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An Iranian View of US Psychological Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan

By Njdeh Asisian

Editorial Abstract: The author, a former Iranian citizen and soldier, offers a unique perspective on contemporary PSYOP efforts. He provides background on Iranian PSYOP organizations and views, then describes Coalition efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan as seen though the eyes of Iranian military authors.

In the last few decades, psychological operations became a very important part of modern military doctrine. In general,

PSYOP intends to weaken the enemy’s will to fight, give extra strength to friendly forces, and—perhaps the most important part—reduce the number of human casualties during military operations.

Allied forces used psychological operations during World War II when engaged in a bloody war with the Axis forces in the European and in the Pacific Theaters. In the past fifty years, we have witnessed noteworthy progress of psychological operations based on modern technology, and a better understanding of human psychology. Since the end of WWII, new conflicts and international problems have risen one after another. The latest international crisis was 9/11, when Al Qaeda members attacked the United States mainland. This attack generated a critical reaction from the US and precipitated US involvement in two wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Naturally the regional states— especially Iran—became interested in understanding the nature of the US Army’s astonishing initial success in both countries. Iran, as the most important and powerful country in this region, has legitimate reasons to be more cautious about the US Army’s presence on both its eastern and western frontiers. At the same time, one should not forget that Iran and the US have had very strange relations since 1979, and there is no hope of improvement in the foreseeable future.

The recently published Iranian Journal of Psychological Operations paid extra attention to the US Army PSYOP effort in both Operations Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Iraqi Freedom (OIF), and published an extensive analysis titled “A Comparative Study of US PSYOP in Iraq and Afghanistan” by Mr. Ali Reza Biabanavard. He has a master’s degree in political science but no degree in psychology. His analysis is based on the theoretical issues of war and peace, the evolutionary process of PSYOP in the US, and finally an Iranian evaluation of the US Army’s PSYOP activities in OEF/OIF.1

In order to understand the nature of Iran’s military and security structure, one should become familiar with the Revolutionary Guard Corp’s (IRGC) history and its operations, which is the first part of this article. The second part discusses the background of Iran-US relations, and why Iran feels insecure with the presence of US forces in the region. This includes analysis of what the Iranians learned from the Iraq and Afghan wars, as well as how they intend to contain any new US PSYOP actions in the region.

The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps & the Journal of Psychological Operations

The main idea behind the IRGC’s creation was protection of new political elite members, and protection of the regime at any cost. The IRGC’s members and affiliates are fully trusted and are loyal to the theocratic regime. The IRGC was a small and ineffective organization compared to Iran’s Army and Secret Service; however, the Iran-Iraq War made this organization a first rate fighting army. The other major factor that made IRGC a rising star was its unconditional loyalty to the establishment. This helped them to expand their operational capabilities beyond anyone’s imagination.

The Iranian political elite clearly understood they needed a modern approach to old problems. Right after the end of the Iran-Iraq War, the Iranian government put intensive efforts into building institutions specializing in government, politics and security. Naturally, the IRGC became the first candidate to implement this new political approach. The government strongly encouraged IRGC officers and members to obtain a higher education in any field that they desired. Unlimited financial assistance made this organization a hub of intellectual capability and a “soft powerhouse” to be taken seriously.

The government allowed the IRGC to be involved in creating and running think-tank organizations, which heavily emphasized national security and military issues. One of the IRGC’s creations is the Cultural Secretariat of the IRGC Chief of Staff, located in the former US Embassy residence in Tehran. This organization is the center of the IRGC’s soft power. Besides other responsibilities, the Cultural Secretariat exclusively researches and writes on

One face of US PSYOP in Southwest Asia. (Defense Link)

� Spring 2007

psychological operations. In the last three years, this office has published a very sophisticated quarterly called the Journal of Psychological Operations. This journal exhibits a high level of professionalism, and introduces very complicated articles about many different international and regional issues. It is worth mentioning that it also translates many US psychological operations articles into Farsi. This journal should receive the highest attention from US psychological operations specialists, academia and relevant policy makers.

Background

After 9/11, the United States engaged in serious conflicts in the Middle East and other parts of the world. The greatest engagements took place in Afghanistan and Iraq, where US forces were able to victoriously defeat both the Taliban and Iraqi Army in a very short period of time. The US Army’s decisive victory opened an unprecedented new era in a region where the Islamic Republic of Iran automatically became a regional superpower, after 1400 years.

However, Iranian specialists noted the US presence presented a serious threat to Iranian national security and its regional sphere of influence. For instance, the Iranian journal Defense Policy evaluated the current Middle East situation and its problems based on a few important factors that could eventually influence Iranian interests. The author observes:

The Middle East is in total chaos because of the lack of security structure, the influence of domestic politics, regional countries’ intergovernmental relations, and trans-regional influences that create a chaotic situation in the region. Based on the factor of regional insecurity, Iran’s government cannot afford to ignore the crucial elements of defense policy such as self-reliance, and coalition formation that generates power, containment, and prevention.

Besides self-reliance and forming coalitions with regional countries, Iranian military analysts want to place checks and balances on the US via containment and war prevention. At the same time, Iran complains about US behavior toward the Middle East and her failure to acknowledge that in the post 9/11 era, Iran plays a positive role in the region and does not create extra problems. The Iranian side believes their country’s post-9/11 behavior should be considered seriously and rewarded by providing regional opportunities for Iran. In contrast, Iran did not receive any reward while the United States engaged in direct intervention in the region, and implemented belligerent policies which directly undermined Iranian national security during a time of increased economic, political, cultural, and military pressures.2 Consequently, the Iranian policy of containment and prevention toward the US, and the Iranian belief that the US is responsible for belligerent anti-Iranian policies, continues to help generate regional confrontation between both countries.

Besides this competition, Iran feels extremely vulnerable to internal and external pressures. The country must learn how to survive in our fast-paced world. In other words, the Iranian state is competing against time, and clearly understands it does not have enough time to reach equality on either the regional or international scene. Mr. Morad Ali Sadoughi, a political analyst

at the Iranian Center for Strategic Studies, notes:The Islamic Republic of Iran struggles to protect the

country’s political independence, and pursues sovereign economic, military and cultural values that will be futile if the Republic does not take serious steps to encourage technical, scientific innovations, or at least obtain technology for home grown productions. The other important issue is that the government must help to create a strong research and development base in country. If the government does not pay attention to these issues, this country will walk through a future that others will design for [and thereby decide] her fate.3

In addition to regional competition and technological problems, both of which directly influence Iranian national security, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the US have additional outstanding problems. These include: nuclear issues, the war on terrorism, Iran’s role in destabilizing both Iraq and Afghanistan, Iran’s antagonism toward Israel, and so on. All of these reasons have made Iran believe the US will eventually try to overthrow the current Iranian government, either by military or political means.

Furthermore, the US has extensive presence in Iraq, Afghanistan, Turkey, Azerbaijan and other neighboring countries. Iranian military planners are facing a bitter reality that Iran is incapable of winning a symmetric war against the United States. Therefore, they have turned their interests to other US military capabilities, such as asymmetric warfare in the streets of Baghdad and Kabul, and psychological operations in the OEF and OIF regions.

With regard to asymmetric warfare, the Iranian military leadership— especially the IRGC—is thoroughly preparing for a possible US land invasion. They studied Iraq and Afghan asymmetric warfare tactics very closely. They came to the conclusion that in order to contain any future US land invasion, they should at least remind American military planners and soldiers that whatever they witnessed in Iraq and Afghanistan would be nothing in comparison to Iran. The ongoing recruitment of suicide bombers is a clear manifestation of this trend.

In the last few years, suicide bombing units were created in cities across Iran, with leaders even openly asking people to participate in these units. Only a year ago the “Basij” paramilitary group printed applications for new recruits wanting to join these suicide groups. This application it was mentioned that “in order to achieve all-round readiness against the enemies of Islam and the sacred Islamic Republic and to protect the foundations of Islam, the Lovers of Martyrdom Garrison plans to organize ‘a martyrdom-seeking division’ for each province in the country and give them specific and specialized training. We therefore request all our pious brothers and sisters, who are committed and determined to defend Islam, if willing, to submit two photographs of themselves, a copy of their identity cards, and the filled-in application form below to the following address, so that preparations for their organization and training could begin.” 4

Under heavy international pressure, the Islamic Republic ceased to advertise creation of the suicide divisions after it

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passed this responsibility to a non governmental organization called “The International Headquarters for Honoring Muslim Martyrs.” This group tries to recruit volunteers from all walks of life. An even more specific application form lets volunteers mention where they want to conduct their suicide mission: fighting against the American forces in Iraq; fighting against the Israeli forces in Palestine; and finally, killing [author] Salman Rushdi.

Such clarification as to where an Iranian suicide bomber could appear is alarming to both American and Israeli forces in Iraq and Israel. Does this mean that Iranian suicide bombers are running in the streets of Baghdad or Tel Aviv? Or do they simply want to remind us that they are willing to hit our targets if Iran is attacked? Is the implication simply to put more psychological pressure on our military planners?

The reason behind this extensive Iranian interest in US psychological operations does not stem from a position of power and self-confidence; rather, it comes from the fact that the Iranian political elites feel extremely weak and vulnerable to any outside pressure on the Iranian state. This feeling of insecurity comes from two different directions: the Mullahs and the nationalists. The Mullahs display self-preservation behavior, as they try to preserve their physical well-being and political future by hiding behind the state. On the other hand, nationalists believe any serious foreign military operation or internal political instability will endanger the Iranian state for a long period of time.

Iranian military analysts consider US psychological operations as a first step to a future conflict between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran. Therefore, instead of sitting idly by and doing absolutely nothing, the Iranian military analysts chose to study US PSYOP in both the OIF and OEF

regions. They consider this a first step in creating an effective defense policy and aborting any hostile PSYOP. It is also a way to contain any escalation of the conflict between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran.

The previously mentioned evaluation of the current US PSYOP effort in OEF and OIF, published in the Journal of Psychological Operations provides a very valuable resource for understanding Iranian military doctrine in more depth.5

An Evaluation of US PSYOP in OEF and OIF

Ali Reza Biabannavard is the author of “A Comparative Study of US PSYOP in Iraq and Afghanistan.” He discusses the theoretical issues of psychological operations through the early nineteenth century, including the Clausewitzian theories of war and peace. He notes that the father of European modern military strategy clearly understood the importance of psychological operations as a tool for victory.

Mr. Biabannavard quotes Clausewitz on several occasions, first noting “War is an act of violence whose object is to compel the enemy to do our will.” Second, he observes “War is the continuation of politics by other means.” Biabannavard stated war is a factor of physical annihilation of the enemy, and is a tool to change a target country’s attitude. He believes Clausewitz was very much in favor of psychologically influencing the enemy, rather than total destruction. He mentions that “Clausewitz considered influencing the enemy’s behavior in line with the agent country’s will as a major goal.” In other words, “if we influence the enemy’s mind then we do not need to impact an enemy’s arms.”6

The first very striking element is that an Iranian military analyst—who had close ties with the Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)—begins to incorporate Western understanding of peace and war into his analysis. This is of major importance, as some [Western] people complain that we are unable to understand the Iranian behavior, because they are distinctly different. On the contrary, Iranian politicians and military leaders’ behaviors are very much predictable if we try to understand them through their literature and analysis; and they seem to have less trouble understanding us.

After a theoretical discussion of psychological operations and its background, the author then tries to explain how PSYOP works in general. He states that psychological operations have been divided into three periods, including “pre-war era, war era and post-war era.”7 In the pre-war era, the author considers three important steps as being necessary to begin any serious operation. “An agent country, which is ready to launch a psychological operation against the target country, must first convince its own population that war is in the national interest of their country.”8 The author uses the Vietnam War as an example where the US government did not properly prepare the American people to support a conflict of such magnitude. He argues that the Vietnam War had a significant influence on the minds of US military planners, thus they now prepare psychological operations in the early stages of any conflict.

The second step in the pre-war psychological process is to prepare potential allies. One must convince the international

Martyrdom seekers recruitment form. (Iranfocus.com)

� Spring 2007

community that the agent country’s action works in favor of the world community, thus benefiting everyone. The agent country does not need to be very ideological, but does need to use a common language that everyone can agree upon.9

The last step of the pre-war psychological operations process is to convince the target country’s citizens they will be better off without their current leader(s).”10 Here the author provides an interesting example from the end of the 1991 Desert Storm operation in Southern Iraq. The people there were tired of the Baath Party dictatorship, and the Iraqi government’s leadership was weak. According to this Iranian explanation, the situation “forced” people to fall under the influence of American psychological operations.11 As a result, the Southern Iraq Shia population rose against Saddam Hussein’s government hoping they could get help from coalition forces in order to topple the government. On the contrary, they never received coalition assistance, and their uprising was crushed in blood. In other words, the author considered the Shia population’s uprising a direct consequence of the Coalitions’ psychological operations during Desert Storm.

After the pre-war psychological preparation of all interested parties, the agent country enters into direct confrontation with the target country’s military. The psychological operation process is mostly concentrated on the battlefield, and the plan is to weaken the enemy army’s personnel and soldiers. The author suggests a successful military operation depends on how willing military planners are to work with psychological operations specialists, in order to make sure their operations match PSYOP tactics, thus convincing enemy forces that resistance is no longer an option. The impact of PSYOP is very short lived because of the high pace of operations; therefore, any military or propaganda activity must be launched simultaneously before allowing the enemy time to organize a response.12

Perhaps the most difficult part of the PSYOP process begins right after the end of hostilities. Again, the most important task in this stage is to legitimize the operation. The legitimizing portion of the operation targets the same three audiences as in the pre-war period. The first is the agent country’s internal public opinion, emphasizing that the operation was in fact successful, and everyone is content with

the results. The second part is convincing the international community of what a great job the agent country has done in order to preserve the other country’s interests and security. The third part of the legitimizing process is to convince the target country’s population that they are better off without their previous leader(s) and they will be at an advantage with their newfound freedom.

The US vs the Middle EastAccording Mr. Biabannavard, after the collapse of the

Soviet Union and the end of the Second Gulf War the US capitalist system needed to reconstruct an “imaginary enemy,” this time in the Middle East and in other Muslim countries. The US began to organize a very sophisticated PSYOP effort against these countries.13 In other words, one can conclude the author believes the US is not capable of maintaining global power without having an ideological or economical enemy.

In addition to creating an enemy, the US government got involved in shaping the destiny of the Middle East. However, the this program faces serious obstacles, such as the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, which reduce US influence in the Arab world, while providing unconditional support to the Israeli side. The other problem was rapid disintegration of the Second Gulf War Coalition, thus the United States was unable to implement its policies as effectively as desired. Further, Russian and Chinese elements in the region were able to change the balance of power by providing missile and nuclear technologies to Iran, which consequently they can use to challenge the US position in the region.14 This possibility also made the US nervous, and uncomfortable with the fact that both Russia and China were extensively involved in Iran’s economy. Further, both states provided Iran very sophisticated military technology, which could create serious problems in the future.

The important problem here was the unofficial alliance between Russia and China, which strives to create a new balance of power by introducing missile and nuclear technologies to challenge US hegemony in the region. The author believes the United States was forced to intensify its PSYOP against both Iraq and Iran15 due to two factors: the US’s intention to create a new enemy; and Sino-Russian efforts to create a new balance of power in the region. The author notes the history of US pressure on Middle Eastern countries dates back to the 1970s, and the high point of this pressure came in 2003, when the United States attacked Iraq.16

In the last part of his analysis, Biabannavard describes US PSYOP tactics in the region. In general, the author believes the US designed a very sophisticated operation. He emphasizes thirteen different steps used to manipulate Middle Eastern countries, with the first and second step somehow related. The first is US assistance in building satellite media; and the second is advertising the American way of life, which is directly contradictory to the region’s indigenous traditions. In other words, the United States is challenging Islamic thought and social structure, in order to create a favorable environment for US policies, and ultimately to bring the area under the Western umbrella through military, economic or ideological means.

Fortress on the Iran-Iraq border. (Defense Link)

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The other eleven steps include a negative explanation of the Middle Eastern countries’ policies and the exaggeration of regional problems. In addition, he finds the US discredits the regional leaders on the basis of financial, political and moral corruption. Furthermore, the United States signs one-sided treaties with individual regional countries with a complete disregard to the other regional players. Additional steps include: undermining the interests of other countries; exaggerating regional crises; creating regional and ethnic conflicts; exaggerating the defense of human rights and the rights of minorities; and finally, financially assisting the opposition groups.17

Iranian PSYOP specialists believe these are the major points of United States concentration, in order to force changes in behavior on a regional scale. In addition to this general statement regarding the United States influence operations in the Middle East, the author provides two current examples.

Afghanistan & Iraq vs the USMr. Biabannavard follows the same analysis when

examining Afghanistan and Iraq. He divides US PSYOP into three different stages as before, noting some differences in each country, but describing generally similar processes.

Afghanistan“A comparative study of US PSYOP in Iraq and

Afghanistan” claims the United States was prepared to overthrow the Taliban government long before 11 September 2001. Biabannavard perceives some irony in this behavior. During the [1979-1988] Soviet-Afghan war, the same militant groups—and even Osama Bin Laden—were on the US Government’s payroll for a long period of time. However, the reason behind the change of allegiances in Washington was based on different factors. The first reason was the existence of paramilitary groups, such as Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, which were responsible for bloody attacks against American interests around the world.18 The second reason was purely geostrategic: Afghanistan is located on the crossroads of China, India, Iran, Pakistan and Central Asia. Of course, the US was aware of the location of Central Asian oil and gas pipelines crossing Afghanistan.19 Whichever country controls Afghanistan can ultimately control the economic and military routes along the north-south axis of Central Asia, and the east-west axis connecting China to Iran. Therefore, having Afghanistan on the American side would help contain China, Russia, and Iran, while at the same time assisting US access to Central Asia’s natural resources. All of this could ultimately release the US from being a hostage to the Persian Gulf oil producers.

The third reason was 9/11 provided two different golden opportunities for US interests. First, it legitimized the Afghan war as a war on terror; and second, Russia and China were unable to oppose US retaliation, thus becoming practically pacified on the Central Asian chessboard for a short period of time.

Based on these military, geostrategic, economic, and other windows of opportunity, the United States launched a

PSYOP campaign in two different directions. The first covered the regional and international offensive against the Taliban government; and the second convinced the Afghan people not to defend the Taliban government.

On the regional and international levels, the United States accused the Taliban government of providing shelter to Bin Laden and his group, plus offering drug smugglers safe haven. They also pointed to the Taliban’s ruthless behavior toward Afghan people, their support of the war on terrorism, masterminding September 11th, and finally weakening US national security in the process.20 This triggered a significant US reaction toward the Taliban government. Preparing international public opinion would have to be complemented by domestic reactions against the Taliban government.

On the domestic level, US PSYOP picked up on the Taliban government’s inability to solve the Afghan people’s social and economic problems after the end of the Soviet-Afghan War. Themes dealt with destruction of historical monuments, distribution of food during official holidays, and the establishment of Afghan radio stations in San Francisco and Washington, DC. Biabannavard wraps up his discussion with development of a secret radio station, the distribution of pamphlets, and the conduct of a propaganda war.21

IraqThe second case in “A comparative study of US PSYOP

in Iraq and Afghanistan,” asserts that immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States decided to overthrow regimes outside the US sphere of influence, by any means. The first target of this new “humanitarian intervention” policy was Iraq.

Biabannavard goes on to subdivide phases of the US-Iraqi PSYOP operation. In the first place, the US found a perfect reason to challenge the Iraqi government by claiming the existence of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). At the same time, the world community had undeniable facts that Iraqi forces used chemical weapons against their own Kurdish population and Iranian forces during the First Gulf War, and during the Iran-Iraq War. Therefore, the WMD accusations worked very well against the Iraqi government.

Civil Affairs team gears up in Afghanistan. (Defense Link)

10 Spring 2007

The second step began right after the September 11th event, when the United States declared that it would launch a military operation and go to war if it is necessary to contain the spread of WMD technology.22 However, the author sees a different reason behind American officials’ tough attitude toward Iraq. He argues that the major reason behind the Iraqi operation was neither WMD nor September 11th. Rather, Biabannavard sees economic reasons as the main cause behind US intentions. In other words, he believes the current Iraqi war is about oil, and nothing else.

US PSYOP against Iraq had two different legs: one was the preparation of regional and international public opinion against the Iraqi government, and the second was the launching of a negative advertisement campaign against Iraqi political leaders.

Furthermore, Biabannavard notes the US government and media tried to use the September 11th episode, especially its massive destruction and death toll, as an advertising tool to convince the US and international public of the need to attack Iraq. The United States censored a UN report, which dealt with 24 US companies assisting with the production of chemical weapons in Iraq, using previous news about the Iran-Iraq War.23 This created an “evil” public opinion image of Saddam Hussein, and threatened that if Iraq maintained WMD, the conflict would rapidly grow and suck other countries into the conflict. It also used the public media to exaggerate Iraq and Saddam’s danger with regards to WMD. Finally, US PSYOP advertised the fact that if Iraqi WMD were destroyed, there would be a positive effect of reducing the overall danger of spreading WMD.24

The US’ international and regional PSYOP against the Iraqi regime was extremely effective. The reason behind this astonishing success was the nature of the Iraqi government and its leadership, who created more regional enemies than anyone else in the history of the Middle East. Another reason was Iraq’s prior use of WMD: it was so real, no one doubted the possibility that Iraq had something to hide from the international community.

The pre-war PSYOP phase ended by discrediting the Iraqi political leadership. Their reputation had already been harmed by their regional behavior: an unforgivable attitude toward opposition, ethnic and religious groups. These negative domestic and regional attitudes toward Iraq made the US PSYOP designers’ job very easy.

These Iranian observations go on to describe how the US dealt with the Iraqi people, using pamphlets, radio and television. At the same time, US forces were able to distribute small radios among Iraqi military personnel, and encourage them to listen to the broadcasts. Television programs displayed video of Bathist officials killing people, as a propaganda tool to satisfy the Iraqi anti-government opposition. The TV messages promised to protect Iraqi holy sites and important economic objects, and to prevent the looting of Iraqi antiques. Videos about the lavish lifestyle of Saddam and his family, versus the difficult lives of the majority of Iraqi people, propagated Saddam’s disrespected of Iraqi values and ideals.

The Americans repeatedly declared they had killed high ranking Iraqi Army officers and Saddam in order to weaken the people’s resistance against the American forces. Finally, the Americans displayed Saddam’s supporters who were taken prisoner, or their dead bodies.25

It is vital to see how Iranian PSYOP specialists judged US efforts, as well as how they evaluated both Iraqi and Afghan responses—and finally, what was their evaluation? “A Comparative Study of US PSYOP in Iraq and Afghanistan” describes the US PSYOP campaigns as very effective tools, designed to castigate both countries’ political leadership, and convince people that life after Saddam and the Taliban will be better. However, the article also points out serious inadequacies in the Iraqi and Afghani response to US PSYOP. These stem from the style of the Iraqi and Taliban leadership, and how they behaved toward their own citizens and the rest of the world.

Iranians believe the success of US PSYOP was dependant on several important factors: 1) lack of an effective connection between the Iraqi and Taliban leadership and its citizens; 2) the US knowledge of both countries political systems and their governing tools; 3) lack of effective media; 4) people being unsatisfied and discontent with their leaders; 5) inability to mobilize people in a short period of time; 6) lack of effective road systems; 7) no centralized and effective decision-making center; 8) the government’s inability to satisfy the needs of the military because of hasty decision-making; 9) the personalization of operational and administrative plans; 10) their isolation from the rest of the world; 11) their lack of education; and finally, 12) the inability to clearly evaluate the belligerent countries’ capabilities.26

What Did Iranians Learn from Iraq & Afghanistan?

Psychological operations are very complicated. They require in-depth knowledge of the target countries’ culture and their social, economic, military and political structures. Iranian psychological operations warriors are learning the reality of modern warfare. They value US experience in this field, and try very hard to learn and understand American successes and shortcomings in different theaters, regardless of the outcome.

This analysis of US PSYOP in Iraq and Afghanistan also serves Iranian interests very well, helping them understand the reality of life, and how they can contain future US PSYOP against Iran. The Iranian evaluation of Iraqi and Afghanistan’s inadequacies in their fight against American forces is very realistic. They clearly mention the fact that in both countries the political leadership and people were not on the same page. At the same time, both governments were unable to satisfy popular demands.

In the current period, it is especially important to see what Iranian military planners and PSYOP warriors learned from the Iraqi and Afghan experience. Most importantly, they want to contain anti-Iranian US PSYOP efforts in the region.

One can suggest the Islamic Republic of Iran is currently preparing for a PSYOP counterattack against the United States. It is worth mentioning that the current Iranian government and its leadership are not just nationalistic; they consider Iran

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as a jumping off point to create a worldwide Islamic empire under the leadership of the Lord of Ages (Imam Zaman). They do not value the nature of Iranian nationalism as much as one might suspect, either its distinctive culture or its background.

The Iranian leadership is very realistic and flexible in their thought and belief system. In order to mobilize people, they use the Shia-Islamic order which is called ‘Taqqieh,’ literally means “the practice of hiding one’s belief under duress.”27 One may also view this as abuse of Iranian people for the government’s own ends. Taqqieh is the Islamic version of Machiavellian politics, in which “politics have no relation to morals.” In other words, the current Iranian leadership is in danger, and they know the people are not willing to risk their lives for the defense of Islam. Therefore, they have decided to “hijack” the traditions and belief system, attempting to fulfill their goals under the banner of the Iranian nationalism.

These cosmopolitan Muslim internationalists have a lot to think about. They desire something which is creative, important, escalates Iranian pride and nationalism, creates a safety net around the Iranian political system, unifies the people regardless of their political or ethnic background, and covers the weakness of the state with popular support.

They have also found a magic tool to save themselves, and contain their enemies. This is very interesting, and at the same time, very dangerous: it is called the uranium enrichment process. Such a plan makes economic sense, provides a sense of pride for Iranian people for their scientific achievements, unifies people against an enemy who wants to stop this process, and saves the Iranian political system from further disarray (for the time being). More importantly, it makes any PSYOP success very difficult, and maybe even fruitless.

The current international crisis regarding Iran’s uranium enrichment is part of the Iranian psychological counterattack against the United States. It is worth noting the Iranian political elites clearly understood the uranium enrichment issue has no military use whatsoever. Any damage to the United States interests around the world by nuclear weapons, either by themselves or by their proxies, is not an option. The Iranian political elites undoubtedly accepted that any nuclear blackmail against the US or other countries would trigger a heavy response, quite possibly destroying Iran and her political system.

It appears the Iranian political elites are much more into preserving their grip on power and their Islamic mythology of helping to return the Lord of Ages (Imam Zaman) than thinking about Iranian national interests. They see a close relation between preserving the system and the existence of a viable Iranian state. Therefore, they are defending the country

for the sake of their own interest and religious beliefs, and nothing else.

The reason beh ind th i s conclusion is very simple. First, Iranians are extremely nationalistic, and they have no positive feeling toward any attacking country as a savior. Secondly, they want to solve their government problems in-house, without third party involvement. Finally, they are witnesses to the realities on the ground in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Thus, it is very difficult to convince any Iranian that it is greener on the other side of the fence.

Conclusion“A Comparative Study of US PSYOP in Iraq and

Afghanistan” is an important document for understanding how Iranians analyze US PSYOP strengths and weaknesses in Afghanistan and Iraq. Clearly, their analysis uncovered what they see as deficiencies. One conclusion they drew was that in both Iraq and Afghanistan, the Center of Gravity (the triangle of government, military and population) is weaker than the Islamic Republic of Iran’s COG. Iran clearly understands they have no time to repair all of their own COG deficiencies. In Biabannavard’s opinion, it will require a tremendous IIR government effort to successfully respond to US PSYOP efforts. Therefore, they are trying to use preventative measures to reduce the chances of a US invasion of Iran.

Organizing the “suicide divisions” (approximately 60,000 suicide volunteers) is one of the first steps to remind American military planners that attacking Iran will not be an easy task, and will cause unbearably heavy US military casualties. The uranium enrichment issue is also an example of shrewd PSYOP planning. They put a very delicate issue before the people, asking if they want another country making decisions for their ancient nation with a long tradition of imperial power. Iran should have the right to do whatever it wants according to the Iranian government. Obviously Iranian national pride is no less important than American or British pride, or of citizens in any other modern country anywhere in the world. Therefore, the world will witness an Iranian nationalistic reaction against any forceful solution to the uranium enrichment problem. Iranian PSYOP against the US will be strategic and will cover many different areas of concern. It is important to remember the Islamic Republic of Iran is working hard to contain any US capability of launching an attack against it, and is against any withdrawal from anything its political elites believe.

The recent US visit of former Iranian President Khatami is part of the counter-PSYOP against US efforts regarding the uranium enrichment question. The Iranian regime sent a very charming personality, and highly educated person, to create some influence in US intellectual circles. The goal is to get the world to question American policies on Iran. This type of

A contemporary view of Iranian leadership. (The Persian Journal)

12 Spring 2007

strategic Iranian PSYOP will be the standard for the coming years: the US must be prepared.

Notes 1 Jahangir Karami, “Mohit Amniyati Khavarmiyaneh va Siyasat Defaee Jomhouri Eslami Iran,” Majaleh Siyasat Defaee, Payiz va Zemestan 1384, 52. Njdeh Asisian, trans. “The Middle East Security Environment and IRI’s Defense Policy,”by Jahangir Karami, The Journal of Defense Policy/ 13,14, winter (2005-06): 52.2 Keyhan Barzegar, “Tazad Naghshha: Bararsi Rishehaye Monazeh Iran va Amrica Baad az Havadess September 11,” Rahbord, Markaz Tahgighat Strategic, Majmae Tashkhis Maslehat Nezam, Shomareh 38, 26 Ordibehesht, 1382, 146. And, Njdeh Asisian, trans. “Conflicting Roles: Examination of Roots of Iran-US conflict in the Post September 11”, By Keyhan Zargar, Rahbord Journal, Center for Strategic Research affiliated to the Expediency Council/38, (2006): 146.3 Morad Ali Sadoughi, “Strategy Amnyat Meli Jomhouri Eslami Iran dar Daheh Sevom (1): Mokhtasat Kelidi Siyasat dar Donyaye Jahani Shodan”, Gahnameh Bardasht Ava, Markaz Barrasihahye Strategic Riayast Jomhouri,Sal Aval, Shomareh 1, Safaeh 19. And, Morad Ali Sadoughi, “The Islamic Republic of Iran National Security in the Third Decade (1): The key Characteristics of politics in the Eve of Globalization”, The Bardash Aval Journal/ 1, no.1 (2001): 19. 4 Iran Focus. “Iran weekly advertises “application form” for suicide operations.” Available from http://www.iranfocus.com/modules/news/article.php?storyid=2949 Internet; accessed Sep. 10, 2006.5 Biabannavard, Ali Reza. “Barrasii Tatbighi Amalyat Ravani Iyalat Motahedeh Dar Do Keshwar Afghanistan va. Araq.” Faslnameh Elmi-Takhasosi Amalyat Ravani. 3.11 (2006): 124. And, Biabannavard, Ali Reza. “A Comparative Study of US PSYOP in Iraq and Afghanistan.” Scientific-Professional Quarterly on Psychological Operations. 3.11 (2006): 124.

6 Ibid.7 Biabannavard, p. 125.8 Ibid9 Ibid10 Ibid.11 Biabannavard, p. 125.12 Ibid, p. 12613 Ibid14 Ibid., p. 12715 Ibid.16 Ibid.17 Ibid., p. 12818 Ibid., p. 12919 Ibid20 Ibid., p. 13021 Ibid.22 Ibid., p. 131.24 Ibid25 Ibid.26 Ibid., p. 13327 “Islamic-Shia Words Glossary”; available from http://www.revertmuslims.com/glossary.html#t Internet; accessed Sept. 2006.

Other works by the author: “Sustaining the Struggle: Interplay of Ethno-Nationalism and

Religion,” in An Army at War, Proceedings of the Combat Studies Institute.

“Iranian Reaction to the Iraqi Election,” at FMSO’s Website.“An Overview of Iran-Armenian Relations in the Post-Soviet Era and

Their Impact on Caucasus Regional Stability” published in the Journal of European-Society for Iranian Studies, Rome, Italy.

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estimate of 2,000, up to 10,000 according to the Soviet Union—both of which were wrong. Post insurgency interviews and records found the actual number to be in excess of 12,000. This was coupled with an initial British effort characterized by Lt Gen Sir Harold Briggs—a major figure in the Emergency—as “inadequate, undermanned and under managed,” partly due to a lack of trained Chinese linguists. Further, the UK’s decision to completely change their civil and military administration hurt the Malayan people’s faith in government. MCP propaganda portrayed the change in administration as an indication of the insurgent’s success, and the loss of faith in the British Administration hampered early calls to the Chinese community for support. Worse, the scale of violence increased while the British

administration studied the problem. The most conclusive item resulting from this analysis was British realization that to win, Malaya had to become independent.

Electronic Warfare & Military Deception

Hoping to take advantage of technology, initial British attempts to locate and gather information on insurgent operations relied heavily upon communications intelligence (COMINT). However, enforcement of strict import controls on radios limited the MCP’s radio capability, and they mostly relied on couriers as their primary means of communication. Because of these two actions, two-way radios were limited to MCP elite, with no radios at the platoon and company level. Some receivers were available for listening to Radio Peking, but this lack of two-way radios was to limit the overall COMINT value.

Military Deception and propaganda were also limited, as administrators saw MILDEC and propaganda as possibly compromising the theme of an open and honest administration. The British and the MCP were fighting over the Malayan population and UK leaders reasoned that a strategic deception could have serious consequences on British credibility.

Malaya is an example of a resource-limited government

that defeats a well-equipped, experienced, and organized insurgent force. The United Kingdom (UK) and its successor, the Government of Malaya (GOM), successfully countered a large-scale insurgency and achieved independence, while showing how a multifaceted civil, military and information program provided an optimum counterinsurgency response. These combined programs did not happen overnight, but were an evolution of the UK and GOM learning and adapting based upon their successes and failures. Through trial and error, UK counterinsurgency efforts evolved from an initial campaign based on retribution, into one that focused on breaking the relationship between the insurgents and the population base.

To achieve this “hearts and minds approach,” Britain’s campaign blended control, information, political, economic, and social measures under a fully unified command structure. Effective use of local civil and police forces were crucial in minimizing the cost of the Emergency, which Malaya’s own tin and rubber export revenues paid. Most significantly, this campaign effectively demonstrates how an information campaign and civil measures can achieve popular support.

Initial StepsThe Malayan Communist Party (MCP) carried out anti-

Japanese actions during World War II, and a protracted fight for Malayan independence beginning in 1948. Initial British evaluations of what they faced were both accurate and wrong. The British correctly assessed that the key industrial targets were the tin mines and rubber plantations of Malaya. At the same time, they correctly identified the unassimilated Chinese civilian population as the base from which the insurgents hoped to draw support. They realized that, in addition to recruits, the critical link would be the food and supplies that friendly Chinese (the Min Yuen) would supply to the insurgents. Initial estimates of the size of the insurgent force ranged from Britain’s

IO During the Malayan EmergencyBy James R. Bortree, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

Editorial Abstract: Lt Col Bortree analyzes the major phases of British counterinsurgency actions in Malaya, describing use of IO core capabilities in an historical campaign context. He then contrasts British successes with the limitations of contemporary US doctrine, and how lessons learned are especially relevant to current Coalition actions in Southwest Asia.

Malaya, circa 1952. (MOD Australia)

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Consequently, the Malayan Emergency did not see the use of strategic deception.

Psychological Operations & Public AffairsBritish High Commissioner Sir Henry Gurney, increased

the emphasis on PSYOP, just as the PSYWAR division became operational in September of 1948. The original configuration of the PSYWAR Department was primarily military, with most of the personnel’s experience gained during World War II. Malaya was a fundamentally different type of confrontation.

Relying on past experience, the PSYWAR division approached the Malayan Emergency from a rather traditional perspective, and guidance from the High Commissioner further diluted the effectiveness of PSYWAR. Responding to criticism from the commercial planters, following the killing of three planters by the insurgents, the primary PSYOP theme became revenge. This resulted in a campaign which threatened not only the insurgents, but the local populace who helped them, even if such help was against the locals’ will.

During this period, the new newspaper sponsored by the PSYWAR division attempted to win over the population supporting the insurgents through several means. Named Sin Lu Pao (New Path News), the new PSYOP sponsored paper reflected several collisions between policy, PSYOP and Public Affairs. For example, the New Path News, while mocking the MCP, simultaneously reported several policy decisions that caused more damage than good. Directives allowed the High Commissioner to deport anyone who was not a federal citizen or born in Malaya, which turned out to be the majority of the Chinese squatter population. Other regulations gave the High Commissioner the right to detain anyone suspected of collaborating with the insurgents, confine them without trial, and relocate or banish families to mainland China. The regulations had an inherent flaw in that they did not discriminate between those who willingly helped, and those forced to aid the insurgents. The combination of rapid implementation and lack of discrimination of these new regulations quickly created distrust and suspicion.

Civil Military Operations After the initial outbreak of hostilities, one of the first items

identified by both the military and the police was inadequate knowledge of the civilian population they were attempting to influence and defend. Significant changes in the population demographics, location and infrastructure occurred during the Japanese occupation. Simply put, the British government was missing key information about the Malayan population, its makeup, and location that the registration process could provide. The key points included:

- Accurate numbers of the population and their ethnicity. - Location and distribution of the population. - Location of Chinese squatters and contested land. - Food and water sources surveyed - Update infrastructure knowledge. What services

(electricity, water, medical, schools, etc.) were available, where and to whom?

As this process began, the MCP realized that registration would ease identification of insurgents. It would also create two additional negative effects for the insurgency. This was the first time many people had ever seen government representatives. Registration became the first step in establishing a government presence and started to dispel the perception of a distant and uncaring administration. Second, the registration served an intelligence function by determining population, food, and resource distribution throughout Malaya while also facilitating the creating or updating of administration maps.

Registration was the first step in re-establishing British presence in many remote parts of Malaya. While not permanent, the registration teams were the first government presence that many of the rural Malay villages had ever seen.

The British determined the MCP was dependent upon the Min Yuen (Chinese squatters) for logistics and resupply. Information gathered during the registration process indicated that if the plan did not include transferring-deeded land to the former squatters, the probability of success would be virtually zero. Second, the registration process drove home to the British administration the fact that most of the Chinese squatters were illegally occupying their land. Third, it would reestablish British control over the outlying areas and undermine the unofficial MCP government. Finally, successful relocation would allow the British administration to sever the insurgents and their supply lines. Two unforeseen effects of the registration were valuable insight into the popular points of the MCP platform and a better understanding of the area of operations and its geographic constraints.

The Briggs Plan The appointment of Sir Harold Briggs marked the

beginning of a significant change in the way that Britain prosecuted the Malayan Emergency. Briggs was the first person to fill the new Director of Operations role. His new position made him responsible for coordinating civil, police, military, naval and air forces. For the first time, these capabilities were under the control of a single person. Any service questioning a Briggs’ decision could appeal to the High Commissioner. Upon unifying the military and civilian police under his authority, Briggs next remodeled the War Executive Committees. Their authority flowed from federal to state to district, and finally the settlement level. Policy review occurred at a local level, and results then flowed from the settlement back to the federal. These committees met weekly and melded civil, police and military actions into a cohesive whole across horizontal governmental levels, while coordinating national policy vertically from the federal down to the settlement level. Another critical aspect is that each committee had discretionary powers limited to its level. For example, a district committee could review and release a leaflet, if within federally determined parameters, across the district. The Committee structure allowed tailoring of national policy, actions, and messages for delivery across state, district and settlement lines. This resulted in messages aimed at groups, ethnicities, and small settlements

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so that individuals could easily discern their place and role in the overall policy.

MILDEC and OPSEC Early experiments had shown that using paratroops

allowed a high degree of mobility, but that the insurgents were now watching the few clearings in the jungle where the paratroops could land. Thus, the insurgents were still able to get advance warning of paratroop arrival into their particular region of the jungle. MILDEC changed this in 1950. First, the British SAS developed a unique tree jumping harness that allowed paratroopers to insert through the jungle canopy. This usage permitted the paratroops to remain suspended in the canopy until after dark, when they would lower themselves to the ground. During the initial phase of this operation, parachute insertion using the special harness, and normal parachute missions into clearings, started to produce results. After designing a preliminary deception campaign, the New Path News published that the typical patrol lasted roughly two weeks. In reality, the patrols lasted a minimum of 100 days. In some cases, to support the two-week perception, some paratroops would link up with the patrols and the same number of troops that began the patrol would return within two weeks. To aid this perception, the paratroops used the same uniforms worn by the regular soldiers. In the meantime, the remaining personnel from the patrol and paratroops wou ld con t inue deeper into the jungle to complete the 100 day mission. This deception resulted in the MCP consistently underestimating the number of patrols actively operating in the jungle at any one time.

PSYOP and PA

In 1950, Director of Emergency Information Hugh Carleton-Greene received permission to institute a radical new information campaign. He concluded the current policies offered little incentive to the Chinese squatters to defect or collaborate and, conversely, served as an incentive for the insurgents to fight to the death. Instead, Carleton-Greene proposed rewards for surrender policy, offering the first substantive shift in Malayan PSYWAR policy from the previous revenge theme. Briggs overrode police objections after Malay leaders convinced him of the potential of the surrender program’s rewards.

To take advantage of this change in policy and to make the marriage of PSYWAR and PA more effective, Carleton-Greene changed the objectives of the PSYWAR section. Working

closely with local political leaders and captured insurgents, they developed a new set of objectives to replace the previous revenge theme. New objectives included:

- Create distrust and suspicion between leaders and led by stressing gulf between the advantages and benefits enjoyed by MCP elite.

- Create doubt in ultimate victory by quoting from captured documents in which senior party members expressed uncertainty.

- Counter propaganda that those who surrendered would be ill-treated or killed when their usefulness ended.

- Promote dissension within units by stressing differences of treatment accorded to various ethnic, religious, or racial classes.

To further open communications with rebels and the Chinese squatters, Carleton-Greene increased the number of channels available for distributing information, adding ground loudspeakers, plays and personal appearances by surrendered enemy personnel (SEP). However, surrendered

personnel indicated that the leaflet remained the best means to communicate with rebels. In fact, the MCP declared that possession of a British leaflet (by an MCP member) as reasonable justification for execution.

Carleton-Greene also introduced a full broadcast schedule in Malay, Tamil, and four dialects of Chinese, replacing the English and Malay only broadcasts. The new programming combined the vernacular press and t ransla ted broadcasts to become the principal means of communicating with the

uncommitted people of the country. Working closely with Carleton-Greene, the PSYWAR and Emergency Information Services, Radio Malaya focused upon explaining three specific themes: the importance of registration; how the resettlement would occur; and countering the growing Malay perception that the Chinese were shown favoritism in infrastructure construction. PA worked with Civil Military Operations and PSYWAR to ensure that the following five objectives in policy and actions matched. This ensured synchronization of message, policy, and actions across the settlement, district, state, and federal levels of Malaya.

CMO Upon reviewing registration and resettlement data, Briggs

laid out a sweeping plan for food and drug control, aimed at breaking the logistic links between the jungle-based insurgents and their Min Yuen support. The key to making the food and drug denial work was the resettlement plan begun in 1948.

British Army firebase in Malaya, circa 1956. (MOD UK)

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To ensure the success of the program, High Commissioner Sir Henry Gurney received approval to gave state and settlement authorities the power to declare areas as controlled areas. The main purpose was to concentrate the population, in part, to provide a means of protecting the population from the insurgents while simultaneously cutting communications and support to the insurgents. To entice the Chinese to relocate to the new villages, villagers received a stipend while they waited for their first crop, one sixth of an acre for a home, and a minimum amount of deeded land for planting. By combining land ownership and security with access to medical facilities, water, electricity, and schooling in each village, the CMO effectively removed several key MCP justifications.

Turning The Tide In early February 1952, Lt Gen Gerald Templar replaced

Briggs. After reviewing the situation in Malaya and talking with Briggs, Templar concluded, much as Briggs did, that this was primarily a political campaign. In September 1952, he created a new policy that offered citizenship to over half the ethnic Indians and Chinese. Templar then followed this success with new legislation proposing an electoral process for state legislative councils elected from the newly established village councils. Though his actions did not effectively change Briggs’ plan, one of Templar’s major innovations was to create a single director of intelligence who oversaw the civilian, military and police intelligence functions. What made this new position unique was that the Director of Intelligence was primarily responsible for analysis and had little to do with actual collection. This division of responsibility let the collectors focus on collection, with all questions and requests for analysis routed to the new Director of Intelligence. The analysts were now responsible for analyzing data and producing estimates. This let the military and police focus on gathering intelligence versus answering questions from on high.

EW and MILDEC During 1953, the MCP introduced a new type of radio for

communications amongst senior MCP officials. However, the new radio allowed a much more accurate triangulation than was possible before. In fact, the triangulation was accurate enough that it could successfully guide RAF heavy bombers. To prevent civilian casualties, the Special Police would verify that the MCP camp was not holding captive civilians and would smuggle homing beacons into the camps. The British took this new EW technique one-step further. They activated a MILDEC plan focused on the MCP leadership. The objective was to convince the MCP leadership that the British were getting their information from high-level members of the MCP. Through information obtained from surrendered enemy personnel, the British leaked that certain high-ranking members of the MCP had left the camps just prior to the RAF strikes. In the end, the MCP did not figure out the EW methodology being used and instead executed 11 mid level officials for leaking information to the British.

PSYOP

PSYOP began to emphasize the decline of the MCP with government films featuring a combination of well-known surrendered insurgents and those from the local area of the village. Another PSYOP program rotated the better-known insurgents through the contested areas to prove to the people that they were alive and well, in keeping with the government promise. Subtle points to the photos and visits included clothing, obvious weight gain, the simple fact they were alive, and doing well under the British.

The PSYOP campaign was also working on the MCP, and as mentioned above, the combination of air strikes and MILDEC allowed for the creation of further dissension within the MCP ranks. At the same time, the PSYOP section began to capitalize further upon the rewards-for-surrender program. Another refinement was in the primary PSYOP message themes:

a. Where did the money go?

b. Why work against the interests of the masses?

c. It is dangerous to carry a pistol or a carbine.

d. One of your comrades has been killed in this area?

e. Do you need medical assistance?”

Theme “d” was quite interesting in that, not only would the PSYOP section announce who had been killed by the government during operations, but would also include who had been executed for possessing, reading or doing something the MCP found offensive. As these were standardized procedures—as Briggs envisioned them—the tailored leaflets differed across districts. This particular theme was the single most effective leaflet in the message inventory, designed to induce the surrender of individual insurgents.

CMO In a refinement of the Briggs plan on food denial, Templar

decided that the security forces should focus their efforts on the guerilla supply parties operating near the jungle fringe to force the insurgents to commit resources to defending their supply organizations. A secondary effect was to force the MCP to divert additional resources to producing the necessary food. Che The, the MCP senior official countered with an aphorism “the guerillas moves among the people like a fish swims through the ocean.” Templar pointed out that food denial and civil programs “would create shallows where the fish could be found easily.”

The next phase was the creation of white areas and black areas. By 1953, in some areas designated as white areas, insurgent activity had practically ceased: residents were not subject to emergency restrictions or regulations. In comparison, black areas continued to enforce all the regulations and restrictions. In fact, the definition of what constituted a white area closely agrees with what Mao would define as a base area. The establishment of white areas delivered yet another blow to the insurgent campaign, which had yet to establish a secure

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base area. Contrast this insurgent failure with the government which actively advertised its success in doing exactly what the insurgents had been attempting to do for the last 4 years.

PAPublic affairs had a challenging role of keeping the

population informed of what was going on and why the selected measures were necessary. The food denial programs and the resultant restrictions programs provided a legitimate means for villagers to refuse food to the insurgents. PA also disseminated the village requirements for designation as a white area to the local populace.

Continuing distribution of radios and openness shown by the British government created two developments that PA had to counter. The first created a new tactic for the MCP. In mid-1952, the MCP shifted their tactics from the adults in the villages to the Chinese students in the middle schools. The ramifications of this shift in policy did not become apparent until 1954 when the students began to attack pro-government educators. The second development was the government plan to begin educating the populace that a unified government which represented all, was better than one based upon a single dominant ethnicity. Templar forced alliances between the various Malay factions to further the single unified government. At the same time, debate and discussions featuring panels of respected local academics debated the issues using the radio as a means for the entire nation to participate.

Mopping Up (1���-1��0) In 1954, General Sir Geoffrey Bourne replaced Templar

and remained the senior British official until Malaya became independent on 31 August 1957. The final military push from the MCP came on an unexpected front, in the schools of Malaya. The execution of several senior administrators of Chinese High Schools in 1954 alerted the British Administration to the new MCP front. During 1954-1956, the British administration discovered several large MCP cells in different, large, mostly Chinese high schools across Malaya. To counter this, Bourne and his Malayan successors, used a variety of programs to combat the MCP incursion into the high schools.

PSYOP The concept of a peace offensive, developed by Templar’s

administration, became the new overall theme behind the PSYOP program. As insurgent numbers decreased, the focus shifted from groups to individuals. Group photos further emphasized the surrendered insurgents peaceful coexistence with the government, years after laying down their arms.

For the insurgents who did not cooperate, the government resorted to other means. First, forces would surround an insurgent area. Then, the government offered insurgents the opportunity to surrender. Message delivery was through assorted means such as radio, voice, speaker aircraft, leaflet, and contact with villagers. The troops would then withdraw for a period of three days. At the end of three days, the troops

moved back into the area and killed all remaining insurgents. If captured, insurgents went to prison on extended sentences.

CMO

By 1954, the relocation program approached completion. Over thirty percent of the villages provided their own protection. In some areas, village guards were down to standby status as the size of white areas increased. The increase in white areas allowed Bourne to begin another step, which was the establishment of a common educational system across Malaya. Bourne created school management committees using locally elected parents and school administrators to enforce common standards. This was the final unifying step taken by the British for the sole purpose of breaking down ethnic barriers.

Lessons From Malaya Briggs recognized the insurgency he was facing in Malaya

differed significantly from World War II, though both this and the Malayan Emergency centered on clashing belief systems. However, the means to success were diametrically opposite. In the case of WWII, defeating the axis governments resulted in the defeat of the nation. This is markedly different from the Malayan Emergency where two parties were fighting to become the Malayan population’s choice for governance. This conceptual difference was the underlying reason for Briggs’ earlier comment that the Malayan Emergency was primarily a political campaign.

Message

Malaya demonstrated the ability of a ruling government to deliver a coherent message, seamlessly coordinated through words and policy, is critical to a successful counterinsurgency. The message that the British delivered to the Malayan populace was simply, “the government is your friend.” This ability to connect with the Malayan people was the result of vertical and horizontal coordination across the Malayan government structures. The ability to meld civil, military and police policies and actions transmitted a message heard loud and clear by the Malayan population. The MCPs inability to offer a better or at least equal message resulted in their eventual downfall.

PA

PA was a key message channel during the Malayan Emergency. PA’s role was critical and evolved as the conflict progressed. In the initial phase, it explained government reasoning behind the registration and relocation of the populace. PA was able to explain why both government programs were beneficial to the local population. Later, in conjunction with Radio Malaya, PA conveyed accurate news about important local issues to the Malayan population. In that regard, providing access to news and a simple radio served as a means of driving another wedge between the insurgents and their supporting population base. Carleton-Greene let the radios receive Radio Malaya and Radio Peking. This deliberate action allowed

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the population to listen to both sides of the argument and make an educated choice about which side to support.

Decentralized Planning

One of the primary lessons of the Malayan Emergency was the value of decentralized planning. One of the problems the British administrations faced was synchronizing the message across nine states which had populations composed of Chinese, Malay, and Indian, along with a religious mix of Christianity, Buddhism and Islam. Timeliness and relevance were important considerations as well. The ability to tailor a message for a region down to a settlement level was critical in the overall success. Early in the conflict, Hugh Carleton-Greene realized that centralizing this process would create unacceptable delays, negating any advantage that PSYOP could create. Fortunately, Lt Gen Briggs recognized this same issue. This was one reason for the creation of the district warfare executive and settlement warfare executive committees for coordinating government policies and actions vertically (from federal down to settlement) and horizontally (across police, civil and military). Working closely together, Briggs and Carleton-Greene created guidelines that allowed the lower levels to create and distribute PSYOP leaflets faster than the MCP. By the end of the conflict, insurgents discovered the government had better knowledge of their losses than their own leadership.

Such decentralized planning was key in being able to focus PSYWAR efforts on individuals versus a movement. In the end, this decentralization allowed the government to react faster than the MCP, creating the perception of a force that would eventually win out over the insurgents.

Joint IO Doctrine Viewed Through Malayan Experience

Generally, doctrine is the synthetic product of actual experience in previous conflicts. When reviewing the majority of Joint Doctrine, it became clear the services self-concepts determine not only how they prepare for war, but how flexible they will be in responding to unexpected situations. The majority of Joint Doctrine is based on large-scale conflict, and thus the United States Armed Forces are organized on the same basis. This can be seen in the types and variety of documents that relate directly to large-scale conflict, including: fire support, forcible entry, space, air mobility, laser designation, amphibious assault, amphibious embarkation, and suppression of enemy air defenses. Yet only two newer documents, Foreign Internal Defense (JP 3-07.1 in 2004) and Urban Operations (JP 3-06 in 2002), relate directly to insurgency.

Insurgency

Insurgency as we know it today is neither a new phenomenon nor a recent one. Once classified as rebellions or revolutions,

insurgencies have long existed in the past. During the twentieth century, the United States has been involved in multiple counterinsurgency efforts. The Hukbalahap rebellion in the Philippines, Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq show recent US counterinsurgency involvement. Based on lessons from the Malayan emergency, the British treat insurgency as a different form of war. Counterinsurgency techniques and methodology are fundamentally different from conventional conflict. Based simply upon frequent US involvement, one could expect that US doctrine would address counterinsurgency.

In reviewing the joint publications, insurgency and counterinsurgency are both

mentioned, primarily in our Doctrine for Joint Operations (JP 3.0), Military Operations Other Than War (JP 3-07) and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (JP 3-07.1). Of all the joint doctrine for operations, the one for Foreign Internal Defense mentions “insurgency” 82 times. If all the insurgency references in the doctrine documents examined by this article are combined, the three JP’s (JP 3.0, 3-07 and 3-07.1) count for 82.6% of the references. This means that for the remaining nine documents, “insurgency” is mentioned roughly once every 90 pages (23 refs over 1998 pages). Granted this is not critical if the term is relevant in context.

The Malayan Emergency demonstrated the importance of a tightly integrated and clearly defined IO campaign within a counterinsurgency. However, the current IO doctrine creates the opposite effect, particularly in how IO is organized. There are currently three doctrinal templates in existence for the services to use. The first and oldest is JP 3-13.1 Command and Control Warfare, and the second edition of JP 3-13 Joint Doctrine for Information Operations, which finally became official on 13 February 2006, after a protracted review process.

The IO documents are particularly relevant in terms of their role within counterinsurgency. As a key means of influencing a target population, these documents as a group do not distinguish between major conflict and insurgency. In some cases, their guidance is simply wrong. For example, Figure 4 is common to JP 3.0 Doctrine for Joint Operations, JP 3-13.1 Command and Control Warfare, and JP 3-57 Civil Military Operations. What is interesting is that Figure 3 lists counterinsurgency as a non-combat mission. Current losses of US troops in Iraq highlight the falsity of this perception.

Using the Iraq example, JP 3-0 later states the US military does not usually engage in counterinsurgency. This assertion flies in direct contrast to the US military’s experience in Vietnam, and the ongoing situations in Iraq and Afghanistan. All three primary publications specify the military will support insurgencies or support counterinsurgency as directed by our government. In that regard, some of the newer documents such as JP 3-58 and JP 3-07.1 are starting to show improvement.

IO and insurgency doctrine documents as a whole suffer from two problems. First, there is no service lead established

Fighting the MCP. (MOD UK)

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for the insurgency mission, which means that there is no advocate to fight for funding and resources to support this area. Notably, we have a service lead for specialized operations such as embarking troops for an amphibious assault, yet counterinsurgency is lumped with unconventional warfare under Army. Second, lack of guidance lets the services determine internal resources for this mission. For example, the Marine Corps formalized counterinsurgency in MCWP 33.5. Third, the Army has not clearly established its role as the lead service—though they are drafting new counterinsurgency guidance—while the Air Force and the Navy currently have no counterinsurgency doctrine at all.

However, considering the frequency of US involvement in insurgency or counterinsurgency, it makes sense, that someone should be in charge of coordinating COIN resources. One service should be in charge and define the other services’ supporting responsibilities.

MessageThe most important lesson from the Emergency remains

relevant today: the importance of being “propaganda minded.” All personnel involved in the campaign, from government officials, police to soldiers—especially at the grassroots level—must provide the same message: “the government is your friend.” The US ability to transmit a similar message is critical. The prerequisites to do this do not exist in US doctrine for three reasons: artificial constraints, local involvement and decentralized planning.

The British concept of PSYWAR was markedly different from the US version of PSYOP. The UK brought in a Military Deception specialist named Hugh Carleton-Greene. Shortly after his arrival, he assumed overall command of the British PSYWAR operation for PSYOP and PA. Carleton-Greene effectively became the coordinator for all messages developed and disseminated through PA and PSYOP methodologies, which allowed the British to create and disseminate a cohesive message in a timely manner.

US doctrine states PA and PSYOP will coordinate to make sure those messages will not conflict. The artificial constraints begin with JP 3-61, stating PA personnel will not be involved in PSYOP activities, and PSYOP personnel cannot talk to media unless it concerns a PSYOP program. In Malaya, PSYOP messages were disseminated using radio, newspapers, and leaflets. However, US doctrine prohibits contact with traditional media (newspaper, radio, etc.) by PSYOP personnel. Notably, in 1952 Hugh Carleton-Greene published an article in the New York Times titled “In Malaya the

Front is Everywhere.” The article identified Carleton-Greene as former head of Information Services, when at the time of the article he was Chief, PSYWAR Division. If Malaya had been a US operation and Carleton-Greene a US citizen, he would not have had access to any press.

Another artificial constraint is the decision process that removes authority for PSYOP and concentrates it in Washington DC further complicating the situation. A second key point is that British media access focuses upon supporting the commander; yet JP 3-53 specifically states that the primary purpose is to “expedite the flow of accurate and timely information about the activities of US joint forces to the public and internal audience.” Unfortunately, these distinctions place an artificial constraint upon US operations in developing and disseminating a synchronized message. An example of this was the uproar in 2006 after the US placed positive news articles in the Iraqi press. American media claimed this was an example of the US compromising free press in Iraq.

The involvement of local personnel was critical in the eventual success of the Malayan Emergency. Local involvement ranged from designing programs and leaflets to garnering political support for the embattled administration. This is

particularly problematic in terms of PSYOP, which relies upon US planners designing and creating appropriate messages. Unlike the British, U S m e t h o d o l o g i e s a r e somewhat more limited. Recent articles in the Washington Post, NY Times and on CNN reported on the Department of Defense’s unwillingness to use local personnel due to security clearance issues. This is in direct contradiction to the methodologies employed by the British in Malaya.

Decentralized Planning The key British decisions to create a single position for

all government coordination, and to decentralize, contrast with current US policy, basic organization and the PSYOP coordination process.

To begin with, American policy does not adequately capture the lesson of a single person responsible for civil and military integration. Today, a State Department official can be responsible for civil and military matters. However, when a Joint Force Commander (JFC) is responsible, this same relationship does not exist. Joint Pub 3-08, which rightly advocates the use of different executive branches in the performance of the job also states the military must build consensus, and that the goals of an institution may conflict with the private, usually short term, agendas of its members. It then goes on to state that the key to success in interagency

Airborne PSYOP in Malaya. (PSYWAR.org)

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cooperation is to achieve consensus in the Department of Defense before entering the interagency process. Again, the Malayan Emergency was managed from within theater. The US process does not reflect this lesson.

In essence, American policy creates unnecessary time delays by having another staff build consensus outside the theater of operations, without a senior decision maker. The problem in most group dynamics is that decisions can be over analyzed or diluted. Theoretically, the theater experts are not located in Washington DC—home of the interagency process—but rather in theater. This does not discount some experts that work in various agencies, but the majority of such experts with contemporary knowledge reside in-theater.

The second major problem is that of organization. The British were able to combine all civil and military functions under a single senior administrator. The US does not possess a similar ability as the actual problem is external to the DOD. This highlights a major lesson from Malaya not incorporated into our current doctrine: military and civilian departments maintain separate chains of command that do not merge until they reach the US President. Briggs’ reorganization was a means to alleviate this specific problem. Unfortunately, this problem is larger than the US military, so in the meantime this design compromises the ability to push decisions down to theater level. Briggs was able to decentralize planning, and American policy does not capture the first step in that process, that of a single decision maker in theater.

The final example concerns the development of PSYOP themes and messages. By 1952, four years into the emergency, PSYWAR officers at the district and settlement level had five themes available for execution. So long as the settlement PSYWAR officers stayed within the approved PSYWAR template, federal approval was not required prior to production and dissemination. This framework also directs rapid implementation of messages and themes at the highest (federal and state) levels without interfering with the local campaign.

This contrasts with US IO doctrine Joint Pub 3-07.1 has a section which calls for working with the local authorities and representatives, but does not provide the same degree of leeway that the British used to achieve success in Malaya. While the document actually mentions “local” sixty-two times, it still requires most actions to be coordinated for approval through the senior staff and provides very little guidance for simplifying the chain of command. The result is that while the document recommends tailoring the mission to meet local needs, central management of all coordination is mandatory.

Unfortunately, the DOD places even tighter controls on the development of PSYOP messages than it does on kinetic capabilities in theater. In fact, JP 3-53 specifically states, “The Secretary of Defense normally delegates PSYOP product approval to the supported combatant commander. This does not mean that the supported combatant commander also has been delegated approval for PSYOP product dissemination.”

This is an important distinction, which means that Joint Force Commander cannot distribute leaflets in his/her theater of operations. In fact, based on this doctrine, the highly successful

British campaign would never have worked, as only the Joint Force Commander can approve products (when delegated). However, the joint force commander cannot approve themes, objectives, or dissemination of the product in his own theater. This becomes particularly troublesome as the ability to decide what will work in theater becomes resident not with the staff working in theater, but rather in the Secretary of Defense’s staff in Washington, DC. Contrasting this with process applied in Malaya, theater staff made all PSYOP decisions with downward delegation to locales for material production and dissemination. The American policy of centralizing guidance also increases the time necessary to create, produce and disseminate a PSYOP message. This is in direct contrast to principle six of the PSYOP methodology, which states that timeliness is critical.

Technology

One of the key lessons of the Malayan Emergency was that technology advantages were almost superfluous. In almost every category, the British and government of Malaya had technological superiority over the insurgents. In fact, the MCP’s dependence upon a courier system rendered Britain’s sophisticated COMINT technology irrelevant. At the same time, the jungle limited access to both aircraft and vehicles. Used for strategic, operational and tactical mobility, aircraft and motor vehicles could not achieve their designed impact. Instead, Britain relied on patrols, which essentially negated advanced technologies in a leveling effect between the insurgents and British forces. Technology cannot counter informal social networks. Unfortunately, as John Nagl points out, a “basic tenet of American military doctrine is the concept of massive firepower/technology.”

Placed in context, Malayan lessons would indicate a connection between the lack of British success in using advanced technology and insurgency. Current lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan are showing that insurgents are able to adapt commercially available technology to their needs. In Iraq today, computers, key chains, garage door openers and cell phones represent several examples of non-traditional technologies being adapted for insurgent uses. Yet there is no JP that provides any direction on how to counter the integration of technology in a counterinsurgency. Worse, the basic lesson that American technology might be ineffective is lost.

Recommendations First, our doctrine must recognize insurgency as a combat

operation. The problem with insurgency is that our current doctrine ignores the lessons learned from Malaya and now Iraq. Our new doctrine should not be part of the JP 3-07 series on major operations other than war. Rather, it should be a stand-alone document that designates a single service as the lead for the counterinsurgency mission. The US Air Force and Navy have a role, but are not appropriate for developing counterinsurgency doctrine. The Army, according to John Nagl, has systematically dismissed insurgency when not engaged in an active insurgent conflict. As the United States Marine Corps

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has shown interest in counterinsurgency, one recommendation would be to designate the USMC as the lead service in the counterinsurgency mission. This would include making the USMC the service lead for organizing and equipping forces for insurgencies. (Editor’s Note: Army Field Manual/Fleet Marine Force Manual 3-42, Counterinsurgency, incorporating a considerable number of lessons learned from Malaya, was finally published on 15 Dec 2006.)

This message problem is partially within the scope of DOD doctrine to change. Current US law prohibits the use of PSYOP messages upon the American populace. However, the concept of using traditional media to convey either PSYOP or deception messages would create a fire storm within the US media community. The World War II D-Day methodology used the media as unwitting participants, in that they reported what they were given. The issue centers around whether PA will pass misleading information to the media. Unfortunately, JP 3-61 seems to imply that some type of agreement needs to be in place with civilian media before removing any artificial constraints. This becomes important as modern communications technology continues reduce the traditional difference between theater and domestic audiences. Without resolution to the question of access to foreign media for counterinsurgency messages, US PSYOP will remain effectively shackled, and incapable of creating British-styled successes.

In terms of decentralized planning, and specifically in terms of PSYOP, this paper recommends that the theater commander have the ability both to develop themes in advance, for approval, and to disseminate these themes through the appropriate mediums in theater. This authority would also include the ability to push pre-approved themes and products to lower levels for faster implementation than our current models.

Similarly, the purpose of a country team, when working with the US ambassador, is to provide contact with and decision-making authority in country to respond to the crisis du jour. Peace and conflict, not war, are the situations where country teams normally exist. Based upon the Malayan Emergency, the US military needs that similar capabilities and authorities for counterinsurgency. However, if a country team is in place when the US declares war or places a JFC in charge, those teams lose their decision authority. Decision authority reverts to Washington versus theater. Instead, this paper recommends that a country team provide the same capabilities to the Joint Force Commander or an ambassador. Appropriate policy decisions would remain in Washington, but execution should remain under the direction of either the JFC or ambassador, supported by appropriate staffs. A common country team would also simplify transition to a more peaceful situation managed by an ambassador. It would eliminate many duplicative staff actions attempting to achieve consensus on issues on the opposite sides of the world.

ConclusionsHave we incorporated those lessons learned by the British

Government and the Government of Malaya during the Malayan Emergency into our doctrinal guidance? At most, the American armed forces have learned the lessons that they wanted to learn. Critical terms like insurgency and downward delegation are in the doctrine, but the organizations retain a highly centralized management style, which diametrically opposes the lessons of Malaya. Insurgency is not a distinct form of war according to US doctrine, and the same doctrine shows it does not involve combat. The evening news from Iraq (or in the past, Vietnam) highlights the inadequacy of our current definition for insurgency.

Critical capabilities like PA and PSYOP are shackled by bureaucratic restraint and artificial limitations. In the battle of minds, the US has organized to fail by limiting its ability to integrate civilian and military capabilities effectively. Organizational limitations hamper US efforts in winning any conflict that sheer force of arms cannot handle. At a minimum, looking to Washington DC for every PSYOP and PA decision will so increase our decision cycle timeline as to make it completely ineffective, regardless of the decision rendered. Furthermore, the knowledge necessary for effective and efficient decisions is located in theater.

Our actions show how little experience our guidance actually captures. This should be doubly frightening given the accelerating pace of insurgencies in the world today.

Lt Col Rob Bortree, US Air Force, is currently serving as the Chief of Strategy, USCENTAF,

Shaw AFB, NC. Previously he served as 40th AEW mission planning cell team chief, and the first USAF IO weapons and tactics chief at Langley AFB, VA. He holds a BS in Electrical Engineering from California State University, Northridge, and earned Masters Degrees from Central Michigan University, the Naval Postgraduate School, and the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies. Readers can contact him at james.

bortree@shaw.af.mil.

Please see the bibliography/references for this article on the IO Sphere Home Page at: https://www.jiowc.osis.gov/

Publications/IOSphere/index.cfmClick on the“updates” link under the Spring 2007 issue

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Strategic Communications: Arab Media and the War in Iraq

By Dr. George Emile Irani

is being channeled, one must analyze the strategies that the media use in communicating messages, influencing their respondents, and forming the thoughts and knowledge of the ordinary citizen about the surrounding happenings. This article overviews the most evident Arab media strategies and analyzes the intentions—both declared and hidden—in covering and reporting events in Iraq. Specifically, the analysis covers three time periods: a) before the US and coalition forces invasion of Iraq (during the hype leading up to the war); b) during the war and up until the Iraqi elections; and c) after the first Iraqi elections.

Strategies adopted by the Arab media differ from one newspaper (or other media) to another, especially those produced abroad. Except for the Al Jazeera TV news channel (seen to have a wider margin of freedom than other media would normally have), the differences are less noticeable in media issued and published locally. The influence of Arab authoritarian regimes is so pervasive that even independent media outlets will tend to reflect the official line. Just as methods and tones are usually similar, so are information sources. Neither locally or foreign-produced Arab media, however, can be described as being completely independent.

Existing Arab opposition voices tend to be concentrated in a few Arab countries such as Lebanon, Egypt, Jordan, and Tunisia. In spite of the apparent marginalization of opposition parties and groups by some Arab regimes (except for Lebanon), opposition opinion in these countries is still louder and more visible than those in some Gulf

The war in Iraq has significantly impacted how Arabs, Muslims, and

Americans perceive each other. In turn, these perceptions have impacted both psychological and military operations and the battle for the “hearts and minds,” which the United States Government has waged to gain the sympathy of public opinion in Iraq and the rest of the Arab and Islamic world.

Using the words of Arab-American scholar Edward Said, the media—both Western and Middle Eastern—is hostage to the “clash of ignorance.” American perceptions of the Arabs are defined by deeply ingrained stereotypes that are slowly changing. In his book The TV Arab, Jack Shaheen writes that America’s view of the Arabs can be subsumed into “three Bs” of billionaires, bombers, and belly dancers.1 In contrast, what molds Arabs’ perceptions of America is ignorance of how the political system works in the US. Their perception is also heavily influenced by Hollywood TV serials such as Bay Watch, Sex in the City, and The Sopranos.

This article is the result of a systematic observation of some of the most influential Arab media coverage and opinion columns from the invasion of Iraq until today. The objective is to identify the means that some key Arabs are using to fuel anti-American sentiments around the world. The outcome is providing recommendations for the future of strategic communications in the Middle East.

Classification of the Arab Media

To understand the directions into which public opinion in the Arab world

Editorial Abstract: Dr. Irani takes a in-depth look at media influence in the first years of the Second Gulf War, examining the messages, strategies, and initial impact on Arab Muslim audiences. He uses systematic observation of influential Arab media coverage and opinion columns to identify the means some key Arabs are using to fuel anti-American sentiments. Finally, he provides recommendations for the future of strategic communications in the Middle East.

countries, Sudan, or Morocco. The lack of freedom of most locally produced media explains why they—versus media issued abroad—are broadcasting a uniform or standardized response to world events.

Arab media produced/published abroad can be classified into two main groups:

Description ExampleTotally

independentAl Quds Al Arabi (although some Arab observers

have claimed that it was financially dependent upon

the former regime of

Saddam Hussein)Funded by

Arab states or businesspersons

and therefore not completely independent

Al Jazeera TV (a semi-independent

visual media outlet that is loyal to its

Qatari provider)

F u n d e d b y A r a b s t a t e s o r businesspersons and therefore not completely independent Al Jazeera TV (a semi-independent visual media outlet that is loyal to its Qatari provider).

London-based newspapers such as Al Sharq Al Awsat and Al Hayat are funded by a number of businesspersons who try to take a liberal position towards local issues, but without crossing the line. Al Jazeera TV and Al Quds Al Arabi are the most followed media outlets among Arabs living abroad, even though their preeminence is threatened by the creation and success of the London-based Al

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Arabia TV channel. The Arab viewers and listeners of the two US Government-funded media outlets, Al Hurrah TV and Radio Sawa, perceive the purpose is to improve America’s image in the Middle East, which has not yet occurred. The reason for the credibility and popularity of Al Jazeera TV and Al Quds Al Arabi is their stand against Arab rulers and regimes, which took place long before the US involvement in the war in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Looking at the Arab media from the days leading up to the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 through the events that followed their first elections will lead us to some conclusions for Special Operations Forces.

Arab Media Before the War in Iraq

During the period leading to the war, official, semi-official local media, and media produced abroad adopted the stated official positions of their respective governments. Therefore, news items and editorials reflected, to a large extent, policies and viewpoints of Arab leaders towards the situation in Iraq. Although every Arab country was aware of the US Government and American public opinion’s anger following the attacks of September 11, 2001, they did not dare to openly challenge the street and support a war in Iraq.

The Arab media clearly had an unplanned consensus against an American invasion of Iraq. (The persistence was largely due to the massive antiwar demonstrations in the streets of several western capitals.) Government-controlled media outlets produced in countries that have bad relations with the US Government, such as Syria, were fiercely aggressive towards the American intervention in Iraq. The fact that the US acted unilaterally, and without the support of a United Nations Security Council resolution, gave the media strong grounds upon which to fight.

Arab Media Focus on Saddam Hussein

The apparent consensus in the official Arab media—against US and coalition forces taking military action

against Iraq—was minimal when it came to supporting Saddam Hussein. Indeed, many Arab leaders and opinion makers blamed him for causing the troubles in Iraq. They also repeatedly called on the Iraqi dictator to avoid a probable US military strike by submitting to the United Nations investigation team’s conditions in looking for weapons of mass destruction.

News reports and analyses intensely followed the work of the United Nations investigation team in Iraq, as well as the discussions and disagreements between the Iraqi regime and the White House. At the time that antiwar demonstrations were beginning to occur in several European and American cities, voices in the Arab world calling for support of Iraq were awakening the political silence and ensuring public support for Iraq.

Arab Media Focus on the People of Iraq

To the observer of regional events, it seemed that Arab media in the period before the war had failed to influence the public to the extent that it could become an active player on the political scene. Of course that was seen to be the goal of the official and semi-official media since

Arab governments were not willing to cause public turmoil. Arab regimes were willing to mobilize respective public opinions only to such an extent that it would divert people’s attention from the dismal state of the economy and the constant abuses of human rights in their own countries.

If influencing the public was the goal of the official media, why did other so-called independent media follow? In fact, media outlets such Al Jazeera TV and Al Quds Al Arabi followed the pattern hoping that the public would interpret their message and react accordingly. They were wrong, however, because the public was not concerned with the political focus and Saddam Hussein was never popular except among Palestinians. Al Jazeera TV then created a new strategy that focused on the distress and injustices suffered by the people of Iraq.

Iraq had waged a war with its strong rival Iran for eight dreadful years. It was not long after the Iran-Iraq war ended that Saddam sent his troops to invade another neighboring country, Kuwait, in August 1990. Iraqi troops remained in Kuwait for less than a year before they were driven out by international forces.

April 2005 Newspaper Cartoon.US President as soldier: “If you are not with us, you are against us.”

Islamist insurgent: “If you are not a fundamentalist, you are an infidel.”Iraqi victim: “If you are not a wolf, wolves will devour you. No to Occupation. No

to Terrorism.” (Abu Mahjoob Creative Productions, used with permission)

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For the next 11 years, Iraq suffered major losses and was still paying the price for invading Kuwait, by way of the United Nations program that allowed the sale of Iraqi oil to buy food and medicine. Additionally, Iraq had to deal with globally imposed sanctions and an international embargo.

On one hand, an interesting shift took place in the official Arab media. After a constant campaign of blaming the West—especially the US—for all of Iraq’s troubles, the media started a fierce campaign against the Iraqi dictator’s personal behavior and policies. This shift in tone occurred only after Saddam had rejected calls from several Arab leaders to yield to United Nations orders.

On the other hand, non-official Arab media focused their attention on the suffering of the Iraqi people. From the beginning of the war, few media outlets expressed support for Saddam or considered him to be the legitimate president of Iraq; the most outstanding example was the London-based Al Quds Al Arabi.

Not all Arab media shifted their focus to the Iraqi people, however. Newspapers in many Arabian Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, were striving not to write or mention Iraq as a next-door neighbor. Only Kuwaiti and some Saudi media outlets were ruthless in attacking Saddam and his Baath party, dubbing them “criminals of Iraq.” They waged direct attacks against the Iraqi dictator and were critical of his games with the United Nations weapons inspectors. Considering Saddam’s brutal invasion of

Kuwait, it was understandable why the Kuwaiti media and other sympathizers would take a more extreme position than some American media in justifying the war against Iraq.

Besides Kuwait and some other Arabian Gulf states, no other Arab media outlet was able or willing to support a military action against Iraq. Arab media seemed to have adopted a completely neutral stand whereby it was implicitly understood that they were, in fact, supporting the war in Iraq. Evidence of such a stand was highlighted by the suspicious silence towards the huge US military build-up in the surrounding Arabian desert.

Arab Media During the War and Until the Iraqi Elections

From the first day of the heavy bombing campaign, which marked the beginning of the war against Iraq, it seemed that most of the official Arab media had forgotten their initial position on the war. News about the battles was reported in a neutral manner. In contrast, a leading Egyptian newspaper published many articles and photos reminding the reader of Saddam’s horrifying crimes against his own people. Other newspapers opened their pages to members of the Iraqi opposition, which expressed their support for the arrival of US-led liberation troops to Iraq.

It was only later on, after a week of fighting, that the official media followed the previous line of focusing on and emphasizing the losses and misery of the Iraqi people. In fact, some analysts interpreted it as a message from Arab regimes to their respective people. Their objective was to show how much their people would suffer if they ever thought of taking a helping hand from the US against their own rulers.

Some official media, however, gave mixed signals by posting some articles about “the liberation of Iraq.” On the one hand, some Arab leaders would have liked to qualify this media behavior as an example of freedom of speech. On the other hand, some analysts described it as the Arab regimes’ predicament vis-à-vis the war in Iraq. It was mostly a problem of regimes not wanting to lose face with the US Government—by openly allowing their official media to criticize American policy—while also wanting to show their public what it really meant to face the same fate as Iraq.

When Saddam appeared on Iraqi television shortly after the assault had begun, he promised fierce resistance to foreign troops and pledged to his people that Iraq would be an American soldier’s graveyard, another Vietnam. These statements and the regular media appearances of Saddam’s Minister of Information, Mohammed Saied Al

January 2006 cartoon showing the US rewriting Iraq’s history. (Abu Mahjoob

Creative Productions, used with permission)

Title of the book being dropped is “Human Rights.” (Abu Mahjoob Creative Productions, July 2005, used with permission)

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Sahhaf, tried to assure viewers about the steadfastness of Iraqi troops and to dismiss any news about the advance of US-led coalition forces into Iraq.

During the war, the official Arab media began to cheer the Iraqi resistance, slowly at first and then with increased intensity, and to support Saddam and his right to defend his country against foreign aggression. Nonetheless, this did not mean that other voices supporting the invasion of Iraq had completely disappeared. Kuwaiti and Saudi media outlets supported the removal of Saddam and his corrupt regime. Two camps had obviously formed in the media—one group was in favor of the US-led invasion of Iraq and the other openly against it—and they were not confronting each other. Independent and influential media such as Al Quds Al Arabi and the Al Jazeera TV channel, for example, focused on demonstrating ruthless opposition to the war and offering total support to the regime in Iraq.

A few weeks following the start of the war, the media gradually seemed to be getting back to business as usual. Regular and satellite TV channels were constantly showing entertainment programs, contest shows, sports, and reality TV. News reports and analysis from the war in Iraq were given less prominence in several media outlets. This situation created a state of Arab collective unconsciousness and disinterest. Regular Arab viewers, who could not use research to get the relevant information, were forced to become passive viewers.

Arab media outlets published by opposition parties or groups had finally managed to rip away from the official orbit (although different from each other in their views). In general, this kind of media did not enjoy widespread popularity and distribution as it was often limited to small newspapers and a few Web sites on the Internet. Some opposition media declared its full support for

the Iraqi regime—blaming other Arab countries for the disgraceful lack of responsibility towards Iraq—and others were against the regime, the war, and the international system altogether.

During this period, the oil-coupons scandal suddenly surfaced in the media. Intelligence leaks showed that certain opposition writers, journalists, and influential opinion makers appeared on lists of people who were benefiting from a financial system established by Saddam Hussein. They were being bribed to support and polish the image of the Iraqi dictator, his regime, and his family and to adopt the official Iraqi position.

The general observation was that the official media had followed an unchanging policy during the war. Media published by the opposition had

been bouncing back and forth from one position to another, occasionally blaming the US and at times supporting the forceful removal of Saddam.

Al Qaeda and the War in Iraq

The Arab media—especially the opposition—received the news about a possible linkage between Al Qaeda and the Iraqi regime with great skepticism and suspicion.

The majority opinion in the Arab street was that the US Government claim linking Saddam Hussein with Osama bin Laden was absurd and a mere lie.

The overall rationale was the basic and irreconcilable difference in the ideologies of the two men. Bin Laden was a natural enemy of Hussein and vice versa.

Some newspapers went even further, accusing Arab leaders of allying themselves with the Americans and Israelis to allow the Mossad and other intelligence services to cook the story against the Arabs. For Arab public opinion, the whole story was an abstract conspiracy aiming to destroy what was left of Arab and Islamic pride.

The Fall of BaghdadNews about the capture of Baghdad,

on 9 April, was not a surprise to the public in Europe and the US It was, however, shocking and disturbing to

the Arab viewer. A day after the fall of Baghdad, media reporters and columnists were mostly perplexed, but most of them continued their support to the Iraqi regime, writing about the Iraqi military as if nothing had happened.

P u b l i c o p i n i o n w a s profoundly misled by the Iraqi regime’s slick propaganda. The ordinary Arab viewer in a country like Egypt had hoped that conquering Baghdad would not happen and many were sure that the notorious Iraqi Special Republican Guards would teach the US a lesson.

July 2003 cartoon used in some leading newspapers. (Abu Mahjoob Creative Productions, used with permission)

On the fourth anniversary of 9/11. (Abu Mahjoob Creative Productions, September 2005, used with permission)

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TV coverage of US soldiers toppling the big statue of Saddam in central Baghdad brought apparent feelings of shock, anger, and disappointment. Some, however, were pleased to see ordinary Iraqi people spontaneously spit and hit the symbol of ruthlessness and brutality. A few Arab newspapers accused the US Army of staging the scene. Arab journalists criticized western media of biased and unfair reporting by showing off a few Iraqis dancing with joy on television while millions of others were suffering and not allowed to complain.

After the fall of Baghdad, the collapse of the regime and its ability to resist, events were moving too fast for the Arab media to handle. Everything was moving at high speed, and news of the anarchy was more appealing to the average Arab reader than news about politics. Revenge killings were constant, and looting public property occurred for several days. All media outlets at that time were focused on the state of lawlessness in Iraq. Looking to the future of the country, some Arab writers urged the US and its allies to quickly restore law and order and hand over power to the Iraqi people. Their pleas were not heard and went in vain.

As news coverage started to catch up, the focus was on depicting the occupation forces as the only reason behind the chaos. Arab viewers were no longer in shock. To the contrary, it seemed that the public was amused.

The State of Anarchy in IraqIn the aftermath of the Iraqi regime

collapse, sporadic pockets of insurgency emerged. The general belief was that they were members of the former Iraqi police force, military and governmental figures left jobless following Paul Bremer’s decision to dismantle all Iraqi services, such as the army and police.

Arab media had been focusing on detailing the state of anarchy and the Iraqi living conditions with shattered infrastructure and lack of legal governmental services. Not surprisingly, the media blamed the coalition forces for not preserving minimum conditions of security and order. Official media in several Arab countries busily posted

articles that showed how miserable the situation could be under a foreign occupation. They used every oppor tuni ty to emphasize the belief that Iraqis were actually better off under their former ruler than the present chaos.

Independent media outlets based outside the Arab world were fiercely attacking US Government policy and defining the situation in Iraq as a major failure. It described President George W. Bush as a liar and a dishonest leader that had fooled his own people.

The Iraqi InsurgencyThe fall of Baghdad was like a slap

in the face for Arab public opinion. Generally most Arabs were hoping to see Iraq become an American graveyard, not because they liked Saddam or cared for the Iraqi people but rather they hated (or to some extent, envied) the US The insurgency that started to operate with sporadic acts of violence was the public’s last hope of humiliating the invaders. Consequently, the Arab media heavily invested in the opportunity.

Most independent Arab media gave moral support to the insurgency in Iraq and praised its deeds against American and coalition forces. At the same time, the official media took a cautious stand in its news reports. Knowing the jihadist Islamist background of the resistance, official Arab media described the events with consideration that these types of heroes were the same people being oppressed and persecuted at home. Slowly official media gave the insurgents a nationalistic dye and tried to justify their cause as resisting a foreign presence in their lands.

The Bombing of Al Jazeera TV Office in Baghdad

On 8 April 2003, the Al Jazeera TV office in Bagdad was hit by a US missile strike. This American military action was definitely a chance for Al Jazeera and all Arab media to get their voice heard around the world. Locally, even

the most skeptical Arab viewers began to express their support and reconsider their stand for the integrity of Al Jazeera and its insistence on providing evidence of conspiracy. The death of Tareq Ayub, the Baghdad bureau chief, provoked an angry reaction throughout the Arab world, even in those countries that considered Al Jazeera to be a disturbing media source operating with a hidden agenda.

It was difficult to find an Arab journalist that did not blame the US for the Tareq Ayub’s death. The bombing of Al Jazeera TV reinforced the public consensus that an American conspiracy to destroy Iraq was present.

The Capture of Saddam HusseinThe capture of Saddam on 14

December 2003 was a turning point for much of the Arab- speaking media. The event dashed any unfulfilled hopes of restoring Iraq to where it was before the fall of Saddam. News stories of an old, weak, and tired man getting out of a rat-like hole were humiliating. Many who had previously respected Saddam as a national hero turned their back on him and wished he had taken his own life rather than be caught in such a degrading manner.

Hardline supporters of Saddam claimed that Americans had faked the capture story to destroy his image as an idol to many youth. Others were giving his capture a religious meaning. They portrayed Saddam in the hole as the Prophet Muhammad hiding in a cave to escape the hunt of the infidels. Another story was Saddam getting out of the hole

Car bombings confront Iraqi police and Coalition forces in Baghdad. (US Army)

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with the Holy Quran in his right hand. Apart from these immediate reactions to his capture, however, long-term consequences changed the public attitude positively towards the jailed tyrant.

The Trial of Saddam HusseinDid the Arab media turn Saddam

into a hero? Why did he insist on holding the Quran in the courtroom when he never had time to read it? What did his dress attire—Turkish wool suit or the blue caftan (dishdasha)—mean? How did the media react to his behavior?

No one in the Arab media tried to uncover the truth behind Saddam’s feverish struggle to associate his image with Islamic heroism. That became clear in the attempts of some Iraqi Islamists to portray him as an Islamic rebel; as previously stated, they even compared him to the Prophet of Islam. Somehow Saddam seemed to be aware, examples being his insistence on holding a large-size Quran during the trial and his attentive insertion of holy verses into his rhetoric.

In the course of his trial in December 2005, Saddam—trying to blow off his critics—wrongly quoted verses from the Quran, which could have hurt the image he was trying to convey as a devout Muslim. He sounded like someone who knew little about Islam. The situation became worse when his former vice president tried to correct his mistake by making yet another. If President George W. Bush had made such a mistake, the

story would have made the front page. As it turned out, no trace of Saddam´s snafu was in the Arab media except on a forum—hosted Web site for Arab infidels, who used it as a laughing matter. Most of the Arab media reported on the trial without much hype. Few stressed issues that favored Saddam.

Only the Iraqi media took these matters seriously and expressed strong opinions about the trial. The Iraqi media was also harsh on the first judge, Rizgar Ali, who was accused of being soft on Saddam and other defendants. Saddam and the other accused with him were obviously using every opportunity to either pretend to be the victims of a world-wide conspiracy and portray themselves as historic heroes of Iraq or to simply complain about the treatment and harassment they claimed to be receiving from their American prison guards.

The Arab media was divided into several groups, none of which managed to take a clear position about the trial. The primary reason was that Arabs had mixed feelings towards the deposed Iraqi dictator. Saddam was not a national hero and even those who were striving to show him in a positive light could not ignore his hideous deeds.

The Abu Ghraib Prison Scandal

Nothing has hurt the American image in the Arab public opinion more than the pictures of torture in the Abu Ghraib prison. The Arab media gave widespread coverage of the news

with pictures. Some newspapers continued their coverage of this prison scandal for weeks after the facts were released to the public. Al Jazeera TV inserted the images into the banner of one of its most seen programs.

The Elections in Iraq

The Arab public did not understand the elections in Iraq and seemed disinterested i n t h e A m e r i c a n

celebration for holding them. Even those that did understand the value of freely choosing government leadership were skeptical about elections held under occupation of a foreign power. The few that believed in American democracy were elated to see the elections occur and succeed despite the challenges. Apart from the Iraqi media, the Arab media gave little focus to public opinion.

Media Manipulation and the Use of Propaganda

In its 4 October 2003 edition, the London newspaper Al Quds Al Arabi related the story of the fall of Baghdad. The editor of the cover page chose a photo that emphasized the nature of the military operation in Iraq as an American occupation of a free country. The Saddam-affiliated newspaper found photos of the broken statues insulting, and another photo with both the American and Iraqi flags on the face of Saddam’s statue was deemed to display unnecessary signs of jubilation.

A common method of manipulating a news-report reaction, while at the same time appearing to be objective, is to restructure a news piece. In the story of the Al Hurrah TV journalist killed along with his son, Al Quds Al Arabi told exactly what most media around the world reported with a few differences in the structure. The reader was not told that the journalist’s son was also killed until the third paragraph, whereas in most other newspapers, it was already mentioned in the title or at least in the first paragraph.

Another form of manipulation was the deliberate attempt to emphasize some secondary facts and ignore others in reporting the news. This type of manipulation avoids facts that have certain implications on the behavior of the reader—for example, facts that may cause him or her to be critical of the message that the newspaper is trying to communicate. In the Al Quds Al Arabi example, readers did not know what other Iraqi news media reported—that is, that the victim was on his way to attending the Friday prayer and that

America´s Statue of Liberty torturing Iraqi victims, May 2004. (Abu Mahjoob Creative Productions,

used with permission)

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his son was also shot down because he screamed. The newspaper emphasized the fact that the Al Hurrah news channel was funded by the US; this statement was made three times (and one was in the heading paragraph).

Dismissal of Opponents by Linking Them to Icons

The media uses the hatred that many Arabs feel towards the US to discredit opposition arguments. If someone observed something positive about the US, he or she would be linked to the CIA and treated as a paid agent for the American propaganda machine. In the best case, that person would be described as a fool because he was unable to properly read history.

Conclusions

The battle for the hearts and minds of Arab public opinion is a long and arduous undertaking. The synopsis of how the Arab media covers the US intervention in Iraq tells us that a lot needs to be done to win the information battle. The path is fraught with three main obstacles:

a. The fragmented Arab media is a reflection of the regimes and societies from which it emerges. Arab journalists have been striving for honest reporting, but have been unsuccessful given the pervasive control of undemocratic regimes. Those Arab media outlets that opted to move to Europe have been somewhat successful, but remain hostage to their funding sources.

b. The political situation in the Middle East colors the way events are reported. The conflict between Palestinians and Israelis, the war in Iraq, and the summer 2006 war in Lebanon are all events to be considered when attempting to formulate a successful strategy for communication.

c. The US Government and the Bush administration face a daunting task of influencing Arab public opinion; the two US-funded media outlets that were given this task failed. Both Al Hurra TV and Radio Sawa have had a marginal impact on Arab public opinion despite the fact that Arab journalists were hired to manage them.

Barring a major international effort that includes participation by

the United Nations and the European Union to develop lasting solutions to the festering crises of the Middle East—Iraq, Palestine, Lebanon—the Middle East media will mirror cultures that are more involved in a deadly clash than a peaceful embrace. Meanwhile the effort must be made to create opportunities for the US to improve its image within Arab public opinion. A Middle East information task force with membership from academics, journalists, anthropologists, and the US military is needed to develop policy and procedures for improving the image of America. In this regard, information experts of the Special Operations community have much to contribute to a reinvigorated information strategy by virtue of their experience in recent years in two major theaters.

Note1 Shaheen, Jack G. The TV Arab (Bowling Green, Ohio: Bowling Green State University Popular Press, October 1984).

[The author would like to thank Maged Hassanain for his research assistance.]

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than the sidelobes, we generally assume the target is in the same direction the mainlobe is pointed. The direction of the main beam is also referred to as the Line-of-Sight (LOS) and in Figure 1, this angle is denoted by µ. Distance to target can be obtained by measuring the difference between the time of signal transmission and the time of reception of the reflected signal. The range rate can be determined by the Doppler shift of the reflected signal, and we can estimate the angular rate from a sequence of angular measurements (shifts in the direction of the centroid of the mainlobe) of the target. The end result is a measurement of the position and velocity of vehicles within the radar’s detection range.[2] The size of this detection range is influenced by radar power limitations, antenna gain, electronic noise and environmental factors. Since the radar is able to point the mainlobe in any direction, we abstract the shape of this region as a circle with the radius of the circle given by the burn-through radius (RB), so noted because the target burns through the noise clutter at that range. This is also referred to as the radar’s “threat circle.”

Radars are also capable of receiving energy through their sidelobes. However, this effect is undesirable from the radar’s point of view. Since the both majority of the EM and largest gain for the returned signal are through the mainlobe, energy received through a sidelobe can cause the radar to indicate an errant or incorrect angle to the target. In order to minimize this effect, many radars can “notch out,” or cancel their sidelobes. Today’s integrated radar systems are complex networked entities that communicate with other radar units to correlate information, and with missile systems to engage and destroy perceived threats. Various types of radar with tailored characteristics typically make up a defense network

Editorial Abstract: Dr. Mears explores electronic attack of integrated air defenses using multiple unmanned air vehicles acting in a coordinated fashion. He begins with an electronic warfare primer, and threat environment outline, then describes the utility of EA against networked radar sites, and offers approaches to solving command and control challenges.

Cooperative Electronic Attack UsingUnmanned Air Vehicles

By Dr. Mark J. Mears

(Editor’s note: In an era seemingly dominated by influence operations, we never forget that Electronic Warfare is doctrinally and historically a large part of Information Operations. This article illustrates the ongoing importance of EW research and subsequent real world applications.)

IntroductionIn the evolution of warfare, we’ve developed a number

of skills, arts, and sciences. As a method is developed for attacking and effectively exploit enemy weaknesses, they create an associated method of defense to make our attack less effective. Electronic Attack (EA) is a counter-counter-measure to reduce the effectiveness of radar systems, allowing aircraft to fly unharmed among radars and associated missiles. This is done by either distracting the radar with confusing or deceptive information, or by blinding the radar—making it unable to detect, track, engage, or destroy threats. In the past, we’ve often achieved EA by flying specially designed EW aircraft between a radar site and the shielded strike- configured aircraft. In these cases, the radar may able to determine the direction to the jamming aircraft, but is denied range information and any information about the strike aircraft. The type of EA activity that is the focus of this paper is referred to as non-destructive Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD).[1]

In this article, our primary interest is how the EA requirements are part of greater cooperative control requirements. These new considerations are based on coordinated use of multiple unmanned air vehicles (UAVs) for EW. Whereas conventional EA is most often done using a single aircraft working together with one or two other aircraft being hidden from the view of a radar site, here are discussing UAVs working together with each other and groups of protected aircraft. The use of UAVs for any task presents a number of technical challenges, and EA is no exception.

The Threat: Radar & IADS

Radar systems operate on the basic principle of sending out radio frequency (RF) electromagnetic radiation (EM) and then “listening” for the reflected signal from distant targets. A radar’s radio signal footprint often has a lobe structure with a large “main beam” or “mainlobe,” and many smaller gain directions called “sidelobes,” as shown in figure 1. During normal operation the gain of the mainlobe is so much larger

Future electronic attacker? (Defense Link)

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with a hierarchy that includes early warning, tracking, and terminal guidance radars. The units are geographically placed to defend key assets, and overlap to prevent gaps in coverage. Use of mobile radars that light-up only when prompted by other radars in the network create uncertainty for attackers. Also, we must assume we’ll face layers of different radars with communication linkage and geographic coverage to minimize the likelihood an adversary will be able to penetrate defense and escape unharmed.

Each radar unit will also have modes such as lobe structure adjustment, mono-pulse operation, frequency alteration, pulse-repetition-frequency changes, pulse-to-pulse agility, multi-static operation and signal gating to allow precision information gathering.[2] These are only a few of the tools that can be used to prevent adversaries from avoiding detection and destruction. Thus, robustness to counter counter-counter measures is vitally important for our EA methods to be useful. It would certainly be unwise to invest heavily in ”point solutions” that could be easily foiled by simple modifications. While Integrated Air Defense Systems (IADS) offer a number of great topics to explore, we will address only those radar feature considerations needed for coordinated UAV EA.

Electronic Warfare

EW is the use of electromagnetic radiation (EM) to control the EM spectrum, or directed energy to attack an enemy.[3] We further divide it into three main components. Electronic Protection involves passive and active means for preventing adverse impact of EM on combat capability. Electronic Warfare Support (ES) is the subdivision of EW that deals with actions to gather information about sources of adverse EM activity. Electronic Attack (EA) deals with use of EM, directed energy, or anti-radiation missiles to adversely affect enemy combat capability.

EA can also be put in the context of Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD), and can be either destructive

or disruptive. In military doctrine, destructive SEAD means permanent target destruction. Alternately, disruptive SEAD means temporarily neutralizing radars, thus EA of an IADS can be considered part of it. We can break down SEAD into the following: 1) suppression over a large area, 2) ”localized” suppression of small areas for time intervals, and 3) suppression against targets of opportunity. UAVs have considerable potential to contribute toward all three tasks. Given a large enough UAV fleet, we could persistently cover large areas, and small teams could suppress EM in localized areas for specified times, thereby opening corridors for operations. By leaving teams of UAVs in our areas of interest, our forces could also suppress Time Sensitive Targets (TST).

Electronic means for countering radars, generally referred to as Electronic Countermeasures (ECM), fall into six general categories: 1) use of chaff, 2) gate stealing, 3) angle deception, 4) use of decoys, 5) noise jamming and 6) false target generation. Varied as these radar countermeasures are, cooperative control of UAVs can contribute to EA effectiveness in each category. Chaff effectively increases noise in the radar return signal, and can be used to screen (hide) areas, or in end-game maneuvers in conjunction with evasive maneuvers, to break a missiles seeker’s lock.

Chaff is a simple means of ECM, but can be particularly effective in conjunction with other methods. A second method, called Gate Stealing, gradually dominates the true return signal with an artificial signal. In order to maintain good signal to noise ratio of an observed target, radars gate a target’s range, speed, or both. Once the radar acquires a strong signal, the operator lowers the gain, and the artificial signal is free to manipulate the radar’s perception independent of the activities of the real aircraft.

Another method of dealing with radars is for aircraft to cause a radar to see their image at angles different from the actual Line-of-Sight. This can be implemented by bouncing EM signals from the terrain to the radar, or by altering the shape of the wave front through phase adjustment of EM sent from different places on the aircraft. These methods are referred to as Angle Deception.

We must also examine use of decoys—devices that distract radar by drawing their attention. These can be expendable entities which serve their purpose with no plan for recovery, or towed devices reeled out behind the aircraft to act as false targets—and recovered afterwards. As expendable decoys get more complex, the line between decoy, munition and generic UAV is becoming blurred. However, increased emphasis on mobile radars suggests a primary role will be exposing hidden radar sights, which give away their position by actively responding to the decoys.

Of course, radar counter measures work best when part of a coordinated effort. The characteristics of each ECM type leads to preplanned methods of use. However, in the context of cooperative control, where we’re concerned with UAV positioning and movement planning, two ECM methods are of most interest. Noise Jamming is an ECM method where EM energy is transmitted to a radar in order to raise the noise

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level and make it harder for the radar to extract the signal. This is not covert, since the enemy is immediately aware of a threat. Although the radar will know the signals’ Angle of Arrival (AoA), it won’t have range or range rate, and therefore will lack fire control information. The need to manage power over both time and frequency ranges results in different types of noise jamming, including: barrage, spot and bin masking. We can categorize jamming according the relative location of the jamming vehicle, the vehicle being shielded, and the radar—thus defining Stand-in and Stand-off jamming [4]. Stand-in jamming of radar implies the jammer is between the shielded vehicle and the radar, whereas Stand-off jamming means the shielded vehicle is closer to the radar than the jammer. Jamming can also be either Escort, where a special jamming aircraft fly with aircraft that are to be shielded, or Self-protection, where an aircraft is able to supply its own jamming support [4]. The effect of jamming can be seen in Figure 2.

Since the radar energy spreads over an increasingly large area as it travels out to a target, the energy that reaches a target is inversely proportional to square of the range. This same phenomenon is at work for the energy reflected from the target back to the radar. Thus, the energy reflected back to a radar is inversely proportional to range to the fourth power, defined here by R4.

Figure 2 shows a return signal from a target which is inversely proportional to 1R4. Also note the two noise levels: the lower level represents the noise inherent in a radar output (due to electrical sources and environmental clutter); the high level represents noise level output by a radar when jamming is being used. Where the target signal rises above the nominal noise at a range of about 1.8 units, the target would be able to approach the radar to about 1.25 units before being detected, if jammed. One reason jamming can be effective is that the jamming vehicle has a mathematical advantage that is proportional to the square of the range. From Figure 3 we can see how detection range is affected by radar proximity with the jammer and target. Again, the effect of jamming is to reduce the burn-through radius of the radar.

If we must fly a strike aircraft near a radar site to hit targets, we’ll often want to use a jamming aircraft to jam the radar, as shown in Figure 4. Here we see the radar site as a dot inside concentric rings, and the strike vehicle path as the line from the start to the destination. The outermost ring designates the nominal (un-jammed) radar detection radius. The innermost circle represents the minimum radius the strike aircraft requires. The dotted ring will vary in size and indicates that jamming requirements are functions of strike aircraft location, and thus time. Therefore, the jamming requirements are a time dependent EM power allocation problem for the jammers.

False Target Generation amounts to sending signals to the radar that would be expected if targets were in predefined locations. For an aircraft to make a radar see multiple targets at ranges beyond the its own position, it simply sends delayed signals back to the radar using transponders or repeaters, which send back the type of signal the radar expects. To

insure this, devices called Digital Radio Frequency Memory (DRFM) record a digital representation of the signal, to insure maximum fidelity of the signals transmitted back to the radar. If the aircraft anticipates a certain signal structure, we can send another signal in advance of the incoming radar illumination, causing the radar to see targets at closer range than that of the actual aircraft. However, since many of today’s radar systems are pulse-to-pulse agile, they are able to change their pulse characteristics, preventing one from confidently anticipating pulse structure. In this case, the jamming aircraft would need to be closer to the radar than the false targets being created. To be believable to an enemy, the range of the false target would need to be within the burn-through-radius of the radar, which in turn requires the jamming aircraft to be within this range—thus vulnerable to threats.

It is also possible to make radars see targets at angles different from the line-of-sight to the jamming aircraft. To achieve this, the jamming aircraft sends EM into a sidelobe of the radar. Since the radar assumes reflected energy is returning through its main beam, the angle to the perceived target is different than the line from the radar to the jamming aircraft. To use this angle deception, the jamming aircraft locate of the main beam so that energy can be consistently sent into the same sidelobe. Given the side lobe’s lower gain, the jamming aircraft must be able to supply enough energy to overcome the attenuation.

The issue of sidelobe jamming requires the jamming aircraft to know its LOS with respect to the radars’ mainbeam and lobe structure to maintain an angular orientation that will fool the radar. It also requires the jamming aircraft to maintain a distance from the radar that allow sufficient EM energy to enter the radar receiver. Thus, in the context of control, we have a path planning problem. Our ability to generate false targets at ranges beyond the range of the jamming aircraft—and within the main beam and sidelobes of the radar—can produce a large number of false targets to confuse a radar system.

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The cooperative nature of this part of the control problem, is that of correlating the false target information sent to one radar by one jamming aircraft, with information sent by other jamming aircraft to different radar systems, all of which overlap the same area. If we ignore this, an IADS radar system could discard the track, because it provides inconsistent information.

Cooperative Control Of UAVs Cooperative control of UAVs is an active area of research,

resulting in a variety of applications, problem formulations and algorithms. McLain and Beard address a cooperative rendezvous problem where multiple UAVs attempt to minimize accumulated exposure to radars, while attempting to rendezvous at a specified location at the same time.[5] Their approach relied on path refinement to generate flyable paths, and path deviations were added to consume slack time and make vehicles arrive simultaneously. Notably, biologically inspired research from “swarm” behaviors led to stability

theorems and path planning algorithms applicable to UAVs.[8] Stochastic Dynamic Programming has been used to produce paths for cooperative search using UAVs.[9] The challenge is the cooperative control areas become formulations of a constrained optimization problem, where one is attempting to derive algorithms that minimize time, fuel, threat exposure, or to maximize the performance, duration, and coverage.

Although the research mentioned above has no direct link to EA, they show a similar optimization problem. Our motivation is to consider technology that could, with considerable additional development, be used on existing and future UAVs. More specifically, we can apply existing algorithms and develop new ones for generic, highly abstracted scenarios involving teams of unmanned Electronic Combat Air Vehicles (ECAVs) acting against radar system networks.

UAV Role In EAUse of multiple unmanned air vehicles (UAVs) to deceive

radar systems is a relatively new area of study within the broader context of cooperative control and cooperative path planning. Use of small UAVs (tens to hundreds of pounds gross weight), military funding of larger UAV platforms, and potential use of unmanned decoy platforms to deliver EM has spurred interest in how we might use multiple vehicles for EA. With greater capabilities for autonomous operation emerging, cooperative and coordinated actions of groups of UAVs could have a synergistic effect.

Since UAVs can be smaller and have reduced safety considerations, they have the potential to change the complexion of the EA. Smaller sizes can not only make UAVs more stealthy and less vulnerable to enemy weapons, they can be considerably cheaper alternatives to manned aircraft.

There are a number of tactics for performing EA using EW aircraft acting independently or “loosely coupled.” However, we could broaden the variety of EA entities to include UAVs acting with one another, as well as within a larger framework. Since UAVs are cheaper, they may present a low cost part of EA within a ”system of systems” approach. Teams of UAV stand-in jammers in close proximity to radars could be very effective, if they are able to coordinate their activities and positions with one another and with other EA systems. But to make UAV teams a good solution, all associated costs must be kept low. Alternately, a drawback to smaller EA assets with low unit costs is that each unit will also have less capability. The amount of EM power produced by each vehicle, the frequency options, and the ability to direct EM will likely be much less than conventional manned platforms. However, due to the quadratic benefit of range, UAV jamming may be of greater importance.

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB) provides information regarding location of enemy assets [10] such as radar sites, however, we must assume mobile radars will pop-up without warning during a SEAD mission. The likelihood and number of these types of events would also be provided with the enemy assessment part of the IPB. Mobile sites are

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generally triggered when prompted by other radars. Part of the UAV’s utility is using them as decoys—without placing people in harm’s way—causing an adversaries to turn on their radars, thus giving away their locations.

Choreographed into an EA plan, UAVs would help obtain accurate information, and provide additional degrees of freedom for SEAD planners. However the larger solution space, without guidance for optimal use, could be no benefit or simply add to the “fog of war.” Therefore, we require tools not just for UAV use, but for all EA system layers. Because solution to the greater EA problem involves many assets, the ensuing optimization problem would likely be too unwieldy to attack in its entirety. We would need a set of integrated algorithms and heuristics to address this.

Key AreasWithin non-destructive, non-lethal SEAD there are two

basic approaches: deception (sometimes called technique jamming); and EM (as noise seen by the radar) jamming. UAVs could provide a means for achieving many EA goals, however algorithmic solutions would need to be incorporated that are capable of working within the computational limits imposed by a UAV.

Both of the SEAD methods above assume we know radar locations and characteristics, but unknown or mobile radars will almost always complicate the EA problem. However, UAVs could play an information gathering role looking for unknown radars, plus we could take advantage having additional UAVs in the battlespace. By cooperatively positioning UAV orbits and fusing observations, we minimize the ellipse of error probability. Multiple vehicles provide improved threat direction information, and UAV decoys could be used to distract radars or cause unknown enemy EM assets to switch on and reveal their locations.

As we go on to describe other deception and noise jamming problem possibilities, it is important to note these discussions may or may not have immediate operational relevance. There may be better uses for assets positioned reasonably close to the enemy. However, these formulations provide a means for defining cooperative control problems which are pervasive for use of UAVs in EA.

DeceptionFor the deception, we consider two different problem

formulations where Electronic Combat Air Vehicles (ECAVs) are used create Phantom tracks (radar target trajectories which do not really exist). In figure 5 we see four ECAVs using time delay of the return radio frequency signal, to deceive four radar sites into believing that a Phantom aircraft exists beyond the ECAVs. We’ll assume the ECAVs are stealthy (unseen by the radar), are able to direct a return signal to one of the radars that will not affect the other three radars, and the radars are assumed to correlate their information. The trajectory (track) of the Phantom is shown as a continuous path, and the control problem is one of ECAV path planning where the geometry largely dictates the ECAV trajectories, i.e. the ECAVs are required to remain on the LOS between one radar and the Phantom. Two points on the Phantom path are noted at times t(1) and n steps later at t(n + 1) to illustrate how the geometry influences the ECAV paths. As long as we use realistic velocity limits and vehicle dynamics, the ECAVs are free to position themselves on the LOS like beads on a string. This model abstracts the radar electronics, leaving a tightly coupled path planning problem.

The geometry of one UAV and one radar with respect to a reference azimuth is shown in Figure 6. The trigonometric relationships show the Phantom and ECAV angular rate and range rate in terms of velocity vectors. From the geometry of this figure, one can show that the radar can be induced to see a desired Phantom velocity vector by an infinite number of ECAV velocity vectors. If one assumes a constant ECAV speed, then the a desired Phantom velocity vector results in a uniquely determined angle, µE. If we put constraints on the ECAV turn rate and velocity, there will be annular regions

Contemplating a sky full of UAVs. (US Marine Corps)

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where the Phantom could fly within a defined time step. In the first of the two approaches defined here, we desire an optimal combination of Phantom and ECAV trajectories, while in the second approach, we wish to find a feasible solution. In both cases we assume that the necessary information is communicated without error or delay.

However, for the feasible solution approach, the information needed is considerably less than that required for the optimal approach. Both approaches assume that velocity constraints exist for both the ECAVs and Phantom, and that the dynamics of the ECAVs impose turn rate restrictions. Both sets also assume the ECAVs start at locations that give them a coherent Phantom track, i.e. one that is correlated for each radar, and that the ECAVs delay the radar signal by the proper amount of time to place the Phantom at the correct range. This leads us to our optimal approach: a path planning control algorithm which has each ECAV maintain a path on its own radar-Phantom LOS, with the smallest possible cost. Again, this currently neglects issues relating to communication of information between ECAVs. Thus, each ECAV operates in a decentralized, but redundant fashion, using global information.

To provide an optimal solution to the deception problem, we define a cost function that includes terms that penalize undesirable characteristics of both the Phantom track and the ECAV tracks. In qualitative terms, this approach allows the ECAVs to negotiate a solution which produces believable Phantom tracks, is able to do so for a long period of time, and does not make excessive demands on the ECAV dynamics. To obtain the results described here, a receding horizon approach was taken where an optimal set of ECAV paths was computed for a prediction horizon of predefined length, and then flown for a fraction of that time (the control horizon).

To understand the rationale behind the cost function used let us first consider the geometry shown in figure 7. This figure shows three radars, the Phantom, and three ECAVs on the radar-Phantom LOS. We want the radars be deceived into thinking the Phantom flies through the waypoint on its way to the endpoint. Because constraints can sometimes make it costly

to exactly follow prescribed paths or hit waypoints precisely, we define a broader waypoint region. From a modeling standpoint, this is more acceptable than constraint violation or extremely high costs [11].

So what is the most feasible approach? How do we determine what could be done if our planners are willing to settle for solutions which are feasible, but not necessarily optimal? [12]. Such an approach would require less inter-UAV communication, which might be better in some operational contexts. The objective of a feasible solution is to create the same type of coherent Phantom track described for the optimal approach above and depicted in Figure 5, however only feasibility with respect to dynamic and velocity constraints are considered. As seen in Figure 6, given the present position of the Phantom, the present position and orientation of an ECAV, a maximum and minimum velocity magnitude and direction of the ECAV, and using the relationship shown in equation 2, one can calculate an annular region where the Phantom could feasibly be positioned within a given time step. In order to move a Phantom from an initial position to a waypoint or final destination, each ECAV communicates four numbers (minimum and maximum ECAV angle and velocity) with each other ECAV. Each ECAV then uses this information to calculate the intersection of the annular regions. By choosing the direction closest to the direct path to the waypoint (or destination), the Phantom moves in the desired direction.

Such a solution degenerates to a straight line path from start to finish if such a Phantom path is feasible for all the ECAVs. Figure 8 shows results of a simulation where four ECAVs are deceiving four radars into seeing a Phantom track moving from a starting point to a final destination. In Figure 8, the Phantom track and ECAV trajectories are shown and dotted lines are shown as LOS between the radar and Phantom for the start and final points of the track. For the first segment of the simulation,

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the Phantom trajectory is a sequence of small line segments forming an arc. However, once the ECAVs reach positions and orientations that allows them to induce a straight line Phantom trajectory to the destination, the Phantom trajectory becomes a straight line. Details of this work can be found in [12].

ConclusionThis has been a brief background and operational context

for applying UAVs to the Electronic Attack problem, describing just a few of the technical challenges involved. We have explored cooperative control of UAV groups or “swarms” within the context of some abstract EA scenarios, but more modeling and testing are vital. Relevant issues not addressed include imperfect communications—where only local information or corrupted information is available for decisions—or for planning and control. Again, UAVs for EA will most often be part of a larger EA framework using multiple vehicles. However, a complete EA solution hierarchy utilizing many types of vehicles will make for a large optimization problem, requiring decomposition into a number of smaller problems. Finally, there is a plethora of research and development in the area of radar electronics which is very important for a comprehensive treatment of EA. The scenarios here are not meant to be of immediate operational significance, but to illustrate salient features. Cooperative control of UAVs for Electronic Attack offers plenty of potential.

References[1] JTTP for Joint Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses, July 1995, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel

[2] G. Stimson, Introduction to Airborne radar. Scitech, 1998.[3] Joint Doctrine For Electronic Warfare, April 2000,http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel[4] J. A. Tirpack, “The New Way Of Electron War,” Air Force Magazine, December 2004.[5] T. McLain, “Cooperative Rendezvous Of Multiple Unmanned Air Vehicles,” AIAA Guidance, Navigation, and Control Conference, August 2000.[6] K. Nygard, P. Chandler, and M. Pachter, “Dynamic Network Flow Optimization Models For Air Vehicle Resource Allocation,” Proceedings of the Automatic Control Conference, June 2001.[7] C. Schumacher, P. R. Chandler, and S. R. Rasmussen, “Task Allocation for Wide Area Search Munitions Via Iterative Network Flow,” Proceedings of the American Control Conference, pp. 1917–1922,2002.[8] V. Gazi and K. M. Passino, “Stability Analysis of Swarms in an Environment With an Attractant/Repellent Profile,” Proceedings of the American Control Conference, pp. 1819–1824, 2002.[9] M. Flint, M. Polycarpou, and E. Fernandez-Gaucheand, “Cooperative Control For Multiple Autonomous UAVs Searching For Targets,” Conference on Decision and Control, pp. 2823–2828, 2002.[10] L. C. M. T. Satterly, L. C. D. Stubbs, M. G. D. Gilbert, M. C. L. Iler, and C. K. B. Glen, “Intelligence Preparation of The Battlespace - An Airman’s Introduction,” Air and Space Power Chronicles - Chronicles Online Journal, July 1999.[11] M. J. Mears and M. R. Akella, “Deception of Radar Systems Using Cooperatively Controlled Unmanned Air Vehicles,” International Conference on Networking, Sensing and Control, March 2005.[12] D. Maithripala and S. Jayasuriya, “Radar Deception Through Phantom Track Generation,” Proceedings of the American Control Conference, June 2005.

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The information environment did not suddenly appear during the late 20th century. It began with human existence and

slowly evolved over time with the advance of civilization. Correspondingly, throughout history, military commanders have used the information environment in limited ways (e.g., propaganda and deception) to support their military objectives. Today, with the proliferation of mass communications, the Internet, and other information networks, the information environment is now on par with the air, land, sea, and space as militarily significant dimensions of the battlespace.

The growth of the information environment and its subsequent use for military purposes is analogous to the growth of airpower. Even though air, as a dimension of the battlespace, always existed as an operating environment, it was not until the development of warplanes that military forces could conduct prolonged operations to attack military forces from the air. Today, a similar situation exists with the information environment. Modern armies can now conduct sustained military operations in, and from, the information environment.

The US military recognizes the information environment as a critical part of the battlespace. Joint doctrine now includes a brief description of the information environment and its relationship to information operations (IO) and other military operations. Yet, if our forces are to effectively conduct sustained operations in the information environment, then we must find a way to see the information environment as clearly as we see the rest of the battlespace.

What is the Information Environment?

The information environment is a man-made construct based on the idea that the existence and proliferation of information and information systems has created a new operating environment. This environment can be used by organizations, civilian or military, to gain an advantage over their opponents. As such, the information environment can be used by military forces to further their objectives.

Joint Publication 3-13, Information Operations, presents a useful model for the information environment. The model consists of three interrelated dimensions; the physical, informational, and cognitive (Figure 1):

• The physical dimension is that part of the information environment which coexists with the physical environments of air, land, sea, and space. It is where information and

communication systems and networks reside, whether they are either technology or human-based.

• The cognitive dimension is the individual and collective consciousness that exists in the minds of human beings. It is where perceptions are formed, and more importantly, where decisions are made.

• The informational dimension is an abstract, non-physical space created by the interaction of the physical and cognitive domains. As such, it links the reality of the physical dimension to the human consciousness of the cognitive dimension. It is the means through which individuals and organizations communicate.

When taken together, the three dimensions explain how the creation and movement of information can create real world effects. At a more practical level, analysis of the three dimensions can explain the character of the information environment in any specific operational area and its impact on military operations.

The Informational Dimension

Of the information environment’s three dimensions, the informational dimension is of greatest interest to the practitioners of IO. It is where information exists and therefore is the key to using information as a military capability. The informational dimension is also the least understood part of the information environment.

Editorial Abstract: While everyone from Joint Publication 3-13 to the soldier on patrol uses the expression “information environment,” Mr. Romanych tackles the content and boundaries of this complex entity. He describes how planners and analysts can apply models for characterizing, and then exploiting the newly-mapped realm.

A Look at the Information EnvironmentBy Marc J. Romanych

Figure 1. (Joint Pub 3-13)

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Without explaining the theoretical nature of information and the information environment, suffice it to say that information moves in and through every operational area. The content and flow of this information creates tangible, real-world effects by converting real (physical) world activities and events into human perceptions. In turn, these perceptions reinforce or alter individual and organizational behavior. Therefore, changes to human behavior result from information content and flow. However, while the impact of the information environment (i.e., changes to human perceptions and behavior) are readily apparent, the primary cause, information flow, is largely unobservable.

Unfortunately, we cannot see the informational dimension the same way we see the physical dimensions of the battlespace. This is because information is abstract and its movement from one place to another is often invisible. If we had the means to see information, it might look like mist moving through the operational area. The mist (information) would appear denser in some places (i.e., urban areas) than in others (i.e., rural areas) in correlation to the concentration of human activity. Also, the mist would continually shift in a complex ebb and flow pattern, reflecting the exchange of information within the populace. Of course, we do not have the means to see information in this manner. Yet, we do require a way to conceptualize information flow and content in physical terms.

Information Flow and Content

It is important to recognize that the information environment exists everywhere in the world and that every operational area has information moving in and through it. Even in remote regions, information flows within the populace and information networks in sufficient quantity to impact military operations.

In more developed regions, the complexity of information content and flow increases in proportion to the development of the information infrastructure and the density of the populace. This is because information is created by, and flows between, humans. In general, with increased information flow, there is greater information content and a corresponding decrease in the ability of military forces to affect the information environment. At some point, from a military perspective, the information environment becomes saturated, meaning that there is so much competing information that military forces have difficulty affecting the information environment. Typically, large, modern cities with their multiple TV, radio, and print medium outlets are saturated information environments.

The movement of information through an operational area is often uneven. This is because information moves at different rates depending on the context and means of transmission. Thus, to estimate the impact of information flow on military operations, IO staffs must chart and track information movement within the operational area. Determining information flow requires knowledge of the sources of information, the means of transmission (both human and technological), and the pathways by which the information moves.

The content of information is also varies within an operational area. Information content is a function of its relevance or importance to the needs of the various population groups and organizations present in the operational area. For example, people located in an area devastated by natural disaster desire information concerning humanitarian assistance, while the populace in an insurgent infested area is primarily interested in information related to security.

The challenge for IO staffs is to determine what information in their operational area is important to the mission. Then, they must identify and track its primary themes and movement in a manner similar to how the rest of the staff observes and monitors the activities of enemy forces and third party entities.

Variations within the Information Environment

Like the rest of the battlespace, the character of the

information environment also changes by level of war, mission, and operating area. Therefore, different levels of command (e.g., brigade, division, corps, army, etc.) can face different features of the information environment even though they operate in the same physical area.

At the tactical level, information flow is primarily by line of sight means such as direct observation, short-range communications systems, and observable means such as graffiti and banners. What people see of their physical surroundings is critical to their situational awareness, perceptions, and behavior. The scope of information content is focused on matters of immediate concern in the operating area. The impact of information flow is often immediate or near real-time (i.e., minutes or hours).

At the operational level, the influence of physical features on the information environment diminishes. Information easily moves over the horizon by long-range and satellite information systems. Geography remains a consideration in that it affects the location of information systems and the populace that use

IO officer explores variations in information flow. (US Army)

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those systems. In terms of scope, information content is much broader than at the tactical level. However, the rate of change of information content and the speed of information flow are slower. The impact of information is also slowed, perhaps taking days or weeks to manifest itself.

The strategic information environment is the realm of abstract ideas, ideologies, and philosophies. As such, it is almost completely removed from the physical world. Geography has little to no impact. Information flow is via mass communications systems, such as satellite media and the Internet. Impacts generated by information content and flow are measured in terms of months and years.

The assigned mission (i.e., combat, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, etc.) determines a military force’s relationship to its information environment. It also establishes the relative importance of the information environment’s specific characteristics to the conduct of operations. For example, in Afghanistan—a counterinsurgency mission—tribal structures and sympathies are the information environment’s most important features. During the invasion of Iraq—a combat mission—the civilian infrastructure was the primary feature that influenced information content and flow. In the Balkans —a peacekeeping mission—it was the media.

The information environment is not static; it is constantly evolving. Because of physical and cognitive features change with time, the relative importance of the three dimensions, fluctuate within and between operational areas. For example, the physical and cognitive features of urban areas are different than those of rural areas. The only way to make sense of the information environment’s changing character and the content and flow of information in the operational area is to map the information environment.

Mapping the Information EnvironmentThe importance of mapping the information environment

to aid our understanding of its impact on military operations cannot be overstated. Imagine conducting a military operation without a map. Lacking a representation of the operational area, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to describe the location and movement of forces in any detail or precision. The same holds true for information operations. Not knowing the characteristics of the information environment or its potential impact on military operations risks the misemployment of IO capabilities.

Like geography, the information environment is not uniform. The topography of a specific information environment is determined by the physical features of the operational area—terrain, information infrastructure, population demographics—and people’s cognitive aspects and organizations present in the region—their collective values, beliefs, and perceptions. Interactions of these factors form distinct sub-information environments, or areas in which the

information environment’s characteristics are notably different from those of adjacent areas. Analysis of a specific operational area can identify sub-information environments and their affect on friendly and enemy military operations.

Within each sub-information environment are information nodes. Information nodes are places, persons, or infrastructure that shape information content and flow by creating or transmitting information into the surrounding area. Information nodes can be human (e.g., key communicators or leaders) or technological (e.g., cellular telephone towers, media outlets, religious or meeting centers), or both. Some information nodes are key terrain in that they critically affect information flow and content within the battlespace and provide an advantage to the side that controls them. These nodes are typically located at the nexus of information content and flow. Nodes critical to both are key terrain in the information environment. For example, a well-known mosque with an influential Imam is a possible candidate for a key node because it creates or perpetuates information content that can affect military operations. If nothing else, by identifying and acting on key terrain in the information environment, a military force can affect the information environment.

ConclusionTo effectively plan and execute an information operation,

IO staffs must map their information environment. This can be accomplished by determining those features of the physical, informational, and cognitive dimensions that are relevant to the mission and that affect information content and flow. The result is the identification of sub-information environments and information nodes within each identified sub-environment, as well as an estimate of how information content is created and flows within the operational area. Using this information, the staff then can identify information nodes to be addressed by the information operation. While this is not a prefect process, it is one way to see the information environment.

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The Global Information Environment & 21st Century Warfare: Targeting Public Opinion in the �th Dimension

By Todd A. Schmidt, Major, US Army

Editorial Abstract: This article won a US Army Information Operations Proponent (USAIOP) annual writing contest award in 2006. MAJ Schmidt looks at a cross section of historical and contemporary influence operations, and how these are both at home and at odds with Western culture. He proposes a US Government plan of action engaging a range of players using non-traditional approaches.

If terrorists throughout the world and insurgents in Iraq and

Afghanistan understand one thing, they understand that American public opinion is a major center of gravity. The term center of gravity (COG) in the military sense is very similar to the term in the scientific sense. The COG is the point in an object where its mass is concentrated. From the military perspective, when we identify and attack our enemies’ COGs, we are attacking those points where they have massed their force or their capabilities to exercise their will. Put another way, if we destroy the enemy’s COG, his force, capability, and morale will crumble.

The US Armed Forces cannot fight and win wars without the American public’s support. If terrorists and insurgents can effectively influence American public opinion, they can affect our strategy, operations, and tactics. This effectively infiltrates and disrupts our decision-making process, forcing us to become reactive and lose the initiative. Our enemies do not need to engage in prolonged conventional confrontations (as in the streets of Fallujah, Iraq, or the villages of Afghanistan) to accomplish this. All they have to do is stage periodic, horrific acts of terrorism that become media events.

Therefore, we see improvised explosive devices, beheadings, ambushes on civilian targets, attacks on symbols of American power, and suicide bombers. Terrorists take a wheelchair-bound hostage and dump him overboard at sea, bomb a poorly-protected Marine barracks, drag a naked, dead soldier through the

streets of Mogadishu, and crash jetliners into our skyscrapers, knowing video footage of their depredations will be shown over and over again. This makes for great press and even better ratings, as it erodes American public support and morale.

Since the beginning of the Global War on Terrorism, periodic heated public debates have broken out over the US Government’s use of certain tactics during information operations campaigns. In one instance, public outcry led to the closure of the Department of Defense’s Office of Strategic Influence (OSI). In another, DOD was hotly criticized for contracting self-described business intelligence companies to conduct public relations on its behalf in Iraq. Words matter. Whether it’s called IO, public relations, public diplomacy, or propaganda, Americans citizens and media are sensitive to any perceived management of the information they receive.

Syndicated columnist and political analyst Mark Shields stresses “strategic communication” must be based on in-depth, quality research and knowledge of the opponent and target audience.

Democratic pollster Fred Yang adds, “The media must be used for the purpose of informing, motivating, and mobilizing” the public to take an intended action.

Soon after 9/11—on 30 October 2001, to be exact—DOD stood up OSI to take the lead on a global IO campaign. Within four months, the office’s intent and motives had received so much negative media publicity that DOD closed it. However, only the office’s name was given a conspicuously awkward and speedy farewell. Other DOD

organizations have the same mission and purpose, including the Office of Global Communications, the Information Awareness Office, the Information Operations Task Force, and the Counter-Disinformation/Misinformation Team (also known as the Counter-Information Team). The point here is that information operations are a legitimate and effective form of warfare. Not to use them aggressively and relentlessly is to cede to the enemy a strategy, operation, and tactic that should be our main GWOT effort.

Background and History

Examples of IO include, but are not limited to, operations as simple as pamphlet drops over targeted foreign population centers to warn them of impending violence, or to apply public pressure on the targeted adversary, military or foreign governments to seek a non-violent, diplomatic resolution of grievances. Pamphlets may provide warnings, recommend civilian courses of action, or even threaten impending doom to enemy combatants.

A sea of opinions. (Defense Link)

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Init ially implemented at the beginning of the Cold War to “promote democratic values and institutions by disseminating factual information and ideas,” many observers credit government broadcast media with playing a major part in the downfall of the Soviet Union. Outlets such as the Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, Radio Free Afghanistan, and Radio Free Iraq are examples of IO that target foreign audiences. Sponsors include the United States Information Agency and the Central Intelligence Agency.

In today’s global communications environment of 24-hour news networks and worldwide interconnectedness, the US Government must consider our domestic population a target audience. The word “target” may make critics wince, but there are targets we must protect from the enemy, just as there are targets we must destroy. US public opinion is a target that we must protect, because it is vulnerable to outside, subversive influences.

To better understand this need, we must put IO into an historical context. The Romans pioneered information operations through edicts, writings, and art to regulate, govern, and control the Roman Empire. The term “propaganda” originated in 1622 during the Thirty Years War when, under the leadership of Pope Gregory XV, the Catholic Church founded the “Sacred Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith” (sacra congregatio christiano nomini propagando)—the Jesuits—to spread Catholicism and regulate religious communications.

The US media and its influence on American public opinion evolved during the Spanish-American War, World War I, World War II, and Vietnam. As [T.E.] Lawrence of Arabia observed in 1920, “The printing press is the greatest weapon in the armory of the modern commander.” Media influence on US public opinion was particularly

evident during the Spanish-American War, when newspaper mogul William Randolph Hearst discovered the level of violence many in the US believed would eventually lead to war, did not exist. Hearst is credited with telling his journalist in Cuba, “You furnish the pictures and I’ll furnish the war” so that his chain could sell more papers. The media has a target audience in everything it produces. This is an example of the media targeting the government.

M o d e r n A m e r i c a n I O a n d public relations have their roots in the World War I-era “Committee for Public Information,” whose members included journalist Walter Lippmann and psychologist Edward Bernays (Sigmund Freud’s nephew). The committee coined the terms “group mind” and “engineering

consent,” and is credited with laying the foundation for the modern public relations industry—and the use of information operations as a method of warfare.

During World War II, America engaged in an epic struggle with Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan (the first “Axis of Evil”), and newspapers and radio were the US public’s primary information sources. Journalists were embedded within military units; they even wore US military-issue uniforms. In effect, the military and the media were in voluntary collusion to reassure Americans and to nurture support for the war effort. Both groups knew America

would not succeed without the support of US public opinion.

Voluntary cooperation between the military and the media began to erode following World War II and reached a low point during the Vietnam War. As technology advanced, journalists became more mobile, independent, and global in perspective, and did not rely so much on government information. Journalists who filed stories from the front lines during World War II brought US public awareness out of a cocoon. America and the media became less isolationist in nature and more international in outlook.

World War II was an example of conventional warfare on a grand scale. Conventional forces defeated the enemy, adversarial governments surrendered, and

foreign populations cooperated with victorious military forces and obeyed their orders. The Vietnam War was the reverse. It provides a classic example of low-intensity conflict or guerilla warfare in which the guerilla force cannot succeed conventionally and, therefore, relies on the information environment to gain advantage and build public support before it confronts enemy forces in open battle.

During the Vietnam war, the relationship between the government and the media began to disintegrate. Critics

of US efforts say a failed DOD public relations strategy damaged the military’s credibility. The media interpreted the practice of publicizing enemy body counts and hiding embarrassing incidents of political and military failures as attempts to cover up more serious problems. The Watergate scandal further eroded the media-government relationship. The media reached a level of near paranoia in its distrust of the government and the military. It could not believe that either organization would provide timely and honest information, facts, and statistics. As a result, suspicion, distrust, and dismay befell both sides. The military blamed the media for its failures in

Looking different directions in the whirl of influence operations. (Defense Link)

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Vietnam, and the media clearly did not subscribe to Winston Churchill’s belief that there must be a “bodyguard of lies” to protect US interests.

The reasons for this failure in cooperation are many. First and foremost, the media resisted what it perceived as an attempt to manage and manipulate it, in order to foster support for the war. From the perspective of the US National Command Authority, the failure to wage information warfare was a failure to command.

S u c h f r i c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e government and the “fourth estate” might be necessary in a liberal-democratic society. Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, Victoria Clarke, notes “a very healthy tension” exists between military and the media. But open antagonism between the two estates ultimately benefits neither, and it puts our nation in peril. News reporters, and print journalists in particular, are justifiably concerned with maintaining credibility, legitimacy, and public trust in their independent reporting. By contrast, the government and the military see the media as a vehicle to use to communicate a message to the American people and the international community. Put another way, in the interest of national security and to protect the lives and safety of US military forces, the government and military seek to manage the margins of messages entering the public domain.

Today, our information war against America’s enemies is global. It is waged in the villages of Kandahar, on the streets of Baghdad, on the Web, and in every major media corporation’s 24 hour newsroom. Fighting the IO conflict is not a military undertaking, but a political war. Paul Bremer, former chief administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq, knew how important it was to make not only Iraqis but also Americans and US allies aware of Iraq’s progress. We must fight the IO conflict not just in the environments and minds of our enemies and targeted foreign audiences, but in the hometowns and living rooms of the United States as well.

Former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld observed “our enemies are operating 24/7 across every time zone [and we are not]. That is an unacceptably dangerous deficiency.” To fight in this new dimension, the United States must engage adversaries globally, 24/7, in peacetime, in times of conflict, and in times of war. The United States must accept reality and engage across the full spectrum of warfare.

Accepting Reality

In many ways , informat ion operations are not much different from political, commercial, and private public relations, media, and marketing campaigns. If the Republican and Democratic National Committees, Coca-Cola, Nike, and McDonald’s can do it, why can’t our government use the same successful methods to target many of the same audiences? Is it because we are a liberal democracy that IO seems to be so distasteful? Is IO too reminiscent of the propaganda of oppressive regimes in world history? Or is it just an easy media target for stirring up controversy?

Some military observers suggest information operations are a form of marketing—and there are many similarities between them. In IO, military planners use a targeting process characterized by the “decide, detect, deliver, and assess” cycle. Marketing and advertising agencies use a similar “discover, define, design, and deliver” cycle. Both seek the same outcome: to produce physical and psychological responses. On this basis, advertising is a form of propaganda; marketing is a form of IO.

Similarly, is commercial ism infecting how the United States wages information operations? Many academics and professional journalists argue that hyper-commercialism is rampant within the media and press. Indeed, journalists know this to be true. In a Georgetown University lecture, journalist Kathy Kiely claims the media openly panders to the “wants” of its audience instead of its needs, and “commercial pressure drives the news.”

Many also believe major media conglomerates are consumed with profits, profitability, and market share. These are commercial enterprises with little, if any, public fiduciary responsibility. Why shouldn’t the US Government conclude it is logical and reasonable to influence the media’s actions, coverage, and product, instead of passively depending on “fair and balanced” coverage of the GWOT?

Some political scientists believe the values of journalism are fundamentally at odds with those of government. Author Thomas E. Patterson says the press routinely distorts issues by focusing on controversy, scandal, conflict, and public opinion polls. Patterson argues the press is not equipped to give order and direction to political coverage. They are miscast, he says; the public expects the media to do what they are incapable of doing. If this is true, shouldn’t government representatives work within this flawed paradigm in the interest of national goals and objectives?

Further, noted journalist Jack Germond argues that journalists should not care about “making the world safer for democracy” and the media “should not strive to fulfill some pseudo-civic purpose other than to report the truth responsibly.” Businesspersons, politicians, and political campaigners understand this. The American public and government should also understand and accept this reality, and either engage the media in an environment of commercialism, or circumvent the media altogether.

If the US Government and DOD are to execute our Nation’s wars efficiently, effectively, and successfully, they must adopt aggressive IO strategies and tactics. If they are to be honest brokers, ensuring timely, accurate dissemination of appropriate information to the public at the appropriate time, they must protect and nurture their credibility. Not doing so would be irresponsible and pose a threat to the lives of military service members and our ability to ensure national security. In this interest, we must regard the full spectrum of IO (public relations, public diplomacy, public affairs, marketing and

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advertising, psychological operations, and propaganda) as essentially the same. They all have the same goal: to influence target audiences to make decisions beneficial to America.

The War of Ideas

Americans think of war in a physical sense, but war is a product of its times, and Americans are behind the times. Terrorists are confronting the United States in an information environment. Given a choice, we expect terrorists will choose the path of least resistance: they will attack the softest target. Terrorists have taken our freedoms—specifically, the freedom of the press—and turned them against us. In the GWOT, our very freedoms can lead to failure. The information environment, a sacred arena for liberal democracies and the freedoms they espouse, is composed of the full spectrum of international media, its conduits, and content. The fact that nearly every American has a television (sometimes one in each room) and most have Internet access gives terrorists the ability to reach into our homes and offices to spread their messages of hate and fear. They can affect our most basic behaviors: how we travel, communicate, interact, educate ourselves, and vote.

Retired Army officer Ralph Peters believes the US Government and DOD are building a military that thinks victory depends on technology and transformation, that unmanned machines can replace Soldiers on the battlefield, and that America’s technological innovations and capabilities are changing the way we fight. However, according to Peters, the battles of the future will actually be epic battles of ideas, will, faith—and, admittedly, flesh—and we will fight them for decades to come.

In US Army doctrine, information operations are employed purely as a secondary effort to support the main physical, kinetic effort. However, in the GWOT, “terror” is an ethereal concept, tactic, and strategy, and information operations—the “war of ideas”—must be our main effort. Terrorists understand this, they “act in the physical environment not to make tactical gains in the physical

environment, but to wage a strategic battle in the information environment; therefore the physical environment enables many of the activities in the information environment to occur.” This is why we should be concerned about “winning the battle and losing the war” and continued comparisons of Iraq to Vietnam. If military forces—and by extension the US Government—fight only in the physical environment, they only fight a tactical battle, as if one hand is tied. In the current campaigns, the United States has unapproachable air superiority and dominance. It must now achieve and maintain information superiority and dominance.

Today’s “epic battle” has a virtual battlefield, fought in the hearts, minds & media of American and foreign societies. Opportunities to exploit the information front present themselves, but unfortunately, and probably for political reasons, DOD has shied away from public debate on this topic. After the OSI debacle, they seem to prefer a tangential approach.

In the minds of many, contracting IO efforts to consulting firms such as the Lincoln Group and the Rendon Group seem perfectly justifiable courses of action. After all, this is an accepted business and political campaign practice. Private lobbying and public relations firms have much more latitude in how they ply their trade, and from a legal perspective, use of contractors distances the US from controversial IO methods and performance.

Political consultant Thomas J. O’Donnell believes that “all [political] techniques are legitimately transferable to public diplomacy campaigns” and that “engineering consent” is not diabolical. He believes IO success involves three crucial imperatives: control the dialogue; preempt attacks; and counterattack relentlessly. When an organization successfully controls the message, it achieves an advantage that it must then vigorously defend. O’Donnell urges his clients to be proactive because they cannot depend on the media to transmit their messages. “You have to do what is necessary to win. The risks are too high to risk losing,” he implores.

DOD must focus on “developing, coordinating, deconflicting, and monitoring the delivery of timely, relevant, and effective messages to targeted international audiences.” To counter adversary actions and challenges in a very fluid, dynamic, multi-dimensional conflict, our government must continually update and refine IO goals, objectives, themes, and messages.

Nothing New

Many mi l i t a ry l eaders and government officials do not understand why US IO is so controversial . President Ronald Reagan, the “Great Communicator,” successfully employed IO. President Bill Clinton’s “quick response” strategy crushed every attack by his opponent with an immediate barrage of rhetoric. Call it “spinning,” campaigning, or IO, but both US Presidents sought to control the message permeating the media. Information operations are a form of public relations. Why do the media and the public admire the public relations skills of politicians and abhor the same skills when military officers use them in the interest of national security?

Perhaps World War II, Vietnam, and Cold War precedents have led us to regard propaganda as a dubious method of warfare. Because of this false rationale, the media and the public seem to regard government IO as “lying” and have the romantic notion that democratic governments and countries at war should not do such things. All manner of conservative and liberal special interest groups, advocates, bloggers, and “spinmeisters” are free to engage in IO, but doing so is taboo for the US military and government.

John McArthur, publisher of Harpers, seems to agree that IO should be off-limits to the government: “Lying from under the cover of anonymity to a [public audience] is merely public relations.” The Los Angeles Times reports, “The military’s effort to disseminate propaganda in the Iraqi media is taking place even as US officials are pledging to promote democratic

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principles.” Both McArthur and the Times’ writer imply public relations and IO are fundamentally opposed to democracy. But they are not; they are a part of democracy, a great experiment and human endeavor that is not a sacred cow, but a goal to fight for using all available means. To suggest otherwise is naïve, hypocritical, and dangerous.

The Marketplace of Ideas

Alexis de Tocqueville, a very insightful observer of American media during America’s formative years, describes how “the influence of the liberty of the press does not affect political opinions alone, but it extends to all the opinions of men, and it modifies customs as well as laws.” In other words, the “press effect” is real. The media might vehemently deny “they do not form public opinion, they merely reflect it,” but this is simply not true. Those who subscribe to this logic deny reality.

Tocqueville lamented that he could see no tenable position “between the complete independence and the entire subjection of the public expression of opinion . . . .” He correctly observed that any protest or prosecution of the media for the abuses it perpetrated only brought attention and legitimacy to the abuses. Tocqueville concluded, “In order to enjoy the inestimable benefits which the liberty of the press ensures, it is necessary to submit to the inevitable evils which it engenders.”

Today we note media hyper-commercialism has affected public discourse. Tocqueville reminds us this is no new trend: “In America three quarters of the enormous sheet which is set before the reader are filled with advertisements, and the remainder is frequently occupied by political intelligence or trivial anecdotes.”

Is it possible that we are amusing ourselves to death, as Neil Postman postulated in 1985? Should we believe that unelected media representatives with no legal or formal public fiduciary responsibility have the best interests of the United States in mind, or should we believe that they aim to please their corporate owners, sponsors,

and advertisers by ensuring a competitive and profitable market-share? Tocqueville would submit that the latter is a greater likelihood. If so, then the government m u s t e n t e r t h e marketplace of ideas and communicate its goals and objectives t o i t s d o m e s t i c and international audiences. But how?

What to Do

The DOD and In t e r agency communities must become more proactive. In fact, the IO war would be better waged outside of DOD. The Defense Department is miscast as the lead agency in this effort. The State Department’s Office of the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs should be the tip of the international IO spear, and the White House Office of Communications should lead domestic public relations efforts. The General Accounting Office recommends that the US Government formulate a comprehensive interagency strategic framework and plan for public diplomacy.

In 2003, the Defense Department produced a comprehensive IO Roadmap outlining how to move forward in the IO arena. While good for DOD, this article recommends a Roadmap adaptation for eventual government-wide adoption. The following recommendations derive from the declassified version of the October 2003 DOD Information Operation Roadmap”

The US Government should:- Make it a policy to engage in IO

activities worldwide to the maximum extent permitted by law, while lobbying for the removal of current restrictions and limitations that prevent a global approach to targeting adversaries, non-adversaries, and domestic and international audiences. This would most likely require a “Presidential Finding” plus Congressional cooperation.

- Establish clear IO definitions with policies that outline authorities and boundaries for execution. Synchronize public affairs and psychological operations to support domestic and international IO strategy. Ensure an appropriate relationship between these activities, one that helps achieve the US public diplomacy strategy.

- Create a long-term, comprehensive, interagency IO strategy led from the White House for government-wide communication to both domestic and international audiences. Ensure accountability and visibility of IO resources.

- Establish measurable IO themes, goals , and object ives based on providing timely, truthful strategic communications where appropriate while retaining deception, misdirection, and misinformation in the IO lexicon and arsenal.

- Continue to increase funding for IO efforts, including domestic programs. Develop a trained and educated workforce with language and cultural proficiency and expertise for all target audiences. Fully fund, man, and equip those offices directed to engage in IO activities. Increase capital investment to fund and staff IO offices and equip them with the most advanced communications capabilities.

- Develop IO as a core competency within government operations. The government’s message is too important to rely on private industry to disseminate it. Invest in public service announcements, advertisements, and infomercials. Adopt

One exhibition in the marketplace of ideas. (Defense Link)

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comprehensive, proactive, and coherent messages that facilitate the achievement of US Government goals and objectives. Ensure synchronization of political messages and military operations to foster public support.

- Develop partnerships and advisory councils and continue to contract with private-industry public relations firms, the motion picture industry, and media conglomerates. Governmental offices and agencies outside of DOD should execute this initiative.

- Develop “off-shore” capabilities to influence target audiences globally. The State Department and other governmental agencies with overt and covert operational capabilities should execute this initiative.

- Increase US Government-sponsored domestic media, including enhanced Internet, print, radio, network, and cable television capabilities. Use the British Broadcasting Company, the Armed Forces Network television stations, and the Stars and Stripes newspaper as examples. Make sure these media are widely available and aggressively marketed domestically.

- Maintain an aggressive “media-embed” strategy that provides increased access to local, hometown media outlets. Develop and grow a grassroots media network that can potentially circumvent traditional establishment outlets.

- Begin permanent, continuous, and unremitting overt and covert offensive campaigns against enemy IO capabilities and execute them relentlessly during peacetime and war. Develop IO target sets that support full-spectrum engagement with both kinetic and non-kinetic options.

- Increase targeting of governments and entities that support, facilitate, and provide sanctuary for the abrogation of women’s rights.

- Obscure the l ine be tween humanitarian assistance and military assistance to support US goals and objectives.

- Attack the terrorists’ credibility and morality. Do not let terrorists hide behind religion. Humiliate, shame, and disgrace them by showing how their violent actions contradict their religion’s code of conduct.

In order to defeat terrorism, we must make terrorists fear our intentions, capabilities, and will. “Fair and balanced” is a good TV network slogan, but a suicidal military maxim. Successful warriors gain and exploit advantages; they do not intend to fight fair. The US Government cannot defeat terrorism by responding to it in a fair and balanced way. The strategic management of information will not undermine our democratic values.

Americans must not cower and flinch in the face of terrorism. We must maintain our deep, long-term resolve. The United States cannot conduct strategic IO while it tries to win an international popularity contest. Nor can it win over the unwinnable hearts and minds of a hostile population. We must accept this reality and wage an uncompromising war on terrorism that never declares “mission accomplished,” that denies the enemy sanctuary and satisfaction during times of war and peace, and that forces him to live in terror himself.

The US Government must maintain its credibility and pursue an aggressive strategic communications strategy. These two objectives are not mutually exclusive. However, once credibility is lost, no communications strategy will effectively restore it. Strategic communications and information operations must strive to provide the American public and media with the information they appropriately need to know, while encouraging the debate on constitutional claims to a right to know, as defined by today’s media.

We cannot accept Tocqueville’s premise that “in order to enjoy the inestimable benefits which the liberty of the press ensures, it is necessary to submit to the inevitable evils which it engenders.” To accept this premise would be to surrender to our adversaries in the fifth dimension of warfare. To fight our adversaries and protect America, we must use credible and legitimate methods that lie “between the complete independence and the entire subjection of the public expression of opinion.”

MAJ Todd Schmidt, US Army, is currently serving on staff in the Office of

the Secretary of Defense. He performed in a variety of command and staff positions in the continental United States and overseas. From 2004 to 2005, he served as the Information Operations Coordinator for Regional Command South in Afghanistan. He holds a BA from Indiana University and an MA from Georgetown

University.

Please see the bibliography/references for this article on the IO Sphere Home Page at: https://www.jiowc.osis.gov/Publications/IOSphere/index.cfm

Click on the “updates” link under the Spring 2007 issue

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Intelligence Support to Contemporary Information Operations

By Dr. David Sloggett

Editorial Abstract: In an on-going series of articles, the author explores ways in which the development of intelligence, collected from many sources, can assist in the development of coherent information operations from the strategic to the tactical levels.

This is the second part of the series, where the author reviews the nature

and characteristics of intelligence material in an historical context, establishing a baseline for development of new approaches. The author suggests intelligence analysis in contemporary theaters requires the development of new collaborative methods based upon what he refers to as the Jigsaw Puzzle Paradigm. Coupled with approaches that draw on a much wider range of analytical skills, such as those involving societal analysis, the methods provide the granularity of situational awareness required to underpin effective IO across the military task spectrum.

IntroductionThis article sets out to explore the

ways in which intelligence material can be derived and used to support contemporary military operations (across the spectrum of humanitarian relief operations to high intensity warfare), such as those based upon adopting the Comprehensive Approach, with their associated need for Information Operations. On-going operations in a number of theaters: Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan form the backdrop to this exploration.

This part of the series establishes an historical perspective of where intelligence has played an important role in the planning of large-scale military operations, and uses these to create the background from which modern-day intelligence work has to be trained and conducted. The main reason for these insights is to develop a view of the baseline of intelligence operations, and their associated analysis paradigms, in the middle and latter-part of the 20th century.

One aim is to challenge those paradigms, in terms of how robust and relevant they are today, highlighting the issues we face today when prosecuting the Global War on Terror (GWOT), and counter-insurgency operations in Iraq. See Clark [2004] for an excellent analysis on what he refers to as a target-centric approach to intelligence analysis. Clearly our approaches to intelligence collection and analysis must adapt to the environment, in which we currently carry out a complex spectrum of military activities. Albeit certain well reported maxims developed for example by Sun Zu are still valid today, such as those which refer to knowing your enemy.

With the requirement to avoid unnecessary casualties and negative media coverage, development of highly accurate and granular intelligence of one’s adversary’s capabilities and intent has never been more important. This can be thought of as part of the process of creating the conditions that enable commanders and their subordinates to share in situational awareness. Clearly,

accurate and timely intelligence is a vital element of creating such an environment in which commanders at all levels can develop an appreciation of the complex situation they are facing—none more so than when faced by a chaotic and rapidly evolving insurgency.

Senior military commanders today need to understand a much wider range of social and cultural interactions than has previously been the case. Specifically, is the need to look at the contemporary picture at its different strategic, operational and tactical levels —noting the need to be able to address time sensitive operational planning. Commanders have to look across what we shall refer to as a range of information landscapes—in effect different pictures that interact. These landscapes are based upon assessments of:

• Military situation—the order of battle (ORBAT) of the active combatants in theater, and their capabilities

• The physical ground over which they chose to fight—rural insurgency having specific challenges

Coalition officer opening the door for intelligence support to IO. (US Navy)

20 Spring 2007

• Economic perspectives, such as major pipelines, sources of natural resources etc.

• Political considerations• Socio-cultural relationships• Technological capabilities (it has

been reported that there are close to 100 ways of detonating an IED in theaters such as Iraq)

• Legal, ethical and moral factors

Intelligence collection and analysis designed to support information operations has to consider each of these landscapes and the interactions—such as the political, socio-cultural and economic dimensions—between them. Pictures that emerge from this analysis are often complex, ambiguous and full of uncertainty. This is the environment in which today’s intelligence analysts have to operate. They also have to work against the kind of deadlines imposed by media reporting, where answers to complex questions are often called for in unrealistic timetables, dictated more by programming schedules than the need for reporting accuracy.

Given the complexities of these landscapes and their interactions, they are multi-dimensional and sometimes change rapidly with time. This article highlights the need to evolve training, and widen the cadre of intelligence analysts recruited into military and defense intelligence staffs. This examination proposes creating collaborative working environments that enable people with a range of appropriate skills, including inter alia those with societal analysis skills, who can work in what we shall refer to as Cognitive Maneuver Space. [Editors Note: see IO Sphere Winter 2007 edition, page 17] Such an entity allows development of new insights into the ways in which specific demographic groups may be influenced, or are currently motivated. This is a vital part of developing an understanding of what is driving people’s behavior in theater.

By way of establishing a more recent analytical baseline, this article provides a view of the ways in which intelligence material was collected and analyzed in the Cold War and the latter part of

the 20th century, and goes on to look at the challenges of creating all source intelligence assessments against the backdrop of an ever-increasingly aware adversary. Through this, we illustrate how people recruited with excellent educational backgrounds provide an increasing understanding of how our intelligence collection operates.

Historical Perspectives: Intelligence in the Second

World WarThe use of intelligence in military

operations has a checkered history. In some cases, such as the provision of ULTRA intelligence in WWII, the material derived was able to provide insights into strategic matters. For example, the role played by ULTRA in the Battle of the Atlantic has been well documented; Gardner [1999].

In his book, Beesly [1977] reveals the British Admiralty’s Operational Intelligence Centre (OIC) role in detecting and classifying U-Boat operations in the North Atlantic. Such actions providing insights that allowed some measure of re-routing of convoys based upon a developed shared situational understanding of the U-Boats, derived from intercepts and analysis of naval Enigma traffic.

Clearly, where OIC had derived intelligence, they provided an important operational service to those trying to safely guide the convoys across the Atlantic. The use of ULTRA intelligence in the hunt for the Battleship Bismarck highlighted its vital role in narrowing the search options, once the Bismarck lost the cruisers who were tracking her using radar. Here is an example of where ULTRA played an important part in operational level planning, helping the Chief of Naval Operations deploy forces to cover a number of options as to where Bismarck was routing.

In contrast, the author’s recent research [Sloggett, 2006] investigated the contribution intelligence derived from ULTRA played in the Battle of Britain. Little evidence has been found in this research, from recently

de-classified UK Public Records Office (PRO) material, that shows any tactical benefit concerning the deployment of Royal Air Force squadrons. Results suggest the government gained some strategic insights from derived intercepts concerning the deployments of large formations, but nothing suggested material was available on specific targets.

The last example is [General Bernard] Montgomery’s use of ULTRA before the Battle of Alamein in 1942. Hamilton [1981] has shown the relish with which Montgomery readily adapted to receiving ULTRA intelligence. Indeed, he continued to use it all the way through the Normandy campaign, and specifically in the build up to Operation Goodwood—the breakout from Caen in 1944. In contrast to his predecessor General Auchinleck, Montgomery found a great deal of value in recognizing the difficulties Field Marshall Rommel was experiencing in routing supplies across the Mediterranean Sea to North Africa. Indeed one reason for this was the benefits being derived from ULTRA in terms of signposting the convoys, and allowing UK planners to arrange for submarine and air attacks to be carried out—for example, from Malta.

Looking over a range of examples of the use of ULTRA in the Second World War, it is probably fair to conclude that its main contribution to the war effort mounted by the Allied Forces was in providing strategic and operational insights. Its main value was in medium to long term force deployment planning, and the timing of major set-piece engagements. There are fewer examples of where intelligence such as ULTRA, and the excellent work of the so-called “Twenty Committee,” had a major tactical impact.

Middle and Latter 20th Century PerspectivesIn more recent times we have had

a wide range of successes and failures associated with intelligence collection and analysis. In the late 1950’s and the early 1960s we had the famous bomber

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and missile gaps—where intelligence agencies over-estimated the scale of Russian heavy bomber and missile production. Intelligence derived through the Cuban Missile Crisis was notable in its ability to show where the Soviets had deployed missiles in Cuba, and their level of operational readiness.

The lack of forewarning in the 1982 invasion of the Falklands, and more recent events Weapons of Mass Destruction [WMD] activities in Iraq are also notable in their impact upon people’s perceptions of the way in which intelligence is collected and analyzed. The term groupthink emerges as one of a number of reasons as to why assessments seem to have created the wrong awareness of Iraq’s WMD capability. Bodansky [2004] is insightful in this regard, and his work is an important contribution to the overall international background and context of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Intelligence Analysis – Cold War Paradigms

In the course of the Cold War, intelligence elements played out in a high-technology world of ever increasingly c a p a b l e s e n s o r systems. These were directed at collecting imagery ( IMINT) , signals intelligence (SIGINT)—such as that derived by ULTRA in the Second World War—and intercepts of communications signals (COMINT). Satellites and ground-based sensor systems provided a ready stream of material showing strategic, operational and tactical insights into the deployments and likely intent of Soviet commanders. A great deal was known

about the likely Soviet order of battle, had they invaded Western Europe.

But intelligence analysts in the Cold War were posed with relatively straightforward problems. They were looking for Indications and Warning trends that indicated moves towards potentially aggressive deployments. Intelligence was at the heart of the plan to be ready for a potential Soviet hostile acts, either strategically—through a preemptive missile strike—or through a land invasion of Western Europe. The whole approach to Western defense was based upon getting the early warning material in time to mobilize forces, and hence deter a potential attack.

In contrast, the Soviets would need to move decisively from what appeared to be a peacetime deployment of forces to be in a position to launch a surprise attack. Clearly large scale land exercises always had the potential to be converted into a major assault. Part of the 1972

Helsinki Accords was put in place to reduce the potential for the wrong assessment to be made of such exercises, through the notification of large scale military maneuvers well in advance of their deployments—all part of what became know as Confidence Building Measures (CBM). In deploying large scale formations it was hard to hide the levels of radio traffic, movements of submarines and land-based equipment from the prying eyes of intelligence sources. Analysts could derive indicators relatively easily, and analysis work performed on these problem sets was relatively straightforward.

Contrast the development of shared understanding at the strategic level that arises from detecting a large number of “step-changes” in signals activity—such as a large number of sailings from ports over a short period of time—to the nature of warfare today. Our adversaries are increasingly, through their educational backgrounds, becoming aware of the extent of our intelligence collection capabilities.

Recent experiences in operational theaters show how key members of major terrorist organizations have become increasingly Operations Security (OPSEC) aware. Indeed it is possible to show how the closer you get to the core of such terrorist organizations, the more OPSEC awareness increases. This will impact our ability to detect clear indications of intent. Our all source assessment teams, working on strategic (and possibly operational) assessments, will need to move from ways of working where clear intent appears in the signals traffic, to understanding other indicators. They must develop hypotheses against which collected intelligence can be tested.

Tactical intelligence collection activities and their associated analysis will still draw upon a great deal of locally derived material, using inter alia HUMINT and tactical SIGINT sources. Specific enemy activity in a local region can be analyzed and understood from developing these sources, and looking at trends and particular intercepts. These will continue to contribute valuable insights into

UK Signals troops hoist their colors. (Defense Link)

22 Spring 2007

enemy locations and intentions. But a key point is that we must increase the degrees of coupling between the strategically derived material, and that developed and collected at the tactical levels. Through such increased coupling of collected material, we can develop greater analysis and understanding in terms of shared situational awareness, and undertake appropriate information operations.

Contemporary Intelligence Analysis

It is possible to draw a parallel between analyzing (synthesizing) in te l l igence f rom a number of contradictory sources into an integrated and shared awareness, and building a jigsaw puzzle without a front cover. Imagine being given a puzzle in such circumstances. Notably, all the pieces may not be present, and some will not be joined up. Further, fragments of the picture remain from the last person to do it—and when you open the box the pieces will all be jumbled up, and some will be upside down. So where do we start in such circumstances?

Well, one might search the box and pick out the edge pieces, i.e. those that bound the problem space. In proposing this metaphor it is important to remember we are in an environment where intelligence analysts—especially those supporting IO development—are dealing with several different pictures at the same time. Hence, while we use the idea of bounding the problem space for each puzzle, in today’s military theaters this is too simplistic an idea. Boundaries between the puzzles will overlap, due to the complex nature of the social relationships that exist in places like Afghanistan and Iraq. The landscapes that we create from the synthesis of the intelligence material will also interact, and offer additional difficulties in creating a clear shared situational awareness.

This can be highlighted through the cases where unintended consequences have occurred as a result of a specific tact ical operat ion. Overlapping boundaries creates the possibilities for confusion and equivocality—where more

than one hypothesis can be developed from the material available. We have to recognize, as Clausewitz suggested, that a major part of intelligence material may well be uncertain or of a dubious nature.

It is also vital that we imagine these pictures evolving over time as Intelligence, Surveillance Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) assets are tasked to collect material. Unlike jigsaw puzzles whose ultimate picture is clear, in the real world our puzzles will evolve in steps, as vital parts emerge or are more slowly collected, such as through a HUMINT source.

Some can be predicted, such as when an ISTAR asset will be reporting back an image, as this will have been tasked for collection—so we may have some idea of the timeline for availability.

In this case, the jigsaw puzzle may well be presented to a commander as incomplete—but with the missing parts annotated to say: “if you are prepared to wait for such-and-such a period of time the intelligence will be available from this ISTAR asset as it has been tasked for collection.” The issue for the commander is the time such intelligence material will become available, how that fits into operations rhythm and

tempo, and how he wishes to conduct the mission.

In some cases parts of the puzzle may be incomplete—as a vital piece is missing—and then the whole area of the puzzle clears when this material is collected. In other situations pieces of the puzzle may not apparently fit with each other—providing contradicting evidence of what is emerging. We can think of this as creating ambiguity in the presentation of the derived intelligence picture.

Through this discussion we’ve developed four major sources of difficulty for intelligence analysts operating in current theaters, including those analysts working IO. The emerging jigsaw puzzles have four associated characteristics:

• Uncertainty—due to our inability to be confident about what we collect. By nature, the intelligence world has associated uncertainty, hence the scoring systems developed for HUMINT.

• Complexity—where interactions can confuse the evolution of the jigsaw puzzle and create links that require further detailed study.

• Ambiguity—where the intelligence can provide contradictory sources.

• Equivocality—where it is possible to derive several equally valid interpretations of the collected material.

Intelligence analysts and those training them need to develop new approaches or paradigms, in which the collected material is synthesized. Because of the ever-increasing complexity of the puzzles being assembled, it is vital that anyone with insights into the way the pieces are forming can contribute to the synthesis process.

This description and analysis of the problem space calls for the development o f more capab le co l l abora t ive environments. In these participants —drawn into the groups because of their relevant background and experience—can be encouraged, using a range of now routinely available collaborative tools. Working with technologies such as the ideas behind Wikipedia, we can create

Intelligence Corps warrant officer uses traditional data sifting techniques.

(MOD UK)

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the conditions where we have more than one person’s eyes on an intelligence assessment; this may become the way forward. New ways of storing and managing collected material from all intelligence sources will also improve its exploitation.

At the heart of this collaborative approach to intelligence analysis and synthesis is the need to develop hypotheses of what the intelligence, with all of its associated uncertainties, is revealing. In situations where adversaries are using OPSEC procedures to reduce the effectiveness of collection activities, such analysis will become increasingly “noisy,” hence the need to generate multiple hypotheses. In this way, each postulate can be run in parallel until one emerges as the clear and agreed level of shared understanding between the collaborative teams. Clearly, one of a number of hypotheses maintained as elements of the synthesis process is one based upon what one would observe if an active deception plan was in place. This might help address the issue of groupthink that emerged in Iraq. One hypothesis that would be maintained is that which asks; “could all of this be part of an elaborate deception plan?”

It is also important that collaborative team members should be drawn from a range of sources and agencies, such as academia, where specific insights may be available from persons who have been studying a specific area in detail over a long period of time. The range and complexity of landscapes that we now have to address, especially in responding to the ideas behind the Comprehensive Approach, mean we must effectively tap into specific expertise. Again, we seek to create the conditions in which commanders can make decisions, and have some ability to anticipate some of the outcomes arising from their selected courses of action.

Today it is common to find material used in operational theaters that has only been developed recently, when other information sources collected in the past are now forgotten. In effect, we’re highlighting the fact we do not approach information management with a view to creating a long-term corporate memory

of the social structures and interactions among people’s with differing religious and cultural backgrounds. It is also becoming increasingly clear that there are links emerging between intelligence collected in one theater and operations being carried out in others. Maintaining an overall appreciation of the situation in such circumstances is vital. An effective approach to information management is a cornerstone to any response to such inter-theater relationships, and to creation of effective response activities.

SummaryIn attempting to create conditions in

which derived intelligence is supportive of information operations, it is vital to describe the nature of the difficulties in developing such material. The idea of a creating a jigsaw puzzle—with all its associated uncertainty, complexity, ambigui ty and equivocal i ty—is something with which all can relate. This is a helpful metaphor and start point for the next part of this series, which moves on to address the ways in which intelligence information—in highly granular forms and from multiple sources—can be used to plan and conduct information operations across the operational spectrum.

Bibliography

Beesly, P [1977] Very Special Intelligence: The story of the Admiralty’s Operational Intelligence Centre 1939-1945, published by Hamish Hamilton.

Bodansky, Y. [2004] The Secret History of the Iraq War, published by Harper Collins

Clark, R.M. [2004] Intelligence Analysis: A target centric Approach, published by CQ Press.

Gardner, W.J.R [1999] Decoding History: The Battle of the Atlantic and Ultra, Published by Macpress.

Hamilton, N. [1981] Monty: The Battles of Field Marshall Bernard Law Montgomery, published by Hodder & Stoughton.

Hart, D, Simon, S. [2006] Thinking Straight and Talking Straight: Problems of Intelligence Analysis, Survival Volume 48, Number 1, Spring 2006.

Leedom, D.K. [2004] The Analytic Representation of Sensemaking and Knowledge Management within a Military C2 Organisation. Report for the USAF Research Laboratory, dated March 2004.

Sloggett, C. [2006] MA Thesis at Oxford University on the Contribution of ULTRA to the Battle of Britain.