Soviet Submarine Warfare Trends (January 1987) DECLASSIFIED

8/12/2019 Soviet Submarine Warfare Trends (January 1987) DECLASSIFIED

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DECLASSIFIED Authority NN 023211

J? irector of Ceotral Intelligence

Special National Intelligence EstimateMemorandum to Holders

III oviet ubmarineWarfare Trends

Key Judgments

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ID: 579002

T8tt SecretSNI II 20 84JXWJanuary 987opy 4


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MEMORANDUM FORsuahECT:


The [ c p u ~~ O C 2 0 S O S

1 4 JAN S87

Recipients of Key JudgmentsTransmittal of Memorandum to Holdersof SNIE 11-20-84Soviet Submarine Warfare Trends

1. There are certain key findings in this updated Estimate on.Soviet submarines that are highly relevant to ongoing policy issues.A d v ~ n c e s the Soviets have made in their submarine warfarei l i t ies, noted. in the Memorandum need to be taken into accountwar planning acquisition of new and .formulationcontrol tiation

I want to emphasize certain key findings:

--Technology transfer has been a significant factor .in Sovietimprovements especially in submarine quieting and torpedodesign and in some cases such transfers have been legal ,that is, not embargoed technology.


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DECLASSIFIED Authority NND 023211..

either this emorandum to Holders nor is a~ ~ ~ e J m t n t of U vs Soviet J U I J m a ~ r

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SNIE 11 20 84JXW

Memorandum to Holders of SNIE 1 1 2 0 ~ 8 4SOVIET SUBMARINE W RF RE TRENDS

KEY JUDGMENTS

p ~ . .

he full text of this Memorandum toHolders s being published separately

with regular distribution


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DECLASSIFIED Authority NND 023211

THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRALINTELLIGENCE.THE N TION L FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS

EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXThe following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation o theEstimate

The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National SecurityAgency, and the intelligence organization of the Department of State.

Also ParticipatingThe Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the rmyThe Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the NavyThe Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the ir ForceThe Director of lnteUigence, H e a d q u a r t ~ s Marine Corps

Warning NoticeIntelligence Sources or Methods InvolvedWNINTEL)

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATIONUnauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

DISSEMINATION CONTROL BBREVI TIONSNOFORN-NOCONTRACT-PROPINORCONREL

Not Releasable to Foreign NationalsNot Releasable to Contractors orContractor ConsultantsCaution Proprietary Information InvolvedDissemination and Extraction of Information

Controlled by OriginatorThis Information Has Been Authorized forRelease to

DERIVATIVE Cl Y REVIEW ON OADRDERIVED FROM .Multiple

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DECLASSIFIED Authority NN 23211MORI DocfD 579662

SCOPE NOTEThis memorandum updates and supplements SNIE 11-20-84,Soviet Submarine Warfare Trends but does not replace it Many of thebasic judgments in the SNIE remain valid. This memorandum, however, highlights significant new developments in Soviet ability to conduct

undersea warfare that have taken place since the SNIE s informationdate of December, 1984. It also introduces changes to the KeyJudgments of the original study based on new information. Neither thisMemorandum to Holders nor the SNIE is a net assessment of US versusSoviet submarine capabilities. -


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B L ~ K P GE

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K Y JUDGMENTSSince SNIE 11-20-84, Soviet Submarine Warfare Trends wasapproved for publication in December 1984, new information andanalysis have developed that indicate significant changes in some of thejudgments are required. In some areas of submarine warfare particu-larly quieting the Soviets are advancing more quickly than wepredicted and in other areas particularly production of submarines-they are not proceeding as quickly. On balance, we are more concernedabout Soviet capabilities to conduct submarine warfare over the next 10years than we were in 1984.

The DOtentially most serious developments include:- Quieting and Acoustic A d v a n t a ~ e Since the SNIE waspublished we have determined that one new submarine classthe Akula, has achieved a quieting l v l that wepredicted the Soviets would not achieve until the early 1990s.These quieting improvements will seriously reduce the effectiveness of all current Western ASW systems, but we cannotevaluate effects ori programed US system improvements. Such

quieting improvement will make detection of newer classes ofSoviet submarines more di

Although the Soviets have made impressiveprogress in narrowing the acoustic advantage of US submarines,they still have and sonar problems.

3Top Secret

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Also , the United Statesin numbers of quiet

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- Technologu Transfer. Further evidence shows that technologytransfer of both design and manufacturing technology has had.more of an impact on improving the Soviet submarine forcethan we estimated in the SNIE.

Important changes in submarine warfare trends that lessen ourprevious cOncerns are:A commitment to building substantially improved submarines at about the same pace s the last decade . . .

- Although the Soviets expanded their shipbuilding capacityduring the 1970s, they have reduced the pace of submarineorod.uction since the late 1970s. The construction rates of thelate 1970s may not be achieved again until at least the early1990s. We are, therefore, now projecting the oroduction of some14 fewer units (from 40 to 26) by 1996 of their newest classes ofSSNs than we projected in the SNIE.Maximum speeds in the 35- to 40-knot range for some o thenewest SSNs .

I t now api>ears the newest SSNs do not have the high-speedcapabilities of the Alfa-class. The Soviets may develop a newhigh-speed SSN in the 1990s, but the latest generation of SSNs-the Mike, Sierra, and Akula classes-probably has maximumspeeds in the 30- to 32-knot range. The Soviets apparently areemphasizing quieting over sJ)eed improvements... Introduction o long-range, land-attack cruise missilesW e see slow progress toward the deployment of long-rangesubmarine-launched cruise missiles SLCMs). We judge the Soviets could begin deploying the subsonic SS-NX-21 in 1987, if theychose to do so. The. supersonic SS-NX-24, however, is little closerto deployment today than we had estimated in 1984 .' Since theSNIE the Soviets launched a converted Yankee. the 402AA, thatwe judge will likely be a dedicated platform for the SS-NX-21. 4

We are uncertain, however, about Soviet plans for deploymentand operation of both the SS-NX-21 and the SS-NX-24 SLCMs.

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Important enigmas have developed since the SNlE. These mayhave a major impact on the Soviet submarine force that we cannotpredict at present:

The Soviets have under way a substantial and continuous effort toimprove their capability to conduct submarine warfare. We judge thegreatest benefit from the developments we have observed will be in enhanced protection of their SSBNs, and a marked improvement intheir submarines abilities to strike carrier battle groups and othersurface ships armed with land-attack cruise missiles. New analysisreinforces our judgment that the newest Soviet submarines may makesome current Western ASW weaoons obsolete, and may require asignificant ana POtentially expensive Western response; We nowjudge production rates of Soviet SSBNs will probably not increase to anyextent, and that by the late 1990s or early 2000s the Soviets are likely tohave fewer than 62 SSBNs. We continue to hold that Soviet submarineswill not be capable of attacking any more than a few US SSBNs andpossibly none, because of continued inability to reliably detect andtrack these units in the open ocean. We are now somewhat moreconcerned about our ability to detect in a timely manner Sovietbreakthroughs in submarine warfare that might add significantly toSoviet capabilities.

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Soviet Submarine Warfare Trends (January 1987) DECLASSIFIED