Standing Joint Force Headquarters(JFCOM) Standing Joint Force Headquarters (Core Element) (SJFHQ (CE)). This important headquarters is the prototype for the SJFHQ elements being established

i

Standing Joint Force Headquarters

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4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Standing Joint Force Headquarters Joint Center for Lessons LearnedQuarterly Bulletin Volume VI, Issue 3, June 2004

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ii

JointCenter for LessonsLearned (JCLL) has changedto Joint Center for Operational

Analysis and LessonsLearned (JCOA-LL).

iii

Message From the Director

BG Robert W. Cone, USADirector, JCOA-LL

Welcome to the final edition of the Joint Center for LessonsLearned (JCLL) Bulletin. No, we are not going away, but inorder to more adequately reflect our new and expanded mission,our name has been changed. Effective June 1, 2004, the JCLLbecame the Joint Center for Operational Analysis and LessonsLearned (JCOA-LL). Future issues of the Bulletin will becalled the JCOA-LL Bulletin–same great lessons learnedinformation under a new name.

This Bulletin is focused on the Joint Forces Command(JFCOM) Standing Joint Force Headquarters (Core Element)(SJFHQ (CE)). This important headquarters is the prototypefor the SJFHQ elements being established at each of thecombatant commands, which will provide a fully trained, fullyoperational joint headquarters staff capable of immediatelydeploying to operational requirements within a combatantcommander’s area of responsibility. Whether the operationinvolves disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, or a varietyof combat operations, the SJFHQ(CE) is able to establishcommand and control immediately upon arrival.

Rear Admiral O’Hanlon, Commander SJFHQ(CE), introducesthe series of Bulletin articles with an overview of the unit.This is followed by an article written by Major Chuck Cosenza,USA, titled SJFHQ(CE): Its Origin, Implementation andProspects for the Future, which discusses the history of theSJFHQ(CE). The next article is SJFHQ(CE)Planning: Into TheFuture, in which Mr. John Eldridge, Political/Military Planner,details pre-crisis and crisis planning functions.

In the fourth article, SJFHQ(CE) Operations Group, LTCTom Coleman, US Army, provides an overview of theorganization and functions of the Operations Group, alongwith its roles and tasks. The next two articles provideinformation on the logistics function of the SJFHQ. In TheSJFHQ(CE) Logistics Organization, Mr. Brad Jublou, LeadLogistics Planner, gives information on the organization,and pre-crisis and crisis planning. This is followed by

Logistics Common Relevant Operational Picture, by Mr.Ron Bullard, Logistics Operations Group Chief. ANOVERVIEW OF INTERNAL TRAINING, by Mr. WilliamBarns, Internal Training Coordinator, is the seventh article.In it, Mr. Barns describes the internal training programdeveloped to ensure the SJFHQ(CE) personnel are fullytrained to perform their duties.

In the eighth Bulletin article, SJFHQ In the Political MilitaryWorld, Mr. John Eldridge, discusses the function of the JointInteragency Coordination Group and the political militaryplanner. In Lessons Learned in SJFHQ(CE)Implementation: Knowledge Management, the nintharticle, author Mr. Michael McGonagle, KnowledgeManagement Director, describes the lessons learned inobtaining decision superiority, and knowledge managementprinciples and procedures. Next, LtCol Horttor, USAF, andLtCol Ed Schmoker, USAF (Ret.), provide the tenth article,Information Operations Lessons Learned in support of theGeographic Combatant Commanders and the StandingJoint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ), on the Joint InformationOperation Center support to the SJFHQ.

The eleventh article, SJFHQ INFORMATIONSUPERIORITY GROUP, by Mr. Ray Baker, Chief InformationSuperiority Group, describes the concept and organizationof the Information Superiority Group, along with observationsfrom recent operations. Finally, the last article discusses theSystem of Systems Analysis (SoSA) function within theSJFHQ(CE). Mr. Rick Wilson and Mr. Bob Kuth describe theSoSA approach to operational net assessment.

ROBERT W. CONEBrigadier General, U.S. ArmyDirector, Joint Center for Operational Analysisand Lessons Learned

ivJoint Center for Lessons Learned (JCLL) Bulletin

JCOA-LL UPDATEMr. Mike Barker

JCOA-LL: Joint Center for Operational Analysis andLessons Learned. As of 1 June, we have a new namefor an expanded game. Lessons learned are still thefocus, with active collection during a specific eventbeing the means. Unlike the legacy Joint Center forLessons Learned (JCLL), we now have the capabilityto support any combatant command/joint task force(COCOM/JTF) with an active collection team, and witha more robust analysis capability. Acting in the capacityof an “honest broker,” our collection teams work forthe commander where the team is embedded, collectingwhat he deems are HIS important issues or concerns.Currently, we have a team in Baghdad and Qatarobserving the Iraqi transition for Operation IRAQIFREEDOM (OIF) and another team embedded inSouthern Command (SOUTHCOM) observing thetransition to the United Nations peacekeeping force inHaiti. In several weeks, a third team heads to PacificCommand (PACOM) for a short visit in support of theGlobal War on Terrorism, while a fourth team will visitTransportation Command (TRANSCOM). A fifth teamis in final preparation to deploy to Iraq and Qatar toreplace the current team. The team we currently havein Baghdad set a new precedence for the collectionteam’s makeup, when for the first time the teamdeployed to a high threat zone with a mix of militaryand civilian personnel, including a female civilian. Allof our collection teams, regardless of where they mightdeploy, will now have a military/civilian mix.

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The next major event we are planning is the WorldwideJoint Lessons Learned Conference, scheduled for 13-14 July 2004. The focus of this conference is to briefand discuss the changes to the Joint Lessons LearnedProgram (JLLP); introduce the JCOA-LL to the jointand allied communities; discuss new or evolving policiesand procedures that support the collection, analysis,integration, and distribution requirements of theSecretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefsof Staff (CJCS); introduce the reports generated by

JCOA-LL that are already having an impact on thewarfighter; and introduce the draft CJCS Instructionfor the lessons learned program. Also, the functional/regional commands, Services, and allies are being giventhe opportunity to brief their program in terms ofsuccesses and challenges. These briefs will be postedto our website after the conference. So far, over 100people have signed up for the conference with threeweeks to go. These attendees represent all theCOCOMs, the Service lessons learned centers,Department of Defense (DOD) and non-DODagencies, the Joint Staff, and several of our allies, toinclude the UK, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.NATO’s Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Center(JALLC) will be participating, along with several“communities of practice” such as medical andinformation operations. The keynote speaker for theconference will be ADM Giambastiani, CommanderJoint Forces Command, with BG Cone, DirectorJCOA-LL, and MajGen Catton, Director Joint StaffJ7, also attending.

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Between the Joint Staff and ourselves, we are pressingas hard as possible to get the draft JLLP instruction onthe street. Release of the preliminary draft (PD) ofthe CJCS Instruction by the Joint Staff is due in thenear future for first review and comments.

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Finally, if you have any thoughts or suggestions for focusareas for future JCOA-LL Bulletins, please forwardyour idea(s) to us.

“It is far better to borrow experience than to buyit.” Charles C. Colton, Lacon (1825)

vJoint Center for Lessons Learned (JCLL) Bulletin

Contents

Message from the Director ................................................................................................................ iiiJCOA-LL Update ................................................................................................................................ ivCommander’s Message: Standing Joint Force Headquarters (Core Element) ............................... 1Standing Joint Force Headquarters (Core Element): Its Origin, Implementation

and Prospects for the Future ................................................................................................... 3Standing Joint Force Headquarters (Core Element) Planning: Into The Future .............................. 9Standing Joint Force Headquarters (Core Element) Operations Group ......................................... 15The Standing Joint Force Headquarters (Core Element) Logistics Organization .......................... 20Logistics Common Relevant Operational Picture ............................................................................ 24Standing Joint Force Headquarters In the Political Military World ............................................... 31Lessons Learned in SJFHQ(CE) Implementation: Knowledge Management .............................. 33Information Operations Lessons Learned in support of the Geographic

Combatant Commanders and the Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ) ............... 37SJFHQ Information Superiority Group ............................................................................................ 42System of Systems Analysis (SoSA) ................................................................................................. 49

viJoint Center for Lessons Learned (JCLL) Bulletin

1Joint Center for Lessons Learned (JCLL) Bulletin

Rear Admiral Richard J. O’HanlonUnited States Navy

Commander, SJFHQ

For many years, America’s crisis response involvedhastily assembled, ad hoc joint task forces, whose staffshad little opportunity for joint training or advancesituational awareness. These staffs were well versedin their own Services’ jargon and procedures, but hadto endure a learning curve to gain familiarity withjointness and the crisis situation itself. The StandingJoint Force Headquarters (Core Element)(SJFHQ(CE)) is the proactive solution to streamlinethe process and eliminate these difficulties.

The SJFHQ(CE) is a standing, coherent team of “jointgeneralists,” led by a flag/general officer. Mission-tailorable, it incorporates extensive joint operationstraining and knowledge of joint operations, thecombatant commander’s area of responsibility, theaterperspective, key issues, and regional players.

The SJFHQ(CE) is the organizational centerpiece ofadaptive joint command and control for a rapid, decisiveoperation. In practical terms, the SJFHQ(CE) conceptallows pre-crisis planning for the focus areas directedby combatant commanders. This capability is based onan improved, more timely situational awareness andunderstanding of the adversary, as well as of friendlyforces. Inherent in the SJFHQ(CE) are establishedhabitual relationships, through the combatantcommanders, to the interagency community. Togetherwith shared situational awareness, these relationshipsallow the Regional Combatant Commander (RCC) toapply the appropriate preemptive or follow-on actionsusing applicable national tools.

The SJFHQ(CE) also provides flexibility in the scale ofapplication. The RCC’s employment options for theSJFHQ include:

• SJFHQ(CE) serves as the core of a joint task force(JTF) headquarters

• SJFHQ(CE) augments a component or otherheadquarters designated as a JTF

• SJFHQ(CE) augments the combatant commandheadquarters or serves as its forward elementwhen the combatant commander functions as thejoint force commander.

The SJFHQ(CE) provides a Regional CombatantCommander with a fully functional command and controlcapability. But, it’s not just the 58 members and sixsystem of systems analysts (SOSA) staffing that bringsthe value added. It’s the tools, techniques, technologies,and procedural enhancements, which facilitate theadvantage. They know each other, how to coordinatewith each other, and have a deep situationalunderstanding before effective force employmentbegins. It’s the operational net assessment (ONA),effects-based operations (EBO), Joint InteragencyCoordination Group (JIACG), collaborative informationenvironment (CIE), and networked knowledge thatpreserves our most precious resource: time. These arewhat give the RCC the ability to deter crises or defeatadversaries.

2 Joint Center for Lessons Learned (JCLL) Bulletin

The ONA provides a comprehensive analysis of bothfriendly and adversary abilities and perspectives, andof the operational environment. The adversary isexamined holistically, as an interdependent system-of-systems. This enables EBO, which administers actiondesigned to change the state of a system, to achievedirected policy goals. This action can be selected fromthe full range of national power instruments, bothmilitary and non-military. The JIACG provides theexpertise in non-military capabilities and options. The

CIE enables multiple participants, from diverse levelsand locations, to interact, coordinate, and synergizetogether.

The articles in this bulletin explain the enabling conceptsand the advantages they provide. As the SJFHQ(CE)concept is implemented, America’s successful responsein crisis situations will save time, physical resources,and lives. In short, the enabling concepts of theSJFHQ(CE) concept are the lessons learned.


Standing Joint Force Headquarters(Core Element):Its Origin,

Implementation and Prospects forthe Future

MAJ Charles W. CosenzaSOF Operations Officer

Historically, equipping and manning a joint task force(JTF) has been a time consuming process. Standingup the 10th Mountain Division (JTF 190) in Haiti andthe XVIII ABN Corps (JTF 180) in Afghanistan aretwo recent examples where it took one to two monthsor more from JTF activation to full operationalcapability. By the time JTFs are stood up and fullymission capable, time critical to the resolution of a crisismay have elapsed. Moreover, unlike cohesive combatunits, JTF headquarters (HQ) are frequently assembledad-hoc and rarely have the opportunity to train the waythey will fight. Efforts to correct these deficiencieshave assumed increased importance since the initiationof the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), where theability to rapidly respond to an adaptive foe may meanthe difference between mission success and failure.With an adaptive foe, there is little time to bring a staff“up to speed.” Future conflicts will require rapidactivation of staffs that are familiar with the specificjoint area of operation and who are proficient with thecollaborative tools and concepts of effects-basedoperations (EBO).

To formalize these requirements and decrease the timerequired to activate a fully functional JTF, in May 2002the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) issued DefensePlanning Guidance (DPG) directing the establishment

of a Standing Joint Force Headquarters (Core Element)[SJFHQ(CE)] in each Regional Combatant Command(RCC) by FY05.1 These SJFHQ(CE) units will serveas full-time, coherently joint headquarter staffs that willbring a trained and ready core to the fight. Armed withboth commander’s intent and a situational understandingof the adversary, the SJFHQ(CE) enables the RCC torapidly transition from pre-crisis deliberate planning (DP)to crisis action planning (CAP). On 16 January 2002,Commander United States Joint Forces Command(USJFCOM) in Norfolk, VA, established a prototype58 man SJFHQ(CE) (consisting of both civiliancontractors and active duty military personnel) to serveas a template for subsequent RCC SJFHQ(CE)formation.2 Among this cadre’s specified tasks was tostandardize SJFHQ(CE) procedures and tool setsacross disparate areas of responsibility.

What then is the SJFHQ(CE)? First and foremost,the SJFHQ(CE) is a weapon system that will improvethe Regional Combatant Commander’s ability tointegrate land, sea, air, maritime, and special operationswith the full range of diplomatic, information, military,and economic (DIME) elements of national powerduring contingency planning and execution. TheSJFHQ(CE) is NOT a stand alone JTF HQ, but insteadis a mission centric, cross-functional organization, whosepersonnel provide proven expertise in the areas of plans,operations, information superiority, knowledgemanagement, and logistics. The SJFHQ(CE) is intendedto meld into a Service HQ that is in the process ofbecoming a JTF HQ at a time and place of thecommander’s choosing, thus enhancing the ServiceDiagram 1. Historical JTF Stand-ups

• Just Cause• Provide Comfort• Somalia• Haiti• Kosovo• Enduring Freedom

• JTF GTMO• JTF 180• JTF 190• JTF Horn of Africa

Nominal JTF HQ Capability

EXORD

JMD

EXECUTE BACKFILLALERTORDWARNORDCrisis

AssessmentCOA Dev

Legacy JTF Performance

Desired JTF Performance

9/11

- An in-place capability for seamless planning and execution- Able to operate across the spectrum of conflict

Which … focuses on Cdr’s intent

Commander

Knowledge Management

InformationSuperiorityOperations

Plans CIE Support

C4I

HQ Cmdt

Security

Admin

CIE=Collaborative Information Environment

Diagram 2. SJFHQ(CE) – A Full TimeOrganization


headquarters capability to become a JTF. It isdesigned to plan and integrate joint, interagency, andmultinational operations with a “system of systems”understanding of the battle space geography throughoutthe full operational spectrum. The SJFHQ(CE) is valueadded to a Service HQ that is in the process of becominga JTF HQ and not a substitute for the process.

Enabled by an established, collaborative network toincrease communications efficiency, the RCC range ofoptions to respond to crisis situations is improved by anorder of magnitude. Not only does this technique savevaluable planning time and resources, it also allows theSJFHQ(CE) to review and analyze other focus areasthroughout the theater. This will increase the RCC abilityto plan for and support the execution of additionalcontingencies within the theater of operation before theybecome a crisis. The SJFHQ(CE) leverages technologyto “reach back” not only within the Department ofDefense (DOD), but to interagency organizations andnon-governmental centers of excellence (COE) andother “communities of purpose”(on-call expertiseassembled for problem solution).3 This capability is beingdeveloped to allow each of the RCCs to employtailorable, adaptive, mission planning tools that enhancethe ability to operate within an adversary’s decision-making cycle (OODA loop: observation, orientation,decision, action) and respond to changing battle spaceconditions.

In a November 2002 Guidance Memorandum, theChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff directedUSJFCOM to develop a prototype for the RCC to useas a baseline for implementing their SJFHQ(CE).4 Tofacilitate the rapid establishment and fielding of theirSJFHQ(CE), USJFCOM Joint Experimentation, JointTraining, and Joint Integration Programs are providingeach RCC with: a concept of employment; a draft

SJFHQ(CE) standard operating procedure (SOP);tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP); and handson training in effects-based planning (EBP) processes.Utilizing the EBP process from pre-crisis to crisistermination, the SJFHQ(CE) applies the exploitation ofthe information age communications, equipment,organization, and procedures (including the employmentof advanced war fighting concepts) to provide acapability to execute command and control (C2)functions across the spectrum of conflict, effectivelyincreasing the speed and, hopefully, the accuracy ofthe decision making cycle.

The establishment of the SJFHQ(CE) organization asa full-time additional staff directorate and functional C2element within an RCC staff, that is focused on volatileand contentious high threat areas of the command,accomplishes several objectives. First, the SJFHQ(CE)has continuing situational awareness (SA) of knowing“what” is occurring within their specific RCC. Byfocusing on specific areas of interest, RegionalCombatant Commander’s develop a true situationalunderstanding (SU) of not only knowing “what” isoccurring but also “why” something occurs within anarea of particular concern. This understanding beginswith the utilization of systems of systems analysts(SoSA) who analyze potential adversaries from asystems perspective. SoSA analysts develop, update,and maintain an operational net assessment (ONA)database that identifies relationships between adversarykey nodes and potential effects the RCC commanderscan achieve by acting on those nodes.

ONA is the foundation for a coherent knowledgeenvironment that enables effects-based operations(EBO). It serves as an operational support tool of

J1 J3 J5 SJFHQ

JIACG

J2 J4 J6

Diagram 3. SJFHQ(CE)–Organization within RCC HQ

Diagram 4. SJFHQ(CE)-The Prototype

• Plans Chief• Functional Planners

• Operations Chief• Functional Ops Officers

• IS Chief• Intelligence Officers• ONA Analysts

• Knowledge Mgmt Chief• KM Officers• Network Control Officer

Operations

CommandGroup

KnowledgeManagement

InformationSuperiorityPlanning

• COS• Deputy COS

Director

Logistics Group expertise distributedto Planning and Operations Teams


interrelated systems that provides a JTF commandervisibility of effects-to-task linkages based on a “system-of-systems” analysis of a potential adversary’s political,military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information(PMESII) war making capabilities. Furthermore, theONA informs decision-makers and correlates U.S.strategic through tactical level objectives regarding thecomplementary effects and supporting missions andtasks. All of this information can be considered beforeapplying any of the elements of national power:diplomatic, information, military, and economic. Doingso offers deliberate contemplation in order to achievespecific effects on an adversary’s will and capability insupport of national objectives.

Full implementation of SJFHQ(CE) capability requirescollaborative technology that facilitates rapid, effectivedecision-making and execution. Increases in headquartersreadiness requirements and implementation of aneffective Collaborative Information Environment (CIE)have driven both C2 processes and the organization of

the SJFHQ(CE).Existing joint C2 capabilities presently utilized to supportRCCs and JTF HQs in joint and interagency operationsinclude the Defense Collaborative Tool Suite (DCTS).DCTS is the DOD system of record. DOD has certifiedthe collaborative tool suite Info Workspace (IWS) as aDCTS enhancement tool. IWS is a synchronouscollaborative software application tool that is organizedinto “conference centers” and “places” that havebuildings, floors, and rooms. The center and rooms areused for simultaneous collaborative presentations,discussions, and sharing of various forms of informationto develop better C2 and coordinate policies, plans, andoptions for the decision-maker.

The SJFHQ(CE) provides enhanced joint C2 readinessand awareness capabilities by leveraging the latesttechnology to within a modern, interoperable CIE. TheCIE is an established, standardized, collaborativenetwork that increases the pace and quality of C2. Itcombines technology, process, people, and informationin order to provide decision-makers across strategic to

Diagram 5. Operational Net Assessment

POLITICALINFORMATION

INFRASTRUCTURE

SOCIAL

ECONOMIC

MILITARY

DIMEactions

Diagram 6. Systems View of Adversary

Diagram 7. IWS Entry

Diagram 8. Collaborative Planning

D

I

M

E

Translat

e

Strategic Operational Joint Tactical Actions

CCIRCCIR

Guid

ance

/ Inte

nt PMESII

Nat’l & Int’l

Objectives

RCC Theater

Objectives

Ops Environment Ops Environment

Analysis

EFFECTS

Getting the “Gears” to Mesh


tactical levels the means to achieve a common sharedSA and SU of the battle space without today’s timeand space limitations. CIE consists of a web portalthat integrates common C2, information, surveillance,and reconnaissance (ISR), and collaborative planningtools in a browser-based environment.

This virtual environment provides access to a “virtualwarehouse” linking all of the information required bywar fighters. From this resource, decision makers willtailor information displays that are relevant to their needsenhancing shared battle space awareness. CIE is alsoknowledge centric, effects-based, fully networked, andcoherently joint. This is not only important but provideskey ingredients for transforming joint C2 for planningand execution. The CIE drives processes andorganizational changes requiring skill through trainingand experience. It is made up of common architectureswith interoperable tools and procedures that includesyears of JTF lessons learned with doctrinal changes inorganization, procedures, technology, and training.

CIE virtually facilitates existing RCC boards, centers,and cells (BCC) that are used to communicate amongstall the components vertically as well as horizontally, andreduces this number of BCC to sixteen. This ability towork across echelons in a virtual environment allowsthe SJFHQ(CE) to establish habitual relationships withinand between the combatant commanders’ staff, externalagencies, the combatant commanders’ components, andother potential JTF HQ members, thus decreasing thetime required to establish these relationships after acrisis erupts. The CIE facilitates this through the useof automated decision support tools, such as course ofaction analysis (COA) and effects analysis tools thatallow planners to analyze many alternatives rapidly.

Future capabilities will improve the process by allowingdecision makers to analyze alternatives through themodeling of mission execution much faster than realtime. This capability will become particularly importantwhen horizontal and vertical collaboration occurssimultaneously.

The RCC has three primary options to integrate theSJFHQ(CE) into the fight before events escalate.5

While the SJFHQ(CE) can serve as the nucleus or coreof a joint task force staff, it is not manned to be a fullyfunctional operational headquarters without broadaugmentation. In a second option, the SJFHQ(CE) canprovide key augmenting personnel to a JTF HQ, thusfacilitating the rapid transition of a Service componentheadquarters to a JTF (such as with III Corps duringMillennium Challenge 2002, which was one of thelargest and most successful joint transformationexperiments within DOD to date).

Diagram 9. Collaboration and the CIE

Joint Staff & IAC

Combatant Command HQ

Joint Task Force

Diagram 10. Collaborative InformationEnvironment

3 Parts:- LaunchPad- IWS Main Page- Conf Ctr/Auditoriums

Diagram 11. SJFHQ(CE) Employment Options

RCC Forward Battle Staff

Service & FunctionalComponents & JTFs

SJFHQ

Option 3

SJFHQ

JTF

SJFHQ can remain with

RCC main HQ or deploy as

part of a forward battle

staff.

Plugs

JTF HQ

Service & FunctionalComponents

RCC HQSJFHQ

Option 2

or Plugs

Service component forms JTF HQ;

SJFHQ augments with expertise.

Plugs

JTF HQSJFHQ

or

Service & FunctionalComponents

RCC HQSJFHQ

Option 1

SJFHQ becomes core of the JTF HQ. RCC HQ

and components augment.

Plugs

Plugs

Reachback and collaboration between SJFHQ, combatant command HQ, subordinatejoint force HQ, interagency community, and centers of excellence occur in each option.


Lastly, the SJFHQ(CE) can be retained at the RCC HQ.In this situation, the RCC forms a warfighting HQexecuting operations through subordinate JTF(s) orService components. The SJFHQ(CE) employed in anyof the aforementioned scenarios provides the joint forcecommander (JFC) with a suitable, feasible, acceptable,and distinguishable plan based on EBO utilizing CIE toconduct “real time” horizontal and vertical planning.

So what can we expect in the near term?USJFCOM’s first priority is to assist the RCCs indeveloping and fielding their SJFHQ(CE) to includeassistance in standardizing joint command, control,communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, andreconnaissance (C4ISR) architectures.6 This will providea common relevant operational picture (CROP) of thebattle space for joint, coalition, and multinational forces.After RCC SJFHQ(CE) are established, USJFCOM willcontinue to test and prototype new technologies andconcepts as they are developed, incorporating RCCrecommendations for improvements into the process.When the SJFHQ(CE) are fully implemented, RCCs willbe better prepared to decisively and rapidly defeat a threatby employing asymmetric strategies and capabilities, thusmaximizing all of our nation’s elements of national power.The operational additives the SJFHQ(CE) brings to thefight undoubtedly will assist the RCC and their staffs inplanning and executing operations faster than ouradversary can react, thus facilitating rapid and decisivecampaign execution across the broad spectrum ofconflict. The implementation of the SJFHQ(CE) withinthe RCCs will not only increase the readiness of a HQelement, but is intended to reduce the ad hoc nature oftoday’s JTF operations, and to facilitate the establishmentof a more efficient and effective combat force.

“We took a small, fifty, fifty-five people group inthis contingency – about right – they were focused,clear, and very useful…it doubles or triples thecapacity of three-star headquarters in our DOD togo do things for us; so, it’s a combat multiplier ofthe highest order. It doesn’t threaten headquarters;it multiplies the utility of the headquarters.”

Lieutenant General B. B. Bell Commander III Corp

Conclusion

It is difficult to address transformation of the UnitedStates military without reviewing the SJFHQ(CE)concept. The transformational concepts currently beingtested and codified will allow the US government toexecute rapid, decisive operations across the spectrumof conflict with an increasingly smaller footprint. Jointwarfighting requires the implementation of theSJFHQ(CE) within the RCCs not only to increase thereadiness of a HQ element, but also to reduce the adhoc nature of today’s JTF operations and to facilitatethe establishment of more efficient and effective JTFs.The fundamental goals of joint doctrine, joint training,and joint integration into a coordinated “joint”warfighting effort will undoubtedly prove to be a vitalpart of the transformation process, and be critical forall future successful US military operations.

End Notes:

1 DOD Defense Planning Guidance for Fiscal years2004-2009, MAY 02.

2 JWFC Doctrine Pamphlet 3, Doctrinal Implicationsof the Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ), 16JUN 2003.

3 SJFHQ Concept of Employment, dated 25 JUN 03.

4 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandumfor Commander in Chief, US Joint Forces Command,02 NOV 01.

5 JWFC Doctrine Pamphlet 3, Doctrinal Implicationsof the Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ), 16JUN 2003.

6 Standing Joint Force Headquarters StandingOperating Procedures Draft, Tactics, Techniques, andProcedures, 08 JAN 2004.

Credits:

Diagram 1. SJFHQ Overview Brief, dated 15 MAY 03.

Diagram 2. SJFHQ Information Superiority brief, dated 15MAY 03.

Diagram 3. SJFHQ and its Enabling Capabilities-Overviewof Transformation Brief, dated 08 OCT 02.MC02 Finding-SJFHQ(CE) Works


Diagram 4. JWFC Doctrine Pamphlet 3, DoctrinalImplications of the Standing Joint force Headquarters(SJFHQ), dated 16 JUN 03, p.8.

Diagram 5. SJFHQ CMO-EBO Brief, dated 15 NOV 03.

Diagram 6. SJFHQ CMO-EBO Brief, dated 15 NOV 03.

Diagram 7. IWS training Brief, dated 15 MAY 03

Diagram 8. SJFHQ Effects-based Operations-Planning Brief,dated 19 MAY 03.

Diagram 9. SJFHQ KM-CIE Brief, dated 15 MAY 03.

Diagram 10. SPPS Training Brief, dated 15 MAY 03

Diagram 11. JWFC Doctrine Pamphlet 3, DoctrinalImplications of the Standing Joint force Headquarters(SJFHQ), dated 16 JUN 03, p.10.

Diagram 12. Concept for Standing Joint ForceHeadquarters (SJFHQ) Brief, dated 04 MAR 02.

About the Author:

Charles Cosenza, MAJ, US Army – SOF Operations.Over 15 years SOF experience with 12 years in SpecialForces commanding three ODA-Detachments inaddition to serving as both a detachment XO and SFcompany XO. Last assignment was battalion S-2/S-3within a civil affairs unit. Currently stationed atSOCJFCOM as an Information Operation team chief.Recent graduate of the Joint Forces Staff College-JPME-Level 2, Joint IO/IW Staff Officer Course, JointIO Planners Course, and the Army Command andGeneral Staff College.


Standing Joint Force Headquarters(Core Element)

Planning: Into The Future

John EldridgePolitical/Military Planner

The formation and fielding of Standing Joint ForceHeadquarters (Core Element) (SJFHQ(CE)) at eachRegional Combatant Command (RCC) are integral partsof DOD’s transformational efforts to strengthen jointoperations and improve joint command and control(C2).1 Inherent in this transformation effort is changinghow we plan for and conduct military operations.

One of the SJFHQ(CE) primary functions is to providethe RCC headquarters an organization with a full-timeplanning focus and assist in implementation of a commandwide effects-based approach to planning and operations.This article captures some of the changes in the waymembers of the SJFHQ(CE) approach planning andlessons learned in implementing this approach.

Background

The SJFHQ(CE) is a standing C2 element. It providesthe RCC commander a dedicated planning organizationthat can support the pre-crisis planning led by his J5[Plans] planners and crisis response planning normallylead by the J3 [Operations]. Specifically, theSJFHQ(CE) planners bring the following to any crisisresponse:

• A standing, joint team with individual and collectiveskills in crisis response planning and operations.

• An understanding of the crisis from the RCCperspective.

• A systems approach to the operational environment,combined with the knowledge and ability to exploitvulnerabilities through the use of collaborative toolsand processes.

• Habitual relationships with RCC staff, interagencyorganizations, and supporting commands.

• An effects-based approach to planning and operations.

It is this last area, an effects-based approach to problemsolving that is the focus of this article.

Effects-Based Operations (EBO)

While the nature of 21st century warfare and its role inresolving international crises remain essentiallyunchanged, changes in our security objectives, theoperational environment, technology, and threat havenecessitated changes in the way we conduct militaryoperations.2 This requires changes in the way we viewourselves and the adversary, who we include in planning,and how we conduct planning and subsequentoperations. It seeks to go beyond integration, to achievea harmonization of all elements of national andinternational power to achieve common objectives.Many books and articles have been written about thecomplex, adaptive threat we face and the need torespond to that threat with a fully integrated joint,interagency, multinational force. No attempt will bemade here to restate what is now the accepted threatanalysis, other than to address the implications of thisreality as it affects planning and operations.

Before proceeding further it is important to highlighttwo things.

One, EBO is not the sole domain of theSJFHQ(CE). It is an enhancement, not areplacement to the current Joint OperationsPlanning and Execution System (JOPES)planning process that is intended as part of aDOD-wide effort to improve the way we planand conduct joint operations. SJFHQ(CE) issimply one group within a RCC headquartersdesigned to train, develop, and conduct EBO.To be successful, EBO must become the wayRCCs and joint force headquarters always planand conduct operations – even without anSJFHQ(CE).

Two, many of the aspects of EBO are not new,nor are they “tool” centric. EBO recognizesthat America’s unmatched success on thebattlefield has forced our adversaries to relyon a broader range of methods to achieve theirends. This in turn requires us to formalize anequally broader, holistic approach to meetingthese challenges.


Although much of EBO is not new, it builds on oursuccess in joint planning and force modernization. EBOis primarily about thinking differently - formalizing abroader, more integrated approach to military operationsand how they are planned and conducted, thus keepingthe focus on the strategic aim of our operations.

Effects-Based Operations are defined as:

Operations that are planned, executed,assessed, and adapted based on a holisticunderstanding3 of the operationalenvironment in order to influence orchange system behavior or capabilitiesusing the integrated application ofselected instruments of power to achievedirected policy aims.4

EBO is characterized by synchronized, overlapping, nearsimultaneously executed actions conducted by aninterdependent joint, multinational, interagency force toachieve theater and national objectives. EBO seek toblend offensive and defensive multi-dimensionaloperations into a seamless continuum of early,continuous actions, which capitalize on sharedknowledge to fully integrate the complementary natureof joint fires, maneuver, and interagency capabilities.Equal, if not increased, emphasis is placed on theconditions and actions associated with crisis terminationas on setting the conditions for decisive operations andthe decisive operations themselves. This requires a more“global perspective of the battlespace, anoncontiguous approach to operations, andemployment of a fully integrated joint force.”5

Supporting Pre-crisis/Deliberate Planning

The SJFHQ(CE) supports RCC pre-crisis and crisis actionplanning as an integral part of the headquarters planningand operations process. It provides expertise, situationalunderstanding, and “depth” to planning and operations. Italso provides the RCC an increased capability to achievecontinuity of effort in crisis response planning and operationsby being able to directly embed RCC level situationalunderstanding and planning into a joint force headquartersformed to conduct crisis response operations.

First, Pre-Crisis/Deliberate Planning.

The SJFHQ(CE) supports RCC level pre-crisisplanning by developing knowledge and

understanding of potential crisis areas throughactive involvement in RCC training and exerciseprograms associated with those areas anddevelopment of a political, military, economic,social, infrastructure, and information (PMESII)systems perspective of the adversary andoperational area. This systems perspective formsthe basis of the operational net assessment(ONA). The ONA is a deliberate, integratedanalytical operations and planning decisionsupport process with products and database thatidentify key nodes and linkages within a focusarea that allows planners the ability to gaindetailed situational understanding of the focusarea.

Many, if not all, of these inputs are developedwithin and through the use of a CollaborativeInformation Environment (CIE) to overcome thechallenges of displacement and non-collocatedpersonnel.

...the SJFHQ supports the development ofoperations plans/concept plans (OPLAN/CONPLAN) under the overall direction of theRCC J5. These OPLAN/CONPLAN includeidentification and development of crisisresponse objectives6, effects7 and a range offlexible deployment options (FDO) withassociated measures of effectiveness (MOE)8

that will help influence, deter, and, if deterrencefails, shape the conditions for militaryoperations.

Using the ONA, the planning team leads theSJFHQ(CE) effort in the RCC development ofthe effects-based plans.9

Second, Crisis Action Planning.

If the situation in a focus area develops into acrisis, SJFHQ(CE) pre-crisis situationalunderstanding, ONA, RCC J2 [Intelligence]assessment and existing OPLAN/CONPLANform the basis for the RCC initial assessmentand actions to influence and deter the situation.This group reviews existing planning resourcesand updates them with new information as itdevelops. Detailed coordination is conductedwith the Interagency Community (IAC) andregional partners on crisis termination criteria.


Throughout crisis response planning, informationis exchanged via the CIE. The final product ofthis effort is a more precise application of anintegrated National and theater response in thecrisis development to influence/deter anadversary, and an execution order directing theRCC’s crisis response, if required.10

Both of these sections of the SJFHQ(CE) Concept ofEmployment lead towards this conclusion statement:

The SJFHQ provides each RCC with a trainedand equipped standing, joint command andcontrol (C2) element specifically organized toreduce lag during crisis spin-up, to maintain ahigher level of situational understanding of aspecific region’s area of responsibility (AOR),and to more rapidly resolve crisis situationswhen they develop. Should deterrence fail, thissame capability provides a potential combinedjoint task force the ability to rapidly build aneffective joint response team and terminate acrisis through precise, fully integrated decisiveoperations. It is the SJFHQ’s coherentsituational awareness and understanding ofpotential crises, use of collaborative tools, andin-place capability to integrate ONAdevelopment and effects-based operations(EBO) planning into a range of component orother headquarters designated to perform jointtask force (JTF) functions that provides theRCC continuity in planning and operation frompre-crisis through execution and transition.11

In a nutshell: SJFHQ(CE) planning uses a systemsunderstanding of the operational environment, organizedwithin an ONA, develops PMESII effects, and workswith the entire RCC staff (enhanced by non-militaryinputs) to determine the actions required to produce thedesired effects necessary to achieve theater and nationalobjectives. By formalizing a broader, longer term viewtoward crisis resolution, SJFHQ(CE) planning has fullyembraced aspects of the transformation initiative.

Lessons Learned

As JFCOM has assisted RCCs in establishing theirSJFHQ(CE) and implementing effects-based planningand operations, several lessons have emerged.

1. Military operational planning alone is not enough.Successful resolution of a crisis situation requires trained,ready joint forces fully integrated with the other elementsof national and international power – diplomatic,informational, and economic – to achieve common aimsand objectives. Winning the fight does not necessarilyequate to resolving the crisis, or address changing theconditions that lead to the crisis in the first place. Whilemilitary commanders cannot direct the supported orsupporting actions of US interagency and internationalorganizations or many multinational effects, theiroperations must be fully integrated to achieve unity ofeffort and guided by a common long term purpose.

2. Diplomacy, information, and economic aspects ofan operation and the associated planning are essentialto success. They must be aggressively understood andfully integrated into all planning. This does not meanthey are found just in the political military annex to anoperations plan or order. These considerations, andthe perspective they provide both in method and meansused to attain success, must be integrated into thecommander’s mission statement, concept of operations,and tasks to subordinates. There are many challengesto achieving this lofty goal; however, the recognitionthat this critical integration must take place is generatingseveral very positive solutions both at JFCOM and atRCC headquarters. One solution is the establishmentof Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACG). Thevision for JIACG implementation is for each RCC tohave a group of about 10 people, either current agencyemployees or other knowledgeable individuals, with avariety of non-military skills that will work directly forthe RCC. The JIACG will bring day-to-day perspectiveand expertise (including diplomacy, infrastructure, justice,law enforcement) into the RCC, in support of the bothRCC staff and SJFHQ(CE) planning efforts.

3. Understanding of the complex, interconnectedoperational environment is an essential part of all planning.The operational net assessment codifies this systemunderstanding of the operational environment and is akey input into the planning process. As in any disciplinedendeavor, you can only form good ideas if you have goodinformation, and if that information is properly assessed.The effort required to develop an effective ONA can beanywhere from limited to exhaustive based on the timeavailable to the planners. It can take weeks to understandthe military aspects of a situation or of a belligerent’smilitary capability. But, it can take months to gain a fullunderstanding of the political, economic, social,


infrastructure, and informational systems at work in anoperational area. Development of an ONA requires theintegration of existing intelligence and operationalinformation from military and non-military sources;planning efforts by a cross-functional planning team; anda database to link, store, and display that information. Ithas become clear, ONA development is only the firststep – development must be followed by updates and re-evaluation to keep it current. Additionally, one RCC mayrequire several ONAs.

4. Today’s planning and operations require a commandclimate and organizational capability that allows a timely,effective exchange of information and ideas. A fullyintegrated CIE is an essential part of that operationalcapability.

• Even though the JIACG will bring a level of agencyexpertise into the RCC, effective and timely ties tothe subordinate and supporting organizations andagencies, without the constraints of time and space,are absolutely vital. Planning must move fromparallel, to a fully integrated collaborative effort,which fully integrates the supported headquarters,subordinates, and supporting agencies andorganizations.

• Collaboration has gone well beyond conferencecalls, email, and video teleconferencing. Compatiblecomputer based systems have proven eminentlyeffective in allowing accurate and timely interactionamong a variety of geographically dispersed players.

• Compatibility within DOD is not nearly enough.With dozens of agencies, organizations, and groupsavailable to add value to the planning process,collaborative applications must be interoperablethroughout all agencies required to participate.

• Effective interaction will enable planners fromanywhere in the network to assemble in a commoninternet location while remaining at their daily worklocation. Participants can bring their expertise ortake away new knowledge simply by being at acompatible computer terminal. No travel, no expense.

5. Effects are not “Blue” actions or targets. Many makeattempts to describe effects in terms of “Blue” or friendlyactions rather than a physical or behavioral state of aPMESII system - essentially descriptions of “Red”systems. Once effects become Blue actions, the focus

almost always shifts to assessing tactical actions - ratherthan a focus on whether we are shaping the operationalenvironment to achieve our objectives. We have alsoseen that effects and targets are used interchangeably –focusing on “little effects” – the affect of weaponssystems rather than on PMESII systems. This becomeseffects-based targeting. While effects need to influencethe selection of targets and weapons systems employed,effects by definition address PMESII rather thanweapons system outcomes.

6. Planners must take the long term perspective to crisisresolution. Along every step of the way, the view mustbe towards enduring stability, maintained neither byoutside forces nor coercive influence, but by dedicatedcooperation among individuals, groups, and nations.Destroying a bridge may stop foot soldiers and tanks.But it also stops ambulances, fire trucks, and school buses.Alternatives to destruction, prudently considered in thelight of additional risks, can bring significant value to thetransition to stability. This requires insuring the meansused during decisive operations support the long-termstability, and support operations required of transition andcrisis resolution. This long term, holistic view is enabledthrough an effects-based approach that builds on anunderstanding of adversary and third party systemsinfluences and interactions.

7. Effects-based operations are essentially an operationallevel approach to joint warfighting. The objectives –effects – action linkage central to EBO has applicationat all levels of a campaign, but there is only one campaignplan – developed by the theater commander – with asingle set of crisis response objectives that shouldincorporate all elements of national and internationalpower. Assessment of the state of the campaign canonly effectively be done by the RCC commander andstaff, with collaboration with supported and supportingcommand input – to include the interagency community.Because of the very nature of effects, assessing them isessentially an RCC/JTF job. JTF component commandersand their subordinates should develop and articulate theirsupporting end states to describe the means to measuretheir military contributions to effects and objectiveaccomplishment. Equally important, they should notattempt to assign their subordinate tactical headquartersindividual effects. Rather, subordinates should be assignedtask(s), purpose, and the associated effect(s) their actionsare intended to attain – most PMESII effects can onlybe attained by the integration of DIME (diplomatic,information, military, economic) actions. Assigning


military tasks that have their basis in creating desiredeffects provides clarity to their purpose and clear directionin how they should be accomplished. Tasking tacticallevel commands with effects has generally resulted inconfusion and frustration by these commanders.

Conclusion

Strengthening joint operations through improved jointcommand and control and better integration of the fullrange of capabilities that a joint, interagency, multinationalforce can bring to crisis resolution is central to DODtransformation efforts. Effects-based planning andoperations are integral to this effort. Embedded in thecurrent National Security Strategy, is this succinctparagraph that is a well-defined measuring stick of howplanning in the future should progress.

Every agency of the United States Governmentshares the challenge. We can build fruitfulhabits of consultation, quiet argument, soberanalysis, and common action. In the long-term,these are the practices that will sustain thesupremacy of our common principles and keepopen the path of progress.12

Evaluating these comments in light of a broad effort tomove toward an effects-based approach to planningindicates:

• Every agency – not just a military solution or singleagency solution to crisis resolution.

• Fruitful habits of consultation - implies that theagencies and organizations will work together.

• Sober analysis - is very well achieved by the ONAprocess.

• Common action - tells us to have a plan that workstogether.

Summary

The SJFHQ(CE) concept and the associated operationalcapabilities of EBO, ONA, CIE, and JIACG continueto develop as RCCs “touch” and use them. The planningprocess continues to be refined and clarified. It is bothinteresting and frustrating that after over 235 years ofour nation’s history, technology has not yet brought allareas of national power into clear, cohesive focus.

History has shown that behind all national endeavors isthe power to enforce national decisions. And, historyhas also shown that this power is most forcefullymanifested in the ability to defend yourself or to defeatyour enemy.

But, there are other ways. The Organization ofPetroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) wields powerthrough the flow and pricing of crude oil. France wieldspower through diplomacy. Switzerland wields powerthrough autonomy and financial influence. The UnitedKingdom wields power by standing behind its decisions.And the United States wields power through economicstrength along with diplomacy backed up by militarypower. All of these are effective to some degree. Andall should be considered available to the military andnon-military planner(s).

Today, military and non-military planning must beaccomplished by individuals who are experts in all areas.While this is still more a goal then fact, it is coming.Until it does, and most assuredly even after it arrives,SJFHQ(CE) and effects-based planning will be centralto any final solution.

End Notes:

1 Strategic Planning Guidance, Fiscal Years 2006-2011,15 March 2004, p. 25.2 Joint Operations Concepts, JCS Version 1.0 for 2003,3 Oct 2003, p. 6.3 This holistic understanding is achieved by using aPMESII construct to analyze the operationalenvironment – political, military, economic, social,information, and infrastructure. This construct seeks,for analysis purposes, to break the operationalenvironment into six manageable subsystems. Throughanalysis of these subsystems, we attempt to understandand identify the key nodes and relationships within andacross these systems to better identify the areas thatmust be affected to change adversary behavior orcapability.4 Standing Joint Forces Headquarters Prototype,Concept of Employment, 25 June 2003, p. E-2.5 Joint Operations Concept, JDC Version 1.0 for 2003,October 2003, p. 6.6 Objectives: “Clearly defined, decisive, andattainable goals towards which all operations aredirected.” This is broadened use of the term “objective”as defined in JP-1-02; removal of the word “military” isimportant to ensure that military operations are tied to


the overall national intent of the operation by establishinga set of objectives that are common to all. Objectivesare not stated as “Blue” actions, which is too often thecase.7 Effects: “The physical and/or behavioral stateof a PMESII system that results from a militaryor non-military action or set of actions (DIME).”SJFHQ Concept of Employment. Effects are notdescriptions of friendly action or individual targets. Theyaddress the impact of actions and operations as theyaffect PMESII systems, not individual targets.8 MOE – Criteria used to evaluate how actions haveaffected system behavior or capabilities; MOE are tiedto effects and effects assessment. They are indicatorsof the outcome of Blue actions on operationalenvironment systems. MOE articulate where to lookand what to look for in order to determine if the desired

effect has been achieved.9 Concept of Employment, op. cit., p. 3-2 excerpts.10 Ibid, p. 3-4 excerpts.11 Ibid, p. 3-6.12 The National Security Strategy of the United Statesof America, September 2002, 28.

About the Author:

John Eldridge – Political/Military Planner. Retired 01Jul 01 after 30 years, USN O-6, submarines. Mostrecent billet: SACLANT Director of Policy. At sea:CO USS Rhode Island (SSBN 740); CO USS LosAngeles (SSN 688). Staff: JSO, Joint Staff (J3 NuclearOperations), SUBLANT (Tactical Development/Doctrine). U. S. Naval Academy 1971 BSEE; NationalWar College 1991.


Standing Joint Force Headquarters(Core Element) Operations Group

LTC Tom Coleman, US Army

Introduction

The Standing Joint Force Headquarters (Core Element)(SJFHQ(CE)) is organized into five administrativegroups (plans, operations, information superiority (IS),knowledge management (KM), and logistics) and acommand element. This article will focus on theoperations group. In the future we will be required toactivate staffs that must rapidly become operational andconduct rapid decision operations, using enabling toolsthat will achieve decision superiority. The SJFHQ(CE)is a command and control (C2) element that eachRegional Component Command (RCC) will haveresiding at the headquarters, which will decrease thetime required to get staffs or joint task forces (JTF)operational. We must transform our thinking, and C2procedures, to function as joint military operators thatmaximize the use of joint forces. The SJFHQ(CE),and its enabling concepts, allow us to operate in orderto meet the unique needs of the RCC; and theOperations Group focus is on execution.

The Operations Group uses effects-based planning/operations along with the other SJFHQ(CE) groups.The purpose of this group is to maximize the operationalefficiency of the combatant commander and decreasethe time needed to get an organization formed andoperational. The SJFHQ (CE) will utilize all elementsof national power to achieve the desired effects.

The Operations Group, like the other groups in theSJFHQ(CE) organization, maintains administrativeresponsibility for its functional area and provides supportto the SJFHQ(CE)’s four cross functional teams(Operations Team, Plans Team, IS Team, KM Team).While in-garrison in a pre-crisis situation, the OperationsGroup personnel will be involved with planning.Members of the Operations Group will be on teamsthat collaborate with members from other groupsforming “cross functional teams.” This facilitatesplanning and operations when in the execution phase.The relationships established among the teams, and thesituational understanding (SU) and situational awareness(SA) that results from their interaction, will greatlyreduce the time required to stand up an organizationwhen a crisis develops.

Although involved with the other cross-functional teams,the Operations Group focus is primarily on theOperations Team. The Operations and InformationSuperiority Teams establish SU and SA by monitoringcurrent events, and working with the RCC JointOperations and Joint Intelligence Centers (JOC andJIC). All SJFHQ(CE) teams apply their expertise toRCC training throughout the RCC’s area of responsibility(AOR), and they develop habitual relationships whichare critical to reducing the time required to stand up astaff. These relationships are developed with the RCC

staff, components, external centers ofexcellence (COE), and governmentaland non-governmental agencies.

The Operations Team consists ofpersonnel from: operations; intelligence;intelligence, surveillance, andreconnaissance (ISR); logistics; andinformation operations (IO). And, itoperates within a knowledge-basedenvironment to conduct cross-functionalcollaboration between the teams, thecombatant command staff, thecomponents, and other external militaryand civilian agencies (multinational(MN) coalition members, academic

institutions, COE, etc.). The team stays abreast ofcurrent operations, and assists in development andupdate of the operational net assessment (ONA) –effects assessment, plan development/updating, andinsuring integration and synchronization of plans. TheOperations Team provides continuity in pre-crisisplanning, SA, and effects-based planning (EBP). When

RCC = Regional Combatant CommandCIE = Collaborative Information Environment

SJFHQ ORGANIZATION AT THE RCC HQ

CIE

OperationsGroup

PlansGroup

InformationSuperiority

Group

LogisticGroup

KnowledgeManagement

Group

DirectorSJFHQ


transitioned to a JTF HQ or in crisis action team/crisisaction planning (CAT/CAP) mode, the team’s primaryresponsibility is in the joint operations center (JOC).The team’s joint experience, collective SA, andknowledge of the commander’s intent will optimizeexecution of current operations, while also being a majorcontributor to the planning effort.

Organization

SJFHQ(CE) operations are comprised of an operationsGroup and an Operations Team.

Operations Group. The SJFHQ(CE) is organized intoadministrative groups. These groups are the day-to-day in-garrison organizations that maintain administrativeresponsibility (scheduling, budgeting, etc.). For example,they coordinate individual training/support, providedocument review and procedure development, andprovide support to SJFHQ(CE)’s cross-functionalteams.

The operations chief is the group lead for the operationsgroup. He will consider current requirements withinthe group and assign personnel to support the crossfunctional teams. If the mission dictates, the operationschief will shift assets within the operations group orteam to meet operational needs as required.

Operations Team. An operations team is a task-organized, cross-functional team designed to accomplishdaily mission requirements, and is composed of membersfrom the operations group and appropriate members ofother groups. It is centered on the managed flow ofinformation within a broader operational context thatincludes all elements of national power. It seeks to

mitigate drawbacks associated with functionalorganizations that develop information stovepipes. TheOperations Team works closely with RCC J2[intelligence], J3 [operations], and the crisis action team(CAT) to maintain and improve SA and SU. It plansand coordinates internal and external training, supportsexpanded planning efforts of the RCC staff, works withthe ONA working group to refine and update the ONA,monitors RCC responses and any flexible deterrentoptions (FDO) implemented, assists the J3 staff inevaluation of the effects of FDO, monitors ISR activityand crisis-related intelligence efforts, refines effects-based planning, and assists in the preparation ofexecution orders.

Operations Roles and Tasks

During pre-crisis/crisis, the SJFHQ(CE) builds andmaintains relationships (physical and virtual) with staff,components, interagency (Joint Interagency ControlGroup (JIACG)), COE (academia, industry, non-governmental organizations (NGO)), and subject matterexperts (SME). The SJFHQ(CE) Operations Groupis responsible for individual and collective skills training;participates in training and exercises; provides tactics,techniques, and procedures (TTP); standard operatingprocedures (SOP) update reviews; and, operates withinan operational Collaborative Information Environment(CIE).

Operations Team (Pre-Crisis)

The Operations Team primarily concerns itself with SAand SU. It forms the lead for SJFHQ(CE) internal/

OPERATIONS GROUP

Air Ops 1 Air Ops 2 Maritime Ops 1 Maritime Ops 1

SOF Ops 1 SOF Ops 2 Land Ops 1 Land Ops 1

Fires/Targeting

Director

OperationsChief

SJFHQ

SOF = special operations forces

OPERATIONS TEAM

Director

OperationsGroup ISR Ops

ISR Ops

ISR Ops

OperationsChief

KMOOps

Current IntelIntegrator

SOF Ops1 and 2

Maritime Ops1 and 2

Land Ops1 and 2

Air Ops1 and 2

Fires/TargetingOps

TransportationOps

SJFHQ


external training, exercises, training support, and supportto J7 [operational plans] for RCC exercises. Pre-crisis,the Operations Team works on ONA development andupdating linkages, actions, and resources. It also tracks“blue” readiness, to include potential response forces.The SJFHQ(CE) mission begins well before a crisisdevelops. When appropriate, the commander will assigna focus area or region to the SJFHQ(CE). The area ismodeled via nodes, which represent all the adversary’sPMESII (political, military, economic, social,informational, and infrastructure) systems. The nodalrelationships and interdependencies are recorded in theONA and potential effects, nodes, actions, andresources are linked. This information, obtained duringpre-crisis, is gathered in a coordinated process that maytake several months to fully develop. Centers ofexcellence – academic, industry, think tanks, etc. – andthe habitual relationships the SJFHQ(CE) develops withthem is critical to getting a complete understanding ofthe adversary. This reachback utilization gives the jointforce information superiority. The Operations Teamuses this fully developed knowledge to execute actionsdesigned to achieve the desired effects. By utilizingsuperior information, we minimize risk and optimize ourresults.

This process supports course of action (COA)development andselection, which leads tothe final product of theeffects tasking order(ETO). The ETOincludes a prioritizedeffects list (PEL) andoperations plan or order(OPLAN/OPORD).The Operations Teamnow has the ONA andETO products ready foruse when the situationescalates into a crisisdevelopment orresponse situation.

Operations Team(CrisisDevelopment)

The team facilitatesinitial SU in support ofthe RCC CAP and the

CAT. It supports FDO and force enhancementexecution. The team uses the ONA, and coordinatestraining with the joint task force as required. In pre-crisis, the SJFHQ(CE) concentrated on five essentialtasks: conducting EBP, maintaining SU, leveraging theCIE to enhance C2 capabilities, building and maintainingthe ONA, and participating in training and exercises.Now as the crisis has developed, the SJFHQ(CE)focuses its five essential task areas on related events.The SJFHQ(CE) can implement integrated actions toaffect the containment, modification, or reversal of thecrisis situation. The Operations Team can augmentthe JOC and/or JIC by monitoring developments viavirtual or physical presence, and prepare to deploy withthe JTF if required. The SJFHQ(CE) has severaldeployment options and the Operations Team willsupport the operation in any mode from fully deployedwith a JTF (or as a JTF), to not deploying and remainingat the RCC HQ. The CIE enables the team to providesupport from remote locations and reduce the footprintof the joint force, if desired. Also, the habitualrelationships the Operations Team has within the RCCstaff allows for reachback to COE via the CIE. TheOperations Team, and the entire SJFHQ(CE), bringsinvaluable assets to the joint force via its enablingconcepts, tools, experience, and expertise.

At RCC Crisis Response 9/26/2003

SJFHQ Battle Rhythm

ShiftTurnover

CDR’sUpdate

JPG

JOC (J3)

ShiftTurnover

LCB

ROEW/G

JFEW/G

0930 1730 20300830

JCB

1630

TSTC

EAC

JCB W/G

Blue/Red Cell

Effects W/G

1330

On Call 0530 & 1430

1530

1300

On Call 1030 & 1800

On Call

24/7 CollaborationCenter

ONA W/G

SJFHQ(CE) Recommended Battle Rhythm


Key Terms:1

1. Effects Tasking Order (ETO): In the context of EBO(effects-based operations), the ETO is the formalmechanism through which JTF orders are issued.The ETO identifies the JTF’s prioritized desiredeffects, and assigns responsibility for their attainmentto JTF components. The ETO is the primary outputof collaborative planning and the vehicle fordissemination of synchronized action and orders.

2. Measures of Performance (MOP): MOP aredeveloped by each JTF component and are thetextual statements of how each component assessesits accomplishments of ETO assigned actions.

3. Measures of Effectiveness (MOE): MOE areexpressions of operational-level intentions pertainingto each commander, joint task force (CJTF)identified desired effect.

4. Operational Net Assessment (ONA): ONA isdetailed information on the PMESII system of theadversary country, as well as a detailed analysis ofthe interrelation of specific nodes contained withinthese systems. This analysis includes evaluatingthe contributory value of targeting a node inachieving the desires effect.

When appropriate, such as when the Operations Teamis embedded in a JTF, or during crisis action planning, theteam will participate in various boards, centers, and cells.The recommended SJFHQ(CE) boards, centers, and cellsthat incorporate Operations Team membership include:

Joint Planning Group (JPG)

The JPG leads the RCC crisis action planning andcoordinates the planning within the headquarters to includecurrent operations, order development, and planning forfuture operations in coordination with J5 for future planning.The JPG Operations Team members are: land operations,maritime operations, SOF operations, and air operations.The JPG produces mission analysis, planning guidance,COA development, ETO development, and coordinatesrecommendations with the joint coordination board.

Joint Coordination Board (JCB)

The purpose of the JCB is to review executionassessment, and provide guidance and priorities for JPG

future operations planning and current operationsexecution. The JCB is the commander’s primarydecision support agency (normally a JTF-level board).The JCB Operations Team members are: fires/targetingofficer, land operations, maritime operations, SOFoperations, and air operations. The JCB producesrecommendations for COA, approval for ETO, follow-on prioritized effects list (PEL), engagement andtargeting guidance, apportionment and allocation, andbattlespace coordination measures.

Joint Fires Element (JFE) Working Group

The purpose of the JFE is to update and develop thePEL, develop engagement and targeting guidance,select ONA-derived critical nodes and vulnerabilities,and provide joint integrated prioritized target list (JIPTL)oversight at the JTF. The JFE consists of the followingOperations Team members: fires/targeting officer, landoperations, maritime operations, SOF operations, andair operations.

Time-Sensitive Targeting (TST) Cell

The TST cell is a virtual network managed by the JTF,which links components, the JTF, and reach-back agencies.TSTs are those targets that either: pose, or will soon pose,a danger to friendly forces; or are highly lucrative, fleeting“targets of opportunity.” The Operations Team membersare: operations chief, fires/targeting officer, land operations,maritime operations, SOF operations, and air operations.The TST cell recommends TSTs, prioritization, andengagement/planning guidance for the commander’sapproval in the JCB.

Rules of Engagement (ROE) Working Group

The ROE working group is a virtual network of SMEresponsible for ROE planning, ROE recommendationsfor input to the ETO for current and future operations,and subsequent ROE modifications and supplementalmeasures. The Operations Team members are:operations chief, fires/targeting officer, landoperations, maritime operations, SOF operations, andair operations.

Effects Assessment (EA) Cell

The EA cell assesses EBO actions executed throughthe ETO. It fuses effects assessment data to providean EA summary, predictive EA analysis, and


recommendations on desired effect modification andassociated operational considerations. The EA summaryis provided to the JCB working group. The OperationsTeam member is: fires/targeting officer.

Effects Working Group

The effects working group develops operations, insupport of the commander’s objectives expressed asMOE, and recommends effects for inclusion in the ETO.This group may also develop the initial PEL. TheOperations Team members are: fires/targeting officer,land operations, maritime operations, SOF operations,and air operations.

Operational Net Assessment (ONA) WorkingGroup

The ONA working group modifies baseline ONA by:linking nodes to effects; identifying diplomatic,information, military, and economic (DIME) options;secondary and unintended consequences; appliesresources to effect-node-action-resource (ENAR)links; updates ONA; and supports the RCC JPG. TheOperations Team members are: operations chief, fires/targeting officer, land operations, maritime operations,SOF operations, and air operations.

CONCLUSION

Future operations will often require the use of joint,interagency, and multinational capabilities.Transformation, and the use of a SJFHQ (CE), is away to more effective operations and utilization of ourcapabilities. SJFHQ(CE) integrates key enablingconcepts and increases our command and controlreadiness, giving us better, faster, and more effective

options to deal with the many missions the RCCencounters. The Operations Group of the SJFHQ(CE)provides the operational capability to the theaterstrategic headquarters. This “commander centric”design emphasizes jointness. The SJFHQ(CE)Operations Group’s knowledge-centric, cross-functionally organized joint team concept is a key tothe success of future operations. With fewer resources,we must synchronize and integrate the joint forceService component strengths in order to maximizeeffectiveness and minimize risk. Time is a critical factorand we often must do our mission faster. This newmodel for visualizing enemy engagement, which seekscontinual focus on the full range of our nationaladvantages, will be an effective combat multiplier infuture conflicts. The SJFHQ(CE) intends to rapidlyfield capabilities to improve joint warfighting.

End Note

1 Mr. David B. Collins, “Effects Assessment –Millenium Challenge ’02 and Beyond,” JCLL BulletinVolume V, Issue 3 (June 2003): p 1. (paraphrased)

About the Author

LTC Tom Coleman is a U.S. Army Field Artillery (FA)officer, currently assigned as the Fires/Targeting Officerin the U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM)Standing Joint Force HQ (Core Element). His priorexperience was in the U.S. Atlantic Command J7;USJFCOM J3; U.S. Army Logisitcs Center, Ft Lee, VA;U.S. Army Artillery Training School, Ft Sill, OK; 7thInfantry Division (Light) Artillery, Ft Ord, CA; and, the41st FA Bde, V Corps Artillery, Germany. He has a BSdegree from the U.S. Military Academy, and is a U.S.Army Command and General Staff College graduate.


The Standing Joint ForceHeadquarters (Core Element)

Logistics Organization

Brad JublouLogistics Planner Lead

Introduction

The Standing Joint Force Headquarters (Core Element)(SJFHQ(CE)) organization has both functional andcross-functional characteristics. That is, its internalorganization is a hybrid, made up of groups and teams;the groups are functional and administrative in nature,and the teams are cross-functional and operational.

The SJFHQ(CE) groups are “functional” in that thegroups are charged with providing expertise in theirparticular functional area to the rest of the SJFHQ(CE),whether that expertise is in planning, operations,logistics, information superiority, or knowledgemanagement. “Administrative” refers to the normalhousekeeping-type tasks routinely performed in thecourse of events, such as ensuring that the group’spersonnel are present for duty, that they are properlytrained, etc. The group chiefs have administrativeaccountability for their people to the chain of command,and a responsibility to the director for all issues pertainingto their functional areas.

The SJFHQ(CE) team structure, on the other hand, iswhere the “rubber meets the road.” Most day-to-dayoperational tasks are carried out by the teams whilethe SJFHQ(CE) is working in-garrison at the RegionalCombatant Command (RCC). These consist of the

planning team, the operations team, the informationsuperiority team, and the knowledge management team.These teams are cross-functional in that theirmembership consists of personnel from two or moregroups, combining a mixture of functional expertise;they address complex problems from an inherentlybroad perspective that incorporates the expertise ofseveral functional areas. The team chiefs areresponsible to the SJFHQ(CE) Director for theperformance of their teams during operational andplanning activities.

This hybrid structure therefore combines the bestaspects of both functional and cross-functionalorganizations: the groups have the charter and thewherewithal to develop and maintain a high degree ofproficiency in their functional areas of expertise, butthis expertise is actually employed in cross-functionalteams, minimizing the information “stove piping”problems that strictly functionally oriented organizations,such as those typically referred to as “Napoleonic staffs”or “J-codes,” routinely encounter.

The Logistics Organization

The effects of this unique internal structure areparticularly evident in the way the logistics functionalarea is organized and employed in the SJFHQ(CE).There is a logistics group, but no logistics team: instead,all of the SJFHQ(CE) logisticians are integrated intothe planning team and the operations team, as shown inthe following illustration:

Although logistics personnel are fully integrated into theteam structure, the logistics (Log) group still has its ownfunctional identity; the logistics area is not hidden orsubsumed. And there is still an administrative path for

logistics issues to be raised to theattention of the director through thechief of staff, just as there is inlegacy organizations.

In order to execute their teamresponsibilities, the log group isdivided into two sections: thelogistics plans section is seen on theleft in the illustration, and the logisticsoperations section is on the right.The logistics operations chief directsthe logistics group overall, as wellas the log ops section; the logisticscoordinator is the lead log planner

Planning Team Operations TeamPlansChief

LogisticsCoordinator Logistics

OperationsChief

TransportationOperations

OfficerStrategicMobilityPlansOfficer

PersonnelPlansOfficer

SustainmentPlansOfficer

OperationsChief

Log Group


in the log group, and directs the efforts of the log planssection.

Although the operational and planning tasks are handeddown through the team structure, the SJFHQ(CE)logisticians still work logistics issues as a group whennecessary. But there is a division of labor andresponsibilities in the log group that follows along teamlines. For example, the log ops section has theresponsibility to plan and manage log-related training,and maintain current situational awareness, reflectingthe ops team’s overall responsibility for those areas inthe SJFHQ(CE). On the other hand, although the logplans section is principally responsible for logisticsplanning, everyone in the log group contributes to thepre-crisis planning process. This is a reflection of theflexibility the logisticians have in this organizationalstructure, which allows intellectual resources to beshifted as required to address the tasks at hand. Infact, due to its small size and distribution of specializedknowledge across both the log ops and the log planssections, staffing across team lines is a necessity.

In addition to their membership in the two cross-functional teams already mentioned, logistics grouppersonnel also have membership in the operational netassessment (ONA) working group, the cross-functionalorganization that develops the SJFHQ(CE) ONA.

This hybrid organization with full integration of logisticsgroup expertise into the cross-functional teams hasseveral advantages:

• Logisticians have full and complete visibility of theoperation from the very beginning of the planningprocess all the way through execution, giving thema more thorough understanding of the operationsrequirements, and enabling the logisticians to bettersupport both the planning effort and the execution.

• There is early attention to logistics issues in theplanning process. Unsupportable courses of action(COA) can be identified and discarded earlier inthe process, preventing planners from expendingtime and energy on COA that can’t work.

• More timely, credible, and comprehensive logisticsestimates and feasibility analyses.

• It facilitates a more thorough and completesynchronization and integration of all considerations

during both planning and execution; operational,logistic, and deployment concerns can be staffedmore rapidly and effectively, potentially resulting ina better plan sooner.

As mentioned previously, the SJFHQ(CE) LogisticsGroup’s small size limits its capability, and dictates thenecessity for the logisticians in both the planning teamand the operations team to work closely together, as afunctional group, to accomplish many of theirresponsibilities in the SJFHQ(CE) organization.Similarly, the log group’s small size and limited breadthof expertise means that their habitual relationshipswith the RCC J-4 [logistics] directorate are crucial aswell. For example, the SJFHQ(CE) has no civilengineering expertise; so, if civil engineering-relatedplanning products (such as a civil engineering supportplan) are required for a concept plan (CONPLAN)being developed for a contingency in the SJFHQ(CE)focus area, these will still have to come from the RCCJ-4. In fact, it should be noted that the existence of anSJFHQ(CE) does not remove responsibility for planningproducts from the various RCC directorates. Instead,the SJFHQ(CE) serves as a coordinator and a focalpoint for planning activities in support of the J-5 [plans]and other directorates for plans developed pre-crisis inthe SJFHQ(CE)’s focus area.

A brief description of how the logistics group operateswhile in garrison at the RCC, in both the pre-crisis andcrisis timeframes, is provided below, as extracted andmodified from the SJFHQ(CE)’s Concept ofEmployment.

The SJFHQ(CE) Logistics Group Pre-Crisis

During the deliberate planning cycle, the SJFHQ(CE)Logistics Group participates in the logistics planningeffort led by the RCC J4 directorate. When planningfor a designated focus area is initiated, the logisticsplanners contribute their expertise and knowledge ofthe theater to the cross-functional planning process.Logistics plans personnel bring the planningrequirements generated by the planning team to thelogistics group, leveraging the logistics operationspersonnel’s additional specialty areas and perspectivefor in-depth functional staffing.

Prior to and throughout the planning process, the logisticsoperations section of the logistics group conductsdetailed analyses of theater resources, infrastructure,


existing intelligence products, and the ongoing ONAbuild, maintaining this information in a continuouslyupdated logistics common relevant operational picture(Log CROP). The Log CROP is a “virtual warehouse”of information that provides real-time access to timely,fused, actionable, and relevant logistics information thatcan be tailored to meet the requirements of the jointforce, and it is described more fully elsewhere in thisissue. Logistics operations section personnel monitorevents in the area of responsibility (AOR) and contributeto the development of the ONA, bringing their situationalawareness and situational understanding of the focusareas to the planning process.

The logistics group assists in the development of therequired logistics-related annexes and appendices forthose designated plans in the SJFHQ(CE) focus areas,and the log group contributes detailed knowledge ofthe resulting support plans to the operations and planningteams. Close coordination and functional staffing withthe RCC J4, logisticians in the RCC Servicecomponents, United States Transportation Command(USTRANSCOM), and the Defense Logistics Agencyis performed in order to ensure that the plan’s conceptof support is feasible from a national, theater, andService perspective.

The SJFHQ(CE) Logistics Group during CrisisAction Planning

An integral part of the crisis response is the developmentof a concept of logistics support that ensures effectivesustainment of the force. While logistics is a Serviceand national responsibility, its impact on developmentof viable COA, its supportability, determination of forceclosure rates, and the potential for common-user supportto the contingency response force requires thatlogisticians play an early, integral part in all crisis actionplanning activities. Continuous analysis of infrastructureand resources in the selected focus areas, review ofoperations plans (OPLAN) and CONPLAN, andinitiation of the logistics sustainment necessary tosupport flexible deterrent options (FDO) and the jointtask force (JTF), facilitate the planning and executionprocess and enable rapid and effective logistics supportfor effects-based operations (EBO). The logisticiansin the SJFHQ(CE) Logistics Group, RCC J4, Servicecomponents, and the JTF staff (if established at thispoint for planning) collaboratively develop the conceptof support, which, after COA selection, will be refinedin the RCC’s effects tasking order (ETO). Logistics

group members contribute the in-depth knowledge ofthe resulting support plan to their cross-functionalplanning and operations teams, creating a baseline ofshared awareness of theater and Service resourcesmatched to the joint force’s requirements

As the crisis continues to develop, and the JTF isestablished for operations, SJFHQ(CE) logisticians mayintegrate into the JTF, taking with them habitualrelationships with USTRANSCOM; detailed knowledgeof the theater; established links to the RCC J4,supporting combatant commands and agencies;expertise in the collaborative process; and an intimatefamiliarity with the RCC’s campaign plan and associatedlogistics concept of support from inception to execution.The Log CROP will play a central role by sharing awide range of support-related information andcomponent readiness data throughout the force.

JTF Staff headquarters Integration

When deploying to a Service staff when forming a JTFheadquarters, as in SJFHQ(CE) Employment Option2, the SJFHQ(CE) log personnel can fit into whateverJTF staff organization the commander dictates. If theJTF is organized along the lines of the SJFHQ(CE), thelogisticians will be integrated into the familiar group/team structure. If the JTF staff is organized in legacyJ-codes, the SJFHQ(CE) logisticians would in alllikelihood be assigned administratively to the J-4directorate. In any event, the logisticians will still carryout their operational business in the cross-functionalboard, center, and cell structure already established intoday’s joint doctrine and used routinely in operations.Log operations section personnel would probably manthe J-4’s logistics readiness center (LRC), the jointmovement center, and/or the J-3’s [operations] jointoperations center (JOC); log plans personnel wouldlikely integrate into the J-5’s joint planning group (JPG),or J-3’s operational planning team (OPT).

Summary

The SJFHQ(CE) uses a hybrid organizational structureto take advantage of the inherent strengths of bothfunctional groups and cross-functional teams. Withinthis construct, the SJFHQ(CE) Logistics Group providesexpertise in logistics planning and operations to theSJFHQ(CE) (when at a Regional CombatantCommander’s headquarters) and a JTF (whendeployed). The logistics group uses this cross-


functional organization, its habitual relationships withthe RCC J4, component logisticians and supportingcommands, and the full range of the SJFHQ(CE)transformational capabilities to improve the flow oflogistics information, synchronize a wide range oflogistics efforts, and help create a logistics communitythroughout the joint force with the ultimate goal of betteroverall support to the joint warfighter.

About the Author

Brad Jublou is the lead logistics planner in the SJFHQ(Core Element). A retired naval officer, Mr. Jublou isthe SJFHQ (CE) Program Manager for Alion Scienceand Technology and has been involved in SJFHQ(CE)prototyping and Joint Experimentation for over threeyears.


Logistics Common RelevantOperational Picture

Mr. Ronald (Ron) S. BullardLogistics Operations Group Chief

In preparation for Millennium Challenge 2002 (MC02),U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) developeda logistics concept to enhance logistical situationalawareness (SA), and improve information managementand sharing of operational planning information for alllogisticians throughout a joint force. During the MC02experiment, this concept was refined and tested; thelogistics common relevant operational picture,commonly referred to as Log CROP, emerged.

As part of the 2002 Defense Planning Guidance (DPG),the Secretary of Defense directed the fielding of aStanding Joint Force Headquarters (Core Element)(SJFHQ(CE)) in each Regional/Geographic CombatantCommand. The DPG further included the requirementto provide these SJFHQ(CE) with MC02-likecapabilities (such as the Log CROP).

As part of the SJFHQ(CE) implementation effort, theRegional Combatant Commands (RCC) receive aMicrosoft share point portal server (SPPS) softwarepackage, which is used as the web portal. The SPPSsoftware package allows the SJFHQ (CE) to tailor andbuild a Log CROP portal relevant to their theaterenvironment, and specific to their planning/operationalneeds. The software allows people to post, edit, andmanage information on the web. Being able to post yourown information leads to greater use of web-basedinformation for collaboration

The Log CROP provides a virtual view and access totimely, fused, accurate, and relevant logisticsinformation. This information can be tailored to anylevel to meet the requirements of the joint force, whichis common to subordinate and supporting organizations.The portal allows planners to gain SA and situationalunderstanding (SU) both vertically and horizontally(across echelons and functions). The Log CROP allowsdeployment, employment, and sustainment (DES)planners to build a web based information portal thatfacilitates quick access to relevant logistical informationon a single web portal page. The intent is to allow theuser to access required information or tools with nomore than two clicks of a computer mouse button.

The goal of the Log CROP is to insure the logisticianhas near real-time information early in the planningprocess, during crisis response planning, and inexecution. Sophisticated information management anddissemination capabilities will enable near real-timeaccess to both raw data and fused information, and willensure a CROP regardless of level of command orphysical location of the user.

The Log CROP is developed by the SJFHQ(CE) for afocus area, updated continually and provided to the jointtask force (JTF) headquarters for their refinement anduse. As a web based product, each segment of the LogCROP can be updated as necessary by the component,staff, or supporting organization responsible for theinformation. This widespread visibility of logisticsinformation from the RCC and its components, throughthe JTF staff, and down to the JTF components, bridgesthe strategic, operational, and tactical levels and canhelp logisticians achieve the goal of optimized factory-to-foxhole focused logistics.

The Log CROP concept allows planners/operators priorto and during crisis action planning (CAP) to gain SAof their area of responsibility (AOR) and develop a SUof their commander-designated focus areas. The LogCROP allows DES planners at all levels to more rapidlydevelop a feasible logistical concept plan (CONPLAN)or concept of operations (CONOPS) in support ofeffects-based planning (EBP) for a commander-directed focus area.

In conjunction with collaborative tools such as theDefense Collaborative Tool Suite’s (DCTS) MicrosoftNet Meeting, or its approved enhancement, Info WorkSpace (IWS), the DES planners collaborate virtually ina horizontal and vertical planning environment, sharingimportant DES information. The display of relevantinformation and the user’s ability to quickly link tocurrent status, tools, maps, and planning documents,helps the Log CROP to enhance and facilitate all aspectsof deployment, employment, and sustainment planning.The following illustration represents a generic LogCROP display. The display is completely tailorable tothe user’s requirements. (See the generic Log CROPdisplay on the next page.)

The Log CROP is not a system. The Log CROP issimply a log-focused portal web page using the SPPSapplication. Global Combat Support System – Joint


(GCSS-J) is the joint system of record, and the JointChiefs of Staff (JCS) J4 [logistics], Defense InformationSystems Agency (DISA), and the combatantcommanders continue their efforts to build the systemusing the tools and information environment from the129 identified, and 57 approved, 1999 Commander inChief logistical information capability requirementsidentified for inclusion in GCSS-J.

Another outcome of MC02 was the log watchboard(logistics situation report) displayed in the Log CROP.The log watchboard emulated a real-time reportingsystem. Though technologically limited at that time, theconceptual watchboard requirement was validated. (Anotional watchboard is also included in the display above.)

The U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) J4 recentlytested the Log CROP at the theater level duringExercise TERMINAL FURY 2004 (TF 04). The J4was the only USPACOM directorate to employ SPPS,as well as IWS, during the exercise. Feedback toUSJFCOM on the use of the collaborative informationenvironment (CIE) in general, and the Log CROP inparticular, were distributed in January 2004.

USPACOM J4 is now exclusively using their SPPSSECRET Internet Protocol Router Network web site. Info related to in-transit visibility, automation tools, and

information management is posted on theJ41-log systems web page. In their TF 04Log CROP observations message,USPACOM J4 stated: “Overall, J4 findsthe CIE tools valuable and with greatpotential for future collaborative efforts. Our findings as we look at the watchboardwill be fed to DISA and joint staff toincorporate in the GCSS watchboard.”

Based on validation of the developmentalwork, the watchboard is now beingincorporated into future releases of GCSS-J. It is hoped that during the futuredevelopment of the Log CROP concept andfuture prototyping activities, USJFCOMefforts will contribute to enhancing futuredevelopments in GCSS-J.

In USJFCOM, the Joint LogisticsTransformation Center of the Joint

Experimentation Directorate (J9) has responsibility forfurthering the development of the Log CROP conceptand CONOPS.

Logistics personnel from USJFCOM J3/4, J7[operational plans], J9, and the SJFHQ(CE) LogisticsGroup work together to synchronize the developmentalactivities related to Log CROP, and determine its impacton future doctrine, organization, training, materiel,leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLP-F).USJFCOM will continue to work with JCS J4, DISA,and the combatant commanders to stay abreast of thechanging logistical information requirements, and thatwill in turn help to develop the technologicalenhancements that will better support the warfightersin future operations.

About the Author

Ron Bullard is the Logistics Operations Group Chieffor the Standing Joint Force Headquarters (CoreElement). He is a retired Army Ordnance Officer withnearly 30 years of active duty service. He is a graduateof the Army Command and General Staff College andthe Industrial College of the Armed Forces. Hepossesses a BS in Business Administration, MA inManagement and a MS in National Resource Strategy.


An Overview of Internal Training:Maintaining Individual Proficiency

Within the SJFHQ (CE)

William F. BarnsMaritime Operations Officer/Internal Training

Coordinator

“Continuous training and exercise support isessential to the success of the Regional CombatantCommander’s C2 readiness and SJFHQ operations.Internal and external training focuses on applyinglessons learned, improving use of collaboration anddecision support tools, understanding commandrelationships, and improving lines ofcommunication.”

— Standing Joint Force Headquarters PrototypeConcept of Employment, pg. 2-5, 25 JUN 03

In his landmark book, The Seven Habits of HighlySuccessful People, Stephen Covey identified “sharpenthe saw” as a necessary practice in order to maintainone’s edge during daily life and work.1 Duty within theStanding Joint Force Headquarters (CoreElement)(SJFHQ (CE)) demands similar discipline:conducting effects-based planning, maintaining day-to-day situational understanding, fully leveraging acollaborative information environment (CIE) to enhancecommand and control (C2) capabilities, building andmaintaining operational net assessment (ONA) products,and conducting/participating in training and exercises– all daunting tasks – (not to mention numerouscollateral assignments), can fill one’s calendar withminimal remaining white space. In many ways,establishing proficiency with these transformational,enabling capabilities is similar to learning a new languageand vocabulary. Additionally, these skills are perishable;they require periodic refreshing, or “sharpening” forthe user to be proficient and relevant. Unlike thewoodsman that Covey describes as too busy to taketime to sharpen his dull implement and continues to laborto the point of exhaustion, a comprehensive trainingstrategy, complete with necessary rigor, is in place withinthe SJFHQ(CE) to maintain its organizational edge. Thisuseful approach is contained in the (Draft) SJFHQ(CE)Standard Operating Procedure (draft SOP) and identifies

the essential components to attain and maintaincompetence.2 Self-study, peer instruction and on-the-job training, and participation in training and exercisesare essential elements of this stratagem, and can beuseful to achieve this end. This article provides a briefoverview of each of these basics and theirinterrelationships.

Self-Study

The Required Reading Program. Orientation andproficiency training commences when the SJFHQ(CE)welcomes a new team member onboard. Promptcompletion of a comprehensive required readingprogram by each individual is imperative: it is theprimary means to promote familiarity with the enablingcapabilities and serves as a foundation for all thatfollows. Through the process of reading,comprehending, questioning, and then relating thefunctional set pieces to their appropriate joint context,3

the reader can begin to appreciate their relevanceimmediately. Sample assignments from this programinclude reading and understanding the concept ofemployment (CONEMP) and standard operatingprocedure (SOP). The first two publications, theCONEMP and draft SOP, are the initial installments ina family of documents that make up the organization’sdoctrinal underpinnings; the first of the SJFHQ(CE)tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). These arecomplemented by the USJFCOM (J9) Joint ConceptDevelopment and Experimentation concept primers onStanding Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ),collaborative information environment (CIE), effects-based operations (EBO), operational net assessment(ONA), Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG),and others; and offer a concise explanation of theseenabling capabilities in logical, comprehensive formats.4In addition to being appropriate scene-setters, thesedocuments are consulted periodically as referencematerial and are available electronically.

Use of the Web Portal. Another viable means tocontinue one’s self-education is by asynchronouscollaboration; i.e., through use of the web portal. Herebriefings, documents, working papers, and other itemsare posted and provide a gateway to numerous usefulinformation resources. The material located here canbe accessed on-demand by an individual; as the needfor research arises, or an opportunity to conductrefresher training emerges, this technique is availableto accomplish the mission. Offering flexibility and ease


of retrieval for a variety of information, mastering thismethod is a prerequisite for success in the SFJHQ(CE).Familiarizing oneself with the postings, navigatingthrough the pages, and managing content can improveone’s situational awareness; situational understandingcan be likewise reinforced.

The SJFHQ(CE) site is located on the SIPRNET at:https://sps.pc4i.sjfhq.jfcom.smil.mil/PC4I-Admin/Portal/Engagement/Training

Directions to request password/access are availablethrough the account request selection option.5 Onceestablished, this account becomes a literal knowledgeportal offering the user an essential glimpse into untoldreferences and links. Figure 1 below shows an extractfrom this site and its topic areas.

One of the most practical and user-friendly features ofthis site is the “how-to” substance contained in the CIETTP and references web part. In addition to suchfeatures as an explanation of the CIE block I and IItools and the Knowledge Management (KM) User’sGuide, step-by-step instruction is also contained ondocument check-in/check-out and sharing, desktopscreen management, etc. These lessons learned areparticularly useful when preparing to participate incollaborative meetings, extract information, or toestablish and/or maintain one’s presence in the CIE.

Additionally, both past and future training schedules aremaintained in this location. By accessing this page auser has the ability to pull down the long-range agenda,

then has knowledge of a future training session, andcan plan accordingly to join in. Finally, there is an e-mail address to provide feedback and/or submitquestions to the internal and external trainingcoordinators.

Peer Instruction and On-the-Job Training

Daily CIE Operation. To further increase individualaptitude and technique, daily skill enhancement occurswhile operating in the CIE. Proficiency is developed intandem: by learning from one’s peers, as well as throughon-the-job training. Duty in the SJFHQ(CE) providesabundant opportunity to accomplish both. For example,through synchronous and asynchronous collaboration,navigation, document and file management,communications – and more importantly – collaborative

performance improves. With eachsuccessive file transfer, documentextraction, web access, etc., the powerof collaboration is simultaneouslydemonstrated and reinforced. Individualreadiness improves and, as a result,organizational effectiveness is enhanced.Users are encouraged to maintain theirpresence in the CIE so that they may beinvited to participate in brief workingsessions as their expertise is required (i.e.,“on demand”), while adhering to their dailyroutine, and then returning to performanceof other functions.

Similarly, at least three times weekly, staffbriefings are conducted in a virtualenvironment. Preparation for these eventsis enabled by one’s peers and through

hands-on instruction. Updating information, slidepreparation, and coordination for sequence ofpresentation along with other tasks — individually andcollectively — promotes one’s competency in the CIE.During updates to the director, the deputy, and others,the senior leadership is briefed, information exchanged,guidance provided, and decisions made – efficiently andeffectively. As a result, each participant in the meetingis able to boost his or her professional awareness andlevel of knowledge of collaborative tool use, as well asprotocols.

Group meetings for working level tasks provide an idealtraining venue for practical skill development andimprovement. For instance, the operations chief may

Figure 1. This excerpt from the SJFHQ(CE) TrainingPage demonstrates the wealth of information

available upon access.


choose to hold a working meeting to discuss addingcontent to the operations web portal.6 He would choosethe collaborative tool (e.g., InfoWorkSpace (IWS), orthe Defense Collaborative Tool Suite (DCTS)),announce the meeting, appoint a moderator and notetaker, and then get to work. The respective operationsofficers (air, land, maritime, special operations (SOF),and fires), in turn would be responsible for holding thenecessary instruction for those who require it to accessthe system, conduct communications checks, brush-upon tool use, obtain the appropriate reference material,and contribute! Through peer instruction and individualassistance, training and (more importantly) learning, hasbeen accomplished.

Participation in Training Exercises

People learn in a variety of ways. Some can read acomplex, technical document and gain a preciseunderstanding of the material at first glance. Otherscan listen carefully to demanding instructions, masteringthe subject matter by exposure alone. Still others requirehands-on reinforcement in order to gain fullcomprehension. Learning in a collaborative environmentis enhanced by all of these diverse methods in order toensure that a particular training objective is reinforced.By participating in training and exercises, these conceptsand capabilities are formalized as part of acomprehensive training strategy.

Standardized WeeklyTraining. Regularweekly training for allhands is a pivotalcomponent of the formaltraining program.Periodic refresherinstruction is required inorder to support sharinginformation andexperiences among awide audience as theSJFHQ(CE) enabling —and transformational —capabilities areimplemented. Thishabitual training moves toparamount importance asthe impact of personnelturnover is felt, due bothto planned rotation and in

response to unforeseen operational requirements.Conversely, as individual skills atrophy, preventive and/or corrective measures may be put in place. A quarterlytraining agenda is an effective means to efficientlymanage this plan and execute the program. Weekly90-minute sessions, facilitated by in-house or externalsubject matter experts (SME), are appropriate to meetthese objectives. Underscoring support for this meansof instruction, the Director of the SJFHQ(CE) recentlycommunicated an additional benefit to his counterparts:“I am committed to providing forums for continuingeducation in SJFHQ(CE) disciplines in collaborativesessions like these. We can use these forums toexchange good ideas as experience with this weaponssystem grows.”7

Representative topics from the previous quarter’sweekly sessions (which are by no means limited) areincluded in Figure 2. Originally derived from an exerciseafter action review that identified areas requiringadditional training, the training program was developed.This orientation’s basic design promotes sequentialexposure to, and understanding of, the enablingcapabilities. As an example, the quarter begins for thetraining audience with: a collaborative tool’s capabilities(in this case DCTS); review of a suggested approachto training and skill development (resources andcapabilities); exposing the group to interagency and otherconsiderations (economic system, urban operations parts

SJFHQ (CE)- S/T Weekly Training Q-2 FY 2004

Topic Defense Collaborative Tool Suite Training Resources & Capabilities New World Disorder Self-Study Collaborative Rules & Practices Economic System of Al Qaeda Urban Operations (Part I) Urban Operations (Part II) Collaborative Planning Demo ONA Database & Plng. Tool Personnel Recovery Matters Semi-Annual Trng. Event

Facilitated by Dean Worster Bill Barns Curt Morris Jim Beck Mike McGongagle Rafael Fermoselle Houston Tucker Houston Tucker Steve Roth Cecil Johnson / Mark Seeley RB Braunhardt Bill Barns

Date 1/07 1/14 1/21 1/28 2/04 2/11 2/18 2/25 3/03 3/10 3/17 3/ 24

Focus is HANDS-ON / PRACTICAL Learning v. Lecture format where appropriat.e. Conducted: 1400 – 1530 IWS (Server 2) / Conference Center / Battle Rhythm Room - Completed Briefings are recorded and located in SPPS: SJFHQ ENGAGEMENT - TRAINING

Figure 2. Sample Table of Quarterly Training ScheduleThis is a sample of the training actually scheduled and conducted for the

second quarter FY 2004. SME from the SJFHQ(CE) and Blue Cell facilitate thediscussions each week. Sessions are conducted in a virtual auditorium and

then stored for future reference and review.


I and II); and conducting a simulated planning session(collaborative planning demonstration).

The sessions are conducted in a “virtual auditorium” usingthe collaborative tool IWS. Holding training in this sortof environment has several incentives for the participants.First, as with a physical meeting, a large group may obtainbriefing material simultaneously; this ensures thateveryone receives the same transmission as the speakerintended. Next, real-time feedback may be provided tothe presenter; questions about the presentation ordiscussions on a related matter may be posed andanswered interactively. Finally, just as a physical briefingmay be recorded, a virtual set of slides and audio filescan be constructed as well. Whether one could not attendthe original presentation, or wishes to review one of thepreviously conducted sessions at a later time, thepresentations are catalogued (“searchable” also) andmade available through the web portal.

The aim of training and exercise participation is toincrease the training audience’s familiarity and conceptualunderstanding of SJFHQ(CE) enabling capabilities.Whether enhancing skills at the individual watch station,facilitating the organization’s operational efficacy at theRegional Combatant Command (RCC) or joint task force(JTF), or sharing information with a center of excellence,opportunities abound to promote general knowledgeenhancement while refining practices and procedures.Recent participation from personnel assigned toSJFHQ(CE) in “the field” has added significant realismand relevance to the instruction.

Semi-Annual Training Events. The final componentof the training program in the SJFHQ(CE) is the designand execution of semi-annual exercises. In an effort tomaintain individual and collective proficiency and integratenew concepts, a semi-annual training event along thelines of a spiral or limited objective experiment isnecessary.8 Figure 3 identifies guidelines for fundamental

training objectives for this type of event; naturally otherscan be added in order to stress a particular functionalarea, or emphasize a specific concept.

Past exercises have involved maturation of the capabilityan SJFHQ(CE) integrates into a commander’sorganization. In March 2003 for instance, theSJFHQ(CE) conducted a mission analysis and course ofaction selection against the backdrop of a complicatedoperational scenario as a directorate on the RCC staff.In September that same year, in a limited objectiveexperiment centered on CIE (prototype) tools, theSJFHQ(CE) provided an inclusive look at severalexperimental tools in the execution of its mission at theRCC. The March 2004 event was centered on ONAinstruction for those personnel newly reported, whilefuture events will focus on the transition to a JTF andredeployment, along with adaptation of lessons learnedto TTP as experience with forming the organizations isgained. As interactive, computer-based instruction forthe SJFHQ(CE) enabling capabilities develop, overall levelof knowledge will grow while efficiency and diversity inexercise possibilities will increase correspondingly.

Conclusion

It is clear from recent events that joint operations takeplace in complex operational environments. Thecomplexity of these operations deepens as multinationalcoalitions form and interagency community partners arecalled to participate. The truth of the matter is that it isincumbent upon those who plan, and ultimately carryout joint, combined, and interagency operations, to havea full understanding of a systems approach to the battlespace. That understanding comes through improvedsituational awareness, followed by true situationalunderstanding, rigorous mission rehearsal, and in-depthknowledge of the commander’s designated focus areaprior to a crisis unfolding. Recognizing which potentialcollaborative partners can and should be included in

the effort is essential as well.

Training is the key to mission success in theseinstances, as with all operational requirements.Establishing a disciplined approach and acomprehensive training strategy that allowsindividual and collective talent, both resident inand external to the Standing Joint ForceHeadquarters, to flourish is an investment thatwill yield considerable and positive dividends.

Figure 3.Sample Training Objectives for a Semi-Annualexercise designed to flex the SJFHQ(CE) training

audience.

Semi-Annual Event Training Objectives Practice SJFHQ(CE) staff processes at the RCC level Transition from in-garrison status to forming as a core of a JTF Exercise Effects Task Order creation methodology Refine ONA procedures Exercise Effects-Based Planning constructs Exercise CIE processes


End Notes:

1 Covey, Stephen R., The Seven Habits of Highly SuccessfulPeople, Fireside: New York, 1989.2 (Draft) Standing Joint Force Headquarters StandardOperating Procedure, Tactics, Techniques & Procedures, 8January 2004.3 By extension this notion would apply to combined andinteragency operations and exercises as well.4 The actual reading order is: Primers on SJFHQ, EBO, CIE,ONA, JIACG, followed by Rapid Decisive Operations WhitePaper, SJFHQ CONEMP, EBO White paper, EBP TTP, ONACONOPS for MC02, Interagency Operations in Support ofRapid Decisive Operations (4/10/01).5 Click on CIE Guide to request a new user account.6 This example was written using the Operations Group; itcould also apply to the Plans, Knowledge Management,Information Superiority, or Logistics Groups as well.7 RDML Richard O’Hanlon, USN, Director, Standing JointForce Headquarters e-mail to the field, 26 FEB 04.8 Draft SOP, pg. 3-12. A bonus advantage of the trainingprogram is the improved staff relationships and attendant

interaction that result. With successive iterations of theseevents, a number of opportunities are presented to train theinternal staff of the SJFHQ(CE) on techniques and proceduresfor deliberate and crisis action planning, ONA developmentand use, integration with a JTF and execution of militaryoperations.

About the author:

Bill Barns is a retired career U.S. Navy Surface WarfareOfficer. He commanded the ocean goingminesweepers EXPLOIT and ADROIT, the guidedmissile frigate THACH, and the Aegis cruiser ANZIO.He was awarded Masters of Arts degrees from theNaval Postgraduate School and the Naval War College,and is designated a Joint Specialty Officer. A partnerwith Sonalysts, Inc., Mr. Barns has been at the StandingJoint Force Headquarters (Core Element) sinceDecember 2002.


Standing Joint Force Headquarters

In the Political Military World

John EldridgePolitical/Military Planner

From its inception, the development of the Standing JointForces Headquarters (Core Element)(SJFHQ(CE)) hasrecognized the need for the planning process to gobeyond the traditional military lines. In today’senvironment, national endeavor seems to always aimwell beyond any straightforward defeat of an enemy.A description of how this is being addressed follows.

There is a strong tendency for people to seek clear-cutdepictions of how historical events occur. Of particularapplication are the events we recall as VE [VictoryEurope] Day and VJ [Victory Japan] Day. Both giveus a feeling of those memorable days when theEuropean and Pacific aspects of World War II came toan end. War is over, hostilities stop, troops come home,and peace is everywhere. We remember those eventsas significant, important, and conclusive. However,bringing hostilities to a conclusion did not guarantee whatthe future would bring. It was the lengthy and combinedefforts of the Marshall Plan in Europe, and of GeneralMacarthur and his staff in Japan, that set the stage forremarkable stability and prosperity.

Today’s world is no different. Combat is avoided aslong as possible... but once combat occurs, the commonpractice is to think that getting the shooting to stop winsthe conflict. The SJFHQ(CE) incorporation of effects-based planning tries to look beyond just the combat aspectsof national influence and seeks to find those non-combatareas of influence, which will cause a belligerent torespond as desired. And this desired response may beprior to, during, and subsequent to any combat operations.

The political military planner (PMP) billet was includedwith the 58 personnel considered in the SJFHQ(CE)initial manning. Hopefully, the PMP can bring inappropriate aspects of the non-military capabilities thatare available to the nation. By including such aspects,the military considerations will become part of a larger,more complete, and more integrated national endeavor.

However, no matter how talented or experienced suchan individual may be, one person cannot adequatelyaddress the multitude and variety of capabilities thatexist among outside organizations. To put this intoperspective, these outside organizations, commonlyknown as the “interagency community,” include cabinetlevel organizations, subordinate agencies, non-governmental organizations, international organizations,and private organizations. In fact, just about any groupthat can bring expertise, advice, and assets to the effortshould be included.

Independent of the SJFHQ(CE) was an effort to bringthe non-military capabilities and non-militaryconsiderations into the operational planning process. Thiseffort produced the Joint Interagency Coordination Group(JIACG) concept. As currently envisioned, such a groupwould be present at each of the five Regional CombatantCommands (RCC) – North, South, Central, Europe, andPacific. The group would be made up of about eightindividuals representing a cross section of the agencies.Supplementing this group would be additional expertsavailable on a temporary basis to bring specific knowledgeto an exercise, planning session, or operation.

The availability of a JIACG present at the RCC on aday-to-day basis would fulfill a previously unmet aspectof the military planning process. It would provide bothagency requirements and agency capabilities to themilitary planners throughout the planning process.

The political military planner is the main liaison betweenthe SJFHQ(CE) and the JIACG. The PMP is in noway to be viewed as the exclusive conduit for interaction.In fact, specific members of the JIACG would berequested (as individuals or in groups) to participate inseveral aspects of the SJFHQ(CE) effects-basedplanning process. It is a big step in the right direction.

We have already learned several things from theSJFHQ(CE)/JIACG/Agency/Organization association:

First, organizations have their own arrangements as faras internal structure and how they view the world. Forexample, the five RCCs are responsible for regions thatmay not match specific regions used by otherorganizations. As a result, the internal personnel structurewill reflect the overall regional divisions, causing amismatch among individuals responsible for specific areas.


Second, the military can easily shift from theunclassified into the classified mode. Most militarypersonnel have a security clearance and the planningeffort gets classified at an early stage. However, mostof the agencies work at the unclassified level, whichbrings security aspects into any collaboration effort.

Third, the agencies have an immense amount of talentand expertise... particularly in those areas where themilitary has none. Examples include: establishing amonetary system, setting up an interim government, andrunning elections. The goal is to bring such considerationsinto the planning process as early as possible...so that ifthe need for combat operations arises, there are minimumeffects on the post combat recovery.

Finally, organizations and agencies aren’t operating inidle – just waiting to be tasked. They are fully employedin pursuit of their own tasks. The military has similartasks, but enjoys the benefits of being able to shiftpriorities and personnel fairly easily. Agencies are notquite as flexible due to their size and the nature of theirongoing work. However, the ability to collaborate viacomputer technology (a significant improvement overvideo teleconferencing) enables the agencies to actively

participate in planning sessions without relocating to aphysical meeting. This technology will allow the JIACGto bring in additional experts in a timely and costeffective manner.

In summary, combat operations are great for stoppingwhatever is happening that is contrary to nationalimperatives. However, the termination of combatoperations does not guarantee the future. Careful, early,and insightful merging of the political and militaryprocesses offers the best chance for enduring stability.The political military planner, linked to the JIACG, shouldbring this merged process into the SJFHQ(CE).

About the Author:

John Eldridge – Political/Military Planner. Retired 01Jul 01 after 30 years, USN O-6, submarines. Mostrecent billet: SACLANT Director of Policy. At sea:Commander (CO), USS Rhode Island (SSBN 740), COUSS Los Angeles (SSN 688). Staff: Joint Staff Officer,Joint Staff (J3 Nuclear Operations), Submarines Atlantic(SUBLANT) (Tactical Development/Doctrine). U. S.Naval Academy 1971 BSEE; National War College1991.


Lessons Learned in SJFHQ(CE)Implementation:

Knowledge Management

Michael McGonagleKnowledge Management Director

Introduction

Information overload stresses decision makers while theywork to plan and control operations – this stress degradesthe ability of the senior leaders to make informed decisionsin a timely manner. In order to reduce informationoverload and achieve decision superiority, knowledgemanagement principles and procedures must be applied.

It is important to define knowledge and knowledgemanagement (KM), particularly in regards to militaryoperations, before we go further.

1. Knowledge is not the same as information.

2. Knowledge cannot be posted or stored – informationcan be.

3. Achieving knowledge requires the acquisition ofdata and conversion of that data to information.When combined with judgment and experience,information becomes knowledge. Beyondknowledge we can achieve wisdom (understandingwith insight) – knowing why something happens,not just what happens.

4. KM is an operational discipline, not a technical orcommunications function. Knowledge managersare similar to battle captains or tactical actionofficers – not communications officers. KM isfocused on providing actionable information to keydecision makers. In short, providing the rightinformation to commanders and key decisionmakers at the right time and in an understandableand usable (actionable) format.

5. KM is more than information management. Theprimary concern in information management ismaking sure the right information gets to the rightperson at the right time. KM goes a step beyondinformation management by placing the informationin the right context to make the information usable

to the decision maker; converting raw informationinto actionable information.

6. KM includes all processes involved in the creation,receipt, collection, control, dissemination/sharing,storage, retrieval, protection, and disposition ofinformation. KM also includes processes used toorganize information and determine its applicabilityto a specific person, element, or larger process.

Knowledge Management and KnowledgeManagement Officers

The purpose of knowledge management, particularlyin military operations, is to:

• Assist the Commander and key decision makers inknowledge discovery efforts to achieve situationalawareness (SA) and understanding (SU), andinformation superiority.

• Continue coordination amongst headquarters (HQ)elements to facilitate free flow of knowledge(breaking organizational stovepipes).

• Prevent anarchy (provide discipline) in thecollaborative information environment (CIE).

• Eliminate (or reduce) information stovepipes.

• Provide net control and discipline.

• Reduce redundant knowledge requests.

• Control bandwidth optimization (through operationalprocesses and procedures).

• Process codification.

• Train the HQ and component staffs.

One of the keys to successfully achieving this purposeis written guidance that defines the information flowprocesses and exchange procedures. Publishing thisguidance in a clearly stated and detailed knowledgemanagement plan (KMP), as a directive from thecommander, is crucial to successful KM. Unlike atraditional information management plan, the KMPapplies to all information collection, storage, and sharingacross the joint force, throughout the spectrum ofoperations – from pre-crisis through crisis resolution.


A comprehensive KMP reduces the risk of introduceduncertainty and ambiguity in decision-making bydocumenting effective processes and procedures. Itsdevelopment is the result of a combined effort by theentire staff; it covers those procedures, pathways, andsystems that support information needs of the entirecommand.

The primary annex to the KMP is the collaborative rulesand practices (CRandP) (formerly called businessrules). The CRandP cover templates for files, filenaming conventions, log-in naming conventions, filestorage taxonomy, and distributed collaborative meetinginstructions.

The CRandP also specify fallback procedures in caseof system failure. These procedures outline secondaryand tertiary collaborative tools, as well as the expecteddegradation in collaborative capability if we are requiredto move to those positions. The procedures also layout the decision criteria for movement to these fallbacks,and the notification procedures to ensure all participantsare aware of the fallback.

The chief of staff is the senior official charged by thecommander with directing, synchronizing, andsupervising the staff; as such he is principally responsiblefor KM within the headquarters. The chief of staffcannot accomplish this mission alone and thus usesknowledge management officers (KMO) as his primaryKM practitioners.

The primary focus of the KMO is keeping thecommander and key decision makers, across thecommand, informed. They must continually work toensure that information stovepipes are broken downand that information freely flows throughout the jointforce. To accomplish this mission, KMO understandthe joint force mission and commander’s intent, as wellas the joint doctrine supporting the operations. Theymust also be familiar with the technological systemsused for obtaining, storing, and conveying information.

Collaboration – Purposes and Means

Collaboration is a critical component of KM. Sinceknowledge cannot be stored on a webpage or hard drive,we must collaborate to share information to achieveknowledge. Webster’s Dictionary defines collaborationas a process of working jointly. We define collaboration

through its purpose. Practical examples of thesepurposes are:

Sharing of ideas and information• Course of action development• Wargaming a course of action

Issuing guidance and intent• Issuance of planning guidance• Issuance of the commander’s intent

Expert evaluation of issues• Coordinated response to time-sensitive targets• Knowledge requests

Rapid transfer of data, information, and knowledge• Component reporting to the headquarters• Notification of alert information (tactical

ballistic missile (TBM) launch information)

There are two basic types of collaboration: synchronousand asynchronous. Synchronous collaboration is mostoften characterized as a conversation. It is the sharingof ideas with instantaneous feedback from the audienceor other participants.

Asynchronous collaboration allows you to reach out toa much broader group of participants, and allows formuch greater detail in the collaboration. You musthowever, wait for delayed feedback to complete thecollaboration. Web-posting of information and e-mailare examples of asynchronous collaboration.

You will probably use a combination of thesecollaboration types to accomplish your missions. Youmay begin by holding a synchronous collaborativesession to initially develop a product. Participants maythen take that product back to their own organizationsfor review and comment; this delayed feedback providesa more thoughtful review, but requires time.

We have seen that when we speak of collaboration inmilitary operations, people at the regional commandsinstantly focus on synchronous collaboration. Theyfocus on the synchronous tools available and thecapabilities of those tools. What they often overlook isthat some of the processes and procedures forasynchronous collaboration they practice on a daily basisare still applicable, and serve their needs far better thanany synchronous tool could.


The Collaborative Information Environment

The CIE is much more than a set of tools and associatedinfrastructure. The CIE is comprised of five basicelements: infrastructure, tools, information, people, andprocesses. These elements must all be in place (oravailable) for an active CIE to exist.

The CIE allows the warfighter to share information andideas, while developing plans with components andhigher headquarters. Planning in this collaborativeenvironment will result in a better understanding of thecommander’s intent and a greater consensus in the plansince the components were directly involved in the plandevelopment. Dynamic planning in the CIE willsignificantly reduce the planning timeline.

Planning and Operations in a DistributedCollaborative Environment

There is a huge difference between general collaborationand conducting military planning and operations in adistributed collaborative environment. Generalcollaboration allows for the sharing of ideas without thephysical gathering of people. A distributed collaborativeplanning and operations environment requires the abilityfor potentially large numbers of personnel from variedlocations, some possibly thousands of miles apart, to haveaccess to the collaborative toolset.

In a distributed environment, true participation is notlimited to those in close physical proximity to the HQ.We have access to key decision makers and seniorleaders much earlier in the planning process. We share(rather than disseminate) information, thus increasing the

level of situational awareness (and potentially situationalunderstanding) of the entire command. And, we enablehorizontal collaboration amongst the components.

These capabilities also allow us to rethink the entireplanning process, to get away from the sequential planningwe have used for years, and move towards a more

integrated and simultaneous planning process. Weare able to involve the combatant command staffand the staffs of the Service components, supportingfunctional combatant commands, and USGovernment departments and agencies. When aJTF is formed, the commander can involve hisfunctional components, his higher headquarters, andcan reach back to national departments andagencies. This distributed collaborative capabilityprovides for more insightful and detailed plans; itallows the involvement of centers of excellence—both public and private; and it provides the potentialfor a reduction in the operational planning timeline.

Knowledge Management Implementationand Lessons Learned

Our efforts in the implementation of KM principles havebeen focused on several areas. Ideally, we would startwith a “process site survey” to access the informationexchange and flow requirements and current processes/procedures. During this site survey we would help toidentify the roadblocks or constrictors to information flow.Our next step would be to identify probable processimprovements. Only after this process survey step wouldwe consider the integration of new technologies.

As we implement the SJFHQ(CE) at each RegionalCombatant Command (RCC), we are finding that manyhave either no CIE or, at best, a partial CIE. To establisha baseline set for collaborative capabilities, we arefielding the block I CIE (formerly referred to as theMillennium Challenge 02 CIE) to each RCC. Includedin that CIE is a draft knowledge management plan/CIEstandard operating procedures (this document is draftbecause it is written as a generic KMP and may requiretheater specific adjustments before implementation).

A second area we are working in implementation is theestablishment of a KM team. This has been particularlychallenging because of the newness of KM to themilitary. There are no trained KMO in the military – atleast none that are recognized by assignments personnel.In every combatant command we see the automatic


assignment of signal or communications specialtypersonnel to the KM teams. Over time and after anexercise/operation, the realization that they have assignedthe wrong “kind” of people to KM becomes evident.

The third area we are working is implementation of theKM tenets and principles across the entire HQ – notjust in the SJFHQ(CE). We have recommended thatthe chief information officer function be broken out ofthe J-6 and refocused from technology to KM, thuscreating a chief knowledge officer (CKO) for thecommand. We believe this CKO should work directlyfor the chief of staff to ensure the promulgation of KMtenets and principles across the staff.

Our efforts to implement KM practices have not beenwithout challenge. These challenges were notroadblocks, they were in fact opportunities to expandand advance the concept.

The first challenge we faced was a lack of understandingof the importance of KM and of the role of the KMO.The duties, responsibilities, and role of the KMO weredefined in advance, but that role was not always accepted.The guidance and instruction given stated that KMO werenot assigned for administrative or technical support tothe headquarters; their role was to facilitate collaborationand assist in information/ knowledge flow.

Another challenge was an identified need to rework theknowledge requests (KR) (formerly known as request forinformation (RFI)) process and define who manages thatprocess. Our initial thought was that collaboration wouldso reduce the number of formal knowledge requests thatwe could eliminate the traditional RFI manager.

Our intent was to answer as many KR as possible incollaboration as “informal” requests, and only forwardto the higher HQ as “formal” requests those that wecould not answer in collaboration. The challenge camein tracking these requests, determining which onesneeded to be forwarded for answers, and recordingthe informal requests for future reference. As a result,we reworked our KR process and tool to better supportour intent. We also found that the management of theserequests would require a full-time effort, not theadditional duty focus of the KMO we had anticipated.

Similar to the KR challenges were the challengesregarding maintenance and management of our commonoperational picture (COP). The COP manager and his

GCCS (Global Command and Control System) operatorsprovide information to all elements of the joint force, butthe concept of a truly integrated and synchronized COPis far from mature. Having a situational awareness toolat each workstation that gives the individual staff officerthe ability to tailor his view of the COP is a requirement.The challenges come in making sure the GCCS datafeed to that picture is updated and accurate.

We are continually challenged by a requirement to trainand re-train on CIE tools and processes (skills becomestale due to lack of practice or because of changes tosystems/ tools used). Along with the tools training, wecontinually worked to enforce the CRandP. The CRandPprovide guidelines to facilitate collaboration and the freeflow of knowledge, and details format requirements toreduce bandwidth usage (in a frequently bandwidthconstrained environment).

Summary

Knowledge management is focused on thecommander’s needs. Collaboration, both inside andoutside the HQ, is a capability to assist in meeting theseneeds. The collaborative networks of the headquarterscontinually feed information to, and draw informationfrom, the commander – as well as each other.

Additionally, the knowledge management officersworking with each cross-functional team of the HQconstantly collaborate to satisfy the knowledgerequirements of the HQ, and maintain the situationalawareness of the key decision makers.

As we have continued our efforts to implement KMprinciples in military organizations and operations, wecontinually learn from the KM practitioners in the field,and have instituted a regular collaborative meeting for KMOfrom all the combatant commands. This in-process review(IPR), conducted in a virtual environment using distributedcollaborative capabilities, allows the KMO from eachcombatant command to raise issues and concerns, and tohear how other KMO are working through similar issues.

About the Author

Michael McGonagle – Knowledge Management Director.Retired 31 DEC 00 after 22 Yrs. US Army O-4. Armor andTransportation Corps. Joint Experience: Chief of SeaMovements, US EUCOM. Last job – Chief, Futures Division,Joint/Army Concepts Directorate, US Army TRADOC.Subject Matter Expertise: Ground Maneuver Operations andStrategic/Operational Transportation.


Information Operations LessonsLearned in support of theGeographic Combatant

Commanders and the StandingJoint Force Headquarters

(SJFHQ)

Lt Col Daun “Hook” Horttor, USAFLt Col Oliver “Ed” Schmoker, USAF (Ret)

Information Operations (IO) are critical factors in thejoint force commander’s (JFC) capability to achieveand sustain the level of information superiority requiredfor decisive joint operations. The Joint InformationOperations Center (JIOC), a subordinate of USStrategic Command (STRATCOM), is the joint centerof excellence for IO. The IO planners at the JIOCplan, integrate, and synchronize comprehensive IO insupport of JFC and national level objectives. In thisarticle, we will examine how the JIOC is able to enhanceIO while directly supporting JFCs and Standing JointForce Headquarters (SJFHQ) Element.

The SJFHQ is the newest subordinate unified commandorganization to be assigned to a geographic combatantcommander (GCC). According to Joint ForcesCommand (JFCOM), the SJFHQ’s core element is ateam of operational planners and information commandand control specialists. This team of experts forms thebackbone of the joint task force command structure.During day-to-day operations, or when a contingencyrequires the establishment of a joint task force, all orpart of the SJFHQ element is assigned to a combatantcommander and is embedded in his staff. The SJFHQis not designed as a standing joint task force but as a

standing element that focuses on a combatantcommander’s operational trouble spots. The SJFHQis the highest priority of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefsof Staff for joint concept development andexperimentation. The SJFHQ staffing can be completedwhen the joint manning document (JMD) for each JFCis finalized. (Ref 1, more details can be found at: http://www.jfcom.mil/about/fact_sjfhq.htm on SIPRNET)Next we will take a more in-depth look at the JIOCand further define IO.

The JIOC has individual teams dedicated to thecombatant commanders that provide direct support(planning and observer/trainer expertise) to the unifiedcommanders and their appointed subordinatecommanders in the planning and execution of IO. TheSecretary of Defense (SECDEF) recently signed theDepartment of Defense (DOD) IO Roadmap whichdefines IO as: “The integrated employment of the corecapabilities of electronic warfare (EW), computernetwork operations (CNO), psychological operations(PSYOP), military deception, and operations security(OPSEC), in concert with specified supporting andrelated capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurpadversarial human and automated decision-makingwhile protecting our own.” They apply across all phasesof an operation, the range of military operations, and atevery level of war. (Ref 2, p. 11)

We emphasize our support on the major capabilities ofIO detailed in Joint Publication (JP) 3-13 (Ref 3) whichinclude: EW, military deception, PSYOP, OPSEC, andCNO. The IO related activities of civil affairs and publicaffairs are also analyzed as required. Many non-IOrelated activities such as communications, space,intelligence, and logistics provide significant support toIO in conjunction with other operations. While theteams are supporting the commanders’ planning efforts,they discover shortfalls as well as best practices. Theseare captured through our IO lessons learned branchwhen the teams return. The next section will coverhow we conduct our operational analysis and acquirethe lessons learned.

JIOC Lessons Learned Operations Analysis

The JIOC analytic process is modeled on the JointCenter for Lessons Learned (JCLL) legacy JointLessons Learned Program (JLLP) and is compatiblewith their new Joint Lessons Learned Integration (JLLI).The JIOC conducts its JLLP operational analysis from


its information collection, analytic review, and evaluationresulting in archiving and dissemination of the results.

Collection: Our first step in the process is collection.Observations/lessons learned/issues (OLI) are collectedand documented through: 1) web-based entry, 2)interviews with JIOC travelers, and 3) directobservation. Passive collection involves our collectingafter action reports and lessons learned inputs fromindividual organizations after operations/training occurs.Our active collection is on location during execution ina coordinated effort to gather significant and IO relevantinformation. After we collect the OLI, we then analyzewhat we have gathered.

Analysis: In step two, JIOC lessons learned aredeveloped from reviewing after action reports orcollected observations during operations or exercises.From this analysis, determinations are made based onwhether issues are caused by problems in doctrine,deficiencies in tactics, techniques, and procedures(TTP) and training; or as a result of operationalemployment. We conduct trend analysis by reviewingaccumulated OLI to identify recurring lessons. Thethird step is to evaluate what we learned in step two.

Evaluation: The JIOC evaluation objectives are todevelop IO concepts resulting from the analysis. IOconcept development includes identifying “bestpractices” which we define as events that are not onlygood ideas, but have been proven in exercises oroperations. We also identify “areas for improvement”as those deficient events that occur frequently (threeor more), or have been highlighted as critical (jointmission essential tasks (JMET) impact) during trendanalysis. Identified “best practices” and “areas forimprovement” are the results of concepts tested andserve as the basis for IO training, education, and doctrinedevelopment. The final step is to store the lessonslearned, making them available for teams beforedeployment and to others for retrieval.

Archive and Dissemination: We maintain the OLIin our database for long-term storage and retrieval. Thisrelational database allows users to tailor search queriesfor specific requirements. There are severaldissemination methods we use to deliver information ina form that is most usable to meet requirements; theseinclude quarterly briefings, special briefings, publishingarticles, special reports, database postings, and briefingsfor our teams before deployment.

As noted, we find that the new JLLI is flexible andcompatible with the legacy JLLP. In response to theChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) request(CJCS message 311435Z OCT 03, Subject: OperationIraqi Freedom and the War on Terrorism InteroperabilityLessons) for “high payoff lessons learned,” the JIOCcontributed two lessons learned as the IO input toSTRATCOM’s reply. These two lessons learnedsubmitted to the Joint Requirements OversightCommittee have applicability for improving the IOactivities of the GCC and the SJFHQ. These weredeveloped from earlier lessons archived in the JIOClessons learned database, which is modeled on the JCLLlegacy program. As of 4 March 2004, the two lessonshad the following status:

• STRATCOM-0008, Information OperationsEnables Effects-Based Targeting: Active

• STRATCOM-0009, Qualified Personnel Essentialfor Effective Information Operations: J8 review andcombined with CENTCOM-0005.

The above are just two of our 490 lessons learned heldin our database.

We’ve discussed our lesson learned retrieval and storageprocess, but how do we use these lessons learned toimprove our operations? We improve through training,so let’s look at how the lessons learned fit into the JointTraining System and why this is important.

IO Development through Lessons LearnedContributions to the SJFHQ and JFC

As the JIOC teams deploy in direct support of thetheater JFC and SJFHQ, the Center is able to enhanceIO through the Joint Training System model. Thisprocess begins when the team members collect andreport observations, lessons learned, and issues toidentify shortfalls and best practices regarding IO. Thecollected best practices then serve as eligible input todoctrine and training. The shortfalls may also serve asthe basis for defining required capabilities, material ornonmaterial; refining operational plans; tactics,techniques and procedures (TTP); or new trainingrequirements. The combatant commands process themajority of these through JFCOM’s legacy programbased in CJCS Instruction 3150.25A “Joint LessonsLearned Program” (Ref. 4).


It’s important for us to identify the shortfalls, deficiencies,trends, best practices, and proposed solutions since thisis what we use to improve our training, education,doctrine, and TTP. These improvements, in turn, enhanceour IO capability. Our process is to follow the four phasesmodeled below in the Joint Training System (Ref 7).

Phase I, Requirements. In this phase, we define theneeded capabilities in terms of standards, tasks,conditions, and organizations. Each geographiccombatant commander defines his own requirementsbased on Unified Command Plan and Joint StrategicCapabilities Plan responsibilities and guidance. Theresult is a list of specified and implied tasks that aretranslated into a mission task list using the commonlanguage in the CJCS Manual 3500.04C, Universal JointTask List (UJTL) (Ref 5). Here are some examplesfrom the UJTL of IO related tasks that support theSJFHQ and the JFC:

ST 5.4 Provide strategic direction to theater forcesST 5.5 Conduct Theater-Wide Information Operations(IO)OP 3.2.2.1 Employ PSYOP in the Joint Operating Area(JOA)OP 3.2.2.2 Employ electronic attack in the JOAOP 3.2.2.3 Employ information attack in the JOAOP 5.6 Coordinate Operational Information OperationsOP 5.6.1 Integrate Operational Information OperationsOP 6.4 Conduct military deception in support ofsubordinate campaigns and major operations

This list is then further reduced to essential tasks thatare indispensable to mission success. These requirementsare identified as JMETs. The GCC then determinesconditions, standards, and responsible organizations thatare matched with each task; this list becomes thecommand JMET list (JMETL). The JIOC looks at the

GCC JMETL and creates our ownJMETL so we can train appropriatelyto meet the needs of the GCC.

Phase II, Plans. Education andtraining requirements are developed tosatisfy the needed capabilities definedin the JMETL. The appropriatetraining methodology is thendetermined and put in a joint trainingplan (JTP). The JIOC has developedtwo courses, the JIOC IntroductionCourse and the JIOC Joint PlannersCourse (JJPC), that our personnelattend to satisfy the training andeducation requirements. Additionally,we schedule training classes fromexternal sources so that we caneffectively support the combatantcommands.

Phase III, Execution. During this phase, detailedevent planning and resource scheduling are finalizedand planned events are conducted, evaluated, and theresults reported. The JIOC executes the two courseslisted above in garrison. We also have begun taking amobile training team to present our JJPC to the GCC,which helps them satisfy their JTP. Observations,lessons learned, and issues are then actively collectedand documented by the JIOC during our training andoperational events.

Phase IV, Assessment. The final phase looks at theperformance of joint training, operations, and exercises.They are reviewed relative to requirements to producemission, task, and education and training assessments.The JIOC and combatant command assessmentsinfluence JTP adjustments, and other users’ supportingprograms including the Joint Doctrine DevelopmentProgram, Joint Lessons Learned Program, JointWarfighting Capabilities Assessment, the professionalmilitary education system, and the Remedial ActionProgram.


As you can see, the JTS provides a systematic approachto training, and lessons learned plays an important role.Up to this point, we have looked at what IO is, whatthe JIOC and SJFHQ do, and how lessons learned fitinto the JTS. We will now turn our attention to whatthe JIOC team members have experienced with differentSJFHQ structures.

General Observations of IO at the SJFHQ

When the JIOC contributes IO expertise, it is the resultof training developed from the JTS model and first-hand experience. The direct support is provided to theunified commands, joint task forces, and subordinatecombat commanders as required. JIOC team membershave experienced varied implementations of the SJFHQstructure while assisting the different GCCs. TheSJFHQ structure detailed in JFCOM’s Standing JointForce Headquarters, Standard Operating Procedure andTactics, Techniques, and Procedures, 8 Jan 04 (DRAFT)provides a working framework for IO under theinformation security group (Ref. 6). As we are lookingat each of the commands, we aren’t trying to comparewhat they are doing. We are simply trying to give theman idea of where they are currently and any roadblocksthey have encountered while standing up a SJFHQ.The first command we will look at is SOUTHCOM.

• SOUTHCOM. JIOC personnel have recentlysupported SOUTHCOM during BLUE ADVANCE04 at the headquarters and the SJFHQ, which isdeveloping as the SCJ7. As a separate standingorganization, the SJFHQ maintained good continuitywith the main headquarters, operational synergy,and focus during the exercise. The IO cell withinSJFHQ’s Information Superiority Group wasstaffed with half of the positions identified in thedraft JFCOM SJFHQ standard operatingprocedures. Further assistance is being providedin the development of the Operational NetAssessment knowledge base to support effects-based planning and operations.

• PACOM. Our most recent experience withPACOM was during exercise TERMINAL FURY.The SJFHQ is physically separate from HQPACOM and is staffed at less than half of theplanned level. The joint manning document (JMD)is still in development so the SJFHQ is currentlystaffed “out of hide.” Currently, the IO cell has

two personnel and is looking to further integratewith the headquarters.

• EUCOM. EUCOM has not formally establishedthe SJFHQ. They are currently reviewing theimplementation plans that include the JMD. Thefocal point operations center, which is collocatedwith the joint operations center, provides focus onsupporting high priority operations as determinedby the EUCOM Commander. This should providevaluable experience when the SJFHQ is formallyestablished.

• CENTCOM. This command has a waiver on theimplementation of the SJFHQ due to ongoingoperations. When the theater situation permits theestablishment of the SJFHQ, many experiencesfrom the current forward headquarters can beapplied in the planning. The JIOC support has beenprovided at HQ USCENTCOM (main and forward)and other JTF locations within the area ofresponsibility.

It is apparent from these observations that eachcommand has varying degrees of experience with theSJFHQ. However, the bottom line for all commands isthat the SJFHQ may not realize its full potential untilthe JMDs are complete for personnel requisition ratherthan staffing “out-of-hide.”

Conclusion

As the SJFHQ and JFC evolve, the JIOC will beprepared to provide the necessary support to each GCCbased upon the new lessons that emerge along the courseof development. It is through the legacy JLLP, andnew initiatives such as the JLLI, which will ensure IOprovides the full range of capabilities needed toaccomplish the commander’s objectives.

References

1. JFCOM, Standing Joint Force Headquarters CoreElement. Retrieved 12 Apr 04 from: http://www.jfcom.mil/about/fact_sjfhq.htm

2. DOD, Information Operations Roadmap, 30 Oct 03.3. JP 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations,

1 Oct 98.4. CJCSI 3150.25A, Joint Lessons Learned Program,

1 Oct 00.5. CJCSM 3500.04C, Universal Joint Task List, 1 Jul 02.


6. JFCOM, Standing Joint Force Headquarters,Standard Operating Procedure & Tactics,Techniques, and Procedures, 8 Jan 04 (DRAFT).

7. CJCSM 3500.03A, Joint Training Manual, 1 Sep 02.

For more information about JIOC lessons learned visitthe SIPRNET website at: www.jioc.smil.mil; or e-mail:[email protected].

About the Authors

Lt Col Daun “Hook” Horttor, USAF, is currently theChief of the IO Development Division at the JointInformation Operations Center. She has spent hercareer as an Air Battle Manager conducting commandand control through ground and air based radar systems.

Prior to this assignment, she was a detachmentcommander and responsible for creating trainingmaterials to support the Joint Surveillance Target AttackRadar System’s (JSTARS) flying training program.

Lt Col Oliver “Ed” Schmoker, USAF (Retired), is acontractor with the Titan Corporation serving as a SeniorOperations Analyst for the IO Lessons Learned Branch.Prior to retirement he had spent most of his Air Forcecareer serving as an electronic warfare officer in theB-52H and RC-135V/W. He also served as the Chiefof Air Intelligence Agency’s Information Warfare andIntelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR)Plans and Programs Branch, and an electronic warfareplanner for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.


SJFHQ Information SuperiorityGroup

Ray BakerChief Information Superiority Group

Introduction

This article examines one portion of the Standing JointForce Headquarters (Core Element) (SJFHQ(CE)), theInformation Superiority Group, and its role within theoverall concept of effects-based operations (EBO). Thefollowing sections provide an introduction to the conceptof information superiority (IS), a brief look at theorganization for IS within the SJFHQ(CE), a shortdescription of how the IS staff within the SJFHQ(CE)utilizes EBO, and a discussion of observations derivedfrom SJFHQ(CE) implementation conducted to date atthe Regional Combatant Commands (RCC).

Information Superiority—the Concept

What is “information superiority?” It’s not new—therehave been discussions in print about informationsuperiority for years, and U.S. Joint Forces Command(USJFCOM)/J9 [experimentation] addressed thesubject as far back as early 2000. Within the greaterjoint community, Joint Vision (JV) 2010 examined theconcept, and JV2020 continued the discussion.

Figure 1 below is a one-over-the-world view of theconcept at its most fundamental level.

The left set of bars in Figure 1 represents a notional“as is” state of the information environment for apossible contingency involving the adversary countryof Red. In this example, Blue (the U.S. and coalitionforces) has better global command and control (C2);however, Red has better knowledge of its own country(represented in these graphs by intelligence, surveillance,and reconnaissance (ISR)). This notional state of theinformation environment would seem to be a reasonabledepiction of an area prior to detailed US defenseplanning. The United States has, arguably, the bestmilitary C2 capability in the world. Red’s knowledgeof their own country (depicted by Red ISR), however,could very well be better than ours, particularly if Redhas not been a focus of Blue collection activity.

The center set of bars show the application of“information superiority activities.” What are thoseactivities? Depending on your military specialty, youcan probably come up with a number of actions that, ifdirected against or used to protect an information nodeor link, could be classified as information superiorityactivities. In addition to activities taken to observe Redand thus improve our own situational awareness (SA),what type of actions might Blue use to degrade RedC2? Dropping bombs on Red’s C2 infrastructure comesimmediately to mind, but other actions could also betaken. Any of a number of information operations (IO)capabilities are candidates for degrading, disrupting,and/or destroying Red’s C2. Additionally, within thecontext of EBO, Blue might employ other instrumentsof national power in addition to strictly military orinformational activities. For example, Blue could use

economic pressure to influence thecommercial satellite companies thatprovide communications support toRed. Blue diplomats might work toconvince neighboring states to cut offlandline communications. Similarly,selected diplomatic, informational,military, and economic (DIME)actions could be taken as part of acoordinated campaign to decreaseRed’s ISR (knowledge) capability.

At the same time Blue is attackingRed’s information capabilities, it isprotecting and enhancing its own.Information protect and informationassurance activities protect bothBlue’s C2 and ISR (knowledge).

Figure 1. Information Superiority Concept


Redirection of space-borne, airborne, and terrestrialassets will enhance C2. Redirection of intelligencegathering and processing assets will increase Blue’sknowledge of Red.

The result of all these collective offensive and defensiveinformation superiority-related activities is a change inthe notional state. The set of bars on the right side ofFigure 1 depicts the hoped-for outcome—Blue is nowbetter and Red is worse. The delta between Blue andRed represents a level of information superiority.

That’s the broad notion of information superiority. It’simportant to note, however, that information superiority,like air superiority, is a means to an end. In the case ofIS, that end is decision superiority – a linkage clearlyarticulated in JV 2020:

“Information superiority provides the joint force acompetitive advantage only when it is effectivelytranslated into superior knowledge and decisions. Thejoint force must be able to take advantage of superiorinformation converted to superior knowledge to achieve‘decision superiority’—better decisions arrived at andimplemented faster than an opponent can react, or in anoncombat situation, at a tempo that allows the forceto shape the situation or react to changes andaccomplish its mission. Decision superiority does notautomatically result from information superiority.Organizational and doctrinal adaptation, relevant trainingand experience, and the proper command and controlmechanisms and tools are equally necessary.” (JointVision 2020, p. 8)

More recently, The Department of Defense JointOperations Concepts (JOpsC) contained extensivereferences to information and decision superiority,describing decision superiority as one of the corecapabilities required of the future joint force:

“The objective of decision superiority is to turn aninformation advantage, i.e. information superiority, intoa competitive advantage. Decision superiority uses asuperior information position to create and enable highlyeffective actions, tactics, techniques, and procedures(TTP) or relationships that would not otherwise bepossible. To facilitate decision superiority, the joint forcemust gain and maintain information superiority byapplying joint capabilities developed in informationoperations, in the collaborative informationenvironment, through shared situational awareness,

and through intelligence, surveillance, andreconnaissance (ISR).” (emphasis added) (JointOperations Concepts, p. 17)

The JOpsC contains guidance for the organization andfunctions that contribute to information superiority andits supported goal—decision superiority. Theorganizational structure for information superiorityutilized by the SJFHQ(CE) operationalizes this concept.

Organizing for Information Superiority

The original USJFCOM/J9 organization that evolvedinto the SJFHQ (CE) was commander centric andcomposed of two principal groups—plans andoperations, supported by a knowledge management cell.Lessons learned from Unified Vision (UV) 2001 led tothe establishment of separate information superiorityand knowledge management groups. In the case ofinformation superiority, the change was made in anattempt to focus more attention on the JV goal ofachieving information superiority.

The SJFHQ(CE) has both an administrative and anoperational organization. Administratively, theSJFHQ(CE) is organized into groups; operationally, itoperates in cross-functional teams. The administrativeorganization for information superiority is called theInformation Superiority Group (ISG), and its makeup isshown in Figure 2.

ISG leadership consists of a chief and an operationsofficer. They are responsible for coordinating all ISGactivity and report to the SJFHQ(CE) Chief of Staff.The four sections in the ISG are staffed with subject

Figure 2. SJFHQ(CE) InformationSuperiority Group.

SJFHQ Information Superiority Group

• ISG– IS Chief– IS Ops Officer

• IO Section– IO Supervisor– IO Ops Officer– IO Planner– EW Specialist– CNO Specialist– PSYOP Specialist

• EA Section– EA Supervisor– EA Planner

• ONA Section– ONA Supervisor– ONA Network Analyst– ONA Effects Planner– 12 X SoSA (PMESII)

• Intelligence Section– Intelligence Supervisor– Intelligence Planner– ISR Ops officer– ISR Collection Manager– ISR Collection Planner– Current Intel Integrator

EA effects assessmentEW electronic warfareONA operational net assessment


matter experts (SME) in four disciplines: informationoperations, effects assessment (EA), operational netassessment, and intelligence. Each section lead isresponsible for administrative oversight of the sectionSME. In conjunction with the IS chief and ops officer,the section leads manage issues such as scheduling,budgeting, coordination of individual and group training,procedure development, and the standard staff actionsapplicable to any portion of the USJFCOM staff. Ifyou refer back to the emphasized portion of the jointoperations concepts definition of decision superiority,you’ll see that each section of the ISG has a major roleto play in that concept: IO section—informationoperations; effects assessment section—situationalawareness; operational net assessment (ONA)section—situational awareness; and intelligencesection—situational awareness and joint ISR.Moreover, all sections rely on the collaborativeinformation environment (CIE) to accomplish theirassigned tasks.

SJFHQ(CE) IS in EBO

Although the SJFHQ(CE) is administratively organizedinto groups, the real “work” of planning for potentialcontingencies in garrison is accomplished by cross-functional, matrixed teams. These teams are formedas necessary depending on the function to be completed,and are headed by experts from the SJFHQ(CE)groups. The SJFHQ(CE) has conceived andestablished a number of these teams to work variousissues associated with effects-based operations, andthese teams are discussed in detail in the SJFHQ(CE)Standard Operating Procedures (SOP). IS personnelare assigned to both the plans and operations teams,and support all aspects of effects-based planning (EBP)and operations. In addition to providing SME to teamsheaded by plans and operations, the ISG is responsiblefor forming a team tasked with a number of specificroles in support of EBO: ONA management; effectsassessment; situational awareness (SA)/situationalunderstanding (SU); intelligence support to SJFHQ(CE)processes; and, IO planning support. The presence ofIS SME on SJFHQ(CE) cross functional teams ensuresthat information superiority is integrated into all planningfrom the outset.

IS Teams

Three major variations of the basic IS team are the ISteam for ONA, the IS team for EA, and the IS team

for collection management. As an example of one ofthese specialized IS teams, let’s look at the one formedfor ONA.

One of the primary roles of the SJFHQ(CE) in pre-crisis is operational net assessment. The IS team forONA is the focal point for SJFHQ(CE) ONA work,and it provides the cross-functional forum required totransform a system-of-systems data base into anoperationally relevant planning capability. TheSJFHQ(CE) IS team for ONA is shown in Figure 3;this IS team, under the leadership of the ONAsupervisor, manages the build of an ONA for the focusarea assigned by the commander.

Operational net assessment is a process, based on asystem-of-systems analysis (SoSA) of a potentialadversary or issue, which results in a database and otherproducts that are used by planners to produce effects-based plans and orders. The IS team for ONA, incollaboration with other RCC staff agencies, thecomponents, and other DOD and interagencyrepresentatives, builds the baseline ONA.

The IS teams formed for effects assessment, collectionmanagement, or any of the other specific roles assignedto IS, are similarly cross-functional and task organized.It is important to note that while IS provides the focusand venue for these activities; none of them can besuccessfully conducted without the active participationand collaboration of planners, operators, and SME fromthroughout the SJFHQ(CE) and RCC staffs. Thecriticality of cross functional participation in effectsplanning and assessment activities has beendemonstrated in numerous exercises – most recentlyby U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) during

Figure 3. IS team for ONA

Information Superiority Teamfor Operational Net Assessment

• ONA Supervisor• ONA Network Analyst• ONA Effects Planner• SoSA (6)**• IO Supervisor• IO Specialists (2)• KMOIS• Land Ops• Maritime Ops • Aerospace Ops• Special Ops Force (SOF) Ops• Logistics Ops• Logistics Coordinator

• Logistics Sustainment Planner• Fires/Target Ops• Planners (3)• Effects Assessment Planner• Blue / Red Planner • Political / Military Planner • Force Protection Planner

(TBM/WME)


exercise TERMINAL FURY. The organization andoperation of the IS team, as well as lessons learnedfrom TERMINAL FURY, BLUE ADVANCE, andother Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) exercises are majortopics examined during the process that the SJFHQ(CE)uses to assist the combatant commanders in establishingtheir own SJFHQ(CE).

Observations During Recent Events

During the past 15 months, the USJFCOM SJFHQ(CE)has engaged all the regional and functional combatantcommands in support of the SJFHQ(CE)implementation program. Of those commands,USPACOM, USEUCOM, USSOUTHCOM, andUSNORTHCOM have already begun the process offorming SJFHQ(CE) staffs. The USJFCOMSJFHQ(CE) has had significant interaction with theSJFHQ(CE) of these four commands, as well as withan element formed in early 2003 at USCENTCOM.

General Observations

The SJFHQ(CE) adds value to the RCC staff. Thevalue that an SJFHQ(CE) provides to the RCC – acoherently joint team focused full-time on potentialcontingencies designated by the commander – hasalready been demonstrated in two recent JCS sponsoredexercises conducted outside USJFCOM. Duringexercise TERMINAL FURY 04, U.S. PacificCommand’s SJFHQ(CE) IS Team developed an ONAand applied the principles of effects-based planning andassessment at both the Tier 1 and Tier 2 joint task forceheadquarters (JTF HQ) levels. Though conductedprimarily as a demonstration, EA was utilized not onlyto focus future planning efforts, but also as a means todrive key campaign decision points. Moreover, theUSPACOM and JTF staffs utilized the ONA as ameans to not only identify key adversary system nodesfor JTF actions, but also as a tool to identify key nodesfor focusing limited Blue ISR assets – an innovationnot previously utilized by the USJFCOM prototypeSJFHQ(CE). Lessons learned from TERMINALFURY, as well as USSOUTHCOM’s BLUEADVANCE and other RCC exercises, are beingincorporated by USJFCOM into SJFHQ(CE) SOP andTTP to assist other RCCs as they implement their ownSJFHQ(CE).

ONA is a cross-functional effort that requires theparticipation of the entire SJFHQ(CE). The ONA

has proven to be an invaluable tool in operationalizing asystems–based analysis of the adversary—thecornerstone of EBO. Building an ONA, however,requires dedicated effort from a broad range of expertise(both within the SJFHQ(CE) and across the RCC andcomponent staffs) from the beginning of the analysiseffort in order to provide maximum value added. Anincomplete, late developing, or changed articulation offocus area and understanding of commander’sobjectives can collapse timelines for ONA baselinedevelopment and make the process less cross-functional. To date, the ISG in general, and the ONASection (including SoSA) in particular, have assumedthe bulk of the responsibility in ONA development.Increased emphasis on a broader range of participationin ONA development will increase the benefits that theONA can provide in focusing planning efforts.

J2/Joint Intelligence Center (JIC) involvement insupport of the ONA process is critical. System-of-systems analysis is an area where the SJFHQ(CE) willrely heavily on reach back support. One of the key,and perhaps the major, reach back centers for suchsupport lies in the RCC intelligence community. Earlyin the SJFHQ(CE) implementation process, weobserved only limited J2/JIC involvement withSJFHQ(CE) processes; however, as the SJFHQ(CE)implementation within the RCC has progressed, we areseeing positive steps taken to forge partnershipsbetween the SJFHQ(CE) and the RCC intelligenceorganizations.

SJFHQ(CE) and its enabling capabilities requirechanges in doctrine, organization, training,materiel, leadership and education, personnel, andfacilities (DOTMLPF). Like any change within DOD,implementation of the SJFHQ(CE) will requiresupporting changes across the DOTMLPF spectrum.Using DOTMLPF as an organizational theme, a numberof additional observations are listed below:

Doctrine

Transformation cannot wait for published JointDoctrine. At virtually every training venue one of thefirst comments from the training audience has been thatSJFHQ(CE) and its enabling capabilities are not codifiedin joint doctrine. While this is in large part true, it isimportant to note that implementation of theSJFHQ(CE) and its enabling capabilities is a Secretaryof Defense (SECDEF) mandated transformational step,


and transformation is, by its very nature, revolutionary.The joint doctrine process, for good reasons, isevolutionary. Fundamentally, doctrine is what we thinkabout the way we will fight, and, using that broaddefinition, SJFHQ(CE) is codified in doctrine. Therehave been numerous working documents published byUSJFCOM that describe the SJFHQ(CE) and itsenabling capabilities, and USJFCOM/J7 has published:Joint Warfighting Center, Joint Doctrine SeriesPamphlet 3, Doctrinal Implications of the StandingJoint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ); and JointWarfighting Center, Joint Doctrine Series Pamphlet4, Doctrinal Implications of Operational NetAssessment (ONA), as the first formal joint doctrinedocuments on SJFHQ(CE). Additionally, USJFCOMis in the process of incorporating SJFHQ(CE) into theJTF SOP and other joint doctrine publications. Theprocess of codifying SJFHQ(CE) within formaldoctrinal publications has been on-going for over a year,and will continue as the RCC implement this capability.

The Combatant Commands want a handbook onInformation Superiority. At some point during everyimplementation process thus far underway, the questionof documentation covering information superiority hascome up. USJFCOM/J9 published white papers and/or concept papers for many of the capabilitiesassociated with SJFHQ(CE), but no such paper hasyet been published for information superiority. JointVision 2010, Joint Vision 2020, and the joint operationsconcepts address IS (and decision superiority) in somedetail, but none of these publications go into the level ofdetail that planners and operators want and need. TheJOpsC states: “The power of superiority in theinformation domain mandates that the United Statesfight for it as a first priority even before hostilitiesbegin.” (emphasis added) (Joint Operations Concepts,p. 17) For a first priority, little formal guidance appearsto be available. The USJFCOM SJFHQ(CE) has beenin coordination with USJFCOM/J9 on this issue, andwe are awaiting further developments.

Organization

The SJFHQ(CE) structure and manning facilitateintegration of Information Operations intooperational planning. Integration of informationoperations with the commander’s overall plan was formany years a difficult and often unachieved planningobjective. IO tended to be a series of bolt on actions that

were often provided too late to be fully integrated intothe commander’s campaign plan. Recent operations,most notably IRAQI FREEDOM, demonstrate theprogress that has been made in integrating IO into theplanning process early on. The ONA offers furtheropportunities for integrating IO planning and provides avehicle for early consideration of IO capabilities. ONAdevelopment efforts, such as the one undertaken by U.SSouthern Command for Exercise BLUE ADVANCE,have reflected an increased emphasis on IO actionswhen creating effect-node-action linkages in the ONAdatabase—reducing the “stove piping” often associatedwith IO planning efforts. With IO options alreadyresearched and linked to key nodes, planners employingthe ONA database are provided IO options at the veryoutset of the planning effort. This is particularly usefulduring the early stages of a potential crisis when viableflexible deterrent options are being considered, and actionsother than force-on-force are sought. The SoSAmethodology employed by the ONA also lends itselfeffectively to existing IO planning tools, such as influencemodels (e.g., Situational Influence Assessment Model –“SIAM”) or electronic network modeling tools (e.g.,TELSCOPE). In a similar fashion, the ONA has beenrecognized as mutually supportive of the U.S. StrategicCommand’s evolving Joint Integrative Analysis andPlanning Capability (JIAPC). The JIAPC draft conceptof operations addresses the ONA at length and outlineseffectively the benefits an ONA brings to IO planningand execution.

Training

SJFHQ(CE) and enabling capability training mustbe expanded horizontally (to the RCC staff) andvertically (up and down) in order to facilitate EBOand ONA. A fundamental tenet of both EBO and ONAis their dependence on collaborative planning. As theSJFHQ(CE) began executing its implementation tasks,it quickly became obvious that the training audienceextends well beyond the relatively small SJFHQ(CE)cadre. At a minimum, the rest of the RCC staff,component staffs, and outside centers of excellencemust be intimately involved in EBO and ONA activity.Consequently, they must become part of the trainingaudience. The USJFCOM SJFHQ(CE) has identifiedthis need and, as resources allow, has begun expandingthe training it offers. As the RCC SJFHQ(CE) reachfull capability, much of the responsibility for trainingwithin the RCC and components will shift to them.


Proficiency in SJFHQ(CE) enabling skills is highlyperishable. Whether due to insufficient manning levelsor high personnel turnover in the SJFHQ(CE), there isa need for recurring enabler training to establish andmaintain proficiency. This training involves skillsassociated with applications and procedures such ascollaborative tools, the ONA database and applicationtool suite, and ONA supplementary analytical tools/software, as well as recurring training in TTP.

Materiel

SJFHQ(CE)-related software and hardware areoften not part of a command’s approved ITinventory. The issue of collaborative tool resourcinghas been raised at most, if not all, commands. TheSJFHQ(CE) uses InfoWorkSpace (IWS) as itspreferred collaborative tool suite. IWS is an approvedaddition to the Defense Collaboration Tool Suite(DCTS); however, it is an “option” that requiresresourcing. In several commands, the decision has beenmade to stick with the standard DCTS without IWS.In addition to establishing a collaborative network, theONA application (which rides on a sequel (SQL) server)must also be resourced and accredited. Both of theseissues (IWS and ONA tools) are being resolved. Inthe case of the collaborative tool, the SJFHQ(CE) hassuccessfully worked implementation atUSSOUTHCOM using DCTS, and, thus far, the ONAtool accreditation issue has been resolved at eachcommand.

Leadership and Education

Implementation of SJFHQ(CE) and its enablingcapabilities requires commander buy-in. Anychange not supported by the top of the chain ofcommand meets resistance at the bottom. In eachcommand, enthusiastic acceptance of the SJFHQ(CE)and its enabling capabilities has been the direct resultof senior staff buy-in. In order to ensure top-downsupport early in the implementation process, theUSJFCOM SJFHQ(CE) kicks-off implementationtraining at each command with a one day seniorleadership seminar.

Information on SJFHQ(CE) and its enablingcapabilities needs to be added to all levels of JointProfessional Military Education (JPME).CAPSTONE, and the newly established PINNACLE,include introductions to SJFHQ(CE). Similar

information needs to be added to all aspects of JPME.Instruction in SJFHQ(CE) and its enabling capabilitiesmust become a standard part of JPME in order toprepare officers for service at joint commands wherethe SJFHQ(CE) has been established and effects-basedoperations are being planned. In the case of informationsuperiority, such training, at a minimum, needs to focuson ONA and EA.

Personnel

Manning to standard is a critical aspect ofSJFHQ(CE) stand up. In many cases at the RCCthere has been insufficient manning of InformationSuperiority Group positions to adequately handle cross-functional processes. A particularly troublesome issuehas been grade/rank mismatches and trainingproficiency. The SJFHQ(CE) structure calls for anexperienced staff of field grade officers trained in theJoint Operation Planning and Execution System(JOPES). Experience to date has been that officers ofthe appropriate rank and experience are often in veryshort supply. The manning issue has been exacerbatedby instances of high SJFHQ(CE) personnel turnoverfollowing major implementation events; however, eachof these issues is being resolved as SJFHQ(CE) billetsare formally added to command joint manningdocuments.

Facilities

Implementation of SJFHQ(CE) at a joint commandhas associated facility costs. Standing up a 60-plusperson staff entity at a joint headquarters requires theidentification and configuration of adequate work space.In addition to work stations, SJFHQ(CE) requirementsinclude space for servers supporting the CIE and ONA.In the cases of USPACOM and USSOUTHCOM, thecommands used new space to house the neworganization. USEUCOM and USNORTHCOMintegrated the SJFHQ(CE) work space into exitingfacilities. Whether existing space is converted, or newspace is acquired, facilities equipped with requisite C2capabilities are necessary.

Conclusion

The Information Superiority Group, while a key elementused to focus the first fight for information superiority,is just one of the tools the SJFHQ(CE) brings to bear tohelp the commander achieve decision superiority.


Planning to win that fight requires the active participationnot only of planners and operators from within theSJFHQ(CE), but also staff from across the RCCheadquarters and the components in order to incorporatedecision superiority as a warfighting enabler from theoutset of any planning effort. To date, the SJFHQ(CE)implementation process has been in a constant state ofrefinement, and several of the commands that haveentered into partnership with USJFCOM in the processhave already realized benefits.

About the Author

Ray Baker is the Information Superiority Chief in theUSJFCOM SJFHQ(CE). Ray, a division manager forAlion Science and Technology, retired from the AirForce in 2000 after more than 30 years of service.Immediately after retirement, he joined the USJFCOM/J9 staff as a contractor in the Blue Cell, the SJFHQ(CE)precursor, and has been assigned to the SJFHQ(CE)since its inception.


System of Systems Analysis (SoSA)

Rick Wilson, ONA Effects PlannerBob Kuth, ONA Supervisor

Fundamental to the development of the operational netassessment (ONA) is system of systems analysis(SoSA), an analytic framework and process whichexamines potential adversaries within a combatantcommander’s designated focus area (a nation, region,entity, or contingency). This examination has a holisticperspective and views an adversary as a complex,integrated, adaptive system comprised of interrelatedsubsystems. SoSA may also examine friendly systems.

• A holistic systems perspective distinguishes itselffrom the more traditional analytical approach bynot only identifying the nature and capabilities ofthe component parts that comprise a system, butalso and more importantly, by examining theproperties and behaviors exhibited by theorganization of the system.

• SoSA analysts focus on the connections,interactions, and interdependencies between thedifferent components of a system in order to identifysystem strengths and exploitable vulnerabilities aswell-related leverage points, that is – nodes, withineach subsystem that may influence multiplesubsystems and the system as a whole.

There are two major SoSA processes: (1) individualsystems analysis, and (2) integrated systems analysis.Individual systems analysis is composed of five sub-processes: basic research, analysis, vulnerabilityidentification, potential node identification, and nodalanalysis. Whereas the principal product of individualsystem analysis is the identification of nodes within eachsystem, integrated systems analysis uses similar sub-processes to examine the interrelationships andinterdependencies of nodes, in order to identify nodalrelationships between and among systems andsubsystems. For the purposes of ONA, these nodesrepresent key leverage points within and across systemsthat can be influenced using diplomatic, information,military, and economic (DIME) options (incentives, aswell as coercive actions) to affect adversary behavior,capabilities, and coherency of power.

Over the past three years, the US Joint ForcesCommand, several Regional Combatant Commands(RCC) and various multinational partners haveexperimented with the SoSA process, to include itsapplication for real-world contingencies. Following aresome of the key lessons learned from those endeavors:

An adversary can be analyzed holistically as an inter-related system of political, military, economic, social,infrastructure, and information (PMESII) systems.From an ONA perspective, the PMESII systemsrepresent an adversary’s sources of national power.

• Use of the PMESII systems approach facilitatesinitial division of the SoSA analyst workload intomanageable segments, and the identification ofspecific skill sets needed within the team. Althoughindividual PMESII systems may constitute “lanesin the road” for individual systems analysis,PMESII system boundaries often overlap.Integrated systems analysis examines wheresystems merge.

• SoSA requires a thorough understanding of theadversary’s culture, social influences, government,religion, and other intangible factors which traditionalintelligence estimates do not address. Thesophisticated nature of SoSA requires a workforcethat has an unusually broad and deep understandingof the focus area and potential adversary.Traditional skill sets that identify intelligenceanalysts in functionally specific specialties (e.g.,imagery analysts) are not appropriate for SoSA.Regional experts, economists, political scientists,sociologists, communications specialists, andengineers are examples of required specialties.

• SoSA analysts are not intelligence collectors orproducers. They rely heavily on pre-analyzed,validated information and intelligence produced bycredible sources. SoSA analysts are principallyresponsible for synthesizing vast quantities ofinformation from all available sources into actionableknowledge that can be properly formatted in anONA database to expedite operational planning.

• Products prepared by SoSA analysts in support ofeffects-based planning (EBP) do not replicateintelligence production (e.g., current or situational


intelligence, area studies, order of battle, or centerof gravity summaries). SoSA products focus onthe behavioral characteristics, interdependencies,and, when appropriate, changes relating to thePMESII systems.

• The information necessary to develop the level ofunderstanding required for SoSA is drawn fromdiverse centers of excellence (COE) and subjectmatter experts (SME). Besides intelligence, COEand SME may include government interagency,academia, industry, the public domain, and othernon-traditional sources. Synthesizing theinformation from these sources requiressophisticated collaboration techniques and tools thatare not readily available today.

• The ONA database provides users with anextremely large volume of data compiled in recordentries for pre-determined data sets. SoSA analystsmust follow strict business rules for enteringrecords. Similarly, users of the database areacquainted with these business rules to improvetheir effectiveness in manipulating the database.

• Techniques such as link analysis, structuredargumentation, network analysis, and influencemodeling have applicability to depicting adversarysystems. Analytic tools and applications thataddress tangible, physically based systems (e.g.,electrical power grid) are well within currentanalysis and modeling capabilities. Applications thatexamine intangible systems (e.g., social, political,or religious systems), remain a challenge to bothDOD and industry.

• Automated tools are also needed to provide multi-level information security and information assuranceand to enable information exchange between diversenational databases and security domains.

• SoSA is a continuous, collaborative process thatbegins when the regional combatant commanderdesignates a focus area and tasks the SJFHQ(CE)to develop an ONA. Ideally this occurs in pre-

crisis and must continue throughout the ONA lifecycle to remain relevant through all phases of acampaign. During crisis response, SoSA analystsmust update and maintain their analysis at a rate atleast equal to the adversary’s ability to adapt. SoSAis manpower intensive and time-consuming.

• SoSA analysts must be well versed in the ONAand EBP processes because they are required tocollaborate extensively within the Standing JointForce Headquarters (Core Element), RCC staff,components, and other collaborative partners.

About the Authors:

Rick Wilson – ONA Effects Planner. Retired as a USArmy O6 in Jun 99 after 31 years. Assignments includeCI/HUMINT Officer and Mideast FAO. Alsocompleted Vietnam and Special Forces intelligenceassignments. Joint duty as SSO at HQ SHAPE andSALT, Geneva; attaché and SAO in Yemen;USCENTCOM J4 Security Assistance and J5 Pol-Milanalyst; CINC’s LNO to American Embassy Riyadhduring Gulf War; Chief, MCC Zakhu, Iraq; Deputy Asst.Inspector General, DIA; and Chief, U.S. Liaison Office(FMS), Abu Dhabi, UAE. Last served asUSAINSCOM Command Inspector General. JSO andSpecial Operations qualified. MA in InternationalRelations.

Bob Kuth – ONA Supervisor. Retired 1 Nov 01 after30 years. US Army MI Colonel. Primary expertise inoperational and tactical intelligence. Last active dutyposition, 2 years faculty instructor in Dept of MilitaryStrategy, Planning, and Operations, US Army WarCollege. Previous 3 years at HQ US Army Europe asDeputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (DCSINT), AsstDCSINT, and Chief Intelligence (Production) Division.Tactical command positions and staff assignments inairborne and light infantry units. 2 years as Chief G2Plans and Chief G2 Exercises, XVIII Airborne Corps.2 years experience in USJFCOM SJFHQ. Ohio StateUniversity, BA. Miami University of Ohio, MA. AirWar College.




DisclaimerThe opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of the contributors and do not necessarily reflectthe views of the Department of Defense, USJFCOM, the JCLL, or any other government agency. This product is not a doctrinalpublication and is not staffed, but is the perception of those individuals involved in military exercises, activities, and real-world events.The intent is to share knowledge, support discussions, and impart information in an expeditious manner.

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Standing Joint Force Headquarters(JFCOM) Standing Joint Force Headquarters (Core Element) (SJFHQ (CE)). This important headquarters is the prototype for the SJFHQ elements being established