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G.R. No. 132223 June 19, 2001BONIFACIA P. VANCIL,petitioner,vs.HELEN G. BELMES,respondent.SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,J.:Petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 45650, "In the Matter of Guardianship of Minors Valerie Vancil and Vincent Vancil Bonifacia P. Vancil, Petitioner-Appellee, vs. Helen G. Belmes, Oppositor-Appellant," promulgated on July 29, 1997, and its Resolution dated December 18, 1997 denying the motion for reconsideration of the said Decision.The facts of the case as summarized by the Court of Appeals in its Decision are:"Petitioner, Bonifacia Vancil, is the mother of Reeder C. Vancil, a Navy serviceman of the United States of America who died in the said country on December 22, 1986. During his lifetime, Reeder had two (2) children named Valerie and Vincent by his common-law wife, Helen G. Belmes."Sometime in May of 1987, Bonifacia Vancil commenced before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City a guardianship proceedings over the persons and properties of minors Valerie and Vincent docketed as Special Proceedings No. 1618-CEB. At the time, Valerie was only 6 years old while Vincent was a 2-year old child. It is claimed in the petition that the minors are residents of Cebu City, Philippines and have an estate consisting of proceeds from their fathers death pension benefits with a probable value of P100,000.00."Finding sufficiency in form and in substance, the case was set for hearing after a 3-consecutive-weekly publications with the Sunstar Daily."On July 15, 1987, petitioner, Bonifacia Vancil was appointed legal and judicial guardian over the persons and estate of Valerie Vancil and Vincent Vancil Jr."On August 13, 1987, the natural mother of the minors, Helen Belmes, submitted an opposition to the subject guardianship proceedings asseverating that she had already filed a similar petition for guardianship under Special Proceedings No. 2819 before the Regional Trial Court of Pagadian City."Thereafter, on June 27, 1988, Helen Belmes followed her opposition with a motion for the Removal of Guardian and Appointment of a New One, asserting that she is the natural mother in actual custody of and exercising parental authority over the subject minors at Maralag, Dumingag, Zamboanga del Sur where they are permanently residing; that the petition was filed under an improper venue; and that at the time the petition was filed Bonifacia Vancil was a resident of 140 Hurliman Court, Canon City, Colorado, U.S.A. being a naturalized American citizen."On October 12, 1988, after due proceedings, the trial court rejected and denied Belmes motion to remove and/or to disqualify Bonifacia as guardian of Valerie and Vincent Jr. and instead ordered petitioner Bonifacia Vancil to enter the office and perform her duties as such guardian upon the posting of a bond of P50,000.00. The subsequent attempt for a reconsideration was likewise dismissed in an Order dated November 24, 1988."1On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered its assailed Decision reversing the RTC order of October 12, 1988 and dismissing Special Proceedings No. 1618-CEB.The Court of Appeals held:"Stress should likewise be made that our Civil Code considers parents, the father, or in the absence, the mother, as natural guardian of her minor children. The law on parental authority under the Civil Code or P.D. 603 and now the New Family Code, (Article 225 of the Family Code) ascribe to the same legal pronouncements. Section 7 of Rule 93 of the Revised Rules of Court confirms the designation of the parents as ipso facto guardian of their minor children without need of a court appointment and only for good reason may another person be named. Ironically, for the petitioner, there is nothing on record of any reason at all why Helen Belmes, the biological mother, should be deprived of her legal rights as natural guardian of her minor children. To give away such privilege from Helen would be an abdication and grave violation of the very basic fundamental tenets in civil law and the constitution on family solidarity."2On March 10, 1998, Bonifacia Vancil filed with this Court the present petition, raising the following "legal points":"1. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in ruling that the preferential right of a parent to be appointed guardian over the persons and estate of the minors is absolute, contrary to existing jurisprudence."2. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in ruling that Oppositor Helen G. Belmes, the biological mother, should be appointed the guardian of the minors despite the undisputed proof that under her custody, her daughter minor Valerie Vancil was raped seven times by Oppositors live-in partner."3. The respondent (sic) Court of Appeals gravely erred when it disqualified petitioner Bonifacia P. Vancil to be appointed as judicial guardian over the persons and estate of subject minors despite the fact that she has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications as judicial guardian, merely on the basis of her U.S. citizenship which is clearly not a statutory requirement to become guardian."At the outset, let it be stressed that in her "Manifestation/Motion," dated September 15, 1998, respondent Helen Belmes stated that her daughter Valerie turned eighteen on September 2, 1998 as shown by her Birth Certificate.3Respondent thus prayed that this case be dismissed with respect to Valerie, she being no longer a proper subject of guardianship proceedings. The said "Manifestation/Motion" was noted by this Court in its Resolution dated November 11, 1998.Considering that Valerie is already of major age, this petition has become moot with respect to her. Thus, only the first and third "legal points" raised by petitioner should be resolved.The basic issue for our resolution is who between the mother and grandmother of minor Vincent should be his guardian.We agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that respondent, being the natural mother of the minor, has the preferential right over that of petitioner to be his guardian. This ruling finds support in Article 211 of the Family Code which provides:"Art. 211. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their common children. In case of disagreement, the fathers decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary. xxx."Indeed, being the natural mother of minor Vincent, respondent has the corresponding natural and legal right to his custody. InSagala-Eslao vs. Court of Appeals,4this Court held:"Of considerable importance is the rule long accepted by the courts that the right of parents to the custody of their minor children is one of the natural rights incident to parenthood, a right supported by law and sound public policy. The right is an inherent one, which is not created by the state or decisions of the courts, but derives from the nature of the parental relationship."Petitioner contends that she is more qualified as guardian of Vincent.Petitioners claim to be the guardian of said minor can only be realized by way ofsubstitute parental authoritypursuant to Article 214 of the Family Code, thus:"Art. 214. In case of death, absence or unsuitability of the parents, substitute parental authority shall be exercised by the surviving grandparent. xxx."InSantos, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals,5this Court ruled:"The law vests on the father and mother joint parental authority over the persons of their common children. In case of absence or death of either parent,the parent present shall continue exercising parental authority. Only in case of the parents death, absence or unsuitability may substitute parental authority be exercised by the surviving grandparent."Petitioner, as the surviving grandparent, can exercise substitute parental authority only in case of death, absence or unsuitability of respondent. Considering that respondent is very much alive and has exercised continuously parental authority over Vincent, petitioner has to prove, in asserting her right to be the minors guardian, respondents unsuitability. Petitioner, however, has not proffered convincing evidence showing that respondent is not suited to be the guardian of Vincent. Petitioner merely insists that respondent is morally unfit as guardian of Valerie considering that her (respondents) live-in partner raped Valerie several times. But Valerie, being now of major age, is no longer a subject of this guardianship proceeding.Even assuming that respondent is unfit as guardian of minor Vincent, still petitioner cannot qualify as a substitute guardian. It bears stressing that she is an American citizen and a resident of Colorado. Obviously, she will not be able to perform the responsibilities and obligations required of a guardian. In fact, in her petition, she admitted the difficulty of discharging the duties of a guardian by an expatriate, like her. To be sure, she will merely delegate those duties to someone else who may not also qualify as a guardian.Moreover, we observe that respondents allegation that petitioner has not set foot in the Philippines since 1987 has not been controverted by her. Besides, petitioners old age and her conviction of libel by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Cebu City in Criminal Case No. CBU-168846filed by one Danilo R. Deen, will give her a second thought of staying here. Indeed, her coming back to this country just to fulfill the duties of a guardian to Vincent for only two years is not certain.Significantly, this Court has held that courts should not appoint persons as guardians who are not within the jurisdiction of our courts for they will find it difficult to protect the wards. InGuerrero vs. Teran,7this Court held:"Doa Maria Muoz y Gomez was, as above indicated, removed upon the theory that her appointment was void because she did not reside in the Philippine Islands. There is nothing in the law which requires the courts to appoint residents only as administrators or guardians. However, notwithstanding the fact that there are no statutory requirements upon this question, the courts, charged with the responsibilities of protecting the estates of deceased persons, wards of the estate, etc., will find much difficulty in complying with this duty by appointing administrators and guardians who are not personally subject to their jurisdiction. Notwithstanding that there is no statutory requirement, the courts should not consent to the appointment of persons as administrators and guardians who are not personally subject to the jurisdiction of our courts here."WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED, with modification in the sense that Valerie, who has attained the age of majority, will no longer be under the guardianship of respondent Helen Belmes.Costs against petitioner.SO ORDERED.FIRST DIVISIONCECILIO C. HERNANDEZ,G.R. No.166470MA. VICTORIA C. HERNANDEZ-SAGUN, TERESA C. HERNANDEZ-VILLA ABRILLE[1]and NATIVIDADPresent:CRUZ-HERNANDEZ,Petitioners,PUNO,C.J.,Chairperson,CARPIO,CORONA,LEONARDO-DE CASTRO and-v e r s u s-BERSAMIN,JJ.JOVITA SAN JUAN-SANTOS,Respondent.x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - xCECILIO C. HERNANDEZ,G.R. No. 169217MA. VICTORIA C. HERNANDEZ-SAGUN and TERESA C.HERNANDEZ-VILLA ABRILLE,Petitioners,-v e r s u s-JOVITA SAN JUAN-SANTOS,[2]Respondent.Promulgated:August 7, 2009x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - xD E C I S I O NCORONA,J.:Maria Lourdes San Juan Hernandez (or Lulu) was born on February 14, 1947 to the spouses Felix Hernandez and Maria San Juan Hernandez. Unfortunately, the latter died due to complications during childbirth. After Maria's death, Felix left Lulu in the care of her maternal uncle, Sotero C. San Juan.On December 16, 1951, Felix married Natividad Cruz. The union produced three children, petitioners Cecilio C. Hernandez, Ma. Victoria C. Hernandez-Sagun and Teresa C. Hernandez-Villa Abrille.Meanwhile, as the only child of Maria and the sole testate heir of Sotero, Lulu inherited valuable real properties from the San Juan family (conservatively estimated atP50 million in 1997).Sometime in 1957, Lulu went to live with her father and his new family. She was then 10 years old and studying at La Consolacion College. However, due to her violent personality, Lulu stopped schooling when she reached Grade 5.In 1968, upon reaching the age of majority, Lulu was given full control of her estate.[3]Nevertheless, because Lulu did not even finish her elementary education, Felix continued to exercise actual administration of Lulus properties. Upon Felix's death in 1993, petitioners took over the task of administering Lulu's properties.During the period of their informal administration (from 1968 until 1993), Felix and petitioners undertook various projects involving Lulus real properties. In 1974, Felix allegedly purchased one of Lulus properties for an undisclosed amount to develop the Marilou Subdivision.[4]In 1995, Ma. Victoria informed Lulu that her 11-hectare Montalban, Rizal property[5]was under litigation. Thus, Lulu signed a special power of attorney[6](SPA) believing that she was authorizing Ma. Victoria to appear in court on her behalf when she was in fact unknowingly authorizing her half-sister to sell the said property to the Manila Electric Company forP18,206,400.[7]Thereafter, Cecilio asked Lulu to authorize him to lease her 45-hectare property in Montalban, Rizal to Oxford Concrete Aggregates forP58,500 per month so that she could have a car and driver at her disposal.In September 1998, Lulu sought the assistance of her maternal first cousin, respondent Jovita San Juan-Santos, after learning that petitioners had been dissipating her estate. She confided to Jovita that she was made to live in the basement of petitioners Montalban, Rizal home and was receiving a measly daily allowance ofP400 for her food and medication.Respondent was appalled as Lulu was severely overweight, unkempt and smelled of urine. She later found out that Lulu was occupying a cramped room lit by a single fluorescent lamp without running water. Since she had not been given a proper toilet, Lulu urinated and defecated in the garden. Due to Lulu's poor hygiene, respondent brought her to several physicians for medical examination. Lulu was found to be afflicted with tuberculosis, rheumatism and diabetes from which she was suffering several complications.[8]Thereafter, the San Juan family demanded an inventory and accounting of Lulus estate from petitioners.[9]However, the demand was ignored.On October 2, 1998, respondent filed a petition for guardianship[10]in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Mateo, Rizal, Branch 76. She alleged that Lulu was incapable of taking care of herself and managing her estate because she was of weak mind.Subsequently, petitioners moved to intervene in the proceedings to oppose the same.Natividad denied that Marilou Subdivision belonged to Lulu. Since she and her late husband were the registered owners of the said property, it was allegedly part of their conjugal partnership.Cecilio, Teresa and Ma. Victoria, for their part, claimed that the issue of Lulus competency had been settled in 1968 (upon her emancipation) when the court ordered her legal guardian and maternal uncle, Ciriaco San Juan, to deliver the properties for her to manage.They likewise asserted that Lulu was literate and, for that reason, aware of the consequences of executing an SPA. Furthermore, whether or not Cecilio and Ma. Victoria acted within the scope of their respective authorities could not be determined in a guardianship proceeding, such matter being the proper subject of an ordinary civil action.Petitioners also admitted that the property developed into the Marilou Subdivision was among those parcels of land Lulu inherited from the San Juan family. However, because the sale between Felix and Lulu had taken place in 1974, questions regarding its legality were already barred by the statute of limitations. Thus, its validity could no longer be impugned, or so they claimed.During the hearing, Lulu was presented and asked to testify on her genealogy and experiences with the San Juan and Hernandez families. Lulu identified and described her parents, stepmother, half-siblings and maternal relatives. She claimed inheriting tracts of land from the San Juan family. However, these properties were dissipated by the Hernandez family as they lived a luxurious lifestyle. When asked to explain this allegation, Lulu said that her stepmother and half-siblings rode in cars while she was made to ride a tricycle.Medical specialists testified to explain the results of Lulus examinations which revealed the alarming state of her health.[11]Not only was Lulu severely afflicted with diabetes mellitus and suffering from its complications,[12]she also had an existing artheroselorotic cardiovascular disease (which was aggravated by her obesity). Furthermore, they unanimously opined that in view of Lulus intelligence level (which was below average) and fragile mental state, she would not be able to care for herself and self-administer her medications.In a decision dated September 25, 2001,[13]the RTC concluded that, due to her weak physical and mental condition, there was a need to appoint a legal guardian over the person and property of Lulu. Thus, it declared Lulu an incompetent and appointed respondent as guardian over the person and property of Lulu on aP1 million bond.Petitioners moved for reconsideration asserting that theP1 million bond was grossly insufficient to secure LulusP50-million estate against fraudulent loss or dissipation.[14]The motion, however, was denied.[15]On July 2, 2002, petitioners appealed the September 25, 2001 decision of the RTC to the Court of Appeals (CA).[16]The appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 75760.On December 29, 2004, the CA issued a decision affirming the September 25, 2001 decision of the RTC (in the petition for guardianship)in toto.[17]It held that respondent presented sufficient evidence to prove that Lulu, because of her illnesses and low educational attainment, needed assistance in taking care of herself and managing her affairs considering the extent of her estate. With regard to the respondents appointment as the legal guardian, the CA found that, since Lulu did not trust petitioners, none of them was qualified to be her legal guardian. Because guardianship was a trust relationship, the RTC was bound to appoint someone Lulu clearly trusted.Petitioners now assail the December 29, 2004 decision of the CA in this Court in a petition for review on certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 166470.[18]Meanwhile, Lulu moved into 8 R. Santos St., Marikina City (Marikina apartment) and was provided with two housemaids tasked to care for her. Sometime in November 2003, Lulu was abducted from her Marikina apartment. Jovita immediately sought the assistance of the Police Anti-Crime Emergency Response (PACER) division of the Philippine National Police.The PACER subsequently discovered that petitioners were keeping Lulu somewhere in Rodriguez, Rizal. Despite their initial hostility to the investigation, Ma. Victoria and Cecilio subsequently contacted the PACER to inform them that Lulu voluntarily left with Natividad because her guardian had allegedly been maltreating her.[19]On December 15, 2003, respondent filed a petition forhabeas corpus[20]in the CA alleging that petitioners abducted Lulu and were holding her captive in an undisclosed location in Rodriguez, Rizal.OnApril 26, 2005, the CA granted the petition forhabeas corpus,ruling that Jovita, as her legal guardian, was entitled to her custody.[21]Petitioners moved for the reconsideration of the said decision but it was denied in a resolution dated July 12, 2005.[22]Aggrieved, they filed this petition for review on certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 169217. This was consolidated with G.R. No. 166470.The basic issue in petitions of this nature is whether the person is an incompetent who requiresthe appointment of a judicial guardian over her person and property.Petitioners claim that the opinions of Lulu's attending physicians[23]regarding her mental state were inadmissible in evidence as they were not experts in psychiatry. Respondent therefore failed to prove that Lulu's illnesses rendered her an incompetent. She should have been presumed to be of sound mind and/or in full possession of her mental capacity. For this reason, Lulu should be allowed to live with them since under Articles 194 to 196 of the Family Code,[24]legitimate brothers and sisters, whether half-blood or full-blood are required to support each other fully.Respondent, on the other hand, reiterated her arguments before the courtsa quo.She disclosed that Lulu had been confined in Recovery.com, a psychosocial rehabilitation center and convalescent home care facility in Quezon City, since 2004 due to violent and destructive behavior. She also had delusions of being physically and sexually abused by Boy Negro and imaginary pets she called Michael and Madonna.[25]The November 21, 2005 medical report[26]stated Lulu had unspecified mental retardation with psychosis but claimed significant improvements in her behavior.We find the petition to be without merit.Under Section 50, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, an ordinary witness may give his opinion on the mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted.[27]Lulu's attending physicians spoke and interacted with her. Such occasions allowed them to thoroughly observe her behavior and conclude that her intelligence level was below average and her mental stage below normal. Their opinions were admissible in evidence.Furthermore, where the sanity of a person is at issue, expert opinion is not necessary.[28]The observations of the trial judge coupled with evidence[29]establishing the person's state of mental sanity will suffice.[30]Here, the trial judge was given ample opportunity to observe Lulu personally when she testified before the RTC.Under Section 2, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court,[31]persons who, though of sound mind but by reason of age, disease, weak mind or other similar causes are incapable of taking care of themselves and their property without outside aid, are considered as incompetents who may properly be placed under guardianship. The RTC and the CA both found that Lulu was incapable of taking care of herself and her properties without outside aid due to her ailments and weak mind. Thus, since determining whether or not Lulu is in fact an incompetent would require a reexamination of the evidence presented in the courtsa quo,it undoubtedly involves questions of fact.As a general rule, this Court only resolves questions of law in a petition for review. We only take cognizance of questions of fact in exceptional circumstances, none of which is present in this case.[32]We thus adopt the factual findings of the RTC as affirmed by the CA.Similarly, we see no compelling reason to reverse the trial and appellate courts finding as to the propriety of respondent's appointment as the judicial guardian of Lulu.[33]We therefore affirm her appointment as such. Consequently, respondent is tasked to care for and take full custody of Lulu, and manage her estate as well.[34]Inasmuch as respondents appointment as the judicial guardian of Lulu was proper, the issuance of a writ ofhabeas corpusin her favor was also in order.A writ ofhabeas corpusextends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention or by which the rightful custody of person is withheld from the one entitled thereto.[35]Respondent, as the judicial guardian of Lulu, was duty-bound to care for and protect her ward. For her to perform her obligation, respondent must have custody of Lulu. Thus, she was entitled to a writ ofhabeas corpusafter she was unduly deprived of thecustody of her ward.[36]WHEREFORE, the petitions are herebyDENIED.Petitioners are furthermore ordered to render to respondent, Lulus legal guardian, an accurate and faithful accounting of all the properties and funds they unlawfully appropriated for themselves from the estate of Maria Lourdes San Juan Hernandez, within thirty (30) days from receipt of this decision.If warranted, the proper complaints should also be filed against them for any criminal liability in connection with the dissipation of Maria Lourdes San Juan Hernandezs estate and her unlawful abduction from the custody of her legal guardian.Treble costs against petitioners.SO ORDERED.

NILO OROPESA,G.R. No. 184528Petitioner,-versus-CIRILO OROPESA,Respondent.

D E C I S I O NLEONARDO-DE CASTRO,J.:This is a petition for review oncertiorariunder Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure of the Decision[1]dated February 29, 2008, as well as the Resolution[2]dated September 16, 2008, both rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88449, entitledNILO OROPESA vs. CIRILO OROPESA.The Court of Appeals issuances affirmed the Order[3]dated September 27, 2006 and the Order[4]dated November 14, 2006 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Paraaque City, Branch 260 in SP. Proc. Case No. 04-0016, which dismissed petitioner Nilo Oropesas petition for guardianship over the properties of his father, respondent Cirilo Oropesa (a widower), and denied petitioners motion for reconsideration thereof, respectively.The facts of this case, as summed in the assailed Decision, follow:On January 23, 2004, the (petitioner) filed with the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque City, a petition for him and a certain Ms. Louie Ginez to be appointed as guardians over the property of his father, the (respondent) Cirilo Oropesa. The case was docketed asSP Proc. No. 04-0016and raffled off to Branch 260.In the said petition, it is alleged among others that the (respondent) has been afflicted with several maladies and has been sickly for over ten (10) years already having suffered a stroke on April 1, 2003 and June 1, 2003, that his judgment and memory [were] impaired and such has been evident after his hospitalization; that even before his stroke, the (respondent) was observed to have had lapses in memory and judgment, showing signs of failure to manage his property properly; that due to his age and medical condition, he cannot, without outside aid, manage his property wisely, and has become an easy prey for deceit and exploitation by people around him, particularly Ms. Ma. Luisa Agamata, his girlfriend.In an Order dated January 29, 2004, the presiding judge of the courta quoset the case for hearing, and directed the court social worker to conduct a social case study and submit a report thereon.Pursuant to the abovementioned order, the Court Social Worker conducted her social case study, interviewing the (petitioner) and his witnesses. The Court Social Worker subsequently submitted her report but without any finding on the (respondent) who refused to see and talk to the social worker.On July 6, 2004, the (respondent) filed his Opposition to the petition for guardianship. On August 3, 2004, the (respondent) filed his Supplemental Opposition.Thereafter, the (petitioner) presented his evidence which consists of his testimony, and that of his sister Gianina Oropesa Bennett, and the (respondents) former nurse, Ms. Alma Altaya.After presenting evidence, the (petitioner) filed a manifestation dated May 29, 2006 resting his case. The (petitioner) failed to file his written formal offer of evidence.Thus, the (respondent) filed his Omnibus Motion (1) to Declare the petitioner to have waived the presentation of his Offer of Exhibits and the presentation of his Evidence Closed since they were not formally offered; (2) To Expunge the Documents of the Petitioner from the Record; and (3) To Grant leave to the Oppositor to File Demurrer to Evidence.In an Order dated July 14, 2006, the courta quogranted the (respondents) Omnibus Motion. Thereafter, the (respondent) then filed his Demurrer to Evidence dated July 23, 2006.[5](Citations omitted.)The trial court granted respondents demurrer to evidence in an Order dated September 27, 2006.The dispositive portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, considering that the petitioner has failed to provide sufficient evidence to establish that Gen. Cirilo O. Oropesa is incompetent to run his personal affairs and to administer his properties, Oppositors Demurrer to Evidence is GRANTED, and the case is DISMISSED.[6]Petitioner moved for reconsideration but this was denied by the trial court in an Order dated November 14, 2006, the dispositive portion of which states:WHEREFORE, considering that the Court record shows that petitioner-movant has failed to provide sufficient documentary and testimonial evidence to establish that Gen. Cirilo Oropesa is incompetent to run his personal affairs and to administer his properties, the Court hereby affirms its earlier Order dated 27 September 2006.Accordingly, petitioners Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit.[7]Unperturbed, petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals but his appeal was dismissed through the now assailed Decision dated February 29, 2008, the dispositive portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, premises considered the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed orders of the courta quodated September 27, 2006 and November 14, 2006 are AFFIRMED.[8]A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner but this was denied by the Court of Appeals in the similarly assailed Resolution dated September 16, 2008.Hence, the instant petition was filed.Petitioner submits the following question for consideration by this Court:WHETHER RESPONDENT IS CONSIDERED AN INCOMPETENT PERSON AS DEFINED UNDER SECTION 2, RULE 92 OF THE RULES OF COURT WHO SHOULD BE PLACED UNDER GUARDIANSHIP[9]After considering the evidence and pleadings on record, we find the petition to be without merit.Petitioner comes before the Court arguing that the assailed rulings of the Court of Appeals should be set aside as it allegedly committed grave and reversible error when it affirmed the erroneous decision of the trial court which purportedly disregarded the overwhelming evidence presented by him showing respondents incompetence.InFrancisco v. Court of Appeals,[10]we laid out the nature and purpose of guardianship in the following wise:A guardianship is a trust relation of the most sacred character, in which one person, called a guardian acts for another called the ward whom the law regards as incapable of managing his own affairs. A guardianship is designed to further the wards well-being, not that of the guardian. It is intended to preserve the wards property, as well as to render any assistance that the ward may personally require. It has been stated that while custody involves immediate care and control, guardianship indicates not only those responsibilities, but those of one inloco parentisas well.[11]In a guardianship proceeding, a court may appoint a qualified guardian if the prospective ward is proven to be a minor or an incompetent.A reading of Section 2, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court tells us that persons who, though of sound mind but by reason of age, disease, weak mind or other similar causes, are incapable of taking care of themselves and their property without outside aid are considered as incompetents who may properly be placed under guardianship.The full text of the said provision reads:Sec. 2.Meaning of the word incompetent.Under this rule, the word incompetent includes persons suffering the penalty of civil interdiction or who are hospitalized lepers, prodigals, deaf and dumb who are unable to read and write, those who are of unsound mind, even though they have lucid intervals, and persons not being of unsound mind, but by reason of age, disease, weak mind, and other similar causes, cannot, without outside aid, take care of themselves and manage their property, becoming thereby an easy prey for deceit and exploitation.We have held in the past that a finding that a person is incompetent should be anchored on clear, positive and definite evidence.[12]We consider that evidentiary standard unchanged and, thus, must be applied in the case at bar.In support of his contention that respondent is incompetent and, therefore, should be placed in guardianship, petitioner raises in his Memorandum[13]the following factual matters:a.Respondent has been afflicted with several maladies and has been sickly for over ten (10) years already;b.During the time that respondent was hospitalized at the St. Lukes Medical Center after his stroke, he purportedly requested one of his former colleagues who was visiting him to file a loan application with the Armed Forces of the Philippines Savings and Loan Association, Inc. (AFPSLAI) for payment of his hospital bills, when, as far as his children knew, he had substantial amounts of money in various banks sufficient to cover his medical expenses;c.Respondents residence allegedly has been left dilapidated due to lack of care and management;d.The realty taxes for respondents various properties remain unpaid and therefore petitioner and his sister were supposedly compelled to pay the necessary taxes;e.Respondent allegedly instructed petitioner to sell his Nissan Exalta car for the reason that the former would be purchasing another vehicle, but when the car had been sold, respondent did not procure another vehicle and refused to account for the money earned from the sale of the old car;f.Respondent withdrew at least $75,000.00 from a joint account under his name and his daughters without the latters knowledge or consent;g.There was purportedly one occasion where respondent took a kitchen knife to stab himself upon the orders of his girlfriend during one of their fights;h.Respondent continuously allows his girlfriend to ransack his house of groceries and furniture, despite protests from his children.[14]Respondent denied the allegations made by petitioner and cited petitioners lack of material evidence to support his claims.According to respondent, petitioner did not present any relevant documentary or testimonial evidence that would attest to the veracity of his assertion that respondent is incompetent largely due to his alleged deteriorating medical and mental condition.In fact, respondent points out that the only medical document presented by petitioner proves that he is indeed competent to run his personal affairs and administer his properties.Portions of the said document, entitled Report of Neuropsychological Screening,[15]were quoted by respondent in his Memorandum[16]to illustrate that said report in fact favored respondents claim of competence, to wit:General Oropesa spoke fluently in English and Filipino, he enjoyed and participated meaningfully in conversations and could be quite elaborate in his responses on many of the test items.He spoke in a clear voice and his articulation was generally comprehensible. x x x.x x x xGeneral Oropesa performed in the average range on most of the domains that were tested. He was able to correctly perform mental calculations and keep track of number sequences on a task of attention. He did BEST in visuo-constructional tasks where he had to copy geometrical designs using tiles. Likewise, he was able to render and read the correct time on the Clock Drawing Test. x x x.x x x xx x x Reasoning abilities were generally intact as he was able to suggest effective solutions to problem situations. x x x.[17]With the failure of petitioner to formally offer his documentary evidence, his proof of his fathers incompetence consisted purely of testimonies given by himself and his sister (who were claiming interest in their fathers real and personal properties) and their fathers former caregiver (who admitted to be acting under their direction).These testimonies, which did not include any expert medical testimony, were insufficient to convince the trial court of petitioners cause of action and instead lead it to grant the demurrer to evidence that was filed by respondent.Even if we were to overlook petitioners procedural lapse in failing to make a formal offer of evidence, his documentary proof were comprised mainly of certificates of title over real properties registered in his, his fathersand his sisters names as co-owners, tax declarations, and receipts showing payment of real estate taxes on their co-owned properties, which do not in any way relate to his fathers alleged incapacity to make decisions for himself.The only medical document on record is the aforementioned Report of Neuropsychological Screening which was attached to the petition for guardianship but was never identified by any witness nor offered as evidence.In any event, the said report, as mentioned earlier, was ambivalent at best, for although the report had negative findings regarding memory lapses on the part of respondent, it also contained findings that supported the view that respondent on the average was indeed competent.In an analogous guardianship case wherein the soundness of mind of the proposed ward was at issue, we had the occasion to rule that where the sanity of a person is at issue, expert opinion is not necessary [and that] the observations of the trial judge coupled with evidence establishing the persons state of mental sanity will suffice.[18]Thus, it is significant that in its Order dated November 14, 2006 which denied petitioners motion for reconsideration on the trial courts unfavorable September 27, 2006 ruling, the trial court highlighted the fatal role that petitioners own documentary evidence played in disproving its case and, likewise, the trial court made known its own observation of respondents physical and mental state, to wit:The Court noted the absence of any testimony of a medical expert which states that Gen. Cirilo O. Oropesa does not have the mental, emotional, and physical capacity to manage his own affairs. On the contrary, Oppositors evidence includes a Neuropsychological Screening Report which states that Gen. Oropesa, (1) performs on the average range in most of the domains that were tested; (2) is capable of mental calculations; and (3) can provide solutions to problem situations. The Report concludes that Gen. Oropesa possesses intact cognitive functioning, except for mildly impaired abilities in memory, reasoning and orientation.It is the observation of the Court that oppositor is still sharp, alert and able.[19](Citation omitted; emphasis supplied.)It is axiomatic that, as a general rule, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review oncertioraribecause the Court is not a trier of facts.[20]We only take cognizance of questions of fact in certain exceptional circumstances;[21]however, we find them to be absent in the instant case. It is also long settled that factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, will not be disturbed by this Court.As a rule, such findings by the lower courts are entitled to great weight and respect, and are deemed final and conclusive on this Court when supported by the evidence on record.[22]We therefore adopt the factual findings of the lower court and the Court of Appeals and rule that the grant of respondents demurrer to evidence was proper under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar.Section 1, Rule 33 of the Rules of Court provides:Section 1.Demurrer to evidence. After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence, the defendant may move for dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. If his motion is denied, he shall have the right to present evidence. If the motion is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed to have waived the right to present evidence.A demurrer to evidence is defined as an objection by one of the parties in an action, to the effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain the issue.[23]We have also held that a demurrer to evidence authorizes a judgment on the merits of the case without the defendant having to submit evidence on his part, as he would ordinarily have to do, if plaintiffs evidence shows that he is not entitled to the relief sought.[24]There was no error on the part of the trial court when it dismissed the petition for guardianship without first requiring respondent to present his evidence precisely because the effect of granting a demurrer to evidence other than dismissing a cause of action is, evidently, to preclude a defendant from presenting his evidence since, upon the facts and the law, the plaintiff has shown no right to relief.WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is herebyDENIED.The assailedDecision dated February 29, 2008 as well as the Resolution dated September 16, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88449 areAFFIRMED.SO ORDERED.