State-Building Challenges in a Post-Revolution Libya

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External Research Associates Program Monograph

STATE-BUILDING CHALLENGESIN A POST-REVOLUTION LIBYA

Mohammed El-Katiri

October 2012

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ISBN 1-58487-551-8


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FOREWORD

Libyas National Transitional Council (NTC) in-herited a difcult and volatile domestic situation fol-lowing the overthrow of Muammar Qadha. The newleadership faces serious and simultaneous challengesin all areas of statehood. Libyas key geostrategic posi-tion, and role in hydrocarbon production and exporta-tion, means that the course of internal developmentsthere is crucial not only to the Libyan people, but alsoto neighboring countries both in North Africa andacross the Mediterranean in southern Europe. Themitigation or prevention of conditions that could leadto Libya becoming a failing or failed state is of vitalimportance.

In this monograph, United Kingdom-based aca-demic Dr. Mohammed El-Katiri reviews the major

challenges to the new Libyan regime, including thecontinuing role of tribalism and the difculty posedby the NTCs lack of monopoly on ensuring securityin Tripoli and beyond. Key issues of concern to foreignpartners when engaging with the new Libyan leader-ship are highlighted, and a number of policy recom-mendations are made. Libyas immediate future is ofcritical importance, and will determine whether the

country faces state consolidation or state failure.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.Director

Strategic Studies Institute


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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

MOHAMMED EL-KATIRI, a British academic, isa Senior Research Analyst at the Conict Studies Re-search Centre (CSRC), and a freelance political riskanalyst for North Africa and the Gulf states, based inLondon, England. Before working for CSRC, he was aResearch Fellow at the United Kingdom (UK) DefenceAcademy, and later covered North Africa as a PoliticalRisk Analyst at the Eurasia Group. With more than 10years of regional experience, Dr. El-Katiri has researchinterests that include political and economic security inNorth Africa and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)states, as well as North African relations with the Euro-pean Union, and security policies around the Mediter-ranean. Dr. El-Katiri has published numerous internaland external UK Defence Academy reports, including

reference reports on national and regional security is-sues in the GCC and the Mediterranean, and a mono-graph on the Algerian national oil and gas company,Sonatrach. In addition, his publications include com-mentaries and research papers for the Centro de Es-tudios y Documentacion Internacionales de Barcelona(CIDOB) and the Centre dtudes Internationales deRabat, as well as various newspaper articles in andabout the region. He is a frequent commentator in themedia, including the British Broadcasting Corpora-tion (BBC), the Financial Times, and Al Jazeera.


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SUMMARY

A peaceful transition to a new form of governmentin Libya is of vital importance not only to the peopleof Libya, but to neighboring countriesand to secu-rity in the broad sense much farther aeld. Yet, at thetime of this writing, the new interim leadership re-mains fragile, with limited capacity and sovereignty,and the inability to enforce security is still a criticalchallenge. There is a risk of conditions being createdthat could lead to Libya becoming a fragile or indeeda failed state.

Despite the mitigation of the threat from support-ers of the old regime, the interim government has nomonopoly on the legitimate use of violence. The secu-rity risks of Libyas uncontrolled armed militias arenot restricted to within national borders. By jeopardiz-

ing state-building efforts, clashes between militias orbetween militias and government authorities threatento undermine the security of neighboring countriesand the international community. Risks include re-newed waves of refugee ows to Tunisia, Egypt, andacross the Mediterranean to Italy and beyond, andcontinuing disruption to oil production, which willonce again deprive the international market of Libyanoil and harm the economic interests of U.S. and Eu-ropean companies. Furthermore, the current lack of acapable national army leaves Libya an open playingeld to be exploited by international criminal or ter-rorist groups active in the region.

A key challenge confronting the interim govern-ment in Libya is the creation of political institutions to

provide for the functioning of an effective democraticstate. The interim government is, in effect, inheritinga stateless state. Drawing up a constitution for Libya


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will not be straightforward. Political inghting be-tween secularists and Islamists has already surfaced

on varying issues of political signicance to Libyasfuture, including vital elements, such as the structureand religious identity of the state. Democratic culturedecit is another key challenge, since political partiesand civil society institutions were absent from Libyafor more than 4 decades.

The socioeconomic and political factors that ledpeople to revolt against the regime are equally per-tinent to post-conict stabilization, and require earlyattention. Unemployment was a signicant long-termissue in Qadhas Libya, as was frustration at the fallin standards of living while the country generated bil-lions of dollars from hydrocarbon exports, much ofwhich was spent on Qadhas foreign policy adven-tures. Ordinary citizens argued that a country rich in

energy resources with a relatively small populationshould be able to offer high living standards to its pop-ulation, in the same manner as in the rich Gulf states.A rapid resumption of oil and gas production will notonly assist in the rebuilding of Libyas infrastructureand economy; it will alleviate economic pressures onneighboring countries, as the Libyan economy reab-sorbs thousands of Egyptian and Tunisian workers indifferent sectors.

The political role of tribes cannot be understatedin determining the future shape of Libya. A numberof attempts to seize power from him prompted Qa-dha to accentuate tribalization, turning to his tribalkinsmen to counter increased political opposition andappointing several blood relatives and in-laws to key

security and military positions. Manipulating tribesand building informal tribal alliances became an im-portant part of Qadhas internal political maneuver-

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ing, with nepotism and favoritism becoming the pil-lars sustaining Qadhas informal political alliances.

Elements of these tribal dynamics remain in the post-revolution environment, and in the interests of stabil-ity and the avoidance of further conict, their man-agement and mitigation are every bit as important asthey were during the reigns of King Idris and Qadhahimself. The key nature of this challenge should not beunderestimated by foreign partners engaging with thenew Libyan regime.

Recommendations.

As the Libyan interim government continuesto struggle to maintain law and order while si-multaneously facing the daunting tasks of state-building ab initio, the United States and other

leading actors in the international communitycan assist in maintaining stability by engagingand providing vitally needed assistance essen-tial to avoid destabilization and deteriorationwithin Libya, gravid with consequences notonly for Libyan citizens, but for neighbors andenergy consumers both in North Africa andEurope. The involvement of the internationalcommunity should be focused on what Libyaneeds in order to perform its functions as an ef-fective sovereign state, both at a national andinternational level.

The ambitions of the interim government areinhibited by the lack of a clear security reformstrategy that includes specic measures for the

disarmament and reintegration of revolution-ary ghters, and the management of legacyarmaments in general. The sooner the interim


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government launches its security reform plan,the better the chances of success for political

transition. Assistance to the interim authoritiesin implementing security reform in order tomitigate the risks outlined above should there-fore be a priority of the United States and otherforeign partners.

Tribes play an important role in the daily lifeof many Libyans, and are likely to continue todo so for the foreseeable future. Under a newregime that does not favor tribal politics, triballeaders might agree to take a limited role atthe national-political level, but will be likely towant to keep their political inuence at the re-gional level. Leading tribes in different areas ofthe country will have great aspirations to playan important role in their respective regions.

The United States and other foreign partnersengaging with the new Libyan state need tobe aware of the limitations on the power andreach of that state imposed by the tribal natureof its society.

An important task for the interim government,and an important step for the stability of thecountry, is to organize a truth-recovery and rec-onciliation initiative. International experienceshows that reconciliation initiatives in post-conict situations or following regime or politi-cal change constitute an important step towardhealing the wounds of the past and strengthen-ing political transitions. Given the importanceof reconciliation initiatives for stability during

transition, the United States and other foreignpartners should encourage these efforts andprovide targeted support for the process.


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U.S. and United Nations (UN) expertise in dis-armament, demobilization, and reintegration

(DDR) of armed ghters in post-conict situa-tions could be of pivotal help to Libya, but suchsupport should be carefully provided. Althoughthe situation on the ground at the time of thiswriting suggests that the interim governmentin Libya would appreciate external help withthe armed militias, any level of visible foreignmilitary presence in Libya risks igniting morepolitical instability than it provides. Any DDRassistance would be best provided throughdiplomatic channels in the form of continuousadvisory and monitoring support.

Preventing the hostile exploitation of Libyasvast territory and largely uncontrolled bordersremains a key task for the international com-

munity while Libya still lacks an adequatenational army. The new Libya needs well-equipped and well-trained military forces toprotect and secure its borders and national ter-ritory. The new security apparatus that will beput in place should be trained to play a neutralrole in internal political life, and specicallyavoid domination by or favoritism toward spe-cic tribes or clans over others. A new securitysystem will reduce the risk of intimidation andviolence during Libyas political transition. TheUnited States and other international partnerswith the experience of building security forcesin Iraq and Afghanistan are well-placed to offerthis experience to Libya.

International nongovernmental organizationshave much to offer the nascent democratic po-litical culture and civil society in Libya. The new


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Libya requires the establishment and strength-ening of a party system, elections, media, and

an independent judiciary. Technical assistancein setting up legal systems on political andeconomic fronts is an essential prerequisite forLibyas transition toward democracy.


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1

STATE-BUILDING CHALLENGESIN A POST-REVOLUTION LIBYA

INTRODUCTION

On October 20, 2011, 4 decades of authoritarianrule by a political regime controversial on both theregional and world stages came to an end. The killingof Muammar Qadha and the toppling of his regimemarked the end of 8 months of civil war, but only thebeginning of a new phase that promises to be evenmore difcult than the Libyan peoples struggle forpolitical power. The transition toward democracy inLibya, if there is to be democracy there, and the build-ing of a modern state present a daunting series of hur-dles and tensions. The interim government faces thechallenging task of simultaneously holding elections,

demilitarizing and reintegrating militias, fosteringnational reconciliation, drafting a new constitution,restoring security, repairing the damage wrought bydomestic combat operations and foreign airstrikes,and ensuring economic development to meet the aspi-rations of its population.

From a political perspective, Libya is not a homog-enous country, either ethnically or ideologically. In-ternal differences are a source of concern to both thelocal population and the international community.Tribal divisions across the country complicate stillfurther the historical rivalry and divided loyalties be-tween the East and West. Tribalism is a societal realityin Libya, and it would be nave to hope that it willcease to be a critical inuence on the post-Qadha po-

litical scene. Indeed, tribalism was also an importantfactor in the survival of that regime: The loyalty ofcertain tribes kept the ghting going for months, in-


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cluding after the capital, Tripoli, fell into the hands ofrebels; furthermore, remnants of the Qadha regime

still have the potential to present a destabilizing threatduring the transition period. Contradictions betweendomestic political forces, as well as interference byexternal parties, all suggest that the post-Qadha erawill be complex and tense for the foreseeable future.

If a transition period toward building an effectiveand democratic state is mishandled or simply takestoo long, conditions could be created that risk Libyabecoming a fragile, or indeed a failed, state. A peace-ful transition is of vital importance not only to thepeople of Libya, but to neighboring countries and tosecurity in the broad sense much farther aeld. Lib-yas geostrategic position is of critical importance notonly to its neighbors in North Africa but also to thosein southern Europe. Hydrocarbon resources and tran-

sit render Libyas stability of even greater signicanceto the international community. A rapid resumptionof oil and gas production will not only assist in therebuilding of Libyas infrastructure and economy; itwill alleviate enormous economic pressures on neigh-boring countries, as the Libyan economy reabsorbsthousands of Egyptian and Tunisian workers in dif-ferent sectors.

This monograph will discuss the challenges of Lib-yas political transition after the fall of the Qadha re-gime, and seek to highlight the key issues that shouldbe of concern to the United States and its allies whenengaging with post-Qadha Libya. First, the mono-graph explores the causes of the Libyan upheaval, fo-cusing on the socioeconomic and political factors that

led people to revolt against the regimesince theseissues are equally pertinent to post-conict stabiliza-tion. Second, it examines the tribes as a crucial element


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that crosscuts many of the political and security issuesthat Libya faces. Third, the monograph discusses the

key post-revolution challenges facing the provisionalgovernment, such as ideological differences, armedmilitias and the collection of weapons, and nationalreconciliation. Democratic culture decit is anotherkey challenge, since political parties and civil societyinstitutions were absent from Libya for more than 4decades. International experience shows that demo-cratic transitions are not smooth and painless process-

es, and there is no reason to suspect that Libya will bean exception.

The monograph draws on open-source mate-rial in English, French, Spanish, and Arabic, and oninterviews with Libyan nationals and foreign diplo-mats in Tripoli and Benghazi, all of whom requestedanonymity.

THE SEEDS OF LIBYAS FEBRUARY 17, 2011,REVOLUTION

The precedent set by the successful oustings of theTunisian and Egyptian presidents, Zine El AbidineBen Ali and Hosni Mubarak, gave weight and focusto a wide range of other factors that pushed Libyansto begin mass protests in the eastern cities of Benghaziand al-Baydaa in February 2011. Both economic griev-ances and resentment of the autocratic nature of theQadha regime lay behind the rapid development ofthe protests and eventual open insurrection.

The revolution that nally toppled Qadha wasnot the rst uprising that Libya had experienced dur-

ing his rule. Protests against his oppressive regimewere relatively frequent, particularly in the easternregion of the country. These protests were always


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brutally quelled by military and security forces. Overmore than 4 decades, Qadha faced several instances

of serious political challenge by internal groups, for-eign governments, and even from close colleaguesaiming to overthrow him. He survived several failedcoups dtat from the 1970s onward. The failed attemptwith the most signicant long-term consequencescame in 1993, leading Qadha to make major changesin his security apparatus and to marginalize most ofthe remaining comrades-in-arms from his own 1969revolution.

This section will examine the issues that triggeredthe February revolution, since addressing these sameissues remains a key task for the new Libyan regimein transition.

Limited Political Openings.

Rather than arising overnight, discontent withthe pace and depth of political reform among Liby-an intellectuals, and even some entrenched politicalelites, had been a constant factorcharacterized byskepticism over the promises by the regime to intro-duce greater democracy. The democratization effortsof Saif al-Islam, Qadhas second eldest son, clashedcontinuously with the authoritarian policies of the oldguard. Reform-oriented transition toward democracyis by nature a lengthy process, requiring constant ne-gotiation of changes to be introduced between theregime and democratizing elites; but after 4 decadesof Qadhas authoritarian rule, patience for a lengthyprocess was exhausted.

The regimes hardliners were concerned that large-scale and rapid changes could undermine the coun-trys political stability. These groups included thosewho had beneted from the system economically and


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politically. The tussle between the two groups wasdemonstrated through various public events, such as

the sidelining of ministers and senior ofcers or theclosure of newspapers. Several journalists workingfor Saif al-Islams publishing company, al-Ghad, werearrested by the Libyan authorities and later releasedby Qadha in late 2010.1 Tom Malinowski, director ofHuman Rights Watch in Washington, believed he ob-served the struggle between the reformers and hard-liners rst hand during an event organized to launch areport on the human rights situation in Libya in 2009.He commented that, There are clearly forces pressingfor greater openness. Thats why were here. But thereare also powerful forces who dont want this processto succeed.2

Qadhas unwillingness to change the political sys-tem not only frustrated broad sectors of the ordinary

Libyan population, but also upset his former closecollaborators from various periods of his rule. Hisone-man style of leadership left room for few friendsaround him. Many of his revolutionary colleagues,senior ofcers, and technocrats rebelled or quit theirpositions. In the 1970s and 1980s, some abandoned thecountry and joined opposition groups abroad. Key is-sues of disagreement between Qadha and his closeassociates varied over the years, but the most impor-tant ones included:

Spending on nancing and training insurgen-cies abroad;

Direct intervention in other countries internalaffairs, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, bysupporting coups and rebel groups over the

course of decades;3 The building of a large man-made river in theLibyan desert, seen as an irrational diversion


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of resources at a time of nancial constraints inthe 1980s;4

Plans for the succession and repeated long-termspeculation over the possible appointment ofone of Qadhas sons to take his position.

Over the last decade of Qadhas rule, the promi-nent role of Saif al-Islam in public life and politicalspheres was perceived as a strong indication of his fu-ture political role. In addition to Saif al-Islams owner-ship of the al-Ghad media company, his position ashead of the Qadha International Charity and Devel-opment Foundation had allowed him to engage inpolitical initiatives nationally and internationally. In2009, a call by Qadha on Libyan regional and triballeaders to nd an ofcial job for his son was well re-ceived: Saif al-Islam was appointed head of the Popu-

lar Social Leadership Committees, a position that al-lowed him broad legislative and executive powers.Following his election, he commented that this ofcialposition would allow him to deliver his political andeconomic reform plan entitled Libya of Tomorrow.5

At the same time, the lack of clarity over Qadhasplans for succession of power created enemies amongboth his close collaborators and ordinary Libyans. Si-lence over the succession plan, combined with the ris-ing star of Saif al-Islam, created animosities within Qa-dhas inner circle of friends, known as the men of thetentsince the unspoken rule for decades had beenthat if Qadha were to disappear from the politicalscene, it would be one of his revolutionary colleagueswho would be his successor. Saif al-Islams new politi-

cal prominence was envied, because no other politicalgure was afforded the same opportunities; Qadhasone-man style of leadership naturally precluded the


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emergence of any other leader in public spheres. Thefact that Saif al-Islam was allowed to introduce new

political initiatives and criticize his fathers regimein a context in which even Qadhas close colleaguesrefrained from questioning his ideaswas perceivedas a further implicit signal of Qadhas intention todesignate him as successor.

Economic Factors.

The limited market economy reforms introducedby Qadha in the late-1990s and during the 2000s werenot sufcient to relieve poverty for a large number ofordinary Libyans, and instead were perceived as ben-eting a small number of Qadhas family membersand his inner circle of loyal friends. This bred pessi-mism with regard to any likelihood of positive eco-

nomic change in Libya under the former regime.Unemployment was a signicant long-term issuein Qadhas Libya. Ofcial sources placed Libyas2009 unemployment rate at 20.74 percent;6 with theyouth unemployment rate higher, at 27 percent;7 at thetime, 65 percent of the countrys population was lessthan 35 years old. In parallel with other Arab oil-richcountries, high unemployment in Libya results large-ly from a long-term mismatch between the educationsystem and the skills needed by the growing privatesector, further complicated by high job expectationsby graduates. A high proportion of Libyan graduateslack the adequate job-related skills required in a va-riety of sectors and industries.8 As a consequence, alarge number of nationals, especially young ones, re-

mained unemployed, despite the positive economicgrowth that followed the lifting of the United Nations(UN) sanctions in September 2003.


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The public investment spending of recent years onmajor infrastructure facilities, transport, housing and

other construction, coupled with private investmentin the oil and gas sectors, generated new job opportu-nities, but mainly in the low-skill sector that does notappeal to Libyans. Hence, until February 2011, some2.5 million foreign migrants worked in constructionand agriculture jobs.9 In addition, the scarcity of tech-nical skills among Libyans meant that most of the lim-ited available skilled jobs went to foreigners. To rectifythis situation, Libyan authorities launched a packageof incentives and measures for foreign companies toincrease the number of Libyans in skilled positions.During a meeting of oil companies operating in Libyain 2009, Shukri Ghane, former Chairman of the Lib-yan National Oil Company, stressed the importanceof training Libyan engineers for future tenders.10 The

development of skilled human resources remains apriority for the Libyan government to achieve its eco-nomic development and diversication plans.

High ination rates caused by increasing food andhousing prices, coupled with the unbalanced distribu-tion of income, led to a deterioration of living condi-tions for many Libyan families and among unskilledforeign laborers. Libyans were particularly frustratedover the fall in standards of living, while the countryhad generated billions of dollars from hydrocarbonexportsmany of which had been spent on Qadhasforeign policy adventures of ghting imperialism orthe unication of Africa. Ordinary citizens arguedthat a country rich in energy resources, with a rela-tively small population, should be able to offer high

living standards to its population, in the same manneras in the rich Gulf states.


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To prevent the spread of food riots that hit Tuni-sia and Algeria in the rst week of January 2011, the

Libyan government lifted taxes and import tariffs onbasic food staples.11 Further measures were also an-nounced, including granting loans for new businessesand housing projects. This, however, was not enoughto preempt dissent. Shortly after the ight of Tuni-sian president Ben Ali to Saudi Arabia on January 14,2011, protests erupted in Libyan cities. Socioeconomicgrievances triggered riots in Benghazi and al-Baydaa.With the lack of affordable housing an acute problemin Libya for years, corruption and the governmentsinability to deliver promised subsidized housing unitsin the scheduled timeframe had angered a broad sec-tion of the Libyan population in these cities and servedas the direct trigger for protest action.12

TRIBES AND POLITICS DURING AND AFTERQADHAFIS RULE

Despite a belated realization of the importance ofthe tribes in Libyan social and political affairs,13 tribaldynamics in Libya still failed to take their proper placeas a major theme of discussion and analysis duringand after the civil war. The political role of tribes can-not be understated in determining the future shapeof Libya. New political elites are currently discussingthe feasibility and modalities of engaging the tribes inthe future political system, while tensions along triballines remain a risk factor likely to complicate politicaltransition in post-Qadha Libya.

There are more than 100 tribes and clans across

Libya, divided across three main ethnicities: Arab,Berber, and African. But it is important to stress thatonly a few are truly inuential, and have dominated


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the political and social scene for decades. The leadingtribes are the following:

Warfala: the largest tribe in the country, withmembers spread across different Libyan cities,but considering Bani Walid as its home base;

Magarha: the second most populous of Libyantribes, inhabiting the southern regions of Wadial-Shati and Sebha;

Zintan: concentrated in the Nafusa mountainsregion in the western part of Libya. Most of itsmembers belong to the Amazigh minority;

Obeidat: located in the northeastern cities; Zawiya: located in the oil-rich southeast; Qadhadhfa: Qadhas own tribe, based in Sirte

and Sebha regions.14

With tribalism in Libya a politically sensitive topic,

there are few studies available that provide up-to-datedetailed information on the tribes. One of these fewwas written by Amal Obeidi, a Libyan academic at theUniversity of Garyounis in Benghazi, whose empiricalstudy described the tribe as a still important elementshaping the identity of Libyans not only in rural areasbut also in urban centers.15 This runs counter to com-mon expectations that the role of the tribe would havediminished among the youth or in the major cities ofTripoli, Benghazi, and Misrata; in fact, reference totribe remains current and popular among young ur-ban Libyans, just as among older rural generations. Inparticular, the role of Libyas tribes in allocating socio-economic benets and security in the absence of effec-tive state institutions reinforced the role of tribalism

across all Libyan regions.16Making sense of the ambivalent political situationof the tribes requires a brief review of Libyas political


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history since its independence. The relation betweentribes and politics was cemented in the early days of

Libyas struggle for independence. The power base forthe rule of King Idris (1951-69) was an alliance betweenthe Sanussi Order, a religious order, and Saadi tribes;the tribal nobility constituted a signicant part of theKings cabinet, serving as advisors and condants.17

Over the course of the years following Qadhasarrival in power as a result of a coup in 1969, he madeattempts to dismantle the tribal alliances put in placeby the previous regime. Qadha replaced tribal no-tables who had occupied administrative positions atregional level with young technocrats.18 The under-mining and marginalization of the role of the tribes inthe early days of Qadhas revolutionary regime wasdriven both by tactical and ideological motives. Tacti-cally, the aim was to remove any remaining elements

loyal to the monarchy. Meanwhile, pan-Arab nation-alism was a strong ideological driver to move on fromtribalism to a political system ready to embrace notonly all Libyans, but also other Arab countries. Qa-dha for years saw himself as successor to the lateEgyptian president Jamal Abdel-Nasser in the Arabnationalist movement. Thus, when Qadha referredto the tribe in his Green Book, the distillation of hispolitical views published in stages throughout the1970sand omnipresent required reading in Libyaunder Qadhait was without any distinct politi-cal connotation. Qadha envisaged the tribe as a keycomponent of Libyan society in the same manner asthe family, providing natural social protection to itsmembers.19

This attempt at exclusion of tribalism from Liby-an politics did not succeed for long. Several factorspushed Qadha to use the tribes politically in order


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to strengthen and stabilize his regime. The most im-portant of these factors was a disagreement over key

policy orientations and rifts among comrades of theRevolutionary Command Council, the supreme ex-ecutive and legislative body that governed Libya afterthe 1969 coup and during the 1970s.20 In an open let-ter published in 1992, Abdul Moneim al-Honi, one ofQadhas close condants who had served in severalimportant positions in the 1970s before defecting toEgypt in 1975, described Qadhas manipulation ofthe tribal factions. He noted that the tribal inghtingof the past had been buried after independence, butthat Qadha had revived these social divisions againin order to strengthen his grip on power.21

A number of attempts to seize power promptedQadha to accentuate tribalization still further. Mostsignicant among these was the 1993 rebellion and

coup attempt by military forces in Misratah, whichled to incidents in other Libyan cities including al-Zawiya and Sirt. In addition to arresting a number ofarmy ofcers, Qadha responded by turning to histribal kinsmen to counter increased political opposi-tion.22 Qadha appointed several blood relatives andin-laws to key security and military positions, includ-ing Brigadier Ahmad Qadhaf al-Damm and AbdullahSanoussi, his cousin and brother-in-law, respectively.Al-Damm held several military and diplomatic posi-tions including, nally, special envoy and represen-tative of Qadha to some Arab countries. Sanoussihad an extended tenure as head of internal security.Several members of Qadhas tribe also took seniorpositions in the armed forces.23

Manipulating tribes and building informal tribalalliances thus became an important part of Qadhasinternal political maneuvering. The small size of the


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Qadhadhfa tribe, and its light political and economicweight, led Qadha to seek informal and tacit alliances

with other key tribes in the country such as the War-fala and Magarha. Nepotism and favoritism becamethe pillars sustaining Qadhas informal political al-liances. Appointing family members and key guresfrom allied tribes in important and leading positionswas the norm, and trusted tribes were armed by theregime. Qadha strengthened his power by effectivelyplaying the tribes against each other, promoting onetribe over the other in different parts of the country.24

In the 1990s, the role of tribes and clans in publiclife was reinforced still further with the establishmentof a nationwide system of Peoples Social LeadershipCommittees. Tribal and regional notables were themain members of these new committees, which tooka number of social and bureaucratic functions over

from the central state.25

These Committees providedwelfare services to the local population, and servedas a judicial forum to settle local conicts. They alsooversaw the implementation of socioeconomic pro-grams in their own regions and localities.26

The military provides a case study demonstratingthe importance of tribalism in Qadhas political sys-tem. In addition to the appointments of relatives andmembers of loyal tribes to key military positions inresponse to failed attempts to topple the regime, par-ticularly the one in 1993, Qadha created a parallel se-curity system made up of several special military unitsthat were assigned to persons of trust, including hissons. These units, known as Kataeb al-Amnia (Se-curity Brigades), were well-trained and equipped

compared to the regular army.27 The best-knownunit of this type was the 32nd Reinforced Brigade,known as the Khamis Brigade, led by Qadhas


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son Khamis. This unit was based close to Benghazi,a city that had seen the majority of the uprisings and

revolts against Qadhas regime over the previous 4decadesas well as being at the source of the most re-cent one, which eventually ended Qadhas rule.28 Inthe event, Qadhas security calculations were provedentirely correct. In the early days of the February 17revolution, several senior army ofcers defected andjoined the rebel forces, including Chief of Staff Abu-Bakr Younes Jaber. Meanwhile, the Kataeb al-Amniaconstituted the main ghting elements opposing therebels over the 8 months of the civil war.

The civil war period saw tribal leaders conveningto discuss the security and political situation. A num-ber of loyalty statements were issued, in favor eitherof Qadhas regime or of the rebels. Tribal notableswere keen to show their importance on the political

scene, and that they were still a political force not tobe ignored.29 Furthermore, in the aftermath of the cap-ture of Tripoli by rebel forces, several tribal delega-tions travelled to Qatar to offer thanks to the Qatarirulers for their support during the ghting.30 Thesevisits have continued during the establishment of thenew Libyan state, despite criticism by Libyan nation-alists and a political elite aspiring to build a modernand unied democracy.

Thus, in the interests of stability and the avoid-ance of further conict, the management and mitiga-tion of Libyas tribal dynamics in the post-revolutionenvironment is every bit as important as it was duringthe reigns of King Idris and Qadha himself, and the keynature of this challenge should not be underestimated

by foreign partners engaging with the new Libyanregime.


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CHALLENGES FOR THE NEW LIBYA

This section examines the key transitional chal-lenges that lie ahead for the interim government inmoving from the old order to a new, possibly demo-cratic, system. It will highlight the problem of armedgroups in post-Qadha Libya and the challenges theyrepresent to the authority of the new political leader-ship and to the countrys stability. This section willalso focus on the daunting task of building the funda-mental pillars of democracy in a country that for morethan 4 decades was run by an opaque political system,with limited civil institutions and no political parties.

Drawing up a constitution for Libya will not bestraightforward. Political inghting between secular-ists and Islamists has already surfaced on varying is-sues of political signicance to Libyas future, includ-

ing vital elements such as the structure and religiousidentity of the state.31

Security Challenges.

Ensuring continued security in the broad sense isa critical concern for the new regime in building thefoundation on which advances can be made in thepolitical and socioeconomic spheres. Yet, at the timeof this writing, the new interim government remainsfragile, with limited capacity and sovereignty, and theinability to enforce security is still a critical challenge.

Threats to security arising directly from the re-maining supporters of the Qadha regime recededafter the arrest of Saif al-Islam Qadha.32 Saif al-Islam

had been a source of concern to Libyas new politicalleadership and to the international community, be-


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cause of his ability to seek contacts with his own tribeand other loyal groups to launch attacks on the new

government.In addition to his importance within the old re-gime as detailed above, Saif al-Islam was his fatherssecrets keeper, which afforded him intimate knowl-edge of the power dynamics of the regime. It wouldthus have been easy for him to gather support, par-ticularly among those Qadha loyalists who sufferedfrom reprisal atrocities perpetuated by the rebel forcesduring the civil war and after the death of Qadha.He could have easily exploited revenge calls from theWarfala tribe in Bani Walid against the National Tran-sitional Council (NTC) and rebel forces.33

Saadi, Qadhas third son, who escaped to Niger,does not constitute a threat to the new regime; neitherdo Qadhas wife and daughter Aicha, who are now

refugees in Algeria, since they had no political role orofcial position in the security apparatus. The arrestof Sanoussi, Qadhas head of intelligence and broth-er-in-law, in Mauritania in March 2012 has weakenedany potential threat from the old regime.34 At the timeof this writing, the Mauritanian authorities have notresponded to any of the extradition demands present-ed by Libya, France, and the International CriminalCourt.

The Challenge of Armed Militias.

Despite the mitigation of the threat from support-ers of the old regime, the interim government hasno monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. The

establishment of the Tripoli Military Council by theNTC was intended to provide security in the capitalof Libya, and to be the rst step in setting up a pro-fessional national army. But the Council, led by com-


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mander Abdel Hakim Belhaj, is not even able to ex-ercise control over military affairs within Tripoli, let

alone across the country.35

Hundreds of armed ghters belonging to different

militias moved to Tripoli in September 2011. Dozensof separate armed groups took control of Tripolis keyneighborhoods;36 as well as strategic infrastructure,such as ports, airports, and border crossings across thecountry. The militias still patrol the capital, setting uptheir own checkpoints in deance of the government-appointed authorities. For example, the Zintan militiais in control of the citys airport and other areas withinTripoli.37 With the aim of maximizing their politicalpower, some brigades have extended control to land-mark buildings within Tripoli, such as those contain-ing the diplomatic representations of important coun-tries.38

The large number of distinct militias arose duringthe civil war because of the regional and tribal divi-sions within the country. The rebel forces were notall unied under a single command during the ghtsagainst pro-Qadha forces.39 Even in eastern Libya,where the NTC controlled the most organized rebelforce, relations between rebel groups were far fromcordial, and some militias continued their intention to

act independently. The assassination of rebel leaderGeneral Abdelfattah Younes on July 28, 2011, by aradical faction of the rebel forces highlighted discordamong the rebels, which constituted a major challengeto NTC cohesion.40 This issue remains unresolved, asthe details of Youness murder have still not been re-leased, nor any suspects named.

The militias, initially an instrument of liberation,very swiftly became a source of concern to the NTCand to the residents of Tripoli. Some of the militias are


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accused directly of the violence and vandalism thattook place after the fall of the capital, and frequent

clashes between members of the different brigadeshave become a norm there. During the rst week ofDecember 2011, Tripolis inhabitants protested, de-manding the departure of armed militias from theircity. A few days after these protests, gun battleserupted between members of the Zintan militia, whoaimed to demonstrate their independence from the in-terim government and its institutions, and followersof Brigadier Khalifa Haftar, a commanding ofcer ofthe yet-to-be-built Libyan National Army.41 Renewedghting between militias in the rst week of January2012 led NTC leader Mustapha Abdeljalil to warn ofthe risks of another civil war.42

All of these factors cause continuing signicantdisruption to the lives of ordinary citizens, and deal-

ing with the issue is a stated priority for the interimgovernment. The establishment of the National Ar-mys monopoly on the legitimate use of force is seenas the solution.

Mahmud Jibril, the former interim head of theNTCs executive board, who resigned on October 23,2011, listed a series of options to solve the issue ofthe rebel brigades. He suggested that the thousandsof rebel ghtersmost of whom joined the revolu-tion with no military trainingwould be offered thechance to join the army or the Interior Ministry, whichoversees the police. Another option would be to formLibyan security companies, which would help guardbusinesses and oil facilities.43

This is easier said than done. Most of the brigades

are not willing to hand over their weapons or to leaveTripoli. They claim that their armed presence is neces-sary for the security of the state at this crucial moment,


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since they maintain security in view of the potentialfor insurgencies led by the remnants of the Qadha

regime.44

In addition, the militias are concerned abouttheir marginalization from the new political orderlearning from observation of the experiences of neigh-boring countries (Egypt and Tunisia) where the youthmovements that led the revolutions were subsequent-ly excluded from power. Maintaining an armed pres-ence in Tripoli is to be used as political leverage tosecure a role in the new Libya.45

Without the formation of a new army and the col-lecting of weapons, security will remain loose, andthe NTC will remain a political formation without le-vers to implement its will. The inability to act and tocontrol state affairs has been a source of frustration tomany of the NTCs members. Mahmud Jibril publiclylisted several reasons for his resignation, including his

lack of control not only of military but also of civilianaffairs. In an interview with the pan-Arab news chan-nel Al-Arabiya, he cited an example to demonstratethe ineffectiveness of NTC control: After the libera-tion of Tripoli, militias went into public institutions,banks, oil entities and other public companies andchanged their boards of directors, without consulta-tion with the NTC or its executive ofce. Jibrils frus-tration also stemmed from the lack of strong supportfor secularists, compared to the Islamic factions of theNTC, which have the backing of Qatar.46 Decisionswere made with no clarity as to who was behind themor how they were going to be implemented, such asthe introduction of visa requirements.47 The currentinterim government has very limited administra-

tive capacity to perform its duties as a sovereign andeffective state.


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At the time of this writing, the interim govern-ments precise strategy with relation to the armed

groups remains unclear. A number of attempts topersuade the armed groups to hand over their weap-ons appear to have convinced NTC leader MustaphaAbdejalil that the demilitarizing of these groups maynot be as easy as rst thought. He then decided to de-lay the collection of arms for the foreseeable future, inorder, paradoxically, to avoid a renewed breakout ofpolitical violence.48

Yet, as time passes, the risk of increased low-levelviolence and criminal activities increases.49 The armedgroups require sources of income to maintain theirstay in Tripoli. The question then becomes how theyare to generate the money. It is considered probablethat at least some of the militias will become involvedin further illegal activities, such as levying protection

fees, trading in narcotics, or kidnapping for ransom.The security risks of Libyas uncontrolled armedmilitias are not restricted to within the countrys na-tional borders. By jeopardizing state-building efforts,clashes between militias or between militias and gov-ernment authorities threaten to undermine the secu-rity of neighboring countries and the internationalcommunity. Risks include renewed waves of refugeeows to Tunisia, Egypt, and across the Mediterraneanto Italy and beyond, and disruption to oil produc-tiondepriving the international market of Libyan oilonce again and harming the economic interests of U.S.and European companies.

Furthermore, the current lack of a capable na-tional army leaves Libya an open playing eld to be

exploited by international criminal groups active inthe region. Terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda or otherJihadist groups based in North Africa, the Sahel, and


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Europe are expected to establish training camps inuncontrolled Libyan territory, as well as developing

links with some of the militias to acquire arms. Duringseveral months of ghting, the revolutionary ghtershad access to weapon storages. Late-2011 saw mediareporting the trafcking of Libyan arms in the Sahelregion.50

Uncontrolled stocks of weapons include systemsthat could be of immediate interest to terrorist groupsand other entities hostile to the United States andits allies, such as man-portable air defense systems(MANPADS), including SA-24 Igla (GRINCH) mis-siles. Securing these systems should be treated as animmediate priority for both the Libyan governmentand its foreign partners.51

Armed militias are already directly affecting rela-tions with Libyas neighbors. In early-December 2011,

as a response to continuous assaults on its citizens andterritorial integrity by Libyan armed groups, Tunisiaclosed two crossing points and deployed additionalmilitary personnel to control its borders with Libya.52

The ambitions of the interim government are con-strained by its lack of authority and capacity to inu-ence the armed groups. But they are also inhibited bythe lack of a clear security reform strategy that includesspecic measures for the disarmament and reintegra-tion of revolutionary ghters, and the management oflegacy armaments in general. The sooner the interimgovernment launches its security reform plan, the bet-ter the chances of success for political transition. As-sistance to the interim authorities in implementingsecurity reform in order to mitigate the risks outlined

above should therefore be a key priority of the UnitedStates and other foreign partners.


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Political Transition: Avoiding the Rotten DoorDemocracy Fate.

The recent, and neighboring, cases of Egypt andTunisia present vivid illustrations to demonstrate therisks and challenges that countries like Libya face inpolitical transition. In both countries, post-revolutionconsolidation was not peaceful. The ousting of formerleaders and the establishment of interim political bod-ies were not sufcient to appease public anger. The Tu-nisian and Egyptian peoples, seeing themselves as theguardians of their popular revolutions, regularly tookto the streets presenting political demands. Growingdisenchantment with the political performance of theMilitary Council in Egypt has led to new riots and po-litical violence 10 months after the toppling of HosniMubarak.

The circumstances of each country dene preciselyhow political instability will manifest itself. This phe-nomenon is not limited to North Africa nor the Arabworld: Examples are available from Europe, includingthe case of Portugal, whose transition toward democ-racy was full of societal tensions for 2 years followingthe military coup in 1974. Tensions abated only whenthe constitution was nally enacted and the rst elec-tions were held.53

In the case of Libya, the experience will be shapedby the lack of ordinary political institutions, a longcivil war, and tribal and regional divisions. In Sep-tember 2011, the Libyan NTC announced its politicalroadmap for the transitional period, with a programresembling Tunisias post-revolution transition. The

Libyan provisional government seeks to hold its rstelections for a constituent assembly in June 2012.54Once elected, the constituent assembly will draft the


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countrys constitution and hold parliamentary elec-tions in 1 years timea very ambitious program that

perhaps fails to take into account the special situationof Libya.There are many hurdles that are likely to make the

transition lengthy and difcult, if not prevent its suc-cess altogether. Libyans could discover that they arefacing an incomplete, rotten-door transition. Politi-cal scientists and experts in political transitions StevenLevitsky and Lucan Way dene rotten-door transi-tions as those that occur in a context of state, party,and civil society, weakness [where] new governmentsare often lled with elites from the old regime.55 Theyargue that the collapse of autocratic regimes oftendoes not ensure democracy, especially if the collapsetakes place in a context of extreme state weakness orin a country with weak civil society. The rapid and

chaotic nature of transitions by rupture often resultsin little real institutional change, Levitsky and Wayargue, with post-transition governments often be-ing led by politicians with no strong commitment todemocracy.56 Although the overthrow of Qadhasregime was neither swift nor easy, Libya presents aprime example of a state that lacks political parties,state institutions, and civil society.

Building Legitimate Institutions.

A key challenge confronting the interim govern-ment in Libya is the creation of political institutions toprovide for the functioning of an effective democraticstate. The interim government is in effect inheriting a

stateless state.After seizing power, Qadha dismantled all thepolitical institutions that were in place under King


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Idris, and replaced them with peoples committees.57This dismantling of the state was more of a process

than a single event, with the latest development as re-cent as 2008, when Qadha announced a controversialplan to abolish most of the ministries as a measure toght corruption. Instead, he promised to establish asystem of wealth transfer directly into the hands of thepeople. This promise never came to fruition.58

In fact, the dismantling of the state went as faras abolishing the actual position of the head of state.With the effect from the replacement of the RevolutionCommand Council by the General Peoples Councilin the late-1970s, Qadha claimed to hold no ofcialposition. His ofcial title was Leader of the Revolu-tion. In reality, this allowed him to run the countrywith no formal responsibility or accountability what-soever. Nonetheless, denial of any ofcial position did

not prevent Qadha from being represented as, andtreated as, head of the Libyan state by the internation-al community. In addition, Libyas political systemhas known no constitution or political parties underQadhas rule. No separation of powers, or discussionthereof, has been attempted since the countrys inde-pendence. Several of Qadhas political committeescombined executive and legislative powers, with com-monly overlapping powers and responsibilities andno clear division of agencies. The system of politicalaccountability was unclearwhich is not to say thatit did not existand was manipulated to serve theinterest of the ruling elite. Freedom of the press wasabsent for decades, with the only permitted mediaserving as an integral part of the regimes propaganda

machinery.59Carciana del Castillo, an economist with expertiseon post-crisis state building, argues that countriesin Libyas situation are confronted with a multi-


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pronged transition. All aspects of this transition areclosely interrelated and reinforce each other. Violence

must give way to public security. Lawlessness, po-litical exclusion, and violations of human rights mustgive way to the rule of law, inclusive and participa-tory government, and respect for human rights. Polar-ization among different groups must give way to na-tional reconciliation. Castillo notes: Failure in any ofthese areas will put the others at risk. Planning, man-agement, coordination, and nancing of this multi-pronged transition are highly burdensome.60 Thecurrent lack of capacity of the interim government,therefore, is dangerous when it attempts to addressall these challenges and create all these institutions,simultaneously. Even reconstruction of the publichealthcare system in Libya is a pressing issue: In De-cember 2011, an article in the Journal of the Royal So-

ciety of Medicine identied that rebuilding the publichealth system, seriously degraded during the civilwar, had not even reached the stage of initial evalua-tion research of what exists and what is needed.61

The Democratic Culture Defcit.

Qadhas regime opposed the idea of political par-ties from the very start of the revolution. Mahmoudal-Maghribi, Libyas prime minister after the 1969revolution, noted during a press conference that par-ty organisations are unlikely to have any role in theLibyan Arab Republic.62 This approach received ide-ological backing when Qadha published his politi-cal thoughts, known as the Third Universal Theory,

which purported to pass power directly to the peoplewithout any need for other political agents.

Abubaker Altajuri, a Libyan opposed to Qadha,described the situation eloquently in a letter com-


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menting on a Foreign Policy magazine article in 1999.He noted: In Libya, people are not only prevented

from expressing independent opinions, they are pre-vented from even conceiving of them.63 This situationremained unchanged, even during talks on politicalopenness during the 2000s.

As result, there was no authorized opposition forcein the country for 4 decades, and, in fact, the only or-ganized political forces that opposed and threatenedQadhas regime within Libya were illegal Islamistgroups: the Muslim Brotherhood and the Libyan Is-lamic Fighting Group. The regimes response to thisthreat was brutal, including direct military interven-tion in 1996-97 to quell the Islamist threat in easternLibyan cities.

Meanwhile, outside the country, several opposi-tion groups and parties were formed in Egypt, Swit-

zerland, the UK, and other Western states with theaim of campaigning against Qadhas regime. Top-pling the regime was the primary focus of all Libyanopposition groups activities.64

There is a consensus within Libya that one of theemblematic features of the new democratic era is go-ing to be the establishment of political parties. At thetime of this writing, several groups and movementsare preparing to form political parties, and waitingfor the appropriate law to be passed.65 But because theopposition to the previous regime had worked eitherclandestinely or from exile, its contact with and im-pact on the masses within Libya was extremely lim-ited. As a consequence, most Libyans now have noexperience or knowledge of the political dynamics of

a democracy. Furthermore, the absence of freedoms ofassociation and the press inhibited the development ofany form of democratic culture among Libyans. This


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absence of culture will inevitably have an impact onthe political transition and on state-building efforts.

Some Libyan intellectuals say they are seeking de-mocratization in its broad sense, limited not only toelections, but also to include freedom of expression,political plurality, promotion of civil society, andprotection of human rights.66 There is a keen interestin avoiding the emergence of another authoritarianregime, or what Levitsky and Way call a hybrid re-gime, which combines elections with various degreesof authoritarianism.67

Achieving all these goals requires, in addition togood intentions, a change in peoples ways of think-ing. International experience shows that a change inthe behavioral patterns of the past is the most difcultpart of political transition. Viktor Orban, the Hungar-ian politician, eloquently explained the difculty of

moving from communism to democracy in Hungaryduring the 1990s. He said the the bricks of the BerlinWall have been snapped up by Japanese and Ameri-can tourists, while here the remains of the wall haveremained in the peoples spirits, in their way of think-ing, in the economy, in the social system, in the educa-tion system, and in many other areas of social life.68

The Tribal Dilemma: Inclusion or Exclusion?

Despite the important role of the tribes in Libyansociety, there is only a narrow base of support amongthe new Libyan political eliteconstituted of mem-bers of the NTC, opposition abroad, and some aca-demicsfor a tribal-based political system. Despite

the youth attitudes cited above, urban Libyan intel-lectuals are wary of tribal politics, as representing aregression to primordial political structures and an


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obstacle to creating a united and democratic Libyawhere all Libyans are treated equally. For many urban

elites, a tribal system connotes dominance by elderlymales, inhibiting societal development. Many Libyanintellectuals instead have expressed wishes for politi-cal allegiance in Libya to be based on the state and onthe basis of citizenship, seeing the tribe instead as asocial umbrella with only a limited role in nationalpolitics over the long term. This, however, remains aminority elite view.

The early days of the revolution saw clear mani-festations of this divergence in thinking. The state-ments of the NTC leaders and the slogans of protest-ers across Libyan cities, including Tripoli, were callingfor a united Libya. These calls came also in reaction toSaif al-Islams warning of the countrys possible splitinto different regions in a controversial speech on Feb-

ruary 20. In that speech, Saif al-Islam warned Libyansand the international community that Libya is a tribalsociety and that clashes could escalate into civil war,with a risk that the country would split into its threepre-independence regions. Calls for a united Libyaappear to be based on strong political belief shared bynationalists, secularists, and Islamists.69

Furthermore, building a political system that is fo-cused on tribalism rather than ideologies carries a riskof creating a societal hierarchy and territorial divi-sions. It creates tensions between those who are insidethe political system and those who are not. In the viewof the new political elite, the citizenship principle,regardless of tribal and ethnical afliations, must beembodied in the new constitution. No political forma-

tion or other civil society institution should make ref-erence to tribes or regions.70 However, the challengesof the political transition, and the strong role of thetribes as detailed above, dictate that the new interim


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government must necessarily take into account thedemands of certain tribes and regions. Abdul Alha-

kim al-Feitouri, a Libyan academic, argues that failingto accommodate the tribes in the transitional periodcould lead to the Balkanization of Libya.71

The new interim government formed on Novem-ber 21, 2011, has implicitly attempted to balance tribal,regional, and armed groups representations. It did notaccommodate every faction that exists in the country,but managed to achieve a balanced distribution of min-isterial posts. All political persuasions are representedin the interim government, including both Islamistsand secularists. The important ministerial positionsof Defence and Interior were allocated to Osama Al-Juwali and Fawzi Abdelalai, representatives from theZintan and Misrata militias, respectively.72 These twomilitias are considered the largest and best-armed in

comparison with other groups.The outcome of the interim-leadership work informing the new government did not satisfy all thefactions. Several protests erupted again in Libyancities. The Berber groups, long oppressed under Qa-dhas regime, resented their exclusion from power.The perception among Berbers was that their signi-cant numbers and substantial contribution during thecivil war were not taken into account. Other protestsover marginalization and the failure of the new gov-ernment to recognize contributions to the toppling ofQadhas rule took place in Benghazi and Ajdabya.

In sum, tribes play an important role in the dailylife of many Libyans, and are likely to continue todo so for the foreseeable future. Under a new regime

that does not favor tribal politics, tribal leaders mightagree to take a limited role at the national politicallevel, but will likely want to keep their political inu-


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ence at the regional level. Leading tribes in differentareas of the country will have great aspirations to

play an important role in their respective regions. Itis likely that they will call for a decentralized politi-cal system that will accommodate their demands andaspirations. Any attempt to ignore and marginalizethe tribes demands is certain to exacerbate the fragiletransitional process toward a modern and democraticLibya. Once again, the United States and other foreignpartners engaging with the new Libyan state need tobe aware of the limitations on the power and reach ofthat state imposed by the tribal nature of its society.

Handling Ideological and Political Differences.

Observation of political discussions among Libyanintellectuals in late-2011 only conrmed that political

transition there is going to be laborious and intense.Opinions differ on the form of the state, its identity,and the administrative structures that have to be in-cluded in the countrys rst constitution. The currentdebates among Libyans have revived memories ofsimilar discussions that took place before Libyas inde-pendence under the auspices of the UN. At that time,the main issue of discussion within the UN Councilfor Libya was over adopting a federal or unitary formfor the state of Libya.73 The federalist voices, callingfor the countrys division into three states, Cyrenaica,Fezzan, and Tripolitania, lost the debate.

One could argue that differences of opinion are ahealthy sign for a democracy in the making. But thelack of institutions and processes that regulate politi-

cal debate in any country make political discord a riskyundertaking. Different groups are wary of each other,and suspect each other of following foreign agendas.


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These fundamental differences are not limited toacademic circles and intellectuals, but also exist with-

in the provisional government. Factional inghtingemerged in the early months of the existence of theNTC. As an interim political body for the rebels, theNTC included members from different political per-suasions, including both those representing the oppo-sition abroad, and those who had served their entirelives under Qadhas regime. The entity thus lackedany cohesion among its members in the early stages.But the main division that has emerged at the time ofthis writing is ideological and/or religious: frictionsbetween secularist- and Islamist-dominated NTC dis-cussions in late-2011.

The unifying factor that had kept the NTC fromssure was the ght against Qadha, with the resultthat a leadership battle resurfaced after the fall of

Tripoli. The announcement by NTC leader MustaphaAbdeljalil that Islam was to be the basis for legislationbrought divisions within the Council to the surface.74Several secularist gures voiced grievances publicly,complaining of their alienation by the Islamist wingbacked by external players. Libyan diplomat Abdul-rahman Shalgam voiced his dissatisfaction with Qa-tars support of one side against other factions.75

Truth Recovery and Reconciliation.

Another important task for the interim govern-ment, and an important step for the stability of thecountry, is to organize a truth recovery and reconcili-ation initiative. International experience, including in

the cases of South Africa and Morocco, shows thatreconciliation initiatives in post-conict situations orfollowing regime or political change constitute an im-


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portant step toward healing the wounds of the past,and that they strengthen political transitions.76

What and whom to reconcile in Libya are impor-tant questions. The new interim regime has not onlyto address atrocities committed over decades by theQadha regime against individuals77 and tribal antag-onism; it also has to deal with human rights violationsthat occurred during the conict between rebel andpro-Qadha forces. Violations reported by interna-tional human rights organizations included torture ofwar prisoners, mass killing, and rape.78

At the time of this writing, the interim govern-ment is unable to launch a formal initiative, despiteincreasingly strident calls from Libyan intellectuals;79it is inhibited by the lack of state institutions that areimportant for the working of any reconciliation pro-cesssuch as a parliament, a functioning judiciary

system, and forces of law and order. Truth recoverywould be a risky endeavor if carried out by a provi-sional government that is still weak, as it could be-come a factor that deepens rifts in society.

Nevertheless, at the end of November 2011, theNTC convened a national reconciliation meeting inthe city of Zawiya, where representatives of tribes andclans from across the country discussed the impor-

tance of addressing the rifts of the past and the waysof doing so.80 The event was intended to convey a clearmessage to Libyans regarding the new governmentsintentions to handle all the issues of the past that couldfuel societal tensions. The event also aimed to raiseawareness and familiarize Libyans with the concept ofreconciliation, through discussion of other countries

experiencesthe intention being to reduce the risk oftension during the framing and implementation of thereconciliation process by ensuring that participants


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and the audience are familiar with the process and itsphilosophy.

Given the crucial importance of reconciliationinitiatives for stability during transition, the UnitedStates and other foreign partners should encouragethese efforts and provide targeted support for theprocess.

Economic Reconstruction Imperatives.

Delivering a degree of economic prosperity is aprerequisite for successful transition. With economicconditions degraded following the months of civilwar, building an economy has become an immediatepriority for the current and coming governments. Theprolonged political crisis, and the ensuing uncertainty,pushed away both foreign and national investors. Ac-

cording to the Bank of International Settlements, $2.2billion of domestic capital left Libya in the rst quarterof 2011.81 During the crisis, economic activity in Libyawas paralyzed as a result of the closure of factories,ports, and roads for months. This disruption of busi-ness activity resulted in huge economic losses. Theeconomic cost of Libyas civil war has been estimatedby the Libyan Central Bank at around $15 billion.82

Nevertheless, by some measures Libya is in arelatively strong economic situation compared withits neighbors, Tunisia and Egypt, both of which areexpecting 2011 to show substantial falls in economicgrowth. Real gross domestic product (GDP) growthin Egypt is expected to drop to 1 percent in 2011 from5.1 percent in 2010, and in Tunisia, the forecast GDP

growth for 2011 is 1.3 percent against 3.7 percent theprevious year.83 The governments in Tunisia and


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Egypt would like to stimulate the economy throughpublic investments, but their capacity is limited by the

lack of public funds; both countries need external -nancing to stabilize the worsening balance of paymentsituations.

By contrast, Libya has a broad spread of projectsand services to spend money on, and access to readyfunds to do so, which is expected to lead to strong GDPgrowth once political stability is restored. Libya is for-tunate to hold good reserves that will help the interimgovernment meet the socioeconomic needs of its citi-zens, as well as pay for the reconstruction of the statewithout resorting to international borrowing. Overthe recent years of high oil prices, Libya accumulateda large amount of wealth, and currently holds around$110 billion of foreign assets.84 By May 2012, most ofthe foreign assets held by Libyan Central Bank and

some state-owned commercial institutions that werefrozen internationally following the UN sanctions hadbeen released, with part of them transferred to thecurrent Libyan authorities. The process of unfreezingassets of Libyan origin in some African countries hasbeen more complex due to political and transparencyreasons. First, some African countries were reluctantto recognize the NTC as the legitimate representativeof the Libyan people in the early months following thecollapse of Qadhas regime.

Second, it remains unclear whether some parts ofLibyas investment in the African continent were thepersonal wealth of Qadhas family, or holdings ofthe Libyan state.85 It is important to note that the UNlifting of sanctions on Libyan assets did not include

assets of Qadhas family and former members ofhis regime, which remain frozen. The future of suchfunds depends on the outcome of each members trial,


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and the restitution of some assets might prove impos-sible. A panel of experts established pursuant to Secu-

rity Council Resolution 1973 highlighted in its reportthe difculty of identifying, tracing, and repatriatingassets of key members of the former regime and theirfamilies as result of embezzlement of public funds andcorruption.86 It is to be hoped that the Libyan Invest-ment Authority, with its $65 billion worth of assetsand accumulated investment experience, should playa key role in the rebuilding of the countrys infrastruc-ture and economy.87

In addition to reserves, the interim governmentcan also rely on hydrocarbon production and exporta-tion revenuesand is therefore understandably keento restore hydrocarbon production. Oil productionreached 840,000 barrels per day at the end of Novem-ber 2011, only a few weeks after the fall of the Qadha

regime, and there is optimism that the new regimemight increase production to the pre-war level of 1.6million barrels a day by the end of 2012.88 Libya waslucky that war damage was limited only to supportinfrastructure and has not affected key production fa-cilities.89 To return to the pre-war oil production level,Libya not only depends on the repair of infrastructurefacilities, but also on the return of foreign skilled la-bor; part of the loss of production at the start of thecivil war was due solely to the departure of interna-tional workers.90

The availability of adequate nances will reducethe number of challenges that the government is facingin the immediate and short term. But the essential eco-nomic development question for Libya remains pre-

cisely what type of development strategies to pursue.There is an urgent need for comprehensive plans totackle the structural economic problems that triggered


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the revolution in the rst place. This will include im-proving living standards for Libyans, and developing

new sources of wealth away from the hydrocarbonsector in order to create enough jobs to meet the risingnumber of new entrants to the labor market. Unem-ployment in Libya, already high as noted above, wasexacerbated still further by the paralysis of almost alleconomic activities during the civil war.91

LOOKING AHEAD: THE INTERNATIONALCOMMUNITY AND LIBYA

As the Libyan interim government continues tostruggle to maintain law and order while simultane-ously facing the daunting tasks of state-building abinitio, the United States and other leading actors in theinternational community can assist in maintaining sta-

bility by engaging and providing vitally needed help.This assistance is essential to avoid destabilization anddeterioration within Libya, gravid with consequencesnot only for Libyan citizens, but for neighbors and en-ergy consumers both in North Africa and Europe.

The involvement of the international communityshould be focused on what Libya needs in order toperform its functions as an effective sovereign state,both at a national and international level. U.S. andUN expertise in disarmament, demobilization, andreintegration (DDR) of armed ghters in post-conictsituations could be of pivotal help to Libya at thiscritical juncture, but such support should be providedcarefully. Although the situation on the ground at thetime of this writing suggests that the interim govern-

ment in Libya would appreciate external help with thearmed militias, any level of visible foreign militarypresence in Libya, particularly from the West, risks


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igniting more political instability than it resolves. AnyDDR assistance would be best provided through dip-

lomatic channels in the form of continuous advisoryand monitoring support. Contributions could also bedelivered in the form of special training courses tomiddle- and high-ranking military ofcers, providedin U.S. and/or European military colleges. The UnitedStates could also work in conjunction with other Arabcountries such as Jordan and Morocco to train Libyanrebel ghters and integrate them into the nationalarmy. Training in other Arab countries seems a viablesolution. In April 2012, Jordan started the training of10,000 policemen at its International Police Centrenear the capital of Amman.92 But use or deploymentof visible military assets by the United States or theNorth Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) wouldhave limited, or no, support within Libya and in the

wider Arab region, and would serve only to fuel con-spiracy theories about interest in Libyan oil and newcolonialism.

Preventing hostile exploitation of Libyas vastterritory and largely uncontrolled borders remains akey task for the international community while Libyastill lacks a national army. The new Libya needs well-equipped and well-trained military forces to protectand secure its approximately 4,000 kilometer (km)-long land border, shared with six countries, and itsnational territory. The new security apparatus thatwill be put in place should be trained to play a neu-tral role in internal political life, and specically avoiddomination by or favoritism toward specic tribes orclans over others. A new security system will reduce

the risk of intimidation and violence during Libyaspolitical transition. The United States and other inter-national partners with experience in building security


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forces in Iraq and Afghanistan are well-placed to offerthis experience to Libya.

The United States and the international commu-nity can provide assistance in building state institu-tions and processes, once the political ambitions ofthe leading revolutionary commanders are satisedor mitigated and the process of reintegration of ex-combatants is in an advanced stage.

International nongovernmental organizations(NGOs) have much scope to support the nascent dem-ocratic political culture and civil society in Libya. Thenew Libya requires the establishment and strengthen-ing of a party system, elections, media, and an inde-pendent judiciary. Technical assistance in setting uplegal systems on political and economic fronts is anessential prerequisite for Libyas transition towarddemocracy.

Libya occupies a strategically important positionin the Maghreb and the Sahel, a region that is consid-ered of increasing importance to U.S. global securitystrategy. In March 2012, the Libyan government host-ed a regional conference on border security, with theaims of setting up collaboration mechanisms and pro-cedures with neighboring countries and conveying amessage to the international community that Libyatakes its border issues very seriously.93 However, giv-en the lack of nancial and human resources primarilyin countries like Chad and Nigeria, it is likely that thecollaborative efforts with Libyas southern neighborswill be less than fully effective.

The porous state of Libyan borders is not only athreat to Libyas stability, but also to other countries

in its vicinity and beyond. Immigration, internationalterrorism, and transnational organized crime could af-fect the interests of European countries and the inter-


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national community, in addition to their implicationsfor Libyas internal stability. Yet, the Libyan security

forces in their present form do not have sufcient pro-fessional personnel, equipment, or surveillance tech-nology to control Libya's borders effectively.

This is not a task the new Libya can manage alone,and this is a key area in which international assistanceis essential for Libyas state-building efforts. There isa potentially important enabling role in this area forU.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), particularly inlight of the improvement of the security environmentin Africa being a key element of AFRICOMs mission.

In June 2012, U.S. Army Chief of Staff GeneralRay Odierno signaled increasing importance for thetrain and advise mission in Africa, in particular dueto the fact that terrorist elements around the worldgo to the areas they think [have] the least resistance

. . . and right now, you could argue thats Africa.94

Libya is a prime example of this potential, and AFRI-COM should consider the case of Libya as a priority,given the security repercussions already felt by neigh-boring countries. The ow of weapons and militantsis increasingly destabilizing the Maghreb and Sahelregions, and prompt action to mitigate this situationwould prove cost effective in restraining the furtherspread of instability.

The planned assignment of a Brigade CombatTeam to AFRICOM in 2013 to act as a pilot programfor the Regionally Aligned Force concept provides anopportunity to build on immediate mitigating actionin conjunction with the Libyan authorities. Converse-ly, if AFRICOM fails to engage promptly in Libya, the

credibility of AFRICOM as a reliable actor and partnerfor the security of Africa will come into question inthe region. Given the U.S. concerns about internation-


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al terrorism, many would nd it incomprehensible ifAFRICOM took no visible action to counter expand-

ing instability resulting from Libyas challenges.The U.S. military is well-positioned to leverage itsexpertise and experience to design a comprehensivesolution for border control and provide support inimplementation. In particular, help could be offeredto the Libyan authorities to control Libyas southernborders, while a collaborative effort involving Euro-pean partners would be conceivable for Libyas seaborders with European neighbors.

The aim should be working together with theLibyan authorities in order to enhance their capabili-ties of providing for their own security. In additionto enhancing the security of neighboring states, a U.S.contribution of this type would strengthen the currentfragile peace and help prevent any relapse into civil

war.Time is of the essence in the case of Libya. Promptengagement with and support for the current Libyanauthorities is essential for a wide range of reasons.First, it will ensure that the continued confrontationsamong armed rival militants do not spread and devel-op into a second civil war. Second, engagement willcurb the further spread of instability to other neigh-boring countries. Last, but not least, achieving politi-cal and economic stability will have a stro

Documents

State-Building Challenges in a Post-Revolution Libya