Special WarfareThe Professional Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School

PB 80–05–2 September 2005 Vol. 18, No. 2

Achieving Popular Support

Counterinsurgency:

From the CommandantSpecial Warfare

At the Special Warfare Center and School,we have watched the stellar performance ofour Army special-operations Soldiers in theGlobal War on Terrorism with immensepride. Their cultural knowledge, coupledwith their language skills, has been key tosuccesses around the world. It is in thisarena that our Army special-operations Sol-diers truly lead the way for the rest of ournation’s forces.

Over the past year, the transformation of theSF Training Pipeline has been a priority for usat SWCS. Current operations have made uslook closely at our cultural and language train-ing to make sure that they enhance our abilityto interact with, and ideally influence the beliefsand behavior of, the populace with whom we areengaged. These are key elements of our uncon-ventional warfare skills.

As part of the pipeline transformation, wehave implemented higher standards for lan-guage training for our Special Forces Sol-diers, and we have redesigned SF trainingto make language training integral to theSFQC, woven throughout its fabric frombeginning to end.

Soldiers are now tested and interviewed dur-ing Special Forces Assessment and Selection todetermine language suitability and thenassigned one of 10 core foreign languages whenthey begin the SFQC. From that point on, stu-dents will be grouped into “ODAs” according totheir language assignments. Each phase of SFtraining will have a block of language training,including the final phase, in which students willbe required to use their foreign-language skillsduring the Robin Sage Exercise. This approachwill expose the students to the languages overthe entire one year average course length toimprove the learning model and reinforce theimportance of language and cultural under-standing in unconventional warfare. At the endof SFQC, students will have to earn a score of1/1/1 on the Defense Language Proficiency Testbefore they will be able to graduate and becomemembers of the SF brotherhood.

SWCS is also now responsible to oversee andassist unit command-language programs,so thatwe can continue to enhance and sustain Soldiers’language skills after they become members of

their units.This will include funding, recommen-dations based on best-business practices andtraining-development assistance.

Contingency language training is a conceptto provide training assistance for languagerequirements that groups may have other thanthe 10 core languages taught as a part of theSFQC. SWCS can provide instructors,resources and course design for language train-ing at the unit location prior to a deployment.The arrival of our LNO from the Defense Lan-guage Institute this fall will improve our abili-ty to leverage that institute for assistance, too.

This nation asks a great deal of its special-operations forces. We are fortunate to find Sol-diers with the pride, intelligence, stamina andsense of duty required by our missions. Whilelanguage training is very important to creatingthe Special Forces Soldier, we must rememberthat our goal is not to train linguists; we aretraining Special Forces combat medics, weaponssergeants and so on, who have a working knowl-edge of a language and the appreciation of a cul-ture that together enhance their ability to workby,with,and through indigenous forces to accom-plish their mission.

Major General James W. Parker

Features2 Strategic Counterinsurgency Modeling

by Lieutenant Colonel (P) Eric P. Wendt

14 Language Transformation Plan to Build Culturally SavvySoldiersby Janice L. Burton

17 Serving a Nation at Warby Command Sergeant Major Dave M. Bruner

18 Good Cops, Bad Cops, Carrots and Sticksby Sergeant First Class Jesse P. Pruett

22 Brown: Trust Transcends the Chaos of Warby Captain Joseph Coslett

24 Special-Operations Forces’ Interoperability With CoalitionForcesby Lieutenant Colonel Mark C. Arnold

29 FBCB2 Gives Soldiers Better Picture of Battlespaceby Dean George

Departments30 Warrant Officer Career Notes

31 Officer Career Notes

32 Enlisted Career Notes

33 Update

36 Book Reviews

Cover: Army News Service photo

PB 80–05–2 ContentsSeptember 2005 Special Warfare Vol. 18, No. 2

Commander & CommandantMajor General James W. Parker

EditorJerry D. Steelman

Associate EditorJanice L. Burton

Graphics & DesignBruce S. Barfield

Special Warfare is an authorized, official quarterly of theUnited States Army John F. Kennedy Special WarfareCenter and School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Its missionis to promote the professional development of special-operations forces by providing a forum for the examinationof established doctrine and new ideas.

Views expressed herein are those of the authors and donot necessarily reflect official Army position. Thispublication does not supersede any information presentedin other official Army publications.

Articles, photos, artwork and letters are invited andshould be addressed to Editor, Special Warfare,USAJFKSWCS, Fort Bragg, NC 28310. Telephone: DSN239-5703, commercial (910) 432-5703, fax -3147. SpecialWarfare reserves the right to edit all material.

Published works may be reprinted, except wherecopyrighted, provided credit is given to Special Warfareand the authors.

Official distribution is limited to active and reservespecial-operations units. Individuals desiring privatesubscriptions should forward their requests to:Superintendent of Documents, U.S. GovernmentPrinting Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. SpecialWarfare is also available on the USASOC internal web(https:asociweb.soc.mil/swcs/dotd/sw-mag/sw-mag.htm).

V E R I T A S

STREBIL

A

E T

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:Peter J. SchoomakerGeneral, United States ArmyChief of Staff

Official:

Sandra R. RileyAdministrative Assistant to theSecretary of the Army

0517101

Headquarters, Department of the Army

As the United States contin-ues to prosecute the GlobalWar on Terrorism, or

GWOT, it must ensure that all ofits resources are used in the mosteffective manner possible. Theeffective application of theseresources can be achieved by link-ing strongly rooted and strategical-ly sound modeling for counterin-surgency, or COIN, with an effec-tive method for implementationsimilar to that used by Joint TaskForce 510 and the 1st SpecialForces Group in the Philippinesduring the initial evolution ofOperation Enduring Freedom-Phil-ippines, or OEF-P.

Prior to 2002, Basilan Island wasa safe haven for the Abu SayafGroup, or ASG, a terrorist groupthat used kidnapping, rape andmurder as a means of controllingthe island. In early 2002, U.S. spe-cial-operations forces1 of JTF-510,led by Soldiers from the 1st SFGroup, conducted operationsthrough, by and with forces of thegovernment of the Republic of thePhilippines, or GRP, which ejectedthe ASG from the island.

In early 2004, more than a yearafter all U.S. forces had withdrawnfrom Basilan Island, the ASG hadvirtually ceased operations on the

island.2 After visiting the southernPhilippines, noted author RobertKaplan pointed to the work doneby JTF 510 on Basilan Island as asuperior example of successfulcounterinsurgency.3

Strategic COIN modelingThere are many strategic theo-

ries related to insurgency andcounterinsurgency that, while aca-

demically stimulating cannot beapplied effectively. Likewise, thereare countless tactical remedies fordealing with insurgent warfarethat are not strategically ground-ed. The tactics must be implement-ed through strategic COIN model-ing in order to avoid squandering

the increase in national-securityspending the U.S. has undertakensince 9/11.4

During Operation Iraqi FreedomII, or OIF II, Colonel Hector Pagan,the commander of the CombinedJoint Special Operations TaskForce-Arabian Peninsula, orCJSOTF-AP, had the insight to usestrategic modeling to developground-truth awareness of theinsurgent situation and to passCOIN recommendations based onthese models to his higher head-quarters for use in theater.

The Naval Postgraduate School’sDepartment of Defense Analysis,which is home to some of theworld’s most brilliant minds inunconventional and counterinsur-gent warfare, teaches many strate-gic COIN models. Several of thosemodels were used during OEF-Pand OIF II. Understanding thosemodels will allow the U.S. to moreeffectively apply its assets in orderto counter insurgency.5

Area-of-influence modelIn order to use the models in con-

cert with each other to achieve asynergistic effect, it is important tounderstand each model individual-ly. We’ll begin with the area-of-

2 Special Warfare

Strategic Counterinsurgency Modeling

by Lieutenant Colonel (P) Eric P. Wendt

Like the moving bubbleon a level, the behavior ofthe bulk of the populacewill shift to assist eitherthe government or theinsurgents, depending onthe carrots and sticks …used by each side.

influence model (Figure 1).6 Thekey to this model is understandingthat, like the moving bubble on alevel, the behavior of the bulk ofthe populace will shift to assisteither the government or the insur-gents, depending on the carrotsand sticks (rewards and punish-ments) used by each side.7

The challenge for the govern-ment in COIN is to sufficientlymove the bubble, using the correctcarrots and sticks, so that the pop-ulation will identify and exposeextreme insurgent members. Thebehavior of those extreme insur-gent members themselves will notbe influenced by carrots and sticks;instead, these extreme members (asmall minority of the population)must be killed or captured.

An additional implication of thearea-of-influence model is thatwhenever possible, we should co-opt people and organizations in theable-to-influence zone by offeringthem amnesty in exchange for tar-getable information about extremeinsurgent members. Bringing peo-ple into the fold with amnesty pre-vents them from assisting insur-gents or becoming insurgentsthemselves, and it provides a har-vest of actionable intelligence.

Origin, flow of supportThe second model (Figure 2),

shows the origins and flow of insur-gent support.8 Derived from thewritings of Nathan Leites andCharles Wolf Jr., this model is vitalfor understanding the differencebetween conventional and uncon-ventional approaches to COIN, aswell as for defining where COINoperations should focus the priori-ty of their effort.

Insurgent support (people, guns,money, etc.) flows from outside ofthe state boundaries of an insur-gency (external support), as well asfrom inside the state boundaries

(internal support). External andinternal support flow to a cadre orinfrastructure, where they will berefined and translated into output.

Output can range from armedforces patrolling in the jungle orthe neighborhood, to the placementof improvised explosive devices, tosuicide bombings.

The origin and flow of insurgentsupport is key to an insurgency. Itis important to note that supportwill likely come from a mixture ofexternal and internal sources.Defining where the majority ofinsurgent support is coming fromallows for the proportionate andcorrect application of COINresources.

Conventional forces are besttrained, organized and equipped toattack insurgent output and exter-nal support, but they are lessfocused on attacking insurgentinfrastructure and internal sup-port. Indirectly attacking insur-gent infrastructure by workingthrough the population and inter-nal insurgent supporters, so thatthe population will reveal andexpose members of the insurgentinfrastructure, is the realm ofunconventional forces, such as SFSoldiers.

How can we define insurgentinfrastructure? It is not an ethere-al concept. The insurgent infra-structure is composed of the peoplewho live in the village, neighbor-hood or community and translateinsurgent support into output. Tophrase it differently, if a villagerwants to give support (people, gunsor money) to a cause, who, by

name, in the village or neighbor-hood is the insurgents’ point of con-tact for transferring thoseresources? That individual is amember of the infrastructure.

To identify members of theinsurgent infrastructure, SF Sol-diers must live and operate withthe population and identify whichcarrots and sticks will shift thearea-of-influence model “bubble”and cause locals to provide infor-mation. COIN forces cannot drivethrough a town and identify mem-bers of the insurgent infrastruc-ture. Gaining the detailed localknowledge and implementing thecarrots and sticks needed foracquiring actionable intelligencerequires long-term presence; lan-guage skills; cultural and areafamiliarization; constant monitor-ing of the area’s population andresource controls, or PRCs; andexpertise in advanced special-oper-ations skills, or ASOs. To reiterate,if we are to be able to identifymembers of the insurgent infra-structure, we must embed forces ina local population for long periodsof time and develop local humanintelligence by implementing car-rots and sticks with the population.In this article, we will call thislong-term local presence the con-stabulary-force mission. One toolperfectly suited for the constabu-lary-force mission is the U.S.Army’s Special Forces.

While it is important to target allfour areas shown in Leites’ andWolf ’s model, it is helpful to likeninternal and external support to awell that provides the overall sup-

September 2005 3

ply of water. The water flows fromthe well through the spigot (theinfrastructure), which translates itinto output (guerrilla patrols,bombings, etc). The output can beequated to water coming out of afaucet. Attacking the outputinvolves engaging trained, organ-ized and equipped insurgents, ortheir planted bombs, in battle.Such attacks against insurgentoutput are resource-intensive andoften carry a high price in blood.

While attacking the output is anecessary portion of COIN, it mustbe a supporting effort and not themain effort. Attacking output asthe main effort in COIN is equiva-lent to trying to stop the flow ofwater by slapping at it as it comesout of the spigot. If we throw ever-increasing resources against theoutput, we will slap the water evenfaster, but we are doomed to fail-ure. Attacking output as the maineffort in COIN has failed through-out history, and it will fail duringthe GWOT.

The unconventional approach toCOIN must address all areas of theLeites and Wolf model, but themain effort must be to attack thecadre or infrastructure. In conven-

tional war, we can make directattacks against troops in the field(output), but in COIN, we cannotdirectly attack the members of theinfrastructure, because we cannoteasily identify them.

Instead, we must first work indi-rectly, through, by and with thelocal internal supporters and popu-lation, using the correct carrotsand sticks so that the populationwill identify and expose membersof the local insurgent infrastruc-ture for us. Once they have beenidentified by the local populace, theinfrastructure members can bekilled or captured. When we workindirectly through the local popu-lace to identify members of theinfrastructure, we are correctlystopping the insurgent flow ofwater by turning off the spigot.Targeting the members of the localinfrastructure must be the maineffort in COIN.

In sum, in conventional war, out-put is the main effort, and externalsupport the primary supportingeffort. In unconventional warfare(including COIN), the infrastruc-ture is the main effort, and themost effective way of identifyinglocal infrastructure members for

killing or capture is that we live,operate with, and apply carrotsand sticks to the local population,so they will identify the infrastruc-ture members for us.

Equivalent-response modelFigure 3 represents the equiva-

lent-response model.9 In thismodel, the qualities of intensity ofviolence and time apply, as does theneed for the insurgency to grow insize and intensity of violent actionover time, if it is to succeed.

For example, if two men are dis-satisfied with their government,they likely have it within theirabilities to conduct a minor terror-ist action, but they are unable tooverthrow the government unlessthey grow in size as an organiza-tion. While they grow, they willpass through several phases. Atfirst, their organization will becapable of small terrorist actionsonly. Later, in addition to terroristactions, they will be capable ofcovert and overt small-unit guerril-la actions. Finally, if they grow suf-ficiently, they will finally be capa-ble of conducting an overt war ofmovement or a conventional war.

Insurgent organizations maygrow and achieve victory in whatappears to be a sudden snowballeffect at the end of an insurgency(e.g., the Cuban insurgency), orthey may take long periods of timeto grow and finally overthrow thegovernment (e.g., the Maoist insur-gency). Quickly or slowly, therequirement is the same: Insurgen-cies must grow in size if they are tooverthrow the government.

The equivalent-response modeldemonstrates that for insurgenciesto achieve their desired and neces-sary growth, they must keep theiractions within a “band of excel-lence,” between the maximum andminimum acceptable thresholdsfor violence (V-max and V-min).

4 Special Warfare

Once insurgents act, the govern-ment must react. For reactions, theband of excellence must be slightlyhigher in intensity of violence thanthe initiating action was. Thisdynamic must be understood: It iscritical to success in insurgent war-fare. The intensity of actions with-in the band of excellence must alsogrow slightly in intensity over timeto sustain the growth of the insur-gent organization. It is importantto note that it is the perception ofthe local populace that determinesthe maximum and minimumacceptable thresholds of violence.

To understand this concept,hypothesize that a small insurgentorganization is capable of low-endterrorism only. In a low-end action,the terrorists commit a bank rob-bery. While robbing the bank, theydon’t kill anyone, but they do beatup the security guard. In the eyesof the local populace, the bank rob-bery probably falls above the V-minline and below the V-max line,making it an appropriate insur-gent event. After the terrorist act,the government responds. Itsresponse is to put up a poster ask-ing the insurgents politely not torob any more banks. The govern-ment’s timid reaction falls belowthe V-min and outside the band ofexcellence, costing the governmenta portion of its legitimacy and con-trol with the populace. We canexpect the bubble of the area-of-influence model to shift slightly infavor of the insurgents.

With that shift, we can then lookto Leites and Wolf ’s origin-and-flow-of-support model (Figure 2).We can expect a slight increase ininsurgent internal support, result-ing in greater throughput and cul-minating in the potential forgreater output in the next insur-gent venture.

On the other hand, if the govern-ment overreacts to the bank rob-bery, lining people up against walls

and shooting them in the hope ofintimidating the insurgent group,the government will undoubtedlyexceed the V-max and fall outsidethe band of excellence. It will real-ize the same bubble shift as whenit fell short of the V-min, decreas-ing local support for the govern-ment and simultaneously increas-ing support for the insurgentgroup.

The equivalent-response modelis vital to strategic COIN modelingbecause it demonstrates thatinsurgent warfare is a thinkingman’s game in the extreme. To besuccessful, COIN forces must takethe initiative, carefully choosetheir actions, weigh possibleactions against the band of excel-lence, and anticipate the adver-sary’s reaction. An effective COINstrategy initiates actions that fallwithin the band of excellence butcause the opponent to react withactions that fall outside thatband.10 When insurgent actionsfall outside the band, the bubble ofthe area-of-influence model willshift, and we can expect corre-sponding decreases in people, gunsand money from the population

and internal insurgent supporters,further diminishing the insur-gents’ ability to produce output.

Diamond modelAn insightful model for under-

standing COIN is the diamondmodel, developed by Dr. GordonMcCormick of the NPS.11 Under-standing this model will allowplanners to optimize COINresources by addressing allaspects of insurgent conflictsimultaneously and holisticallyrather than in a disjointed finger-in-the-dike fashion.

The diamond in Figure 4 has fivelegs. In order for a government tosuccessfully counter an insurgency,it must build its legitimacy andcontrol with the population (Leg 1),then lower the insurgent force’slegitimacy and control with thepopulation (Leg 2). Building legiti-macy and control with the popula-tion allows the government toacquire the actionable intelligenceneeded to be effective in killing orcapturing members of the insur-gent infrastructure.

While attacking legs 1 and 2, the

September 2005 5

government must determine if theinsurgency has external support. Ifso, the government must build itslegitimacy in the eyes of relevantinternational actors (other govern-ments, nongovernment organiza-tions, private volunteer organiza-tions, etc.), represented by Leg 4 ofthe diamond. Building externallegitimacy will bring increasedexternal support to the govern-ment from the international com-munity. The government must alsoattempt to reduce external supportto the insurgents by minimizing ordestroying the insurgent group’ssupport and sanctuary from inter-national actors (Leg 5).

The majority of the conventionalmilitary is most comfortable withdirect action (Leg 3). However, onlya flawed COIN approach wouldattempt to undertake direct actionwithout first taking the necessarysteps of COIN’s indirect approach.The indirect approach requires liv-ing and operating with the popula-tion, executing legs 1 and 2 insequence, so that the local popula-tion identifies the members of theinsurgent infrastructure. Oncethey have been identified, direct

action can be executed successfully.The impatient approach to COIN,attacking Leg 3 without gainingactionable intelligence from theother legs first, will inevitablyresult in destruction of the wrongtargets and abundant dry holes.

It is important to note that thechief advantage of the insurgent isthat counterinsurgent forces can-not pick him out of a crowd. Thepopulace at the village or neighbor-hood level can identify the insur-gent and the insurgent infrastruc-ture. To correctly use unconven-tional and conventional forces andsucceed in COIN, the counterinsur-gents must first invest the effortneeded to control the neighborhoodor village (often with conventionalforces in areas that are simply too“hot” for a small SF team to controlby itself) and to develop the carrot-and-stick incentives needed toacquire local intelligence from thepopulace. To re-emphasize, at-tempts to bypass legs 1 and 2 andgo straight to direct action willyield dry holes and needless collat-eral damage that will exceed the V-max of the equivalent-responsemodel. Naturally, following Leg 3

actions that follow actions in legs 1and 2 must still fall within theequivalent-response model’s bandof excellence. Ideally, these Leg 3actions will also be designed toprompt enemy reactions that lieoutside the band of excellence.

If COIN is to succeed, it mustaddress all five legs of the dia-mond. All COIN strategies shoulduse McCormick’s diamond in theirplanning and execution phases inorder to produce a coherent andholistic COIN effort.

Desired componentsThe last model is the author’s

own creation, based partially onoperations during the Malaysianinsurgency. This model containsthe three desired military compo-nents for successful prosecution ofCOIN.

Figure 2 showed us that themost efficient way of interruptingthe conversion of insurgent sup-port into output is to attack theinsurgent infrastructure. In orderto attack that infrastructure, thegovernment requires a constabu-lary force, which is the first compo-nent and main effort of theauthor’s model.

As previously stated, SF Soldiersare ideal for leading the constabu-lary force because of their regionaland cultural awareness, ASO skillsand light-infantry skills that allowthe SF detachments to defendthemselves for short periods oftime.

Using the proper carrots andsticks, dispensing amnesty (for theprice of actionable intelligenceagainst the insurgent infrastruc-ture), ASO and appropriate PRCsin legs 1 and 2 of the diamond, theconstabulary force will learn whothe local insurgent infrastructuremembers are in each community.One mission of the constabulary isto develop small, local host-nation

6 Special Warfare

nets for human intelligence, orHUMINT, and small, local host-nation SWAT-type teams that cantarget members of the insurgentinfrastructure once they have beenidentified and exposed (Leg 3).

The constabulary force mustmonitor PRCs by checking to see,for example, if food supplies sud-denly decline in a local market(because the food is going to aninsurgent force), or if, after a battlein which insurgents were wound-ed, local doctors disappear for aday or two (while they give care tothe insurgents).12 Checkpoints,house monitors and many morePRC measures are possible. It isimportant that PRC measures beproportionate to the level of insur-gent support in a local area: Onlythose areas with the deepest insur-gent support will require the mostinvasive PRC measures. We mustconsider the long-term effects uponcivil liberties, and we must ensurethat the PRCs will not exceed theperceived V-max of the locals whocan still be influenced.

It is important to emphasizeonce again that in some areas withthe deepest insurgent support, con-ventional forces (U.S. or host-nation) will be needed to establishlocal control before and while theconstabulary conducts its work.Once the constabulary begins oper-ations, however, all military forces,as well as joint and interagencyassets, operating in the constabu-lary’s area of operations, or AO,should fall under the constabu-lary’s operational control for unityof command and unity of effort.

Feeling the heat from the con-stabulary, the insurgents willundoubtedly try to destroy andeject the constabulary force. Forthat reason, the constabulary musthave light-infantry skills so that itcan defend itself for a short periodof time. In areas in which a con-ventional force is not nearby the

constabulary, a second component,the quick-reaction force, or QRF,must be available.

The QRF must be capable ofcoming to the aid of the constabu-lary whenever it is attacked andrequires outside help. Constantcommunication, coupled with QRFmobility and day-and-night avail-ability, are essential. The reactionforce should be skilled in offensiveurban operations: Rangers,Marines, SEALs, Stryker units andSF-led host-nation forces are idealQRF elements.

The final component of themodel is the movement-to-contact,or MTC, force. Ideally, the MTCforce operates along the seams ofconstabulary AOs and along keyavenues of enemy external support(country borders, inbound flowfrom sanctuaries, etc.). Its missionis to gain and maintain contactwith the enemy outside the areasin which the constabularies areworking. Relentless in nature, theMTC force must move aggressivelyand continuously, forcing theenemy to either engage or move.Host-state or U.S. conventionalinfantry, armor and aviation forces

are superb tools for the MTC force.As the MTC force operates, the

engagements or insurgent move-ments that it causes will eventual-ly compel the insurgent force toreturn to areas of active or passivesupport to refuel, rearm and re-equip. As the insurgent force doesso, the resident constabulary willdetect its presence and theresources it consumes. The insur-gents’ support infrastructurebecomes increasingly vulnerable asthe insurgents’ need for resourcesincreases. Once detected, the mem-bers of the local insurgent infra-structure can be captured or killedby the constabulary SWAT teams.If the insurgent output force is toorobust for the constabulary, theQRF can be called in to eject it, andthe relentless pursuit by the MTCcan continue.13

These three components: theconstabulary, the QRF and theMTC force, form the required foun-dation for effective military coun-terinsurgency action.

In conventional war, the outputis the top priority, so the common-sense main effort is to developMTC forces that address output:

September 2005 7

battalions, brigades, etc. However,in COIN, targeting the infrastruc-ture is the top priority. The con-stabulary element, which specifi-cally targets the infrastructure,must be the main effort. In COIN,the reaction force and MTC forcesare supporting efforts. Ourresourcing and prioritization inCOIN should reflect the constabu-lary, not the MTC force, as themain effort.

In areas that do not have astrong host-nation police or mili-tary in operation at the beginningof U.S. COIN involvement, asequential approach to COIN AOswill be required. Since there arenot enough conventional or uncon-ventional U.S. forces in many areasof the world to simultaneouslyoccupy whole countries, this three-component methodology should beinitiated in one area of the countryand then slowly built and expand-ed to geographically linked areasrather than to geographically sepa-rate areas. As the three militarycomponent missions are phasedover to host-nation forces in differ-ent towns, villages and provinces,U.S. forces can then move to the

next geographically linked town orneighborhood and begin the proc-ess anew.14

Methodology Our discussion of the strategic

models presents the structurallycorrect method of prosecuting andwinning COIN, but the models areinsufficient unless they can beapplied in the real world. How canthese models be tailored, and howcan governments locally apply thecorrect mix of the elements ofnational power? How can we opti-mize resources and achieve desiredeffects and outcomes?

The following methodology wasused to implement the strategicmodels during OEF-P with success.The methodology was used againduring OIF II to prepare and pres-ent recommendations to the higherchain of command. The method-ology works, and it can be used infuture U.S. COIN efforts.15

The first step of the methodologyis to gain a solid understanding ofthe COIN models. Without thisunderstanding, we will be unable tocorrectly use the models as we

develop and implement the COINplan. Worse yet, we will be unableto adapt to changing conditions onthe ground. Like a football game ora jujutsu match, insurgency/COINis dynamic, not a static chalkboardencounter.

DemographicsOne of the points demonstrated

by the strategic models is thatinsurgents must return to areas ofactive and passive support for peo-ple, guns and money so that theycan continue to produce insurgentoutput. An often overlooked rule ofthumb in COIN is that for everyactive insurgent, there are approxi-mately 10 active supporters.16

Active insurgents operating asmembers of the infrastructure nor-mally fall into the category of thosewhose behavior cannot be influ-enced with carrots and sticks —they must be killed or captured.However, with the proper carrotsand sticks, the vast majority ofactive and passive supporters of theinsurgents can be influenced tochange their behavior.

Operations in neutral or pro-government areas should beresourced as economy-of-forceefforts. Throughout the history ofCOIN, it has been an unfortunatereality that governments oftencommit excessive resources toareas in which they have alreadywon the fight. Such “preaching tothe choir” is a certain recipe fordecreasing government legitimacyand control in areas of active andpassive insurgent support.

The first step in executing theCOIN strategy, therefore, is to iden-tify the regions, villages and neigh-borhoods that provide insurgentswith their greatest active and pas-sive support. A study of demo-graphics (with factors such as reli-gious makeup, number of govern-ment jobs and services, number and

8 Special Warfare

cost of government projects in vari-ous areas, infant-mortality rates,per-capita income, numbers ofsquatters and local education lev-els, etc.) is one of the measures wecan use to build a map of disap-pointment. The map can help ascer-tain where active and passive sup-port is likely to blossom, leading tomore detailed assessments of thoseareas. These will be the areas fromwhich the enemy will likely drawmuch of his internal support (peo-ple, guns and money). Such areasare primary candidates for constab-ulary team emplacement.

Once areas of active and passivesupport have been identified, theymust be targeted with the appro-priate elements of national power.Assessments allow the governmentto pinpoint where and how best toattack insurgent support and to

begin working through the popu-lace to target the support infra-structure.17

MIDLIFE, assumptionsThe next step is to gather a group

of subject-matter-expert planners18

to discuss McCormick’s diamondmodel. Initially, they should list theassumptions necessary for all plan-ners to consider. Four of theassumptions used during OEF-Pand OIF II are listed in Figure 6.

With the assumptions listed,planners are ready to start work.Beginning with Leg 1 of the dia-mond model (increasing legitimacyand control between the govern-ment and the people), they shouldconsider the elements of nationalpower — military, informational,diplomatic, law-enforcement, intel-

ligence, financial and economic, orMIDLIFE — one at a time. Begin-ning with military, what are themilitary actions (Civil Affairs,humanitarian assistance, etc.) thatcan feasibly be performed in theareas of active and passive supportto build government legitimacy andcontrol? How can U.S. forces mar-ket or label these efforts in such away that the host government —not the U.S. — gets credit, andtherefore expands its legitimacyand control?

After an exhaustive discussionthat lists all feasible militaryactions for building host-nationcontrol and legitimacy, the plan-ning group will address all feasibleinformational actions. How can themessage be translated? By radio?By television? Does the populationhave television sets? Is the popula-

September 2005 9

tion literate? Can local newspapersbe used, or should cartoons bedeveloped that will inform an illit-erate population? These questionscontinue in exhaustive detail untilthe list of feasible informationalactions is developed. Next comesdiplomatic actions, and so on, untilthe entire analysis of MIDLIFEassets for Leg 1 of the diamond iscomplete.

Next comes Leg 2 of the diamond,severing the relationship betweenthe people and the insurgents.What MIDLIFE assets can be usedto reduce or destroy the insurgents’legitimacy and control? How canPsychological Operations, informa-tion operations and other assets beleveraged to sever the insurgents’control over the people? Again,planners must take each element ofnational power in sequence andproduce a list of feasible actions.

Leg 3 of the diamond addresseshow the best direct-action resultscan be achieved against the insur-gents. Have host-nation constabu-lary forces, a QRF and an MTC

force been identified and trained?What schooling, training, resourcesand operations are needed by theU.S. and the host nation to correct-ly select, train, organize, equip andemploy these three components inCOIN conflict for an effective com-bined, joint and interagency effort?

The same methods should beapplied to legs 4 and 5 of the dia-mond. What diplomatic or law-enforcement efforts can be used toseal the borders? How can moreinternational support for the gov-ernment be gathered? How can theflow of external support into theinsurgency be stopped? How canthat support be attacked at its ori-gin? How can we best eliminateinternational enemy sanctuary?Who comprises the infrastructureused to transition this raw supportinto output? How can we use infor-mational means to target the infra-structure?

The planning is exhaustive, thelists of feasible actions for each ele-ment of national power are long,and the planning group must not

take shortcuts. This methodologyshould be applied for all five legs ofthe diamond, methodically andsequentially war-gaming every ele-ment of MIDLIFE against each legof the diamond.

Once MIDLIFE actions of eachindividual diamond leg have beenidentified, they should be war-gamed to determine the effects thatactions taken in one area will haveon other legs of the diamond. Oncethis dynamic phase of war-gamingis complete, we will have a list ofuntailored but feasible actions thataddress the MIDLIFE spectrum.

Local assessment When the list of feasible

MIDLIFE actions has been devel-oped, progress is being madetoward the goal of developing aneffective COIN campaign. Next, thelist of feasible actions must be tai-lored for local implementation. Acookie-cutter approach that com-mits resources across broad areaswithout local tailoring is wasteful,hard to sustain and will likely notyield the desired outcomes.

The best way to tailor resourcesfor local implementation is to con-duct a census and an assessment ofeach area identified as an area ofactive or passive insurgent support.Broad, national-level census andassessments are not sufficient; localcensus and assessments must beconducted so that area-specificresults can be captured.

When assessments were conduct-ed during the initial evolution ofOEF-P on Basilan Island, andthroughout Iraq during OIF II, theresults demonstrated that thereare different issues and needsthroughout different insurgentareas of support. For example, itwas found that in a barangay, or vil-lage,19 on the eastern side of Basi-lan Island, education achieved thegreatest gains in legitimacy for the

10 Special Warfare

government. In another barangay afew kilometers away, the peoplewere not concerned with educationbut instead responded to having awell provided for them. The samevariances during assessments wereevident in Iraq.

The point is that just as all poli-tics are local, so the MIDLIFEimplementation used by the gov-ernment to gather actionable intel-ligence from the populace will varyfrom village to village, barangay tobarangay, and neighborhood toneighborhood. Therefore, localizedassessments are a must.

Accurate assessmentIf U.S. forces rely wholly on the

host state to conduct assessments,they may receive a distorted pic-ture. After all, the reason the insur-gency is growing or sustainingitself is that the host-state govern-ment has lost control and legitima-cy in these areas of active and pas-sive support.

For conducting the assessment,teams with language, cultural andregional expertise are invaluable.20

Additionally, accurate and localizedassessments require men who dailylive or operate in the area they areassessing. A drive-by view of theneeds of a given community willinevitably result in civic-action andhumanitarian projects that are nottailored to the most essential needsof each individual community. Adrive-by view will not accuratelygauge how best to implement thespectrum of feasible MIDLIFEactivities, and it will lead to subop-timal effects.

Additional required attributes ofthe assessment team are expertisein areas as diverse as security,operations and training; and engi-neering assessments of roads,bridges, wells and other structures.The medical needs of a community,ranging from dentistry, veterinary

medicine, optometry and surgeryto food storage and hygiene, mustbe addressed, as well as therequired capabilities for communi-cations, computers and informa-tion operations.

In sum, the assessment teammust live or operate consistently inthe target areas of insurgent activeor passive support and be intelli-gent and skilled enough to answerand recognize assessment-tool indi-cators across the MIDLIFE spec-trum. The importance of informa-tion derived from the man on theground for these assessments,

rather than using the “facts” com-piled in some headquarters, cannotbe overemphasized. The man on theground with the correct attributesis the only one capable of providingaccurate ground truth, and hisinformation must be valued aboveall others. Failure to obtain and useground truth will result in the mis-application of resources.

Assessment toolWe have identified the need for

localized assessments, as well asthe desirable attributes for theteams that will conduct them. Withthose needs met, planners mustdevelop an assessment tool that willprovide the ground truth needed toefficiently apply feasible MIDLIFEactions.

To develop the assessment tool,planners start with the list of untai-lored but feasible MIDLIFE actions.Then, for each feasible action, theydevelop a list of questions and fur-ther indicators that will show thebest way of locally tailoring andapplying local MIDLIFE-resourcecarrots and sticks.

When the assessment tool is com-plete, it is distributed to the assess-ment teams throughout the entireinsurgent area. Each team willanswer the questions in detail andreturn the assessment. Consolidat-ing and tabulating the data fromthe teams produces a matrix thatcompares assessed areas through-out the insurgent battlespace.

Note that while in one categorythe assessment tool’s evaluation issubjective, it is expressed as anumerical rating so that the variousarea assessments can be quantifiedand compared. In this way, the initialassessment tool sets a baseline. Asoperations, training and projects areimplemented, the same assessmenttool can be readministered periodi-cally to provide feedback on theeffect of applied MIDLIFE resources.Across the MIDLIFE spectrum,resource levels for carrots and stickscan then be adjusted by senior com-manders and resourcers, based onsound assessments of local effectsfrom the best possible source — theman on the ground.

The follow-on assessments makeMIDLIFE carrot-and-stick resourc-ing dynamic, which is essential,because the insurgency will grow orcontract in each community at a dif-ferent rate. Using this methodology,the maps of assessment results(Figure 8) will be periodicallyreviewed by senior MIDLIFE com-manders and resourcers, who canthen effectively distribute resourcesto optimize the desired COINresult: local, actionable intelligenceagainst members of the insurgentinfrastructure.

September 2005 11

In COIN, the reactionforce and MTC forcesare supporting efforts.Our resourcing and pri-oritization in COINshould reflect the con-stabulary, not the MTCforce, as the main effort.

It is important to re-emphasizethat the purpose of these MIDLIFEactions is not simply to provideunconditional, feel-good projectsthat achieve positive perceptionsamong the local populace. Instead,the purpose is to utilize the correctMIDLIFE carrots and sticks in legs1 and 2 of the diamond model thatwill yield actionable intelligencethat can be used to target anddestroy the insurgent infrastruc-ture (Leg 3).

Unconditional civic-action carrotsare a superb technique for winningsoft entry and acceptance into aninsurgent area. However, once entryhas been achieved, at the appropri-ate time, continued carrots mustbecome conditional upon populationsupport and identification of theinsurgent infrastructure. We cannotcontinue to expend MIDLIFEresources without achieving desiredCOIN effects.

SummaryEffective COIN requires constab-

ulary forces to live and operateamongst the local populace. Limit-ed hours of contact with the popu-lace will not yield the carrot-and-stick control required to promptthe local population to provideactionable intelligence against theenemy infrastructure. Convention-al forces (U.S. and/host-state) willbe required to establish and main-tain control in the most dangerousareas with the deepest enemy roots(under the operational control ofthe constabulary) while the con-stabulary implements the correctlocally assessed carrots and sticksfor infrastructure targeting. Afterthe infrastructure has been identi-fied and exposed by the local popu-lation, its members can be killed orcaptured.

Once locals in an area are reflex-ively reporting and exposing out-siders and infrastructure members,

the local COIN effort is well on theway to being won, and U.S. forcescan begin a phased handover of thelocal area to host-nation constabu-lary, QRF and MTC forces. U.S.forces can then move into a new,geographically connected area, tostart the entire process anew.21

As the U.S. continues to prose-cute the GWOT, these models andmethodologies need to becomerequired knowledge for COINplanners and executors. If usedproperly, they will allow the U.S.to conduct COIN in a structurallysound way, minimizing the invest-ment of resources and maximizingthe success of counterinsurgencyoperations.

Since Sept. 11, 2001,Lieutenant Colonel (P)Eric P. Wendt hasserved as the deputycommander of theArmy special-opera-tions task force dur-ing the first evolution of OEF-Phil-ippines; as commander of the 1stBattalion, 1st SF Group, in Oki-nawa; and in Iraq as the deputycommander of the combined jointspecial-operations task force duringOIF II. He recently completed anArmy War College resident fellow-ship. Lieutenant Colonel (P) Wendtis scheduled to take command of the1st SF Group in June 2006.

Notes:1 While all services and SOF elements were

represented during OEF-P, the major groundunits and their commanders involved were:the Special Operations Command-Pacific’sJTF 510, commanded by Brigadier GeneralDonald Wurster; the 1st Special ForcesGroup, commanded by Colonel DavidFridovich; and the 1st Battalion, 1st SFGroup, commanded by Lieutenant ColonelDave Maxwell.

2 Not a single ASG murder, rape or kidnap-ping was reported during this period to theU.S. Embassy, U.S. military forces in the RPor the Armed Forces of the Philippines. It is

possible that an unreported ASG murder,rape or kidnapping occurred, but even so,there was indisputably an extreme drop inASG effectiveness and activity.

3 Robert Kaplan visited the southern Phil-ippines in 2003 and noted the exceptionalresults and methods used by the JTF and theU.S. Army Special Forces in driving the ASGfrom Basilan Island. His observations andremarks were delivered to the highest levelsof the U.S. Department of Defense.

4 National Commission on Terrorist AttacksUpon the United States, The 9/11 Commis-sion Report (New York: W.W. Norton & Com-pany, Inc., 2004), 361.

5 The Naval Postgraduate School’s Depart-ment of Defense Analysis is commonlyknown in the SOF community as the special-operations and low-intensity-conflict curricu-lum, an 18-month, master’s degree-produc-ing program.

6 Dr. Gordon McCormick, lecture deliveredat the Naval Postgraduate School, 1994.

7 James C. Scott, The Moral Economy of thePeasant (New Haven, Conn.: Yale UniversityPress, 1977.)

8 Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf Jr., Rebel-lion and Authority: An Analytic Essay onInsurgent Conflicts (Santa Monica, Calif.:The RAND Corporation, 1970).

9 Dr. Gordon McCormick, lecture deliveredat the Naval Postgraduate School, 1995.10 The equivalent-response model is ideal forthe human-rights instruction of U.S. and for-eign forces. Once U.S. or foreign forces under-stand this model, they will see that if theyoverreact and commit human-rights abuses,they will suffer a strategic loss. With thisinstruction, human-rights issues becomefundamental war-fighting tools, vs. a“touchy-feely” subject.11 In 1994, Dr. Gordon McCormick created

the triangle insurgent/COIN model usedwith success during OEF-P. Later, addingother facets to the triangle to account forexternal international actors in insurgentwarfare, Dr. McCormick created the diamondmodel. For a further discussion of this modeland its application, see Gordon H.McCormick, “A ‘Pocket Model’ of InternalWar,” Department of Defense Analysis, NavalPostgraduate School, forthcoming.12 PRC monitoring techniques will rangefrom crude to sophisticated, based on host-state technological capabilities. With today’sswipe-age technology, PRC monitoringbecomes exponentially effective. The firstorder of business should be for U.S. forces toconduct a census and an assessment. If it istechnologically feasible, after the census,swipe ID cards can be issued, biometrics ofknown and suspected insurgents and theirsupporters recorded, and a database main-

12 Special Warfare

tained with details of who lives where, who isrelated to whom, previous police records,political affiliations, etc. If the cards becomea requirement for purchases at a market,hospital use, leaving an area, and variousother situations, in short order these cardscan become a powerful tool for identifyinginsurgent infrastructure. Always be mindfulthat PRC measures are a two-edged swordthat can have long-term implications afterthe insurgency is defeated. As such, theymust be applied proportionally in relation tothe depth and intensity of local insurgentsupport and activity.13 In an urban COIN environment, the reac-tion force and the MTC force are often thesame. The constabulary force, however, is aconstant in both urban and rural environ-ments. In a maritime environment, the reac-tion force can be launched from a sea-basedplatform, and the MTC force can be eitherships afloat or detection devices that willhave the desired pursuit effect.14 Dr. Gordon McCormick, lecture deliveredat the Naval Postgraduate School, 2005.15 During OEF-P, four of the models wereused. The area-of-influence model was added

during OIF II.16 Timothy P. Wickham-Crowley, Guerrillas& Revolution in Latin America: A Compara-tive Study of Insurgents and Regimes Since1956 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton UniversityPress, 1993).17 We can use similar techniques to identifythe sources of external support, and once wehave identified them, we can more effective-ly target our national elements of poweragainst them.18 This group of planners should consist ofmembers of a combined, joint and inter-agency team who are true subject-matterexperts in military, informational, diplomat-ic, law-enforcement, intelligence, financialand economics fields. Such a group was notavailable during OEF-P or OIF II, so withgreat foresight, the commanders of the JTF(Brigadier General Wurster) and theARSOTF (Colonel Fridovich) during OEF-P,and the CJSOTF commander during OIF II,made their best efforts to bring those withthe greatest possible knowledge and exper-tise in each of these areas into the productionof the planning-and-assessment tool. Whilesuch visionary commanders (like the 5th SF

Group commander, Colonel Hector Pagan,during OIF II) gave all the best resourcesthey could muster for these planning groups,insurgent conflict is a serious commitment ofnational blood and treasure, and forming aplanning group with true experts must besupported by the highest levels of govern-ment and the military chain of command.The lack of experienced interagency plannershighlights the need for formal joint andinteragency education at the senior-officerlevel. This sort of education will be invalu-able in the years of GWOT that lay ahead.19 “Barangay” is the term for village in thePhilippines.20 It should be noted that the desired attri-butes for our assessment team are identicalto the desired attributes of the constabularycomponent.21 The methodology of achieving COIN con-trol in one area and then growing into geo-graphically connected areas was presentedby Dr. Gordon McCormick in a lecture deliv-ered at the Naval Postgraduate School in2005.

September 2005 13

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All submissions will be reviewed in a timely manner. Special Warfare reserves the right to edit all contri-butions. Special Warfare will attempt to afford authors an opportunity to review the final edited version;requests for changes must be received by the given deadline.

Articles that require security clearance should be cleared by the author’s chain of command prior to sub-mission. No payment or honorarium is authorized for publication of articles. Material appearing in SpecialWarfare is considered in the public domain and is not protected by copyright unless it is accompanied by theauthor’s copyright notice. Published works may be reprinted, except where copyrighted, provided credit isgiven to Special Warfare and the authors.

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As the United States contin-ues its war on terror, mili-tary leaders are sending a

transformation plan forward thatwill change the way the U.S. fights.At the heart of t he transformationis a move from large conventionalground forces to smaller teams of“culturally savvy Soldiers.”1

The U.S. Army John F. KennedySpecial Warfare Center and School,or SWCS, the proponent for SpecialForces training, has a long history ofproducing culturally savvy Soldierswho are skilled in languages and canact as warrior-diplomats. But thecenter is taking that training to thenext level, with a move to transformthe language program to ensure thatSoldiers graduating from the center’sSpecial Forces training program areready to meet the demands of thetransforming Army.

“We’ve been producing culturallysavvy Soldiers for more than 50 years,”said Lieutenant Colonel Angelo John-son, chief of the SWCS Training Devel-opment Division, which is heading upthe language transformation. “Theconventional Army’s recent exposureto the effectiveness of our SF forces inIraq and Afghanistan has made themmore aware of the need for this kind oftraining, and it has also made usaware of the need to do it better.”

The language-transformation plan,

under the leadership of Major Gener-al James W. Parker, is designed tointroduce languages into the trainingprogram early on and weave themthroughout the course of the trainingprogram rather than teaching themat the end of the program. Just as theSoldiers will be taught the basics oftheir designated language, they willalso be given a foundation in the cul-ture of the areas in which they will beoperating. The new language pro-gram mirrors some of the changesbeing made at the Department ofDefense aimed at making language afundamental Soldier skill.

“The biggest thing we are doingdifferently is weaving languagetraining throughout the course andintroducing a different method ofdelivery,” continued Johnson. “Stu-dents will receive more hours oftraining, but it will be spread outover a period of time, and we willintroduce digital training.”

In addition to the incorporationof the latest technology and train-ing methods, utilizing advanceddistributed learning, or ADL, pro-grams, students will also beinvolved in immersion programs toimprove their fluency. The ultimateintent is to make sure that SF Sol-diers are able to communicate intheir assigned language within thecontext of the customs, traditions

and mores of a specific culture ormix of cultures indigenous to theirareas of responsibility.

A key to fulfilling that intent is toensure that the Soldiers have a basicunderstanding of the culture. Thefoundation of cultural understandingbegins with the Special OperationsLanguage Training, or SOLT, pro-gram, according to LieutenantColonel William Butcher, commanderof the 3rd Battalion, 1st Special War-fare Training Group, at SWCS.

Butcher explained that withineach lesson of the SOLT program,instructors are mandated to provide30 to 60 minutes of instruction onthe cultures associated with the lan-guage they are teaching. By the endof the program, students will beexposed to 25 to 30 hours of culturalawareness. Students also haveaccess to a cultural reading program,which currently has a focus onIslamic cultures, through the SWCSMarquat Memorial Library.

That cultural awareness, Butcherbelieves, will help students in learn-ing the language. “It is difficult tospeak a language if you do notunderstand the culture,” he said.

The combination of increased lan-guage proficiency and cultural under-standing led the center to adopt ahigher language-proficiency standardbased on the Defense Language Profi-

14 Special Warfare

Language Transformation Plan to Build Culturally Savvy Soldiers

by Janice L. Burton

ciency Test, or DLPT. In order to grad-uate from the Special Forces Qualifi-cation Course, or SFQC, and earn thecoveted Green Beret, students musthave a DLPT score of 1/1/1.

The establishment of a group ofcore languages is the centerpiece ofthe language-training transforma-tion. The selected languages are:Chinese, Korean, Tagalog, Indone-sian, French, Arabic, Persian Farsi,Russian, German and Spanish.

The decision to reduce the numberof languages taught came from a deci-sion brief given to the general officersin the U.S. Army Special OperationsCommand, which sought to focus onlanguages that are relevant to the geo-graphic combatant commands, haveregional utility and endurance and arethe most applicable to the Global Waron Terrorism. Consideration was alsogiven to Soldiers’ ability to use,improve and sustain the language overthe course of their careers. In thisrespect, selecting languages that arealso important to business and acade-mia allows SWCS to leverage commer-cial language products, Web-basedtraining, university instruction and

other venues for teaching and main-taining language skills.

Reducing the number of languagestaught will also provide higher effi-ciency, provide better entry-level lan-guage skills and provide languagesthat are sustainable through ADLcommercial teaching products. Theselected languages will be taught atthe most effective location, with somelanguage training being conducted atFort Bragg, N.C.; at Fort Lewis,Wash.;in Germany and at the Defense Lan-guage Institute, or DLI, in Washing-ton, D.C. The establishment of theinstitutional core languages is the firststep in a four-step transition.

The second step is to change the waystudents receive their languageassignments. Under the current proc-ess, students enrolled in the SFQC areassigned languages at the end of thecourse. Under the new program, Sol-diers receive a language assignmentand unit assignment at the end of Spe-cial Forces Assessment and Selection,or SFAS,which is Phase I of the SFQC.The early language assignment leadsto the third step, the integration of lan-guage training throughout the SFQC.

At the end of Phase I, students willbe given an aptitude test before begin-ning a four-week program of independ-ent instruction that will give them ahead start on training in their desig-nated language. Students will berequired to log on to a monitored com-puter system on a regular basis.

According to Johnson, the head-start program will utilize ADLtools and will include SOLT mate-rials, as well as commercial, off-the-shelf products.

“Some of these materials aregeared toward survival, while othersare geared toward sustainment,” saidJohnson. “We have 10 different lan-guages, and the materials won’t nec-essarily be geared the same way.”

Some of the introductory materialsmay be geared more toward “tourist-training,” Johnson said, teaching sim-ple ideas such as “Where is the air-port?” or “What are the area’s point ofinterest?” The survival training willbe aimed more at communicatingneeds, such as “Where is theembassy?” or “I’m hurt, take me tothe hospital.”

Culture is included in this training,infused into the program throughWeb-based lessons that indirectlyinclude cultural training,added Butch-er. “Soldiers will read through thematerial, which may discuss the cus-tom of greetings or how the transit sys-tem works in a particular country, andwill pick up that part of the culture.”

At the beginning of Phase II, whichis now small-unit tactics, Soldiers willbe divided into student SF opera-tional detachments, based on theirlanguage assignments. During thisphase, students will receive an addi-tional two weeks of language trainingknown as Language Block I.

During Phase III, the militaryoccupational specialty, or MOS,training, Soldiers will completeLanguage Block II. This trainingwill incorporate an additional 13Saturdays of training, each ofwhich will consist of six hours of

September 2005 15

Schedule Ph II/Target Language/Schedule DLPT

Schedule Ph II/Assign Language/Category 3 or 4

Schedule Ph II/Assign Language/Category 1 or 2

Schedule Ph II/Assign Language/Category 1 or 2

Schedule Ph II/Mandatory Signed Counseling/Target Language

Schedule Ph II/Mandatory Signed Coun-seling/Interview with Language Training SME/Assign Language/Category 1 or 2

DLPT 1/1

65

No

115

No

No

Waiver

No

RTU

DLAB

GT Score

Prior LanguageExperience

1st SWTG(A)Review

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

95+

65+

Language Screening Process

face-to-face instruction and twohours of ADL. The course will alsoincorporate a two-week block oflanguage training between the sev-enth and eighth weeks of training.

Phase IV, dedicated entirely to lan-guage training, will incorporate Lan-guage Block III. Depending on theirlanguage assignment, students willparticipate in either an eight or 12-week course. Languages are dividedinto four categories based on the diffi-culty of the language. Romance lan-guages, such as French and Spanish,are designated categories 1 or 2. Lan-guages utilizing non-Roman alpha-bets, such as Korean, Chinese Man-darin and Arabic, are categories 3 or 4.Languages assigned to categories 1 or2 will have an eight-week block, whilecategories 3 and 4 will be 12 weeks.

During the first week of Phase IV,all students will take a mock DLPT.Those with the highest scores may bechosen to attend an advanced 16-week language course taught by theDLI. Approximately 36 Soldiers willbe offered this opportunity annually.

Students who have been assigned tothree specific languages — Tagalog,Chinese Mandarin and German —will be assigned to special immersionprograms taught at Fort Lewis and inGermany.Other students will not haveas intensive an immersion, but theywill be given opportunities to experi-ence the culture of their target lan-guages.Students may do something assimple as visiting a French restaurant,where they will learn dining customsand greetings, or they may visit muse-ums showcasing the French culture,said Butcher. However, some studentswill be given the opportunity to travelin the United States and stay for aweek in communities that are com-posed heavily of a specific culture.Recently 26 language students spent aweek in Dearborn, Mich., the largestArabic community in the UnitedStates. “They had the opportunity toeat in Arabic restaurants, talk to themerchants in the stores,visit a mosque

and visit museums with Arabicinstructors,” said Butcher.

The school also sends students toCanada to spend time learning theFrench culture and to BrightonBeach, N.Y., to spend time in a Rus-sian community, just to name a fewof the programs. The realistictraining in both culture and lan-guage will be beneficial when Sol-diers enter the final phase of theSFQC — Robin Sage.

To date, students attending RobinSage have not been asked to put theirlanguage skills to the test, but that’schanging, as well. Prior to going toRobin Sage, students may have theopportunity to participate in an inter-active scenario-driven simulationwhere their language skills will beput to the test. The simulation,designed and implemented by 3rd

Battalion, utilizes the EngagementSkills Trainer to put Soldiers in situ-ations they may encounter.

The scenario, which is controlledby an instructor, may have a Soldierasking an individual to leave hishouse in order for a search to be con-ducted. The interaction will use thetarget language, with one of the cen-ter’s native-speaker instructors play-ing the role of the indigenous person-nel. Soldiers are required to use theproper greetings, render the neces-sary respect, recognize culturaltaboos and negotiate with the man toreach a peaceful solution. “Theirknowledge of the culture helps to de-escalate the situation,” said Butcher.

This simulation is still in thebeginning stages, but when fullyimplemented, it will help set thestage for the newly redesigned Robin

16 Special Warfare

USAJFKSWCS PAO

Students participating in the SFQC’s culmination exercise, Robin Sage, will use their foreign-lan-guage skills to negotiate with role players acting as guerrilla chiefs who are native speakers.

Sage. The exercise has been infusedwith scenarios that will require stu-dents to negotiate with guerrillachiefs utilizing their language train-ing. Johnson said native-speakingcontractors will be brought in to par-ticipate in those scenarios. “Unlessyou do it, you don’t realize how muchlonger it takes or how much more dif-ficult it is to negotiate in a foreignlanguage,” said Johnson.

“That kind of scenario in Robin Sagewill orient the students to negotiatingin their target language and willacquaint them with some of the cour-tesies that must be followed in thosekinds of negotiations,” Johnson said.

The final element in the transi-tion plan is a sustainment-and-enhancement program that willallow SWCS to support unit com-mand-language programs throughlanguage labs and ADL productsand courseware at the SF-grouplevel. The sustainment of languageskills will be incorporated into thecareer management of Soldiers.

Johnson added that the increaseddemands of the language-trainingprograms will require students todemonstrate a lot of initiative. “Weare asking a lot, but with the caliberof students who come through here,that shouldn’t be a problem,” he said.“The Soldiers who elect to become SFare self-starters who are searchingfor knowledge. We believe if we givethem this opportunity, they willstrive and work to make themselvesa more viable asset to their team.”

The first SFQC class to participatein the new language program will beclass 02/06, which starts in November;however, the first pilot of the revampedRobin Sage was conducted in July.

Janice L. Burton is assigned tothe staff of Special Warfare.

1 Greg Jaffe, “Rumsfeld details big militaryshift in new document,” Wall Street Journal, 11March 2005.

Serving a Nation at WarBy Command Sergeant Major Dave M. Bruner

Since the tragic events of Sept. 11,2001, the United States has remained anation at war. This war is being wagedacross the spectrum of warfare and isunlike any other in American history.The adversaries we face today are intenton destroying American power and influ-ence, both abroad and in our homeland.They are intent on bringing fear and ter-ror to the American homeland, usingwhatever means necessary. This hatredis being fueled in part by a fundamental-ist ideology that attacks our personal and religious freedom, ourdemocratic system of government and our American way of life.

Every Soldier swears a solemn and sacred oath to supportand defend the Constitution of the United States of America.Our profession demands selfless service, discipline, love of one’scountry, personal integrity, honor, courage, pride and living theSoldier’s Creed every day.

The Soldier’s Creed

I am an American Soldier.I am a Warrior and a member of a team.I serve the people of the United States

and live the Army Values.I will always place the mission first.I will never accept defeat.I will never quit.I will never leave a fallen comrade.I am disciplined, physically and mentally tough,

trained and proficient in my warrior tasks and drills.I always maintain my arms, my equipment and myself.I am an expert, and I am professional.I stand ready to deploy, engage and destroy

the enemies of the United States of America in close combat.I am a guardian of freedom and the American way of life.I am an American Soldier.Remember, we as American Soldiers have been entrusted

with preserving peace and freedom, defending American cul-ture, defending democracy and safeguarding the Constitution ofthe United States. We cannot and will not fail to do our duty anddefend our great country and its people!

Veritas et Libertas!

Command Sergeant Major Dave M. Bruner is the commandsergeant major for the JFK Special Warfare Center and School.

CSM Dave M. Bruner

September 2005 17

One of literary icon Robert Heinlein’scharacters, Lazarus Long, adopteda matter-of-fact, if somewhat cyni-

cal, viewpoint on the nature of obtainingcooperation from his fellow man: “Neverappeal to a man’s ‘better nature.’ He maynot have one. Invoking his self-interestgives you more leverage.”

In operations on the ground in bothIraq and Afghanistan, this cautionarywisdom is finding practical application.

Although the approach may not be anacknowledged tactic, or even a consciouseffort, it is perhaps worthwhile to look athow variations of it are yielding resultsand how those local applications maytransfer to a larger strategy and multi-ply its effectiveness.

In three “tours” in the Global War onTerrorism, or GWOT, the author has beenable to see the varying success of a widespectrum of tactics, employed at variouslocations, designed to both ensure the“force protection” of the coalition contin-gent and, more critically, stabilize theoperational environment.

Quite often the tactics include the“stick,” or the threat of offensive opera-tions directed against those unwilling tocooperate with local leadership operatingin concert with the coalition presence. Aswell, there is the “carrot,” consisting ofthe largess of the coalition in the form,most often, of some sort of infrastructureimprovement, be it a school, clinic,bridge, etc., serving as either a rewardfor a community’s good citizenship or anincentive for future positive relationsand stability.

Psychological studies have long heldfear of loss and promise of reward to beamong chief behavioral influences. Citi-zens of the lands in which we currentlyconduct our large, overt military opera-tions may be motivated by self-preser-vation or by potential material gains.

18 Special Warfare

Good Cops, Bad Cops, Carrots and Sticks

by Sergeant First Class Jesse P. Pruett

Army News Service

A Psychological Operations Soldier distributes information to Iraqi citizens in anattempt to gain their support. By sharing information, rather than kicking in doors, theSoldier is offering a carrot — but the carrot doesn’t always work.

But when the populace flags down thepassing coalition convoy to alert them ofan IED just ahead, or treks to the near-est forward operating base to report arecent meeting of anti-coalition militarypersonnel, then the approach is work-ing, irrespective of the motivation. Thisis “force protection” in its most basicincarnation.

To be successful, this approachrequires flexibility and an ability toeffectively evaluate the situation. Whenan operational unit rolls into mythicalOaklandistan and is greeted with thecold stares of a people whose dailymantra has been hatred for all thingsWestern, that is not the best environ-ment in which to pull the carrot from thequiver. Rather, we maintain security bybrandishing the stick. When the sameunit moves to neighboring Diegostan,however, and the faces carry wearinessnot wrath, then we may put down thestick and offer the carrot. In both cases,the environment has been secured. Even-tually, the folks in Oaklandistan see theimprovements in the lives of their neigh-bors in Diegostan, and begin to eschewthe stick their actions compelled andseek the carrot they desire.

The author’s first exposure to the suc-cess of this dual approach came shortlyafter 9/11, when the fact that a third ofBosnia’s population was Muslim suddenlytook on a new relevance. Although thestick had not been employed for sometime in that environment, for many Bosni-ans the uncertainty of the nature of theAmerican response added a fresh layer oftension.

Our task force flexed its muscle andtook a more assertive stance. Theincreased posture was not lost on thepopulation, and two results were quicklyevident: Some folks were moved tosilence, others to demonstrate their non-affiliation with the terrorists. As expect-ed, the collection of active intelligencespiked. Less predictable was the numberof locals who sought out the carrot hold-ers, in this case the Civil Affairs team, tooffer information. A theme recurrentwith these individuals was a general

indifference to the military presence, butthey felt obligated to assist those whohad assisted them in tangible ways, par-ticularly with the implementation ofinfrastructure reconstruction. This car-rot-induced response revealed the pres-ence of a Wahaabist (a particular form ofSaudi Arabian Islam that is often associ-ated with extremism) enclave suspectedof smuggling heavy weapons. Even if notby full design, the combination of theovert and aggressive tactics of tradition-al military operations with the passive,more subtle aspects of the Civil Affairs

Army News Service

Civil Affairs Soldiers aretasked with winninghearts and minds. Whenrewards, such as the dis-tribution of heaters tovillagers, do not work,Soldiers may have to useforce.

September 2005 19

mission allowed the full picture to berevealed.

The forces on the ground may often beunaware of the other side of the coin, thatwe are in effect implementing a goodcop/bad cop scenario writ large. Maneuvercommanders, for example (for ease of illus-tration, filling the role of bad cop), may beonly mildly aware of the presence andnature of operations of a Civil Affairs team(the good cop), yet the population respondsas if it were a choreographed routine. Wemay be able to capitalize on the appear-ance of divided aims while leveraging thecarrot and stick appeal to the disparateself-interests of our opponent. This willboth sway the members of the target audi-ence and influence their behavior.

This is true even now in Afghanistan,where provincial reconstruction teams tra-

verse the same ground as Infantry battal-ions. They travel through the same vil-lages, yet they evoke distinct responses.Epithets are hurled along with rocks asthe bad cops rumble through. They meanto intimidate and they do. They set thestage for the good cops. When the goodcops approach, smiles are offered freely,along with the ubiquitous “chai” (the localtea). Same uniforms, same weapons, dif-ferent response.

The bad do not patrol in advance of thegood as part of some master plan; it justworks out that way. Yet the good could notso readily expect their warm welcome,were it not in the back of the villager’sminds that the options are to accept theoffered generosity and the move towardsstability or face the consequences of a con-flict they cannot hope to win. Either copacting alone could not achieve the result.

Together, there is a symbiosis that doeswork. Imagine, then, the benefits weresuch complementary activities actuallycoordinated — if this naturally occurringphenomenon were to become part of theplan. If the cops were sufficiently read-into each other’s strategy that they couldconsciously use each other — the threatand the reward — as tactics, then the ben-efit would be manifest.

This marriage can be achieved througheducation and planning. Current opera-tions can harness the benefit of thisappeal by revisiting preparation tech-niques that have proven successful in thepast and by proactively accounting for theflip side of each respective cop’s opera-tional focus.

Currently, the coordination between thetwo camps is perfunctory, with the natureof the exchange being determined primar-ily by the personalities of the leadership.There are no joint training exercises toallow for better understanding of the dif-ferent missions, much less for ways inwhich they may complement each other.Egos, territorialism, possessiveness andinflexibility minimize the potential ofthese individual, lower-level alliances toaffect the entire scope of the operationalarea.

In some cases, the leadership recognizesthe benefits and the good and bad copstruly do operate in unison, producing pos-itive results such as those described inBosnia. However, this ideal scenario is fartoo infrequent. Prior to deployments toBosnia, there were detailed trainingevents, incorporating role players, mockvillages and subject-matter experts withon-the-ground experience. These eventsbrought together the maneuver units andthe personnel with whom they would beworking. The strangers met and began toplan how their missions could interlink.GWOT has moved into a phase of opera-tions in which these preparatory functionswill multiply the effectiveness of the car-rot and stick approach already takingplace. Creating a laboratory where thegood cops and bad cops can rehearse theirtactical approach, mentoring by experi-enced veterans of the theater, will surely

20 Special Warfare

Psychological studies have long held fear ofloss and promise of reward to be among chiefbehavioral influences. Citizens of the lands inwhich we currently conduct our large, overtmilitary operations may be motivated by self-preservation or by potential material gains.

magnify any positive impact that may beachieved.

The carrot and stick approach, implement-ed through the dual presentation ofunabashed strength on one hand and of coop-erative assistance on the other, is an appealto self-interest that is an effective and effi-cient application of the coalition’s presence.With a force-wide emphasis on joint-trainingopportunities and appropriate cross-educa-tion, we may optimize the ability of our forcesto achieve our overall objectives.

Many of our current adversaries, oftencloaked in the false legitimacy of religion,have embraced violence and greed. Withthe right stick, our bad cops can usurptheir initiative and through vastly superi-or tactical ability, decisively trump theirviolence. With the right carrot, our goodcops can expose the pervasiveness of theircorruption and erode the fanatical founda-tion of their claims to power. Together, U.S

and coalition forces can demonstrate theirability to both intimidate and encourage,delivering the message that one way or theother, they will prevail.

Sergeant First Class Jesse P. Pruett, a mem-ber of the 450th Civil Affairs Battalion, is serv-ing his second U.S. Army tour in Afghanistan.His other tours of duty include Bosnia-Herze-govina, Nicaragua and El Salvador. Out ofuniform, he most recently served with theDepartment of Defense as the regional pro-grams coordinator for the Coalition Provision-al Authority in Baghdad, where he oversaw$300 million in national reconstructionsefforts. He is a founding partner of a Web-based consulting firm focusing on issues ofsingle-issue terrorism. He is a distinguishedmember of the Civil Affairs Association andholds a bachelor’s in international relationsfrom United States International University.

Army News Service

Civil Affairs Soldiers patrol in Baghdad. Often the threat of force, rather than the promise of reward, is needed to influ-ence the local populace.

September 2005 21

Citing the need to build coali-tions before a crisis occurs,General Doug Brown, com-

mander, United States Special Oper-ations Command, welcomed SOFoperators from around the world tothe first USSOCOM InternationalSpecial Operations Forces Week con-ference June 8 at the Tampa Con-vention Center.

“We are truly honored to host somany international guests as well asU.S. military and civilian leadershipand our industry partners,” he said.

Brown said this extraordinaryevent was a great opportunity forbuilding new friendships, strength-ening acquaintances and learninghow individual SOF units, workingas a coalition team, can train andpartner together to improve security;stabilize societies; improve the quali-ty of life for our citizens; enhance cul-tural awareness; share tactics, tech-niques and procedures; and whenrequired – defeat global threats.

Pointing to the need for more cul-turally aware soldiers, Brown notedthat the forces present came fromdifferent backgrounds, cultures, reli-gions, politics and experiences, andthat while it would not be wise topresume to understand all nuancesof each culture, SOF share a commonbond.

“But there is a bond we all sharein the profession of special opera-tions,” he said. “Our strength is notin numbers, it’s in the innovation ofour forces across a spectrum of capa-bilities, their superior physical andmental fitness, their adaptability,and most of all, their judgment andinitiative, which guide them in themost challenging and unexpected circumstances.”

All SOF stand on common groundto defend and secure their nations byrejecting terror and tyranny, whichare not associated with any particu-lar culture, said Brown. “Belief inhuman dignity is not restricted bypolitics or geography — these arebasic human values that as civilizednations we all share — and seek todefend.”

SOF complete high-level training,operate in hostile environments andare tested in the heat of battle.“Honor is our hallmark — the brav-ery, razor-sharp skills and devotionto duty of SOF are key factors indetermining the ultimate outcome ofany conflict we may face.

“We’ve trekked alongside eachother through thick mountain jun-gles to build a school or clinic in aremote village.We’ve quietly prowledthrough murky waters and along faraway beaches in a stealthy pursuit of

an unsuspecting foe — and just aswe did this past December, many ofus have worked side-by-side in noth-ing less than heroic efforts to helpvictims of natural disasters.”

Brown lauded the many years ofjoint training that have built acoalition force capable of operatingacross the spectrum of operationsfrom pre-crisis to post-crisis. Buthe added that the force could notbe complacent, rather it shouldinstead look to the next level —building a global network of spe-cial-operations capabilities.

Brown noted that a key compo-nent to taking that next step was forcoalition partners to learn moreabout each other’s capabilities. Theyneed to gain a better understandingof each other’s thoughts and plans inthe ongoing operational environ-ment, he said, particularly in regardsto global security issues, and to con-tinue to develop mutually beneficialapproaches to coalition operations.

Brown also challenged all the forceto look beyond its traditional rolesand missions and to search for newapproaches to the way SOF trainand operate together.

“With this incredible grouptogether for the first time in oneplace we have a unique and power-ful opportunity to openly emerge

22 Special Warfare

Brown: Trust Transcends the Chaos of War

by Captain Joseph Coslett

on the future’s horizon,” he said.Brown also stressed the impor-

tance of non-military skills andexpertise such as diplomacy, infor-mation, economics and finance —noting that interagency partners area key component of the internationalteam. In addition, he said, industrypartners are enabling SOF to net-work and operate in ways neverthought possible. Technology is a keyenabler of special operations; howev-er, the challenge is interoperability.

“Our future rests in a globalizedsystem, one that (New York Timesreporter) Thomas Friedman charac-terizes as ‘the (unstoppable) integra-tion of markets, nation-states andtechnologies to a degree never wit-nessed before,” said Brown, addingthat USSOCOM’s operations tempois expected to remain high for theforeseeable future, which will affectthe amount of training conductedwith our coalition partners.

“But we will pursue every oppor-tunity we can … we’ve learned wecan’t wait until a crisis occurs todevelop effective working relation-ships. Our relationships must behabitual.”

Noting that relationships nurturetrust — the cornerstone of the spe-cial operations culture — he added,“We train and operate as onejoint/coalition team in order to buildthe trust between operators that cantranscend the chaos of war.”

Supporting regional training isthe responsibility of USSOCOM’stheater special-operations com-mands, or TSOCs. As a sub-unifiedcommand, TSOCs act as a conduit,with regionally oriented, culturallytrained and language-proficient SOFin their areas of responsibility tofacilitate regional objectives of thegeographic combatant commandsand USSOCOM.

“As a global community, we allhave an interest and role in address-ing and preventing the circum-stances that lead people to make theleap from nonviolent opposition todissent to violent opposition,” Brownsaid. “If we fail to confront impend-ing dangers, we imperil ourselves.The statesman Edmund Burke aptlywarned, “All that is necessary for thetriumph of evil is that good men donothing.” The threat of global terror-ism is a threat that requires a long

and determined effort from all of us.”Brown said he believes the key to

success in the Global War on Terror-ism is joint, coalition, combined andinteragency operations. “They havebuilt a network to defeat us, and itwill take a network to defeat them.”

According to Brown, preventingthe emergence of threats to nationalsecurity is the key to combatting ter-rorism. He believes that can be doneby improving living conditions forcitizens, which will take away theterrorists havens.Through diplomat-ic, informational and economicefforts, interagency partners cannegotiate and provide aid to vulnera-ble regions.

“Our adversaries will try to con-vince us that our coalitions cannotprevail,” he said. “They will try tomake us believe that our diversity isa weakness — they are wrong.

“We must always remember thatwe cannot let the bonds we forge dis-solve after the shooting stops or a cri-sis is over — building coalitions forthe long term means for the longterm, not just when it is convenientfor current operations,” he said.

As crises emerge across the globe,SOF are enabling rapid dissemina-tion of information, rapid decision-making, rapid movement and rapidmission-accomplishment. HoweverBrown cautioned, “We must balanceour sense of urgency with a sense ofpatient persistence.

“There is a Chinese proverb thattells us, ‘If your vision is for a year,plant wheat … if your vision is for adecade, plant trees. If your vision isfor a lifetime, plant people — we areplanting people.”

Captain Joseph Coslett is assignedto the U.S. Special Operations Com-mand Public Affairs Office.

September 2005 23

USSOCOM Public Affairs Office

General Doug Brown, commander of U.S. Special Operations Command, addresses attendees atthe first annual International Special Operations Forces Week in June at MacDill Air Force Base.

Since Sept. 11, 2001, UnitedStates special-operationsforces have fought alongside

coalition forces on an unprece-dented scale. Integration withcoalition forces is critical toaffirming the legitimacy and cred-ibility of our operations in theGlobal War on Terrorism, orGWOT, accomplishing missionsthat cover vast amounts of terrain.

In Iraq and Afghanistan, thisintegration has affected opera-tions from the task-force leveldown to the special-operationsSoldiers on the ground who workwith coalition forces in adjacentspecial-operations areas. ARSOFaviators also work directly withcoalition units while inserting, re-supplying and exfiltrating coali-tion forces operating deep inenemy territory.

In both operations EnduringFreedom, or OEF, and Iraqi Free-dom, or OIF, SF groups were thecore of combined joint-special-operations task forces, orCJSOTFs. Forces from sevenallied nations were committed toOEF in late 2001 and deployed toAfghanistan in December 2001,where they executed well over 200special-reconnaissance, direct-action and sensitive-site-exploita-

tion missions over the ensuing 12months.

Correct command relationshipsresulted in unity of command andunity of effort. British and Aus-tralian forces, under the tacticalcontrol of CJSOTF-West duringthe opening months of OIF, con-tributed significantly to the stra-tegically critical counter-theatre-

ballistic-missile, or CTBM, mis-sion in Iraq’s western desert.

Long before we begin isolationplanning, rehearsals and infiltra-tion of units, we must achieve athorough integration of coalitionSOF into the theater campaignplan. This integration begins atsenior levels of leadership — thetheater special-operations com-

mand, or SOC; the CJSOTF; andthe combined Army special-opera-tions task force, or ARSOTF —and extends down to the operatorlevel.

An example of this integrationoccurred in Iraq, as an Australianpatrol reached the eastern edge ofits assigned area. While an Aus-tralian staff sergeant croucheddown with his patrol in defiladeobserving an Iraqi military con-voy moving toward his position,he called for support, using air-borne warning and control sys-tem, or AWACS. The AWACS air-craft on station that night hap-pened to have a British crew, whoguided a flight of American F-15sonto the enemy targets withineight minutes of the initial callfor close air support, or CAS.

Thorough training made thisexample one of dozens of success-ful contacts with the enemy. CASprocedures and new control tech-niques were rehearsed and devel-oped with U.S. SF, coalitionground units and U.S. and Britishair forces during three major jointexercises conducted prior todeployment and in theater duringthe weeks leading up to OIF. SFand U.S. Air Force commanderssaid these exercises were the

24 Special Warfare

Special-Operations Forces’ Interoperability With Coalition Forces

by Lieutenant Colonel Mark C. Arnold

Long before we beginisolation planning, re-hearsals and infiltra-tion of units, we mustachieve a thoroughintegration of coalitionSOF into the theatercampaign plan.

most sophisticated and realisticthey have experienced duringtheir careers. SF operationaldetachments on the ground calledin fighters and bombers thatdropped live ordnance on targets;SOF air insertion and resupplyteams used both ground and air-borne control centers. Command-ers believe this training made thedifference during the openingweeks of the war in Iraq.

The 5th SF Group was the

nucleus of CJSOTF-West duringthis period of OIF. The group staffintegrated British and Australianofficers into almost all direc-torates of the task force as quick-ly as allied national authoritiesapproved their potential partici-pation in contingency operationsinvolving Iraq. The CJSOTF J3,the CJSOTF deputy commander,J3-western desert and assistantJ2 were all allied officers.

A British army officer proved to

be a no-nonsense J3 who quicklyorganized the CJSOTF staff intoa war-ready mix of officers andNCOs from the 5th SF Group,allied forces, and U.S. reserve-component forces. His accent anduniform proved to be the onlynoticeable differences betweenhim and his U.S. staff; doctrine hehad trained to during his careerwas so similar to U.S. proceduresthat integration appeared to beseamless to the command. This

September 2005 25

Army News Service

U.S. Special Forces and forces of the Albanian Army conduct a joint patrol in Iraq.

top-down staffing enhanced inter-operability immeasurably, andcoalition forces were integratedinto all phases of operations.

During CTBM operations inOIF, SF was an enabling force forthe combined force air componentcommander, or CFACC. Coalitionunits demonstrated their capabil-ities in the use of emerging tech-nologies by directing precision-targeted air-delivered ordnance.These units have continuouslyimproved their interoperabilitywith U.S. SF and U.S. strike air-craft over the years by training toNATO-standard CAS procedures;they used these skills effectivelyagainst the Iraqi Army and para-military forces.

On several occasions, coalitionSOF units were attacked in Iraq’swestern desert by mounted Iraqicounter-SOF forces. Theseengagements were often termi-nated when coalition SOF calledimmediate CAS strikes onto theenemy. The CAS missions werecoordinated through the CJSOTF-West joint-fires element, whichhad a combined staff of U.S. andU.K. fires-coordination officers.Coalition units also engagedmobile enemy targets in ambush-es using a combination of CASand their organic direct fires.

The days immediately followingthe insertion of coalition forcesinto Iraq’s western desert wereamong the most dangerous forCJSOTF West’s subordinate unitsconducting counter-TBM. Infiltra-tion required British and Aus-tralian patrols to deconflict theiroperations with those of U.S.forces and to conduct a passage oflines as they moved through eachother’s operating areas. All move-ments were conducted at night,when Iraqi counter-SOF opera-tions were very aggressive, andthere was an increased possibilityof fratricide. Rehearsals, a com-

mon radio operating frequencyand coordination at all levels ofcommand resulted in success dur-ing this period.

SF operators were underextreme pressure as they avoidedenemy ambushes and destroyedmobile enemy formations.Through thick dust and night-vision goggles, ODAs had to beable to differentiate betweenenemy vehicles and various mod-els of coalition vehicles — usuallywithin the standoff range of

friendly and enemy weapons sys-tems. Fortunately, recognitiontraining on vehicles and markingshad continued until infiltrationbegan.

SF detachments and coalition-SOF patrols from CJSOTF-Westaccomplished this CTBM missionwithout the loss of any coalitionsoldiers, while inflicting consider-able damage and casualties onthe enemy.

As part of the CTBM fight, theBritish isolated the Iraqi garrisonat the strategically significantcity of Al Qaim, near the Syrianborder, from late March until itsurrendered in late April. The

British destroyed large numbersof enemy forces, calling dozens ofair strikes onto enemy positionsand often using CAS to break con-tact. Near the end of the Scudmissile fight in the westerndesert, an Australian patrol foundmore than 50 Iraqi fighter jetshidden under camouflage netsand tents at Al Asad air base. Thepatrol leader called his command,saying, “I think we just locatedhalf the bloody Iraqi air force!”

During OIF, the coalition SOFheadquarters was located nearthe CJSOTF-West headquarters,but during the first year of OEFin Afghanistan, the coalition SOFunits were separated by hundredsof miles from the CJSOTF-Afghanistan headquarters. Con-sequently, the CJSOTF-Afghanistan commander estab-lished an SF liaison element – a“coalition forward operating base”also known as the coalition coor-dination cell, manned by Soldiersfrom the 3rd SF Group — locatedwith the five coalition SOF taskgroups. The coalition FOB wasmanned with representation fromthe J2, J3, J4 and J6. It providedU.S. command-and-control, com-munications and intelligencelinks to the coalition SOF head-quarters such as: dissemination ofU.S. intelligence in support ofmission-oriented requests forinformation; video feeds of intelli-gence, surveillance and recon-naissance; clearance of fires;redundant radio communications;frequency and crypto manage-ment; U.S.-supervised use of clas-sified e-mail; video teleconferenc-ing with the CJSOTF commander;U.S.-provided combat service sup-port; and operational advice.

Coalition SOF were incorporat-ed into the battle throughoutAfghanistan. The units conductedspecial reconnaissance where lit-tle was known of the enemy situa-

26 Special Warfare

Coalition SOF in U.S.-led task forces continu-ously proved their abili-ty to get the job done atthe tactical and opera-tional levels. They alsocontributed to strategicobjectives by affirmingthe legitimacy and cred-ibility of our efforts inthe GWOT.

tion. They operated mounted inthe desert and valleys and dis-mounted in the most severe ter-rain. Those deep operations oftenled to follow-on direct-action mis-sions against members of al-Qaeda and resurgent Taliban.

Interoperability was led at theoperational level from the head-quarters at CJSOTF Afghanistanthrough its coalition FOB; howev-er, interoperability often began atthe tactical level — a U.S. SF bat-talion. This began in Afghanistanwhen the 2nd Battalion, 3rd SFGroup, established its FOB atKandahar Airfield in April 2002.Five coalition SOF task groupsand CJSOTF-Afghanistan’s coali-tion FOB — the coalition coordi-nation cell — were located adja-cent to FOB 32.

FOB 32’s commander and stafftook advantage of the coalitionSOF units’ static and mobile spe-cial reconnaissance capabilities toconduct operational preparationof the battlefield, or OPB, for hisdetachments. Through the coali-tion FOB and Colonel Joe Celeski,who took command of 3rd SFGroup and CJSOTF-Afghanistanin May 2002, FOB 32 plannedcombat missions with the coali-tion task groups for execution inthe Oruzgun, Helmund and Pakti-ka provinces. Initial reconnais-sance missions led to successfuloperations directed at al-Qaedaand Taliban leadership cells. SFdetachments unilaterally con-ducted many of these missionsbased on OPB conducted by coali-tion SOF and briefed to FOB 32.

Coalition SOF were particular-ly successful in mobile-reconnais-sance missions that resulted inthe capture and destruction ofnumerous caches of enemy arms.These missions were in directsupport of CJSOTF-Afghanistan’scampaign plan. Coalition SOFconducted their own unilateral

direct-action missions and werealso successful in the capture ofTaliban leadership and in facili-tating the information-operationsmission of striking the enemywhen and where they leastexpected it.

The 3rd Battalion, 160th Spe-cial Operations Aviation Regi-ment, supported most of thesecoalition SOF raids. The battal-ion’s staff, flight leads and com-

manders took interoperability toa high level as the Night Stalkersmutually planned mission aftermission with coalition SOFground-force leaders and plan-ners. The 160th noted that thisplanning was particularly welldone by the Danish SOF, whobrought two of their U.S.-trainedhelicopter pilots to Afghanistanfor the purpose of conducting air-operations planning with the

Army News Service

A U.S. officer from the 422nd Civil Affairs Battalion (left) discusses Iraqi fire-fighting capabilitieswith a representative of the British Ministry of the Interior and a British Royal Marine.

September 2005 27

Night Stalkers.Extraordinary one-wheel “land-

ings” by MH-47 pilots on extremeslopes at high elevations were thenorm for the 160th as it insertedcoalition SOF reconnaissanceteams on dozens of missions inthe middle of the night. Chinookand Blackhawk aircrews tookenemy fire on several occasions asthey approached insertion pointsfor coalition SOF and while pro-viding fire support from minigunsduring raids on enemy leadershipcompounds.

Most successful combat mis-sions are preceded by some degreeof deliberate planning and coali-tion SOF operations in Iraq and

Afghanistan were no exception.Planning and decision-makingdoctrine used by the coalitionforces in both operations provedto be almost identical to U.S. doc-trine. Common doctrine and acommon format for briefbacks andconcept of operations facilitatedthe interoperability of U.S. SFand coalition SOF.

Coalition SOF in U.S.-led taskforces continuously proved theirability to get the job done at thetactical and operational levels.They also contributed to strategicobjectives by affirming the legiti-macy and credibility of our effortsin the GWOT. Future missionsmay cover vast expanses of enemy

territory with complex missionsets that can be simultaneouslyexecuted with a coalition force aspart of a CJSOTF; they will alsoinvolve air fires. During thosemissions, U.S. SOF aviation willprobably lift and support alliedunits into enemy territory again,and U.S. SF will work adjacent tothem on the ground while usingtheir training to avoid incidentsof fratricide.

Integration of coalition SOFofficers and NCOs in senior posi-tions into U.S. SF-led special-operations task forces is key togaining a unity of effort and max-imizing the potential of our coali-tion partners. Multinational SOFtraining exercises at the tacticaland CJSOTF/CARSOTF levelscan improve the interoperabilitylessons learned and successesachieved in Iraq and Afghanistanby the 5th and 3rd SF groups.These exercises will also maintainthe professional relationshipsbetween U.S. and coalition SOFthat were created immediatelyprior to OIF and OEF and bondedin combat.

Lieutenant Colonel Mark C.Arnold served as an operationsofficer with CJSOTF-South inKandahar, Afghanistan, in Janu-ary and February 2002 and wasthe director of the coalition SOFFOB in Kandahar from Marchthrough October 2002. He servedas an operations and liaison offi-cer for CJSOTF-West duringOperation Iraqi Freedom.

28 Special Warfare

Army News Service

A training instructor from the 2nd Battalion, 10th SF Group, reviews the capabilities of the Valon3 metal detector with a member of the Lebanese Army Engineering Regiment, during a field train-ing exercise in Hammana, Lebanon.

Akey element of the Army’s successin current and future operations ismaking the force smarter with bet-

ter situational awareness and improvedcommand and control capabilities. TheForce XXI Battle Command Brigade andBelow, or FBCB2, is designed to put cur-rent information in the hands of decision-makers on the ground and in the field.

The FBCB2, an integrated suite of hard-ware, installation kits, system softwareand application software that can beinstalled on both weapons platforms andvehicles, extends the battlespace from thetraditional line-of-sight data providedvisually or by radio to one that includesbroadcast messaging and automatic mapposting. The system is designed to improvecommunications management and battlecommand, including the execution of mis-sions, through the use of technology.

FBCB2 is a sub-element of the Army Bat-tle Command System, which interfaces withthe Army tactical command and control sys-tem that is located within a group, regi-ment, brigade or battalion. The system pro-vides battle-command information from thegroup, regiment, brigade or battalion head-quarters to the Soldiers in the field. Mount-ed tactical combat, combat-support andcombat-service-support commanders, lead-ers and Soldiers will use the system acrossall battlefield functional areas.

The FBCB2 technology provides Sol-diers timely information by leveragingwireless tactical Internet and GPS tech-nology. With a clear picture of the battle-field, commanders have a tactical advan-tage because they can make decisions

faster and communicate those decisionsto their Soldiers without allowing theenemy time to react.

Units within the United States ArmySpecial Operations Command will receivetwo configurations of FBCB2 — a vehicle-mounted platform and a Tactical Opera-tion Center, or TOC, system. Fielding ofFBCB2 vehicle-mounted and TOC sys-tems will begin during the fourth quarterof Fiscal Year 2005 and will continuethroughout FY 2007. Each group head-quarters and each tactical battalion (Spe-cial Forces, CivilAffairs and Psycho-logical Operations)will receive oneTOC system. Themounted systemswill be installed inthe high-mobilitym u l t i p u r p o s ewheeled vehicleclass of vehicles,and in groundmobility vehicles.The initial distribu-tion of the vehicle-mounted systems is asfollows: 3rd and 5th Special Forcesgroups, the 96th Civil Affairs Battalionand the 9th Psychological OperationsBattalion. To date, 37 systems have beeninstalled and are in use by SOF support-ing of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Dean George is a force modernizationofficer assigned to USASOC G8, ForceModernization Branch.

September 2005 29

FBCB2 Gives Soldiers Better Pictureof Battlespace

by Dean George

The Tactical OperationsCenter, or TOC, is one oftwo variants of theFBCB2.

File photo

30 Special Warfare

Warrant Officer Career NotesSpecial Warfare

Significant initiatives are being pursued at the Department of Armylevel to improve recruiting and retention of warrant officers in allmilitary occupational specialties.

Lower time-in-grade requirement for technical-service promotions.Warrant officers in the field are gaining experience much faster thanthey did in a peacetime environment. There is a critical shortage ofCW4s and an over-strength of CW3s. The Army is staffing a proposalto lower the time-in-grade requirement for active-component promo-tion to CW4. If the initiative is approved, an additional promotionboard may be held during the first quarter of Fiscal Year 2006 to con-sider CW3s for promotion to CW4.

Tenure for active-component CW4s. Current policy requires thatactive- component CW4s who are two-time nonselects for CW5 be sep-arated, unless they are selected for continuation, or SELCON. If theyare SELCON, they can serve only 24 years of warrant-officer service(or 30 years total service, whichever occurs first). A legislative changeproposal has been submitted that would remove the separation andSELCON requirement for CW4s. An additional change has been sub-mitted to remove the 30 years total service limit. Under the proposal,Soldiers would be limited only by their total warrant-officer service,which would still be capped at 24 years of warrant-officer service forCW4s and below. A legislative change package has been submitted tochange the law, and the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpowerand Reserve Affairs) has been asked to suspend the separation policy(which he may do in wartime) until the law is changed.

Reserve-component warrant-officer critical skills retention bonus.Reserve-component warrant officers, including those officers in theNational Guard, were not included in the CSRB that was authorizedby Congress for FY 2005. A legislative change package has been sub-mitted to authorize critical skills retention bonuses for Reserve-com-ponent warrants in FY 2006. The military occupational specialtiesthat would receive the bonus will be determined after the legislationis passed.

Reserve-component affiliation bonus. This approved initiative pro-vides a $6,000 affiliation bonus for warrant officers who agree toserve three years in the Selective Reserves.

DA staffing WO recruiting,retention initiatives

September 2005 31

Officer Career NotesSpecial Warfare

The final Phase II Civil Affairs course will be held in March 2006 for ArmyReserve officers. Reserve officers unable to complete Phase I distance-learn-ing by that date must attend either a mobilization course or a nine-week CAQualification Course to obtain duty-MOS qualification. As mobilizations forIraq and Afghanistan continue, a series of 29-day intensive mobilizationcourses will be taught to officers o the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psycho-logical Operations Command. Mobilization courses will be skill-identifier pro-ducing, with additional qualifications awarded following 90 days experiencein an operational environment. The final Phase II course will be held in April2006 for Army Reserve officers. USAR CA or PSYOP officers desiring furtherattendance in the active-component pipeline courses (Advanced RegionalAnalysis Course) can attend as space is available. For information regardingcourse prerequisites, call Major Rick Springett at DSN 239-8102, commercial(910) 432-8102, or send e-mail to: springer@soc.mil.

The Army Human Resources Command, or HRC, will select 21 senior captainsfrom the Operations Career Field, or OPCF, to participate in a program ofAdvanced Civil Schooling, or ACS. The program provides OPCF officers the abili-ty to earn a high-quality graduate degree, attend Intermediate Level Education,and return to their basic branch for a follow-on developmental assignment.The targeted population for this year’s ACS program are year groups 1997and 1998. To be eligible, applicants must have completed command no laterthan May 1, 2006. Members of earlier and later year groups who meet therequirements may apply, but the primary focus is for YG97 and YG98. Thefour available graduate-level programs are listed below:• The University of South Carolina, located in Columbia, S.C., offers a 22-

month program leading to a master’s in business administration.• The Naval Postgraduate School, located in Monterey, Calif., offers an 18-

month program leading to a master of science in defense analysis.• Columbia University, based in New York City and West Point, N.Y, offers a

12-month program leading to a master of arts in psychology.• Hawaii Pacific University in Honolulu, Hawaii, offers an 18-month pro-

gram leading to a master of arts in diplomacy and military studies.The application deadline is Sept. 15, and the selection process runs throughOct. 1. The conditional primary and alternate selections will be announcedFeb. 1, 2006. Students will report to Columbia University and to HawaiiPacific University in May 2006. Students will report to the NPS and to USCin June 2006.For additional information and requirements contact the SF captain’s assign-ment officer or visit the ACS Web page: https://www.hrc.army.mil/site/active/opfamacs/ACS00.htm.

Final Reserve Phase IICA Course offered

OPCF captains eligiblefor ACS programs

32 Special Warfare

Enlisted Career NotesSpecial Warfare

The Training Development Division of the JFK Special Warfare Centerand School has completed the critical-task selection and development proc-ess for the Civil Affairs NCO Reclassification Course, a six-week coursedesigned for reclassifying NCOs into the new enlisted career-managementfield 38B, Civil Affairs. SWCS will conduct the course at Fort Bragg begin-ning Sept. 12, 2005, and Jan. 23, 2006. The course will conclude with acapabilities exercises and a field-training exercise that will require stu-dents to form Civil Affairs assessment teams with their counterparts inthe CA officer reclassification course. For information regarding reclassifi-cation to CMF 38B, contact Master Sergeant Robert Crite at DSN 239-5379, commercial (910) 432-5379, or send e-mail to: ca-psyoprecruiting@soc.mil. NCOs who desire instructions for reclassificationto CMF 38B should contact their enlisted personnel manager at PERS-COM, Sergeant First Class J.A. Cassel, at DSN 221-3899.

Recently approved changes to Army promotion policy give increased oppor-tunities for Special Forces candidates and SF sergeants serving in opera-tional assignments. According to a memorandum recently released by theUnited States Army’s director of personnel management, Soldiers in therank of sergeant who hold an SF military occupational specialty, or MOS,are recommended by their commander and meet other basic eligibilityrequirements for promotion, may be boarded and promoted to staffsergeant without regard to the requirements for time in grade and time inservice. Soldiers in the grade of specialist and sergeant who are enrolledin the SF Qualification Course, or SFQC, and carry Special Report Code18X (a training MOS), and are eligible for promotion in MOS 11B if theymeet primary-zone eligibility requirements and are recommended for pro-motion by their commander. The changes are in addition to other changesto Army promotion policy, which apply to SFQC graduates, that werereleased via MILPER message No. 05-003. One of those changes providesfor the automatic promotion of specialists and corporals to sergeant with-out a board appearance, effective the day they receive their SF MOS. Foradditional information, telephone Sergeant Major Charles Stevens at DSN239-7594, commercial (910) 432-7594, or send e-mail to stevensc@soc.mil.

Enlisted SF Soldiers gainpromotion opportunity

SWCS to offer CA NCOReclassification Course

Ziegler takes command of 1st SWTG

Calling the students at the U.S.Army John F. Kennedy SpecialWarfare Center and School, orSWCS, the “nation’s best resource,”Colonel Jack C. Zeigler Jr. acceptedcommand of the 1st Special War-fare Training Group from ColonelManuel A. Diemer during a changeof command ceremony at FortBragg, N.C., on June 24.

Zeigler, a native of Florence, S.C.,is taking control of the traininggroup at a critical time. The train-ing group, responsible for the train-ing and education of all SpecialForces, Civil Affairs and Psycholog-ical Operations Soldiers, is in themidst of a comprehensive transfor-mation designed to make the forcerelevant on today’s battlefields andthe battlefields of the future.

“There is not a more important,meaningful mission in the Armytoday than to prepare the nation’sbest resource — our sons anddaughters — to fight, survive andwin on the battlefield,” said Zeigler.

In addition to ensuring theforces’ relevance, 1st SWTG hasalso been tasked with turning outmore special-operations Soldiersthan ever before to support theGlobal War on Terrorism. Part ofthe ongoing transformation isensuring that training is done notonly to standard, but also in themost efficient manner possible.

Zeigler is well-prepared to carry onwith the transformation, havingserved in special operations for themajority of his career. He was com-missioned as a second lieutenant inthe Infantry in December 1979 fol-

lowing graduation from PresbyterianCollege in Clinton, S.C., and served ina variety of positions in the 5th Spe-cial Forces Group, the 3rd SpecialForces Group and at the U.S. ArmySpecial Operations Command.

Colonel Diemer is now theUSASOC operations officer.

SWCS CA/CMO Divisionupdates doctrinal products

The Civil Affairs/Civil-MilitaryOperations Division of the JFK Spe-

cial Warfare Center and School’sDirectorate of Training and Doctrineis working on a number of publica-tions that will keep Soldiers up-to-date on current doctrine and proce-dures of Army Civil Affairs.

Army Field Manual 3-05.40,Civil Affairs Operations, will intro-duce its users to Civil Affairs andgive them more detailed informa-tion on CA organizations, CA oper-ations, effects-based operations,and transition considerations forplanners of civil-military opera-tions. The manual will also provideformats for the CMO estimate andthe CMO annex.

The initial draft of FM 3-05.40 isin production at SWCS. When com-pleted, it will be sent to selectedorganizations worldwide for reviewand comment. It will also be postedon the SWCS ARSOF UniversityWeb page (https://arsofu.army.mil).Once FM 3-05.40 has been reviewedand necessary changes have beenmade, it is scheduled to be distrib-uted Armywide in March 2006.

For additional informationregarding FM 3-05.40, telephoneMajor Kent Hinchcliff, the chief ofthe CA/CMO Division’s doctrinebranch, at DSN 239-1548, commer-cial (910) 432-1548, or send e-mail tohinchclk@soc.mil.

The CA/CMO Division beganwork to rewrite FM 3-05.401, CivilAffairs Tactics, Techniques and Pro-cedures, in late May 2005. Theauthor’s draft is currently in produc-tion and is scheduled to be staffed inOctober 2005.

The new CA TTP incorporateschanges in the organizational struc-ture of Army CA units that are pro-grammed through the Force Design

September 2005 33

UpdateSpecial Warfare

SWCS PAO

Colonel Jack Zeigler salutes his troops as he takescommand of the 1st Special Warfare Training Group.

Update process, as well as emergingdoctrine contained in FM 3-05.40.The production timeline for FM 3-05.401 calls for the author’s draft byOctober 2005, the initial draft by Jan-uary 2006, the final draft by May2006 and final approval by Septem-ber 2006.

For additional information on FM3-05.401, telephone Ron Fiegle atDSN 239-1548, commercial (910)432-1548, or send e-mail tofieglero@soc.mil.

The CA/CMO Division is alsopreparing an updated version ofGTA 41-01-001, Planning, Executionand Assessment Guide. Now titledCivil Affairs Operations Planning,Execution and Assessment Guide,the updated graphic training aidgives more in-depth informationthan the previous version andincludes a section on effects-basedoperations. GTA 41-01-001 is in theediting phase and scheduled to bereleased in December 2005.

The CA/CMO Division is alsoupdating several CA training refer-ences: ARTEP 41-701-10-MTP, MTPfor a Civil Affairs Team (15 Sep 00);ARTEP 41-701-35-MTP, CA Battal-ion, Brigade, and Command (5 Aug02); ARTEP 41-701-60, MTP forCivil Affairs Specialty Teams (5 Aug02); STP 41-38A14-SM-TG, Soldier’sManual and Trainer’s Guide (31 Oct03); and STP 41-38II-OFS, OfficerFoundation Standards II (30 Apr04). In the future, the MTP and STPmanuals will be replaced by theCombined Arms Training Strategy,which will be accessible down to theunit level through the Army’s Digi-tal Training Management System.

In addition to working on the pub-lications listed above, the CA/CMODivision will be contributing infor-mation to the CA forums on theARSOF University Web site. Theinformation will be relevant to prod-ucts and issues related to the devel-opment of doctrine and training,including general information, doc-trinal reviews, collective and individ-ual training, emerging issues, and

after-action reports and observa-tions. The forums will not only pro-vide links to all current CA doctrinalproducts; they will be used to solicitinput from the field for the mainte-nance and revision of CA manuals.

4th POG changes commandColonel Kenneth A. Turner

assumed command of the 4th Psy-chological Operations Group fromColonel Jack N. Summe during achange of command ceremony heldJuly 19 at Fort Bragg’s MeadowsMemorial Plaza.

Turner’s most recent assignmentwas director of plans and programsfor the Joint PSYOP Support Ele-ment, U.S. Special OperationsCommand, MacDill Air Force Base,Fla. Turner previously served ascommander of the 3rd PSYOP Bat-talion, 4th POG, from 1999 to 2002.

7th SF Group welcomes new commander

Colonel Edward M. Reeder Jr.took command of the 7th SpecialForces Group at Fort Bragg’s Mead-ows Memorial Field Aug. 4.

Reeder assumed command from

Colonel Jeffrey D. Waddell, who hadcommanded the group since July2003.

Reeder’s previous assignmentsinclude detachment commander,company commander, battalion S3,group S3, group XO and deputy com-mander in the 7th SF Group. He hasalso served as an adviser in El Sal-vador, as an operations officer in theJoint Special Operations Command,and as chief of J3 plans in the JointInteragency Task Force-South.

USASOC namesSoldier/NCO of the year

One Soldier and one noncommis-sioned officer stood above all othersthis year when they were named the2005 U.S. Army Special OperationsCommand’s Soldier and NCO of theYear after a week-long competition.

Sergeant Kyle Vreeman, a SpecialForces weapons sergeant assignedto the 3rd Battalion, 1st SpecialForces Group, was named the NCOof the Year.

Specialist Christopher Shanahan,an infantryman assigned to the 1stBattalion, 75th Ranger Regiment,was the Soldier of the Year.

Both Vreeman and Shanahanwere honored during a special cere-mony at Fort Bragg July 22. Theywill represent the command duringthe Army-level competition laterthis year.

Army approves badges for special-ops divers

Two new diving badges haverecently replaced the Army divingbadges for Soldiers in Army special-operations forces.

The Special Operations DiverBadge and the Special OperationsDiving Supervisor’s Badge wereapproved July 20 for special-opsSoldiers in the active and reservecomponents.

“The process to get the badgechanged began with a proposal fromthe JFK Special Warfare Center andSchool,” said Captain Rebecca L.

34 Special Warfare

USASOC PAO

Colonel Kenneth A. Turner (left) accepts com-mand of the 4th PSYOP Group.

Eggers, chief of the Action Branch,Assistant Chief of Staff for Person-nel, U.S. Army Special OperationsCommand. “The request was thensubmitted to the Human ResourceCommand, where the award wasapproved.”

After the award was approved, thebadges went to the Army Institute ofHeraldry for the design and the cre-ation of dies that can be used tomanufacture the badges, Eggersexplained.

The Special Operations DiverBadge is now awarded to gradu-ates of the JFK Special WarfareCenter and School’s Combat DiverQualification Course, taught byCompany C, 2nd Battalion, 1stSpecial Warfare Training Group,located in Key West, Fla., Eggerssaid. The award is also given toSoldiers who have completed anyother combat diver qualificationcourse approved by the U.S. ArmySpecial Operations Command.

The Special Operations DivingSupervisor’s Badge is awarded toindividuals who have graduated

from the SWCS Combat DivingSupervisor Course, or from anyother USASOC-approved combatdiving supervisor’s course. “Fromhere on out, all Soldiers whoattend the courses in Key Westwill automatically get the newbadges,” Eggers said. Both badgesmay be awarded retroactively tomembers of any service who com-pleted the courses on or followingOct. 1, 1964. — Cassie Chance,USASOC PAO

USAREC activates special-opsrecruiting battalion

The U.S. Army Recruiting Com-mand activated the Special Opera-tions Recruiting Battalion at FortBragg, N.C., on July 21.

The new battalion, formerly a 38-person company, will consolidate therecruiting functions of all Army spe-cial-operations forces.

Commanded by LieutenantColonel Dave Roddenberry, the bat-talion will synchronize ARSOFrecruiting efforts, capitalizing on itsaccess to the U.S. Army John F.Kennedy Special Warfare Centerand School and the U.S. ArmyRecruiting Command.

Tovo takes command of 10th SF Group

Hundreds of Green Berets andsupport Soldiers from the 10th Spe-cial Forces Group assembled in for-mation at Fort Carson, Colo.’s Man-hart Field July 22 for the group’schange of command ceremony.

Colonel Kenneth E. Tovo, a multi-ple-tour veteran of the 10th SFGroup — most recently as com-mander of the 3rd Battalion —accepted command of the groupfrom Colonel Michael S. Repass.

Tovo’s previous assignmentsinclude detachment, company andbattalion commands in the 10th SFGroup, as well as stints as a plansand operations officer at the U.S.Special Operations Command andat NATO’s Joint Headquarters Cen-

ter. He is a veteran of OperationDesert Shield/Desert Storm, non-combatant-evacuation operations inSierra Leone, Operation JointGuard in Bosnia and OperationIraqi Freedom.

Repass had commanded the groupsince 2003 and led it through twocombat tours in support of Opera-tion Iraqi Freedom. His next assign-ment will be with U.S. Army Europe,based in Germany.

September 2005 35

USASOC Public Affairs Office

Colonel Kenneth E. Tovo (left) assumes com-mand of the 10th SF Group at Fort Carson, Colo.

The Special Operations Diver Badge (top) and theSpecial Operations Diving Supervisor’s Badge.

Institute of Heraldry

You’re Stepping on My Cloakand Dagger. By Roger Hall.Annapolis, Md.: Naval InstitutePress, 2004. ISBN: 0-8117-0024-0.219 pages. $22.95.

You’re Stepping on My Cloak andDagger is a highly entertaining andengaging account of one man’suncommon experiences in the Officeof Strategic Services, or OSS, duringWorld War II. It is a tale of courage,danger and wit, with a clever turn ofphrase on nearly every page. Thebook appeals to the patriot, thethrill-seeker and the rebel, easilycapturing the imagination of theinner spy within each of us.

The author, Roger Hall, writesabout his experiences as a youngArmy lieutenant recruited into theOSS. Hall, the son of a Navy captainand raised in Annapolis among hisfather’s peers, had little awe forauthority, so the excitement offeredby the OSS seemed to be a perfect fitfor him. Hall is quite the storyteller,and his personality, verbal agilityand quick wit endear him to thereader.

Not fully understanding the scopeof the assignment for which he vol-unteered, Hall reported for OSSduties almost as an exercise inintestinal fortitude. Greeted by acolonel who regarded him with amix of awe and pity, he was mourn-fully told that none of the youngOSS officers who processed throughthe office were married, nor hadthey ever returned. With a sense ofimpending doom, Hall began toquestion his decision to volunteer.

Seeking the thrill and adventurehe associates with the OSS, Hallwas disappointed when, after his

initial training, he was saddled withinstructor duty. The duty wasdesigned to fill his time while hewaited for the unlikely arrival of28 Danes who were to completethe formation of his Danish opera-tional group. After four monthsand the realization that a Danishoperational group was not feasi-ble, Hall was “volunteered” forparachute school at Fort Benning.

Parachute school was followedby an assessment phase in whichHall began the “cloak” portion ofhis cloak-and-dagger training. Herecounts the students’ attempts tocreate and maintain cover storiesthat backed up their phony identi-ties, as well as the cadre’s often-successful attempts to crack theircover stories and break themdown mentally. Hall laterobtained orders to the “spyschool,” which was designed toprovide operational training inundercover activities. From the

spy school, students were sent outto performing, “espionage mis-sions” in Philadelphia. Each stu-dent was given the task of infil-trating various factories or otherplaces of interest. Hall elected topresent himself as a wounded warveteran in search of a job. Aftercatching the eye of a secretary,who happened to be the boss’daughter, Hall was invited to awar- bond rally in the company’scafeteria, where he made animpassioned plea for support. Heperformed so well that hisimpromptu speech appeared thenext day in the local newspaper.

Having effectively demonstrat-ed his ability to maintain coverand to improvise, Hall shipped outto London, but instead of hittingthe battlefield, he received a liter-al five-day crash course at theBritish parachute school. Uponcompletion of the course, helearned that his first assignmentwas to perform a high-risk, night-time parachute drop behindenemy lines to join the Frenchmaquis groups. After nerve-rack-ing preparation for the jump, Halllanded safely, only to discover thatthe lines had shifted and that hehad landed behind Americanlines.

Hall’s following assignments gotbetter. On his next assignment, hewas chosen to accompany sevenGerman officers through para-chute school before dropping themback behind German lines asspies. His job — to determinewhich one was really a doubleagent.

Fearing he would never seeaction, Hall finally found himself

36 Special Warfare

Book ReviewsSpecial Warfare

in an operational role toward theend of the war, when he wasassigned to head a Norwegianoperational group and to overseethe surrender of seven Germanbattalions.

You’re Stepping on My Cloakand Dagger is an excellent book.Because Hall writes so well, thebook reads like a popular spynovel, and the reader sometimesforgets that this is a true accountrather than an exciting work offiction. Hall’s sense of humor andirreverence keep the mood lightwithout detracting from the dan-ger and importance of his experi-ences. Instead, they highlight thehumility and unassuming couragewith which these unsung heroesfought the war. The only disap-pointment is the book’s length —it is entirely too short, leaving thereader yearning for more.

Lt. Michelle Mui, U.S. NavyNaval Postgraduate SchoolMonterey, Calif.

Behind the Lines: The OralHistory of Special Operationsin World War II. By RussellMiller. New York: Penguin Books,2004. ISBN: 0415121112X (paper)304 pages. $15.

Behind Enemy Lines is com-posed almost entirely of debrief-ings, letters and reports writtenduring or immediately after theconduct of World War II specialoperations. The operations includ-ed were conducted predominantlyin Central Europe by personnelfrom the Special Operations Exec-utive, or SOE, and the Office ofStrategic Services, or OSS. Themissions ran the gamut from indi-vidual-agent operations prior tothe June 1944 Normandy invasionto guerrilla operations in supportof the Normandy and Mediter-ranean landings.

The sources of the material andits operational intimacy at the

time that it was written provide areality and humanity that is lack-ing in later, fuller and more con-sidered accounts. Miller did a goodjob in selecting materials thatstand on their own without signif-icant supporting information. Hehas organized them in a roughlychronological order, and the WorldWar II history buff will find littleor no need to refer to other sourcesto establish the operational envi-ronment referenced in the reports.

While the well-informed readermight garner snippets of opera-tional techniques or intelligencetradecraft, there are no real spe-cial-operations lessons stated,implied or readily extracted fromthis work. This does not mean thatit does not have professionalvalue, only that its values lie else-where. One of these values is therepeated demonstration of thecriticality of selecting the rightpeople: people who can operateindependently under pressure, inambiguous situations and with noimmediate availability of externalsupport. (These characteristicswould almost define the differencebetween the special operator andthe line Soldier.)

The reader cannot help butadmire the courage of the person-

nel involved, most particularly theagents and their radio operatorswho went into occupied Franceyears before the invasion. Theyvolunteered to enter a continentoccupied and ever more tightlycontrolled by a totalitarianregime. Their enemies were notonly the German military andstate police forces (Gestapo) butalso the German-controlledFrench police and in particular,the Germans’ subordinate gen-darme force, the French milice.

Against these massive forces,the agents’ only defenses weretheir individual cover identities,their language skills, theirinstincts and, above all, their wits.Even with the best of thesedefenses, they could be caught byfaults in their documentation,radio direction-finding, a notori-ously feeble encryption system,willing or unwilling betrayal bytheir local contacts, or simple badluck.

One of the book’s more charm-ing accounts is the effort of twoOSS operatives from a linked-upJedburgh team to provide thesenior ground-force commanderwith the details of a German-heldharbor. To meet the commander’srequirements, reconnaissance hadto be done overnight. The opera-tives pulled it off with a combina-tion of intelligence, courage verg-ing on bravado and quick wits. Inexercising the last, they not onlyavoided capture but also con-vinced the Germans to give thema ride to their destination.

This book is recommended forbackground or just enjoyable spe-cial-operations reading.

COL J. H. CrerarU.S. Army (ret.)Vienna,Va.

September 2005 37

Special Warfare

This publication is approved for public release; distribution is unlimited ■ Headquarters, Department of the Army

Department of the ArmyJFK Special Warfare Center and SchoolATTN: AOJK–DT–MPFort Bragg, NC 28310

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