STATCON FINALS

Week 1: Introduction

Caltex v Palomar Definition of Statutory Construction: ∙ Construction, verily, is the art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of the law with

respect to its application to a given case, where that intention is rendered doubtful, amongst others, by reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for in the law

∙ Inquiry into the intended meaning of the words used therein

People v Mapa When construction is necessary: ∙ The first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law ∙ Construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them

Alonzo v IAC Construction is necessary when legislative intent cannot be readily ascertained from the words used in the law as applied under a set of facts:

∙ Cardinal rule: In seeking the meaning of the law, judges should first discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker. ∙ The law should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. We presume the

good motives of the legislature which is to render justice. ∙ There are some laws that, while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case because of its peculiar

circumstances. ∙ In such a situation, find a balance between the word and the will, that justice may be done even as the law is obeyed. ∙ "The letter that killeth" versus "the spirit that vivifieth" to give effect to the law maker's will

o For what is within the spirit is within the letter but although it is not within the letter thereof, and that which is within the letter but not within the spirit is not within the statute

∙ This is an exception to the general rule. Verba legis first before ratio legis!

Endencia v David Judicial function: ∙ Before the courts can determine whether a law is constitutional or not, it will have to interpret and ascertain the meaning not only of

said law, but also of the pertinent portion of the Constitution in order to decide whether there is a conflict between the two, because if there is, then the law will have to give way and has to be declared invalid and unconstitutional

∙ A legislative definition of a word as used in a statute is not conclusive of its meaning as used elsewhere. It shall be so construed as not to violate the constitutional inhibition.

I. Characteristics of Construction: 1. Art or process

∙ No silver bullet o Intrinsic – words or phrases within the law o Extrinsic – outside of the law (deliberations, news, etc.)

∙ Basic principles: o Principle of effectiveness – give full effect to the statute o Constitutionality o Avoid absurdity o Presumptions (ex. Adoption – construe in favour of the benefit of the child) o Construe as a whole (ex. Consti – relate articles to each other)

2. Involves determination of legislative intent ∙ Check the purpose of the law

o Verba legis – letter of the law (Speech is the index of intention) Words of the law and the source of legislative intent Assume Congress knows what they were writing. Congress meant what it said. If it is clear, apply it!

o Ratio legis – spirit of the law prevails over letter of the law ∙ Check the evil sought to be avoided (ex. Dinagat Island case, Philex v Floresca) ∙ Courts can construe but not legislate ∙ However, spirit must not be used as an excuse not to follow the letter of the law. Speech is the index of intention. Speech is manifest.

3. Necessary when legislative intent cannot be readily ascertained from the words used in the law as applied under a set of facts Ambiguity ∙ When there are two or more reasonable interpretations ∙ See how the law applies to the facts; don’t just apply it because the facts may be different ∙ Two types:

o Patent – actual words are ambiguous o Latent – as applied

4. Judicial function ∙ There must be an actual controversy – judiciary is passive, won’t act without a case ∙ When there is an ambiguity of statute construction only necessary when there is ambiguity ∙ Subject matter of construction: Constitution, statutes, executive issuances, and ordinances ∙ Statute must not be in conflict with the Constitution ∙ Legislative cannot interfere. ∙ Executive is capable of contemporaneous construction out of necessity, such as in IRRs and Opinions issued. These are persuasive only.

II. Purpose of construction: ascertain true intent III. Subject matter of construction: Constitution, statutes, executive issuances, and ordinances IV. Related legal principles:

∙ Separation of powers (legislative cannot interfere with judiciary re: interpretation, executive IRRs and opinions merely persuasive) ∙ Checks and balances (constitutionality of the laws) ∙ Hierarchy of laws

o Constitution statutes jurisprudence international law o Congress has plenary power of laws. It can pass long as long as it is not contrary to the Constitution. (Art 7 Civil Code on subsequent provisions) o Only a law can repeal a law.

∙ Stare decisis o Judicial decisions form part of the law o Follow interpretation of the courts; uniformity and stability

Week 2 Parts of a Statute

Art. VI Sec. 26(1), 1987 Constitution: Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.

Govt of the Philippine Islands

1. Title ∙ The requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title should receive a reasonable and not a technical construction.

v HSBC ∙ It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general object which a statute seeks to effect, without expressing each and every end and means necessary or convenient for the accomplishing of that object. Mere details need not be set forth

Eugenio v Drilon 2. Preamble ∙ The intention of the legislature in enacting a law is the law itself and must be enforced when ascertained, although it may not be

consistent with the strict letter of the statute. Courts will not follow the letter of a statute when it leads away from the true intent and purpose of the legislature and to conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act.

∙ Intent can be derived from the preamble.

3. Enacting clause 4. Body 5. Repealing Clause (Everything defined on p. 6 of reviewer)

Antonio v Miranda and Tatad v DOE

6. Separability Clause ∙ The general rule is that where part of a statute is void as repugnant to the Constitution, while another part is valid, the valid portion, if

separable from the invalid, may stand and be enforced. The presence of a separability clause in statute creates the presumption that the legislature intended separability, rather than complete nullity, of the statute. To justify this result, the valid portion must be so far independent of the invalid portion that it is fair to presume that the legislature would have enacted it by itself if it had supposed that it could not constitutionally enact the other. Enough must remain to make a complete, intelligible, and valid statute, which carries out the legislative intent. The void provisions must be eliminated without causing results affecting the main purpose of the act in a manner contrary to the intention of the legislature. The language used in the invalid part of the statute can have no legal effect or efficacy for any purpose whatsoever, and what remains must express the legislative will independently of the void part, since the court has no power to legislate.

∙ The exception to the general rule is that when the parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and connected, as conditions, considerations, inducements, or compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole the nullity of one part will vitiate the rest. In making the parts of the statute dependent, conditional, or connected with one another, the legislature intended the statute to be carried out as a whole and would not have enacted it if one part is void, in which case if some parts are unconstitutional, all the other provisions thus dependent, conditional, or connected must fall with them.

Tanada v Tuvera 1985 and 1986

7. Effectivity Clause ∙ Ignorantia legis non excusat ∙ It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. ∙ The clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which

cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its previous publication. Publication is indispensible.

Limitation on the Power of the Courts to Construe

Tanada v Yulo ∙ By liberal construction of statutes, courts from the language use, the subject matter, and the purposes of those framing them are able to find their true meaning.

∙ There is a sharp distinction, however, between construction of this nature and the act of a court in engrafting upon a law something that has been omitted which someone believes ought to have been embraced.

o The former is liberal construction and is a legitimate exercise of judicial power.

o The latter is judicial legislation forbidden by the tripartite division of powers among the three departments of government, the executive, the legislative, and the judicial.

Week 3 Verba Legis v Ratio Legis

Tanada v Yulo (supra); Globe-

Mackay Cable and Radio Corp v NLRC

and Salazar

∙ If a statute is clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. ∙ Plain-meaning rule or verba legis derived from the maxim index animi sermo est (speech is the index of intention) rests on the valid

presumption that the words employed by the legislature in a statute correctly express its intent or will and preclude the court from construing it differently.

∙ The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words, to:have used words advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found in the statute.

∙ Verba legis non est recedendum or from the words of a statute there should be no departure.

Alonzo v IAC (supra); Salvacion

v Central Bank

∙ Courts must exercise vigilance in examining statutes because some of them may already be out of tune and irrelevant to our day. ∙ Examine when the law was enacted, during what circumstances, and see the intent of the law in the whereas clauses. ∙ The application of the law depends on the extent of its justice. If verba legis would cause injustice, then apply ratio legis.

People v Purisima ∙ When there is ambiguity, check the preamble or the whereas clauses for the intent or spirit of the law. They are strictly not a part of the law but they can be resorted to.

∙ Presumption is that undesirable consequences were never intended by the Congress. ∙ Construe also with the presumption that penal statutes are to be construed and applied liberally in favour of the accused and strictly

against the state. ∙ Legislative intent is the controlling factor. Whatever is within the spirit of a statute is within the statute, and this has to be so if strict

adherence to the letter will result in absurdity, injustice and contradictions. ∙ Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole, and not of an isolated part or a particular

provision alone.

Ambiguity

Del Mar v PAGCOR ∙ A statute admitting of different interpretations is the best evidence that it is vague and ambiguous. ∙ When it is capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in either of two or more senses ∙ Thus it is open to explanation by extrinsic aids, not only when its abstract meaning or the connotation of its terms is uncertain but also

when it is uncertain in its application to, or effect upon, the fact-situation of the case at bar. ∙ In the interpretation of statutes, it is not proper or permissible to inquire into the motives which influenced the legislative body,

except insofar as such motives are disclosed by the statute itself.

Week 4 and 5 General Policies on Construction

Philippine American Drug Co

v CIR

Ejusdem Generis ∙ Rule: general words follow a designation of particular subjects or classes of persons, the meaning of the general words will ordinarily

be presumed to be restricted by the particular designation, class or nature as those specifically enumerated o General words are presumed to be restricted by enumeration o X, Y, Z, etc X, Y, Z

NAPOLCOM v De Guzman

Doubt Legislative deliberations ∙ In case of doubt as to what a provision of a statute means, the meaning put to the provision during the legislative deliberations may

be adopted. (ex. Bicameral Conference Committee records)

Tanada v Tuvera (supra)

Construe consistent with the Constitution ∙ To give rise to ignorantia legis non excusat, laws must be published in full

City of Naga v Agna

Pari material harmonize; except when there is an express repeal or conflicting provisions ∙ A statute will not be construed as repealing prior acts on the same subject in the absence of words to that effect unless there is an

irreconcilable repugnancy between them, or unless the new law is evidently intended to supersede all prior acts on the matter in hand and to compromise itself the sole and complete system of legislation on that subject.

∙ Pari materia – when statutes relate to the same person or thing, or to the same class of persons or things, or have the same purpose or object when statutes are in pari materia, they should be construed together

o Supposed to form part of a uniform system o Latter ones are supplementary or complimentary

General Principles/Presumptions on the Interpretation of Certain Statutes: 1) Penal Laws

Centeno v Villalon Pornillos

Express mention excludes the others ∙ Express mention of one person, thing, act, or consequence exclude all others expression unius est exclusion alterius ∙ When a statute is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not be extended to others by interpretation or construction ∙ Legislature would not have made specified enumerations in a statute had the intention been not to restrict its meaning and to confine

its terms to those expressly mentioned.

US v Go Chico Spirit of the law; Preamble ∙ When there is ambiguity, resort is had to the principle that the spirit of a law controls the letter, so that a thing which is within the

intention of the statute is as much within the statute as if it were within the letter. A thing which is within the letter of the statute is not within the statute unless it be within the intention of the makers.

∙ Preamble is not a part of the state but it is considered in the constructionof an act as it sets out the object and intention. ∙ Preamble may be used when there is doubt or ambiguity.

2) Tax Laws

Marinduque Iron Mines v Municipal

Council

Explicit ∙ Taxes imposed must be clear, expressed, and unambiguous. ∙ General rule of requiring adherence to the letter in construing statutes applies with peculiar strictness to tax laws and the provisions

of a taxing act are not to be extended by implication. ∙ Construed strictly and against the subjection to a tax liability

NPC v City of Cabanatuan

Implicit ∙ Tax exemptions construed strongly against the claimant. Exemptions must be shown to exist clearly and categorically and supported

by clear legal provisions. ∙ “unless otherwise provided herein” implied and express at the same time

o It would be tedious and impractical to attempt to enumerate all the existing statutes providing for special tax exemptions or privileges

o Express albeit general

3) Social Legislation

Intl Pharma Inc v Secretary

Resolve in favour of the laborer ∙ The rule is that all doubts in the interpretation and implementation of labor laws should be resolved in favour of labor.

4) Rules of Court

Office of the Court Administrator v

Garong

Liberally construed in order to promote objective of securing a just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition ∙ Strict compliance to rules is mandatory and imperative. Nevertheless, procedural rules were conceived to aid the attainment of

justice. ∙ If a stringent application of the rules would hinder rather than serve the demands of substantial justice, then the former should yield

to the latter ∙ Decide on merits and not on technicality ∙ Rule may be relaxed if rigid application will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice ∙ Rules of procedure are used only to help secure, not override substantial justice

*sir does not agree with the case

Provincial Sheriff of Rizal v CA

Strict reglementary period; sound discretion of the court ∙ While the rules of procedure are liberally construed, the provisions on reglementary periods are strictly applied as they are deemed

indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and necessary to the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business. ∙ Same is true with rules on the manner and periods for perfecting appeals ∙ Period to appeal may be extended subject to sound discretion of the court ∙ Mere filing and pendency of motion for extension does not suspend running of reglementary period

5) Law on Adoption

Duncan v CFI In favour of the child; not dura lex sed lex ∙ Dura lex sed lex to be softened in adoption cases. Apply the law with less severity and with compassion and humane understanding. ∙ All efforts to provide homes, love, care and education for unfortunate children. ∙ Give all chances for human life to exist.

6) Local Government/Local Autonomy

San Juan v CSC Favor local autonomy ∙ Where a law is capable of 2 interpretations, one in favour of centralized power in Malacanang and the other beneficial to local

autonomy, scales must be weighed in favour of autonomy.

7) Constitution

Bagong Bayani v COMELEC

Verba legis, spirit, extraneous ∙ Verba legis – speech is the index of intention ∙ Words in Constitution is couched in its objective ∙ Primary source of intent: provision itself; so look at the law first ∙ If words are unclear resort to extraneous aids like ConCon, but those are opinions and persuasive only ∙ Safer to construe from what appears on its face. How it was understood by the people adopting it than what is the understanding of

the framers

Manila Prince Hotel v GSIS

Self-executing ∙ Complete in itself and becomes operative without aid of supplementary or enabling legislation ∙ In case of doubt, Consti should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-executing; unless the contrary is intended

Francisco v HR ∙ Verba legis – words used in their ordinary meaning except when technical terms are employed o Begin with the ordinary meaning

∙ Ratio legis est anima – in accordance with the intent of its framers o Reason which induced framers to enact provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished

∙ Ut magis valeat quam pereat - interpret as a whole; in conjunction with all other provisions; harmonize ∙ May resort to other aids if meaning of the word is not clear

o Ex. Debates and proceedings of ConCon o But they are powerless when the meaning of the provision is clear. So safer to construe provisions on its face.

De Castro v JBC ∙ Avoid conflict, harmonize and reconcile ∙ Each provision has a reason; conflict can be cleared up ∙ What is favourable is a construction that will leave every word operative ∙ Provisions were meticulously organized ∙ Had the framers wanted to extend prohibition they could have explicitly said it ∙ This was dependent on the deliberations, as opposed to the ruling in Valenzuela; Valenzuela did not take heed of the intentions

Chavez v JBC ∙ Provision is clear and ambiguous apply plain and literal meaning; no need for spirit and deliberations ∙ Verba legis except when there are technical terms ∙ Verba legis non est recendendum – from words of a statute there should be no departure ∙ Noscitur a sociis – if ambiguous, consider the company of words in which it is founded ∙ Harmonize

Week 6 to 8 Intrinsic Aids of Construction

Caudal v CA 1) Law construed as a whole and in relation to other laws ∙ Legislative intent ascertained from the whole statute. Clauses and phrases of statutes should not be taken as detached and isolated

expressions but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts.

City of Baguio v Marcos

2) Title of the Law ∙ When engaged in the task of construing an obscure expression in the law or where exact or literal rendering of the words would not

carry out the legislative intent, the title may be resorted to in the ascertainment of congressional will. ∙ Title of the law properly regarded as an index of or clue or guide to legislative intent. ∙ Courts must consider both title and body to arrive at the intent.

People v Purisima (supra)

3) Preamble ∙ When there is ambiguity, resort to the preamble.

Florentino v PNB 4) Punctuation marks ∙ Positioning of punctuation marks is crucial to determine meaning of the provision ∙ But even disregarding grammatical construction, there are still other ways to determine its meaning ∙ Doctrine of last antecedent

People v Yabut 5) Headnotes or epigraphs ∙ When the text is clear, there is neither necessity nor propriety in resorting to the preamble or headings or epigraphs of a section for

interpretation of a text, especially where such epigraphs or headings are mere catchwords or reference aids indicating the general nature of the text that follows.

∙ Headings – catchwords, convenient index, cannot in any event have the effect of modifying or limiting the unambiguous words ∙ Body > Title when body is not ambiguous; titles are just indexes

Manila Railroad Co v Collector

6) Conflicting provisions ∙ It is the general rule in the interpretation of statutes levying taxes or duties not to extend their provisions beyond the clear import of

the language used. In every case of doubt, such statutes are construed most strongly against the Government and in favour of the citizen, because burdens are not to be imposed, nor presumed to be imposed, beyond what the statutes expressly and clearly import.

∙ The particular enactment must be operative and the general enactment must be taken to affect only such cases within its general language as are not within the provisions of the particular enactment.

∙ General < Special

David v CA 7) Meaning of word qualified by purpose of the statute ∙ Two or more meanings adopt which will most tend to give effect to the manifest intent of the lawmaker and promote the object for

which the statute was enacted. ∙ Uphold intention or purpose; construe in favour of the deprived party

Collector v Manila Lodge

8) Words construed in their ordinary sense ∙ Use plain and ordinary meaning dictionaries

Gatchalian v COMELEC

9) General words construed generally ∙ Use plural ∙ When the context so indicates, the word may be construed to mean, and indeed it has been frequently used in its enlarged and plural

sense, as meaning “all,” “all or every,” “each,” “each one for all,” “every,” without limitation; indefinite number or quantity, an indeterminate unit or number of units out of many or all, one or more as the case may be, several, some.

Geotina v CA 10) Use of generic words include things that arise after enactment of the law --- progressive interpretation ∙ Doctrine of progressive interpretation – obtaining at the time of its enactment but also designed to comprehend those that may

normally arise after its approval

Claudio v COMELEC

11) Words and phrases construed in relation to other provisions ∙ Look at other provisions that can shed light to the matter when there is ambiguity

Pilar v COMELEC 12) Where the law does not distinguish ∙ Where the law does not distinguish, the courts should not distinguish. --- Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos ∙ No distinction is to be made in the application of a law where none is indicated.

Manila Herald Publishing v

Ramos

13) Use of technical terms ∙ Technical if statute itself defines it. Before you look in the dictionary, examine the statute first.

Buenaseda v Sec. Flavier

14) Use of associated words ∙ Noscitur asociis – the word should be given the same sense as the other words with which it is associated ∙ Where a particular word is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made specific by considering the

company of terms in which it is found or with which it is associated.

Mutuc v COMELEC 14) Use of associated words ∙ Ejusdem generis – general words following any enumeration being applicable only to things of the same kind or class as those

specifically referred to

Cagayan Valley Enterprises v CA

14) Use of associated words ∙ Ejusdem generis is to be resorted only to determine the intent. However, if that intent clearly appears from other parts of the law and

such intent thus clearly manifested is contrary to the result which would be reached by the appreciation of the rule of ejusdem generis

then the latter must give way.

Sarmiento III v Mison

15) Express mention and implied exclusion ∙

Pepsi Cola Products Phils Inc

v Sec of Labor

16) Necessary implication ∙ Doctrine of necessary implication – what is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is expressed ∙ There is always an omission that may not meet a particular situation in the future gaps of the law ∙ Doctrine of necessary implication to fill in the gaps as may be fairly and logically inferred from its terms, which is necessary to

achieve object and purpose ∙ Ex necessitate legis

People v Manantan

17) Cassus Omissus ∙ Means case omitted ∙ What is omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally ∙ Operate and apply only if and when the omission has been clearly established (not applicable in this case)

People v Tamani 18) Each to each ∙ Reddendo singular singulis – referring each to each ∙ Referring each phrase or expression to its appropriate object ∙ Let each be put in its proper place; the words should be taken distributively

Mapa v Arroyo 19) Relative and qualifying terms ∙ Ad proximum antecedens fiat relation nisi impediatur sentencia – relative words refer to the nearest antecedent, unless it be

prevented by the context ∙ Ex. “and”is not meant to separate words but is a conjunction to join them

Paras v COMELEC 20) Context and related clauses ∙ Every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context; construed together with the other parts, and kept

subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment ∙ Statutes are to be interpreted in harmony with the Constitution ∙ Avoid a situation wherein a provision construed is defeated

US v Hart 21) Use of punctuation marks ∙ Punctuation marks if it is the same with the legislative intent, it can be used as an argument; don’t use it if otherwise ∙ If punctuation gives a meaning in accordance with the legislative will, use it as argument

Mercado et al v NLRC

22) Words and phrases: Proviso ∙ Office of a proviso is to qualify or modify only the phrase immediately preceding it or restrain or limit the generality of the clause that

it immediately follows ∙ Proviso is to be construed with reference to the immediately preceding part of the provision to which it is attached and not to the

statute itself or even the statute as a whole

Sterling v LLDA 22) Words and phrases: “Including” ∙ Include – to take in or comprise as a part of a whole ∙ Conveys the idea of non-exclusivity of the enumeration ∙ Expressio unius est exclusion alterius does not apply here

McGee v Republic 22) Words and phrases: Negative vs affirmative words

∙ Negative words and phrases prevail over affirmative words. ∙ They are to be regarded as mandatory while those in the affirmative are merely directory.

Bersabal v Salvador

22) Words and phrases: Mandatory v permissive ∙ “May” – general rule: connotes a permissible thing; merely permissive; operates to confer discretion ∙ “Shall” – imperative; operating to impose a duty which may be enforced; court left with no choice

Diokno v Rehabilitation Finance Corp

22) Words and phrases: Mandatory v permissive ∙ The presumption is that the word “shall” in a statute is used as an imperative, and not in a directory, sense. If a different

interpretation is sought, it must rest upon something in the character of the legislation or in the context which will justify a different meaning.

∙ In the ordinary signification, “shall” is imperative and not permissive though it may have the latter meaning when required by the context.

RMBSA v HDMF 22) Words and phrases: “and/or” ∙ “and/or” – the word “and” and “or” are to be used interchangeably ∙ Effect is given to both conjunctive “and” and the disjunctive “or” ∙ Or that one word or the other may be taken accordingly as one or the other will best effectuate the purpose intended by Congress ∙ Used to avoid a construction which by the use of the disjunctive “or” alone will exclude the combination of several of the alternatives

or by the use of the conjunctive “and” will exclude the efficacy of any one of the alternatives standing alone

Week 9 Extrinsic Aids of Construction

Manila Jockey Club Inc v GAB

1) Contemporaneous Circumstances ∙ On the principle of contemporaneous exposition, common usage and practice under the statute, or a course of conduct indicating a

particular undertaking of it, will frequently be of great value in determining its real meaning, especially where the usage has been acquired in by all parties concerned and has extended over a long period of time

Commissioner v Esso

2) Legislative History ∙ Where a statute is ambiguous, courts may examine both the printed pages of the published Act as well as those extrinsic matters that

may aid in construing the meaning of the statute, such as: o History of enactment o Reasons for passage of the bill o Purposes to be accomplished by the measure

∙ Courts may take judicial notice of the origin and history of statutes which they are called upon to construe and administer, and of facts which affect their derivation, validity and operation

∙ Others: Antagonism between the Act to be interpreted and existing or previous laws is to be avoided, unless it was clearly the intention of the legislature that such antagonism should arise and one amends or repeals the other, either expressly or by implication

∙ Repeal by implication is not favored unless it is manifest that the legislature so intended. As laws are presumed to be passed with deliberation and with full knowledge of all existing ones on the subject, it is logical to conclude that in passing a statute it was not intended to interfere with or abrogate any former law relating to the same matter, unless the repugnancy between the two is not only irreconcilable but also clear and convincing as a result of the language used, or unless the latter act fully embraces the subject matter of the earlier

Filipinas Life 2) Legislative History

Assurance Company v Court

of Tax Appeals

∙ A purely syntactical approach is hardly a safe guide to the meaning of a statute. Thus, the position of a proviso, although posses of considerable influence, is not necessarily controlling, as the proviso may apply to sections or portions thereof which follows it or even to the entire statute. In the ascertainment of intention, the legislative history of statute is extremely more important than position.

o Position cannot override intention o General rule was: a proviso is deemed to apply only to the immediately preceding clause or provision. changes if intent

shows otherwise

Manila Jockey Club Inc v GAB

3) Legislative Debates and Committee Reports ∙ Appellants: legislative debates and explanatory statements may be resorted to to throw light on the meaning of the words ∙ Appellees: legislative debates are expressive of views and motives of individual members and are not safe guides ∙ Court: in view of these conflicting authorities, no appreciable reliance can be safely placed on any of them ∙ The purpose of the inquiry is to know what the author meant by the language he used and also to see that the language used

sufficiently expresses that meaning. So there are two elements: o Internal – originates in intention o External – perfected by expression o Failure of the latter may defeat the former

Astorga v Villegas 3) Legislative Debates and Committee Reports ∙ Journals can be resorted to by the courts in this case since the enrolled bill passed had problems ∙ The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record. The Constitution requires it. While it is true that the

journal is not authenticated and is subject to the risks of misprinting and other errors, the point is irrelevant in this case. This Court is merely asked to inquire whether the text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the Chief Executive was the same text passed by both Houses of Congress. Under the specific facts and circumstances of this case, this Court can do this and resort to the Senate journal for the purpose. The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and signed by him

Gaanan v IAC 3) Legislative Debates and Committee Reports ∙ On the construction or interpretation of a legislative measure, the primary rule is to search for and determine the intent and spirit of

the law. Legislative debates and committee reports are extrinsic aids to find the intent and spirit of the law ∙ Additional: It is a general rule that penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused

League of Cities v COMELEC

3) Legislative Debates and Committee Reports ∙ Legislative debates were resorted to in order to determine the intent of the law

Bengzon v Secretary of

Justice

4) Executive/Contemporaneous Construction ∙ While contemporaneous is not decisive for the courts, yet where a construction of statutes has been adopted by the legislative

department and accepted by the various agencies of the executive department, it is entitled to great respect. Where legislative intent and executive purpose is evident, it devolves upon the judiciary to give deferential attention to the attitude assumed by the other two branches of the government.

Navarro et al v Executive Secretary

4) Executive/Contemporaneous Construction ∙ It is well to remember that the LGC-IRR was formulated by the Oversight Committee consisting of members of both the Exec and Legis

departments. The IRR made amounts not only to an executive construction, entitled to great weight and respect from this Court, but to legislative construction as well, esp with the inclusion of representatives from the 4 leagues of local government units as members of the Oversight Committee

Philippine Global Communications,

Inc v Relova

4) Executive/Contemporaneous Construction ∙ The principle that the contemporaneous construction of a statute by the executive officers of the government, whose duty it is to

execute it, is entitled to great respect, and should ordinarily control the construction of the statute by the courts, is so firmly embedded in our jurisprudence that no authorities need be cited to support it.

∙ Additional: pari materia – when they relate to the same person or thing, or same class of persons or things, or same purpose or object o Statutes in pari materia should be construed together o Also said to be overlapping statutes

Escosura v San Miguel Brewery

Inc

5) Reference to other statutes ∙ “to pay” – normally construed to mean full payment based on several other laws ∙ Other statutes may be looked into to ascertain the legislative meaning behind the term being construed since it is assumed that they

use the terms similarly (except nalang siguro if technical term?)

US v De Guzman 6) Statutes borrowed from foreign jurisdictions ∙ In construing the statutes which the courts are called upon to administer and apply, judicial notice may be taken of their origin and

history, and of the facts which affect their derivation, validity and operation. ∙ For proper construction and application of the borrowed terms and provisions, it is proper and oftentimes essential to review their

legislative history and to find an authoritative guide for their interpretation and application in the decisions of the courts in those countries.

Week 10 Clerical Error

Lopez & Sons Inc v CTA

∙ Courts can correct clerical errors. ∙ It is not the letter but rather the spirit of the law and intention of the Legislature that is important and which matters. ∙ When the interpretation of the statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to absurdity or would contravene the clear

purposes of the Legislature, it should be construed accordingly to its spirit and reason ∙ Statutes may be extended to cover cases not within the literal meaning of the terms. ∙ Also, in this case, the clerical error is plain and obvious.

Construction of Conflicting Statutes/Conflicting Provisions

Gordon v Veridiano II

General Rule ∙ Courts of justice, when confronted with apparently conflicting statutes, should endeavour to reconcile the same instead of declaring

outright the invalidity of one against the other. Such alacrity should be avoided. The wise policy is for the judge to harmonize them if this is possible, bearing in mind that they are equally the handiwork of the same legislature, and so give effect to both while at the same time also according due respect to a coordinate department of the government. It is this policy that the court will apply in arriving at the interpretation of the laws above-cited and the conclusions that should follow therefrom.

Lopez Jr v CSC ∙ A special law prevails over a general law, regardless of their dates of passage. ∙ The special is to be considered as remaining an exception to the general.

PNB v Asuncion ∙ A substantive law cannot be amended by a procedural law. ∙ Sec 5 Art 10 of the Constitution says that rules of the SC should not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights.

PNB v Cruz ∙ Statutes of equal theoretical application or in equal standing like general laws – the one enacted in a later date must prevail being a later expression of the legislative will

People v Palma ∙ A general law cannot repeal a special law by mere implication.

∙ The repeal must be express and specific.

Bagatsing v Ramirez

∙ The fact that one is special and the other general creates a presumption that the special is to be considered as remaining an exception of the general, one as a general law of the land, the other as the law of a particular case. However, the rule readily yields to a situation where the special statute refers to a subject in general, which the general statute treats in particular. The exactly is the circumstance obtaining in the case at bar.

∙ Section 17 of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila speaks of "ordinance" in general, i.e., irrespective of the nature and scope thereof, whereas, Section 43 of the Local Tax Code relates to "ordinances levying or imposing taxes, fees or other charges" in particular. In regard, therefore, to ordinances in general, the Revised Charter of the City of Manila is doubtless dominant, but, that dominant force loses its continuity when it approaches the realm of "ordinances levying or imposing taxes, fees or other charges" in particular. There, the Local Tax Code controls.

∙ Here, as always, a general provision must give way to a particular provision. Special provision governs. This is especially true where the law containing the particular provision was enacted later than the one containing the general provision.

City of Manila v Teotico

∙ Special provision in a general law > general provision in a special law

Arenas v City of San Carlos

∙ The primary purpose of a proviso is to limit the general language of a statute. When there is irreconcilable repugnancy between the proviso and the body of the statute, the former is given precedence over the latter on the ground that it is the latest expression of the intent of the legislature.

∙ Proviso > body