Stalin Works 3.pdf

5/20/2018 Stalin Works 3.pdf

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W O R K E R S O F A L L C O U N T R I E S, U N I T E !


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From Marx to Mao

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Digital Reprints

2006


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RUSSIAN EDITION

PUBLISHED BY DECISION

OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEEOF THE COMMUNIST PARTY

OF THE SOVIET UNION

(BOLSHEVIKS)


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C O N T E N T S

Page

Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XIII

1917

THE SOVIETS OF WORKERS AND SOLDIERSDEPUTIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

THE WAR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

BIDDING FOR MINISTERIAL PORTFOLIOS . . . . 10

CONDITIONS FOR THE VICTORY OF THE RUSSIANREVOLUTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

ABOLITION OF NATIONAL DISABILITIES . . . . . 17

EITHEROR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

AGAINST FEDERALISM. . . . . . . . . . . . 25

TWO RESOLUTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

THE LAND TO THE PEASANTS . . . . . . . . 36

MAY DAY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT. Speech Deliveredat a Meeting in Vasilyevsky Ostrov, April 18 (May 1),1917. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

THE CONFERENCE IN THE MARIINSKY PALACE . 46

THE SEVENTH (APRIL) CONFERENCE OF THER.S.D.L.P (BOLSHEVIKS), April 24-29, 1917 . . 51

1. Speech in Support of Comrade Lenins Resolutionon the Current Situation, April 24 . . . . . . 51


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CONTENTSVIII

2. Report on the National Question, April 29 . . 52

3. Reply to the Discussion on the National Question,April 29 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

LAGGING BEHIND THE REVOLUTION . . . . . 61

WHAT DID WE EXPECT FROM THE CONFERENCE? . 67

THE MUNICIPAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN . . . . . 70

YESTERDAY AND TODAY (Crisis of the Revolution) . 84

AGAINST ISOLATED DEMONSTRATIONS . . . . . 92

RESULTS OF THE PETROGRAD MUNICIPAL ELEC-TIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95

TO ALL THE TOILERS, TO ALL THE WORKERS ANDSOLDIERS OF PETROGRAD . . . . . . . . 101

AT THE DEMONSTRATION . . . . . . . . . . 105

CLOSE THE RANKS! . . . . . . . . . . . . 110

SPEECHES DELIVERED AT AN EMERGENCY CONFER-ENCE OF THE PETROGRAD ORGANIZATION OFTHE R.S.D.L.P. (BOLSHEVIKS), July 16-20, 1917 . 114

1. Report of the Central Committee on the JulyEvents, July 16 . . . . . . . . . . . . 114

2. Report on the Current Situation, July 16 . . . 121

3. Replies to Written Questions, July 16 . . . . 129

4. Reply to the Discussion, July 16 . . . . . . 131

WHAT HAS HAPPENED? . . . . . . . . . . . 134

VICTORY OF THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION . . . . 138

THE VICTORY OF THE CADETS . . . . . . . . 142

TO ALL THE TOILERS, TO ALL THE WORKERS ANDSOLDIERS OF PETROGRAD . . . . . . . . 145

TWO CONFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153


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CONTENTS IX

THE NEW GOVERNMENT . . . . . . . . . . . 155

THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS . . . 158

SPEECHES DELIVERED AT THE SIXTH CONGRESSOF THE R.S.D.L.P. (BOLSHEVIKS), July 26-August3, 1917. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166

l. Report of the Central Committee, July 27 . . . 166

2. Reply to the Discussion,July 27 . . . . . . 179

3. Report on the Political Situation,July 30 . . . 182

4. Replies to Questions in Connection With the

Report on the Political Situation, July 31 . . . 1905. Reply to the Discussion,July 31 . . . . . . 195

6. Reply to Preobrazhensky on Clause 9 of the Reso-lution On the Political Situation, August 3 . . . 199

WHAT DO THE CAPITALISTS WANT? . . . . . . 201

AGAINST THE MOSCOW CONFERENCE . . . . . 207

MORE ON THE SUBJECT OF STOCKHOLM. . . . . 211

WHITHER THE MOSCOW CONFERENCE? . . . . . 215

COUNTER-REVOLUTION AND THE PEOPLES OFRUSSIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221

TWO COURSES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 226

OUTCOME OF THE MOSCOW CONFERENCE . . . 231

THE TRUTH ABOUT OUR DEFEAT AT THE FRONT . 234

THE CAUSES OF THE JULY DEFEAT AT THE FRONT . 238

WHO REALLY IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DEFEATAT THE FRONT? . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245

AMERICAN BILLIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . 250

THIS IS ELECTION DAY . . . . . . . . . . . 254

A PERIOD OF PROVOCATION . . . . . . . . . 260

DIVISION OF LABOUR IN THE SOCIALIST-REVOLU-TIONARY PARTY . . . . . . . . . . . . 263


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CONTENTSX

YELLOW ALLIANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267

EITHEROR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271

WE DEMAND! . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 277

THE CONSPIRACY CONTINUES . . . . . . . . 282

AGAINST COMPROMISE WITH THE BOURGEOISIE . 287

THE CRISIS AND THE DIRECTORY . . . . . . . 289

THEY WILL NOT SWERVE FROM THEIR PATH . . 293

THE BREAK WITH THE CADETS . . . . . . . . 296

THE SECOND WAVE . . . . . . . . . . . . . 301

FOREIGNERS AND THE KORNILOV CONSPIRACY . 308

THE DEMOCRATIC CONFERENCE . . . . . . . 311

TWO LINES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 316

ALL POWER TO THE SOVIETS! . . . . . . . . 320THE REVOLUTIONARY FRONT . . . . . . . . . 323

FORGING CHAINS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 328

A GOVERNMENT OF BOURGEOIS DICTATORSHIP . 332

COMMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 336

The Railway Strike and the Democratic Bankrupts 336

The Russian Peasants and the Party of Numskulls 338

CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE WORKERS . . . . . . 340

YOU WILL WAIT IN VAIN! . . . . . . . . . . 343

COMMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 347

The Party of Indeterminates and the Russian Sol-diers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 347

Conspirators in Power . . . . . . . . . . . 349


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CONTENTS XI

A PAPER COALITION . . . . . . . . . . . . 351

COMMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 354

Starvation in the Countryside . . . . . . . . . 354

Starvation in the Factories . . . . . . . . . . 355

SELF-CHASTISEMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . 358

THE PLOT AGAINST THE REVOLUTION . . . . . 361

WHO IS TORPEDOING THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY? 383

THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION IS MOBILIZINGPRE-PARE TO RESIST! . . . . . . . . . . . . 386

WHO NEEDS THE PRE-PARLIAMENT? . . . . . 389

SOVIET POWER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 392

A STUDY IN BRAZENNESS . . . . . . . . . . 397

BLACKLEGS OF THE REVOLUTION . . . . . . 401

SPEECH AT A MEETING OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE,October 16, 1917 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 407

STRONG BULLS OF BASHAN HAVE BESET ME ROUND 409

WHAT DO WE NEED? . . . . . . . . . . . . 414

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 418

Biographical Chronicle (March-October 1917) . . . . 440


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PREFACE

The third volume contains the major works ofJ. V. Stalin relating to the preparatory period of theGreat Socialist Revolution of October 1917.

J. V. Stalin worked in 1917 in close fellowship withV. I. Lenin, directing the Bolshevik Party and the work-ing class in its struggle for the conquest of govern-

mental power.An important place in the works contained in the

volume is given to the question of Bolshevik leadershipof the masses at the time of the June and July demonstra-tions and of the elections to the Petrograd district and cityDumas (the appeal To All the Toilers, to All the Workersand Soldiers of Petrograd, and the articles Against

Isolated Demonstrations, The Municipal ElectionCampaign, What Has Happened? Close the Ranks!This Is Election Day, etc.), at the time of the actionto defeat Kornilov's counter-revolutionary attempt (WeDemand! The Conspiracy Continues, Foreignersand the Kornilov Conspiracy, etc.), and in the periodof direct preparation for the armed uprising, September-October 1917 (The Democratic Conference, Two Lines,You Will Wait in Vain! The Counter-revolution Is


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PREFACEXIV

MobilizingPrepare to Resist! Forging Chains,A Study in Brazenness, etc.).

A number of the works in the volume deal with thestruggle of the Party to convert the Soviets from organsfor the mobilization of the masses into organs of revoltand of proletarian rule (reports at the Emergency Confer-ence of the Petrograd organization of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.)and at the Sixth Congress of the Party, and the articlesAll Power to the Soviets! Soviet Power, Blacklegs

of the Revolution, What Do We Need?).Most of the articles in this volume were reprinted

in the book, On the Road to October, published in 1925in two editions. They were first printed in the CentralOrgan of the Bolshevik Party, Pravda, which also ap-

peared under other namesProletary , Rabochy, RabochyPutas well as in the Bolshevik papers, Soldatskaya

Pravda , Proletarskoye Delo , Rabochy i Soldat, etc.

Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute

of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.)


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1917MARCH-OCTOBER


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THE SOVIETS OF WORKERS

AND SOLDIERS DEPUTIES

The chariot of the Russian revolution is advancingwith lightning speed. The detachments of revolutionarymilitants are everywhere growing and spreading. The

pillars of the old power are tottering on their founda-tions and crumbling. Now, as always, Petrograd is inthe forefront. Behind it, stumbling at times, trail theimmense provinces.

The forces of the old power are crumbling, but theyare not yet destroyed. They are only lying low, waitingfor a favourable moment to raise their head and flingthemselves on free Russia. Glance around and you willsee that the sinister work of the dark forces is going onincessantly. . . .

The rights won must be upheld so as to destroy

completely the old forces and, in conjunction with theprovinces, further advance the Russian revolutionsuch should be the next immediate task of the prole-tariat of the capital.

But how is this to be done?What is needed to achieve this?In order to shatterthe old power a temporary alliance

between the insurrectionary workers and soldiers wasenough For it is self-evident that the strength of the


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J. V. S T A L I N2

Russian revolution lies in an alliance between the work-ers and the peasants clad in soldier s uniform.

But in order to preserve the rights achieved and todevelop further the revolution, a temporary alliance be-tween the workers and soldiers is far from enough.

For this it is necessary that the alliance should bemade conscious and secure, lasting and stable, sufficientlystable to withstand the provocative assaults of the coun-ter-revolutionaries. For it is clear to all that the guarantee

of the final victory of the Russian revolution lies inconsolidating the alliance between the revolutionaryworkers and the revolutionary soldiers.

The organs of this alliance are the Soviets of Work-ers and Soldiers Deputies.

And the more closely these Soviets are welded to-gether and the more strongly they are organized, the

more effective will be the revolutionary power of therevolutionary people which they express, and the morereliable will be the guarantees against counter-revolution.

The revolutionary Social-Democrats must work toconsolidate these Soviets, form them everywhere, andlink them together under a Central Soviet of Workersand Soldiers Deputies as the organ of revolutionary

power of the people.Workers, close your ranks and rally around theRussian Social-Democratic Labour Party!

Peasants, organize in peasant unions and rally aroundthe revolutionary proletariat, the leader of the Russianrevolution!

Soldiers, organize in unions of your own and gatheraround the Russian people, the only true ally of theRussian revolutionary army!


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THE SOVIETS OF WORKERS AND SOLDIERS DEPUTIES 3

Workers, peasants and soldiers, unite everywherein Soviets of Workers and Soldiers Deputies, as organsof alliance and power of the revolutionary forces ofRussia!

Therein lies the guarantee of complete victory overthe dark forces of old Russia.

Therein l ies the guarantee that the fundamentaldemands of the Russian people will be realized: landfor the peasants, protection of labour for the workers,

and a democratic republic for all the citizens of Russia!

Pravda , No. 8,March 14, 1917

Signed: K. Stalin


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THE WAR

The other day General Kornilov informed the Pet-rograd Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputiesthat the Germans were planning an offensive againstRussia.

Rodzyanko and Guchkov took advantage of theopportunity to appeal to the army and the people to

prepare to fight the war to a finish. And the bourgeois press sounded the alarm: Libertyis in danger! Long live the war! Moreover, a sectionof the Russian revolutionary democracy took a handin raising the alarm. . . .

To l isten to the alarmists, one might think thatthe situation of Russia today resembles that of France

in 1792, when the reactionary monarchs of Central andEastern Europe formed an alliance against republicanFrance with the object of restoring the old regime inthat country.

And if the external situation of Russia today reallydid correspond to that of France in 1792, if we reallywere faced with a specific coalition of counter-revolu-tionary monarchs whose specific purpose it was to restorethe old regime in Russia, there can be no doubt that


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THE WAR 5

the Social-Democrats, like the French revolutionariesof that period, would rise up as one man in defence ofliberty. For it is self-evident that liberty won at the

price of blood must be safeguarded by force of armsagainst all counter-revolutionary assaults, from whateverquarter they may proceed.

But is this really the case?The war of 1792 was a dynastic war fought by ab-

solute feudal monarchs against republican France, be-

cause they were terrified of the revolutionary conflagra-tion in that country. The aim of the war was to ex-tinguish the conflagration, restore the old order inFrance, and thus guarantee the scared monarchs againstthe spread of the revolut ionary contagion to their own countries. It was for this reason that the Frenchrevolutionaries fought the armies of the monarchs so

heroically.But this is not the case with the present war. The

present war is an imperialist war. Its principal aim isthe seizure (annexation) of foreign, chiefly agrarian, ter-ritories by capitalistically developed states. The latterneed new markets, convenient communications withthese markets, raw materials and mineral wealth, and

they endeavour to secure them everywhere, regardlessof the internal regimes in the countries they seek toannex.

This explains why, generally speaking, the presentwar does not, and cannot, lead necessarily to inter-ference in the internal affairs of the territories annexed,in the sense of restoring their old regimes.

And precisely for this reason the present situationof Russia provides no warrant for sounding the alarm


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J. V. S T A L I N6

and proclaiming: Liberty is in danger! Long live thewar!

It would be truer to say that the present situationof Russia resembles that of the France of 1914, theFrance of the time of the outbreak of the war, of thetime when war between Germany and France had be-come inevitable.

Just as in the bourgeois press of Russia today, soin the bourgeois camp of France at that time the alarm

was sounded: The Republic is in danger! Fight theGermans!

And just as in France at that time the alarmspread to many of the Socialists (Guesde, Sembat,etc.), so now in Russia quite a number of Socialists arefollowing in the footsteps of the bourgeois bellmen ofrevolutionary defence.

The subsequent course of events in France showed thatit was a false alarm, and that the cries about liberty andthe Republic were a screen to cover up the fact that theFrench imperialists were lusting after Alsace-Lorraineand Westphalia.

We are profoundly convinced that the course ofevents in Russia will reveal the utter falsity of

the immoderate howling that liberty is in danger:the patriotic smoke screen will disperse, and peo-p le wil l see for themselves that what the Russ ianimperialists are really after isThe Straits and Per-sia. . . .

The behaviour of Guesde, Sembat and their like wasduly and authoritatively assessed in the anti-war resolu-tions of the Zimmerwald and Kienthal Socialist Con-gresses (1915-16).1


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THE WAR 7

Subsequent events ful ly proved the correctnessand fruitfulness of the Zimmerwald and Kienthaltheses.

It would be deplorable if the Russian revolutionarydemocracy, which was able to overthrow the detestedtsarist regime, were to succumb to the false alarm raised

by the imperialist bourgeoisie and repeat the mistakesof Guesde and Sembat. . . .

What should be our attitude, as a party, to the pres-

ent war?What are the practical ways and means capable of

leading to the speediest termination of the war?First of all, it is unquestionable that the stark slo-

gan, Down with the war! is absolutely unsuitable asa practical means, because, since it does not go beyond

propaganda of the idea of peace in general, it does not

and cannot provide anything capable of exerting prac-tical influence on the belligerent forces to compel themto stop the war.

Further, one cannot but welcome yesterdays appealof the Petrograd Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Dep-uties to the peoples of the world, urging them to compeltheir respective governments to stop the slaughter.

This appeal, if it reaches the broad masses, will undoubt-edly bring back hundreds and thousands of workersto the forgotten sloganWorkers of all countries,Unite! It must be observed, nevertheless, that it doesnot lead directly to the goal. For even assuming thatthe appeal becomes widely known among the peoplesof the warring countries, it is hard to believe that theywould act on it, seeing that they have not yet realizedthe predatory nature of the present war and its annexa-


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J. V. S T A L I N8

tionist aims. We say nothing of the fact that, since theappeal makes the cessation of the terrible slaughterdependent upon the preliminary overthrow of the semi-absolute regime in Germany, it actually postponesthe cessation of the terrible slaughter indefinitely,and thereby tends to espouse the position of a war toa finish; for no one can say exactly when the German

people will succeed in overthrowing the semi-absoluteregime, or whether they will succeed at all in the near

future. . . .What, then, is the solution?The solution is to bring pressure on the Provisional

Government to make it declare its consent to start peacenegotiations immediately.

The workers, soldiers and peasants must arrangemeetings and demonstrations and demand that the Pro-

visional Government shall come out openly and publiclyin an effort to induce all the belligerent powers to start

peace negotiations immediately,on the basis of recognitionof the right of nations to self-determination.

Only then will the slogan Down with the war!not run the risk of being transformed into empty andmeaningless pacifism; only then will it be capable of

developing into a mighty political campaign which willunmask the imperialists and disclose the actual motivesfor the present war.

For even assuming that one of the sides refuses tonegotiate on a given basiseven this refusal, that is,unwillingness to renounce annexationist ambitions, willobjectively serve as a means of speeding the cessationof the terrible slaughter, for then the peoples will

be able to see for themselves the predatory character of


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THE WAR 9

the war and the bloodstained countenance of the impe-rialist groups in whose rapacious interests they are sacri-ficing the lives of their sons.

But unmasking the imperialists and opening theeyes of the masses to the real motives for the present waractually is declaring war on war and rendering the pres-ent war impossible.

Pravda , No. 10,

March 16, 1917Signed: K. Stalin


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BIDDING FOR MINISTERIAL PORTFOLIOS

A few days ago resolutions on the Provisional Govern-ment, on the war, and on unity passed by the Yedinstvogroup2were published in the press.

This is the Plekhanov-Buryanov group, a defenc-ist group

To understand the character of this group, it is enoughto know that in its opinion:

1) The necessary democratic control over the actions of theProvisional Government can best be achieved by the participa-tion of the working-class democracy in the Provisional Govern-ment;

2) The proletariat must continue the waramong otherreasons, in order to deliver Europe from the menace of Austro-German reaction.

In brief, what they are demanding of the workers is:Send your hostages, gentlemen, into the Guchkov-Milyukov Provisional Government and be so kind asto cont inue the war forthe seizure of Constant i-nople!

That is the slogan of the Plekhanov-Buryanov group.And, after that , this group has the hardihood to

appeal to the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Partyto unite with it!


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BIDDING FOR MINISTERIAL PORTFOLIOS 11

The worthies of the Yedinstvo group forget that theRussian Social-Democratic Labour Party stands by theZimmerwald-Kienthal resolutions, which repudiate bothdefencism and participation in the present government,even if it is a provisional one (not to be confused witha revolutionaryprovisional government!).

They fail to realize that Zimmerwald and Kienthalwere a repudiation of Guesde and Sembat, and, converse-ly, that unity with Guchkov and Milyukov precludes

unity with the Russian Social-Democratic LabourParty. . . .

They overlooked the fact that for a long time al-ready Liebknecht and Scheidemann have not been livingtogether, and cannot live together, in one party. . . .

No, sirs, you have addressed your unity appeal tothe wrong quarter!

One may, of course, make a bid for Ministerial port-folios, one may unite with Milyukov and Guchkov forthe purpose ofcontinuing the war and so on. All thisis a matter of taste. But what has it got to do with theRussian Social-Democratic Party, and why unite with it?

No, sirs, go your way!


Unsigned


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CONDITIONS FOR THE VICTORY

OF THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION

The revolution is on the march. From Petrograd,where it started, it is spreading to the provinces andis gradually embracing all the boundless expanses ofRussia. More, from political questions it is inevita-

bly passing to social quest ions, to the quest ion ofimproving the lot of the workers and peasants, therebydeepening and sharpening the present crisis.

All this cannot but arouse anxiety among definitecircles of property-owning Russia. Tsarist-landlord reac-tion is raising its head. The imperialist clique are sound-ing the alarm. The financial bourgeoisie are extendinga hand to the obsolescent feudal aristocracy with a viewto joint organization of counter-revolution. Today theyare still weak and irresolute, but tomorrow they may

grow stronger and mobilize against the revolution. Atall events, they are carrying on their sinister work in-cessantly, rallying forces from all sections of the popu-lation, not excluding the army. . . .

How can the incipient counter-revolution be curbed?What conditions are necessary for the victory of

the Russian revolution?It is one of the peculiarities of our revolution that

to this day its base is Petrograd. The clashes and shots,


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CONDITIONS FOR THE VICTORY OF THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION 13

the barricades and casualties, the struggle and victorytook place chiefly in Petrograd and its environs (Kron-stadt, etc.). The provinces have confined themselvesto accepting the fruits of victory and expressing confi-dence in the Provisional Government.

A reflection of this fact is that dual power, thatactual division of power between the Provisional Govern-ment and the Petrograd Soviet of Workers and SoldiersDeputies, which is the cause of so much anxiety to the

hirelings of counter-revolution. On the one hand, thePetrograd Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies,which is an organ of revolutionary struggle of theworkers and soldiers, and, on the other, the Pro-visional Government, which is an organ of the moderate

bourgeoisie, who are scared by the excesses of therevolution and have found a prop in the inertia of the

provincessuch is the picture.Therein lies the weakness of the revolution, because

such a state of affairs perpetuates the isolation of the prov-inces from the capital, the lack of contact between them.

But, as the revolution goes deeper, the provinces tooare being revolutionized. Soviets of Workers Deputiesare being formed in the localities. The peasants are being

drawn into the movement and are organizing their Own unions The army is becoming democratized andsoldiers unions are being organized in the military units.The inertia of the provinces is receding into the past.

Thus the ground is trembling under the feet of theProvisional Government.

At the same time, the Petrograd Soviet of WorkersDeputies is also becoming inadequate for the new sit-uation.


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J. V. S T A L I N14

What is needed is an all-Russian organ of revolu-tionary struggle of the democracy of all Russia, oneauthoritative enough to weld together the democracy of thecapital and the provinces and to transform itself at therequired moment from an organ of revolutionary struggleof the people into an organ of revolutionary power,whichwill mobilize all the vital forces of the people againstcounter-revolution.

Only an All-Russian Soviet of Workers, Soldiers

and Peasants Deputies can be such an organ.This is the first condition for the victory of the

Russian revolution.Further, along with its bad sides, the war, like ev-

erything in life, has a good side, which is that by mobi-lizing practically the whole adult population of Russia,it has given the army the character of a peoples army,

and has thus facilitated the work of uniting the soldierswith the insurrectionary workers. This, in fact, explainsthe comparative ease with which the revolution brokeout and triumphed in our country.

But the army is mobile and fluid, particularly owingto its constant movements from one place to anotherin conformity with the requirements of war. The army

cannot remain permanently in one place and protectthe revolution from counter-revolution. Consequently,another armed force is needed, an army of armed work-ers who are naturally connected with the centres of therevolutionary movement. And if it is true that a revo-lution cannot win without an armed force that is readyto serve it at all times, then our revolution too musthave its own forcea workers guard vitally bound upwith the cause of the revolution.


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CONDITIONS FOR THE VICTORY OF THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION 15

Thus a second condition for the victory of the revo-lution is the immediate arming of the workersa work-ers guard.

A characteristic feature of the revolutionary move-ments, in France for example, was the indubitable fact thatthe provisional governments there usually arose on the

barricades, and were therefore revolutionary, or at anyrate more revolutionary than the constituent assembliesthey subsequently convoked, which usually met after

the tranquil izat ion of the country. This , indeed,explains why the more experienced revolutionaries ofthose times tried to get their program carried throughwith the help of a revolutionary government, and beforethe convocation of a constituent assembly, by delayingits convocation. Their idea was to confront the constit-uent assembly with already accomplished reforms.

That is not the case in our country. Our ProvisionalGovernment arose not on the barricades, but near the

barricades. That is why it is not revolutionaryit isonly being dragged along in the tail of the revolution,unwillingly and getting in its way. And judging fromthe fac t tha t the revolut ion is growing ever more

profound, i s put t ing forward socia l demandsthe

eight-hour day and confiscation of the landand isrevolutionizing the provinces, it may be confidentlysaid that the future Popular Constituent Assembly will

be much more democratic than the present ProvisionalGovernment, which was elected by the Duma of Junethe Third.

Moreover, i t is to be feared that the ProvisionalGovernment, scared as it is by the sweep of the revolu-tion and imbued with imperialist tendencies, may, in


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J. V. S T A L I N16

certain political circumstances, serve as a lawful shieldand screen for the counter-revolution that is organ-izing.

The convocation of a Constituent Assembly shouldtherefore not be delayed under any circumstances.

In view of this, it is necessary to convene a Constit-uent Assembly as speedily as possible, as the only insti-tution which will enjoy authority in the eyes of all sec-tions of society and be capable of crowning the work

of the revolution, thereby clipping the wings of therising counter-revolution.

Thus a third condition for the victory of the revo-lution is the speedy convocation of a Constituent As-sembly.

A general condition for all these necessary measuresis the opening of peace negotiations as speedily as pos-

sible and the termination of this inhuman war, becausecontinuation of the war, with the financial, economicand food crisis it brings in its train, is that submergedreef on which the ship of revolution may be wrecked.


Signed: K. Stalin


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ABOLITION OF NATIONAL DISABILITIES

One of the ulcers that disgraced the old Russia wasnational oppression.

Religious and national persecution, forcible Russi-fication of the alien peoples, suppression of national-cultural institutions, denial of the franchise, denial ofliberty of movement, incitement of nationality against

nationality, pogroms and massacressuch was the na-tional oppression of shameful memory.

How can national oppression be eliminated?The social basis of national oppression, the force

which animates it, is the obsolescent landed aristocracy.And the nearer the latter is to power and the firmer itgrasps it, the more severe is national oppression and the

more revolting are its forms.In the old Russia, when the old feudal landed aris-tocracy was in power, national oppression operated to thelimit, not infrequently taking the form of pogroms (ofJews) and massacres (Armenian-Tatar).

In England, where the landed aristocracy (the land-lords) share power with the bourgeoisie and have longsince ceased to exercise undivided rule, national oppres-sion is milder, less inhumanif, of course, we disregard


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J. V. S T A L I N18

the fact that in the course of this war, when power haspassed into the hands of the landlords, national oppres-sion has become much more severe (persecution of theIrish, the Indians).

And in Switzerland and North America, where land-lordism has never existed and the bourgeoisie enjoysundivided power, the nationalities develop more or lessfreely, and, generally speaking, there is practically nosoil for national oppression.

This is to be explained chiefly by the fact that, owingto its very position, the landed aristocracy is (cannot

but be!) the most determined and implacable foe of allliberty, national liberty included; that liberty in gener-al, and national liberty in particular, undermines (can-not but undermine!) the very foundations of the polit-ical rule of the landed aristocracy.

Thus the way to put an end to national oppres-sion and to create the actual conditions necessary fornational liberty is to drive the feudal aristocracyfrom the political stage, to wrest the power from itshands.

Inasmuch as the Russian revolution has triumphed,it has already created these actual conditions, having

overthrown the power of the feudal serfowners and estab-lished liberty.What is now necessary is:1) to define the rights of the nationalities emanci-

pated from oppression, and2) to confirm them by legislation.This is the soil from which sprang the Provisional

Governments decree on the abolition of religious andnational disabilities.


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ABOLITION OF NATIONAL DISABILITIES 19

Spurred by the growth of the revolution, the Pro-visional Government was bound to take this first steptowards the emancipation of the peoples of Russia; andit did take it.

The decree amounts in general substance to theabolition of restrictions on the rights of citizens of non-Russian nationality and not belonging to the Ortho-dox Church in respect to: 1) settlement, domicile andmovement ; 2) acquis i t ion of proper ty r ights , e tc . ;

3) engaging in any occupation, in trade, etc.; 4) partic-ipation in joint-stock and other societies; 5) enteringthe government service, etc.; 6) enrolling in educa-tional institutions; 7) use of languages and dialectsother than Russian in the transaction of the affairsof private associations, in tuition in private educa-tional establishments of all kinds, and in commercial

accountancy.Such is the Provisional Governments decree.The peoples of Russia who were hitherto under suspi-

cion may now breathe freely and feel they are citizensof Russia.

This is all very good.But it would be an unpardonable mistake to think

that this decree is sufficient to guarantee national liberty,that emancipation from national oppression is alreadyfully accomplished.

In the first place, the decree does not establish na-tional equality in respect to language. The last clauseof the decree speaks of the right to use languages otherthan Russian in the transaction of the affairs of privateassociations and in tuition in private educational estab-lishments. But what about the regions with compact


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J. V. S T A L I N20

majorities of non-Russian citizens whose language isnot Russian (Transcaucasia, Turkestan, the Ukraine,Lithuania, etc.)? There is no doubt that they will have(must have!) their parliaments, and hence will haveaffairs (by no means private!) and tuit ion ineducational establishments (not only private!)andall this, of course, not only in Russian, but also inthe local languages. Is it the idea of the ProvisionalGovernment to proclaim Russian the state language

and to deprive these regions of the right to conductaffairs and tuition in their native languages in their,by no means private, institutions? Apparently, it is.But who but simpletons can believe that this signifiescomplete equalization of the rights of nations, aboutwhich the bourgeois gossips of Rech3 and Dyen4

shout from all the housetops and cry at all the cross-

roads? Who can fail to realize that this meanslegitimizing inequality of nations in respect to lan-guage?

Furthermore, whoever wants to establish real na-tional equality cannot confine himself to the negativemeasure of abolishing disabilitieshe must proceed fromthe abolition of disabilities to the adoption of a posi-

tive program which will guarantee the elimination ofnational oppression.It is therefore necessary to proclaim:1) political autonomy (not federation!) for regions

representing integral economic territories possessinga specific way of life and populations of a specific nationalcomposition, with the right to conduct affairs andtuition in their own languages;


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ABOLITION OF NATIONAL DISABILITIES 21

2) the right of self-determination for such nationsas cannot, for one reason or another, remain within theframework of the integral state.

This is the way towards the real abolition of nationaloppression and towards guaranteeing the nationalitiesthe maximum liberty possible under capitalism.


Signed: K. Stalin


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EITHEROR

In the interview he gave on March 23, Mr. Milyukov,Minister of Foreign Affairs, outlined his programon the aims of the present war. Our readers will knowfrom yesterdays Pravda 5 that these aims are impe-rialistic: seizure of Constantinople, seizure of Armenia,

partition of Austria and Turkey, seizure of NorthernPersia.It appears that the Russian soldiers are shed-

ding their blood on the battlefields not in defenceof the fatherland, and not for freedom, as the venal

bourgeois press assures us, but for the seizure of for-eign territories in the interests of a handful of impe-rialists.

That, at least, is what Mr. Milyukov says.In whose name does Mr. Milyukov say all this so

frankly and so publicly?Not, of course, in the name of the Russian people.

Because the Russian peoplethe Russian workers, peas-ants and soldiersare opposed to the seizure of foreignterritories, opposed to the violation of nations. This is

eloquently attested by the appeal of the Petrograd


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EITHEROR 23

Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies, the spokesmanof the will of the Russian people.

Whose opinion, then, is Mr. Milyukov expressing?Can it be the opinion of the Provisional Govern-

ment as a whole?But here is what yesterdays Vecherneye Vremya6had

to say about it:

In connection with the interview given by Foreign Min-

ister Milyukov published in the Petrograd papers on March 23,Minister of Justice Kerensky has authorized the Press Informa-tion Bureau of the Ministry of Justice to state that the expositionit contained of the aims of Russian foreign policy in the present waris the personal opinion of Milyukov and does not represent the viewsof the Provisional Government.

Thus, if Kerensky is to be believed, Mr. Milyukov

does not express the opinion of the Provisional Govern-ment on the cardinal question of the war aims.In brief, when Foreign Minister Milyukov told the

world that the aims of the present war were annexa-tionist, he went not only against the will of the Russian

people, but also against the Provisional Government,of which he is a member.

In the days of tsardom Mr. Milyukov advocatedthe responsibility of Ministers to the people. We agreewith him that Ministers should be accountable andresponsible to the people. We ask: does Mr. Milyu-kov still recognize the principle of the responsibili-ty of Ministers? And if he does, why does he notresign?

Or perhaps Kerenskys statement was notaccu-

rate?


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J. V. S T A L I N24

Either one thing or the other:EitherKerenskys statement was untrue, in which

case the revolutionary people must call the ProvisionalGovernment to order and compel it to recognize itswill.

OrKerensky is right, in which case Mr. Milyukov hasno place in the Provisional Governmenthe mustresign.

There can be no middle way.


Editorial


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AGAINST FEDERALISM

Delo Naroda ,7

No. 5, carried an art icle enti t ledRussiaa Union of Regions. It recommends nothingmore nor less than the conversion of Russia into a unionof regions, a federal state. Listen to this:

Be it declared that the federal state of Russia assumes theattributes of sovereignty vested in the various regions (LittleRussia, Georgia, Siberia, Turkestan, etc.). . . . But let it

grant the various regions internal sovereignty. And let the forth-coming Cons t i tuent Assembly es tab l i sh a Russ ian Union of Regions.

The author of the article (Jos. Okulich) explainsthis in the following manner:

Let there be instituted a single Russian army, a single cur-rency , a s ing le fore ign pol icy , a s ing le supreme cour t . Butlet the various regions of the single state be free to build theirnew life independently. If already in 1776 the Americans . . .created a United States by means of a treaty of union, whyshould we in 1917 be incapable of creat ing a f i rm union of regions?

So says Delo Naroda.One has to admit that the article is in many re-

spects interesting and, at any rate, original. Intriguing,


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J. V. S T A L I N26

too, is the solemnity of its tone, its manifestostyle, so to speak (be it declared, let there be insti-tuted!).

For all that, i t must be observed that in generalit is a peculiar piece of muddle-headedness. Andthe muddle is due at bottom to i ts more than friv-olous treatment of the consti tutional history of theUnited States of America (as well as of Switzerlandand Canada).

What does this history tell us?In 1776, the United States was not a federation, but

a confederation of what until then were independentcolonies, or states. That is, there were independentcolonies, but later, in order to protect their commoninterests against their enemies, chiefly external, theyconcluded an alliance (confederation), without, however,

ceasing to be fully independent state units. In the 1900sa crucial change took place in the political life of thecountry: the Northern states demanded a firmer andcloser political connection between the states, in op-

position to the Southern states, which protested againstcentralism and stood up for the old system. The CivilWar broke out and resulted in the Northern states

gaining the upper hand. A federation was established inAmerica, that is, a union of sovereign states whichshared power with the federal (central) government.But this system did not last long. Federation proved to

be as much a transitional measure as confederation. Thestruggle between the states and the central governmentcontinued unceasingly, dual government became intol-erable, and in the course of its further evolution theUnited States was transformed from a federation into


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AGAINST FEDERALISM 27

a unitary (integral) state, with uniform constitutionalprovisions and the limited autonomy (not governmental,but political-administrative) permitted to the states bythese provisions. The name federation as applied tothe United States became an empty word, a relic of the

past which had long since ceased to correspond to theactual state of affairs.

The same must be said of Switzerland and Canada,to whom the author of the article likewise refers. We

find the same independent states (cantons) at the begin-ning, the same struggle for stronger union (the waragainst the Sonderbund8 in Switzerland, the struggle

between the British and French in Canada), and thesame subsequent conversion of the federation into aunitary state.

What do these facts indicate?

Only that in America, as well as in Canada andSwitzerland, the development was from independentregions, through their federation, to a unitary state;tha t the t rend of development i s not in favour of federation, but against it. Federation is a transitionalform.

This is not fortuitous, because the development

of capitalism in its higher forms, with the concomitantexpansion of the economic territory, and its trend to-wards centralization, demands not a federal, but a uni-tary form of state.

We cannot ignore this trend, unless, of course, wetry to turn back the wheel of history.

But it follows from this that in Russia it would beunwise to work for a federation, which is doomed by thevery realities of life to disappear.


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J. V. S T A L I N28

Delo Naroda proposes to repeat in Russia the expe-rience of the United States of 1776. But is there even aremote analogy between the United States of 1776 andthe Russia of today?

The United States was at that time a congeries ofindependent colonies, unconnected with one anotherand desirous of linking themselves together at least in theform of a confederation. And that desire was quite nat-ural. Is the situation in any way similar in present-day

Russia? Of course, not! It is clear to everyone that theregions (border districts) of Russia are linked with Cen-tral Russia by economic and political ties, and that themore democratic Russia becomes, the stronger these tieswill be.

Further, in order to establish a confederation or fed-eration in America, it was necessary to unite colonies

which were unconnected with one another. And thatwas in the interest of the economic development of theUnited States. But in order to convert Russia into afederation, it would be necessary to break the alreadyexisting economic and poli t ical t ies connecting theregions with one another, which would be absolutelyunwise and reactionary.

Lastly, America (like Canada and Switzerland) isdivided into states (cantons) not on national, but ongeographical lines. The states evolved from colonialcommunities, irrespective of their national composi-tion. There are several dozen states in the United States,

but only seven or eight national groups. There are 25 can-tons (regions) in Switzerland, but only three nationalgroups. Not so in Russia. What in Russia are calledregions which need, say, autonomy (the Ukraine, Trans-


49/476


caucasia, Siberia, Turkestan, etc.), are not simply geo-graphical regions, as the Urals or the Volga area are;they are definite parts of Russia, each with its own defi-nite way of life and a population of definite (non-Rus-sian) national composition. Precisely for this reasonautonomy (or federat ion) of the s tates in Americaor Switzerland, far from being a solution for the na-tional problem (this, in fact, is not its aim!), does noteven raise the quest ion. But , in Russia , autonomy

(or federation) of the regions is proposed preciselyin order to raise and solve the national problem,

because Russia is divided into regions on nationallines.

Is it not clear then that the analogy between theUnited States of 1776 and the Russia of today is arti-ficial and foolish?

Is it not clear that in Russia federalism would not,and cannot, solve the national problem, that it wouldonly confuse and complicate it by quixotic attemptsto turn back the wheel of history?

No, the proposal to repeat in Russia the experienceof America of 1776 will positively not do. The transi-tional half-measure, federation, does not and cannot

satisfy the interests of democracy.The solution of the national problem must be aspracticable as it is radical and final, viz.:

1) The right of secession for the nations inhabitingcertain regions of Russia who cannot remain, or who donot desire to remain, within the integral framework;

2) Political autonomy within the framework of thesingle (integral) state, with uniform constitutional pro-visions, for the regions which have a specific national


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J. V. S T A L I N30

composi t ion and which remain within the integralframework.

It is in this way, and in this way alone, that theproblem of the regions should be solved in Russia.*


Signed: K. Stalin

* AUTHORS NOTE

This ar t ic le ref lects the at t i tude of disapprovaltowards a federal form of state which prevailed in ourParty at that t ime. The object ion to const i tut ionalfederalism was most distinctly expressed in Lenins letter

to Shaumyan of November 1913. We, Lenin saidin that letter, stand for democratic centralism, unre-servedly. We are opposed to federation. . . . We are op-

posed to federation in principleit weakens economicties, and is unsuitable for what is one state. You wantto secede? Well, go to the devil if you can bring yourselfto sever economic ties, or, rather, if the burden and

friction of cohabitation are such that they poison andcorrode economic ties. You dont want to secede? Good,but then dont decide for me, and dont think you havethe right to federation (see Vol. XVII, p. 90**).

It is noteworthy that in the resolution on the na-tional question adopted by the April Conference of the

** References in Roman numerals to Lenins works here andelsewhere are to the 3rd edition of the Works.Tr.


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FROM MARX

TO MAO

NOT FOR

COMMERCIAL

DISTRIBUTION

31

Party in 1917,9 the question of a federal structure wasnot even mentioned. The resolution spoke of the right ofnations to secession, of autonomy for national regionswithin the framework of the integral (unitary) state, and,lastly, of the enactment of a fundamental law prohibitingall national privileges whatsoever, but not a word was saidabout the permissibility of a federal structure of the state.

In Lenins book, The State and Revolution (August1917), the Party, in the person of Lenin, made the first

serious step towards recognition of the permissibility offederation, as a transitional form to a centralized repub-lic, this recognition, however, being accompanied bya number of substantial reservations.

Approaching the matter from the point of view of the prole-tariat and the proletarian revolution, Lenin says in this book,Engels, like Marx, upheld democratic centralism, the republic

one and indivis ible . He regarded the federal republic e i ther as an exception and a hindrance to development, or as a transi-tional form from a monarchy to a centralized republic, as a stepforward under certain special conditions. And, as one of thesespecial conditions, he mentions the national question. . . . Evenin regard to England, where geographical conditions, a commonlanguage and the history of many centuries would seem to haveput an end to the national question in the separate small divi-sions of Englandeven in regard to that country, Engels reckoned

with the patent fact that the national question was not yet a thingof the past, and recognized in consequence that the establishmentof a federal republic would be a step forward. Of course, thereis not the slightest hint here of Engels abandoning the criticismof the shortcomings of a federal republic or that he abandonedthe most determined propaganda and struggle for a unified andcentralized democratic republic (see Vol. XXI, p. 419).

Only after the October Revolution did the Partyfirmly and definitely adopt the position of state feder-

AGAINST FEDERALISM


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J. V. S T A L I N32

ation, advancing it as its own plan for the constitutionof the Soviet Republics in the transitional period. This

position was expressed for the first time in January1918, in the Declaration of Rights of the Toiling andExploited People, written by Lenin and approved bythe Central Committee of the Party. This declarationsaid: The Russian Soviet Republic is established onthe principle of a free union of free nations, as a fed-eration of Soviet national republics (see Vol. XXII,

p. 174).Officially, this position was affirmed by the Party

at its Eighth Congress (1919).10 It was at this congress,as we know, that the program of the Russian CommunistParty was adopted. The program says: As one of thetransitional forms towards complete unity, the Partyrecommends a federal amalgamation of states organized

on the Soviet pattern (see Program of the R.C.P.).Thus the Party traversed the path from denial of

federation to recognition of federation as a transitionalform to the complete unity of the working people of thevarious nations (see Theses on the National Ques-tion11 adopted by the Second Congress of the Comin-tern).

This evolution in our Partys views on the questionof a federal state is to be attributed to three causes.First, the fact that at the time of the October Revo-

lution a number of the nationalities of Russia were actu-ally in a state of complete secession and complete isola-tion from one another, and, in view of this, federationrepresented a step forward from the division of the work-ing masses of these nationalities to their closer union,their amalgamation.


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Secondly, the fact that the very forms of federationwhich suggested themselves in the course of Soviet de-velopment proved by no means so contradictory to theaim of closer economic unity between the working massesof the nationalities of Russia as might have appearedformerly, and even did not contradict this aim at all,as was subsequently demonstrated in practice.

Thirdly, the fact that the national movement provedto be far more weighty a factor, and the process of amal-

gamation of nations far more complicated a matter thanmight have appeared formerly, in the period prior tothe war, or in the period prior to the October Revolu-tion.

J. St.December 1924


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TWO RESOLUTIONS

Two resolutions. Onethat of the Executive Commit-

tee of the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies.The otherthat of the workers (400) of the machineshops of the Russo-Baltic Railway Car Works.

The former is for supporting the so-called LibertyLoan.

The latter is against.The former uncritically accepts the Liberty Loan

at its face value, as a loan in support of liberty.The latter characterizes the Liberty Loan as aloan against liberty, because it is being floated withthe aim of continuing the fratricidal slaughter, whichis advantageous only to the imperialist bourgeoisie.

The former is prompted by the misgivings of dis-traught mindswhat about the supply of the army,

will not the supply of the army be injured by refusalto support the loan? The latter has no such misgivings, because it sees

a solution: it recognizes that to supply the needs of thearmy funds are required, and points out to the Sovietof Workers and Soldiers Deputies that these fundsshould be taken from the pockets of the bourgeoisie, whostarted and are continuing this war, and who are coining

millions out of the slaughter.


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TWO RESOLUTIONS 35

The authors of the first resolution should be content,for have they not done their duty?

The authors of the second resolution protest, consid-ering that by such an attitude towards the cause of the

proletariat the former are betraying the International.That hits the nail on the head!

For and against a Liberty Loan that is directedagainstliberty.

Workers, who are r ight? Decide for yourselves,

comrades.

Pravda , No. 29,April 11, 1917

Signed: K. Stalin


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THE LAND TO THE PEASANTS

The peasants of the Ryazan Gubernia have sent

a statement to Minister Shingaryov to the effect thatthey wil l plough the land lef t uncul t ivated by thelandlords even if the landlords do not give their con-sent. The peasants declare that it will be disastrous ifthe landlords refrain from planting, that immediate

ploughing of untilled land is the only means of ensur-ing bread both for the population in the rear and for

the army at the front.In reply to this, Minister Shingaryov (see his tele-

gram12) emphatically prohibits unauthorized ploughing,calling it usurpation, and orders the peasants to waituntil the convocation of the Constituent Assembly; it,forsooth, will settle everything.

As, however, it is not known when the Constituent

Assembly will be convened, since its convocation isbeing postponed by the Provisional Government, ofwhich Mr. Shingaryov is a member, it follows that,in fact, the land is to remain unploughed, the landlordsare to remain in possession of the land, the peasantswithout land, and Russiathe workers, the peasants andthe soldierswithout sufficient bread.

And all this in order not to offend the landlords,even though Russia fall into the clutches of famine.


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THE LAND TO THE PEASANTS 37

Such is the reply of the Provisional Government, ofwhich Minister Shingaryov is a member.

This reply does not surprise us. A government ofmanufacturers and landlords cannot behave otherwisetowards the peasantswhat do they care about the

peasants so long as all is well with the landlords?We, therefore, call upon the peasants, upon the

peasant poor of all Russia, to take their cause into theirown hands and push it forward.

We call upon them to organize and form revolu-tionary peasant committees (volost, uyezd, etc.), takeover the landed estates through these committees, andcult ivate the land in an organized manner withoutauthorization.

We call upon them to do this without delay, notwaiting for the Constituent Assembly and paying no

attention to reactionary ministerial prohibitions whichput spokes in the wheel of the revolution.

We are told that immediate seizure of the landedestates would disrupt the unity of the revolution

by splitting off the progressive strata of society from it.But it would be naive to think that it is possible

to advance the revolution without quarrelling with the

manufacturers and landlords.Did not the workers split off the manufacturersand their ilk from the revolution when they introducedthe eight-hour day? Who would venture to assert thatthe revolution has suffered from having alleviated thecondition of the workers, from having shortened theworking day?

Unauthorized cultivation of the landed estates andtheir seizure by the peasants will undoubtedly split off


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J. V. S T A L I N38

the landlords and their ilk from the revolution. But whowould venture to assert that by rallying the millions of

poor peasants around the revolution we shall be weak-ening the forces of the revolution?

People who want to influence the course of the revo-lution must realize once and for all:

1) That the main forces of our revolution are theworkers and the poor peasants who, owing to the war,are now wearing soldiers uniform;

2) That as the revolution grows deeper and wider,the so-called progressive elements, who are progres-sive in word but reactionary in deed, will split offfrom it inevitably.

It would be reactionary utopianism to retard thisbeneficent process of purging the revolution of unneces-sary elements.

The policy of waiting and procrastinating until theConstituent Assembly is convened, the policy recommend-ed by the Narodniks, Trudoviks, and Mensheviks oftemporarily renouncing confiscation, the policy ofzigzagging between the classes (so as not to offend any-

body!) and of shamefully marking time, is not the pol-icy of the revolutionary proletariat.

The victorious onmarch of the Russian revolutionwill sweep it away like so much superfluous lumber thatis suitable and advantageous only to the enemies of therevolution.

Pravda , No. 32,April 14, 1917

Editorial

Signed: K. Stalin


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MAY DAY

It is nearly three years since the bourgeois vam-pires of the belligerent countries plunged the world intoa bloody shambles.

For nearly three years now the workers of all coun-tries, who were yesterday kin brothers and are nowclad in soldiers uniform, have stood confronting oneanother as enemies, and are crippling and murdering one

another to the joy of the enemies of the proletariat.Wholesale slaughter of the man power of the nations,

wholesale ruin and want, destruction of once flourish-ing towns and villages, wholesale starvation and lapseinto savagery, all in order that a handful of crownedand uncrowned robbers may pillage foreign lands andrake in untold millionsthis is where the war is

tending.The world has begun to stifle in the grip of war. . . .The peoples of Europe can bear it no longer, and are

already rising up against the bellicose bourgeoisie.The Russian revolution is the first to be forcing

a breach in the wall that divides the workers from oneanother. The Russian workers, at this time of universalpatriotic frenzy, are the first to proclaim the forgottenslogan: Workers of all countries, unite!


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J. V. S T A L I N40

Amidst the thunder of the Russian revolution, theworkers of the West too are rising from their slumber.The strikes and demonstrations in Germany, the demon-strations in Austria and Bulgaria, the strikes and meet-ings in neutral countries, the growing unrest in Brit-ain and France, the mass fraternization on the battlefrontsthese are the first harbingers of the socialistrevolution that is brewing.

And this holiday we are celebrating today, this May

Day, is it not a sign that in the welter of blood new tiesof fraternity among the peoples are being forged?

The soil is burning underneath the feet of the capi-talist robbers, for the Red Flag of the Internationalis again waving over Europe.

Let, then, this First of May, when hundreds of thou-sands of Petrograd workers extend the hand of fraternity

to the workers of the world, be an earnest of the birth ofa new revolutionary International!

Let the slogan which resounds today in the squaresof PetrogradWorkers of all countries, unite!re-verberate through the world and unite the workers ofall countries in the fight for socialism!

Over the heads of the capitalist robbers, over the

heads of their predatory governments, we extend a handto the workers of all countries, and cry:Hail the First of May!Hail the Brotherhood of Nations!Hail the Socialist Revolution!

Pravda , No. 35,April 18 (May 1), 1917

Unsigned


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THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT

Speech Delivered at a Meeting in Vasilyevsky Ostrov

April 18 (May 1), 1917

In the course of the revolution two governmentalauthorities have arisen in the country: the ProvisionalGovernment, elected by the Duma of June the Third,and the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies,elected by the workers and soldiers.

The relations between these two authorit ies arebecoming increasingly strained; the former cooperationbetween them is coming to an end; and it would be crim-inal on our part to gloss over this fact.

The bourgeoisie were the first to raise the questionof the dual power; they were the first to pose thealternative: either the Provisional Government, or

the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies. Thequestion has been put bluntly, and it would be un-worthy of us to evade it. The workers and sol-diers must say clearly and distinctly which they con-sider to be their governmentthe Provisional Govern-ment, or the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies.

We are told that there must be confidence in theProvisional Government, that this confidence is essen-tial. But what confidence can there be in a government


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J. V. S T A L I N42

which itself has no confidence in the people on the car-dinal and basic issue? We are in the midst of a war.It is being waged on the basis of treaties concluded

by the tsar with Britain and France behind the backof the people and now sanctified by the ProvisionalGovernment without the consent of the people. The

people are entitled to know the contents of these trea-t ies; the workers and soldiers are enti t led to knowwhat they are shedding their blood for. To the de-

mand of the workers and soldiers that the treaties bemade public, what did the Provisional Governmentreply?

It declared that the treaties remained in force.And it did not publish the treaties, and doesnt

intend to publish them!Is it not obvious that the Provisional Government

is concealing the real aims of the war from the peopleand that, by concealing them, it is stubbornly refusingto put its confidence in the people? What confidencecan the workers and peasants have in a ProvisionalGovernment which itself has no confidence in them onthe cardinal and basic issue?

We are told that the Provisional Government must

be supported, that such support is essential. But judgefor yourselves: can we, in a period of revolution, supporta government which has been hindering the revolutionfrom its very inception? So far, the situation has beenone in which the revolutionary initiative and democraticmeasures emanated from the Soviet of Workers andSoldiers Deputies, and from it alone. The ProvisionalGovernment held back and resisted and only afterwardsagreed with the Soviet, and then only partially and


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THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 43

verbally, while in practice creating obstacles. Such hasbeen the situation so far. But how is it possible, at theheight of revolution, to support a government whichgets in the way of the revolution and pulls it back? Wouldit not be better to demand that the Provisional Govern-ment should not hinder the Soviet of Workers andSoldiers Deputies in the work of further democratizingthe country?

The forces of counter-revolution are mobilizing in

the land. They are carrying on agitation in the army.They are carrying on agitation among the peasants andthe small townsfolk. The counter-revolutionary agita-tion is spearheaded first and foremost against the Sovietof Workers and Soldiers Deputies. It uses the name ofthe Provisional Government as a screen. And the Pro-visional Government plainly connives at the attacks

on the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies.Why, then, should we support the Provisional Govern-ment? Not for its connivance at counter-revolutionaryagitation, surely?

An agrarian movement has begun in Russia. Thepeasants are seeking on their own authority to ploughthe land left untilled by the landlords. If that is not

done, the country may find itself on the verge of famine.In compliance with the wishes of the peasants, the All-Russian Conference of Soviets13 resolved to supportthe peasant movement for the confiscation of the landedestates. But what does the Provisional Government do?It characterizes the peasant movement as usurpation,forbids the peasants to plough up the landed estates,and issues instructions accordingly to its commissars(see Rech, April 17). Why, then, should we support the


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Provisional Government? Not for its having declared waron the peasantry, surely?

We are told that lack of confidence in the ProvisionalGovernment will undermine the unity of the revolution,repel the capitalists and landlords from it. But whowill venture to assert that the capitalists and landlordsreally are supporting, or can support, the revolutionof the masses?

Did not the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Depu-

ties, when it introduced the eight-hour working day,repel the capitalists, and at the same time rally the

broad mass of the workers around the revolution? Whowould venture to assert that the dubious friendship ofa handful of manufacturers is more valuable to the revo-lution than the real friendship of millions of workerswhich has been cemented with blood?

Or again, did not the All-Russian Conference of So-viets, when it decided to support the peasants, repel thelandlords and at the same time link the peasant massesto the revolution? Who would venture to assert that thedubious friendship of a handful of landlords is more val-uable to the revolution than the real friendship of themany millions of poor peasants now clad in soldiers

uniform?The revolution cannot satisfy everyone and every-body. One of its sides always satisfies the toiling masses,while the other strikes at the overt and covert enemiesof the masses.

It is therefore necessary to choose: either with theworkers and poor peasants forthe revolution, or with thecapitalists and landlords againstthe revolution.

And so, who shall we support?


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THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 45

Who shall we regard as our government: the Sovietof Workers and Soldiers Deputies or the ProvisionalGovernment?

Clearly, the workers and soldiers can support onlythe Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies whichthey themselves elected.

Soldatskaya Pravda, No. 6,April 25, 1917

Signed: K. Stalin


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THE CONFERENCE

IN THE MARIINSKY PALACE

A report of the conference between the ExecutiveCommittee of the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Dep-ut ies and the Provisional Government has alreadyappeared in the bourgeois press. This report, which ingeneral is rather less than accurate, in places flatlydistorts the facts and is misleading. This apart from the

peculiar manner of handling the facts which is character-

istic of the bourgeois press. It is therefore necessaryto reproduce the real picture of what happened at theconference.

The purpose of the conference was to clarify therelations between the Provisional Government and theExecutive Committee in connection with Minister Mi-lyukovs Note,14which had sharpened the conflict.

The conference was opened by Premier Lvov. Hisintroductory speech boiled down to the following points.Until very recently the country had had confidence inthe Provisional Government and things had gone satis-factorily. But now this confidence had disappeared, andthere was even resistance. This had been felt particu-larly in the past fortnight, when certain well-knownsocialist circles started a campaign in the press againstthe Provisional Government. That could not continue.


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THE CONFERENCE IN THE MARIINSKY PALACE 47

They must have the determined support of the Sovietof Workers and Soldiers Deputies. Otherwise, theywould resign.

Then came reports by Ministers (War, Agricul-ture, Transport, Finance, Foreign Affairs), the mostoutspoken being Guchkov, Shingaryov and Milyukov.The speeches of the other Ministers only repeated theirconclusions.

Minister Guchkovs speech amounted to a justifi-

cation of the imperialist view of our revolution, namely,that the revolution in Russia must be regarded as a meansof fighting the war to a finish. It was my conviction,he said in effect, that a revolution in Russia was neededin order to avoid defeat. I wanted the revolution tocreate a new factor of victory, and I hoped that it wouldcreate it. Our aim is defencism in the broad meaning

of the term, defencism not only for the present, but alsofor the future. But in these past weeks there have been anumber of adverse developments. . . . The fatherland isin danger. . . . The chief reason was the spate of

pacifist ideas preached by certain socialist circles. TheMinister transparently hinted that this preachingmust be curbed, that discipline must be restored, and

that in this the assistance of the Executive Committeewas needed. . . .Minister Shingaryov painted a picture of the food

crisis in Russia. . . . The cardinal issue was not the Noteand foreign policy, but grain: if the grain situation werenot remedied, nothing could be remedied. No smallfactor in aggravating the food crisis was the spoiling ofthe roads owing to the spring thaw, and other transientcauses. But the chief reason, Shingaryov considered,


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was the deplorable fact that the peasants were tak-ing up the land question, were arbitrari ly plough-ing up landed estates, removing war prisoners from thelandlords farms, and generally indulging in agrarianillusions. This peasant movementin Shingaryovsopinion a harmful movementwas being fanned

by the agitation of the Leninists in favour of the con-fiscation of the land and their fanatical partisan blind-ness. The pernicious agitation from that poisonous

nest, the Kshesinska mansion,15 must be stopped. . . .One or the other: either confidence in the existing Pro-visional Government, in which case the agrarian ex-cesses must stop; oranother government.

Milyukov . The Note is not my personal opinion,but the opinion of the ent i re Provis ional Govern-ment. The question of foreign policy amounts to the

question of whether we are prepared to fulfil our pledgesto our allies. We are bound to our allies. . . . Generally,we are assessed as a force solely by whether we are fit-ted or unfitted for specified purposes. We have only toshow ourselves weak, and the attitude towards us willchange for the worse. . . . Renunciation of annexationswould therefore be fraught with danger. . . . We need

your confidence; let us have it, and then there will beenthusiasm in the army, we shall then have an offensivein the interests of a united front, we shall then presshard on the Germans and deflect them from the Frenchand British. This is demanded by our commitments toour al l ies . You see, then, Milyukov concluded,that, the situation being what it is, and we not beingdesirous of losing the confidence of our allies, the Notecould not be other than it was.


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THE CONFERENCE IN THE MARIINSKY PALACE 49

Thus the lengthy speeches of the Ministers boileddown to a few terse theses: the country was passingthrough a severe crisis; the cause of the crisis was therevolutionary movement; the way out of the crisis wasto curb the revolution and carry on with the war.

It followed that to save the country it was necessary:1) to curb the soldiers (Guchkov), 2) to curb the peas-ants (Shingaryov), 3) to curb the revolutionary work-ers (all the Ministers), who are unmasking the Pro-

visional Government. Support us in this difficult job,help us to wage an offensive war (Milyukov), and all will

be well. Otherwise, we resign.That is what the Ministers said.It is highly noteworthy that these arch-imperialist

and counter-revolutionary speeches of the Ministers metwith no rebuff from the representative of the Executive

Committee majority, Tsereteli. Scared by the Ministersbluntness, and dumbfounded by the prospect of theirresignation, Tsereteli, in his speech, implored them tomake a still possible concession by issuing an expla-nation16 of the Note in a desirable spirit, at least forhome consumption. The democracy, he said, wouldsupport the Provisional Government with the utmost

energy, if it consented to make this concession, which,essentially speaking, would be a purely verbal one.A desire to gloss over the conflict between the Pro-

visional Government and the Executive Committee,a readiness to make concessions so long as agreementwas maintainedsuch was the keynote of Tseretelisspeeches.

Quite the opposi te was the tenor of Kamenevsspeech. If the country was on the verge of disaster, if


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it was in the throes of economic, food and other crises,the way out lay not in continuing the war, which wouldonly aggravate the crisis and might devour the fruitsof the revolution, but in its speediest termination. Toall appearances the existing Provisional Government wasnot capable of assuming the task of ending the war,

because it was out for a war to a finish. The solutiontherefore lay in the transfer of power to another class,a class capable of leading the country out of the im-

passe. . . .When Kamenev concluded, there were cries from the

Ministerial seats: Well, then, take power yourselves!

Pravda , No. 40April 26, 1917

Signed: K. Stalin


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THE SEVENTH (APRIL) CONFERENCE

OF THE R.S.D.L.P. (BOLSHEVIKS)April 24-29, 1917

1. SPEECH IN SUPPORT

OF COMRADE LENINS RESOLUTION

ON THE CURRENT SITUATION

April 24

Comrades, that which Bubnov proposes is providedfor in Comrade Lenins resolution. Comrade Lenin doesnot reject mass action, demonstrations. But this is notthe point at present. The disagreement centres around

the question of control. Control presumes controller andcontrolled, and some sort of agreement between control-ler and controlled. We had control and we had an agree-ment. What were the results of control? Nil. After Mi-lyukovs pronouncement (of April 19) its shadowy char-acter has become particularly evident.

Guchkov says, I regard the revolution as a means

of fighting better: let us make a small revolution for thesake of a big victory. But now the army is permeatedwith pacifist ideas and it is impossible to fight. Thegovernment tells us, Stop the propaganda against thewar, otherwise we resign.

On the agrarian question the government is like-wise unable to meet the interests of the peasants, theseizure by the latter of the landed estates. We are told,Help us to curb the peasants, otherwise we resign.


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Milyukov says, A united front must be pre-served, we must attack the enemy. Inspire the soldierswith enthusiasm, otherwise we resign.

And after this we are proposed control. It is ridic-ulous! At first the Soviet outlined the program, nowthe Provisional Government outlines it. The alliance con-cluded between the Soviet and the government on theday after the crisis (Milyukovs pronouncement) signi-fies that the Soviet is following the government. The

government attacks the Soviet. The Soviet retreats. Tosuggest after this that the Soviet controls the governmentis just idle talk. That is why I propose that Bubnovsamendment on control be not accepted.

2. REPORT ON THE NATIONAL QUESTION

April 29

The national question should be the subject of anextensive report, but since time is short I must makemy report brief.

Before discussing the draft resolution certain prem-ises must be established.

What is national oppression? National oppression is

the system of exploitation and robbery of oppressed peo-ples, the measures of forcible restriction of the rightsof oppressed nationalities, resorted to by imperialistcircles. These, taken together, represent the policy gener-ally known as a policy of national oppression.

The first question is, on what classes does any partic-ular government rely in carrying out its policy of na-tional oppression? Before an answer to this question can

be given, it must first be understood why different forms


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THE SEVENTH (APRIL) CONFERENCE OF THE R.S.D.L.P.(B.) 53

of national oppression exist in different states, why na-tional oppression is severer and cruder in one state thanin another. For instance, in Britain and Austria-Hungarynational oppression has never taken the form of pogroms,

but has existed in the form of restrictions on the nation-al rights of the oppressed nationalities. In Russia, on theother hand, it not infrequently assumes the form of po-groms and massacres. In certain states, moreover, there areno specific measures against national minorities at all. For

instance, there is no national oppression in Switzerland,where French, Italians and Germans all live freely.

How are we to explain the difference in attitude to-wards nationalities in different states?

By the difference in the degree of democracy prevail-ing in these states. When in former years the old landedaristocracy controlled the state power in Russia, na-

tional oppression could assume, and actually did assume,the monstrous form of massacres and pogroms. In Brit-ain, where there is a certain degree of democracy and

political freedom, national oppression is of a less brutalcharacter. Switzerland approximates to a democraticsociety, and in that country the nations have more orless complete freedom. In short, the more democratic

a country, the less the national oppression, and viceversa. And since by democracy we mean that definiteclasses are in control of the state power, it may besaid from this point of view that the closer the old land-ed aristocracy is to power, as was the case in old tsaristRussia, the more severe is the oppression and the moremonstrous are its forms.

However, national oppression is maintained not onlyby the landed aristocracy. There is, in addition, another


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forcethe imperialist groups, who introduce in their owncountry the methods of enslaving nationalities learnedin the colonies and thus become the natural allies ofthe landed aristocracy. They are followed by the petty

bourgeoisie, a section of the intelligentsia and a sectionof the upper stratum of the workers, who also share thespoils of robbery. Thus, there is a whole gamut of socialforces, headed by the landed and financial aristocracy,which support national oppression. In order to create

a real democratic system, it is first of all necessary toclear the ground and remove these forces from the polit-ical stage. (Reads the text of the resolution.)

The first question is, how is the political life of theoppressed nations to be arranged? In answer to thisquestion it must be said that the oppressed peoples form-ing part of Russia must be allowed the right to decide

for themselves whether they wish to remain part of theRussian state or to secede and form independent states.We are at present witnessing a definite conflict betweenthe Finnish people and the Provisional Government. Therepresentatives of the Finnish people, the representa-tives of Social-Democracy, are demanding that the Provi-sional Government should restore to the people the rights

they enjoyed before they were annexed to Russia. TheProvisional Government refuses, because it will not rec-ognize the sovereignty of the Finnish people. On whoseside must we range ourselves? Obviously, on the sideof the Finnish people, for it is inconceivable for us toaccept the forcible retention of any people whatsoeverwithin the bounds of a unitary state. When we put for-ward the principle that peoples have the right to self-determination we thereby raise the struggle against na-


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THE SEVENTH (APRIL) CONFERENCE OF THE R.S.D.L.P.(B.) 55

tional oppression to the level of a struggle againstimperial ism, our common enemy. If we fai l to dothis, we may find ourselves in the position of bringinggrist to the mill of the imperialists . If we, Social-Democrats, were to deny the Finnish people the right todeclare their will on the subject of secession and theright to give effect to their will, we would be puttingourselves in the position of continuing the policy of tsa-rism.

It would be impermissible to confuse the questionof the rightof nations freely to secede with the questionof whether a nation must necessarilysecede at any givenmoment. This latter question must be settled quite sep-arately by the party of the proletariat in each particularcase, according to the circumstances. When we recognizethe right of oppressed peoples to secede, the right to

decide their political destiny, we do not thereby settlethe question whether particular nations should secedefrom the Russian state at the given moment. I may rec-ognize the right of a nation to secede, but that does notmean that I oblige it to do so. A people has the rightto secede, but it may or may not exercise that right, ac-cording to the circumstances. Thus we are at liberty

to agitate for or against secession in accordance with theinterests of the proletariat, of the proletarian revolution.Hence, the question of secession must be determined ineach particular case independently, in accordance withthe existing situation, and, for this reason, recognizingthe right of secession must not be confused with theexpediency of secession in any given circumstances.For instance, I personally would be opposed to thesecession of Transcaucasia, bearing in mind the common


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development in Transcaucasia and Russia, certain con-ditions of the struggle of the proletariat, and so forth. Butif, nevertheless, the peoples of Transcaucasia were todemand secession, they would, of course, secede with-out encountering opposition from us. (Reads furtherthe text of the resolution.)

Further, what is to be done with the peoples whichmay desire to remain within the Russian state? Whatevermistrust of Russia existed among the peoples was fos-

tered chiefly by the tsarist policy. But now that tsarismno longer exists, and its policy of oppression no longerexists, this mistrust is bound to diminish and attrac-tion towards Russia to increase. I believe that now, afterthe overthrow of tsarism, nine-tenths of the nationalitieswill not desire to secede. The Party therefore proposesto institute regional autonomy for regions which do not

desire to secede and which are distinguished by pecu-liari t ies of customs and language, as, for instance,Transcaucasia, Turkestan and the Ukraine. The geo-graphical boundaries of these autonomous regions must

be determined by the populations themselves with dueregard for economic conditions, customs, etc.

In contradistinction to regional autonomy there ex-

ists another plan, one which has long been recommendedby the Bund,17 and particularly by Springer and Bauer,who advocate the principle of cultural-national autono-my. I consider that plan unacceptable for Social-Demo-crats. Its essence is that Russia should be transformedinto a union of nations, and nations into unions of per-sons, drawn into a common society no matter what partof the state they may be living in. All Russians, allArmenians, and so on, are to be organized into separate

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