Available online at www.sciencedirect.com

Space Policy 25 (2009) 198e200www.elsevier.com/locate/spacepol

Book Review

Space as a Strategic Asset, Joan Johnson-Freese, ColumbiaUniversity Press, New York, 2007 (320 pp., $45/£29, ISBN:0-231-13654-4)

Space as a Strategic Asset focuses on the subject of trendsin space security, and its essence can be best described in theauthor’s own concluding words to the book: ‘‘Space securitycan be achieved in more than one way, and it is imperative thatwe explore them all’’. Interestingly, Joan Johnson-Freese’swork was published during a transitional period betweena time of American exceptionalism and an anticipated periodof greater cooperation on security matters. Nevertheless, iteffectively captures the history of US military affairs as theyrelate to space security, focusing more on recent years, fol-lowed by an analysis of other global powers and their spaceambitions and how the USA should adopt a new, compre-hensive space policy.

There is much discussion among experts on whether spaceis a contested domain or a cooperative one. Taken together,most of the literature on the subject of space security seems tofavor a perspective that space has been a contested environ-ment at least since 1957 with the launch of Sputnik. Johnson-Freese’s book helps reinforce this concept, emphasizing therole of ambition as catalyst for contesting space. Indeed, thefirst chapter addresses this with the appropriate title ‘A Clashof Ambitions’. Here, Johnson-Freese introduces four recentevents she argues as ‘‘indicating an alarming trend’’ in termsof the US approach to space. These include the October 2003launch of China’s first human crew into orbit; a November2003 agreement between China and the European Union towork together on the Galileo positioning, navigation andtiming system; the January 2004 Vision for Space Exploration(VSE) announced by US President George Bush; and theAugust 2004 release of US Air Force Doctrine Document 2-2.1, entitled Counterspace Operations.

The author argues that when taken together, they demon-strate that the USA intends to continue contesting space byweaponizing this domain. However, it is unclear how the VSEsupports this argument, and it is interesting that the USNational Space Policy of 2006, which was received poorly bymany in the USA and the rest of the world as ‘‘belligerent intone’’ was not selected for the list. Put another way, Johnson-Freese argues that the USA is trending from a historicallypassive use of space by the military to a more active rolecharacterized by a desire to pursue weaponization. Of course,a change in administrations has occurred since publication of

doi:10.1016/j.spacepol.2009.05.004

the book, and it seems likely that, following statements madeby President Barack Obama, this trend will be stopped. In anycase, Johnson-Freese’s general argument that the trend towardweaponization of space had been accelerating until 2009 iswell supported throughout her book, with specifics com-plementing the overall theme that officials, military personneland even the public favor emotion over science and adhere tothe belief that war in space or anywhere else is simply a fact oflife now and into the future.

Johnson-Freese begins our journey to understanding USmilitary space policy with a discussion of dual-use technolo-gies, which, according to the Department of Defense (DoD),are technologies that have ‘‘both military utility and sufficientcommercial potential to support a viable industrial base’’. Theauthor describes the benefits and pitfalls of regimes designedto prevent certain space technologies, such as those related tolaunch vehicles, remote sensing satellites and navigationsatellites, from landing in the hands of terrorist groups androgue nations. In the case of the USA Johnson-Freeseemphasizes how dual-use technology has followed a policy ofcontrolling everything that has potential military value,a condition that has adversely affected the US space industrialbase. The reasons for this vary, but generally it is because theprocess for controlling space-related trade, strictly enforced bythe International Trade in Arms Regulations (ITAR), has madeUS space products less attractive to international consumersand government partners. Johnson-Freese correctly asserts,however, that efforts to control the proliferation of technolo-gies are generally fruitless and indeed strict application ofenforcement regimes negatively affect US national security astheir existence encourages nations to invest in their own high-technology research and development. She urges furtherconsideration on the dual-use technology proliferation issueand presumably a more sophisticated regime than whatcurrently exists, otherwise ‘‘the United States could quicklyend up with 100 percent control of nothing e a security riskthat is both unnecessary and counterproductive.’’

In the chapter entitled ‘From Apollo to Where?’ Johnson-Freese addresses the US government’s apparent lack ofenthusiasm for pursuing a robust human spaceflight program,arguing that since the conclusion of the Apollo ProgramNASA has essentially been floundering. The lack of a coherentvision is not just the fault of NASA but also of administrationswith lukewarm support and a Congress that isn’t patient withmulti-year, technically challenging programs. However, theauthor focuses on a different aspect of human spaceflight than

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the typical mainstream debate on whether to spend money onhuman space exploration at all. Without much effort, forexample, one can see that the USA considers militaryspending on space a greater priority than human explorationand development of space. Put another way, the USA isa ‘‘crisis-response’’ nation with a short attention span. Thismeans it ‘‘takes a lot to rouse the United States, but.once itswrath is unleashed, it is a fierce and formidable opponent.’’ Italso means that Apollo and programs like it become uninter-esting or unpopular very quickly. Johnson-Freese goes on todescribe the history of civil and military spending on spacesince the establishment of NASA in 1958, while also pointingout the intimate relationship NASA has had with the DoD interms of personnel and technology transfers. She also writesabout the Shuttle program, which she points out was notsupported by Congress in terms of level of commitment orstrategic investment.

Finally, she writes about international cooperation on space,which she says is a valuable objective, although she doeshighlight the constantly shifting reasons for developing theInternational Space Station (ISS) between its nascent begin-nings in 1984 to the launch of the core module in 1998. Thechapter wraps up with a history of the Bush space vision of 2004,which followed a litany of issues that add up to a confused messwhen it comes to national direction on space: uncertain purposeof the ISS, follow-on to the Space Shuttle, the burst bubble oflow Earth orbit telecommunication satellite constellations andsubsequent failure of many startups in the commercial orbitallaunch industry, the Air Force left with two brand new launchvehicles and a much less robust launch market than anticipated,and so on. The 2004 vision, drafted following the loss ofColumbia in 2003, serves as the foundation for the current effortbeing undertaken by NASA, what former NASA administratorMichael Griffin described as ‘‘Apollo on steroids’’ e a return tohuman exploration of the Moon. While Johnson-Freese arguesthat human spaceflight yields benefits in terms of ‘‘jobs,education, technology development, and prestige,’’ it also offers‘‘a soft-power strategic alternative to counterbalance some,though not all, of the international fears generated by U.S.military ambitions in space.’’ She points out that this approachmust be done right to be effective, and that this was not the caseunder the Bush administration.

Two chapters, ‘The Militarization of Space’ and ‘TheWeaponization of Space’ provide perhaps the most interestingand salient parts of the book. Johnson-Freese describes thedifferences between the two concepts in a convincing andnicely packaged way. Nothing particularly new is included;rather, each chapter clearly captures what each concept means,an important contribution considering that ‘‘militarization’’and ‘‘weaponization’’ are often considered interchangeable byboth experts and lay persons. Generally speaking, the authordefines ‘‘militarization of space’’ as the use of space by themilitary to peacefully support terrestrial military operations(for example, telecommunication, imaging, signals intelli-gence, navigation, etc.), whereas the ‘‘weaponization ofspace’’ is the stationing and use of offensive and defensiveweapons in space by a military.

Regarding the militarization of space, the author definesand elaborates on the concepts of space support, forceenhancement and space control, elements which remain incurrent joint documents. There is also discussion of theimportance of budgets and how this can become a definingcharacteristic of a space program, in some cases effectivelyderailing national security requirements. The chapter onmilitarization of space nicely introduces the next chapter onweaponization by addressing US space intentions, focusing onthe concept of ‘‘space dominance’’ in an era of ‘‘pre-emptivewar’’ defined by President Bush. However, as Johnson-Freesepoints out, no one truly knows what space dominance is,although it apparently constitutes one of two objectives whenit comes to the US military perspective on space, the otherbeing deterrence. Deterrence, which can be either reprisal(overwhelming counter-response) or denial (not worth theeffort on the part of the attacker) in nature, means preventinga strike against the USA by lowering the potential for success.

In terms of dominance, the terms ‘‘space projection’’ areoften used in military literature. This is another conceptaddressed in the final pages of the militarization chapter, andthe author writes effectively about how this remains confusingat the expense of great controversy. As defined in militarydocuments, space projection means ‘‘ensuring US access toand use of space and to deny hostile exploitation of space toadversaries.’’ Again, this complements the so-called BushDoctrine of pre-emptive war.

‘‘The Weaponization of Space’’ is introduced nicely bypointing out that in 1988 the Air Force defined space as a missionrather than just a place, ‘‘revers[ing] decades of tradition anddoctrine’’. Here, Johnson-Freese addresses the fourth element ofmilitary space theory: force application, or the ‘‘overt weaponi-zation of space.’’ She writes on the legal parameters of ‘‘peacefuluses of outer space’’ as defined in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty(OST), for example. The USA defines peaceful as ‘‘non-aggres-sive’’ and notes that this in turn can be interpreted any number ofways. In addition, the OST prohibits weapons of mass destructionfrom being placed in orbit or on celestial bodies, but not weaponsin general, ‘‘opening the door to legal differences of opinion onwhich types of space hardware are subject to international law andunder what circumstances e for example, offensive versusdefense purposes e and, more recently, whether preemptiveattacks can be considered defensive.’’

The chapter goes on to address counterspace operations,which effectively merges space control and force application,a recent phenomenon as reflected in military doctrine. It ishere that space surveillance is addressed as a component ofspace control, with a description of the Space SurveillanceNetwork (SSN) and its role in space situational awareness(SSA). However, the author encourages the reader to considerhow, without adequate SSA, the USA could misinterpret anaction as hostile and attack a presumably dangerous satelliteonly to discover that the orbital debris generated is nowa national security threat. She also points out that SSA has notreceived the level of attention required.

Other elements of space control, like protection of spaceassets and measures to ‘‘preclude an enemy’s ability to use

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data or services for hostile purposes’’ are also discussed, withcommercial remote sensing shutter control used as oneexample. This leads to a section on how space control has beeninterpreted by the Bush Administration following a detailedhistory of missile defense. Johnson-Freese then conciselyaddresses four schools of thought on space weaponization:space dominance as the ‘‘ultimate high ground’’, weaponiza-tion of space is an inevitability, limiting space militarizationby arms control agreements (or status quo), and the conceptthat space should be off-limits to the military (space doves).This section essentially complements work already done byMoltz, Mueller and others, and serves as an excellent intro-duction to how each camp defines space weapons, a subjectwhich concludes the chapter.

Following a chapter on the politicization of the US aero-space industry, in which there is an interesting discussion ofthe 1998 Cox Commission, Johnson-Freese discusses thespace ambitions of Europe and China, each devoted a chapter.These serve mainly as historical overviews concluded witha current status in military space activities, with only a cursoryexamination of how the space activities of these two geopo-litical power centers relate to U.S. ambitions. The chapter onChina is interesting, and the author uses this as an opportunityto address the space ambitions of developing countriesgenerally, including the role of key UN bodies like theCommittee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS).China’s future space plans are also examined, including ideason what the country might pursue in terms of military objec-tives, followed by the author’s clarification on the popular ideathat the USA and China might enter a sort of ‘‘Cold War spacerace’’. Johnson-Freese dismisses this idea, pointing out thatChina has no desire ‘‘to match the military capabilities of theUnited States generally, or in space specifically.’’ Indeed,China is comparatively more deliberative than the USSR was,so the ‘‘technology race’’ perspective is a bit strained. Thechapter on Chinese space ambitions calls for special attentionsince Johnson-Freese has been studying Asian space activitiesgenerally and Chinese space activities in particular fordecades.

In the final chapter of the book, Johnson-Freese advocatesthe need for a comprehensive US space policy, replacing thecurrent military-centric policy which has the USA viewing‘‘space activity through a lens different from that of most otherspacefaring nations.’’ The author draws attention to theexceptionalist attitude captured in the Bush space policy,addressing a key point regarding the US view that ‘‘Freedomof action in space is as important to the United States as airpower and sea power.’’ If this is the case, Johnson-Freese asks,

‘‘Are similar rights and expectations considered legitimate forcountries other than the United States? While one mightassume that if the United States claims a right or expresses anexpectation for itself, it implicitly grants the same right orrecognizes the same expectation of others, the language of theNational Space Policy does not explicitly say that and, in fact,at times infers otherwise.’’ Other examples of this exception-alist perspective exist in the policy, all forcing the questionJohnson-Freese wants the reader to consider: ‘‘Is it consideredthreatening to the United States if other nations adopt similarlanguage?’’

Johnson-Freese argues that the USA must replace thecurrent National Space Policy with one that is ‘‘comprehen-sive’’ and made with ‘‘consideration of the goals and capa-bilities of other countries.’’ Failure to do so will mean that theUSA remains in a ‘‘perpetual burden to keep outdoing itselftechnologically, because others can counter US achievementswith less technological skill and far less money.’’ She supportsengagement, pointing out that this is not an end in itself, butrather a means. The engagement should be supporting anagenda of strategic stability, because ‘‘relying exclusively ontechnology for security e in this case, space weapons e doesnot provide an asymmetric advantage, it creates a strategicallyunstable environment.’’ Further, Johnson-Freese argues thatthe use of confidence and security-building measures, workingcooperatively on ‘‘rules of the road’’ (sometimes described asa space code of conduct), fleshing out principles held in theOST, pursuing international relationships on human space-flight activities (particularly with China) and maintaining USleadership in the commercial space industry all representobjectives that should be pursued under a new national spacepolicy.

Space as a Strategic Asset is a solid work of history thatnicely captures what may represent the closing years of a USspace policy dominated by an exceptionalist or unilateralistperspective. Johnson-Freese concludes her historical analysisof space security and assessment of current events (up to thefinal year of the George W. Bush administration) witha concluding chapter that offers both new and old recom-mendations for a new national space policy. Perhaps these willconstitute the elements of a more cooperative and forward-thinking space policy consistent with national security needsunder President Obama.

Phil SmithSecure World Foundation, 314 West Charles Street, Superior,

CO 80027-9622, USAE-mail address: psmith@swfound.org