] Limarymoved for a judgment of acquittal on the manslaughter

charge,arguingthatthevictim’ssurgery,whichheclaimswaselective,broke

thechainofcausationbetweenhisactionsandthevictim’sdeathsuchthatthe

jurycouldnotfindhimguiltyofmanslaughter.SeeM.R.U.Crim.P.29.Thecourt

deniedthemotion.

[¶10] Limary then offered an expert witness—the Chief Medical

ExaminerfortheStateofMaryland—whosetestimonydifferedfromtheState’s

Chief Medical Examiner’s mainly in identifying the source of the victim’s

bleedingasoneormoreveinsatthesiteofthetracheostomy,notthesiteof

Limary’sinjuriesandsurgery.3Limaryalsoofferedhisowntestimonythathe

hadkickedthevictiminthemouthtoprotecthisfriendbecausehethoughtthe

victimwasgettinguptocontinuefightingandhewantedtogetawayfromthe

victimandhisfriends.

[¶11]Initsinstructionstothejury,thecourtprovidedinstructionson

self-defenseanddefenseofanother.ThejuryfoundLimaryguiltyofboththe

manslaughterandaggravatedassaultcharges.Afterasentencinghearing,the

courtsentencedLimarytosixteenyearsinprisonformanslaughter,withallbut

3Throughcross-examination,itbecameclearthat,whentheexpertpreparedhisreport,hehad

mistakenlybelievedthatthetracheostomytubehadstillbeeninthevictim’sthroatwhenhedied.

7

forty-fivemonthssuspendedandfouryearsofprobation.Fortheconvictionof

aggravatedassault,thecourtsentencedLimarytoforty-fivemonthsinprison,

to be served concurrently with the manslaughter sentence. The court also

ordered Limary to pay $70 plus restitution of $2,519 to the Victims’

CompensationFund.Executionofthesentencewasstayedpendingappeal.See

M.R.U. Crim. P. 38(a). Limary timely appealed. 15M.R.S. § 2115 (2020);

M.R.App.P.2B(b)(1).

II.DISCUSSION

[¶12] Limary challenges (A) the court’s denial of his request to pose

questions regarding self-defense and defense of another in the juror

questionnaireand(B)thesufficiencyoftheevidencethathecausedthevictim’s

death.Weaddresseachissueinturn.

A. JurorQuestionnaire

[¶13] Limaryargues thathewasdeprivedofa fairand impartial jury

because the questionnaire did not specifically inquire of the jurorswhether

theywere able to be fair and impartial regarding issues of self-defense and

defenseofanother.Hecontendsthat,unlikeinStatev.Burton,2018ME162,

¶17&n.2,198A.3d195,thecourtdidnotincludeotherquestionsregarding

self-defenseordefenseofanotherthatwouldsatisfytheconcernsheraised.

8

[¶14] We review challenges to the conduct of voir dire for abuse of

discretion.Statev.Roby,2017ME207,¶11,171A.3d1157.“[T]hepurposeof

thevoirdireprocessistodetectbiasandprejudiceinprospectivejurors,thus

ensuring that a defendant will be tried by as fair and impartial a jury as

possible.”Burton,2018ME162,¶15,198A.3d195(quotationmarksomitted).

Thus, a trial court has considerable discretion over the scope of voirdire

providedthatitisadequatetodisclosefactsthatwouldrevealjurorbias.Id.

[¶15] Acourtneednot voirdirepotential jurors in the exactmanner

requestedbyapartyas longastheprocessissufficienttorevealbias. Roby,

2017ME207,¶13,171A.3d1157. Nordoesacourtabuseitsdiscretionin

excluding questions “that have no relationship to a prospective juror’s

knowledge,bias,orpredisposition,orthatareintendedtoadvocateaparty’s

positionregardingthefactsorissuesindispute.”Roby,2017ME207,¶11,171

A.3d1157(quotationmarksomitted).

[¶16] For purposes of the United States Constitution, “[t]o be

constitutionallycompelled,...itisnotenoughthat[voirdire]questionsmight

behelpful.Rather,thetrialcourt’sfailuretoaskthesequestionsmustrender

thedefendant'strial fundamentallyunfair.” Mu’Minv.Virginia,500U.S.415,

425-26(1991).Forinstance,theUnitedStatesSupremeCourthasdetermined

9

that voir dire questions about racial bias may be constitutionally required,

particularly indeathpenaltycases. SeeTurnerv.Murray,476U.S.28,35-36

(1986);Rosales-Lopezv.UnitedStates,451U.S.182,190(1981)(holdingthat,

althoughthereisnopresumptionofracialbias,acourtmayberequiredtoask

voirdire questions about race if there are “substantial indications of the

likelihoodofracialorethnicprejudiceaffectingthejurorsinaparticularcase”);

Aldridgev.UnitedStates,283U.S.308,314-15(1931)(vacatingajudgmentof

convictionofmurder, forwhich thedefendanthadbeensentenced todeath,

becausethecourtfailedtoinquireofthejurorsregardingracialbias).

[¶17] Consistent with this jurisprudence, theMaine Jury Instruction

Manual,widelyusedincivilandcriminaljurytrialsinMaine,recommendsthat

thetrialcourtconsiderspecificvoirdireincasesthat“mayinvolveparticularly

sensitive issues such as race, religion, sexual preferences, interpersonal or

sexualviolence,orchildabuse.”Alexander,MaineJuryInstructionManual§2-4

at2-6(2019-2020ed.2019).Thesameresourcerecommendsthatduringjury

voirdire the trial court “describe the basic law applicable to the case—in

criminalcases,thepresumptionofinnocence,theState’sbeyondareasonable

doubtstandardofproof,thedefendant’srighttoremainsilentandnotpresent

anyevidence—andthenaskthejurorsiftheywerewillingandabletoaccept

10

andapplythelawtothecaseiftheywereselectedasjurors,regardlessofany

personalviewtheymayhaveastowhatthelawshouldbe.”Id.§2-4Eat2-20.

In this case, all of these principles were addressed in the written jury

questionnaire.

[¶18]Ontheotherhand,theManualrecommendsagainst“[q]uestions

that ask about jurors’ knowledge or beliefs about the law and whether the

jurorsagreewiththelawasstatedbycounsel.”Id.§2-4Fat2-24(“Voirdireis

notaminibarexamforcitizenjurorsuntrainedinthelaw.”).

[¶19] The principles set forth in theManual are consistentwith, and

derivefrom,ourownjurisprudence.“Avoirdireofjurorsbecomesessential

when the potential for bias and prejudice is manifest.” State v. Barczak,

562A.2d140,142(Me.1989).“Whetherprejudiceismanifestisaquestionof

fact for the trial court's determination and the scope of an examination is a

matterofdiscretionforthecourt.”Id.Basedontheevidenceanticipatedina

case,therefore,specialinquiryofjurorsduringvoirdiremayberequiredwith

respecttopotentialbiasregardingmatterssuchasraceandsexualorientation,

pretrialpublicity,andlawenforcementconnections.SeeStatev.Bethea,2019

ME 169, ¶¶ 15-19, 221 A.3d 563; State v. Turner, 495 A.2d 1211, 1212-13

(Me.1985); State v. Lovely, 451 A.2d 900, 901-02 (Me. 1982); see also

11

Alexander,Maine Jury Instruction Manual § 2-4I at 2-31 to 2-32 (including

sample juryquestions aboutpretrialpublicity);cf.State v. Saucier, 2001ME

107,¶21,776A.2d621(affirmingthedenialofamotiontochangevenuein

partbecausevoirdirequestionsaboutpretrialpublicityhadbeenposedtothe

jury). Applying theseprinciples,weheld that juryvoirdirewas inadequate

whentrialcourtsprecludedinquiryintothenatureofjurors’associationswith

prospectivelawenforcementwitnesses,Statev.O'Hara,627A.2d1001,1003

(Me. 1993), and jurors’ past experienceswith violent crime, State v. Lowry,

2003ME38,¶¶10-11,819A.2d331.

[¶20] Inmany circumstances, it will be necessary for a defendant to

provideevidenceofpotentialbiasforvoirdiretoberequired.See,e.g.,Statev.

Lowe, 2015ME124,¶17,124A.3d156(holding that therewas insufficient

evidencethatpretrialpublicitygeneratedapotentialforbias);seealsoUnited

Statesv.Robinson,475F.2d376,381(D.C.Cir.1973)(holdingthat,whenno

recognized class of societal bias is involved, “it is incumbent upon the

proponenttolayafoundationforhisquestionbyshowingthatitisreasonably

calculated to discover an actual and likely source of prejudice, rather than

pursueaspeculativewill-o-the-wisp”).

12

[¶21] In a case in which the defendant was a patron of a gay bar,

however,weineffecttookjudicialnoticeofsocietalprejudicethatcompelled

inquiry on the subject of anti-gay bias. See Lovely, 451 A.2d at 901-02

(acknowledgingtheundeniable“stigmatizationofhomosexualsinoursociety”

andconcludingthatthetrialcourtwasrequiredtoinquireaboutanti-gaybias

duringjuryvoirdirewhentheevidencesuggestedthatthedefendanthadbeen

apatronofagaybar).Thecommonthemeinourjuryvoirdirejurisprudence

hasbeentorequireinquiryintojurors’attitudesandexperiencesinvolvingthe

partiesandwitnessesor involvingspecificareasofevidencewhenthereisa

morethanspeculativepotentialforjurorbias.

[¶22] Asto legaldefensesandjustifications—asopposedtoquestions

regardingpotentialevidence-basedandstatus-basedbiasesagainstpartiesor

expected witnesses—some courts in other states have decided that several

possible defenses and justifications, including self-defense, are sufficiently

“controversial” that they must be specifically explored during voirdire if

requested by a party. See Griffin v. State, 389 S.W.2d 900, 902 (Ark. 1965)

(self-defense); People v. Gregg, 732 N.E.2d 1152, 1163 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000)

(“Although the insanity defense upon which the defendant relied is a

well-recognizedlegaldefense,itremainsasubjectofintensecontroversyand

13

has been described as ‘a defense which is known to be subject to bias or

prejudice.’”(quotingPeoplev.Bowel,488N.E.2d995,999(Ill.1986)));People

v.Taylor,489N.W.2d99,101(Mich.Ct.App.1992)(percuriam)(self-defense

and the use of deadly force); cf. People v. Keenan, 758 P.2d 1081, 1123

(Cal.1988) (holding that sequestered voir dire may be required in a death

penaltycaseasto“potentiallycontroversialdefenses”suchasself-defense).

[¶23]Themajorityoftheothercourtsthathaveconsideredwhethera

requested self-defense question must be posed to potential jurors during

voirdire,however,holdthatthedeterminationisinthediscretionofthetrial

courtbasedon thecircumstancesbefore it. SeeStatev.Ebron,975A.2d17,

26&n.14(Conn.2009),overruledinpartonothergroundsbyStatev.Kitchens,

10A.3d942,959(Conn.2011);see,e.g.,Robinson,475F.2dat380-81(holding

that,althoughitmayhavebeenpreferableforthetrialcourttoinquireabout

jurorattitudestowardself-defense,therefusaltodosodidnotprejudicethe

defendant’ssubstantialrights);Simpsonv.State,276So.3d955,958(Fla.Dist.

Ct. App. 2019) (“This Court has recognized that no bright line rule can be

fashionedtodeterminethelimitsatrialcourtmayimposeonvoirdirebecause

thecomplexitiesineachcasearedifferent.”);Statev.Bedford,529N.E.2d913,

920(Ohio1988)(“Thescopeofvoirdireiswithinthetrialcourt’sdiscretion

14

andvariesdependingonthecircumstancesofeachcase.”);seealsoSavov.State,

382P.3d1179,1182(AlaskaCt.App.2016)(vacatingaconvictionwhenthe

courtrefusedtoallowrequestedvoirdirewhen“theevidencealreadyknown

totheStateprovidedsupportforth[e]claimofself-defense”).

[¶24] Wehavenot identifiedanyparticulardefenseor justificationas

being sufficiently “controversial” to warrant special inquiry during jury

voirdirewhenever raised and cannot now conclude that the law regarding

defense of self or others is sufficiently controversial to justify elevating its

significanceabovethemanyotherpotentialformsofbiasthatcould,intheory,

bethesubjectofspecificinquiryduringjuryvoirdire.Wearenotpersuaded

thatthereexistssocietalbiasagainstthelawofdefenseofselforotherstothe

extent that the constitutional right to a fair trial compels specific voirdire

inquiryduringjuryselection.SeeCommonwealthv.Fisher,290A.2d262,264

(Pa.1972)(holdingthattherewasnoevidenceofwidespreadbiasagainstthe

self-defense justification); Commonwealth v. Morales, 800 N.E.2d 683, 694

(Mass.2003)(“Thereisnoreasontosuspectjurorprejudiceagainstclaimsof

self-defenseandthedefendanthasnotshownasubstantialriskof jurorbias

againstsuchadefense.”).

15

[¶25]Totheextentthatwehaveaddressedvoirdireaboutself-defense,

weaffirmedatrialcourt’sdecisionnottoaskthefollowingquestionregarding

self-defenseinamurdercase:

Thelawallowsapersontousedeadlyforceagainstanotherpersonin self-defense. Do you have any beliefs or opinions thatwouldprevent you from applying the law of self-defense if the Courtprovidedsuchaninstructioninthiscase?

Burton,2018ME162,¶7,198A.3d195(quotationmarksomitted).Weheld

thattheproposedquestionwasnotrequiredtoensureimpartialityandthatthe

questionaboutself-defensethatthecourtdidask—whichstatedthatthelaw

allowedtheuseofdeadlyforceinself-defense“incertaincircumstances”—was

sufficient to reveal juror bias. Id. ¶17 & n.2 (emphasis omitted) (quotation

marks omitted). We affirmed the judgment based on the adequacy of the

questionsaskedtodeterminebiasandtheavailabilityofindividualvoirdireof

thepotentialjurors.Id.¶¶17&n.2,19.

[¶26]UnlikethejuryquestionpropoundedbythecourtinBurton,the

threequestions thatLimaryproposed regarding self-defense anddefenseof

anotherdidnot indicate thataperson’srightsofself-defenseanddefenseof

othersarelimited,see17-AM.R.S.§108(1)-(2)(2020),4and, inthatrespect,

4Atthetimeofthecrimeatissuehere,subsection3of17-AM.R.S.§108(2020)hadnotyettaken

effect.SeeP.L.2019,ch.462,§2(effectiveSept.19,2019).

16

theyfailedtoprovideaccuratestatementsofthelaw.SeeBurton,2018ME162,

¶17n.2,198A.3d195.Thecourtwasjustifiedindecliningtoadoptthemas

phrased.SeeRoby,2017ME207,¶14,171A.3d1157.

[¶27] Although the court could well have included an appropriate

question regarding self-defense and defense of another based on Limary’s

contentionthatthoseissueswouldlikelybegeneratedattrial,thecourtdidnot

abuse its discretion in declining to include such a question. Limary did not

supply an evidentiary basis to establish societal bias against the law of

self-defenseordefenseofanother,cf.Lowe,2015ME124,¶17,124A.3d156;

itwasnotclearwhethertheevidencewouldgenerateeitherjustification,which

increased the risk that the question would amount to improper pretrial

advocacy,seeRoby,2017ME207,¶11,171A.3d1157;andLimary’sconcerns

regarding bias against the law of self-defense and defense of another were

addressedbythecourt’squestionsaboutwhetherthejurorscouldfollowallof

the court’s instructions, even if theydisagreedwith the law, includingwhen

there had been fighting.5 Ultimately, Limary agreed that the jury that was

selectedwasacceptable,andthereisnoevidenceofbiasinanyparticularjuror

5Thewrittenjuryquestionnaireaskedjurorswhethertheycouldfollowthelawinfivedifferent

questions.

17

or inthe juryasawholeasaresultofthecourt’sexclusionoftherequested

instructions.Becausethequestionsaskedinthequestionnairewereadequate

torevealfactsthatwouldidentifyanybiasagainstapplyingtheexistinglawand

thereisnoevidencethatLimarywasdeprivedofanimpartialjury,wewillnot

vacatethejudgmentonthisbasis.SeeBurton,2018ME162,¶15,198A.3d195.

B. SufficiencyoftheEvidenceofCausation

[¶28]Limaryarguesthat,becausethevictimdidnotdieuntileighteen

daysandtwosurgeriesafterthefight, theevidencecannotsupportafinding

that,butforLimary’sconduct,thedeathwouldnothaveoccurredorthathis

conductwasthelegalcauseofthevictim’sdeath.Hecontendsthatthekickwas

a “non-dispositiveevent” thatdidnot,beyondareasonabledoubt, cause the

victim’s death because the victim had elective surgery and was released in

stablecondition.Hecontendsthattherewasnoevidencethatthekickcaused

thebleedingthatoccurredonNovember17,2017.

[¶29] When adefendant challenges the sufficiencyof the evidence to

supportaconviction,weviewtheevidenceinthelightmostfavorabletothe

State to determine whether a trier of fact rationally could find beyond a

reasonabledoubteachelementoftheoffensecharged.Asaad,2020ME11,¶8,

224A.3d596. “Thefact-findermaydrawallreasonableinferencesfromthe

18

evidence,anddecidetheweighttobegiventotheevidenceandthecredibility

tobeaffordedtothewitnesses.”Id.(quotationmarksomitted).

[¶30]“Apersonisguiltyofmanslaughterifthatperson...[r]ecklessly,

or with criminal negligence, causes the death of another human being.”

17-AM.R.S. § 203(1)(A). Limary does not contest the sufficiency of the

evidence that he acted recklessly or with criminal negligence.

See17-AM.R.S.§35(3)(A), (C), (4)(A), (C) (2020) (defining “recklessly” and

“criminalnegligence”).Hearguesonlythattheevidencedidnotpermitthejury

tofindbeyondareasonabledoubtthathisconductcausedthevictim’sdeath.

[¶31] At the time of the fight, the statute governing causation stated,

“Unlessotherwiseprovided,when causinga result is an elementof a crime,

causationmaybefoundwheretheresultwouldnothaveoccurredbutforthe

conductofthedefendantoperatingeitheraloneorconcurrentlywithanother

cause,unlesstheconcurrentcausewasclearlysufficienttoproducetheresult

and the conductof thedefendantwas clearly insufficient.” 17-AM.R.S. §33

(2017).6

6Thelanguageregardingconcurrentcausationwasamended,effectiveaftertheeventsatissue

here,tostatetheconcurrentcausationstandardintheaffirmativeandinaseparateparagraph,usingsimplifiedlanguage:

19

[¶32] “Section 33 expressly imposes limitations on causative

responsibilityandimposesstandardssimilartothecommonlawstandardsof

proximate cause.” State v. Snow, 464 A.2d 958, 962 (Me. 1983). Thus, the

foreseeability of events or conditions contributing to the victim’s death

becomesrelevant.SeeStatev.Shanahan,404A.2d975,983(Me.1979);seealso

UnitedStatesv.Kilmartin,944F.3d315,331(1stCir.2019)(“Proximatecause

iscommonlyunderstoodasafunctionoftheforeseeabilityoftheharm.”). In

applyingsection33,“theStatemustprovebeyondareasonabledoubtnotonly

thattheresultwouldnothaveoccurredbutfortheconductofthedefendant,

butalsothattheconcurrentcausewasnotaloneclearlysufficienttoproduce

theresultandthattheconductofthedefendantwasnotclearlyinsufficientto

producetheresult.”Snow,464A.2dat962;seealsoStatev.Crocker,431A.2d

1323,1325(Me.1981).

§33.Resultasanelement;causation

1. Unlessotherwiseprovided,when causinga result isan elementof a crime,causationmaybefoundwhentheresultwouldnothaveoccurredbutfortheconductofthedefendant,operatingeitheraloneorconcurrentlywithanothercause.

2.Incasesinwhichconcurrentcausationisgeneratedasanissue,thedefendant’sconductmustalsohavebeensufficientbyitselftoproducetheresult.

17-AM.R.S.§33(2020)(codifyingP.L.2017,ch.432,§C-1(emergency,effectiveJuly4,2018));seeL.D.1091,Summary(128thLegis.2017)(“Subsection2containsasimplifiedtesttobeappliedintheeventconcurrentcausationisgeneratedasanissue.Itprovidesthat,whenadefendant’sconductmayhaveoperatedconcurrentlywithanothercause, inadditiontosatisfyingthe ‘butfor’testthedefendant’sconductmusthavebeensufficientbyitselftoproducetheresult....”).

20

[¶33] The evidence plainly supported a jury finding that the victim

underwentsurgeriestorepairinjuriescausedbyLimary’skickandthatthose

surgerieswouldnothaveoccurredbut forLimary’sactions. Thequestionis

whethertheevidencewassufficientforthejurytofind,beyondareasonable

doubt, that thesurgerieswerenot thesolecauseofdeathand thatLimary’s

actionswerenot“clearlyinsufficient”tocausethedeath.17-AM.R.S.§33.In

other words, we must decide whether the medical treatment undertaken

beforethevictim’sdeathwas,asamatteroflaw,anintervening—ratherthan

merelyaconcurrent—causeofthevictim’sdeath,negatingcriminalliability.

[¶34] We have not explicitly announced a rule regarding concurrent

versus interveningcausesofdeath in thecontextofmedical treatmentofan

injuredvictim.InStatev.Hachey,278A.2d397,400-01(Me.1971),however,

weaffirmedamurderconvictionwhen,althoughthevictimreceivedmedical

care, including a tracheostomy, after the defendant shot him, the victim

ultimatelydiedofinfection:“Certainly[thejury]couldfindthatthecauseofthe

septicemiawastheentryofthebulletintothebodyofthedecedent.”Id.7

7Wereachedthisholdingatcommonlawbecausenostatuteequivalenttosection33wasinforce

untiltheadoptionoftheMaineCriminalCodeinthemid-1970s.SeeP.L.1975,ch.499,§1(effectiveMar.1,1976)(codifiedat17-AM.R.S.A.§56(1979)).Asthebill’scommentreveals,thenewstatutorylanguage was taken from a proposed Massachusetts Code and based on the proposed FederalCriminalCode. L.D.314,§1,cmt.to17-AM.R.S.A.§56(107thLegis.1975). Thefederaldraftersspecificallynotedthat“[t]hemajorprobleminenunciatingsuchrulesispresentedbysituationsinwhichtwoormorefactors‘cause’theresult.”Nat’lComm’nonReformofFed.CriminalLaws,Final

21

[¶35] Inotherconcurrentcausationcontexts,wesimilarlyheld thata

jurycouldfindcausation,despiteothereventsorcircumstancesthatmayhave

contributedtothevictim’sdeath.Forinstance,weconcludedthattheevidence

was sufficient to support a manslaughter conviction when the medical

examiner testified that a wound inflicted by the defendant, which was

accompaniedbyotherinjuriesnotinflictedbythedefendant,wouldeventually

have caused death if untreated. State v. Morelli, 493 A.2d 336, 338-40

(Me.1985);seealsoStatev.Cumming,634A.2d953,954,956-57(Me.1993)

(affirming a murder conviction when, although the pathologist could not

distinguishwhich injuries resulted from the victim leaping or being pushed

from the defendant’s car andwhich injuries resulted fromhim then driving

overher, theevidencecouldsupporta jury finding that thevictimwasalive

when shewas run over);State v. Peaslee, 571A.2d 825, 826-27 (Me. 1990)

(affirming a vehicular manslaughter conviction when the defendant’s

passenger was thrown from the vehicle and then run over by another car

becausethevictimwouldnothavebeenintheroadifnotforthedefendant’s

Report32(1971).Thesectionwasproposedas“amodified‘butfor’testwithaprovisothatexcludesthosesituationsinwhichtheconcurrentcausewasclearlysufficienttoproducetheresultandtheaccused’sconductclearlyinsufficient....‘Butfor’isaminimalrequirementforguilt;andresolvingthatquestionpermitsfocusingonthemoreimportantissueofculpabilityastotheresultcaused.”Id.

22

conduct);Statev.Reardon,486A.2d112,116-18(Me.1984)(affirmingatrial

court’sfindingofcausationinafelonymurdercasebecauseitwasreasonably

foreseeable that a sixty-seven-year-old robbery victim would have a heart

attackdue to the stressof the robbery,his foreseeable attempt to chase the

perpetrator,andhisagitatedexplanationoftherobberytopolice);Shanahan,

404A.2dat983(holdingthatthevictim’sforeseeableconductinattemptingto

wrest the gun away from the defendant was not, “as a matter of law, an

interveningcauserelievingdefendantofcriminalresponsibilityforherdeath”).

[¶36]Otherjurisdictionshavemorespecificallyheldthatwhenmedical

treatmentisprovidedtoan injuredvictim,negligenttreatmentcannotbean

interveningcause“unlessthedoctor’streatmentissobadastoconstitutegross

negligence or intentional malpractice.” 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive

CriminalLaw§6.4(f)(5)at658-59(3ded.2018).Thesecourtshaveheldthat

grossnegligence,which isnotreasonably foreseeable, canbean intervening

causeifthefact-finderdeterminesthatthevictimwouldhavesurvivedwithout

thatgrossnegligence.SeePeoplev.Calvaresi,534P.2d316,319(Colo.1975)

(“[M]eremedicalnegligencecanreasonablybe foreseen. Wehold,however,

thatgrossnegligence isabnormalhumanbehavior,wouldnotbereasonably

foreseeable,andwouldconstituteadefense, if,but for thatgrossnegligence,

23

deathwouldnothaveresulted.”);Statev.Soucy,653A.2d561,565(N.H.1995)

(“Themajorityofjurisdictions...haveadoptedwhathasbeentermeda‘sole’

causetest,underwhichmalpracticeconstitutesasuperveningcauseonlyifit

wasthe‘sole’causeofthedeath.”);cf.Statev.Jackson,223N.W.2d229,233-34

(Iowa1974)(holding,withrespecttoordinarynegligence,that“[a]ninjuryis

the proximate cause of resulting death although the deceased would have

recoveredhadhebeentreatedbythemostapprovedsurgicalmethodsorby

moreskillfulmethods,orwithmoreprudentcare”).

[¶37] Applying these generally accepted standards, courts have

concluded that a jury could find causation despite interceding medical

treatment when there was no evidence that the medical care was grossly

negligent,seePeoplev.Saavedra-Rodriguez,971P.2d223,228-29(Colo.1998);

whenthewoundwassodangerousonitsownthatthemedicaltreatmentcould

nothavebeenthesolecauseofdeath,seeStatev.Shabazz,719A.2d440,444-45

(Conn.1998);Wrightv.State,374A.2d824,827,828-29(Del.1977);Statev.

Surbaugh,786S.E.2d601,607-08,616(W.Va.2016);andwhennonnegligent

emergency treatment caused some bleeding but not enough to cause the

victim’sdeath,Nealv.State,722S.E.2d765,768(Ga.2012).8

8 Incontrast,acourt foundthattheevidencewas insufficient toestablishcausationbeyonda

reasonabledoubtwhenthevictimwasstabbed inthestomachandduringsurgery, thesurgeons

24

[¶38]Here,thereisnoevidenceofmedicalnegligence—muchlessgross

medicalnegligence—noranyevidence that thesurgerywas foranypurpose

otherthantotreattheinjuriesinflictedonthevictimbyLimary.Cf.id.Although

therewasevidencethatthevictimcouldhavedeferredthesurgery,thesurgery

wasentirelyforeseeableandwasnotcosmetic;themedicalexamineropined

thatthestabilityofthevictim’sfacewasatriskandthat,withoutsurgery,he

wouldbe indangerofbleedingorof thebones inhis facehealingbadlyand

impedinghisbreathing.Themedicalexamineralsotestifiedthataboneshard

could have severedmultiple blood vessels and caused the type of excessive

sinusbleedingthatheconcludedhadoccurredhere.Giventhisevidence,and

the medical examiner’s specific determination that the victim died of

“hemorrhagiccomplicationsfollowingmultiplefracturesoffacialbonesdueto

the blunt force trauma of his head,” the jury could rationally find that the

surgerywasnotthesolecauseofthebleedingandthatthedamageinflicted

discoveredanincarceratedhernia,whichtheyproceededtocorrectaftertheinitialsurgery.Peoplev.Stewart,358N.E.2d487,489-90(N.Y.1976).Duringthatsecondsurgicalprocedure,thevictimwentintocardiacarrest.Id.at490.Themedicalexaminertestifiedthatthecardiacarrestcouldhavebeencausedbytheshockofthestabwoundorbythephysicalstrainofeitheroperation;healsotestifiedthattheanesthesiologist’sreportandsurgeons’reportwerecontradictoryaboutwhethertheanesthesiologisthadfailedtodeliveroxygentothevictim,whichalonecouldhavecausedthevictim’sdeath.Id.at490-91.Thecourtconcludedthatitcouldnotberuledoutasapossibilitythattheherniaoperationhadcausedthevictim’sdeath,“certainlynotbeyondareasonabledoubt.”Id.at492.

25

throughthekickwasnot“clearlyinsufficient”tocausedeath.See17-AM.R.S.

§33.

[¶39]Basedontheevidenceintherecord,thejurycouldrationallyfind

beyondareasonabledoubtthat(1)thevictim’sdeath“wouldnothaveoccurred

but for the conductof thedefendant, operatingeither aloneor concurrently

withanothercause”;and(2)themedicalcarewasnot“clearlysufficient,”and

thekicktothevictim’sfacewasnot“clearlyinsufficient,”tocausethevictim’s

death.17-AM.R.S.§33;seeCalvaresi,534P.2dat319;Soucy,653A.2dat565.

Wethereforeaffirmthejudgmentofconviction.

Theentryis:

Judgmentaffirmed. HunterJ.Tzovarras,Esq.,Bangor,forappellantJonathanLimaryAaronM.Frey,AttorneyGeneral,andKatieSibley,Asst.Atty.Gen.,OfficeoftheAttorneyGeneral,Augusta,forappelleeStateofMaineAroostookCountyUnifiedCriminalDocketdocketnumberCR-2018-12FORCLERKREFERENCEONLY