St. Gallen Symposium 2009 Revival of Political and Economic Boundaries · 2009-06-11 · St. Gallen Symposium 2009 Revival of Political and Economic Boundaries St. Gallen Wings of

St. Gallen Symposium 2009

Revival of Politicaland EconomicBoundaries

St. Gallen Wings of Excellence Award 2009

39th St. Gallen Symposium

University of St. Gallen, Switzerland

7–9 May 2009

3939

St. GallenWings of Excellence

Award

St. Gallen Wings of Excellence Award 2009 St. Gallen Wings of Excellence Award 2009

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Aris TrantidisAris Trantidis

Born in 1979. Aris Trantidis is a doctoral student in European stud-ies at the London School of Economics. He completed an LLB and a master’s degree in European and international relations, sum-ma cum laude, at the University of Athens. He previously worked as a trainee research assistant for the Greek Parliament and the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP) in Athens.

Aris Trantidis’ research covers the interplay of interests, ideas, norms and institutions, the theory on democracy and the concept of semi-authoritarianism with emphasis on post-communist transition. His paper “The economic underpinnings of semi-authoritarianism: explaining preferences and power relations in the case of Belarus” was runner-up for a Ph.D. paper in 2007 in the EU-Consent network of European universities.

Aris Trantidis’ research interests encompass institutional law and economics as well as rational choice theory. He has published a number of papers on the economic integration of the Balkan re-gion, the European neighbourhood policy, and political hege-mony. His most recent essay deals with the theory of democratic peace. Aris Trantidis has won a number of distinctions, such as the A.G. Leventis Foundation Fellowship.

Aris Trantidis

Aris Trantidis (GR)Student of Law and PoliticsLondon School of Economics and Political ScienceLondon

Born in 1979. Aris Trantidis is a doctoral student in European stud-ies at the London School of Economics. He completed an LLB and a master’s degree in European and international relations, sum-ma cum laude, at the University of Athens. He previously worked as a trainee research assistant for the Greek Parliament and the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP) in Athens.

Aris Trantidis’ research covers the interplay of interests, ideas, norms and institutions, the theory on democracy and the concept of semi-authoritarianism with emphasis on post-communist transition. His paper “The economic underpinnings of semi-authoritarianism: explaining preferences and power relations in the case of Belarus” was runner-up for a Ph.D. paper in 2007 in the EU-Consent network of European universities.

Aris Trantidis’ research interests encompass institutional law and economics as well as rational choice theory. He has published a number of papers on the economic integration of the Balkan re-gion, the European neighbourhood policy, and political hege-mony. His most recent essay deals with the theory of democratic peace. Aris Trantidis has won a number of distinctions, such as the A.G. Leventis Foundation Fellowship.

Aris Trantidis

Aris Trantidis (GR)Student of Law and PoliticsLondon School of Economics and Political ScienceLondon


Critical moments have sweeping effects on past beliefs but can also confi rm long-term commitments. The current economic cri-sis brings to attention the role of the state and our responsibility to preserve the principle of liberty while pursuing stability and growth. If our preference is for prosperity and freedom – and we are not willing to compromise the one for the sake of the other – the current economic crisis gives us the opportunity to reaffi rm that short-term pragmatism should not undermine the long-term commitment to these two values.

Over the last few months, we have experienced an unanticipated and unprecedented return of the state in an attempt to address the current economic turmoil. It has been unanticipated, because many of us came to believe that the era of long-term state inter-vention is gone, and that the state has now receded to a super-visory and regulatory role in the background of private economic activity, abstaining from mass-scale economic interference. It has been unprecedented, because we saw for the very fi rst time busi-ness managers openly and in big numbers asking for the state to bail out their businesses – much to the surprise of those who believed that such demands would never be articulated. Well-established economic beliefs were shaken as spectacularly as a number of reputable businesses collapsed during the same time.

The state now appears as the anchor of the economy that can stop its drifting away on the wild waves of risk-taking capitalism. May-be this is so, and hopefully this shall provide some degree of the much needed remedy to today’s uncertainty. But like any other medicine which cures a disease if delivered in the right quantity, it can also kill by an overdose. This essay is about reconfi rming the necessary limits to state intervention if we are to prevent unin-tended consequences for liberty and peace.

This short essay contends that despite the scale of the current crisis the symbiosis which economic and social actors as well as the state have achieved should be observed and maintained. This includes adherence to the rule of law and the principle of limited and accountable government at home, and commitment to open-er world trade and investment abroad.

2626

Critical moments have sweeping effects on past beliefs but can also confi rm long-term commitments. The current economic cri-sis brings to attention the role of the state and our responsibility to preserve the principle of liberty while pursuing stability and growth. If our preference is for prosperity and freedom – and we are not willing to compromise the one for the sake of the other – the current economic crisis gives us the opportunity to reaffi rm that short-term pragmatism should not undermine the long-term commitment to these two values.

Over the last few months, we have experienced an unanticipated and unprecedented return of the state in an attempt to address the current economic turmoil. It has been unanticipated, because many of us came to believe that the era of long-term state inter-vention is gone, and that the state has now receded to a super-visory and regulatory role in the background of private economic activity, abstaining from mass-scale economic interference. It has been unprecedented, because we saw for the very fi rst time busi-ness managers openly and in big numbers asking for the state to bail out their businesses – much to the surprise of those who believed that such demands would never be articulated. Well-established economic beliefs were shaken as spectacularly as a number of reputable businesses collapsed during the same time.

The state now appears as the anchor of the economy that can stop its drifting away on the wild waves of risk-taking capitalism. May-be this is so, and hopefully this shall provide some degree of the much needed remedy to today’s uncertainty. But like any other medicine which cures a disease if delivered in the right quantity, it can also kill by an overdose. This essay is about reconfi rming the necessary limits to state intervention if we are to prevent unin-tended consequences for liberty and peace.

This short essay contends that despite the scale of the current crisis the symbiosis which economic and social actors as well as the state have achieved should be observed and maintained. This includes adherence to the rule of law and the principle of limited and accountable government at home, and commitment to open-er world trade and investment abroad.

Building bridges or raising barriers? Reconfi rming the boundaries between the state, the market and society

Aris TrantidisSt. Gallen Wings of Excellence Award 2009Aris Trantidis

Building bridges or raising barriers? Reconfi rming the boundaries between the state, the market and society


If liberty and prosperity remain at the heart of our preferences, we must be aware that the temporary urge for more state inter-vention at home shall open up the possibility for arbitrary and discriminatory treatment of business by the government. This would entail the risk of subordinating social groups to relations of dependency on the government. At the same time, if protec-tionism revives, this shall raise economic barriers between mutu-ally exclusive zones of economic activity similar to the ones that brought confl ict between nations a century ago.

Let us recollect a few lessons from history. The state has had a central role in the recurrent processes of raising, bringing down and reviving boundaries which separate societies or divide groups within society. By delineating a territory, the function of state is necessarily one of inclusion and exclusion. States have main-tained their zones of exclusivity in which governments regulate over scarce resources and human activity, and have historically competed for expanding their jurisdiction. To understand why the state’s economic domination at home is linked to political hegemony at home, and why economic exclusion towards other countries has triggered confl ict abroad, we can analyse human action and social change in terms of the incentives decision-making actors confront at any given time.

Incentives are, indeed, the most powerful predictor of human action. Different incentives resulting from different types of capi-talist relations can trigger moves from democracy and peace to instability or hegemony.

The state, the economy and society: lessons for pluralism and liberty

We know that the role of the government has been central to the distribution of resources and the granting of access to opportu-nities. At times governments have been involved in the discrimi-natory allocation of rents. Hence, and not surprisingly, the state has been a subject of societal confl ict, harsh antagonisms and necessitated compromises by social and political forces. If there is discrimination in the form of selective inclusion and exclusion,

2727

If liberty and prosperity remain at the heart of our preferences, we must be aware that the temporary urge for more state inter-vention at home shall open up the possibility for arbitrary and discriminatory treatment of business by the government. This would entail the risk of subordinating social groups to relations of dependency on the government. At the same time, if protec-tionism revives, this shall raise economic barriers between mutu-ally exclusive zones of economic activity similar to the ones that brought confl ict between nations a century ago.

Let us recollect a few lessons from history. The state has had a central role in the recurrent processes of raising, bringing down and reviving boundaries which separate societies or divide groups within society. By delineating a territory, the function of state is necessarily one of inclusion and exclusion. States have main-tained their zones of exclusivity in which governments regulate over scarce resources and human activity, and have historically competed for expanding their jurisdiction. To understand why the state’s economic domination at home is linked to political hegemony at home, and why economic exclusion towards other countries has triggered confl ict abroad, we can analyse human action and social change in terms of the incentives decision-making actors confront at any given time.

Incentives are, indeed, the most powerful predictor of human action. Different incentives resulting from different types of capi-talist relations can trigger moves from democracy and peace to instability or hegemony.

The state, the economy and society: lessons for pluralism and liberty

We know that the role of the government has been central to the distribution of resources and the granting of access to opportu-nities. At times governments have been involved in the discrimi-natory allocation of rents. Hence, and not surprisingly, the state has been a subject of societal confl ict, harsh antagonisms and necessitated compromises by social and political forces. If there is discrimination in the form of selective inclusion and exclusion,

Aris Trantidis Aris Trantidis


there may be a high possibility of confl ict between competing groups for access to scarce resources. Discrimination also opens the possibility for an alternative outcome: the hegemony of the state elite over society when the scale and the reach of its capaci-ty to distribute rents cover most economic activities and conse-quently most social actors.

Fortunately, in many societies, following bitter struggles and confl icts, a balance of power among economic and other socie-tal powers and the government has led to an institutional com-promise that was designed to prevent the domination of any of these groups. Democracy and the rule of law have been put in place to protect each of the groups from encroachment by the other, through institutions for legitimate decision-making and the adjudication of disputes. The birth and consolidation of de-mocracy and the rule of law is refl ective of the power symmetries between social groups, and the fact that no group could domi-nate the others. Whilst many of us know that our democracies are far from perfect, as there is still rent-seeking, corruption and ineffi ciency to tackle, we acknowledge that they have peacefully accommodated the diversity of social interests.

It took many years for social groups to achieve limited, account-able and democratic government. This occurred in societies in which civil society was empowered by the working of freer mar-kets. Freer markets allow groups to get the bargaining power and the resources to push for the rule of law and for accountable and limited government. Over the years civil society has achieved tre-mendous political change principally by its convincing argument of economic effi ciency, or by invoking human rights and constitu-tional freedoms – the very principles of the original liberal settle-ment – but most signifi cantly thanks to the resources it has had when taking part in the battle of ideas.

As the character of economic relations differs from place to place and changes over time, so do the incentives that social actors such as business, trade unions and others fi nd in their national context. On many occasions groups have looked to the state for subsidies, regulatory allowances and contracts. Many of those

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there may be a high possibility of confl ict between competing groups for access to scarce resources. Discrimination also opens the possibility for an alternative outcome: the hegemony of the state elite over society when the scale and the reach of its capaci-ty to distribute rents cover most economic activities and conse-quently most social actors.

Fortunately, in many societies, following bitter struggles and confl icts, a balance of power among economic and other socie-tal powers and the government has led to an institutional com-promise that was designed to prevent the domination of any of these groups. Democracy and the rule of law have been put in place to protect each of the groups from encroachment by the other, through institutions for legitimate decision-making and the adjudication of disputes. The birth and consolidation of de-mocracy and the rule of law is refl ective of the power symmetries between social groups, and the fact that no group could domi-nate the others. Whilst many of us know that our democracies are far from perfect, as there is still rent-seeking, corruption and ineffi ciency to tackle, we acknowledge that they have peacefully accommodated the diversity of social interests.

It took many years for social groups to achieve limited, account-able and democratic government. This occurred in societies in which civil society was empowered by the working of freer mar-kets. Freer markets allow groups to get the bargaining power and the resources to push for the rule of law and for accountable and limited government. Over the years civil society has achieved tre-mendous political change principally by its convincing argument of economic effi ciency, or by invoking human rights and constitu-tional freedoms – the very principles of the original liberal settle-ment – but most signifi cantly thanks to the resources it has had when taking part in the battle of ideas.

As the character of economic relations differs from place to place and changes over time, so do the incentives that social actors such as business, trade unions and others fi nd in their national context. On many occasions groups have looked to the state for subsidies, regulatory allowances and contracts. Many of those



who had professed freedom of the markets from protectionist barriers, later witnessed – some with relief and acclaim – the re-turn of demand-boosting Keynesian policies by the state.

Where there have been demands for economic liberalisation, thereare now pleas for the government to provide bail-outs and fi nan-cial support. Driven by the assumption of benevolent govern-ment they have been more often than not facing the reality of the self-servicing bureaucracy and the tit for tat from the rational and astute politician.

Yet the story of liberty and democracy reminds us that any sig-nifi cant shift in the distribution of economic power between civil society and government on a large scale is likely to put the liberal democratic arrangement at home at risk, allowing for the political hegemony of the bureaucratic-political elite. This could happen because the resulting asymmetry of economic resources between a powerful state and a weak non-state sector shall bring an imbalance of bargaining power between society and the gov-ernment.

Across nations: confl ict or peace?

Over the second half of the twentieth century protectionism, closed economic borders and national economy antagonisms triggered wars for the reshuffl ing of territories. These economic models have mostly given way to international trade, to multi-national ventures, to foreign investment, to transnational fl ows of capital as well as ideas, which render territorial expansion an obsolete strategy. The shift from sheltered national econo-mies to globalisation has changed the pattern of incentives for decision-makers across the world. In place of mutually exclusive interests of primary national economies, there emerged linkages and shared interests across nations. The ever increasing pattern of shared interests has linked societies and governments in rela-tions of interdependency.

This interdependency of interests across countries brought last-ing peace between previously enemies by changing the incen-

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who had professed freedom of the markets from protectionist barriers, later witnessed – some with relief and acclaim – the re-turn of demand-boosting Keynesian policies by the state.

Where there have been demands for economic liberalisation, thereare now pleas for the government to provide bail-outs and fi nan-cial support. Driven by the assumption of benevolent govern-ment they have been more often than not facing the reality of the self-servicing bureaucracy and the tit for tat from the rational and astute politician.

Yet the story of liberty and democracy reminds us that any sig-nifi cant shift in the distribution of economic power between civil society and government on a large scale is likely to put the liberal democratic arrangement at home at risk, allowing for the political hegemony of the bureaucratic-political elite. This could happen because the resulting asymmetry of economic resources between a powerful state and a weak non-state sector shall bring an imbalance of bargaining power between society and the gov-ernment.

Across nations: confl ict or peace?

Over the second half of the twentieth century protectionism, closed economic borders and national economy antagonisms triggered wars for the reshuffl ing of territories. These economic models have mostly given way to international trade, to multi-national ventures, to foreign investment, to transnational fl ows of capital as well as ideas, which render territorial expansion an obsolete strategy. The shift from sheltered national econo-mies to globalisation has changed the pattern of incentives for decision-makers across the world. In place of mutually exclusive interests of primary national economies, there emerged linkages and shared interests across nations. The ever increasing pattern of shared interests has linked societies and governments in rela-tions of interdependency.

This interdependency of interests across countries brought last-ing peace between previously enemies by changing the incen-



tives for state action. We can look at France, Germany, Britain and Spain to realise that confl ict is unthinkable today between coun-tries that have come to share a vision of future not only driven by common ideals but also by the reality of common interests. We can compare Europe, a battleground for centuries, with those areas today where economic barriers persevere. We can look at those regions where confl icts broke up to redraw the boundaries separating zones of economic exclusion. Economies in those re-gions are not fully integrated. With a different set of incentives, exclusion breeds tensions. Confl icts break up between countries antagonising for the use of goods and services that are territori-ally-bound, such as gas, oil and their pipelines, and subject to the exclusionary monopoly of the state and its local elite.

If state-sponsored capitalism and protectionism become the norm again, we can ask ourselves: are there grounds to believe that it is not likely that secluded economies will resort to aggression and confl ict for the control of state-monopolised resources? By a change in the structure of incentives guiding decision-making, the economic barriers can intensify political divisions preventing societies from realising the potential for peace and prosperity out of co-operation. The retreat from the global and the return to the territorial shall come at a cost, once capitalism again operates as a zero-sum game between nation-states.

At home: democracy, confl ict or hegemony?

Let’s now focus on the democracy at home. I would contend that it is the bargaining power that society has acquired relative to the government that has made room for democracy and liberty. The bridges democracy has built among social groups and between society and the government are resting upon an economic land-scape of non-domination. Lift this landscape, and democracy is vulnerable again.

By a glimpse at the political and economic map today it is clear to observe that there is an association between types of capital-ism on the one hand, referring to the range from mostly private economies to state-administered economies in which the gov-

3030

tives for state action. We can look at France, Germany, Britain and Spain to realise that confl ict is unthinkable today between coun-tries that have come to share a vision of future not only driven by common ideals but also by the reality of common interests. We can compare Europe, a battleground for centuries, with those areas today where economic barriers persevere. We can look at those regions where confl icts broke up to redraw the boundaries separating zones of economic exclusion. Economies in those re-gions are not fully integrated. With a different set of incentives, exclusion breeds tensions. Confl icts break up between countries antagonising for the use of goods and services that are territori-ally-bound, such as gas, oil and their pipelines, and subject to the exclusionary monopoly of the state and its local elite.

If state-sponsored capitalism and protectionism become the norm again, we can ask ourselves: are there grounds to believe that it is not likely that secluded economies will resort to aggression and confl ict for the control of state-monopolised resources? By a change in the structure of incentives guiding decision-making, the economic barriers can intensify political divisions preventing societies from realising the potential for peace and prosperity out of co-operation. The retreat from the global and the return to the territorial shall come at a cost, once capitalism again operates as a zero-sum game between nation-states.

At home: democracy, confl ict or hegemony?

Let’s now focus on the democracy at home. I would contend that it is the bargaining power that society has acquired relative to the government that has made room for democracy and liberty. The bridges democracy has built among social groups and between society and the government are resting upon an economic land-scape of non-domination. Lift this landscape, and democracy is vulnerable again.

By a glimpse at the political and economic map today it is clear to observe that there is an association between types of capital-ism on the one hand, referring to the range from mostly private economies to state-administered economies in which the gov-



ernment enjoys a central and highly discriminatory role, and on the other hand the range from democracies to authoritarianism. We can explain this association by arguing that when economic power is dispersed and large segments of the private sector are relatively autonomous from state action, multiple fi nancial and human resources found outside the reach of the government fa-cilitate political action, dissent, and criticism of the government.

Changes in the economic relations have different political impli-cations. A shift of economic model to a state-administered econo-my reduces the areas of activity autonomous from government discretion. If a government decides to use the politicised state to buy complacency and punish dissent, the set of incentives which condition political and economic action changes. In a predomi-nantly state-administered economy, the rents it offers and the ex-clusion it threatens against social and economic actors is a pow-erful set of incentives and disincentives that covers most parts of the population. This can undermine pluralism at home, because in a state-administered economy actors evaluate the cost of ex-clusion and discrimination if they express dissent or openly align with the opposition. They know that in an economy in which the state has a dominant economic, there are small chances that they would avoid any cost for their dissent, as the areas of activity au-tonomous from the government are small. There is little scope for exit from government intervention, and social actors are trapped in a relationship of dependence. Hence it is reasonable to predict that they would be likely to settle on complacency with the state elite.

At the heart of my argument lie two assumptions. The fi rst as-sumption is that actors apply a cost and benefi t calculation within a given set of incentives. The second assumption is that different distributions of economic-political power provide different sets of options to social and economic actors when acting politically. The two assumptions together are fundamental in establishing the link between economic power and bargaining power. Whethereconomic resources are concentrated or dispersed power, so is political power.

3131

ernment enjoys a central and highly discriminatory role, and on the other hand the range from democracies to authoritarianism. We can explain this association by arguing that when economic power is dispersed and large segments of the private sector are relatively autonomous from state action, multiple fi nancial and human resources found outside the reach of the government fa-cilitate political action, dissent, and criticism of the government.

Changes in the economic relations have different political impli-cations. A shift of economic model to a state-administered econo-my reduces the areas of activity autonomous from government discretion. If a government decides to use the politicised state to buy complacency and punish dissent, the set of incentives which condition political and economic action changes. In a predomi-nantly state-administered economy, the rents it offers and the ex-clusion it threatens against social and economic actors is a pow-erful set of incentives and disincentives that covers most parts of the population. This can undermine pluralism at home, because in a state-administered economy actors evaluate the cost of ex-clusion and discrimination if they express dissent or openly align with the opposition. They know that in an economy in which the state has a dominant economic, there are small chances that they would avoid any cost for their dissent, as the areas of activity au-tonomous from the government are small. There is little scope for exit from government intervention, and social actors are trapped in a relationship of dependence. Hence it is reasonable to predict that they would be likely to settle on complacency with the state elite.

At the heart of my argument lie two assumptions. The fi rst as-sumption is that actors apply a cost and benefi t calculation within a given set of incentives. The second assumption is that different distributions of economic-political power provide different sets of options to social and economic actors when acting politically. The two assumptions together are fundamental in establishing the link between economic power and bargaining power. Whethereconomic resources are concentrated or dispersed power, so is political power.



Concluding remarks

I developed in brief the argument that a change in the economic structure can impinge on calculations by rational actors and can affect decisions of complacency, confl ict or accommodation at home, and decisions over confl ict or peace abroad. This does not suggest that politics is a bleak domain, or that all governments intend to threaten freedom. Rather it is a reminder of unintended consequences and of what is possible as the worst case scenario.

It would be unwise if for the sake of expediency and in face of urgent challenges short-term calculations would allow a retreatfrom the balance of power between society and government. There are useful lessons to consider. Where there is exclusion, there can be confl ict. Where there is dependency, there can be hegemony, and where there is interdependency, there is peaceful symbiosis embedded in functioning democratic institutions and international cooperation.

This is why state action designed to confront present-time urgen-cies should be conditioned and temporary, cautioned and moni-tored, and in full awareness of the prerequisites of liberty. Any new regulatory regime designed to prevent a future crisis should remain subject to general and impersonal rules that shall prevent the rise of barriers within society, and between societies.

3232

Concluding remarks

I developed in brief the argument that a change in the economic structure can impinge on calculations by rational actors and can affect decisions of complacency, confl ict or accommodation at home, and decisions over confl ict or peace abroad. This does not suggest that politics is a bleak domain, or that all governments intend to threaten freedom. Rather it is a reminder of unintended consequences and of what is possible as the worst case scenario.

It would be unwise if for the sake of expediency and in face of urgent challenges short-term calculations would allow a retreatfrom the balance of power between society and government. There are useful lessons to consider. Where there is exclusion, there can be confl ict. Where there is dependency, there can be hegemony, and where there is interdependency, there is peaceful symbiosis embedded in functioning democratic institutions and international cooperation.

This is why state action designed to confront present-time urgen-cies should be conditioned and temporary, cautioned and moni-tored, and in full awareness of the prerequisites of liberty. Any new regulatory regime designed to prevent a future crisis should remain subject to general and impersonal rules that shall prevent the rise of barriers within society, and between societies.



3333

James M. Buchanan, 1975, The Limits of Liberty: Between Anar-chy and Leviathan. Chicago: Chicago University Press.

Fernando H. Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, 1979, Dependency and Development in Latin America, translation by Marjory Mattingly Urquidi. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Kiren A. Chaudhry, ‘Economic Liberalization and the Lineages of the Rentier State’. Comparative Politics 27 (October 1994), pp. 1–25.

Peter Evans, “Reinventing the Bourgeoisie: ‘State Entrepreneur-ship and Class Formation in Dependent Capitalist Development’, The American Journal of Sociology, 88 (Supplement 1982), pp. 210-247.

Milton Friedman, 1962, Capitalism and Freedom, Chicago University Press.

Eric Gartzke, 2007, ‘The Capitalist Peace’, American Journal of Political Science, 51 (1), pp. 166–191.

Friedrich A. von Hayek, 1944, The Road to Serfdom, Chicago University Press.

Adam Przeworski, 1988, ‘Democracy as a Contingent Outcome of Confl icts’. In Jon Elster and Rune Slagstad (eds), Constitutionalism and Democracy, 1993 edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 59–80.

Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Huber Stephens and John D. Stephens, 1991, Capitalist Development and Democracy. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Carlos Waisman, ‘Capitalism, the Market, and Democracy’, Ameri-can Behavioural Scientist 35 (March 1992) pp. 500–517.

Aris TrantidisAris Trantidis

James M. Buchanan, 1975, The Limits of Liberty: Between Anar-chy and Leviathan. Chicago: Chicago University Press.

Fernando H. Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, 1979, Dependency and Development in Latin America, translation by Marjory Mattingly Urquidi. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Kiren A. Chaudhry, ‘Economic Liberalization and the Lineages of the Rentier State’. Comparative Politics 27 (October 1994), pp. 1–25.

Peter Evans, “Reinventing the Bourgeoisie: ‘State Entrepreneur-ship and Class Formation in Dependent Capitalist Development’, The American Journal of Sociology, 88 (Supplement 1982), pp. 210-247.

Milton Friedman, 1962, Capitalism and Freedom, Chicago University Press.

Eric Gartzke, 2007, ‘The Capitalist Peace’, American Journal of Political Science, 51 (1), pp. 166–191.

Friedrich A. von Hayek, 1944, The Road to Serfdom, Chicago University Press.

Adam Przeworski, 1988, ‘Democracy as a Contingent Outcome of Confl icts’. In Jon Elster and Rune Slagstad (eds), Constitutionalism and Democracy, 1993 edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 59–80.

Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Huber Stephens and John D. Stephens, 1991, Capitalist Development and Democracy. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Carlos Waisman, ‘Capitalism, the Market, and Democracy’, Ameri-can Behavioural Scientist 35 (March 1992) pp. 500–517.

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St. Gallen Symposium 2009 Revival of Political and Economic Boundaries · 2009-06-11 · St. Gallen Symposium 2009 Revival of Political and Economic Boundaries St. Gallen Wings of