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RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, ET AL. v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, ETC. ET ALG.R. No. 180050,May 12, 2010

Doctrines:The requirement of a contiguous terr i tory and the requirement of a land area of at least 2,000square kilometers are distinct and separate requirements for land area. The exemption under

Se c4 61 (b )pertains only to the requirement of territorial contiguity.

Facts: When the Dinagat Islands was proclaimed a new province on December 3, 2006, it had an officialpopulation of only 106,951 based on the 2000 Census of Population conducted by the NationalStatistics Office (NSO), which population is short of the statutory requirement of 250,000 inhabitants. Mor eo ve r, th eland area of the province failed to comply with the statutory requirement of 2,000square kilometers.R.A. No. 9355 specifically states that the Province of Dinagat Islands contains an approximate land area of 802.12square kilometers.

Hence, Republic Act No. 9355, otherwise known as An Act Creating the Province of DinagatIslands was held unconstitutional and the provision in Article 9 (2) of the Rules and RegulationsImplementing the Local Government Code of 1991 stating, "The land area requirement shall notap pl y wher e th e proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands," was declared NULL and VOID.

Respondents instead asserted that the province, which is composed of more than one island, isexempted from the land area requirement based on the provision in the Rules and RegulationsImplementing the Local Government Code of 1991 (IRR), specifically paragraph 2 of Article 9 which s ta te s th at"[t]he land area requireme nt shall not apply where the p roposed provinc e is com posed of one (1) ormore islands."

Issue: Whether Dinagat Islands is exempted from the land area requirement

Held: No.

There are two requirements for land area: (1) the land area must be contiguous; and (2) the landarea must be sufficient to provide for such basic services and facilities to meet the requirements of its populace.The requirement of a contiguous terr i tory and the requirement of a land area of at leas t2,000

square kilometers are distinct and separate requirements for land area. The exemption abovepertains only to the requirement of territorial contiguity. It clearly states that the requirement of territorial contiguitymay be dispensed with in the case of a province comprising two or more islands, or is separated by a chartered cityor cities which do not contribute to the income of the province. Nowhere in paragraph (b) is it expressly stated or mayit be implied that when a province is composed of two or mor e i sla nds , or when the te rri tor y o f a p rovin ceis separated by a chartered city or cities, such province need not comply with the land areareq uir ement of at lea st 2,0 00 squ are kil ome te rs or the requirement in paragraph (a) (i) of Section 461of theLocal Government Code

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Joemar Ortega vs. People of the Philippines.GR. 151085 (August 20, 2008)Facts:

Petitioner was 13 years old when he raped a 6 year old girl This act was committed sometime in 1996. The lowercourts convicted him of rape with criminal and civil liability imposed. During the pendency of appeal in the SupremeCourt, RA 9344was passed which provided that at the time of the commission of the crime, a child whose age was15years old and below will be exempted from criminal liability.

ISSUE:Whether criminal liability attachs although there were already convictions in the lower court. Stated otherwise,whether the retroactive effect of the law is not applicable in the case at bar.

HELD.NO. Although there is a crime committed, no criminal liability attaches. Sec. 15 of RA 9344exempts a child belowfifteen from criminal liability if at the time of the commission of the crime he is below fifteen (15) years of age. Uponassessment, the offender will be released to the custody of his parents or be referred to prevention programs. It isgiven a retroactive since penal laws which are favourable to the accused are give retroactive effect(Art 22 of theRevised Penal code)Even if the crime committed is heinous a sin this case - criminal liability does not attach.The flaw in the logic of the law should be addressed in Congress and not in courts. This is to

Joseph Estrada vs Macapagal & Desierto

De Jure vs De FactoPresidentEstrada alleges that he is the President on leave while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo claims she is thePresident. From the beginning of Eraps term, he was plagued by problems that slowly but surely eroded hispopularity. His sharp descent from power started on October 4, 2000. Singson, a longtime friend of the Estrada,went on air and accused the Estrada, his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords. Theexposimmediatelyignited reactions of rage. OnJanuary 19, the fall from power of the petitioner appearedinevitable. At 1:20 p.m., the petitioner informed Executive Secretary Edgardo Angara that General Angelo Reyes,Chief ofStaffof the Armed Forces of the Philippines, had defected. January 20 turned to be the day of surrender. OnJanuary 22, the Monday after taking her oath, respondent Arroyo immediately discharged the powers and duties ofthe Presidency. After his fall from the pedestal of power, the Erapslegalproblems appeared in clusters. Severalcases previously filed against him in theOfficeof the Ombudsman were set in motion.

ISSUE: Whether or not Arroyo is a legitimate (de jure) president.

HELD: The SC holds that the resignation of Estrada cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by his leavingMalacaang. In thepressreleasecontaining his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of therespondent as President of the Republic albeit with the reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he wasleaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and inorderto begin the healing process of ournation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability and that he was going to re-assume thepresidency as soon as the disability disappears; (3) he expressed hisgratitudeto the people for the opportunity toserve them. Without doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as President; (4)he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our country.Estradas reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of the president which he has given up; and (5)he called on his supporters tojoin him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation andsolidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the

presidency. The press release was petitioners valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is now in the pasttense. Even if Erap can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leaveon the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest byCongressandthe decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure President made by a co-equal branch ofgovernmentcannot bereviewed by this Court.

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ESSO STANDARD EASTERN, INC., petitioner-appellant,vs.ACTING COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, respondent-appellee.

Ross, Selph and Carrascoso for petitioners.Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.

SANCHEZ,J .:

Claim for the refund of P722.84 paid in 1956 as special import tax on pump parts imported by petitioner. Petitioner'sground: The imported articles "consist of equipment and spare parts for its own exclusive use and therefore wereexempt from special import tax", by the terms of Section 6, Republic Act 1394.

1The Collector of Customs of Manila

rejected the claim. Respondent Acting Commissioner of Customs, on appeal, affirmed the rejection. Petitioner's casesuffered the same fate in the Court of Tax Appeals.

2We are asked to review the Court on Tax Appeals' judgment.

The interrelated errors assigned in petitioner's brief funnel down to one controlling legal issue: Are the imported pumpparts exempt from the payment of special import tax?

By Section 1 of Republic Act 1394, a special import tax is imposed "on all goods, articles or products imported orbrought into the Philippines" during the period from 1956 up to and including 1965 in accordance with the schedule of

rates therein provided. Exempt from this tax, by express mandate of Section 6 of the same law, inter alia, are"machinery, equipment, accessories, and spare parts, for the use of industries, miners, mining enterprises, plantersand farmers".

Petitioner is engaged in the industry of processing gasoline, and manufacturing lubricating oil, grease and tincontainers. Petitioner owns gasoline stations with pumps, which are leased to and operated by gasoline dealers. Itsells gasoline to these dealers. The pump parts imported by petitioner in 1956 were intended, installed and actuallyused by gasoline dealers in pumping gasoline from under around tanks into customers' motor vehicles. These pumpparts, in other words, are used in the sale at retail of gasoline not by petitioner but by lessees of gasoline stations.In this factual environment, it is quite evident that the pump parts are not used in petitioner's industryof processinggasoline, or manufacturing lubricating oil, grease and tin containers.

The drive of petitioner's argument is that marketing of its gasoline product "is corollary to or incidental to its industrialoperations."

3But this contention runs smack against the familiar rules that exemption from taxation is not

favored,

4

and that exemptions in tax statutes are never presumed.

5

Which are but statements in adherence to theancient rule that exemptions from taxation are construed in strictissimi juris against the taxpayer and liberally in favorof the taxing authority.

6Tested by this precept, we cannot indulge in expansive construction and write into the law an

exemption not therein set forth. Rather, we go by the reasonable assumption that where the State has granted inexpress terms certain exemptions, those are the exemptions to be considered, and no more. Since the law statesthat, to be tax exempt, equipment and spare parts should be "for the use of industries", the coverage herein shouldnot be enlarged to include equipment and spare parts for use in dispensing gasoline at retail. In comparable factualbackdrop, this Court has held that tax exemption in connection with the manufacture of asbestos roof does not extendto the installation thereof.

7

Upon the facts and the law, we vote to affirm the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals under review. Costs againstpetitioner. So ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Castro, JJ., concur.

Barrera, J., is on leave.

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DE VILLA vs.CA

FACTS:On October 5, 1987, petitioner Cecilio S. de Villa was charged before the RTC Branch 145, Makati with violation ofBatas Pambansa Bilang 22. Petitioner allegedly issued a check payable to private respondent, Roberto Lorayez, inthe total amount of U.S. $2,500.00 equivalent to P50,000.00 knowing that at the time of issue he had no sufficientfunds in or credit with drawee bank for payment of such check in full upon its presentment. The check was

Petitioner failed to payrespondent despite receipt of notice of such dishonor. Petitioner moved to dismiss the information maintaining thatthe court had no jurisdiction over the offense charged since the check was payable in dollars (foreign currency) anddrawn against a foreign bank. The RTC denied the motion to dismiss for lack of merit. Petitioner moved forreconsideration but his motion was subsequently denied by the RTC. The petitioner filed a petition forcertiorariwith the CA seeking to declare the nullity of RTC orders. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. A subsequentmotion for reconsideration was also denied by the CA. Thus, petitioner filed petition with SC

ISSUE:

1.Whether or not the Regional Trial Court of Makati has jurisdiction over the case in question.2.Whether or not a check drawn against the dollar account with a foreign bank is covered by BP Blg. 22

RULING:

The Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit.

I. WON RTC has jurisdictionThe RTC has jurisdiction over the case. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the statute in force atthe time of commencement of the action. The Rules of Court provide thatbe instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory where the offense was committed or any of theessential ingredients thereof took place. The court also stated that jurisdiction or venue is determined by theallegations in the information. In this particular case, the information filed against petitioner specifically alleged thatthe offense was committed in Makati, and therefore, the same is controlling and sufficient to vest jurisdiction upon theRTC of Makati. The Court acquires jurisdiction over the case and over the person of the accused upon the filing of acomplaint or information in court which initiates a criminal action. Moreover, in the case of Que v. People of thePhilippines, the court held that the determinative factor in determining venue is the place of the issuance of the check.On the matter of venue for violation of BP 22, the Ministry of Justice laid down the following guidelines the pertinentportion of which reads:

(1)Venue of the offense lies at the place where the check was executed and delivered;

(2)the place where the check was written, signed or dated does not necessarily fix the place where it was executed,as what is of decisive importance is the delivery thereof which is the final act essential to its consummation as anobligationIt is undisputed that the check in question was executed and delivered by the petitioner to private respondent at

Makati.

II. WON a check drawn against the dollar account with a foreign bank is covered by BP Blg. 22The court ruled that under the B.P. Blg. 22, foreign checks, provided they are either drawn and issued in thePhilippines though payable outside thereof are within the coverage of said law. It is a cardinal principle in statutoryconstruction that where the law does not distinguish courts should not distinguish and where the law does not makeany exception, courts may not except something unless compelling reasons exist to justify it. And where there isdoubt as to what a provision of a statute means, the meaning put to the provision during the legislative deliberation ordiscussion on the bill may be adopted. The records of the Batasan, Vol. III, unmistakably show that the intention ofthe lawmakers is to apply BP Blg. 22 to whatever currency may be the subject thereof

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CASCO Philippines vs Gimenez

CascoPhilippineChemical Co., Inc. was engaged in the production ofsyntheticresinglues used primarily in theproduction ofplywood. The main components of the said glue are urea and formaldehyde which are both beingimported abroad. Pursuant to RA 2609 (Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law), the Central Bank of the Philippinesissued on July 1, 1959, its Circular No. 95, fixing a uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange transactions. Tosupplement the circular, the Bank later promulgated a memorandum establishing the procedure for applications for

exemption from the payment of said fee, as provided in same law. In compliance, Casco paid the fees but latermoved for reimbursement as Casco maintained that urea and formaldehyde are exempted from such fees. The CBPissued the vouchers for refund (pursuant to Resolution 1529 of the CBP) but the banks auditor refused to honor thevouchers since he maintained that this is in contrast to the provision of Sec 2, par 18 of RA 2609 which provides:

The margin established by the Monetary Board pursuant to the provision of section one hereof shall not be imposedupon the sale of foreign exchange for the importation of the following:

xxx xxx xxxXVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardboard when imported by and for the exclusiveuse of end-users.

The Auditor General, Gimenez, affirmed the ruling of CBPs auditor. Casco maintains that the termureaformaldehyde appearing in this provision should be construed as urea andformaldehyde He furthercontends that the bill approved inCongress contained the copulative conjunction and between the terms urea

and, formaldehyde, and that the members ofCongress intended to exempt urea and formaldehyde separatelyas essential elements in the manufacture of the synthetic resin glue calledureaformaldehyde, not the latter afinished product, citing in support of this view the statements made on the floor of the Senate, during theconsideration of the bill before said House, by members thereof.

ISSUE: Whether or not the term ureaformaldehyde should be construed as urea andformaldehyde.

HELD: Urea formaldehyde is not a chemical solution. It is the synthetic resin formed as a condensation product fromdefiniteproportionsof urea and formaldehyde under certain conditions relating to temperature, acidity, and time ofreaction. This produce when applied in water solution and extended with inexpensive fillers constitutes a fairlylow cost adhesive for use in the manufacture ofplywood. Ureaformaldehyde is clearly a finished product, which ispatently distinct and different from urea and formaldehyde, as separate articles used in the manufacture of thesynthetic resin known as ureaformaldehyde The opinions of any member of Congress does not represent theentirety of the Congress itself. What is printed in the enrolled bill would be conclusive upon the courts. It is well

settled that the enrolled billwhich uses the term ureaformaldehyde instead of urea andformaldehyde isconclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the President.If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress andapproved by the Executive on which the SC cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of separation ofpowers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic system the remedy is by amendment orcurative legislation, not by judicial decree.

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Association of Small Landowners vs Secretary of Agrarian Reform

Equal ProtectionThese are 3 cases consolidated questioning the constitutionality of the Agrarian Reform Act. Article XIII on SocialJustice and Human Rights includes a call for the adoption by the State of an agrarian reform program. The Stateshall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, whoare landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just

share of the fruits thereof. RA 3844, Agricultural Land Reform Code, had already been enacted by Congress onAugust 8, 1963. This was substantially superseded almost a decade later by PD 27, which was promulgated on Oct21, 1972, along with martial law, to provide for the compulsory acquisition of private lands for distribution amongtenant-farmers and to specify maximum retention limits for landowners. On July 17, 1987, Cory issued EO 228,declaring full land ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of PD 27 and providing for the valuation of still unvaluedlands covered by the decree as well as the manner of their payment. This was followed on July 22, 1987 by PP 131,instituting a comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP), and EO 229, providing the mechanics for itsimplementation. Afterwhich is the enactment of RA 6657, Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, which Corysigned on June 10. This law, while considerably changing the earlier mentioned enactments, nevertheless gives themsuppletory effect insofar as they are not inconsistent with its provisions.In considering the rentals as advance payment on the land, the executive order also deprives the petitioners oftheirproperty rights as protected by due process. The equal protection clause is also violated because the orderplaces the burden ofsolving the agrarian problems on the owners only of agricultural lands. No similar obligation isimposed on the owners of other properties.

The petitioners maintain that in declaring the beneficiaries under PD 27 to be the owners of the lands occupied bythem, EO 228 ignored judicial prerogatives and so violated due process. Worse, the measure would not solve theagrarian problem because even the small farmers are deprived of their lands and the retention rights guaranteed bythe Constitution.In his comment the Sol-Gen asserted that the alleged violation of the equal protection clause, the sugar plantershave failed to show that they belong to a different class and should be differently treated. The Comment alsosuggests the possibility ofCongress first distributing public agricultural lands and scheduling the expropriation ofprivate agricultural lands later. From this viewpoint, the petition for prohibition would be premature.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a violation of the equal protection clause.

HELD: The SC ruled affirming the Sol-Gen. The argument of the small farmers that they have been denied equalprotection because of the absence of retention limits has also become academic under Sec 6 of RA 6657.Significantly, they too have not questioned the area of such limits. There is also the complaint that they should not

be made to share the burden of agrarian reform, an objection also made by the sugar planters on the ground thatthey belong to a particular class with particular interests of their own. However, no evidence has been submitted tothe Court that the requisites of a valid classification have been violated.Classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars anddifferent from each other in these same particulars. To be valid, it must conform to the following requirements:

(1) it must be based on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) it must notbe limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class.

The Court finds that all these requisites have been met by the measures here challenged as arbitrary anddiscriminatory.

Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated alike both as to the rightsconferred and the liabilities imposed. The petitioners have not shown that they belong to a different class andentitled to a different treatment. The argument that not only landowners but also owners of other properties must bemade to share the burden of implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a substantial distinction betweenthese two classes of owners that is clearly visible except to those who will not see. There is no need to elaborate onthis matter. In any event, the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification. Its decision isaccorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice except only where its discretion is abused to the detrimentof the Bill of Rights.

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Arroyo vs. De Venecia G.R. No. 127255, August 14, 1997

Facts: A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which amends certain provisions of

the National Internal Revenue Code. Petitioners, who are members of the House of Representatives,charged that there is violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim are constitutionally-mandated so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution.

The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate approved it with certain amendments.A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the Houseand Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral committee submitted its report to the House. During theinterpellations, Rep. Arroyo made an interruption and moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. But aftera roll call, the Chair declared the presence of a quorum. The interpellation then proceeded. After Rep.Arroyos interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report, Majority Leader Albano moved for theapproval and ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair called out for objections to themotion. Then the Chair declared: There being none, approved. At the same time the Chair wassaying this, Rep. Arroyo was asking, What is thatMr. Speaker? The Chair and Rep. Arroyo weretalking simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leadersmotion, the approval of the conference committee report had by then already been declared by theChair.

On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the

President of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress. Theenrolled bill was signed into law by President Ramos.

Issue:Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of theHouse

Held:Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character. They are subject to revocation,modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily procedural.Courts ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They may be waived or disregarded by thelegislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the effect of nullifyingthe act taken if the requisite number of members has agreed to a particular measure. But this

is subject to qualification. Where the construction to be given to a rule affects person other thanmembers of the legislative body, the question presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even itsvalidity is open to question in a case where private rights are involved.

In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead ofseeking redress in the House, chose totransfer the dispute to the Court.

The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with which the Courtshould not be concerned. The claim is not that there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo waseffectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyos earlier motion to

adjourn for lack of quorum had already been defeated, as the roll call established the existence of aquorum. The question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly especially when the quorumis obviously present for the purpose of delaying the business of the House.

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Carlos Superdrug Corp. v. DSWD, 526 SCRA 130 (2007)

Facts: Petitioners are domestic corporations and proprietors operating drugstores in the Philippines. Petitionersassail the constitutionality of Section 4(a) of RA 9257, otherwise known as the Expanded Senior Citizens Act of2003. Section 4(a) of RA 9257 grants twenty percent (20%) discount as privileges for the Senior Citizens. Petitionercontends that said law is unconstitutional because it constitutes deprivation of private property.

Issue: Whether or not RA 9257 is unconstitutional

Held: Petition is dismissed. The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the power of eminentdomain, has general welfare for its object.

Accordingly, it has been described as the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as itdoes to all the great public needs. It is the power vested in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, andestablish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without,not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of thesubjects of the same.

For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined by the legislature, property rights must bow to theprimacy of police power because property rights, though sheltered by due process, must yield to general welfare.

RULING

The permanent reduction in their total revenues is a forced subsidy corresponding to the taki ng ofprivate propert y for public use or benefit. This constitutes compensable taking for whichpetitioners would ordinarily become entitled to a just compensation. Just compensation is defined as thefull and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the exp ropr iat or. The m eas ure isnot the takers gain but the owners loss. The word just is used to intensify the meaning ofthe word compensation, and to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for theproper ty to be taken shal l be real, substantial, full and ample. A tax deduction does not offer fullreimbursement of the senior citizen discount. As such, it would not meet the definition of justcompensation. Having said t hat, t his r aises t he ques tion of whether the State, in pr omotingthe health and welfare of a special group of citizens, can impose upon private establishments the burden

of partly subsidizing a government program

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Romualdez-Marcos vs COMELEC

FACTS:

Imelda, a little over 8 years old, in or about 1938, established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte where she studied andgraduated high school in the Holy Infant Academy from 1938 to 1949. She then pursued her college degree,

education, in St. Pauls College now Divine Word University also in Tacloban. Subsequently, she taught in LeyteChinese School still in Tacloban. She went to manila during 1952 to work with her cousin, the late speaker DanielRomualdez in his office in the House of Representatives. In 1954, she married late President Ferdinand Marcoswhen he was still a Congressman of Ilocos Norte and was registered there as a voter. When Pres. Marcos waselected as Senator in 1959, they lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965, whenMarcos won presidency, they lived in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel Manila. Sheserved as member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila during 1978.

Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte for the 1995Elections. Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and also a candidate for thesame position, filed a Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification"

with the Commission on Elections alleging that

petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. The petitioner, in an honest misrepresentation,wrote seven months under residency, which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in herAmended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 29, 1995 and that "she has always maintained TaclobanCity as her domicile or residence. She arrived at the seven months residency due to the fact that she became a

resident of the Municipality of Tolosa in said months.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1year residency requirement to be eligible in running as representative ofthe First District of Leyte.

HELD:

Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes. The court are in favor of a conclusionsupporting petitoners claim of legal residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte despite her own declaration of 7months residency in the district for the following reasons:

1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became Imeldas domicile of origin by operation of law whenher father brought them to Leyte;

2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide intention of

abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with the purpose. In theabsence and concurrence of all these, domicile of origin should be deemed to continue.

3. A wife does not automatically gain the husbands domicile because the term residence in Civil Law does notmean the same thing in Political Law. When Imelda married late President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile oforigin and merely gained a new home and not domicilium necessarium.

4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired right to choose a new one only afterthe death of Pres. Marcos, her actions upon returning to the country clearly indicated that she chose Tacloban, herdomicile of origin, as her domicile of choice. To add, petitioner even obtained her residence certificate in 1992 inTacloban, Leyte while living in her brothers house, an act, which supports the domiciliary intention clearlymanifested. She even kept close ties by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and otherimportant milestones.

WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat

in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24,May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order theProvincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.

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CARLOS ALONZO and CASIMIRA ALONZO, petitioners,vs.INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and TECLA PADUA, respondents.

CRUZ, J .:

The question is sometimes asked, in serious inquiry or in curious conjecture, whether we are a court of law or a courtof justice. Do we apply the law even if it is unjust or do we administer justice even against the law? Thus queried, wedo not equivocate. The answer is that we do neither because we are a court both of law and of justice. We apply thelaw withjustice for that is our mission and purpose in the scheme of our Republic. This case is an illustration.

Five brothers and sisters inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a parcel of land registered in 'the name of theirdeceased parents under OCT No. 10977 of the Registry of Deeds of Tarlac. 1

On March 15, 1963, one of them, Celestino Padua, transferred his undivided share of the herein petitioners for thesum of P550.00 by way of absolute sale.

2One year later, on April 22, 1964, Eustaquia Padua, his sister, sold her

own share to the same vendees, in an instrument denominated "Con Pacto de Retro Sale," for the sum of P 440.00.3

By virtue of such agreements, the petitioners occupied, after the said sales, an area corresponding to two-fifths of thesaid lot, representing the portions sold to them. The vendees subsequently enclosed the same with a fence. In 1975,

with their consent, their son Eduardo Alonzo and his wife built a semi-concrete house on a part of the enclosedarea.4

On February 25, 1976, Mariano Padua, one of the five coheirs, sought to redeem the area sold to the spousesAlonzo, but his complaint was dismissed when it appeared that he was an American citizen .

5On May 27, 1977,

however, Tecla Padua, another co-heir, filed her own complaint invoking the same right of redemption claimed by herbrother.

6

The trial court * also dismiss this complaint, now on the ground that the right had lapsed, not having been exercisedwithin thirty days from notice of the sales in 1963 and 1964. Although there was no written notice, it was heldthat actualknowledge of the sales by the co-heirs satisfied the requirement of the law.

7

In truth, such actual notice as acquired by the co-heirs cannot be plausibly denied. The other co-heirs, including TeclaPadua, lived on the same lot, which consisted of only 604 square meters, including the portions sold to the petitioners

.8

Eustaquia herself, who had sold her portion, was staying in the same house with her sister Tecla, who later claimedredemption petition.

9Moreover, the petitioners and the private respondents were close friends and neighbors whose

children went to school together. 10

It is highly improbable that the other co-heirs were unaware of the sales and that they thought, as they alleged, thatthe area occupied by the petitioners had merely been mortgaged by Celestino and Eustaquia. In the circumstancesjust narrated, it was impossible for Tecla not to know that the area occupied by the petitioners had been purchasedby them from the other. co-heirs. Especially significant was the erection thereon of the permanent semi-concretestructure by the petitioners' son, which was done without objection on her part or of any of the other co-heirs.

The only real question in this case, therefore, is the correct interpretation and application of the pertinent law asinvoked, interestingly enough, by both the petitioners and the private respondents. This is Article 1088 of the CivilCode, providing as follows:

Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition, any orall of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the priceof the sale, provided they do so within the period of one month from the time they were notified inwriting of the sale by the vendor.

In reversing the trial court, the respondent court ** declared that the notice required by the said articlewas written notice and that actual notice would not suffice as a substitute. Citing the same case of De Conejero v.Court of Appeals11applied by the trial court, the respondent court held that that decision, interpreting a like rule inArticle 1623, stressed the need for written notice although no particular form was required.

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Thus, according to Justice J.B.L. Reyes, who was the ponente of the Court, furnishing the co-heirs with a copy of thedeed of sale of the property subject to redemption would satisfy the requirement for written notice. "So long,therefore, as the latter (i.e., the redemptioner) is informed in writing of the sale and the particulars thereof," hedeclared, "the thirty days for redemption start running. "

In the earlier decision ofButte v. UY, 12 " the Court, speaking through the same learned jurist, emphasized that thewritten notice should be given by the vendor and not the vendees, conformably to a similar requirement under Article

1623, reading as follows:

Art. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised except within thirtydays from the notice in writing by the prospective vendor, or by the vendors, as the case may be.The deed of sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property, unless accompanied by anaffidavit of the vendor that he has given written notice thereof to all possible redemptioners.

The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of the adjoining owners.

As "it is thus apparent that the Philippine legislature in Article 1623 deliberately selected a particular method of givingnotice, and that notice must be deemed exclusive," the Court held that notice given by the vendees and notthe vendorwould not toll the running of the 30-day period.

The petition before us appears to be an illustration of the Holmes dictum that "hard cases make bad laws" as thepetitioners obviously cannot argue against the fact that there was really no written notice given by the vendors to theirco-heirs. Strictly applied and interpreted, Article 1088 can lead to only one conclusion, to wit, that in view of suchdeficiency, the 30 day period for redemption had not begun to run, much less expired in 1977.

But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is acardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge should be to discover in itsprovisions the in tent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a way as to causeinjustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume thegood motives of the legislature, is to render justice.

Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice. Law and justice areinseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that, while generally valid, may seemarbitrary when applied in a particular case because of its peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we are not

bound, because only of our nature and functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish obedience to their language.What we do instead is find a balance between the word and the will, that justice may be done even as the law isobeyed.

As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it is worded, yielding likerobots to the literal command without regard to its cause and consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking tooclosely to the words of a law," so we are warned, by Justice Holmes again, "where these words import a policy thatgoes beyond them."13 While we admittedly may not legislate, we nevertheless have the power to interpret the law insuch a way as to reflect the will of the legislature. While we may not read into the law a purpose that is not there, wenevertheless have the right to read out of itthe reason for its enactment. In doing so, we defer not to "the letter thatkilleth" but to "the spirit that vivifieth," to give effect to the law maker's will.

The spirit, rather than the letter of a statute determines its construction, hence, a statute must beread according to its spirit or intent. For what is within the spirit is within the letter but although it is

not within the letter thereof, and that which is within the letter but not within the spirit is not withinthe statute. Stated differently, a thing which is within the intent of the lawmaker is as much withinthe statute as if within the letter; and a thing which is within the letter of the statute is not within thestatute unless within the intent of the lawmakers. 14

In requiring written notice, Article 1088 seeks to ensure that the redemptioner is properly notified ofthe sale and to indicate the date of such notice as the starting time of the 30-day period ofredemption. Considering the shortness of the period, it is really necessary, as a general rule, topinpoint the precise date it is supposed to begin, to obviate any problem of alleged delays,sometimes consisting of only a day or two.

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The instant case presents no such problem because the right of redemption was invoked not days but years after thesales were made in 1963 and 1964. The complaint was filed by Tecla Padua in 1977, thirteen years after the first saleand fourteen years after the second sale. The delay invoked by the petitioners extends to more than a decade,assuming of course that there was a valid notice that tolled the running of the period of redemption.

Was there a valid notice? Granting that the law requires the notice to be written, would such notice be necessary inthis case? Assuming there was a valid notice although it was not in writing. would there be any question that the 30-

day period for redemption had expired long before the complaint was filed in 1977?

In the face of the established facts, we cannot accept the private respondents' pretense that they were unaware ofthe sales made by their brother and sister in 1963 and 1964. By requiring written proof of such notice, we would beclosing our eyes to the obvious truth in favor of their palpably false claim of ignorance, thus exalting the letter of thelaw over its purpose. The purpose is clear enough: to make sure that the redemptioners are duly notified. We aresatisfied that in this case the other brothers and sisters were actually informed, although not in writing, of the salesmade in 1963 and 1964, and that such notice was sufficient.

Now, when did the 30-day period of redemption begin?

While we do not here declare that this period started from the dates of such sales in 1963 and 1964, we do say thatsometime between those years and 1976, when the first complaint for redemption was filed, the other co-heirs wereactually informed of the sale and that thereafter the 30-day period started running and ultimately expired. This couldhave happened any time during the interval of thirteen years, when none of the co-heirs made a move to redeem theproperties sold. By 1977, in other words, when Tecla Padua filed her complaint, the right of redemption had alreadybeen extinguished because the period for its exercise had already expired.

The following doctrine is also worth noting:

While the general rule is, that to charge a party with laches in the assertion of an alleged right it isessential that he should have knowledge of the facts upon which he bases his claim, yet if thecircumstances were such as should have induced inquiry, and the means of ascertaining the truthwere readily available upon inquiry, but the party neglects to make it, he will be chargeable withlaches, the same as if he had known the facts. 15

It was the perfectly natural thing for the co-heirs to wonder why the spouses Alonzo, who were not among them,

should enclose a portion of the inherited lot and build thereon a house of strong materials. This definitely was not theact of a temporary possessor or a mere mortgagee. This certainly looked like an act of ownership. Yet, given thisunseemly situation, none of the co-heirs saw fit to object or at least inquire, to ascertain the facts, which were readilyavailable. It took all ofthirteen years before one of them chose to claim the right of redemption, but then it wasalready too late.

We realize that in arriving at our conclusion today, we are deviating from the strict letter of the law, which therespondent court understandably applied pursuant to existing jurisprudence. The said court acted properly as it hadno competence to reverse the doctrines laid down by this Court in the above-cited cases. In fact, and this should beclearly stressed, we ourselves are not abandoning the De Conejero and Buttle doctrines. What we are doing simply isadopting an exception to the general rule, in view of the peculiar circumstances of this case.

The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of the sales although no notice in writing was given them. Andthere is no doubt either that the 30-day period began and ended during the 14 years between the sales in question

and the filing of the complaint for redemption in 1977, without the co-heirs exercising their right of redemption. Theseare the justifications for this exception.

More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and perpetual wish to render every one hisdue."16 That wish continues to motivate this Court when it assesses the facts and the law in every case brought to itfor decision. Justice is always an essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the facts warrants, we interpret thelaw in a way that will render justice, presuming that it was the intention of the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law bedispensed with justice. So we have done in this case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The decision of the respondent court

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COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner,vs.ESSO STANDARD EASTERN, INC. and THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS, respondents.

In two (2) cases appealed to it 1 by the private respondent, hereafter simply referred to as ESSO, the Court of TaxAppeals rendered judgment 2 sustaining the decisions of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue excepted to, save"the refund-claim .. in the amount of P39,787.94 as overpaid interest which it ordered refunded to ESSO

Reversal of this decision is sought by the Commissioner by a petition for review on certiorarifiled with this Court. Heascribes to the Tax Court one sole error: "of applying the tax credit for overpayment of the 1959 income tax of ..ESSO, granted by the petitioner (Commissioner), to .. (ESSO's) basic 1960 deficiency income tax liability x x andimposing the 1-1/2% monthly interests 3 only on the remaining balance thereof in the sum of P146,961.00" 4 (insteadof the full amount of the 1960 deficiency liability in the amount of P367,994.00). Reversal of the same judgment of theCourt of Tax Appeals is also sought by ESSO in its own appeal (docketed as G.R. Nos. L28508-09); but in the brieffiled by it in this case, it indicates that it will not press its appeal in the event that "the instant petition for review bedenied and that judgment be rendered affirming the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals."

The facts are simple enough and are quite quickly recounted. ESSO overpaid its 1959 income tax by P221,033.00. Itwas accordingly granted a tax credit in this amount by the Comissioner on August 5,1964. However, ESSOs paymentof its income tax for 1960 was found to be short by P367,994.00. So, on July 10, 1964, the Commissioner wrote toESSO demanding payment of the deficiency tax, together with interest thereon for the period from April 18,1961 to

April 18,1964. On August 10, 1964, ESSO paid under protest the amount alleged to be due, including the interest asreckoned by the Commissioner. It protested the computation of interest, contending it was more than that properlydue. It claimed that it should not have been required to pay interest on the total amount of the deficiency tax,P367,994.00, but only on the amount of P146,961.00representing the difference between said deficiency,P367,994.00, and ESSOs earlier overpayment of P221,033.00 (for which it had been granted a tax credit). ESSOthus asked for a refund.

The Internal Revenue Commissioner denied the claim for refund. ESSO appealed to the Court of Tax Appeals. Asaforestated. that Court ordered payment to ESSO of its "refund-claim x x in the amount of P39,787.94 as overpaidinterest. Hence, this appeal by the Commissioner. The CTA justified its award of the refund as follows:

... In the letter of August 5, 1964, .. (the Commissioner) admitted that .. ESSO had overpaid its1959 income tax by P221,033.00. Accordingly .. (the Commissioner) granted to .. ESSO a taxcredit of P221,033.00. In short, the said sum of P221,033.00 of ESSO's money was in the

Government's hands at the latest on July 15, 1960 when it ESSO paid in full its second installmentof income tax for 1959. On July 10, 1964 .. (the Commissioner) claimed that for 1960, .. ESSOunderpaid its income tax by P367,994.00. However, instead of deducting from P367,994.00 the taxcredit of P221,033.00 which .. (the Commissioner) had already admitted was due .. ESSO .. (theCommissioner) still insists in collecting the interest on the full amount of P367,994.00 for the periodApril 18, 1961 to April 18,1964 when the Government had already in its hands the sum ofP221,033.00 of .. ESSOs money even before the latter's income tax for 1960 was due and payable.If the imposition of interest does not amount to a penalty but merely a just compensation to theState for the delay in paying the tax, and for the concomitant use by the taxpayer of funds thatrightfully should be in the Government's hand (Castro v. Collector, G.R. No. L-1274, Dec. 28,1962), the collection of the interest on the full amount of P367,994.00 without deducting first the taxcredit of P221,033.00, which has long been in the hands of the Government, becomes erroneous,illegal and arbitrary.

.. (ESSO) could hardly be charged of delinquency in paying P221,033.00 out of the deficiencyincome tax of P367,994.00, for which the State should be compensated by the payment of interest,because the said amount of P221,033.00 was already in the coffers of the Government. Neithercould .. ESSO be charged for the concomitant use of funds that rightfully belong to the Governmentbecause as early as July 15, 1960, it was the Government that was using .. ESSOs funds ofP221,033.00. In the circumstances, we find it unfair and unjust for .. (the Commissioner) to exactthe interest on the said sum of P221,033.00 which, after all, was paid to and received by theGovernment even before the incidence of the deficiency income tax of P367,994.00. (Itogon-SuyocMines, Inc. v. Commissioner, C.T.A. Case No. 1327, Sept. 30,1965). On the contrary, theGovernment should be the first to blaze the trail and set the example of fairness and honest dealingin the administration of tax laws.

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Accordingly, we hold that the tax credit of P221,033.00 for 1959 should first be deducted from thebasic deficiency tax of P367,994.00 for 1960 and the resulting difference of P146,961.00 would besubject to the 18% interest prescribed by Section 51 (d) of the Revenue Code. According to theprayer of ..(ESSO) .. (the Commissioner) is hereby ordered to refund to .. (ESSO) the amount ofP39,787.94 as overpaid interest in the settlement of its 1960 income tax liability. However, as thecollection of the tax was not attended with arbitrariness because .. (ESSO) itself followed x x (theCommissioner's) manner of computing the tax in paying the sum of P213,189.93 on August 10,

1964, the prayer of .. (ESSO) that it be granted the legal rate of interest on its overpayment ofP39,787.94 from August 10, 1964 to the time it is actually refunded is denied. (See Collector ofInternal Revenue v. Binalbagan Estate, Inc., G.R. No. 1,12752, Jan. 30, 1965).

The Commissioner's position is that income taxes are determined and paid on an annual basis, and that suchdetermination and payment of annual taxes are separate and independent transactions; and that a tax credit couldnot be so considered until it has been finally approved and the taxpayer duly notified thereof. Since in this case, heargues, the tax credit of P221,033.00 was approved only on August 5, 1964, it could not be availed of in reduction ofESSOs earlier tax deficiency for the year 1960; as of that year, 1960, there was as yet no tax credit to speak of,which would reduce the deficiency tax liability for 1960. In support of his position, the Commissioner invokes theprovisions of Section 51 of the Tax Code pertinently reading as follows:

(c) Definition of deficiency. As used in this Chapter in respect of tax imposed by this Title, the term'deficiency' means:

(1) The amount by which the tax imposed by this Title exceeds the amount shown as the tax by thetaxpayer upon his return; but the amount so shown on the return shall first be increased by theamounts previously assessed (or collected without assessment) as a deficiency, and decreased bythe amount previously abated credited, returned, or otherwise in respect of such tax; ..

xxx xxx xxx

(d) Interest on deficiency. Interest upon the amount determined as deficiency shall be assessedat the same time as the deficiency and shall be paid upon notice and demand from theCommissioner of Internal Revenue; and shall be collected as a part of the tax, at the rate of six percentum per annum from the date prescribed for the payment of the tax (or, if the tax is paid ininstallments, from the date prescribed for the payment of the first installment) to the date thedeficiency is assessed; Provided, That the amount that may be collected as interest on deficiency

shall in no case exceed the amount corresponding to a period of three years, the present provisionregarding prescription to the contrary notwithstanding.

The fact is that, as respondent Court of Tax Appeals has stressed, as early as July 15, 1960, the Government alreadyhad in its hands the sum of P221,033.00 representing excess payment. Having been paid and received by mistake,as petitioner Commissioner subsequently acknowledged, that sum unquestionably belonged to ESSO, and theGovernment had the obligation to return it to ESSO That acknowledgment of the erroneous payment came some four(4) years afterwards in nowise negates or detracts from its actuality. The obligation to return money mistakenly paidarises from the moment that payment is made, and not from the time that the payee admits the obligation toreimburse. The obligation of the payee to reimburse an amount paid to him results from the mistake, not from thepayee's confession of the mistake or recognition of the obligation to reimburse. In other words, since the amount ofP221,033.00 belonging to ESSO was already in the hands of the Government as of July, 1960, although the latterhad no right whatever to the amount and indeed was bound to return it to ESSO, it was neither legally nor logicallypossible for ESSO thereafter to be considered a debtor of the Government in that amount of P221,033.00; and

whatever other obligation ESSO might subsequently incur in favor of the Government would have to be reduced bythat sum, in respect of which no interest could be charged. To interpret the words of the statute in such a manner asto subvert these truisms simply can not and should not be countenanced. "Nothing is better settled than that courtsare not to give words a meaning which would lead to absurd or unreasonable consequences. That is a principle thatgoes back to In re Allen (2 Phil. 630) decided on October 29, 1903, where it was held that a literal interpretation is tobe rejected if it would be unjust or lead to absurd results." 6 "Statutes should receive a sensible construction, such aswill give effect to the legislative intention and so as to avoid an unjust or absurd conclusion." 7

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED, and the Decision of the Court of Tax Appeals dated October 28,1967 subject of the petition is AFFIRMED, without pronouncement as to costs.

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