1-5 Cases for Stat Con

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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-19650 September 29, 1966

CALTEX (PHILIPPINES), INC., petitioner-appellee,vs.ENRICO PALOMAR, in his capacity as THE POSTMASTER GENERAL, respondent-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General for respondent and appellant.Ross, Selph and Carrascoso for petitioner and appellee.

CASTRO, J.:

In the year 1960 the Caltex (Philippines) Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Caltex) conceived andlaid the groundwork for a promotional scheme calculated to drum up patronage for its oil products.Denominated "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest", it calls for participants therein to estimate the actualnumber of liters a hooded gas pump at each Caltex station will dispense during a specified period.Employees of the Caltex (Philippines) Inc., its dealers and its advertising agency, and theirimmediate families excepted, participation is to be open indiscriminately to all "motor vehicle ownersand/or licensed drivers". For the privilege to participate, no fee or consideration is required to bepaid, no purchase of Caltex products required to be made. Entry forms are to be made availableupon request at each Caltex station where a sealed can will be provided for the deposit ofaccomplished entry stubs.

A three-staged winner selection system is envisioned. At the station level, called "DealerContest", the contestant whose estimate is closest to the actual number of liters dispensed by thehooded pump thereat is to be awarded the first prize; the next closest, the second; and the next, thethird. Prizes at this level consist of a 3-burner kerosene stove for first; a thermos bottle and a Ray-O-Vac hunter lantern for second; and an Everready Magnet-lite flashlight with batteries and ascrewdriver set for third. The first-prize winner in each station will then be qualified to join in the"Regional Contest" in seven different regions. The winning stubs of the qualified contestants in eachregion will be deposited in a sealed can from which the first-prize, second-prize and third-prizewinners of that region will be drawn. The regional first-prize winners will be entitled to make a three-day all-expenses-paid round trip to Manila, accompanied by their respective Caltex dealers, in orderto take part in the "National Contest". The regional second-prize and third-prize winners will receivecash prizes of P500 and P300, respectively. At the national level, the stubs of the seven regionalfirst-prize winners will be placed inside a sealed can from which the drawing for the final first-prize,

second-prize and third-prize winners will be made. Cash prizes in store for winners at this final stageare: P3,000 for first; P2,000 for second; Pl,500 for third; and P650 as consolation prize for each ofthe remaining four participants.

Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails not only as amongst the media for publicizing thecontest but also for the transmission of communications relative thereto, representations were madeby Caltex with the postal authorities for the contest to be cleared in advance for mailing, having inview sections 1954(a), 1982 and 1983 of the Revised Administrative Code, the pertinent provisionsof which read as follows:


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SECTION 1954.Absolutely non-mailable matter. No matter belonging to any of thefollowing classes, whether sealed as first-class matter or not, shall be imported into thePhilippines through the mails, or to be deposited in or carried by the mails of the Philippines,or be delivered to its addressee by any officer or employee of the Bureau of Posts:

Written or printed matter in any form advertising, describing, or in any manner

pertaining to, or conveying or purporting to convey any information concerning any lottery,gift enterprise, or similar scheme depending in whole or in part upon lot or chance, or anyscheme, device, or enterprise for obtaining any money or property of any kind by means offalse or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises.

"SECTION 1982. Fraud orders.Upon satisfactory evidence that any person orcompany is engaged in conducting any lottery, gift enterprise, or scheme for the distributionof money, or of any real or personal property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind, or thatany person or company is conducting any scheme, device, or enterprise for obtaining moneyor property of any kind through the mails by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,representations, or promises, the Director of Posts may instruct any postmaster or otherofficer or employee of the Bureau to return to the person, depositing the same in the mails,with the word "fraudulent" plainly written or stamped upon the outside cover thereof, any mailmatter of whatever class mailed by or addressed to such person or company or therepresentative or agent of such person or company.

SECTION 1983. Deprivation of use of money order system and telegraphic transferservice.The Director of Posts may, upon evidence satisfactory to him that any person orcompany is engaged in conducting any lottery, gift enterprise or scheme for the distributionof money, or of any real or personal property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind, or thatany person or company is conducting any scheme, device, or enterprise for obtaining moneyor property of any kind through the mails by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,representations, or promise, forbid the issue or payment by any postmaster of any postalmoney order or telegraphic transfer to said person or company or to the agent of any suchperson or company, whether such agent is acting as an individual or as a firm, bank,

corporation, or association of any kind, and may provide by regulation for the return to theremitters of the sums named in money orders or telegraphic transfers drawn in favor of suchperson or company or its agent.

The overtures were later formalized in a letter to the Postmaster General, dated October 31,1960, in which the Caltex, thru counsel, enclosed a copy of the contest rules and endeavored to

justify its position that the contest does not violate the anti-lottery provisions of the Postal Law.Unimpressed, the then Acting Postmaster General opined that the scheme falls within the purview ofthe provisions aforesaid and declined to grant the requested clearance. In its counsel's letter ofDecember 7, 1960, Caltex sought a reconsideration of the foregoing stand, stressing that therebeing involved no consideration in the part of any contestant, the contest was not, under controllingauthorities, condemnable as a lottery. Relying, however, on an opinion rendered by the Secretary ofJustice on an unrelated case seven years before (Opinion 217, Series of 1953), the PostmasterGeneral maintained his view that the contest involves consideration, or that, if it does not, it isnevertheless a "gift enterprise" which is equally banned by the Postal Law, and in his letter ofDecember 10, 1960 not only denied the use of the mails for purposes of the proposed contest but aswell threatened that if the contest was conducted, "a fraud order will have to be issued against it(Caltex) and all its representatives".

Caltex thereupon invoked judicial intervention by filing the present petition for declaratory reliefagainst Postmaster General Enrico Palomar, praying "that judgment be rendered declaring its


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'Caltex Hooded Pump Contest' not to be violative of the Postal Law, and ordering respondent toallow petitioner the use of the mails to bring the contest to the attention of the public". After issueswere joined and upon the respective memoranda of the parties, the trial court rendered judgment asfollows:

In view of the foregoing considerations, the Court holds that the proposed 'Caltex

Hooded Pump Contest' announced to be conducted by the petitioner under the rules markedas Annex B of the petitioner does not violate the Postal Law and the respondent has no rightto bar the public distribution of said rules by the mails.

The respondent appealed.

The parties are now before us, arrayed against each other upon two basic issues: first,whether the petition states a sufficient cause of action for declaratory relief; and second, whether theproposed "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" violates the Postal Law. We shall take these up inseriatim.

1. By express mandate of section 1 of Rule 66 of the old Rules of Court, which was the

applicable legal basis for the remedy at the time it was invoked, declaratory relief is available to anyperson "whose rights are affected by a statute . . . to determine any question of construction orvalidity arising under the . . . statute and for a declaration of his rights thereunder" (now section 1,Rule 64, Revised Rules of Court). In amplification, this Court, conformably to established

jurisprudence on the matter, laid down certain conditions sine qua non therefor, to wit: (1) there mustbe a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests areadverse; (3) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; and (4)the issue involved must be ripe for judicial determination (Tolentino vs. The Board of Accountancy,et al., G.R. No. L-3062, September 28, 1951; Delumen, et al. vs. Republic of the Philippines, 50O.G., No. 2, pp. 576, 578-579; Edades vs. Edades, et al., G.R. No. L-8964, July 31, 1956). Thegravamen of the appellant's stand being that the petition herein states no sufficient cause of actionfor declaratory relief, our duty is to assay the factual bases thereof upon the foregoing crucible.

As we look in retrospect at the incidents that generated the present controversy, a number ofsignificant points stand out in bold relief. The appellee (Caltex), as a business enterprise of someconsequence, concededly has the unquestioned right to exploit every legitimate means, and to availof all appropriate media to advertise and stimulate increased patronage for its products. In contrast,the appellant, as the authority charged with the enforcement of the Postal Law, admittedly has thepower and the duty to suppress transgressions thereof particularly thru the issuance of fraudorders, under Sections 1982 and 1983 of the Revised Administrative Code, against legally non-mailable schemes. Obviously pursuing its right aforesaid, the appellee laid out plans for the salespromotion scheme hereinbefore detailed. To forestall possible difficulties in the dissemination ofinformation thereon thru the mails, amongst other media, it was found expedient to request theappellant for an advance clearance therefor. However, likewise by virtue of his jurisdiction in thepremises and construing the pertinent provisions of the Postal Law, the appellant saw a violation

thereof in the proposed scheme and accordingly declined the request. A point of difference as to thecorrect construction to be given to the applicable statute was thus reached. Communications inwhich the parties expounded on their respective theories were exchanged. The confidence withwhich the appellee insisted upon its position was matched only by the obstinacy with which theappellant stood his ground. And this impasse was climaxed by the appellant's open warning to theappellee that if the proposed contest was "conducted, a fraud order will have to be issued against itand all its representatives."


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Against this backdrop, the stage was indeed set for the remedy prayed for. The appellee'sinsistent assertion of its claim to the use of the mails for its proposed contest, and the challengethereto and consequent denial by the appellant of the privilege demanded, undoubtedly spawned alive controversy. The justiciability of the dispute cannot be gainsaid. There is an active antagonisticassertion of a legal right on one side and a denial thereof on the other, concerning a real not amere theoretical question or issue. The contenders are as real as their interests are substantial.

To the appellee, the uncertainty occasioned by the divergence of views on the issue of constructionhampers or disturbs its freedom to enhance its business. To the appellant, the suppression of theappellee's proposed contest believed to transgress a law he has sworn to uphold and enforce is anunavoidable duty. With the appellee's bent to hold the contest and the appellant's threat to issue afraud order therefor if carried out, the contenders are confronted by the ominous shadow of animminent and inevitable litigation unless their differences are settled and stabilized by a tranquilizingdeclaration (Pablo y Sen, et al. vs. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. L-6868, April 30, 1955).

And, contrary to the insinuation of the appellant, the time is long past when it can rightly be said thatmerely the appellee's "desires are thwarted by its own doubts, or by the fears of others" whichadmittedly does not confer a cause of action. Doubt, if any there was, has ripened into a justiciablecontroversy when, as in the case at bar, it was translated into a positive claim of right which isactually contested (III Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1963 ed., pp. 132-133, citing:Woodward vs. Fox West Coast Theaters, 36 Ariz., 251, 284 Pac. 350).

We cannot hospitably entertain the appellant's pretense that there is here no question ofconstruction because the said appellant "simply applied the clear provisions of the law to a given setof facts as embodied in the rules of the contest", hence, there is no room for declaratory relief. Theinfirmity of this pose lies in the fact that it proceeds from the assumption that, if the circumstanceshere presented, the construction of the legal provisions can be divorced from the matter of theirapplication to the appellee's contest. This is not feasible. Construction, verily, is the art or process ofdiscovering and expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of the law with respect to itsapplication to a given case, where that intention is rendered doubtful, amongst others, by reason ofthe fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for in the law(Black, Interpretation of Laws, p.1). This is precisely the case here. Whether or not the scheme proposed by the appellee is within thecoverage of the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law inescapably requires an inquiry into the

intended meaning of the words used therein. To our mind, this is as much a question of constructionor interpretation as any other.

Nor is it accurate to say, as the appellant intimates, that a pronouncement on the matter athand can amount to nothing more than an advisory opinion the handing down of which is anathemato a declaratory relief action. Of course, no breach of the Postal Law has as yet been committed.Yet, the disagreement over the construction thereof is no longer nebulous or contingent. It has takena fixed and final shape, presenting clearly defined legal issues susceptible of immediate resolution.With the battle lines drawn, in a manner of speaking, the propriety nay, the necessity of settingthe dispute at rest before it accumulates the asperity distemper, animosity, passion and violence of afull-blown battle which looms ahead (III Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1963 ed., p. 132and cases cited), cannot but be conceded. Paraphrasing the language in Zeitlin vs. Arnebergh 59Cal., 2d., 901, 31 Cal. Rptr., 800, 383 P. 2d., 152, cited in 22 Am. Jur., 2d., p. 869, to deny

declaratory relief to the appellee in the situation into which it has been cast, would be to force it tochoose between undesirable alternatives. If it cannot obtain a final and definitive pronouncement asto whether the anti-lottery provisions of the Postal Law apply to its proposed contest, it would befaced with these choices: If it launches the contest and uses the mails for purposes thereof, it notonly incurs the risk, but is also actually threatened with the certain imposition, of a fraud order withits concomitant stigma which may attach even if the appellee will eventually be vindicated; if itabandons the contest, it becomes a self-appointed censor, or permits the appellant to put into effecta virtual fiat of previous censorship which is constitutionally unwarranted. As we weigh theseconsiderations in one equation and in the spirit of liberality with which the Rules of Court are to be


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interpreted in order to promote their object (section 1, Rule 1, Revised Rules of Court) which, inthe instant case, is to settle, and afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to, rightsand duties under a law we can see in the present case any imposition upon our jurisdiction or anyfutility or prematurity in our intervention.

The appellant, we apprehend, underrates the force and binding effect of the ruling we hand

down in this case if he believes that it will not have the final and pacifying function that a declaratoryjudgment is calculated to subserve. At the very least, the appellant will be bound. But more than this,he obviously overlooks that in this jurisdiction, "Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the lawshall form a part of the legal system" (Article 8, Civil Code of the Philippines). In effect, judicialdecisions assume the same authority as the statute itself and, until authoritatively abandoned,necessarily become, to the extent that they are applicable, the criteria which must control theactuations not only of those called upon to abide thereby but also of those in duty bound to enforceobedience thereto. Accordingly, we entertain no misgivings that our resolution of this case willterminate the controversy at hand.

It is not amiss to point out at this juncture that the conclusion we have herein just reached isnot without precedent. In Liberty Calendar Co. vs. Cohen, 19 N.J., 399, 117 A. 2d., 487, where acorporation engaged in promotional advertising was advised by the county prosecutor that itsproposed sales promotion plan had the characteristics of a lottery, and that if such sales promotionwere conducted, the corporation would be subject to criminal prosecution, it was held that thecorporation was entitled to maintain a declaratory relief action against the county prosecutor todetermine the legality of its sales promotion plan. In pari materia, see also: Bunis vs. Conway, 17

App. Div. 2d., 207, 234 N.Y.S. 2d., 435; Zeitlin vs. Arnebergh, supra; Thrillo, Inc. vs. Scott, 15 N.J.Super. 124, 82 A. 2d., 903.

In fine, we hold that the appellee has made out a case for declaratory relief.

2. The Postal Law, chapter 52 of the Revised Administrative Code, using almost identicalterminology in sections 1954(a), 1982 and 1983 thereof, supra, condemns as absolutely non-mailable, and empowers the Postmaster General to issue fraud orders against, or otherwise deny

the use of the facilities of the postal service to, any information concerning "any lottery, giftenterprise, or scheme for the distribution of money, or of any real or personal property by lot,chance, or drawing of any kind". Upon these words hinges the resolution of the second issue posedin this appeal.

Happily, this is not an altogether untrodden judicial path. As early as in 1922, in "El Debate",Inc. vs. Topacio, 44 Phil., 278, 283-284, which significantly dwelt on the power of the postalauthorities under the abovementioned provisions of the Postal Law, this Court declared that

While countless definitions of lottery have been attempted, the authoritative one forthis jurisdiction is that of the United States Supreme Court, in analogous cases having to dowith the power of the United States Postmaster General, viz.: The term "lottery" extends to

all schemes for the distribution of prizes by chance, such as policy playing, gift exhibitions,prize concerts, raffles at fairs, etc., and various forms of gambling. The three essentialelements of a lottery are: First, consideration; second, prize; and third, chance. (Horner vs.States [1892], 147 U.S. 449; Public Clearing House vs. Coyne [1903], 194 U.S., 497; U.S.vs. Filart and Singson [1915], 30 Phil., 80; U.S. vs. Olsen and Marker [1917], 36 Phil., 395;U.S. vs. Baguio [1919], 39 Phil., 962; Valhalla Hotel Construction Company vs. Carmona, p.233, ante.)


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Unanimity there is in all quarters, and we agree, that the elements of prize and chance are tooobvious in the disputed scheme to be the subject of contention. Consequently as the appellanthimself concedes, the field of inquiry is narrowed down to the existence of the element ofconsideration therein. Respecting this matter, our task is considerably lightened inasmuch as in thesame case just cited, this Court has laid down a definitive yard-stick in the following terms

In respect to the last element of consideration, the law does not condemn thegratuitous distribution of property by chance, if no consideration is derived directly orindirectly from the party receiving the chance, but does condemn as criminal schemes inwhich a valuable consideration of some kind is paid directly or indirectly for the chance todraw a prize.

Reverting to the rules of the proposed contest, we are struck by the clarity of the language inwhich the invitation to participate therein is couched. Thus

No puzzles, no rhymes? You don't need wrappers, labels or boxtops? You don't haveto buy anything? Simply estimate the actual number of liter the Caltex gas pump with thehood at your favorite Caltex dealer will dispense from to, and win valuable prizes . . . ."

.

Nowhere in the said rules is any requirement that any fee be paid, any merchandise bebought, any service be rendered, or any value whatsoever be given for the privilege to participate. Aprospective contestant has but to go to a Caltex station, request for the entry form which is availableon demand, and accomplish and submit the same for the drawing of the winner. Viewed from allangles or turned inside out, the contest fails to exhibit any discernible consideration which wouldbrand it as a lottery. Indeed, even as we head the stern injunction, "look beyond the fair exterior, tothe substance, in order to unmask the real element and pernicious tendencies which the law isseeking to prevent" ("El Debate", Inc. vs. Topacio, supra, p. 291), we find none. In our appraisal, thescheme does not only appear to be, but actually is, a gratuitous distribution of property by chance.

There is no point to the appellant's insistence that non-Caltex customers who may buy Caltex

products simply to win a prize would actually be indirectly paying a consideration for the privilege tojoin the contest. Perhaps this would be tenable if the purchase of any Caltex product or the use ofany Caltex service were a pre-requisite to participation. But it is not. A contestant, it hardly needsreiterating, does not have to buy anything or to give anything of value. 1awphl.nt

Off-tangent, too, is the suggestion that the scheme, being admittedly for sales promotion,would naturally benefit the sponsor in the way of increased patronage by those who will beencouraged to prefer Caltex products "if only to get the chance to draw a prize by securing entryblanks". The required element of consideration does not consist of the benefit derived by theproponent of the contest. The true test, as laid down in People vs. Cardas, 28 P. 2d., 99, 137 Cal.

App. (Supp.) 788, is whether the participant pays a valuable consideration for the chance, and notwhether those conducting the enterprise receive something of value in return for the distribution of

the prize. Perspective properly oriented, the standpoint of the contestant is all that matters, not thatof the sponsor. The following, culled from Corpus Juris Secundum, should set the matter at rest:

The fact that the holder of the drawing expects thereby to receive, or in fact doesreceive, some benefit in the way of patronage or otherwise, as a result of the drawing; doesnot supply the element of consideration. Griffith Amusement Co. vs. Morgan, Tex. Civ. App.,98 S.W., 2d., 844" (54 C.J.S., p. 849).


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Thus enlightened, we join the trial court in declaring that the "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest"proposed by the appellee is not a lottery that may be administratively and adversely dealt with underthe Postal Law.

But it may be asked: Is it not at least a "gift enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of money,or of any real or personal property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind", which is equally

prescribed? Incidentally, while the appellant's brief appears to have concentrated on the issue ofconsideration, this aspect of the case cannot be avoided if the remedy here invoked is to achieve itstranquilizing effect as an instrument of both curative and preventive justice. Recalling that theappellant's action was predicated, amongst other bases, upon Opinion 217, Series 1953, of theSecretary of Justice, which opined in effect that a scheme, though not a lottery for want ofconsideration, may nevertheless be a gift enterprise in which that element is not essential, thedetermination of whether or not the proposed contest wanting in consideration as we have foundit to be is a prohibited gift enterprise, cannot be passed oversub silencio.

While an all-embracing concept of the term "gift enterprise" is yet to be spelled out in explicitwords, there appears to be a consensus among lexicographers and standard authorities that theterm is commonly applied to a sporting artifice of under which goods are sold for their market valuebut by way of inducement each purchaser is given a chance to win a prize (54 C.J.S., 850; 34 Am.Jur., 654; Black, Law Dictionary, 4th ed., p. 817; Ballantine, Law Dictionary with Pronunciations, 2nded., p. 55; Retail Section of Chamber of Commerce of Plattsmouth vs. Kieck, 257 N.W., 493, 128Neb. 13; Barker vs. State, 193 S.E., 605, 56 Ga. App., 705; Bell vs. State, 37 Tenn. 507, 509, 5Sneed, 507, 509). As thus conceived, the term clearly cannot embrace the scheme at bar. Asalready noted, there is no sale of anything to which the chance offered is attached as an inducementto the purchaser. The contest is open to all qualified contestants irrespective of whether or not theybuy the appellee's products.

Going a step farther, however, and assuming that the appellee's contest can be encompassedwithin the broadest sweep that the term "gift enterprise" is capable of being extended, we think thatthe appellant's pose will gain no added comfort. As stated in the opinion relied upon, rulings thereare indeed holding that a gift enterprise involving an award by chance, even in default of the element

of consideration necessary to constitute a lottery, is prohibited (E.g.: Crimes vs. States, 235 Ala 192,178 So. 73; Russell vs. Equitable Loan & Sec. Co., 129 Ga. 154, 58 S.E., 88; State ex rel. Staffordvs. Fox-Great Falls Theater Corporation, 132 P. 2d., 689, 694, 698, 114 Mont. 52). But this is onlyone side of the coin. Equally impressive authorities declare that, like a lottery, a gift enterprise comeswithin the prohibitive statutes only if it exhibits the tripartite elements of prize, chance andconsideration (E.g.: Bills vs. People, 157 P. 2d., 139, 142, 113 Colo., 326; D'Orio vs. Jacobs, 275 P.563, 565, 151 Wash., 297; People vs. Psallis, 12 N.Y.S., 2d., 796; City and County of Denver vs.Frueauff, 88 P., 389, 394, 39 Colo., 20, 7 L.R.A., N.S., 1131, 12 Ann. Cas., 521; 54 C.J.S., 851,citing: Barker vs. State, 193 S.E., 605, 607, 56 Ga. App., 705; 18 Words and Phrases, perm. ed., pp.590-594). The apparent conflict of opinions is explained by the fact that the specific statutoryprovisions relied upon are not identical. In some cases, as pointed out in 54 C.J.S., 851, the terms"lottery" and "gift enterprise" are used interchangeably (Bills vs. People, supra); in others, thenecessity for the element of consideration or chance has been specifically eliminated by statute. (54C.J.S., 351-352, citing Barker vs. State, supra; State ex rel. Stafford vs. Fox-Great Falls TheaterCorporation, supra). The lesson that we derive from this state of the pertinent jurisprudence is,therefore, that every case must be resolved upon the particular phraseology of the applicablestatutory provision.

Taking this cue, we note that in the Postal Law, the term in question is used in associationwith the word "lottery". With the meaning of lottery settled, and consonant to the well-known principleof legal hermeneutics noscitur a sociis which Opinion 217 aforesaid also relied upon althoughonly insofar as the element of chance is concerned it is only logical that the term under a


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construction should be accorded no other meaning than that which is consistent with the nature ofthe word associated therewith. Hence, if lottery is prohibited only if it involves a consideration, soalso must the term "gift enterprise" be so construed. Significantly, there is not in the law the slightestindicium of any intent to eliminate that element of consideration from the "gift enterprise" thereinincluded.

This conclusion firms up in the light of the mischief sought to be remedied by the law, resort tothe determination thereof being an accepted extrinsic aid in statutory construction. Mail fraud orders,it is axiomatic, are designed to prevent the use of the mails as a medium for disseminating printedmatters which on grounds of public policy are declared non-mailable. As applied to lotteries, giftenterprises and similar schemes, justification lies in the recognized necessity to suppress theirtendency to inflame the gambling spirit and to corrupt public morals (Com. vs. Lund, 15 A. 2d., 839,143 Pa. Super. 208). Since in gambling it is inherent that something of value be hazarded for achance to gain a larger amount, it follows ineluctably that where no consideration is paid by thecontestant to participate, the reason behind the law can hardly be said to obtain. If, as it has beenheld

Gratuitous distribution of property by lot or chance does not constitute "lottery", if it isnot resorted to as a device to evade the law and no consideration is derived, directly orindirectly, from the party receiving the chance, gambling spirit not being cultivated orstimulated thereby. City of Roswell vs. Jones, 67 P. 2d., 286, 41 N.M., 258." (25 Words andPhrases, perm. ed., p. 695, emphasis supplied).

we find no obstacle in saying the same respecting a gift enterprise. In the end, we arepersuaded to hold that, under the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law which we have heretoforeexamined, gift enterprises and similar schemes therein contemplated are condemnable only if, likelotteries, they involve the element of consideration. Finding none in the contest here in question, werule that the appellee may not be denied the use of the mails for purposes thereof.

Recapitulating, we hold that the petition herein states a sufficient cause of action fordeclaratory relief, and that the "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" as described in the rules submitted by

the appellee does not transgress the provisions of the Postal Law.

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment appealed from is affirmed. No costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar andSanchez, JJ., concur


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Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-61236 January 31, 1984

NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR and ZAMBOWOOD MONTHLY EMPLOYEES UNION, ITSOFFICERS AND MEMBERS, petitioners,vs.THE HONORABLE CARLITO A. EISMA, LT. COL. JACOB CARUNCHO, COMMANDINGOFFICER, ZAMBOANGA DISTRICT COMMAND, PC, AFP, and ZAMBOANGA WOODPRODUCTS, respondents.

Jose C. Espina and Potenciano Flores for petitioners.

The Solicitor General for public respondents.

Gaspar V. Tagalo for private respondent Zamboanga Wood Products.

FERNANDO, C.J.:

This Court is confronted once again with the question of whether or not it is a court or a labor arbiterthat can pass on a suit for damages filed by the employer, here private respondent ZamboangaWood Products. Respondent Judge Carlito A. Eisma 1 then of the Court of First Instance, now of theRegional Trial Court of Zamboanga City, was of the view that it is a court and denied a motion todismiss filed by petitioners National Federation of labor and Zambowood Monthly Employees Union,

its officers and members. It was such an order dated July 20, 1982 that led to the filing of thiscertiorari and prohibition proceeding. In the order assailed, it was required that the officers andmembers of petitioner union appear before the court to show cause why a writ of preliminaryinjunction should not be issued against them and in the meanwhile such persons as well as anyother persons acting under their command and on their behalf were "temporarily restrained andordered to desist and refrain from further obstructing, impeding and impairing plaintiff's use of itsproperty and free ingress to or egress from plaintiff's Manufacturing Division facilities at Lumbayao,Zamboanga City and on its road right of way leading to and from said plaintiff's facilities, pending thedetermination of the litigation, and unless a contrary order is issued by this Court." 2

The record discloses that petitioner National Federation of Labor, on March 5, 1982, filed with theMinistry of Labor and Employment, Labor Relations Division, Zamboanga City, a petition for directcertification as the sole exclusive collective bargaining representative of the monthly paid employeesof the respondent Zamboanga Wood Products, Inc. at its manufacturing plant in Lumbayao,Zamboanga City. 3 Such employees, on April 17, 1982 charged respondent firm before the sameoffice of the Ministry of Labor for underpayment of monthly living allowances. 4 Then came, on May3, 1982, from petitioner union, a notice of strike against private respondent, alleging illegaltermination of Dionisio Estioca, president of the said local union; unfair labor practice, non-paymentof living allowances; and "employment of oppressive alien management personnel without properpermit. 5 It was followed by the union submitting the minutes of the declaration of strike, "includingthe ninety (90) ballots, of which 79 voted for yes and three voted for no." 6 The strike began on May23, 1982. 7 On July 9, 1982, private respondent Zambowood filed a complaint with respondent Judge


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against the officers and members of petitioners union, for "damages for obstruction of privateproperty with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or restraining order." 8It was alleged thatdefendants, now petitioners, blockaded the road leading to its manufacturing division, thuspreventing customers and suppliers free ingress to or egress from such premises. 9 Six days later,there was a motion for the dismissal and for the dissolution of the restraining order and opposition tothe issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction filed by petitioners. It was contended that the acts

complained of were incidents of picketing by defendants then on strike against private respondent,and that therefore the exclusive jurisdiction belongs to the Labor Arbiter pursuant to BatasPambansa Blg. 227, not to a court of first instance.10 There was, as noted earlier, a motion todismiss, which was denied. Hence this petition for certiorari.

Four days after such petition was filed, on August 3, 1982, this Court required respondents toanswer and set the plea for a preliminary injunction to be heard on Thursday, August 5, 1982. 11

After such hearing, a temporary restraining order was issued, "directing respondent Judge and thecommanding officer in Zamboanga and his agents from enforcing the ex-parte order of injunctiondated July 20, 1982; and to restrain the respondent Judge from proceeding with the hearing of theuntil otherwise case effective as of [that] date and continuing ordered by [the] Court. In the exerciseof the right to peaceful picketing, petitioner unions must abide strictly with Batas Pambansa Blg. 227,specifically Section 6 thereof, amending Article 265 of the Labor Code, which now reads: '(e) Noperson engaged in picketing shall commit any act of violence, coercion or intimidation or obstruct thefree ingress to or egress from the employer's premises for lawful purposes, or obstruct publicthoroughfares.' " 12

On August 13, 1982, the answer of private respondent was filed sustaining the original jurisdiction ofrespondent Judge and maintaining that the order complained of was not in excess of such

jurisdiction, or issued with grave abuse of discretion. Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, 13 on theother hand, instead of filing an answer, submitted a Manifestation in lieu thereof. He met squarelythe issue of whether or not respondent Judge had jurisdiction, and answered in the negative. He(i)ncluded that "the instant petition has merit and should be given due course."

He traced the changes undergone by the Labor Code, citing at the same time the decisions issued

by this Court after each of such changes. As pointed out, the original wording of Article 217 vestedthe labor arbiters with jurisdictional. 14 So it was applied by this Court in Garcia v. Martinez15 and inBengzon v. Inciong. 16 On May 1, 1978, however, Presidential Decree No. 1367 was issued,amending Article 217, and provided "that the Regional Directors shall not indorse and Labor Arbitersshall not entertain claims for moral and other forms of damages." 17 The ordinary courts were thusvested with jurisdiction to award actual and moral damages in the case of illegal dismissal ofemployees. 18 That is not, as pointed out by the Solicitor General, the end of the story, for on May 1,1980, Presidential Decree No. 1691 was issued, further amending Article 217, returning the original

jurisdiction to the labor arbiters, thus enabling them to decide "3. All money claims of workers,including those based on non-payment or underpayment of wages, overtime compensation,separation pay and other benefits provided by law or appropriate agreement, except claims foremployees compensation, social security, medicare and maternity benefits; [and] (5) All other claimsarising from employer-employee relations unless expressly excluded by tills Code." 19 An equallyconclusive manifestation of the lack of jurisdiction of a court of first instance then, a regional trialcourt now, is Batas Pambansa Blg. 130, amending Article 217 of the Labor Code. It took effect on

August 21, 1981. Subparagraph 2, paragraph (a) is now worded thus: "(2) those that involve wages,hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment." 20 This is to be compared with theformer phraseology "(2) unresolved issue in collective bargaining, including those that involvewages, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment." 21It is to be noted that BatasPambansa Blg. 130 made no change with respect to the original and exclusive jurisdiction of Labor

Arbiters with respect to money claims of workers or claims for damages arising from employer-employee relations.


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Nothing becomes clearer, therefore, than the meritorious character of this petition. certiorari andprohibition lie, respondent Judge being devoid of jurisdiction to act on the matter.

1. Article 217 is to be applied the way it is worded. The exclusive original jurisdiction of a laborarbiter is therein provided for explicitly. It means, it can only mean, that a court of first instance judgethen, a regional trial court judge now, certainly acts beyond the scope of the authority conferred on

him by law when he entertained the suit for damages, arising from picketing that accompanied astrike. That was squarely within the express terms of the law. Any deviation cannot therefore betolerated. So it has been the constant ruling of this Court even prior to Lizarraga Hermanos v. YapTico, 22 a 1913 decision. The ringing words of the ponencia of Justice Moreland still call forobedience. Thus, "The first and fundamental duty of courts, in our judgment, is to applythe law.Construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application isimpossible or inadequate without them." 23 It is so even after the lapse of sixty years. 24

2. On the precise question at issue under the law as it now stands, this Court has spoken in threedecisions. They all reflect the utmost fidelity to the plain command of the law that it is a labor arbiter,not a court, that ossesses original and exclusive jurisdiction to decide a claim for damages arisingfrom picketing or a strike. In Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. v. Martinez, 25the issue was set forth in theopening paragraph, in the ponencia of Justice Escolin: "This petition for certiorari, prohibition andmandamus raises anew the legal question often brought to this Court: Which tribunal has exclusive

jurisdiction over an action filed by an employee against his employer for recovery of unpaid salaries,separation benefits and damages the court of general jurisdiction or the Labor Arbiter of theNational Labor Relations Commission [NLRC]?" 26It was categorically held: "We rule that the Labor

Arbiter has exclusive jurisdiction over the case." 27Then came this portion of the opinion:"Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the sovereign authoritywhich organizes the court; and it is given only by law. Jurisdiction is never presumed; it must beconferred by law in words that do not admit of doubt. Since the jurisdiction of courts and judicialtribunals is derived exclusively from the statutes of the forum, the issue before us should be resolvedon the basis of the law or statute now in force. We find that law in presidential Decree 1691 whichtook effect on May 1, 1980, Section 3 of which reads as follows: ... Article 217. Jurisdiction of Labor

Arbiters and the Commission. (a) The Labor Arbiters shall have the original and exclusive

jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural: ... 3. All money claims of workers, including those based on nonpayment orunderpayment of wages, overtime compensation, separation pay and other benefits provided by lawor appropriate agreement, except claims for employees' compensation, social security, medicareand maternity benefits; 4. Cases involving household services; and 5. All other claims arising fromemployer-employee relations, unless expressly excluded by this Code." 28That same month, twoother cases were similarly decided, Ebon v. De Guzman29 andAguda v. Vallejos. 30

3. It is regrettable that the ruling in the above three decisions, decided in March of 1982, was notfollowed by private respondent when it filed the complaint for damages on July 9, 1982, more thanfour months later. 31On this point, reference may be made to our decision in National Federation ofLabor, et al. v. The Honorable Minister of Labor and Employment, 32promulgated on September 15,1983. In that case, the question involved was the failure of the same private respondent,Zamboanga Wood Products, Inc., to admit the striking petitioners, eighty-one in number, back towork after an order of Minister Blas F. Ople certifying to the National Labor Relations Commissionthe labor dispute for compulsory arbitration pursuant to Article 264 (g) of the Labor Code of thePhilippines. It was noted in the first paragraph of our opinion in that case: "On the face of it, it seemsdifficult to explain why private respondent would not comply with such order considering that therequest for compulsory arbitration came from it. It ignored this notification by the presidents of thelabor unions involved to its resident manager that the striking employees would lift their picket lineand start returning to work on August 20, 1982. Then, too, Minister Ople denied a partial motion forreconsideration insofar as the return-to-work aspect is concerned which reads: 'We find no merit in


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the said Motion for Reconsideration. The Labor code, as amended, specifically Article 264 (g),mandates that whenever a labor dispute is certified by the Minister of Labor and Employment to theNational Labor Relations Commission for compulsory arbitration and a strike has already takenplace at the time of certification, "all striking employees shall immediately return to work and theemployees shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms andconditions prevailing before the strike." ' " 33 No valid distinction can be made between the exercise

of compulsory arbitration vested in the Ministry of Labor and the jurisdiction of a labor arbiter to passover claims for damages in the light of the express provision of the Labor Code as set forth in Article217. In both cases, it is the Ministry, not a court of justice, that is vested by law with competence toact on the matter.

4. The issuance of Presidential Decree No. 1691 and the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 130,made clear that the exclusive and original jurisdiction for damages would once again be vested inlabor arbiters. It can be affirmed that even if they were not that explicit, history has vindicated theview that in the appraisal of what was referred to by Philippine American Management & FinancingCo., Inc. v. Management & Supervisors Association of the Philippine-American Management &Financing Co., Inc. 34 as "the rather thorny question as to where in labor matters the dividing line is tobe drawn" 35between the power lodged in an administrative body and a court, the unmistakable trendhas been to refer it to the former. Thus: "Increasingly, this Court has been committed to the view thatunless the law speaks clearly and unequivocally, the choice should fall on [an administrativeagency]." 36 Certainly, the present Labor Code is even more committed to the view that on policygrounds, and equally so in the interest of greater promptness in the disposition of labor matters, acourt is spared the often onerous task of determining what essentially is a factual matter, namely,the damages that may be incurred by either labor or management as a result of disputes orcontroversies arising from employer-employee relations.

WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted and the order of July 20, 1982, issued by respondentJudge, is nullified and set aside. The writ of prohibition is likewise granted and respondent Judge, orwhoever acts in his behalf in the Regional Trial Court to which this case is assigned, is enjoin fromtaking any further action on Civil Case No. 716 (2751), except for the purpose of dismissing it. Thetemporary restraining order of August 5, 1982 is hereby made permanent.

Teehankee, Makasiar, Aquino, Guerrero, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin Relova and Gutierrez,Jr., JJ., concur.

Concepcion Jr., J., took no part.

De Castro, J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions

ABAD SANTOS, J .,concurring:

I concur and express the hope that Art. 217 should not undergo repeated amendments.


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Separate Opinions

ABAD SANTOS, J .,concurring:

I concur and express the hope that Art. 217 should not undergo repeated amendments.

Footnotes

1 The other respondents are Lt. Col. Jacob Caruncho, Commanding Officer,Zamboanga District Command, PC, AFP and Zamboanga Wood Products.

2 Annex K to Petition 2.

3 Manifestation of Solicitor General in Lieu of Answer, par. 1.

4 Ibid, par. 2.

5 Ibid, par. 3.

6 Ibid, par. 4.

7 Ibid, par. 5.

8 Ibid, par. 8.

9 Ibid.

10 Ibid, par. 10.

11 Resolution of this Court dated August 3, 1982.

12 Resolution of this Court dated August 5, 1982.

13 He was assisted by then Assistant Solicitor General Reynato S. Puno; AssistantSolicitor General Ruben E. Agpalo and Solicitor Amado D. Aquino

14 Manifestation, in Lieu of Answer, 5-6, citing pars. (3) and (5) of Article 217.

15 L-47629, August 3, 1978, 84 SCRA 577.

16 L-48706-07, June 29, 1979, 91 SCRA 248.

17 Manifestation, 8.


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18 Cf. Garcia v. Martinez, L-47629, May 28, 1979, 90 SCRA 331; Calderon Sr. v.Court of Appeals, L-52235, October 28, 1980, 100 SCRA 459; Abad v. Phil.

American General Insurance Co., L-50563, October 30,1981, 108 SCRA 717. In allthree cases, it was made clear that money claims arising from employer-employeerelations by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 1367 were cognizable by the ordinarycourts, labor arbiters being excluded from passing upon "claims for moral and other

forms of damages."

19 Manifestation, 14.

20 Batas Pambansa Blg. 130, amending Article 217 of subparagraph 2 of paragraph(a) of the Labor Code (1981).

21 Article 2l7 of the Labor Code, par .(2).

22 24 Phil. 504.

23 Ibid, 513.

24 In Asuncion, Jr. v. Segundo, G.R. No. 59593, promulgated on September 24,1983, reference was made to Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa v. Manila RailroadCo., L-25316, February 28, 1979, 88 SCRA 616. The opinion acted 13 cases startingfrom People v. Mapa, L- 22301, August 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 1164 to Gonzaga v.Court of Appeals, L-27455, June 28, 1973, 51 SCRA 381. After the Manggagawadecision came two later cages of the same tenor: Banawa v. Mirano, L-24750, May16, 1980, 97 SCRA 517; Insular Lumber Co. v. Court of Tax Appeals, L-31057, May29, 1981, 104 SCRA 710. All in all, since the 1967 decision in Mapa, seventeencases have applied the ruling in Lizarraga Hermanos.

25 L-58877, May 15, 1982; 112 SCRA 578.

26 Ibid, 580.

27 Ibid, 581.

28 Ibid, 581-582.

29 L-58265, March 25, 1982, 113 SCRA 52.

30 L-58133, March 26, 1982, 113 SCRA 69.

31 The complaint in the lower court was signed by Alberto de la Rosa, resident

manager of private respondent. He was assisted by two members of the bar,Demosthenes S. Baban and Monico E. Luna, Annex J to Petition.

32 G.R. No. 64183.

33 Ibid, 2.

34 L-27953, November 29, 1972, 48 SCRA 187.


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35 Ibid, 91.

36 Ibid. Cf. Allied Free Workers Union v. Apostol, 102 Phil. 292 (1957); Bay ViewHotel Inc. v. Manila Hotel Workers Union, L. 21803, Dec. 17, 1966, 18 SCRA 946;Republic Savings Bank v. Court of Industrial Relations, L-20303, Sept. 27, 1967, 21SCRA 226; Seno v. Mendoza, L- 20565, Nov. 29, 1967, 21 SCRA 1124; Security

Bank Employees Union v. Security Bank and Trust Company, L-28536, April 30,1968, 23 SCRA 503; Manila Hotel Co. v. Pines Hotel Employees Association, L-24314, Sept. 28, 1970, 35 SCRA 96; Alhambra Industries, Inc. v. Court of IndustrialRelations, L-25984, Oct. 30, 1970, 35 SCRA 550; Espanilla v. La Carlota SugarCentral, L-23722, March 31, 1971; 38 SCRA 186; Mindanao Rapid Co., Inc. v.Omandam, L-23058, Nov. 27, 1971, 42 SCRA 250.


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Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 111107 January 10, 1997

LOEONARDO A. PAAT, in his capacity as Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Regional ExecutiveDirector (RED), Region 2 and JOVITO LAYUGAN, JR., in his capacity as CommunityEnvironment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO), both of the Department of Environmentand Natural Resources (DENR), petitioners,vs.COURT OF APPEALS, HON. RICARDO A. BACULI in his capacity as Presiding Judge ofBranch 2, Regional Trial Court at Tuguegarao, Cagayan, and SPOUSES BIENVENIDO andVICTORIA DE GUZMAN, respondents.

TORRES, JR., J.:

Without violating the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies, may an action for replevinprosper to recover a movable property which is the subject matter of an administrative forfeitureproceeding in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources pursuant to Section 68-A ofP.D. 705, as amended, entitled The Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines?

Are the Secretary of DENR and his representatives empowered to confiscate and forfeitconveyances used in transporting illegal forest products in favor of the government?

These are two fundamental questions presented before us for our resolution.

The controversy on hand had its incipiency on May 19, 1989 when the truck of private respondentVictoria de Guzman while on its way to Bulacan from San Jose, Baggao, Cagayan, was seized bythe Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR, for brevity) personnel in Aritao,Nueva Vizcaya because the driver could not produce the required documents for the forest productsfound concealed in the truck. Petitioner Jovito Layugan, the Community Environment and NaturalResources Officer (CENRO) in Aritao, Cagayan, issued on May 23, 1989 an order of confiscation ofthe truck and gave the owner thereof fifteen (15) days within which to submit an explanation why thetruck should not be forfeited. Private respondents, however, failed to submit the requiredexplanation. On June 22, 1989, 1 Regional Executive Director Rogelio Baggayan of DENR sustainedpetitioner Layugan's action of confiscation and ordered the forfeiture of the truck invoking Section68-A of Presidential Decree No. 705 as amended by Executive Order No. 277. Private respondentsfiled a letter of reconsideration dated June 28, 1989 of the June 22, 1989 order of Executive DirectorBaggayan, which was, however, denied in a subsequent order of July 12, 1989. 2 Subsequently, thecase was brought by the petitioners to the Secretary of DENR pursuant to private respondents'statement in their letter dated June 28, 1989 that in case their letter for reconsideration would bedenied then "this letter should be considered as an appeal to the Secretary." 3 Pending resolutionhowever of the appeal, a suit for replevin, docketed as Civil Case 4031, was filed by the privaterespondents against petitioner Layugan and Executive Director Baggayan 4with the Regional TrialCourt, Branch 2 of Cagayan, 5 which issued a writ ordering the return of the truck to private


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respondents. 6 Petitioner Layugan and Executive Director Baggayan filed a motion to dismiss withthe trial court contending, inter alia, that private respondents had no cause of action for their failureto exhaust administrative remedies. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss in an order datedDecember 28, 1989. 7 Their motion for reconsideration having been likewise denied, a petition forcertiorariwas filed by the petitioners with the respondent Court of Appeals which sustained the trialcourt's order ruling that the question involved is purely a legal question. 8 Hence, this present

petition,9

with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction, seeking to reversethe decision of the respondent Court of Appeals was filed by the petitioners on September 9, 1993.By virtue of the Resolution dated September 27, 1993, 10 the prayer for the issuance of temporaryrestraining order of petitioners was granted by this Court.

Invoking the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, petitioners aver that the trial courtcould not legally entertain the suit for replevin because the truck was under administrative seizureproceedings pursuant to Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as amended by E.O. 277. Private respondents,on the other hand, would seek to avoid the operation of this principle asserting that the instant casefalls within the exception of the doctrine upon the justification that (1) due process was violatedbecause they were not given the chance to be heard, and (2) the seizure and forfeiture was unlawfulon the grounds: (a) that the Secretary of DENR and his representatives have no authority toconfiscate and forfeit conveyances utilized in transporting illegal forest products, and (b) that thetruck as admitted by petitioners was not used in the commission of the crime.

Upon a thorough and delicate scrutiny of the records and relevant jurisprudence on the matter, weare of the opinion that the plea of petitioners for reversal is in order.

This Court in a long line of cases has consistently held that before a party is allowed to seek theintervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means ofadministrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery canstill be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on amatter that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first before court's

judicial power can be sought, The premature invocation of court's intervention is fatal to one's causeof action. 11Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel the case is susceptible of dismissal

for lack of cause ofaction. 12This doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not without its practical andlegal reasons, for one thing, availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses andprovides for a speedier disposition of controversies. It is no less true to state that the courts of justicefor reasons of comity and convenience will shy away from a dispute until the system ofadministrative redress has been completed and complied with so as to give the administrativeagency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and to dispose of the case. However, we arenot amiss to reiterate that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies as tested by abattery of cases is not an ironclad rule. This doctrine is a relative one and its flexibility is called uponby the peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial settings of a case. Hence, it isdisregarded (1) when there is a violation of due process, 13 (2) when the issue involved is purely alegal question, 14 (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of

jurisdiction, 15 (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned, 16(5)when there is irreparable injury, 17 (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts asan alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter, 18 (7) when torequire exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable, 19(8) when it would amount toa nullification of a claim, 20 (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings, 21(10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when there arecircumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention. 22

In the case at bar, there is no question that the controversy was pending before the Secretary ofDENR when it was forwarded to him following the denial by the petitioners of the motion for


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reconsideration of private respondents through the order of July 12, 1989. In their letter ofreconsideration dated June 28, 1989, 23 private respondents clearly recognize the presence of anadministrative forum to which they seek to avail, as they did avail, in the resolution of their case. Theletter, reads, thus:

xxx xxx xxx

If this motion for reconsideration does not merit your favorable action, then this lettershould be considered as an appeal to theSecretary. 24

It was easy to perceive then that the private respondents looked up to the Secretary for the reviewand disposition of their case. By appealing to him, they acknowledged the existence of an adequateand plain remedy still available and open to them in the ordinary course of the law. Thus, theycannot now, without violating the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies, seek court'sintervention by filing an action for replevin for the grant of their relief during the pendency of anadministrative proceedings.

Moreover, it is important to point out that the enforcement of forestry laws, rules and regulations andthe protection, development and management of forest lands fall within the primary and specialresponsibilities of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. By the very nature of itsfunction, the DENR should be given a free hand unperturbed by judicial intrusion to determine acontroversy which is well within its jurisdiction. The assumption by the trial court, therefore, of thereplevin suit filed by private respondents constitutes an unjustified encroachment into the domain ofthe administrative agency's prerogative. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a courtto arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initiallylodged with an administrative body of special competence. 25In Felipe Ismael, Jr. and Co. vs. DeputyExecutive Secretary, 26 which was reiterated in the recent case of Concerned Officials ofMWSS vs.Vasquez, 27this Court held:

Thus, while the administration grapples with the complex and multifarious problems

caused by unbriddled exploitation of these resources, the judiciary will stand clear. Along line of cases establish the basic rule that the courts will not interfere in matterswhich are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted withthe regulation of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and trainingof such agencies.

To sustain the claim of private respondents would in effect bring the instant controversy beyond thepale of the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies and fall within the ambit of exceptedcases heretofore stated. However, considering the circumstances prevailing in this case, we can notbut rule out these assertions of private respondents to be without merit. First, they argued that therewas violation of due process because they did not receive the May 23, 1989 order of confiscation ofpetitioner Layugan. This contention has no leg to stand on. Due process does not necessarily mean

or require a hearing, but simply an opportunity or right to be heard.28

One may be heard, not solelyby verbal presentation but also, and perhaps many times more creditably and practicable than oralargument, through pleadings. 29 In administrative proceedings moreover, technical rules of procedureand evidence are not strictly applied; administrative process cannot be fully equated with dueprocess in its strict judicial sense. 30 Indeed, deprivation of due process cannot be successfullyinvoked where a party was given the chance to be heard on his motion for reconsideration, 31 as inthe instant case, when private respondents were undisputedly given the opportunity to present theirside when they filed a letter of reconsideration dated June 28, 1989 which was, however, denied in


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an order of July 12, 1989 of Executive Director Baggayan, In Navarro III vs. Damasco, 32 we ruledthat :

The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied toadministrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity toseek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A formal or trial type

hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The requirements aresatisfied when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explaintheir side of the controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is the absolute lack ofnotice or hearing.

Second, private respondents imputed the patent illegality of seizure and forfeiture of the truckbecause the administrative officers of the DENR allegedly have no power to perform these actsunder the law. They insisted that only the court is authorized to confiscate and forfeit conveyancesused in transporting illegal forest products as can be gleaned from the second paragraph of Section68 of P.D. 705, as amended by E.O. 277. The pertinent provision reads as follows:

Sec. 68. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

The courtshall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timberor any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well asthe machinery, equipments, implements and tools illegaly [sic] used in the areawhere the timber or forest products are found. (Emphasis ours)

A reading, however, of the law persuades us not to go along with private respondents' thinking notonly because the aforequoted provision apparently does not mention nor include "conveyances" thatcan be the subject of confiscation by the courts, but to a large extent, due to the fact that privaterespondents' interpretation of the subject provision unduly restricts the clear intention of the law andinevitably reduces the other provision of Section 68-A, which is quoted herein below:

Sec. 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department or His Duly AuthorizedRepresentative To Order Confiscation. In all cases of violation of this Code or otherforest laws, rules and regulations, the Department Head or his duly authorizedrepresentative, may order the confiscation of any forest products illegally cut,gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned, and all conveyances used either byland, water or airin the commission of the offense and to dispose of the same inaccordance with pertinent laws, regulations and policies on the matter. (Emphasisours)

It is, thus, clear from the foregoing provision that the Secretary and his duly authorizedrepresentatives are given the authority to confiscate and forfeit any conveyances utilized in violating

the Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations. The phrase "to dispose of the same" is broadenough to cover the act of forfeiting conveyances in favor of the government. The only limitation isthat it should be made "in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the matter." Inthe construction of statutes, it must be read in such a way as to give effect to the purpose projectedin the statute. 33Statutes should be construed in the light of the object to be achieved and the evil ormischief to be suppressed, and they should be given such construction as will advance the object,suppress the mischief, and secure the benefits intended. 34 In this wise, the observation of theSolicitor General is significant, thus:


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But precisely because of the need to make forestry laws "more responsive to presentsituations and realities" and in view of the "urgency to conserve the remainingresources of the country," that the government opted to add Section 68-A. Thisamendatory provision is an administrative remedytotally separate and distinct fromcriminal proceedings. More than anything else, it is intended to supplant theinadequacies that characterize enforcement of forestry laws through criminal actions.

The preamble of EO 277-the law that added Section 68-A to PD 705-is mostrevealing:

"WHEREAS, there is an urgency to conserve the remaining forestresources of the country for the benefit and welfare of the presentand future generations of Filipinos;

WHEREAS, our forest resources may be effectively conserved andprotected through the vigilant enforcement and implementation of ourforestry laws, rules and regulations;

WHEREAS, the implementation of our forestry laws suffers from

technical difficulties, due to certain inadequacies in the penalprovisions of the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines; and

WHEREAS, to overcome this difficulties, there is a need to penalizecertain acts more responsive to present situations and realities;"

It is interesting to note that Section 68-A is a new provision authorizing the DENR toconfiscate, not only "conveyances," but forest products as well. On the other hand,confiscation of forest products by the "court" in a criminal action has long been

provided for in Section 68. If as private respondents insist, the power on confiscationcannot be exercised except only through the court under Section 68, then Section68-A would have no Purpose at all. Simply put, Section 68-A would not haveprovided any solution to the problem perceived in EO 277, supra. 35

Private respondents, likewise, contend that the seizure was illegal because the petitionersthemselves admitted in the Order dated July 12, 1989 of Executive Director Baggayan that the truckof private respondents was not used in the commission of the crime. This order, a copy of which wasgiven to and received by the counsel of private respondents, reads in part, viz.:

. . . while it is true that the truck of your client was not used by her in the commissionof the crime, we uphold your claim that the truck owner is not liable for the crime andin no case could a criminal case be filed against her as provided under Article 309and 310 of the Revised Penal Code. . . 36

We observed that private respondents misread the content of the aforestated order and obviously

misinterpreted the intention of petitioners. What is contemplated by the petitioners when they statedthat the truck "was not used in the commission of the crime" is that it was not used in thecommission of the crime of theft, hence, in no case can a criminal action be filed against the ownerthereof for violation of Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioners did not eliminatethe possibility that the truck was being used in the commission of another crime, that is, the breachof Section 68 of P.D. 705 as amended by E.O. 277. In the same order of July 12, 1989, petitionerspointed out:


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. . . However, under Section 68 of P.D. 705 as amended and further amended byExecutive Order No. 277 specifically provides for the confiscation of the conveyanceused in the transport of forest products not covered by the required legal documents.She may not have been involved in the cutting and gathering of the product inquestion but the fact that she accepted the goods for a fee or fare the same istherefor liable. . . 37

Private respondents, however, contended that there is no crime defined and punishable underSection 68 other than qualified theft, so that, when petitioners admitted in the July 12, 1989 orderthat private respondents could not be charged for theft as provided for under Articles 309 and 310 ofthe Revised Penal Code, then necessarily private respondents could not have committed an actconstituting a crime under Section 68. We disagree. For clarity, the provision of Section 68 of P.D.705 before its amendment by E.O. 277 and the provision of Section 1 of E.O. No. 277 amending theaforementioned Section 68 are reproduced herein, thus:

Sec. 68. Cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other products without license. Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, or remove timber or other forestproducts from any forest land, or timber from alienable and disposable public lands,or from private lands, without any authority under a license agreement, lease, licenseor permit, shall be guilty of qualified theft as defined and punished under Articles 309and 310 of the Revised Penal Code . . . (Emphasis ours; Section 68, P.D. 705 beforeits amendment by E.O. 277)

Sec. 1. Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended, is hereby amendedto read as follows:

Sec. 68. Cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other forestproducts without license. Any person who shall cut, gather, collect,remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timberfrom alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, withoutany authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the

legal documents as required under existing forest laws andregulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under

Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code . . . (Emphasis ours;Section 1, E.O. No. 277 amending Section 68, P.D. 705 as amended)

With the introduction of Executive Order No. 277 amending Section 68 of P.D. 705, the act ofcutting, gathering, collecting, removing, or possessing forest products without authority constitutes adistinct offense independent now from the crime of theft under Articles 309 and 310 of the RevisedPenal Code, but the penalty to be imposed is that provided for under Article 309 and 310 of theRevised Penal Code. This is clear from the language of Executive Order No. 277 when it eliminatedthe phrase "shall be guilty of qualified theft as defined and punished under Articles 309 and 310 ofthe Revised Penal Code" and inserted the words "shall be punished with the penalties imposed

under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code". When the statute is clear and explicit, thereis hardly room for any extended court ratiocination or rationalization of the law. 38

From the foregoing disquisition, it is clear that a suit for replevin can not be sustained against thepetitioners for the subject truck taken and retained by them for administrative forfeiture proceedingsin pursuant to Section 68-A of the P.D. 705, as amended. Dismissal of the replevin suit for lack ofcause of action in view of the private respondents' failure to exhaust administrative remedies shouldhave been the proper course of action by the lower court instead of assuming jurisdiction over thecase and consequently issuing the writ ordering the return of the truck. Exhaustion of the remedies


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in the administrative forum, being a condition precedent prior to one's recourse to the courts andmore importantly, being an element of private respondents' right of action, is too significant to bewaylaid by the lower court.

It is worth stressing at this point, that a suit for replevin is founded solely on the claim that thedefendant wrongfully withholds the property sought to be recovered. It lies to recover possession of

personal chattels that are unlawfully detained.39

"To detain" is defined as to mean "to hold or keep incustody,"40 and it has been held that there is tortious taking whenever there is an unlawful meddlingwith the property, or an exercise or claim of dominion over it, without any pretense of authority orright; this, without manual seizing of the property is sufficient. 41 Under the Rules of Court, it isindispensable in replevin proceeding that the plaintiff must show by his own affidavit that he isentitled to the possession of property, that the property is wrongfully detained by the defendant,alleging the cause of detention, that the same has not been taken for tax assessment, or seizedunder execution, or attachment, or if so seized, that it is exempt from such seizure, and the actualvalue of the property. 42 Private respondents miserably failed to convince this Court that a wrongfuldetention of the subject truck obtains in the instant case. It should be noted that the truck was seizedby the petitioners because it was transporting forest products without the required permit of theDENR in manifest contravention of Section 68 of P.D. 705 as amended by E.O 277. Section 68-A ofP.D. 705, as amended, unquestionably warrants the confiscation as well as the disposition by theSecretary of DENR or his duly authorized representatives of the conveyances used in violating theprovision of forestry laws. Evidently, the continued possession or detention of the truck by thepetitioners for administrative forfeiture proceeding is legally permissible, hence, no wrongfuldetention exists in the case at bar.

Moreover, the suit for replevin is never intended as a procedural tool to question the orders ofconfiscation and forfeiture issued by the DENR in pursuance to the authority given under P.D. 705,as amended. Section 8 of the said law is explicit that actions taken by the Director of the Bureau ofForest Development concerning the enforcement of the provisions of the said law are subject toreview by the Secretary of DENR and that courts may not review the decisions of the Secretaryexcept through a special civil action forcertiorarior prohibition. It reads:

Sec. 8. REVIEW

All actions and decisions of the Director are subject to review,motu propio or upon appeal of any person aggrieved thereby, by the DepartmentHead whose decision shall be final and executory after the lapse of thirty (30) daysfrom the receipt of the aggrieved party of said decision, unless appealed to thePresident in accordance with Executive Order No. 19, Series of 1966. The Decisionof the Department Head may not be reviewed by the courts except through a specialcivil action forcertiorarior prohibition.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED; the Decision of the respondent Court of Appeals datedOctober 16, 1991 and its Resolution dated July 14, 1992 are hereby SET ASIDE AND REVERSED;the Restraining Order promulgated on September 27, 1993 is hereby made permanent; and theSecretary of DENR is directed to resolve the controversy with utmost dispatch.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado, Romero, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Rollo p. 235.


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2 Rollo pp. 241-242.

3 Rollo p. 239.

4 Baggayan died during the pendency of Civil Case 4031, he was succeeded inoffice by Petitioner Leonardo Paat.

5 Presided by Judge Ricardo A. Baculi.

6 Rollo pp. 251-252.

7 Rollo pp. 274-275.

8 Rollo pp. 36-46 penned by Justice Serafin V.C. Guingona, concurred by JusticesLuis A. Javellana and Jorge S. Imperial.

9 Rollo pp. 14-35.

10 Rollo pp. 117-119.

11 National Development Company v. Hervilla, L-65718, June 30, 1987; AtlasConsolidated Mining Company vs. Mendoza, G.R. No. L -15809, August 30, 1961;

Aboitiz v. Collector of Customs, G.R. No. L-29466, May 18, 1978; Pestenas v. Dyogi,G.R. No. L-25786, February 27, 1978.

12 Soto v. Jareno, G.R. No. 38962, September 15, 1986; Hodges v. Mun. Board, L-18276, January 12, 1967; Abe-Abe v. Manta, L-4827, May 31, 1979; Gone v. DistrictEngineer, L-22782, August 29, 1975.

13 Quisumbing v. Judge Gumban, G.R. No. 85156, February 5, 1991.

14 Eastern Shipping Lines v. POEA, L-76633, October 18, 1988.

15 Industrial Power Sales, Inc. V. Sinsuat, L-29171, April 15, 1988.

16 Vda. De Tan v. Veterans Backpay Commission, L-12944, March 30, 1959.

17 De Lara v. Cloribel, G.R. No. L-21653, May 31, 1965.

18 Demaisip v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 13000, September 25, 1959; Bartulata v.Peralta, G.R. No. 23155, September 9, 1974.

19 Cipriano v. Marcelino, G.R. No. L-27793, February 28, 1972.

20 Alzate v. Aldana, G.R. No. 14407, February 29, 1960.

21 Soto v. Jareno, supra.

22 Quisumbing v. Judge Gumban, supra.


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23 Rollo pp. 236-240.

24 Rollo p. 239.

25 Vidad v. RTC, G.R. No. 98084, October 18, 1993.

26 G.R. No. 79538, October 18, 1990.

27 G.R. No. 109113, January 25, 1995.

28 Pepsi Cola Distributors of the Phil. V. NLRC, G.R. No. 100686, August 15, 1995.

29 Concerned Officials of MWSS vs. Vasquez, supra.

30 Ibid.

31 Rodriguez v. Project 6 Market Service Cooperative, G.R. No. 79968, August 23,1995.

32 G.R. No. 101875, July 14, 1995.

33 Lopez, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104158, November 6, 1992.

34 De Guia v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 104712, May 6, 1992.

35 Rollo pp. 170-171; Memorandum pp. 12-13.

36 Rollo p. 242.

37 Ibid.

38 Libanan v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 112386, June 14, 1994.

39 American Jurisprudence, Second Edition, Volume 66, p. 850, footnote 57; I.Tanenbaum Son and Company vs. C. Ludwig Baumann and Company, 261 NY 85,184 NE 503, 86 ALR 102.

40 Ibid., footnote 59; Anderson vs. Hapler, 34 III 436; Wails vs. Farrington, 27 Okla754, 116 P 428.

41 Id., footnote 60 ; Haythorn vs. Rushforth, 19 NJL 160.

42 Section 2, Rule 60 of the Rules of Court.


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Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-22301 August 30, 1967

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,vs.MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG, defendant-appellant.

Francisco P. Cabigao for defendant-appellant.Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General F. R. Rosete and SolicitorO. C. Hernandez for plaintiff-appellee.

FERNANDO, J .:

The sole question in this appeal from a judgment of conviction by the lower court is whether or notthe appointment to and holding of the position of a secret agent to the provincial governor wouldconstitute a sufficient defense to a prosecution for the crime of illegal possession of firearm andammunition. We hold that it does not.

The accused in this case was indicted for the above offense in an information dated August 14, 1962reading as follows: "The undersized accuses MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG of a violation of Section878 in connection with Section 2692 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended byCommonwealth Act No. 56 and as further amended by Republic Act No. 4, committed as follows:That on or about the 13th day of August, 1962, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accuseddid then and there wilfully and unlawfully have in his possession and under his custody and controlone home-made revolver (Paltik), Cal. 22, without serial number, with six (6) rounds of ammunition,

without first having secured the necessary license or permit therefor from the correspondingauthorities. Contrary to law."

When the case was called for hearing on September 3, 1963, the lower court at the outset asked thecounsel for the accused: "May counsel stipulate that the accused was found in possession of thegun involved in this case, that he has neither a permit or license to possess the same and that wecan submit the same on a question of law whether or not an agent of the governor can hold a firearmwithout a permit issued by the Philippine Constabulary." After counsel sought from the fiscal anassurance that he would not question the authenticity of his exhibits, the understanding being thatonly a question of law would be submitted for decision, he explicitly specified such question to be"whether or not a secret agent is not required to get a license for his firearm."

Upon the lower court stating that the fiscal should examine the document so that he could pass on

their authenticity, the fiscal asked the following question: "Does the accused admit that this pistol cal.22 revolver with six rounds of ammunition mentioned in the information was found in his possessionon August 13, 1962, in the City of Manila without first having secured the necessary license or permitthereof from the corresponding authority?" The accused, now the appellant, answered categorically:"Yes, Your Honor." Upon which, the lower court made a statement: "The accused admits, Yes, andhis counsel Atty. Cabigao also affirms that the accused admits."

Forthwith, the fiscal announced that he was "willing to submit the same for decision." Counsel for theaccused on his part presented four (4) exhibits consisting of his appointment "as secret agent of the


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Hon. Feliciano Leviste," then Governor of Batangas, dated June 2, 1962;1 another documentlikewise issued by Gov. Leviste also addressed to the accused directing him to proceed to Manila,Pasay and Quezon City on a confidential mission;2 the oath of office of the accused as such secretagent,3 a certificate dated March 11, 1963, to the effect that the accused "is a secret agent" of Gov.Leviste.4 Counsel for the accused then stated that with the presentation of the above exhibits he was"willing to submit the case on the question of whether or not a secret agent duly appointed and

qualified as such of the provincial governor is exempt from the requirement of having a license offirearm." The exhibits were admitted and the parties were given time to file their respectivememoranda.1wph1.t

Thereafter on November 27, 1963, the lower court rendered a decision convicting the accused "ofthe crime of illegal possession of firearms and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from oneyear and one day to two years and to pay the costs. The firearm and ammunition confiscated fromhim are forfeited in favor of the Government."

The only question being one of law, the appeal was taken to this Court. The decision must beaffirmed.

The law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall be unlawful for any person to. . . possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument orimplement used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, orammunition."5 The next section provides that "firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully issuedto officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the Armed Forces of the Philippines], the PhilippineConstabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincialgovernors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, andguards of provincial prisoners and jails," are not covered "when such firearms are in possession ofsuch officials and public servants for use in the performance of their official duties."6

The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for a secret agent. As such he is not exempt.Our task is equally clear. The first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law. "Constructionand interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or

inadequate without them."7 The conviction of the accused must stand. It cannot be set aside.

Accused however would rely on People v. Macarandang,8 where a secret agent was acquitted onappeal on the assumption that the appointment "of the accused as a secret agent to assist in themaintenance of peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes, sufficiently put him within thecategory of a "peace officer" equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly coveredby section 879." Such reliance is misplaced. It is not within the power of this Court to set aside theclear and explicit mandate of a statutory provision. To the extent therefore that this decision conflictswith what was held in People v. Macarandang, it no longer speaks with authority.

Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro andAngeles, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1Exhibit 1.

2Exhibit 2.


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3Exhibit 3.

4Exhibit 4.

5Sec. 878 as amended by Republic Act No. 4, Revised Administrative Code.

6Sec. 879, Revised Administrative Code.

7Lizarraga Hermanos v. Yap Tico, (1913) 24 Phil. 504, 513.

8L-12088, December 23, 1959.


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Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-34568 March 28, 1988

RODERICK DAOANG, and ROMMEL DAOANG, assisted by their father, ROMEO DAOANG,petitioners,vs.THE MUNICIPAL JUDGE, SAN NICOLAS, ILOCOS NORTE, ANTERO AGONOY and AMANDARAMOS-AGONOY, respondents.

PADILLA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision, dated 30 June 1971, rendered by therespondent judge * in Spec. Proc. No. 37 of Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, entitled: "Inre Adoption of the Minors Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos; Antero Agonoy and Amanda R.

Agonoy, petitioners", the dispositive part of which reads, as follows:

Wherefore, Court renders judgment declaring that henceforth Quirino Bonilla andWilson Marcos be, to all legitimate intents and purposes, the children by adoption ofthe joint petitioners Antero Agonoy and Amanda R. Agonoy and that the former befreed from legal obedience and maintenance by their respective parents, MiguelBonilla and Laureana Agonoy for Quirino Bonilla and Modesto Marcos andBenjamina Gonzales for Wilson Marcos and their family names 'Bonilla' and 'Marcos'be changed with "Agonoy", which is the family name of the petitioners.

Successional rights of the children and that of their adopting parents shall begoverned by the pertinent provisions of the New Civil Code.

Let copy of this decision be furnished and entered into the records of the Local CivilRegistry of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, for its legal effects at the expense of thepetitioners. 1

The undisputed facts of the case are as fol

Documents

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