[G.R. No.L-22526. November 29, 1966.]

[G.R. No.L-22526. November 29, 1966.]PEDRO PACIS, in his capacity as Acting Collector of Customs, Port of Manila, the Flag Officer-in-Command and the Base Commander of Cavite Naval Base, Philippine Navy,petitioners,vs.HON. ALBERTO V. AVERIA, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cavite, PROCESO P. SILANGCRUZ, Provincial Sheriff at Trece Martires City and EUSEBIO MARGES,respondents.SYLLABUS1.CERTIORARI; COURT CONFINED TO QUESTIONS OF JURISDICTION IN CERTIORARI PROCEEDINGS; FUNCTION OF WRIT. In a certiorari proceeding, the court is confined to questions of jurisdiction. (Tuason vs. Concepcion, 54 Phil., 408.) The reason is that the function of the writ of certiorari is to keep an inferior court within its jurisdiction. (Brillo vs. Buklatan, 87 Phil., 519.) It is available for such purpose and not to correct errors of procedure or mistakes in the judge's findings or conclusion. (Regala vs. Court of First Instance of Bulacan, 77 Phil., 684; Ong Sit vs. Piccio, 78 Phil., 785; Icutamin vs. Hernandez, 81 Phil. 161; Verhomal vs. Tan, 88 Phil., 389; Association of Beverages Employees vs. Figueras, 91 Phil., 450; Matute vs. Macadaeg, 99 Phil., 340.)2.TARIFF AND CUSTOMS LAWS; SEIZURE AND FORFEITURE PROCEEDINGS; JURISDICTION OF COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS. When the original jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance under Section 44(c) of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended byRepublic Act 3828, tends to encroach upon and to render futile, the jurisdiction of the Collector of Customs in seizure and forfeiture proceedings, the Court of First Instance should yield to the jurisdiction of the Collector of Customs, because the jurisdiction of the latter is provided for inRepublic Act 1937which took effect on July 1, 1957, much later than the Judiciary Act of 1948. It is axiomatic that a later law prevails over a prior statute. (Herman vs. Radio Corporation of the Philippines, 50 Phil. 490; Pampanga Sugar Mills vs. Trinidad, 279, U.S. 211, 73 L. ed. 665.) Moreover, it is reasonable to conclude that the legislators intended to divest the Court of First Instance of the prerogative to replevin a property which is a subject of a seizure and forfeiture proceedings for violation of theTariff and Customs Code. Otherwise, actions for forfeiture of property for violation of customs laws could easily be undermined by the simple device of replevin. Furthermore, Section 2303 of theTariff and Customs Codewhich requires the Collector of Customs to give to the owner of the property sought to be forfeited written notice of the seizure and to give him the opportunity to be heard in his defenses, clearly indicates the intention of the law to confine in the Bureau of Customs the determination of all questions affecting the disposal of property proceeded against in a seizure and forfeiture case. The judicial recourse of the property owner is not in the Court of First Instance but in the Court of Tax Appeals, and only after exhausting administrative remedies in the Bureau of Customs.3.CONTEMPT OF COURT; LIABILITY OF SHERIFF FOR FAILURE TO ENFORCE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY MANDATORY INJUNCTION; CASE AT BAR. Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, it cannot but be concluded that respondent Sheriff's failure to enforce the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issued by the Supreme Court, and his failure to make a return thereof for quite a time had in effect prevented the Court from taking possession of the vessel in question, thus directly interfering impeding or obstructing its processes. The respondent Sheriff's non-performance has resulted in the frustration of the mandates of the Supreme Court and the setback of the administration of Justice. The Court can not tolerate evasion of its commands by any omission, negligence, artifice or contrivance of any kind, nor would it countenance any disregard of its authority. It is essential to the effective administration of justice that the processes of the courts be obeyed. Upon no one else does this obligation of obedience rest with more binding force than a judicial officer such as respondent Sheriff. The said respondent is therefore liable for contempt punishable under Section 6 of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.D E C I S I O NBENGZON, J.P.,Jp:The success of the law enforcement agencies in curbing smuggling depends to some extent upon the cooperation of the other branches of the Government. Remove such cooperation and the campaign against smuggling is doomed, as concretely demonstrated in this case.On December 26, 1963 Coast Guard Cutter 115 of the Philippine Navy pursued a fishing boat bearing the name of M/B "Bukang Liwayway" off Ternate, Cavite. During the chase the fishing boat fired upon the navy cutter thus wounding two Philippine Navy sailors. Said fishing boat was boarded and found loaded with untaxed foreign made cigarettes, to wit:495casesUnion cigarettes1,385cartonsUnion cigarettes3,197packsUnion cigarettes88casesChesterfield cigarettes498cartonChesterfield cigarettes87casesSalem cigarettes799cartonsSalem cigarettes50cartonsWinston cigarettesThe cigarettes and the fishing boat were confiscated and turned over to the Flag officer in command of the Philippine naval base at Cavite City. On December 27, 1963 the cigarettes were delivered to the custody of the Bureau of Customs.On January 13, 1964 Pedro Pacis, acting Collector of Customs of Manila, commenced seizure and forfeiture proceedings pursuant to Title VI of theTariff and Customs Code(RepublicAct No. 1937) by issuing a warrant of seizure and detention against the cigarettes and M/B "Bukang Liwayway", docketed as Manila Seizure Identification Nos. 8009 and 8009-A. On the same day, Eusebio Marges, the alleged owner of M/B "Bukang Liwayway", filed Civil Case No. TM-114 in the Court of First Instance at Trece Martires City for replevin against the Flag officer of the Philippine Navy and others, alleging that said fishing boat was stolen on December 15, 1963 while moored at Caacao Bay, Cavite City; and that notice of loss was reported on December 16, 1963 to the Philippine Constabulary, Cavite City Police and the Collector of Customs of Manila.On January 14, 1964, before defendants filed their answer but after Marges posted a surety bond in the amount of P40,000.00, His Honor, Judge Alberto V. Averia, issued a writ of replevin commanding the provincial sheriff of Cavite at Trece Martires City to take immediate possession of the M/B "Bukang Liwayway", retain the same in his custody and keep it and/or dispose of it according to law. On the following day the provincial sheriff served the writ upon the commanding officer of the Philippine Naval base at Cavite City. The latter, however, refused to surrender custody over the vessel. On January 16, 1964, acting upon the sheriff's manifestation, the court ordered the arrest of the naval base commander for contempt of court. On the same day said base commander filed an urgent motion to lift writ of replevin and order of arrest.On January 20, 1964 the Republic of the Philippines, through the Bureau of Customs, filed a motion for intervention. Then on January 27, 1964 the Republic and defendant base commander filed a motion to dismiss the complaint and to lift the writ of replevin on the grounds that the Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction over the object in litigation (M/B "Bukang Liwayway"), the same being the subject of seizure proceedings in the Bureau of Customs; that the action for replevin was premature inasmuch as administrative remedies have not been exhausted; that a criminal action for smuggling was being prepared against Marges under which case M/B "Bukang Liwayway" would be liable for forfeiture, as an instrument of the crimes; and that the surety bond of P40,000.00 was insufficient. The Court denied the motion to lift writ of replevin on February 17, 1964 but ordered Marges to post an additional surety bond of P60,000.00.Marges posted the additional surety bond of P60,000.00 and on February 20, 1964 defendant Flag Officer of the Philippine Navy delivered the M/B "Bukang Liwayway" to Provincial Sheriff Proceso P. Silangcruz without the previous knowledge and consent of the Collector of Customs of Manila.Acting on the belief that the provincial sheriff was about to deliver M/B "Bukang Liwayway" to its owner, the Collector of Customs of Manila and the Commander of the Philippine Naval Base of Cavite City filed with this Court on February 29, 1964 the instant petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction.Not known however to the Customs and Philippine Navy authorities, Provincial Sheriff Proceso P. Silangcruz had delivered the M/B. "Bukang Liwayway" on February 25, 1964 to Eusebio Marges. On March 2, 1964, after the filing of the petition for certiorari in this Court, petitioners received an order dated February 21, 1964 of the lower court denying their motion to dismiss and to lift writ of replevin.On March 4, 1964 We required the respondents, Honorable Alberto V. Averia, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cavite, Proceso P. Silangcruz, Provincial Sheriff of Cavite, and Eusebio Marges, to answer the petition for certiorari, and at the same time granted, without bond, preliminary prohibitory mandatory injunction, enjoining the respondent Judge and Sheriff together with their agents from enforcing the writ of replevin of January 14, 1964 and order dated February 17, 1964; prohibiting them further from delivering the M/B "Bukang Liwayway" to Eusebio Marges; and commanding them to deliver said vessel to petitioners. Respondent Sheriff however manifested on March 17, 1964 that he had already delivered the vessel in question to its owner on February 25, 1964 after petitioners failed to object to the sufficiency of the surety bond filed by Eusebio Marges and after they failed to file a counterbond needed for the retention of the vessel.On April 22, 1964 this court issued another preliminary writ: Writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, commanding the Provincial Sheriff of Cavite to take possession again of M/B "Bukang Liwayway" and to keep the same under his custody until further orders from this Court. Respondent Sheriff received copy of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction on April 28, 1964. For more than one month said sheriff did not make a return of the writ. Not until the Solicitor General moved on June 3, 1964 to require respondent Sheriff to report to this Court whether or not he has complied with the aforesaid writ and, if so, to order him to allow petitioners and their agents to inspect the vessel in question but, if not, to require him to show causes why he may not be declared in contempt of court. When asked to comment on the Solicitor's motion, respondent Sheriff on June 11, 1964 returned the writ unsatisfied, stating that said writ was served upon Eusebio Marges, owner of M/B "Bukang Liwayway" on April 30, 1964 who informed him in writing that the vessel in question was on a fishing expedition; that Marges promised to surrender the same upon its return; and that despite diligent efforts said vessel could not be located.On July 22, 1964 this Court required respondent Sheriff to show cause why he should not be dealt with for contempt of court. Said Sheriff submitted his explanation on August 11, 1964 restating the allegations in his return filed with this Court on June 11, 1964. The Solicitor General filed his comment thereon on September 2, 1964 recommending that respondent Sheriff be declared in contempt of court.On the basis of respondent Sheriff's explanation and the comment of the Solicitor General this Court once more requiredsaid Sheriffto show cause within ten days why he should not be dealt with in contempt of court. In compliance, he manifested on September 25, 1964 the following: (1) On August 15, 1964 he caused to be served on, and delivered to, Eusebio Marges his letter dated August 13, 1964 which reads:"This is in connection with the Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction issued by the Hon. Supreme Court in G.R. No.L-22526, entitled 'Pedro Pacis, et al. vs. Hon. Alberto V. Averia, et al.', requiring the undersigned Provincial Sheriff to take possession of the motor boat, 'M/B BUKANG LIWAYWAY,' which writ was served upon you on April 30, 1964."Please inform the undersigned whether the said motor boat which you alleged had been on fishing expedition has already arrived inasmuch as more than three (3) months have already elapsed since the writ was served upon you, and in the event that the motor boat is still in the fishing expedition, you are hereby required to contact forthwith the crew members thereof and direct them to proceed home immediately, in order that the writ issued by the Hon. Supreme Court may be complied with."(2)Eusebio Marges replied by letter dated August 24, 1964, to wit:"I would like to inform you that the M/B BUKANG LIWAYWAY was due to arrive last week, but up to the present I have not heard of its whereabouts. I am afraid that the said boat might be lost due to several typhoons."Assistance of the Philippine Constabulary Commander of Cavite was asked to locate the whereabouts of said motor boat, as per copy of the letter hereto attached."Please be rest assured that I will not hesitate to surrender the said boat to you as soon as it is located."Marges' letter to the Provincial Commander of Cavite states:"My fishing boat, M/B BUKANG LIWAYWAY was due to arrive from Palawan last Thursday morning August 6, 1964, but up to the present, it has not arrived at our place at Rosario, Cavite."I am afraid that due to the storm 'Senyang', my said boat might have been caught by said storm on its way home, so please help us locate my boat for the safety of the eight (8) crew members on board the boat."I have sent similar request to the Provincial Commanders of Mindoro, Batangas and Bataan asking their help in locating my boat as well as my crew members. Please inform me of any development."(3)On September 1, 1964 respondent Sheriff sent the following communication to the Provincial Commander of the Philippine Constabulary in Cavite:"I am in receipt of a letter of Mr. Eusebio Marges dated August 24, 1964 regarding the motor boat M/B BUKANG LIWAYWAY', copy of which is hereto attached."Please inform the undersigned as to what action or step your command has taken on the request of Mr. Marges."to which the Provincial Commander made the following reply:"Respectfully returned to Mr. Proceso P. Silangcruz, Provincial Sheriff of Cavite, Trece Martires City, the herein attached true copy of the original communication with the information that all shoreline troops detailed to look for the M/B 'Bukang Liwayway' failed to locate the same."No definite information has as yet been obtained as to the whereabouts of the boat, hence, this Command is still in the process of looking for it."Rest assured that whatever progress made of the search will be sent to the Office."(4)Again respondent Sheriff addressed a letter dated September 15, 1964 to the Cavite Provincial Commander in the following tenor:"Relative your 1st Indorsement dated September 4, 1964, assuring this office that further information will be furnished regarding the motor boat M/B 'Bukang Liwayway', please inform the undersigned of whatever progress your command has made on the subject matter in view of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued by the Honorable Court."(5)On September 11 and 16, 1964 respondent Sheriff telegrammed the PC Provincial Commanders of Batangas, Palawan, Mindoro and Butuan requesting their help to locate the M/B "Bukang Liwayway" but he has not received any answer thereto.Treating the motion of the Solicitor General dated June 3, 1964 as a written charge for contempt against Provincial Sheriff Proceso P. Silangcruz and the latter's comment thereto as his answer, this Court set the contempt incident for hearing on September 21, 1966. Only the counsel for Provincial Sheriff Proceso P. Silangcruz appeared.Up to now respondent Provincial Sheriff has not taken custody of the motor boat in question.The issues are:1.Whether or not petitioners could elevate the case at bar to this Court on a petition for certiorari.2.Whether or not the owner of M/B "Bukang Liwayway" could recover possession of the same by way of a civil case with replevin; and3.Whether or not Provincial Sheriff Proceso P. Silangcruz may be adjudged in contempt of the Supreme Court for failure to comply with the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issued in this case on April 22, 1964.The first issue is on the availability of the remedy of certiorari with preliminary injunction. It is pressed that the order of the lower court dated February 17, 1964 denying the motion to dismiss and to lift the writ of replevin is an interlocutory order, hence not appealable.It should be remembered that the case before Us is not an appeal. It is a special civil action of certiorari under Section 1 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to annul the aforesaid order for having been rendered without or in excess of the lower court's jurisdiction. The points of inquiry therefore should be on whether or not the respondent court acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction and whether or not there is an appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.The pertinent provision of the Rules of Court reads:1"Section 1.Petition for certiorari When any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions, has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings, as the law requires, of such tribunal, board or officers."In acertiorariproceeding under the above-quoted rule, the court is confined to questions of jurisdiction.2The reason is that the function of the writ of certiorari is to keep an inferior court within its jurisdiction.3It is available for such purpose and not to correct errors of procedure or mistakes in the judge's findings or conclusion.4Precisely, in this case, petitioners are assailing the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Cavite to issue the order of February 17, 1964.The parties have not put in controversy the non-availability of appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Appeal is not open to them for We have already set at course the ruling that denial of a motion to dismiss a complaint does not entitle a party whose motion is denied to forthwith appeal therefrom.5Respondents have pointed out however that petitioners failed to allege such fact in their petition for certiorari. Aside from the fact that the absence of appeal and similar ordinary remedies is patent from the petition's allegations the defect, if any, has been cured by the allegation in paragraph 17 of the supplemental petition expressly stating the same.Certiorari was therefore properly brought.We now come to the propriety of the filing of Civil Case No. TM- 114 in the Court of First Instance of Cavite for the purpose of recovering possession of MB "Bukang Liwayway" which was then held in detention by the Philippine Navy in the Cavite Naval base for the Bureau of Customs which instituted seizure and forfeiture proceedings (Seizure Identification Nos. 8009 & 8009-A) against it.At issue is the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Cavite to entertain Civil Case No. TM-114, and the existence of therein plaintiff's cause of action.Petitioners would contend that the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs to conduct seizure and forfeiture proceedings of vessels for violation of theTariff and Customs Codeis exclusive of the Courts of First Instance. They would further maintain that the issuance of a writ of replevin, as what actually transpired in this case, will prevent the Bureau of Customs from further proceeding with the seizure and forfeiture for allegedly under Section 2531 of theTariff and Customs Code, forfeiture could be effected only when and while the thing subject to forfeiture is in the custody of the Bureau of Customs.TheTariff and Customs Code, in Section 2530 thereof, lists the kinds of property subject to forfeiture. At the same time, in Part 2 of Title VI thereof, it provides for the procedure in seizure and forfeiture cases and vests in the Collector of Customs the authority to hear and decide said cases.6The Collector's decision is appealable to the Commissioner of Customs7whose decision is in turn appealable to the Court of Tax Appeals.8An aggrieved party may appeal from a judgment of the Court of Tax Appeals directly to this Court.9On the other hand, Section 44 (c) of the Judiciary Act of 194810lodges in the Court of First Instance original jurisdiction in all cases in which the value of the property in controversy amounts to more than ten thousand pesos. This original jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, when exercised in an action for recovery of personal property which is a subject of a forfeiture proceeding in the Bureau of Customs, tends to encroach upon, and to render futile, the jurisdiction of the Collector of Customs in seizure and forfeiture proceedings. This is precisely what took place in this case. The seizure and forfeiture proceedings against the M/B "Bukang Liwayway" before the Collector of Customs of Manila was stifled by the issuance of a writ of replevin by the Court of First Instance of Cavite.Should Section 44(c) of the Judiciary Act of 1948 give way to the provisions of theTariff and Customs Code, or vice versa? In Our opinion, in this particular case, the Court of First Instance should yield to the jurisdiction of the Collector of Customs. The jurisdiction of the Collector of Customs is provided for inRepublic Act 1937which took effect on July 1, 1957, much later than the Judiciary Act of 1948. It is axiomatic that a later law prevails over a prior statute.11Moreover, on grounds of public policy, it is more reasonable to conclude that the legislators intended to divest the Court of First Instance of the prerogative to replevin a property which is a subject of a seizure and forfeiture proceedings for violation of theTariff and Customs Code. Otherwise, actions for forfeiture of property for violation of Customs laws could easily be undermined by the simple device of replevin.Furthermore, Section 2303 of theTariff and Customs Coderequires the Collector of Customs to give to the owner of the property sought to be forfeited written notice of the seizure and to give him the opportunity to be heard in his defense. This provision clearly indicates the intention of the law to confine in the Bureau of Customs the determination of all questions affecting the disposal of property proceeded against in a seizure and forfeiture case. The judicial recourse of the property owner is not in the Court of First Instance but in the Court of Tax Appeals, and only after exhausting administrative remedies in the Bureau of Customs.We come to the last question whether or not respondent Provincial Sheriff Proceso P. Silangcruz is in contempt of this Court for failure to comply with the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issued by this Court on April 22, 1964.The writ of preliminary mandatory injunction was received by respondent Provincial Sheriff Proceso P. Silangcruz on April 28, 1964. Thenceforth, nothing was heard of the writ nor from said Sheriff. Only after June 3, 1964 when the Solicitor General filed a motion charging him of contempt of court for non-compliance with the writ did Provincial Sheriff Proceso P. Silangcruz oblige himself to make a return of the writ, informing Us that he could not enforce the same because the subject vessel was out on a fishing expedition. For this undue delay in making a return on the writ, respondent Sheriff offered no explanation.Such conduct of Sheriff Silangcruz is a far cry from his behavior on January 16, 1964 when he made not merely a return of the writ of replevin but a manifestation before the Court of First Instance of Cavite ONE DAY after he served the same advising said court of the refusal of the Philippine Navy Commander to obey it and praying for the arrest of said Commander for contempt of court. It is also a great contrast from his excellent efficiency in delivering the subject vessel to its owner notwithstanding the absence of an express order from the court and one day earlier than the time provided for in the Rules of Court. On those two occasions he was in the process of obtaining possession for the vessel's owner. Incidentally, and of course We fully comprehend the situation, the writ issued by this Court would deprive the alleged boat owner of possession over the boat, thus putting to naught respondent Sheriff's previous efforts.The more than one month's time when the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction stayed frozen in the hands of Sheriff Silangcruz made it possible for interested parties to whisk the boat in question from the reach of the law. The boat allegedly disappeared and the respondent Sheriff together with the alleged boat owner conveniently put the blame for its alleged disappearance on typhoon Senyang. They insinuate that M/B "Bukang Liwayway" was sunk or wrecked on its way from Palawan to Cavite by said typhoon. Probably, Sheriff Silangcruz and boat owner Marges were misinformed about typhoon Senyang. The official reports of the Weather Bureau,12considered as within judicial notice, do not indicate that said typhoon affected Palawan and Cavite. On August 5, 1964 said typhoon was in the Pacific Ocean, 690 miles East of Manila. On August 6, 1964 it was 670 miles East Southeast of Casiguran, Quezon. On August 7, typhoon Senyang hit Southern Luzon causing heavy rains to fall in the Manila-Cavite area but it turned North to Cagayan Province and the Batanes. Then it blew towards the China Sea, Hongkong and the Gulf of Tongkin. Very prominent, however, is the report of Col. Segundo L. Gazmin, II PC Zone Commander about one fishing boat (from Cavite) missing carrying 20 crew members. The M/B "Bukang Liwayway" had only eight crew members on board. Undoubtedly, the missing boat could not have been the M/B "Bukang Liwayway."One more thing. It has caught our notice, especially because the Solicitor General called our attention, that respondent Sheriff has practically taken the cudgels for boat owner Eusebio Marges in this proceeding for certiorari. In his answers to the petition for certiorari and to the supplemental petition, he went beyond justifying his official acts and proceeded to espouse the cause of the boat owner thereby giving the impression that his interest in the case and in the subject matter of this litigation is more than just the interest of a public official complying with his duties as such.On the foregoing premises, We are constrained to conclude that respondent Sheriff's failure to enforce the writ and his failure to make a return thereof for quite a time had in effect prevented this Court from taking possession of M/B "Bukang Liwayway", thus directly interfering, impeding or obstructing the processes of this Court. The respondent Sheriff's non-performance has resulted in the frustration of the mandates of this Court and the setback of the administration of justice. This Court can not tolerate evasion of its commands, by any omission, negligence, artifice or contrivance of any kind, nor would it countenance any disregard of its authority. For it is essential to the effective administration of justice that the processes of the courts be obeyed. And upon no one does this obligation of obedience rest with more binding force than a judicial officer such as respondent Sheriff.13We therefore find and declare Provincial Sheriff Proceso P. Silangcruz guilty of contempt of the Supreme Court punishable under Section 6 of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted. The writ of replevin issued on January 14, 1964 and the order issued on February 17, 1964 by the Court of First Instance of Cavite are hereby declared null and void. The mandatory injunction of April 22, 1964 to deliver the Boat M/B "Bukang Liwayway" is hereby reiterated.Respondent Sheriff of Cavite, Proceso P. Silangcruz, is hereby declared in contempt of the Supreme Court, and considering all attendant circumstances, sentenced to imprisonment of six months and to pay a fine of P1,000.00. No pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.|||(Pacis v. Averia, G.R. No. L-22526, [November 29, 1966], 124 PHIL 1541-1556) [G.R. No.81552. May 28, 1990.]DIONISIO FIESTAN and JUANITA ARCONADO,petitioners,vs.COURT OF APPEALS; DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, LAOAG CITY BRANCH; PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, VIGAN BRANCH, ILOCOS SUR; FRANCISCO PERIA; and REGISTER OF DEEDS OF ILOCOS SUR,respondents.D E C I S I O NFERNAN,C.Jp:In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners spouses Dionisio Fiestan and Juanita Arconada, owners of a parcel of land (Lot No. 2-B) situated in Ilocos Sur covered by TCT T-13218 which they mortgaged to the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) as security for their P22,400.00 loan, seek the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals1dated June 5, 1987 affirming the dismissal of their complaint filed against the Development Bank of the Philippines, Laoag City Branch, Philippine National Bank, Vigan Branch, Ilocos Sur, Francisco Peria and the Register of Deeds of Ilocos Sur, for annulment of sale, mortgage, and cancellation of transfer certificates of title.Records show that Lot No. 2-B was acquired by the DBP as the highest bidder at a public auction sale on August 6, 1979 after it was extrajudicially foreclosed by the DBP in accordance withAct No. 3135, as amended byAct No. 4118, for failure of petitioners to pay their mortgage indebtedness. A certificate of sale was subsequently issued by the Provincial Sheriff of Ilocos Sur on the same day and the same was registered on September 28, 1979 in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Ilocos Sur. Earlier, or on September 26, 1979, petitioners executed a Deed of Sale in favor of DBP which was likewise registered on September 28, 1979.Upon failure of petitioners to redeem the property within the one (1) year period which expired on September 28, 1980, petitioners' TCT T-13218 over Lot No. 2-B was cancelled by the Register of Deeds and in lieu thereof TCT T-19077 was issued to the DBP upon presentation of a duly executed affidavit of consolidation of ownership.On April 13, 1982, the DBP sold the lot to Francisco Peria in a Deed of Absolute Sale and the same was registered on April 15, 1982 in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Ilocos Sur. Subsequently, the DBP's title over the lot was cancelled and in lieu thereof TCT T-19229 was issued to Francisco Peria.After title over said lot was issued in his name, Francisco Peria secured a tax declaration for said lot and accordingly paid the taxes due thereon. He thereafter mortgaged said lot to the PNB-Vigan Branch as security for his loan of P115,000.00 as required by the bank to increase his original loan from P49,000.00 to P66,000.00 until it finally reached the approved amount of P115,000.00. Since petitioners were still in possession of Lot No. 2-B, the Provincial Sheriff ordered them to vacate the premises.On the other hand, petitioners filed on August 23, 1982 a complaint for annulment of sale, mortgage and cancellation of transfer certificates of title against the DBP-Laoag City, PNB-Vigan Branch, Ilocos Sur, Francisco Peria and the Register of Deeds of Ilocos Sur, docketed as Civil Case No. 3447-V before the Regional Trial Court of Vigan, Ilocos Sur.After trial, the RTC of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, Branch 20, rendered its decision2on November 14, 1983 dismissing the complaint, declaring therein, as valid the extrajudicial foreclosure sale of the mortgaged property in favor of the DBP as highest bidder in the public auction sale held on August 6, 1979, and its subsequent sale by DBP to Francisco Peria as well as the real estate mortgage constituted thereon in favor of PNB-Vigan as security for the P115,000.00 loan of Francisco Peria.The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC of Vigan, Ilocos Sur on June 20, 1987.The motion for reconsideration having been denied3on January 19, 1988, petitioners filed the instant petition for review on certiorari with this Court.Petitioners seek to annul the extrajudicial foreclosure sale of the mortgaged property on August 6, 1979 in favor of the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) on the ground that it was conducted by the Provincial Sheriff of Ilocos Sur without first effecting a levy on said property before selling the same at the public auction sale. Petitioners thus maintained that the extrajudicial foreclosure sale being null and void by virtue of lack of a valid levy, the certificate of sale issued by the Provincial Sheriff cannot transfer ownership over the lot in question to the DBP and consequently the deed of sale executed by the DBP in favor of Francisco Peria and the real estate mortgage constituted thereon by the latter in favor of PNB-Vigan Branch are likewise null and void.The Court finds these contentions untenable.The formalities of a levy, as an essential requisite of a valid execution sale under Section 15 of Rule 39 and a valid attachment lien underRule 57 of the Rules of Court, are not basic requirements before an extrajudicially foreclosed property can be sold at public auction. At the outset, distinction should be made of the three different kinds of sales under the law, namely: an ordinary execution sale, a judicial foreclosure sale, and an extrajudicial foreclosure sale, because a different set of law applies to each class of sale mentioned. An ordinary execution sale is governed by the pertinent provisions of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.Rule 68 of the Rules of Court applies in cases of judicial foreclosure sale. On the other hand,Act No. 3135, as amended byAct No. 4118otherwise known as "An Act to Regulate the Sale of Property under Special Powers Inserted in or Annexed to Real Estate Mortgages" applies in cases of extrajudicial foreclosure sale.The case at bar, as the facts disclose, involves am extrajudicial foreclosure sale. The public auction sale conducted on August 6, 1979 by the Provincial Sheriff of Ilocos Sur refers to the "sale" mentioned inSection 1 ofAct No. 3135, as amended, which was made pursuant to a special power inserted in or attached to a real estate mortgage made as security for the payment of money or the fulfillment of any other obligation. It must be noted that in the mortgage contract, petitioners, as mortgagor, had appointed private respondent DBP, for the purpose of extrajudicial foreclosure, "as his attorney-in-fact to sell the property mortgaged underAct No. 3135, as amended, to sign all documents and perform any act requisite and necessary to accomplish said purpose . . . . In case of foreclosure, the Mortgagor hereby consents to the appointment of the mortgagee or any of its employees as receiver, without any bond, to take charge of the mortgaged property at once, and to hold possession of the same . . . ."4There is no justifiable basis, therefore, to apply by analogy the provisions of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court on ordinary execution sale, particularly Section 15 thereof as well as the jurisprudence under said provision, to an extrajudicial foreclosure sale conducted under the provisions ofAct No. 3135, as amended.Act No. 3135, as amended, being a special law governing extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings, the same must govern as against the provisions on ordinary execution sale under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.In that sense, the case ofAparri v. Court of Appeals, 13 SCRA 611 (1965), cited by petitioners, must be distinguished from the instant case. On the question of what should be done in the event the highest bid made for the property at the extrajudicial foreclosure sale is in excess of the mortgage debt, this Court applied the rule and practice in a judicial foreclosure sale to an extrajudicial foreclosure sale in a similar case considering that the governing provisions of law as mandated bySection 6 ofAct No. 3135, as amended, specificallySections 29, 30 and 34 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court (previously Sections 464, 465 and 466 of the Code of Civil Procedure) are silent on the matter. The said ruling cannot, however, be construed as the legal basis for applying the requirement of a levy under Section 15 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court before an extrajudicially foreclosed property can be sold at public auction when none is expressly required underAct No. 3135, as amended.Levy, as understood underSection 15, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court in relation to execution of money judgments, has been defined by this Court as the act whereby a sheriff sets apart or appropriates for the purpose of satisfying the command of the writ, a part or the whole of the judgment-debtor's property.5In extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage, the property sought to be foreclosed need not be identified or set apart by the sheriff from the whole mass of property of the mortgagor for the purpose of satisfying the mortgage indebtedness. For, the essence of a contract of mortgage indebtedness is that a property has been identified or set apart from the mass of the property of the debtor-mortgagor as security for the payment of money or the fulfillment of an obligation to answer the amount of indebtedness, in case of default of payment. By virtue of the special power inserted or attached to the mortgage contract, the mortgagor has authorized the mortgagee-creditor or any other person authorized to act for him to sell said property in accordance with the formalities required underAct No. 3135, as amended.The Court finds that the formalities prescribed underSections 2, 3 and 4 ofAct No. 3135, as amended, were substantially complied with in the instant case. Records show that the notices of sale were posted by the Provincial Sheriff of Ilocos Sur and the same were published in Ilocos Times, a newspaper of general circulation in the province of Ilocos Sur, setting the date of the auction sale on August 6, 1979 at 10:00 a.m. in the Office of the Sheriff, Vigan, Ilocos Sur.6The nullity of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale in the instant case is further sought by petitioners on the ground that the DBP cannot acquire by purchase the mortgaged property at the public auction sale by virtue of par. (2) of Article 1491 and par. (7) of Article 1409 of theCivil Codewhich prohibits agents from acquiring by purchase, even at a public or judicial auction either in person or through the mediation of another, the property whose administration or sale may have been entrusted to them unless the consent of the principal has been given.The contention is erroneous.The prohibition mandated bypar. (2) of Article 1491 in relation to Article 1409 of theCivil Codedoes not apply in the instant case where the sale of the property in dispute was made under a special power inserted in or attached to the real estate mortgage pursuant toAct No. 3135, as amended. It is a familiar rule of statutory construction that, as between a specific statute and general statute, the former must prevail since it evinces the legislative intent more clearly than a general statute does.7TheCivil Code(R.A. 386) is of general character whileAct No. 3135as amended, is a special enactment and therefore the latter must prevail.8UnderAct No. 3135, as amended, a mortgagee-creditor is allowed to participate in the bidding and purchase under the same conditions as any other bidder, as in the case at bar, thus:"Section 5.At any sale, the creditor, trustee, or other person authorized to act for the creditor, may participate in the bidding and purchase under the same conditions as any other bidder, unless the contrary has been expressly provided in the mortgage or trust deed under which the sale is made."In other words, Section 5 ofAct No. 3135, as amended, creates and is designed to create an exception to the general rule that a mortgagee or trustee in a mortgage or deed of trust which contains a power of sale on default may not become the purchaser, either directly or through the agency of a third person, at a sale which he himself makes under the power. Under such an exception, the title of the mortgagee-creditor over the property cannot be impeached or defeated on the ground that the mortgagee cannot be a purchaser at his own sale.Needless to state, the power to foreclose is not an ordinary agency that contemplates exclusively the representation of the principal by the agent but is primarily an authority conferred upon the mortgagee for the latter's own protection. It is an ancillary stipulation supported by the same cause or consideration for the mortgage and forms an essential and inseparable part of that bilateral agreement.9Even in the absence of statutory provision, there is authority to hold that a mortgagee may purchase at a sale under his mortgage to protect his own interest or to avoid a loss to himself by a sale to a third person at a price below the mortgage debt.10The express mandate of Section 5 ofAct No. 3135, as amended, amply protects the interest of the mortgagee in this jurisdiction.WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit and the decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 20, 1987 is hereby AFFIRMED. No cost.SO ORDERED.|||(Fiestan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 81552, [May 28, 1990], 264 PHIL 364-374) [G.R. No. L-41631. December 17, 1976.]HON. RAMON D.BAGATSING, as Mayor of the City of Manila; ROMAN G. GARGANTIEL, as Secretary to the Mayor; THE MARKET ADMINISTRATOR; and THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF MANILA,petitioners,vs.HON. PEDRO A.RAMIREZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXX and the FEDERATION OF MANILA MARKET VENDORS, INC.,respondents.D E C I S I O NMARTIN,Jp:The chief question to be decided in this case is what law shall govern the publication of a tax ordinance enacted by the Municipal Board of Manila, the Revised City Charter (R.A. 409, as amended), which requires publication of the ordinance before its enactment and after its approval, or theLocal Tax Code(P.D. No. 231), which only demands publication after approval.cdOn June 12, 1974, the Municipal Board of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 7522, "AN ORDINANCE REGULATING THE OPERATION OF PUBLIC MARKETS AND PRESCRIBING FEES FOR THE RENTALS OF STALLS AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES." The petitioner City Mayor, Ramon D.Bagatsing, approved the ordinance on June 15, 1974.On February 17, 1975, respondent Federation of Manila Market Vendors, Inc. commenced Civil Case 96787 before the Court of First Instance of Manila, presided over by respondent Judge, seeking the declaration of nullity of Ordinance No. 7522 for the reason that (a) the publication requirement under the Revised Charter of the City of Manila has not been complied with; (b) the Market Committee was not given any participation in the enactment of the ordinance, as envisioned byRepublic Act 6039; (c) Section 3 (e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act has been violated; and (d) the ordinance would violatePresidential Decree No. 7of September 30, 1972 prescribing the collection of fees and charges on livestock and animal products.prLLResolving the accompanying prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, respondent Judge issued an order on March 1, 1975, denying the plea for failure of the respondent Federation of Manila Market Vendors, Inc. to exhaust the administrative remedies outlined in theLocal Tax Code.After due hearing on the merits, respondent Judge rendered its decision on August 29, 1975, declaring the nullity of Ordinance No. 7522 of the City of Manila on the primary ground of non-compliance with the requirement of publication under the Revised City Charter. Respondent Judge ruled:"There is, therefore, no question that the ordinance in question was not published at all in two daily newspapers of general circulation in the City of Manila before its enactment. Neither was it published in the same manner after approval, although it was posted in the legislative hall and in all city public markets and city public libraries. There being no compliance with the mandatory requirement of publication before and after approval, the ordinance in question is invalid and, therefore, null and void."Petitioners moved for reconsideration of the adverse decision, stressing that (a) only a post-publication is required by theLocal Tax Code; and (b) private respondent failed to exhaust all administrative remedies before instituting an action in court.On September 26, 1975, respondent Judge denied the motion.Forthwith, petitioners brought the matter to Us through the present petition for review on certiorari.We find the petition impressed with merits.1.Thenexusof the present controversy is the apparent conflict between the Revised Charter of the City of Manila and theLocal Tax Codeon the manner of publishing a tax ordinance enacted by the Municipal Board of Manila. For, while Section 17 of the Revised Charter provides:"Each proposed ordinanceshall be published in two daily newspapers of general circulation in the city, and shall not be discussed or enacted by the Board until after the third day following such publication. . . .Each approved ordinance. . . shall be published in two daily newspapers of general circulation in the city, within ten days after its approval; and shall take effect and be in force on and after the twentieth day following its publication, if no date is fixed in the ordinance."Section 43 of theLocal Tax Codedirects:"Within ten daysafter their approval, certified true copies of all provincial, city, municipal and barrioordinances levying or imposing taxes, fees or other chargesshall be published for three consecutive days in a newspaper or publication widely circulated within the jurisdiction of the local government, or posted in the local legislative hall or premises and in two other conspicuous places within the territorial jurisdiction of the local government. In either case, copies of all provincial, city, municipal and barrio ordinances shall be furnished the treasurers of the respective component and mother units of a local government for dissemination."In other words, while the Revised Charter of the City of Manila requires publicationbeforethe enactment of the ordinanceand afterthe approval thereof in two daily newspapers of general circulation in the city, theLocal Tax Codeonly prescribes for publication after the approval of "ordinances levying or imposing taxes, fees or other charges" either in a newspaper or publication widely circulated within the jurisdiction of the local government or by posting the ordinance in the local legislative hall or premises and in two other conspicuous places within the territorial jurisdiction of the local government. Petitioners' compliance with theLocal Tax Coderather than with the Revised Charter of the City spawned this litigation.There is no question that the Revised Charter of the City of Manila is aspecial actsince it relates only to the City of Manila, whereas theLocal Tax Codeis ageneral lawbecause it applies universally to all local governments. Blackstone defines general law as a universal rule affecting the entire community and special law as one relating to particular persons or things of a class.1And the rule commonly said is that a prior special law is not ordinarily repealed by a subsequent general law. The fact that one is special and the other general creates a presumption that the special is to be considered as remaining an exception of the general, one as a general law of the land, the other as the law of a particular case.2However, the rule readily yields to a situation where the special statute refers to a subject in general, which the general statute treatsin particular. The exactly is the circumstance obtaining in the case at bar. Section 17 of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila speaks of "ordinance" in general, i.e., irrespective of the nature and scope thereof,whereas, Section 43 of theLocal Tax Coderelates to "ordinances levying or imposing taxes, fees or other charges" in particular. In regard, therefore, to ordinances in general, the Revised Charter of the City of Manila is doubtless dominant, but, that dominant force loses its continuity when it approaches the realm of "ordinances levying or imposing taxes, fees or other charges" in particular. There, theLocal Tax Codecontrols. Here, as always, a general provision must give way to a particular provision.3Special provision governs.4This is especially true where the law containing the particular provision was enacted later than the one containing the general provision. The City Charter of Manila was promulgated on June 18, 1949 as against theLocal Tax Codewhich was decreed on June 1, 1973. The law-making power cannot be said to have intended the establishment of conflicting and hostile systems upon the same subject, or to leave in force provisions of a prior law by which the new will of the legislating power may be thwarted and overthrown. Such a result would render legislation a useless and idle ceremony, and subject the law to the reproach of uncertainty and unintelligibility.5The case ofCity of Manilav.Teotico6is opposite. In that case, Teotico sued the City of Manila for damages arising from the injuries he suffered when he fell inside an uncovered and unlighted catchbasin or manhole on P. Burgos Avenue. The City of Manila denied liability on the basis of the City Charter (R.A. 409) exempting the City of Manila from any liability for damages or injury to persons or property arising from the failure of the city officers to enforce the provisions of the charter or any other law or ordinance, or from negligence of the City Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce the provisions of the charter or of any other law or ordinance. Upon the other hand, Article 2189 of the Civil Code makes cities liable for damages for the death of, or injury suffered by any persons by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision. On review, the Court held the Civil Code controlling. It is true that, insofar as its territorial application is concerned, the Revised City Charter is a special law and the subject matter of the two laws, the Revised City Charter establishesa general ruleof liability arising from negligence in general, regardless of the object thereof, whereas the Civil Code constitutes aparticular prescriptionfor liability due to defective streets in particular. In the same manner, the Revised Charter of the City prescribes a rule for the publication of "ordinance"in general, while theLocal Tax Codeestablishes a rule for the publication of "ordinance levying or imposing taxes fees or other chargesin particular.In fact, there is no rule which prohibits the repeal even by implication of a special or specific act by a general or broad one.7A charter provision may be impliedly modified or superseded by a later statute, and where a statute is controlling, it must be read into the charter notwithstanding any particular charter provision.8A subsequent general law similarly applicable to all cities prevails over any conflicting charter provision, for the reason that a charter must not be inconsistent with the general laws and public policy of the state.9A chartered city is not an independent sovereignty. The state remains supreme in all matters not purely local. Otherwise stated, a charter must yield to the constitution and general laws of the state, it is to have read into it that general law which governs the municipal corporation and which the corporation cannot set aside but to which it must yield. When a city adopts a charter, it in effect adopts as part of its charter general law of such character.102.The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is strongly asserted by petitioners as having been violated by private respondent in bringing a direct suit in court. This is because Section 47 of theLocal Tax Codeprovides that any question or issue raised against the legality of any tax ordinance, or portion thereof, shall be referred for opinion to the city fiscal in the case of tax ordinance of a city. The opinion of the city fiscal is appealable to the Secretary of Justice, whose decision shall be final and executory unless contested before a competent court within thirty (30) days. But, the petition below plainly shows that the controversy between the parties is deeply rooted in a pure question of law: whether it is the Revised Charter of the City of Manila or theLocal Tax Codethat should govern the publication of the tax ordinance. In other words, the dispute is sharply focused on the applicability of the Revised City Charter or theLocal Tax Codeon the point at issue, andnoton the legality of the imposition of the tax. Exhaustion of administrative remedies before resort to judicial bodies is not an absolute rule. It admits of exceptions. Where the question litigated upon is purely a legal one, the rule does not apply.11The principle may also be disregarded when it does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy. It may and should be relaxed when its application may cause great and irreparable damage.123.It is maintained by private respondent that the subject ordinance is not a "tax ordinance," because the imposition of rentals, permit fees, tolls and other fees is not strictly a taxing power but a revenue-raising function, so that the procedure for publication under theLocal Tax Codefinds no application. The pretense bears its own marks of fallacy. Precisely, the raising of revenues is theprincipalobject of taxation. Under Section 5, Article XI of the New Constitution, "Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own sources of revenue and to levy taxes, subject to such provisions as may be provided by law."13And one of those sources of revenue is what theLocal Tax Codepoints to in particular: "Local governments may collect fees or rentals for the occupancy or use of public markets and premises . . ."14They can provide for and regulate market stands, stalls and privileges, and, also, the sale, lease or occupancy thereof. They can license, or permit the use of, lease, sell or otherwise dispose of stands, stalls or marketing privileges.15It is a feeble attempt to argue that the ordinance violatesPresidential Decree No. 7, dated September 30, 1972, insofar as it affects livestock and animal products, because the said decree prescribes the collection of other fees and charges thereon "with the exception of ante-mortem and post-mortem inspection fees, as well as the delivery, stockyard and slaughter fees as may be authorized by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources."16Clearly, even the exception clause of the decree itself permits the collection of the proper fees for livestock. And theLocal Tax Code(P.D. 231, July 1, 1973) authorizes in its Section 31: "Local governments may collect fees for the slaughter of animals and the use of corrals . . ."4.The non-participation of the Market Committee in the enactment of Ordinance No. 7522 supposedly in accordance withRepublic Act No. 6039, an amendment to the City Charter of Manila, providing that "the market committee shall formulate, recommend and adopt,subject to the ratification of the municipal board, and approval of the mayor, policies and rules or regulation repealing or maneding existing provisions of the market code" does not infect the ordinance with any germ of invalidity.17The function of the committee is purely recommendatory as the underscored phrase suggests, its recommendation is without binding effect on the Municipal Board and the City Mayor. Its prior acquiescence of an intended or proposed city ordinance is not a conditionsine qua nonbefore the Municipal Board could enact such ordinance. Thenative powerof the Municipal Board to legislate remains undisturbed even in the slightest degree. It can move in its own initiative and the Market Committee cannot demur. At most, the Market Committee may serve as a legislative aide of the Municipal Board in the enactment of city ordinances affecting the city markets or, in plain words, in the gathering of the necessary data, studies and the collection of consensus for the proposal of ordinances regarding city markets. Much less could it be said thatRepublic Act 6039intended to delegate to the Market Committee the adoption of regulatory measures for the operation and administration of the city markets.Potestas delegata non delegare potest.5.Private respondent bewails that the market stall fees imposed in the disputed ordinance are diverted to the exclusive private use of the Asiatic Integrated Corporation since the collection of said fees had been let by the City of Manila to the said corporation in a "Management and Operating Contract." The assumption is of course saddled on erroneous premise. The fees collected do not go direct to the private coffers of the corporation. Ordinance No. 7522 was not made for the corporation but for the purpose of raising revenues for the city. That is the object it serves. The entrusting of the collection of the fees does not destroy the public purpose of the ordinance. So long as the purpose is public, it does not matter whether the agency through which the money is dispensed is public or private. The right to tax depends upon the ultimate use, purpose and object for which the fund is raised. It is not dependent on the nature or character of the person or corporation whose intermediate agency is to be used in applying it. The people may be taxed for a public purpose, although it be under the direction of an individual or private corporation.18Nor can the ordinance be stricken down as violative of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act because the increased rates of market stall fees as levied by the ordinance will necessarily inure to the unwarranted benefit and advantage of the corporation.19We are concerned only with the issue whether the ordinance in question is intra vires. Once determined in the affirmative, the measure may not be invalidated because of consequences that may arise from its enforcement.20ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the court below is hereby reversed and set aside. Ordinance No. 7522 of the City of Manila, dated June 15, 1975, is hereby held to have been validly enacted. No. costs.SO ORDERED.|||(Bagatsing v. Ramirez, G.R. No. L-41631, [December 17, 1976], 165 PHIL 909-920) [G.R. Nos. L-32979-81. February 29, 1972.]NAPOLEON LECHOCO,petitioner,vs.CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD, PHILIPPINE AIR LINES, INC., FILIPINAS ORIENT AIRWAYS, INC., AND AIR MANILA, INC.,respondents.SYLLABUS1.MERCANTILE LAW; TRANSPORTATION; AIR CARRIERS;REPUBLIC ACT 2677DOES NOT REPEALREPUBLIC ACT 776. There is nothing inRepublic Act 2677, which amended various sections ofCommonwealth Act 146, the basicPublic Service Act, that expressly repealsRepublic Act 776. While section 3 ofRepublic Act 2677provides that "All Acts or parts of Acts inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed," the fact is that the derogation was thereby made dependent upon actual inconsistency with previous laws. This is the very foundation of implied repeal. However, there is nothing in Act 2677 that evidences an intent on the part of the Legislature to set aside the carefully detailed regulation of civil air transport set forth in Act 776. Said act in itself constitutes a recognition of the need of entrusting regulation, supervision and control of civil aviation to a specialized body.2.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NO INCONSISTENCY BETWEENPUBLIC SERVICE ACT, AS AMENDED, AND SECTION 10 (c) (2) OFREPUBLIC ACT 776; POWER TO FIX RATES BOTH VESTED IN CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD AND PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION. There is no irreconcilable inconsistency between section 14 of thePublic Service Act, as amended byRepublic Act 2677, and section 10 (c) (2) of the priorRepublic Act 776, except for the fact that power over rates to be charged by air carriers of passengers and freight are vested in different entities, the CAB and the PSC. Even that will result in no more than a concurrent jurisdiction in both supervisory entities, and not in the divesting of the power of one in favor of the other.3.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EXPLANATORY NOTE TO BILL WHICH BECAMEREPUBLIC ACT 2677SHOWS ABSENCE OF INTENT TO REPEALREPUBLIC ACT 776. The absence of intent to repealRepublic Act 776by the enactment of Act 2677 is also evidenced by the explanatory note to House Bill 4030 (that later became Act 2677). It expressly stated the desire to broaden the jurisdiction of the PSC "by vesting it with the power to supervise and control maritime transportation . . .except air transcriptionand warehouses which are now subject to regulation and supervision by the Civil Aeronautics Board and the Bureau of Commerce respectively."4.ID.; ID; ID; ID.; LEGISLATION SUBSEQUENT TOREPUBLIC ACT 2677SHOWS LEGISLATIVE INTENT TO MAINTAIN JURISDICTION AND POWERS OF CAB. The same legislative intent to maintain the jurisdiction and powers of the CAB appears from a consideration of the legislation subsequent to the enactment ofRepublic Act 2677. Thus,Republic Act 4147, enacted 20 June 1964 (granting air transportation franchise to Filipinas Orient Airways), andRepublic Act 4501, passed in 19 June 1965 (granting a similar franchise to Air Manila, Inc.), both uniformly require that the franchise grantee "shall fix just and reasonable and uniform rates for the transportation of passengers and freight, subject to the regulations and approval of the Civil Aeronautics Board, or such other regulatory agencies as the Government may designate for this purpose." Such reference to the Civil Aeronautics Board after the enactment ofRepublic Act 2677would be difficult to explain if said law had already repealed the power of the CAB over air fares or rates, as contended by petitioner Lechoco.5.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; IMPLIED REPEALS NOT FAVORED; SECTION 14 OFPUBLIC SERVICE ACT, AS AMENDED, AND SECTION 10 (C) (2) OFREPUBLIC ACT 776, RECONCILED. The well established principle is that implied repeals are not favored and consequently statutes must be so construed as to harmonize all apparent conflicts and give effect to all the provisions whenever possible. This rule makes it imperative to reconcile both section 14 of thePublic Service Act, as amended byRepublic Act 2677, and section 10 (c) (2) ofRepublic Act 776, by recognizing the power of the Civil Aeronautics Board "to fix and determine reasonable individual, joint or special rates, charges of fares" for air carriers (underRepublic Act 776) but subject to the "maximum rates on freights and passengers" that may be set up by the Public Service Commission (as perRepublic Act 2677); so that rates, charges or fares allowed or fixed by CAB may in no case exceed the maxima prescribed now or to be prescribed in the future by the PSC.6.ID.; CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD; JURISDICTION TO FIX AIR CARRIERS' FARES; NO SHOWING THAT PSC FIXED ANY MAXIMUM RATES THEREFOR; INSTANT CASE. The questioned orders of the Civil Aeronautics Board, asserting its jurisdiction to fix the reasonable fares that air carriers may demand, are in accord with law, there being no showing that the Public Service Commission has fixed any maximum rates therefor.7.ID.; ID.; ID.; COURT MUST FOLLOW EXPRESS TERMS OF THE LAW. However plausible the suggestion of the respondents should be that the retention inRepublic Act 2677of the power of the PSC to fix maximum rates on air freight and passenger was the result of legislative inadvertence, considering that in House Bill No. 4030 the phrase conferring such power on the PSC appear in brackets, indicating that said passage is to be eliminated, this Court is powerless to ignore the express grant of the authority in question in the wording ofRepublic Act 2677as finally approved. The elimination of the words "except as regards the fixing of their maximum rates on freight and passengers" from section 14 (c) of thePublic Service Act, as amended byRepublic Act 2677, in order to avoid conflict withRepublic Act 776, and to unify jurisdiction and control over civil aviation in the Philippines can be obtained from the Legislature itself.D E C I S I O NREYES,J.B.L.,Jp:Original petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction to annul and set aside Civil Aeronautics Board resolutions Nos. 166 (70), 321(70) and 330 (70), fixing temporary and permanent rate or fare adjustments of three domestic air carriers, Philippine Air Lines (PAL), Filipinas Orient Airways (FOA) and Air Manila, and dismissing petitioner's objections thereto, based on alleged lack of jurisdiction.The issue submitted for Our decision is whether authority to fix air carrier's rates is vested in the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) or in the Public Service Commission (PSC).Petitioner Lechoco contends that by the enactment ofRepublic Act No. 2677(on 18 June 1960) amending sections 13(a) and 14 of CommonwealthAct No. 146(the original PSC Act), jurisdiction to control rates of airships was taken away from the Civil Aeronautics Board and revested in the PSC, sinceRepublic Act 2671impliedly repealed section 10 (c) (2) ofRepublic Act No. 776, passed on 20 June 1952, conferring control over air rates and fares on the CAB.Respondents aver, on the other hand, that, at the very least, jurisdiction over air fares and rates was, under both statutes, exercisable concurrently by the CAB and the PSC, and that following the rule on concurrent jurisdictions of judicial bodies, the first to exercise or take jurisdiction (CAB in this case) should retain it to the exclusion of the other body.In resolving the issue posed, it is apposite to review the various laws enacted on the matter.In 1932, the Philippine (pre Commonwealth) Legislature provided by Public Law No. 3996, in its section 15, that any "Person or persons engaged in air commerce shall submit for approval to the Public Service Commission or its authorized representative uniform charges applied to merchandise and passengers per kilometer or over specified distances. . ."In consonance with said law, the legislative franchise granted in November of 1935 to the Philippine Aerial Taxi Company, Inc. (Act No. 4271) specified that (section 3) "The grantee shall fix just, reasonable and uniform rates for the transportation of passengers and freight, subject to the supervision and approval of the Public Service Commission. . ."The following year the PSC was reorganized by CommonwealthAct No. 146, enacted 7 November 1936. Section 13 thereof granted PSC "general supervision and regulation of, jurisdiction and control over, all public services . . ." except as otherwise provided. The same section, however, contained the following reservation:". . .Provided further,That the Commission shall not exercise any control or supervision over aircraft in the Philippines, except with regard to the fixing of maximum passenger and freight rates . . ."In the aftermath of World War II the Legislature of the independent Republic of the Philippines passedRepublic Act No. 51, on 4 October 1946, authorizing the Chief Executive to reorganize within one year the different executive departments, bureaus, offices, agencies and other instrumentalities of the government, including corporations owned or controlled by it. In the exercise of the broad powers thus conferred, the President of the Philippines, by Executive Order No. 94, of 4 October 1947, in its section 149, abolished the Civil Aeronautics Commission and transferred its functions and duties to the Civil Aeronautics Board created by said Order No. 94, with the following provision:"The . . . functions provided in section 13 of CommonwealthAct No. 146, pertaining to the power of the Public Service Commission to fix the maximum passenger and freight rates that may be charged by airlines . . . are hereby transferred to and consolidated in the Civil Aeronautics Administration and/or Civil Aeronautics Board."The foregoing transfer of functions was virtually ratified byRepublic Act No. 776, effective on 20 June 1952, entitled "An Act to Reorganize the Civil Aeronautics Board and the Civil Aeronautics Administration, to provide for the regulation of civil aeronautics in the Philippines . . ." that delimited the powers of the Board. Section 10 of Act 776 prescribed,inter alia,the following:"SEC. 10.Powers and duties of the Board. (A) Except as otherwise provided herein, the Board shall have the power to regulate the economic aspect of air transportation, and shall have the general supervision and regulation of, and jurisdiction and control over, air carriers as well as their property, property rights, equipment, facilities, and franchise, in so far as may be necessary for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this Act.xxx xxx xxx'(C)The Boardshallhave the following specific powers and duties:'(2)Tofix and determinereasonable individual, joint, or special rates, charges or fareswhich an air carrier may demand,collect or receive for any service in connection with air commerce. The Board may adopt any original, amended, or new individual, joint or special rates, charges or faresproposed by an air carrierif the proposed individual, joint, or special rates, charges or fares are not unduly preferential or unduly discriminatory or unreasonable. The burden of proof to show that the proposed individual, joint or special rates, charges or fares are just and reasonable shall be upon the air carrier proposing the same.'"Latest enactment of the series wasRepublic Act No. 2677, in effect on 18 June 1960, that amended various sections of CommonwealthAct No. 146, the basicPublic Service Act. Among those amended was section 14, which was made to read:"Sec. 14. The following are exempted from the provisions of the preceding section:1xxx xxx xxx"(c)Airships within the Philippinesexcept as regards the fixing of their maximum rates or freight and passengers."(Italics supplied)Contrary to the views of petitioner Lechoco, there is nothing inRepublic Act 2677that expressly repealsRepublic Act No. 776. While section 3 ofRepublic Act 2677provides that "All Acts or parts of Acts inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed", the fact is that the derogation was thereby made dependent upon actual inconsistency with previous laws. This is the very foundation of the rule of implied repeal. However, there is nothing in Act 2677 that evidences an intent on the part of the Legislature to set aside the carefully detailed regulation of civil air transport as set forth in Act 776. Said Act in itself constitutes a recognition of the need of entrusting regulation, supervision and control of civil aviation to a specialized body.We find no irreconcilable inconsistency between section 14 of thePublic Service Act, as amended byRepublic Act 2677, and section 10 (c) (2) of the priorRepublic Act 776, above quoted, except for the fact that power over rates to be charged by air carriers on passengers and freight are vested in different entities, the CAB and the PSC. Even that will result in no more than a concurrent jurisdiction in both supervisory entities, and not in the divesting of the power of one in favor of the other.The absence of intent to repealRepublic Act No. 776by the enactment of Act 2677 is also evidenced by the explanatory note to House Bill 4030 (that later became Act 2677). It expressly stated the desire to broaden the jurisdiction of the PSC "by vesting it with the power to supervise and control maritime transportation . . .except air transportionand warehouses which are now subject to regulation and supervision by the Civil Aeronautics Board and the Bureau of Commerce respectively."2The same legislative intent to maintain the jurisdiction and powers of the CAB appears from a consideration of the legislation subsequent to the enactment ofRepublic Act 2677. Thus,Republic Act No. 4147, enacted 20 June 1964 (granting an air transportation franchise to Filipinas Orient Airways), andRepublic Act No. 4501, passed in 19 June 1965 (granting a similar franchise to Air Manila, Inc.), both uniformly require (in their section 3) that the franchise grantee "shall fix just and reasonable and uniform rates for the transportation of passengers and freight,subject to the regulations and approval of the Civil Aeronautics Boardor such other regulatory agencies as the Government may designate for this purpose." (Italics supplied)Such references to the Civil Aeronautics Board after the enactment ofRepublic Act No. 2677would be difficult to explain if said law had already repealed the power of the CAB over fares or rates, as contended by petitioner Lechoco.Be that as it may, the well-established principle is that implied repeals are not favored and consequently statutes must be so construed as to harmonize all apparent conflicts and give effect to all the provisions whenever possible.3This rule makes it imperative to reconcile both section 14 of thePublic Service Actas amended byRepublic Act No. 2677, and section 10 (c) (2) ofRepublic Act No. 776, by recognizing the power of the Civil Aeronautics Board to "fix and determine reasonable individual, joint or special rates, charges or fares" for air carriers (underRepublic Act 776) but subject to the "maximum rates on freights and passengers" that may be set by the Public Service Commission (as perRepublic Act 2677); so that the rates, charges or fares allowed or fixed by CAB may in no case exceed the maxima prescribed now or to be prescribed in the future by the PSC.The respondents have suggested that the retention inRepublic Act 2677of the power of the PSC to fix maximum rates on air freight and passengers was the result of legislative inadvertence, considering that in House Bill No. 4030 the phrase conferring such power on the PSC appeared in brackets, indicating that said passage was to be eliminated. But however plausible the suggestion should be, this Court is powerless to ignore the express grant of the authority in question in the wording ofRepublic Act 2677as finally approved. The elimination of the words "except as regards the fixing of their maximum rates on freight and passengers" from section 14(c) of thePublic Service Act, as amended byRepublic Act 2677, in order to avoid conflict withRepublic Act 776, and to unify jurisdiction and control over civil aviation in the Philippines, can only be obtained from the Legislature itself.PREMISES CONSIDERED, the questioned order of the Civil Aeronautics Board, asserting its jurisdiction to fix the reasonable fares that air carriers may demand, are in accord with law, there being no showing that the Public Service Commission has fixed any maximum rates therefor.WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari with preliminary injunction applied for is hereby denied. Costs against petitioner Napoleon Lechoco.|||(Lechoco v. Civil Aeronautics Board, G.R. Nos. L-32979-81, [February 29, 1972], 150 PHIL 769-778) [G.R. No. L-7899. June 23, 1955.]ALFREDO MONTELIBANO, PASTOR MALLORCA, GONZALGO DE LA TORRE, and JOSE ARTICULO,petitioners-appellants,vs. THE HONORABLE FELIX S. FERRER, as Judge of the Municipal Court of Bacolod, and JOSE F. BENARES,respondents-appellees.SYLLABUS1.CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; WHO MAY INITIATE CRIMINAL CASES. Since the only officer authorized by the Charter of the City of Bacolod to initiate criminal cases in the courts thereof is its City Attorney, the Municipal Court may not entertain a complaint filed directly with it by the offended party.2.STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; INTERPRETATION OF REENACTED STATUTES. Considering that the Charter of the City of Bacolod merely incorporates therein the pertinent provisions of the Charter of the City of Manila, it may be presumed that the Legislature intended to adopt also the settled interpretation already given to the latter by the judicial department.D E C I S I O NCONCEPCION,Jp:The question involved in this case is one purely of law.On June 13, 1953, respondent Jose F. Benares filed, with the Municipal Court of the City of Bacolod, a criminal complaint, which was docketed as Case No. 2864 of said court, against petitioners herein, Alfredo Montelibano, Pastor Mallorca, Gonzalgo de la Torre and Jose Articulo, charging them with the crime of malicious mischief. It is alleged in said complaint:"That on or about the 5th, the 7th and the 8th of June, 1953, in the City of Bacolod, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this court, Alfredo Montelibano, as author by inducement, Pastor Mallorca, Gonzalgo de la Torre and Jose Articulo, as authors by direct participations, conspiring and confederating together and helping one another, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and deliberately cause damage to the sugarcane plantation belonging to Jose F. Benares, the offended party herein, intentionally and using bulldozer and destroying completely eighteen (18) hectares of sugarcanes obviously under the impulse of hatred and a desire for revenge, as the accused, Alfredo Montelibano, failed in his attempt to have the herein offended party punished for contempt of Court in Civil Case No. 1896 of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, thereby causing upon said Jose F. Benares damage in the amount of more than P13,000.00."Upon the filing of this complaint, due course was given thereto by the herein respondent, Hon. Felix S. Ferrer, Municipal Judge of the City of Bacolod, who, likewise, issued the corresponding warrant of arrest. On or about June 22, 1953, the aforementioned defendants (petitioners herein) filed a motion to quash said warrant of arrest, as well as the complaint, upon several grounds, which may be reduced to two, namely: (1) The only officer authorized by the Charter of the City of Bacolod to initiate criminal cases in the courts thereof is its City Attorney, who is opposed to the institution of said Case No. 2864; and (2) Said case involves a prejudicial question.In this connection, petitioners alleged, and Benares has not denied, the following: Sometime in 1940, the Capitol Subdivision Inc. (hereinafter referred to as the Subdivision), of which petitioner Alfredo Montelibano is the president and general manager, leased Lot No. 1205-I-1 (which is the same property involved in Case No. 2864) to Benares, for a period of five (5) crop years, ending in the crop-year 1944-1945, with an option in favor of Benares, of another five (5) crop years. On June 5, 1951, the Subdivision instituted against Benares, unlawful detainer case No. 1896 of the Municipal Court of the City of Bacolod, which, in due course, subsequently, rendered a decision ordering his ejectment from said lot. Benares appealed to the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental (in which it was docketed as Civil Case No. 1896). On motion of the Subdivision, this court issued a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, commanding Benares to turn over the aforementioned lot to the Subdivision, which filed a bond undertaking to pay to Benares "all damages which he may sustain" by reason of the issuance of said writ, "if the court should finally decide that the plaintiff was not entitled thereto." Inasmuch as Benares continued planting on Lot No. 1205-L-1, instead of delivering it to the Subdivision, the latter filed a petition praying that the former be declared in contempt of court. This petition was denied, by an order dated April 30, 1953, which, however, required Benares to "immediately and promptly obey the order of preliminary mandatory injunction." On June 5, 1953, the provincial sheriff delivered the land in question to the Subdivision. Seemingly, acting upon instructions of petitioner Montelibano, his co-petitioners thereupon cleared the land of the sugarcane planted therein by Benares. Hence, the criminal complaint filed by the latter.The Municipal Court denied the aforementioned motion to quash said complaint and the warrant of arrest, as well as a subsequent motion for reconsideration, whereupon petitioners instituted the case at bar, in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 2828, against said Municipal Judge, and complainant Benares, for the purpose of securing a writ of certiorari and mandamus "annulling and vacating all the proceedings so far taken by respondent Judge in said Case No. 2864" and "holding that said Judge had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the same" and "dismissing said case" with a writ of preliminary injunction, enjoining respondent judge "to desist from further proceedings in the case." The writ of preliminary injunction was issued by said court of first instance, which, in due course, eventually rendered a decision, dismissing the petition for certiorari and mandamus, and dissolving the writ of preliminary injunction, with costs against the petitioners. The case is now before us on appeal taken, from said decision, by the aforementioned petitioners, the defendants in said criminal case.It is not disputed that the complaint in question was filed by Benares directly with the municipal court of Bacolod, and that the City Attorney had, not only no intervention whatsoever therein, but, also, expressed, in open court, his opposition thereto. The issue boils down to whether said municipal court may entertain said complaint. Petitioners contend that it may not, relying upon section 22 of CommonwealthAct No. 326, otherwise known as the Charter of the City of Bacolod, the pertinent part of which provides:". . . The City attorney . . . shall also have charge of the prosecution of all crimes, misdemeanors, and violations of city ordinances, in the court of First Instance and the Municipal Court of the city, and shall discharge all the duties in respect to criminal prosecutions enjoined by law upon provincial fiscals."The city attorney shall cause to be investigated all charges of crimes, misdemeanors, and violation of ordinances, and have the necessary informations or complaints prepared or made against the persons accused . . ."Upon the other hand, respondents argue that this provision is merely declaratory of the powers of the City Attorney of Bacolod and does not preclude the application of Sec. 2 of Rule 106 of the Rules of Court reading:"Complaint is a sworn written statement charging a person with an offense, subscribed by the offended party, any peace officer or other employees of the government or governmental institution in charge of the enforcement or execution of the law violated."This was the very same provision invoked by the petitioner in the case of Espirituvs.Dela Rosa (45 Off. Gaz. 196), in which this Court refused to issue a writ of mandamus to compel the Court of First Instance of Manila to accept a complaint filed, directly with said court, by the offended party in a given case, without the intervention of the City Fiscal of Manila. In his concurring opinion therein, then Chief Justice Moran had the following to say:"I concur upon the ground that Rule 108 section 4 does not apply in the City of Manila wherethe only officer authorized by law to conduct preliminary investigation is the City Fiscal(sec. 2474, Adm. Code) and therefore,all criminal complaints should be filed with that officerwho in turn may, after investigation, file the corresponding information with the Court of First Instance. The provisions of theAdministrative Codeon this matter have not been repealed by the Rules of Court. (Hashimvs.Boncan, 40 Off. Gaz., p. 13.)" (Italics supplied.)As indicated in said decision, the same was based, partly, upon the rule laid down in Hashimvs.Boncan (71 Phil. 216), which, in turn, was predicated upon earlier precedents (U. S.vs.Wilson, 4 Phil. 317; U. S.vs.McGovern, 6 Phil. 621; U. S.vs.Ocampo, 18 Phil. 1; U. S.vs.Grant and Kennedy, 18 Phil. 122; U. S.vs.Carlos, 21 Phil. 553).In case of Sayovs.Chief of Police (45 Off. Gaz. 4875) the language used by this Court was:"Under the law, a complaint charging a person with the commission of an offense cognizable by the courts of Manila is not filed with the municipal court of First Instance of Manila,because as above stated, the latter do not make or conduct a preliminary investigation proper.The complaint must be made or filed with the city fiscal of Manilawho, personally or through one of his assistance, makes the investigation, not for the purpose of ordering the arrest of the accused, but of filing with the proper court the necessary information against the accused if the result of the investigation so warrants, and obtaining from the court a warrant of arrest or commitment of the accused.xxx xxx xxx"In the City of Manila,where complaints are not filed directly with the municipal court or the Court of First Instance, theofficer or person making the arrest without warrant shall surrender or take the person arrested to the city fiscal, and the latter shall make the investigation above mentioned and file, if proper, the corresponding information without the time prescribed by section 125 of the Revised Penal Code, so that the court may issue a warrant of commitment for the temporary detention of the accused . . ." (Italics supplied.)It is clear, therefore, that, in the City of Manila, criminal complaints may be filed only with the City Fiscal, who is thereby given, by implication, the exclusive authority to institute criminal cases in the different courts of said city, under the provisions of its Charter, originally found in Section 39 ofAct No. 183, the pertinent part of which we quote:". . . The prosecuting attorney of the city of Manila shall have charge of the prosecution of all crimes, misdemeanors, and violations of city ordinances, in the Court of First Instance and the municipal courts of the city of Manila. He shall investigate all charges of crimes, misdemeanors, and violations of ordinances, and prepare the necessary informations or make the necessary complaints against the persons accused, and discharge all other duties in respect to criminal prosecutions enjoined upon provincial fiscals . . ."This provision wasmutatis mutandisreproduced, firstly, in section 2437 of the OldAdministrative Code(Act No. 2657), then in section 2465 of the RevisedAdministrative Code, and lastly in section 38 ofRepublic Act No. 409. We do not see, and respondents herein have not pointed out, any reason why the above quoted provision of the Charter of the City of Bacolod, should be interpreted differently from said sections of the Charter of the City of Manila, which are substantially identical thereto. On the contrary, considering that said provisions of the Charter of the City of Manila had been consistently construed in the manner above indicated, before being incorporated in the Charter of the City of Bacolod, the conclusion is inevitable that the framers of the latter had reproduced the former with intent of adopting, also its settled interpretation by the judicial department (In reDick, 38 Phil. 41, 77)."In the interpretation of reenacted statutes the court will follow the construction which they received when previously in force. The legislature will be presumed to know the effect which such status originally had, and by reenactment to intend that they should again have the same effect . . . It is not necessary that a statute should be reenacted in identical words in order that the rule may apply. It is sufficient if it is reenacted in substantially the same words . . . The rule has been held to apply to the reenactment of a statute which received a practical construction on the part of those who are called upon to execute it. The Supreme Court of Nebraska says: 'Where the legislature in framing an act resorts to language similar in its import to the language of other acts which have received a practical construction by the executive departments and by the legislature itself, it is fair to presume that the language was used in the later act with a view to the construction so given the earlier.' . . ." (Sutherland Statutory Construction, Vol. II, 2d. ed., section 403).". . . two statutes with a parallel scope, purpose and terminology should, each in its own field, have a like interpretation, unless in particular instances there is something peculiar in the question under consideration, or dissimilar in the terms of the act relating thereto, requiring a different conclusion." (50 Am. Jur. 343).". . . Since it may be presumed that the legislature knew a construction, long acquieced in, which had been given by the courts to a statute re-enacted by the legislature, there is a presumption of an intention to adopt the construction as well as the language of the prior enactment. It is accordingly a settled rule of statutory construction that when a statute or a clause or provision thereof has been construed by a court of last resort, and the same is substantially reenacted, the legislature may be regarded as adopting such construction." (50 Am. Jur. 461).In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from must be, as it is hereby, reversed and another one shall be entered annulling the warrant of arrest issued by respondent Judge and enjoining the latter to refrain from entertaining the complaint aforementioned and to dismiss the same. With cost against respondent Jose F. Benares. It is so ordered.Bengzon, Padilla, Montema