Standardization of Reactor Designs and International Safety Framework

7/31/2019 Standardization of Reactor Designs and International Safety Framework

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Standardization of Reactor Designs

and

International safety framework

An Industry view

Bernard Fourest

WNU SI 2011

Oxford, 05 August2011


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Content

Part I: The needs for Internationalstandardization of nuclear reactor designs

Part II: Harmonization initiatives in theinternational safety framework

Part III: The WNA/CORDEL Initiative


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Part I: The needs for Internationalstandardization of nuclear reactor

designs


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Some Historical aspects(1/3)

The fifties: Hope of a worldwide market forcivil nuclear technology and wide internationalcooperations.

Atom for peace conference: Eisenhoweropen US nuclear technology to the world

Establishment of IAEA

Euratom treaty: one of the first pilar of whatwould became the European Union

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The sixties and seventies: Nationalism prevails

Several countries develop their own technology

(Canada, UK, France, USSR),

And/or customize US LWR technology to escape USvendors licenses (Germany, Japan, Korea, France)

Development of country specific industry design and

manufacturing codes (ASME, JSME, KEPIC, ANRIC),

Regulators develop their own safety requirementsand licensing processes

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Apart from the NSSS, each utility wanted its nuclear powerplant to be built on its own standard (custom-made) :

The result: all Nuclear Power Plants were different, nostandardization

One main exception in France where EDF built 58 PWRs of the

same design in 3 batches (900Wwe, 1300Mwe, 1450Mwe) thisbeing recognized as a key element of the competitiveness ofthe french nuclear program

Lesson learnt by the world nuclear industry:

Standardization is a necessary condition fornew nuclear plants to be built economicaly

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The 2000: Main additional context changes

Past:

Investment by state-ownedutilities in regulatedmarkets

Investment by nationalplayers

Custom-made reactors:

almost every reactor wasdifferent

Present:

Investment by private-owned utilities in highlycompetitive markets

Emergence of multinationalutilities choosing among asmall number ofinternational designs

Standardization is requiredto facilitate new build !!!

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International standardization of reactordesigns

International standardization means that each vendors

design can be built by a vendor, and ordered by a

utility, in every country without obligatory adaptationto specific national regulations

International standardization will

help competitiveness needed to

deliver large-scale worldwidenew build

bring benefits for safety


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Standardization as a benefit for safety

Fleets of standardized designs offer a broad basis for

construction and operation experience feedback

Design improvements could be implemented across the

fleet

Risk of a design shortcoming affecting the whole fleet

(large scale shutdown) is small due to high probability

of early detection of design flaws

Standardized advanced plants will bring additionalsafety layers in all stages: design, construction,operation and decommissioning


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Standardization as a benefit for theindustry and regulators

Standardization will

reduce strain on resources

reduce investment risks, time and cost in licensing and

construction

foster joint supplier oversight

enable project neutral manufacturing

of components for standardized designs

improve transparency of regulatory practices

gain public confidence

facilitate establishment of nuclear power programmes in

emerging countries in safest and efficient manner


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www.world-nuclear.org/reference/reports.html

Paper Benefits Gained throughInternational Harmonization of

Nuclear Safety Standards for

Reactor Designs available on


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Among actions for governments:

To the extent possible, facilitate the construction ofstandardised designs for nuclear power plants worldwide

by harmonising regulatory design requirements. Inparticular, countries introducing new nuclearprogrammes should avoid imposing unique requirements.

Milestones: Common requirements should be established from 2020.

OECD IEA-NEA Nuclear TechnologyRoadmap (June 2010) conclusions


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Existing regulatory/legal situation

Each NPP is licensed by an independent regulatorybody within

specific national licensing process, which vary fromcountry to country

specific national safety requirements, which varyconsiderably in details

A design approval in one country is legaly irrelevant

for others

This is an obstacle to deployment of standardizeddesigns across a range of countries


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Harmonization of regulatory regimes

Absolutely necessary for standardization!

Differences are even more difficult to justify in publiceyes (why should regulation in one country be saferthan in others....)

However, combination and piling up of the strictestrequirements to be avoided

IAEA Safety Standards - a good initial model for

harmonisation

Newcomer countries should start right away withregulations based on international consensus


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What challenges have to be kept in mind

Sovereignty of each countrys regulator has to be

respected

Regulators are bound by law to apply their nationalsafety requirements and licensing procedures

Regulators need to build up knowledge of the design


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Part II: Harmonization initiativesin the international safety

framework


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International Safety Framework

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Global European

Convention on Nuclear Safety

IAEA - Safety Standards

EU Council Directive2009/71/Euratom

Establishing a CommunityFramework for the nuclear safety

of nuclear installations

Other Directives will follow...


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IAEA

OECD/NEA

WENRAMDEP

European Council- EURATOM

EC (DG ENER)

ENSREG

FORATOM-ENISSWNA-CORDEL

Regulatory

WANO

ENEF

EUR

Global European

Industry

Intergovtal

Institutions

Who is Who? in internationalharmonization of safety standards

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IAEA Safety Standards Hierarchy

Safety Guides

Safety Requirements

Safety Fundamentals

Global ReferencePoint for a HighLevel of Nuclear

Safety

Slide from the IAEA presentation at the WNU Harmonization Forum, Manchester, September 200919


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A Foundation built on Principlesfor Safety and Security

Principle 1: Responsibility for Safety

Principle 2: Role of Government

Principle 3: Leadership and Management for safety

Principle 4: Justification of facilities and activities

Principle 5: Optimization of protectionPrinciple 6: Limitation of risk to individuals

Principle 7: Protection of present and future generations

Principle 8: Prevention of accidents

Principle 9: Emergency preparedness and response

Principle 10: Protective actions to reduce existing of unregulatedradiation risk


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IAEA Safety Standards Revision 2006-2015

21 Current Structure of IAEA Safety Standards


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IAEA Safety Review Services

Operational Safety OSART Operational Safety Review Team

SEDO Safety Evaluation of Fuel Cycle FacilitiesDuring Operation

SCART Safety Culture Assessment Review Team

Research Reactors

INSARR Integrated Safety Assessment of ResearchReactors

Engineering and Technical Safety

Safety Assessment Services Engineering/SafetyAssessment Review Services

Regulatory Framework and Activities

IRRS Integrated Regulatory Review Service


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OECD - Nuclear Energy Agency

OECD-NEA has two nuclear safety-related committees:

Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations (CSNI)

Mission is to assist member countries in maintaining and further

developing the scientific and technical knowledge base required to assess

the safety of nuclear reactors and fuel cycle facilities. Committee is made

up of senior scientists and engineers, and representatives from regulatory

authorities.

Committee on Nuclear Regulatory Activities (CNRA)

Mission is to guide the NEA programme concerning the regulation,

licensing and inspection of nuclear installations with regard to safety.

CNRA is made up of senior representatives from regulatory bodies.

CNRAs Working Group on the Regulation of New Reactors (WGRNR)examines the regulatory issues of the siting, licensing and regulatory

oversight of generation III+ and generation IV nuclear reactors.

WGRNR is developing: Construction Experience Database

Regulation of Nuclear sites Selection and Preparation

Licensing Structure of Regulatory staff and Regulatory Licensing Process

The WGRNR also coordinates activities of the CNRA and MDEP23
http://www.oecd.org/home/0,3305,en_2649_201185_1_1_1_1_1,00.html


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Multinational Design Evaluation Programme(MDEP)

10 regulators who are/will be undertaking review of new NPPdesigns: Canada, China, Finland, France, Japan, Russia, South Africa,

South Korea, UK, US and IAEA in observers

Fully operable since 2008

Aims of MDEP:

enhance cooperation between regulators

establish reference regulatory practices

achieve convergence of codes, standards, and

safety goals in the long-term

However: no harmonization of safety requirements, no

commonly valid design acceptance

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WENRA is Association of Heads of Nuclear Regulatory Authorities

of 17 countries: Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany,Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Netherlands, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden,Switzerland, United Kingdom. Plus 5 Observers: Austria, Ireland, Luxemburg, Norwayand Poland; in 2009 Russian, Ukraine and Armenia were invited)

Main objective is to find a common approach to nuclear safety andradiation protection within EU (Nations recognize IAEA Safety Standards, the

Convention on Nuclear Safety, etc. but, different organizations & different regulatoryregimes)

And to give EU an independent means of examining applicantcountries nuclear safety & regulation (Nuclear safety in EU enlargementcriteria)

WENRAs Reactor Harmonisation Working Group (RHWG) wasestablished to harmonize safety approaches & continuouslyimprove nuclear safety for NPPs

Reference Levels FOR EXISTING NPPs were established. All 17 countrieshave been benchmarked against 18 safety issues and National Action

Plans being implemented.

Definition ofsafety objectives for new reactors25

Western European Nuclear Regulators

Association (WENRA)


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European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group(ENSREG)

ENSREG - independent authoritative expert body composed of senior

officials from national regulatory or nuclear safety authorities from

all 27 Member States in the EU.

ENSREG had a key role in the development of the EU Council

Directive 2009/71/Euratom establishing a Community Framework forthe nuclear safety of nuclear installations

3 working groups:

Nuclear Safety

Openness and Transparency

Radioactive Waste Management and Decommissioning

ENSREG has key role in future development of harmonised safety

requirements for new NPPs in the EU

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European Nuclear

Energy Forum

Bratislava - Prague

European Nuclear

Energy Forum

Bratislava - Prague

27 EU MS governments,

European Institutions incl. the European

Parliament and the European Economic and

Social Committee,

the nuclear industry, the electricity

consumers

Civil society

ENSREG and Sustainable Nuclear Energy

Technology Platform

Financial institutions (EBRD, EIB)

WG Risk aims to further improve nuclearsafety aspects on the basis of theSafety Directive, which provides forhigh level harmonisation of nuclear

safety in the EU27

European Nuclear Energy Forum(ENEF)

Consultative Process

Inform.&Communicatio

n

Special events

Competitiveness

Nuclear Legal Roadmap

Safety harmonisation

Waste disposal

Training and education

Risks

Opportunities

Transparency

Financing

Smart grids

Non Proliferation

ENEF is a unique forum, free of taboos, for an open dialoguebetween key decision makers and stakeholders:


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European Utility Requirements (EUR)

a utility network to share experience in plant specification, design

evaluation, licensing

to build common specifications for the European

Gen 3 LWR NPPs

a common bridge with the externalstakeholders: vendors, partners outside Europe:EPRI, Asian utilities..., the regulators, international

organisations: IAEA, OECD, EU, WENRA...

A range of Gen 3 LWR projects: PWRs and BWRs, "evolutionary" and passive safety

features

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European Utility Requirements (EUR)

It has been used as technical specification for the call for bids inFinland, Bulgaria, South Africa, Turkey as well as in other countriesworldwide.

It has also been used by the NPP vendors willing to be present inEurope, as a guide for designing their new products.

Main objective of utilities: the design rules must be harmonised,stabilised & predictable, high operational performance,simplification, short construction

These requirements cover not only safety but also balance of plant,

grid connection EUR drives design towards standardisation

The same design is usable by different utilities in different countries

without specific re-development

Licensing and safety studies costs can be shared

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The EUR Document

Applications ofEUR to specific

projects

volume 3

genericconventional island

requirements

volume 4

main policies& objectives

genericnuclear islandrequirements

volume 1 volume 2

Th EUR D t t t


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The EUR Document contentsand status

Volume 1 presents the main utility objectives and

summaries the main requirements.

Volume 2 is a set of generic nuclear island

requirements. The contents cover most of what a

Plant Owner has to specify for the assessment,

licensing, design, supply, construction, tests and

operation of a future LWR power plant.

Volume 3 includes evaluations of the selected LWR

designs that are felt feasible for the European

market. There is a subset of volume 3 per project,

produced with contribution of the corresponding

vendor. Volume 4 is a set of generic requirements for the

power generation plant organised by chapters that

deal with the specific systems.

revision A: 03/1994

revision B: 11/1995

revision C: 04/2001

revision A: 11/1996

revision B: 03/2000

revision C: 10/2007

BWR 90: 06/1999

EPR rev A: 12/1999

EP1000: 12/1999

ABWR: 12/2001

SWR 1000: 02/2002

AP1000: 06/2006

AES92: 06/2006EPR rev B: 06/2009


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FORATOMs ENISS-Initiative

European Nuclear Installations Safety Standards Initiativerepresents nuclear licensees across Europe

ENISS is acting as a stakeholder in the regulatory issue process in

Europe and has fruitful interactions with WENRA to improve its

Reference Levels

ENISS is strengthening its activities in the IAEA revision work

ENISS is developing a constructive interaction with the EU

institutions and initiatives dealing with regulatory issues

in the areas of:o Nuclear Safety

o Waste Management

o Decommissioning

o Radiation Protection

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ENISS Membership

Belgium (Tractebel, Electrabel) Finland (Fortum, TVO) Germany (EON, RWE)

Italy (SOGIN/ENEL) Spain (UNESA) The Netherlands (EPZ) France (EdF, AREVA NC) Sweden (EON-Se, Vattenfall AB) Switzerland (Swiss Nuclear)

Czech Republic (CEZ) Hungary ( Paks NPP) Slovakia (Slovenske

Elektrarne, JAVYS*) Romania (Nuclearelectra) Bulgaria (Kozloduy NPP) United Kingdom (BE) Slovenia (Krko NPP) Lithuania (Ignalina NPP*)

All ENISS Members represent licensees

*involved only in waste & decommissioning activities

FORATOMs ENISS-Initiative


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Part III: The WNA/CORDEL

initiative


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The CORDEL Working Group

WNAs Cooperation in Reactor Design Evaluation andLicensing (CORDEL) Group

Founded in January 2007

Membership:

all major vendors: AECL, AREVA NP, GE-Hitachi, Hitachi-GE, MHI,Toshiba, Westinghouse...

utilities interested in new build: CEZ, EDF, ENDESA,Energoatom, E.ON,, Exelon, KHNP, NOK/Resun, OPG, Rosenergoatom,RWE, FEPC (TEPCo), TVO, Vattenfall, Visagino AE,...

service companies: EXCEL Services Corp., Rolls-Royce, AMEC, CH2MHill,...

observers from intl organisations: FORATOM/ENISS, EUR, EPRI,ISO, IAEA DNE, WANO, NEI


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http://www.world-

nuclear.org/uploadedFiles/org/referenc

e/pdf/CORDELreport2010.pdf

January 2010

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http://www.world-nuclear.org/uploadedFiles/org/reference/pdf/CORDELreport2010.pdfhttp://www.world-nuclear.org/uploadedFiles/org/reference/pdf/CORDELreport2010.pdfhttp://www.world-nuclear.org/uploadedFiles/org/reference/pdf/CORDELreport2010.pdfhttp://www.world-nuclear.org/uploadedFiles/org/reference/pdf/CORDELreport2010.pdfhttp://www.world-nuclear.org/uploadedFiles/org/reference/pdf/CORDELreport2010.pdfhttp://www.world-nuclear.org/uploadedFiles/org/reference/pdf/CORDELreport2010.pdfhttp://www.world-nuclear.org/uploadedFiles/org/reference/pdf/CORDELreport2010.pdf


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Boundaries of standardization within NPP

Not every detail in a nuclear plant can bestandardized: a certain degree of adaptation,dictated by site-specific conditions and other localfactors, would be necessary.

But sufficient detail of standardization to enable:

a) the operator to prepare specifications for the

procurement of equipment; and

b) the regulatory body to determine the adequacy of a

facility's safety.

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D i l f h ll


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Design approval as part of the overallregulatory process

creation of legal framework

decision in principle and justification of a particular NPP project

surveillance, inspections and assessments during operation

new NPP licensing process

construction and

operating licence

site

licence on decommissioning, dismantling and site clearance

policy decision on nuclear energy in the country

licenseedesign


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Main Conclusions of CORDEL ReportCORDEL proposes 3 Phases to achieve international standardization

of reactor designs:

Urgent need for international harmonization of

national licensing processes and safety requirements

Standardized designs will

help deliver nuclear new build on a large scale

enhance nuclear safety

3. Issuing international design certification

2. Validating and accepting design approvals

1. Sharing design reviews and assessments


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Phase 1: Share design assessments/reviews

design review design review

Regulator BRegulator A

design approval

by regulator A

design approval

by regulator B

share

elements of design review,

i.e.calculations, modelling

of event sequences, etc.


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During safety reviews, regulators could make use of:

Assessment work done by their peers, e.g. by reusing calculations or

modelling of event sequences

Assessments done by industry (EUR, US URD)

Regulators may join efforts in reviewing the same design bycreating a collaborative network

This would reduce the strain on regulators resources

This would in no way infringe the right and the duty of regulators

to take the final decision to issue a licence

CORDEL encourages MDEP progress towards shared assessment

work

Phase 1: Share design reviews/assessments

Ph 2 V lid & d i


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Phase 2: Validate & accept designapprovals

design review

Regulator BRegulator A

design approval

by regulator A

design approval

by regulator B

validation

Not automatic but through a validation.

Examples: transport casks for waste, aviation industrys Type Certification

i i


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Phase 2: Validation and acceptance ofdesign approvals (2)

Example: Italys new Act on Energy Companies, Act no.

99 of 23 July 2009, Art. 25, 2 i):

[Government is empowered to issue] a provision thatlicencesrelating to technical requirements andspecifications for reactor designs which have beenlicenced in the past 10 years by the competentauthorities in member states of OECD-NEA, or in

states linked to Italy by bilateral agreements ... in thenuclear sector, will be considered to be valid inItaly after approval by the Nuclear Safety Agency


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Phase 3: International Design Certification

Multinational Design Certification/Approval issued bya team of all concerned regulators or by an

international organisation

Multinational certification is owned by the vendor and

is valid for entire design life

Operator is intelligent customer, but vendor is

responsible for the detailed design knowledge

Network of vendors, operators and regulators is

required to address post-certification design changes

and to maintain the lifetime validity of Multinational

Design Certification


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Team of Regulators: A, B, C

(or, later, International Organisation)

Jointdesign review

multinational

design Approval / Certification

Country A Country B Country C



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Team of Regulators: A, B, C

(or, later, International Organisation)

Jointdesign review

multinational

design Approval / Certification

Country A Country B Country C


... a long term goal


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Alignment of licensing processes

Licensing processes and documents should be aligned sothat the design approval of one country would fit into

the licensing sequence of another country

Best solution: separate design approval (e.g.design

certificate) Legal implications of design approval: period of validity,

binding character, ownership, etc.

Examples:

US: Design Certification

UK: Generic Design Assessment (GDA)

France: ASN monitoring of compliance on design safety, parallel

to construction


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Industry:

operators and vendors: Owners Groups, information exchange,

implementation of design improvements, Design Authorities, experience

feedback, codes and standards, training

Role of WNA Cordel within industry and liaison with regulators (MDEP)

Regulators:

National regulators can already achieve greater convergence and

facilitate mutual acceptance of design reviews

Enhanced role of MDEP in promoting harmonization and mutual

acceptance

Governments:

Some changes in national legislation may be required to facilitate

standardization Longer term goal creation of legal framework for international

certification

International organizations:

IAEA and OECD-NEA, EU institutions - to take a proactive part in

standardization and harmonization

Role of all stakeholders


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CORDEL commitment from industry

13 April 2010, 11 Leading Nuclear Companies CEOs published aletter of support for CORDEL:

John Ritch, DG, WNA

Anne Lauvergeon,CEO, Areva

Hugh MacDiarmid, CEO, Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd.

Henri Proglio, CEO, Electricit de France

Wulf H Bernotat, CEO, Eon

Christopher Crane, President , Exelon

Jack Fuller, CEO, GE-Hitachi Nuclear Energy

Masaharu Hanyu, President, Hitachi-GE Nuclear Energy Akira Sawa,Director, Nuclear Systems, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries

Ichiro Takekuro, Chief Nuclear Officer, Tokyo Electric Power Co

Yashuharu Igarashi, CEO, Power Systems Toshiba

Aris Candris, CEO, Westinghouse


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CORDEL commitment from industry

13 April 2010, 11 Leading Nuclear Companies CEOs published aletter of support for CORDEL:

Recipients:

Yukiya Amano, DG, IAEA

Andr-Claude Lacoste, Chairman, Multinational Design EvaluationProgram (MDEP)

Luis Echvarri, DG, Nuclear Energy Agency of the OECD

Andrej Stritar, Chairman, European Nuclear Safety Regulator

Groupcc: Laurent Stricker, Chairman, World Association of Nuclear

Operators (WANO)


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CORDELs near-term activities

The group encourages international cooperation in design

reviews, mutual acceptance of design approvals and (in the longterm) international certification of designs

Cooperation with MDEP and other relevant regulatory initiatives

Participation in IAEA safety standard revision process

Promotion of harmonization of standards and codes(complementary to the MDEP work, compile existing comparisons of codes and

conduct additional comparisons of mechanical, electrical, civil, fire protection

etc. codes with the view of producing industry reference document)

Design Change Management develop institutional mechanisms

in the industry which would enable compliance withstandardization throughout standard fleets lifetime

Develop model licensing regime and focus on support to emergingmarkets


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CORDEL in IAEA Safety Standards Revision

Observer status in the IAEA NUSSC since early 2008.

Involvement in drafting process of the IAEA Safety Standards.

Main safety standards:

Safety requirements on NPP Design NS-R-1;

Safety Classification Guide; Guides on licensing processes; regulatory infrastructure;

Construction and Commissioning guides,

Guides related to safety assessments of NPP designs...

WNA through CORDEL members can identify industry expertson specific issues and send them to technical meetings -enriching standards with industry experience from a very earlystage

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Codes and Standards Task Force

A MDEP working group with national standard organisations

launched a comparison between different industrial mechanical

codes (ASME, JSME, KEPIC, RCCM)

CORDEL proposes a pilot project going a step further:

Selection in relation with SDOs of few topics of major interest for

the industry, Where convergence could be reached or equivalence could be

demonstrated,

Sponsoring independant experts to do the work,

Results to be approved by SDOs,

And agreed by the regulators.

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Design Change Management Task Force

How to maintain standardization after the plants licensingstage?

DCM TF Objective: to develop and promote institutionalmechanisms in the industry which would enable compliancewith standardization throughout standard fleets lifetime

Many existing mechanisms are being examined and could befurther improved:

Owners Groups

Responsibility of vendors and utilities Design Authority /

Entity concept WANO role

Regulators role

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Licensing and Permitting Task Force

A joint initiative with the Nuclear Law and Contracting WG

Objective : to provide a unified industry position in the dialogue on new

licensing arrangements;

to establish new structural arrangements for licensing and permitting

of NPPs with requirements for safety and efficiency of new build,

particularly in emerging markets.

Communicate with all stakeholders - regulators , IAEA, OECD-NEA

With this aim, the Task Force set up a WNA Membership Survey,which will seek to identify

The current licensing, permitting processes and nuclear laws in

various countries and how they impact scheduling, procurement,

financing, risk assessment...

In order to propose to emerging countries the process fitting the best

their needs.

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Conclusions


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Conclusions

Industry has learnt from past experience that standardizationis a necessary (but not always sufficient) condition for new

nuclear plant competitiveness and for nuclear to take its sharein world energy needs.

Regulators have to agreed to further rapid progress in safetyrequirements harmonisation.

This last point being all the more important after Fukushima.

Various International organisations have to better coordinatetheir efforts towards harmonized safety regimes

Aerospace industry needed 30 years to get internationalyrecognized aircraft certification.

Nuclear industry cannot wait for such a long time.

This will be your role .

Documents

Standardization of Reactor Designs and International Safety Framework