Social Capital and Generation “Y”:

does it address inequalities in political participation across the education divide?

Paper Presented to the Annual General Meeting of the

Canadian Political Science Association

May 31-June 2, 2016

University of Calgary

Calgary, AB Canada

Dr. L.S. Tossutti

Associate Professor

Department of Political Science

Brock University

St. Catharines, ON

ltossutti@brocku.ca

Young Canadians emerged as an engaged and powerful voting group that helped propel the Liberal

Party to victory in the 2015 federal election (Colletto, 2016). Turnout among 18-24-year-olds grew by 12

percent over 2011─the largest increase of any age group (Statistics Canada, 2016). Yet even with this

impressive growth, the youngest members of “Generation Y”1 voted at rates almost 20 points lower than

Canadians aged 65-74 years. The persistence of the age gap in electoral participation is the chief reason why

turnout rates plunged in the late 1990s and did not show signs of recovery until the most recent election. The

same pattern has been observed for municipal elections, with younger people less likely to vote than older

Canadians (Kushner and Siegel, 2006; Tossutti, 2007). While troubling, these trends must be viewed in the

context that not all young people are the same, and that youth absentionism is largely confined to those with less

formal education. As Bastedo has argued, worthy initiatives to set up voting stations on university and college

campuses across the country do not reach the most tuned-out segment of the youth electorate (Bastedo, 2015).

A new critical perspective on young people’s political engagement has argued that a generational shift in

citizenship norms is underway. Research has suggested that young people are disengaging from conventional

models of duty-based citizen participation (voting, party membership and reading the newspaper) and moving

towards “a more personalised politics of self-actualisation through digital networking or consumer activism”.

These theories posit that young people see and engage with politics in a more individualized rather than

collectivist way and prefer ad hoc involvement in issues-based campaigns, to long-term organizational

commitments or a particular ideology (Vromen et al., 2015). Because they prefer to work in a non-hierarchical

environment with their peers, their social circles constitute important sources of information and support

(Bennett et al., 2009). Other researchers have argued that everyday local spaces offer young people the ideal

venue for practicing a more individualised and personalised form of political engagement (Harris and Wyn,

2009).

There is evidence that digital networking has opened up avenues for more personalized and less

hierarchical forms of political engagement for the young. Canadians aged 18-34 years are more likely than

Canadians in general to circulate or report political information on social networking sites, use email or instant

messaging to discuss societal/political issues,blog about a political issue and participate in an online group

about a societal/political issue in the last 12 months (Samara Canada, 2014). A preference for acting in a non-

systematic and less hierarchical fashion is also manifested in the fact that young Canadians born after 1970 are

more likely than older Canadians to take part in a protest (Gidengil et al., 2004). In 2002, 70 percent of 20-29-

year-olds had signed a petition and between 11-22 percent reported participating in a boycott or attending a

demonstration (Tossutti, 2007). More individualized and personalized modes of political behavior are also

evident in the rise of “political consumerism,” where consumers seek to change institutional or market practices

thought to be politically or ethically objectionable through boycotts (rejecting consumer goods) or buycotts

(follow purchasing guidelines and buy labeled goods) (Micheletti and Stolle, 2008). Data on rates of youth

political consumerism in Canada are not available, but one Swedish study found that boycotts are often even

more important for 18-29-year-olds than for older individuals. Nevertheless, while the young may be more

inclined to adopt more personalized and less hierarchical forms of political action, Canadian evidence suggests

that even these venues are dominated by the better-educated (Gidengil et al., 2004).

1Statistics Canada defines a generation as a group of individuals who are about the same age and have experienced, most often as children

or young adults, specific historical events that may influence their world views. Among the Canadian population in 2011, children of baby boomers

born between 1972 and 1992 are often referred to as “Generation Y”. See https://www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/2011/as-sa/98-311-x/98-

311-x2011003_2-eng.cfm.

This paper examines the question of how young people with different levels of formal education

participate in institutionalized and non-institutionalized politics, through the lens of social capital theory. Social

capital theory posits that social networks help generate trust and goodwill, through which benefits such as

information, influence and solidarity are conferred to a collective or an individual (Coleman, 1988).

Participation in voluntary associations and social trust have been praised as key resources that help create an

active and committed citizenry. In his observations of nineteenth-century America, de Toqueville observed that

the presence of non-hierarchical voluntary associations contributed to the development of democracy by

overcoming individualism and encouraging people to cooperate to achieve the collective good (1969).

Contemporary survey data has shown that at both the individual and country level of analysis, “people who trust

others are more likely to engage in non-institionalized forms of political action, are more often members of

political groups, show higher levels of political interest, tend to trust their governments and display more

support for democracy” (Rossteutscher, 2008). Voluntary associations can serve as recruitment networks for

political activities or as incubators for the civic attitudes and skills necessary for political participation. Voting,

party membership, discussing and taking an interest in politics, attending meetings, and contacting political

officials have all been linked to associational involvements in mature and newly-established democracies

(Almond and Verba 1965; Verba and Nie 1972; Olsen 1972; Rogers et al., 1975; Erickson and Nosanchuck

1990; Verba et al., 1995; Stolle and Rochon 1998; Seligson 1999).

The positive verdict on the relationship between social capital and political engagement has been subject

to qualifications. Skeptics have argued it is inherently anti-political to rely on voluntary associations embedded

in the intermediate structure of pluralistic societies to mobilize participation, on the grounds that they encourage

a privatized rather than public response to societal problems (Lisman 1998). At the micro-level, the relationship

between participation in groups and participation in politics is robust but “modest” (van Deth, 1996). The

salutary effects of social capital for political engagement are contingent on the organizational type (Stolle and

Rochon 1998; Seligson 1999; Putnam 2000) and the internal activities of these groups (Erickson and

Nosanchuk, 1990: 206).

Using the unique opportunity provided by the 2013 General Social Survey on Social Identity, with its

oversample of young Canadians, this paper offers a preliminary examination of whether different forms of

social capital, as measured by the type and nature of memberships in voluntary organizations, the frequency and

nature of online and offline social contacts with family and friends, generalized and particular social trust, and

neighbourhood social capital, are associated with the increased odds of voting in the most recent federal and

municipal elections, signing an internet petition and participating in a boycott/”buycott” in the previous 12

months, for Canadians 24 years and under, who have not obtained a post-secondary diploma or degree. These

findings will be compared to their peers with a higher level of formal education in order to determine whether

social capital is a promising route for stimulating the involvement of the most tuned-out segment of the

Canadian citizenry.

Young Canadians and Political Engagement

Age has consistently been found to be the most important predictor of turnout in Canada. Just 38.8 percent of

young adults aged 18–24 voted in the 2011 federal election, compared with 54.5 percent of 35–44-year-olds,

and 75.1 percent of 65–74 year-olds (Elections Canada, 2012). While there was a strong uptick in youth voting

in 2015, their participation rates are still substantially below those of older Canadians. Generational decline has

been pinpointed to explain this phenomenon. Canadians born since 1970 are less likely to vote than their

parents or grandparents when they were the same age (Blais et al., 2004), and younger generations of voters are

also less likely than their predecessors to start voting even as they grow older (Elections Canada, 2008). Life-

cycle effects also help explain the age gap in electoral participation; as people grow older, they get more

involved in their social milieu and develop stronger preferences over time, and they are more likely to vote

(Baum, 2002). This is because as they settle down with a partner, become parents, and find a job, they become

more aware of how political issues such as taxes, economic development, and access to social and health

services affect their lives (Gidengil et al., 2004). Other lifecycle effects that depress youth electoral

participation include: singlehood (Stoker and Jennings, 1995), greater mobility (Pammett and LeDuc, 2003),

reaching political adulthood in an atmosphere of political uncompetitiveness (Johnston et al., 2007); declining

levels of civic duty (Blais, 2000); a preference for non-electoral political participation (Gidengil et al., 2004;

Young and Everitt, 2004); value change associated with a “decline of deference” (Nevitte, 1996); and greater

partisan de-alignment (Dalton and Wattenberg, 2000).

Studies comparing the voting habits of younger to older Canadians have found that the former are less

likely than Canadians aged 30 years and over to agree they have a duty to vote, and are less interested in and

knowledgeable about politics (Gidengil et al., 2004; Howe, 2010). The decline of newspapers as the most

important source of political information and the increased dependence on commercial television have been

blamed for contributing to lower levels of political knowledge (Milner, 2002), which are also more likely to be

found among younger Canadians (Rubenson et al. 2004). When non-voting Canadian youths were asked why

they did not cast a ballot in 2000, they were more likely than older respondents to cite a lack of interest, in

addition to personal/administrative factors and registration problems as the reason (Pammett and LeDuc, 2003).

Younger voters and non-voters tend to be distinguished by their attitudes, lifestyles, and demographic

characteristics. Following the 2011 election, Canadians aged 18–34 years were asked why they voted. Many

referred to voting as a civic duty and to their desire to express their opinions and views. A majority of those

who did not vote said they were too busy with school, work, or taking care of their families. Those with higher

levels of education and household income and who were employed were also more likely to have voted than

young people who were unemployed and who had lower levels of education and income (Statistics Canada,

2011). A study of 18–30 year olds between 1997–2008 found that youths who were informed and interested in

politics were also more likely to vote than those who were not (Blais & Loewen, 2011). While research on the

profile of young participants in non-institutionalized forms of political activities is less developed, we do know

that protest activity, including signing a petition, joining a boycott and attending a demonstration, tends to be

dominated by well-educated and relatively affluent baby boomers (Gidengil et al., 2004).

Social capital: a flexible concept

The notion of “social capital” has generated a vigorous debate about its emergence, nature and consequences for

individuals and communities alike. What various conceptualizations of the term share in common is the idea

that social relations built on trust and fellowship constitute a resource distinct from financial (money), human

(skills and expertise) and physical capital (tools). Perspectives differ on whether social capital arises out of

rational self-interest or combination of self-interest and cultural norms, whether it is a private or public good,

and whether it is an exclusionary resource designed to maintain social hierarchies, or one that produces positive

and inclusive benefits for individuals, neighbourhoods or countries.

The earliest known use of the expression “social capital” was in 1916, when L.J. Hanifan, a state

supervisor of rural schools in West Virginia observed that the good will, fellowship, sympathy and social

contact among individuals and families could result in an accumulation of social capital that might satisfy the

needs of an individual, as well as improve living conditions in the whole community (Hanifan, 1920). In the

1980s, French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu employed the social capital concept to explain how upper and middle

classes maintained their dominant position in society, describing it as the “sum of the actual or potential

resources that are linked to possession of a durable relationship of mutual acquaintance and recognition.”

(Bourdieu, 1986). While distinct from economic capital, it was inseparable from it because upper and middle

classes used it to preserve the exclusivity of their spheres of influence (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992).

Writing in the late 1980s, American sociologist James Coleman challenged economic assumptions that

people were motivated by rational self-interest and unconcerned about other people or society (Couto, 2010).

According to Coleman, economic models failed to account for how social structures─history, cultural norms

and beliefs─could shape and redirect individual actions. He proposed that cultural norms also motivated people

to invest time and energy into relationships, in addition to a self-interested hope that the investment would

eventually bring a pay off; by cooperating with others, the individual would acquire a good reputation in the

community and benefit from being trusted in the future. Although no individual could own social capital, he

saw it as a resource created by and for the individual (Couto, 2010). Coleman was primarily concerned with

socialization processes in families and school systems, and argued that social capital could foster the

development of human capital in the next generation by helping young people acquire a stronger sense of self-

identity, confidence in expressing their opinions and emotional intelligence. This in turn would lead to better

learning and educational outcomes (Coleman, 1988).

Writing in the same era, American political scientist Robert Putnam extended the social capital concept

from the individual to societies and communities. He interpreted social capital as not just an individual asset,

but as a collective asset of neighbourhoods and communities. He defined social capital as consisting of social

networks and interpersonal relationships that give rise to trust and reciprocity, which in turn generate “civic

virtue” where residents know each other and are involved in each other’s lives and maintain trustful and helpful

relations (Putnam 2000, 19). In contrast to Bourdieu’s understanding of social capital as primarily a private

good, Putnam regards social capital as an asset that benefits the broader community.

In Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community, Putnam draws on rich databases

of aggregate and individual-level measures of social connectedness and trust to document the decline of social

capital across the United States. Following a rapid increase in the membership market shares for major civic

organizations during most of the first two thirds of the century, these organizations experienced a levelling and

decline in their market shares, and then an absolute decline in their membership numbers (Putnam, 2000).

Longitudinal data on the frequency of attendance at church and club meetings, volunteering, socializing with

friends and family, and even picnicking, painted the same portrait of weakening social ties between 1975 and

1999. Altruism, a strong predictor of social connectedness, also declined. Fewer people gave blood, money or

volunteered their time, and since 1964, there has been a steady decline in the fraction of income given to

charities. Trust in others, which Putnam regards as a consequence of social capital, also experienced a forty-

year decline, with the drop most pronounced among American youths. Weakening social bonds have been

accompanied by a decline in political and civic engagement: fewer Americans were signing a petitions, writing

a letter to their members of Congress, attending a local meeting, serving as an official of a local club, serving on

a committee of any local organization, and working for a party. The decline was most pronounced among the

generations born after 1940 compared to the activism of the long civic generation born between 1910 and 1940

(2000).

Putnam argues that the implications of the loss of social connectedness are profound: American states

with a large stock of social capital enjoyed greater economic and civic equality, better student educational

performance and child welfare outcomes, lower rates of violent crime and higher rates of tolerance for gender,

racial equality and civil liberties (2000). The policy consequences of social capital build on the findings of his

comparative study of social capital in Italy, which found that regions with dense networks of voluntary

associations enjoyed superior economic development and institutional performance at the regional level

(Putnam, 1993).

Further refinements to the social capital concept have distinguished between the structure of social

networks, the frequency and intensity of connections between network members, and the sociological diversity

of the network. Social capital could be formal, such as joining an organization that is “formally organized with

recognized officers, membership requirements, dues and regular meetings...” or informal, such as a group of

people who gather at a bar (Putnam and Goss, 2002). Some forms of social capital are dense and

interconnected, while others are “thin”. An example of the former would be a group of people who work

together every day, attend the same religious institution on a weekly basis, and socialize with each other every

Saturday. Thin networks would involve casual forms of social connections, such as nodding to an

acquaintance. Even these had the potential to generate reciprocity in the sense that the individual would be

more likely to come to your aid (Putnam and Goss, 2002). Other researchers have focused on the frequency of

social connections, with Granovetter naming frequent ties as “strong” and less frequent ties as “weak”.

Another relevant distinction is that of bonding verus bridging social capital (Putnam, 2008). Bonding

social capital is developed within groups of sociologically similar people, as might be found in churches or

ethnic organizations. Bridging social capital refers to networks comprised or people from diverse social

cleavages, such as those in youth service groups or the civil rights movement etc (Warren, 2008). While the

line between the two is not always clear, and the same organization can encompass bonding and bridging ties

(e.g. a religious group that includes people from different socio-economic backgrounds), their respective impact

on social cohesion differs: bonding social capital creates strong in-group loyalty, encourages reciprocity, and

can provide social and psychological resources for marginalized groups, but it can also generate out-group

antagonism and intolerance, or negative externalities (Putnam, 2008). Bridging social capital extends networks

and connects groups to resources they might not otherwise access, enhances information flows and generates

broader identities and reciprocity Along these lines, bonding social capital has helped Caribbean young people

in the United Kingdom develop a sense of belonging and ethnic identity (Reynolds, 2007). Their same-ethnic

friendships encouraged particularized trust, provided mutual support and a shared understanding concerning

issues of racial discrimination and social exclusion. However, it also discouraged friendships existing outside

of these bonds, suggesting that it can operate as an exclusionary device.

Social Capital and Political Engagement

The mobilization version of social participation theory maintains that even involvement in apolitical voluntary

associations can encourage political participation by broadening one’s sphere of concerns to include political

issues, expanding social networks so that people meet new individuals who might introduce them to political

activities, and providing training in social interaction and leadership skills. By lobbying decision makers or

providing political elites with a channel for contacting their constituents, they can also serve as parapolitical

mediators between individuals and the political system (Olsen, 1972).

In his analysis of American elections during the 1960s, Olsen found that membership and participation

in secular and church-sponsored voluntary groups, as well as participation in community events, was positively

associated with voter turnout (1972, 323). Another study found that participation in voluntary associations led

to higher turnout rates in local and national elections and to diminished political alienation in the United States

(Hanks and Eckland, 1978). In Sweden, Germany and the United States, members of voluntary associations

scored significantly higher than nonmembers on all indicators of social capital, including political contacting

and engagement (Stolle and Rochon, 1998). Individuals with multiple associational memberships in these

countries were also more likely to vote in local elections and to participate in neighbourhood and community

activities outside of group life (Stolle, 2001). In Canada, members of voluntary organizations were more likely

than non-members to have voted in the 2000 federal election and to join political parties (Pammett and LeDuc,

2003; Gidengil et al. 2004). Bowler, Donavan and Hanneman (2003) concluded that membership in some

private, non-political associations was associated with greater political engagement in Europe, with engagement

operationalized by an index composed of discussing politics, being a member of a party, and political interest.

Nakhaie used the 2004 General Social Survey to evaluate the importance of social capital for the

political participation of native-born Canadians, early immigrants and more recent immigrants who landed

between 1970 and 1989. Seven indicators of social capital were used: trust, belonging to associations,

volunteering, involvement in social groups while in high school, religious participation, intensity of contact

with friends, and the extent of friendship networks within the same ethnicity. Participation was measured by

questions asking respondents if they had searched for information on political issues, expressed their views by

contacting newspapers/politicians, signed a petition, boycotted a product/chose a product for ethical reasons,

attended a public meeting and/or participated in a demonstration or march. He found that associational

involvements and social networks, followed by trust and volunteering, were the best predictors of political

participation for the three groups (2008).

The effects of organizational type and the intensity and nature of a member’s involvement have also

been investigated. The boundary between voluntary associations that are primarily designed to influence

government action or the selection of people who make public policies, and non-political voluntary activity, is

often unclear (Verba et al., 1995). This is because apolitical organizations such as sports clubs, philanthropic

groups or churches can serve as recruitment venues for political participation, expose people to political cues or

messages, or perform functions normally undertaken by governments such as aiding in refugee settlement or

collecting money to fund medical research (40-41). Research on the effects of political and non-political

voluntary associations is mixed. A study of six Central American countries found that participation in

community development groups was the only form of voluntary involvement consistently associated with

making demands of government officials (Seligson, 1999). However, in Germany, Sweden, and the United

States, political activity was strongly related to memberships in both political and apolitical voluntary

associations. Members of political, economic and community groups were most likely to be heavily involved in

political and community participation, while members of cultural, personal interest and economic groups

registered higher levels of political trust and efficacy (Stolle and Rochon, 1998).

Organizational effects are also contingent on country setting. In the United States, members of political

groups were more likely to have voted in local elections or to have participated in neighbourhood and

community activities than members of church choirs. In Sweden, members of church choirs were most likely to

have voted and to have participated in neighbourhood and community activities. In Germany, church choir

members were less likely to have voted in local elections than other group members (Stolle, 2001).

The political consequences of bonding and bridging, formal and informal social capital have also been

explored. Bonding social capital has facilitated turnout in Denmark, where membership in an ethnic association

had a positive effect on turnout for Lebanese and Turkish voters in local elections (Togeby, 1999). Members of

Amsterdam’s Turkish community reported higher turnout in municipal elections and other political activities,

higher levels of interest in local news and politics, and more trust in local, non-ethnic institutions relative to

other ethnic groups─patterns attributed to the community’s larger network of interlocking ethnic associations

(Fennema and Tillie, 1999). Across six cities in The Netherlands, large and dense networks of Turkish migrant

organizations corresponded with higher Turkish voting turnout rates and local council representation compaed

to other ethnic minority communities with smaller associational networks (van Heelsum, 2002).

A study of the Canadian population aged 25 years and over found that measures of bonding social

capital (i.e. same ethnic friendship networks and the intensity of networks) helped predict political participation,

but their effects were weaker than forms of bridging social capital, such as high school group involvement.

Nakhaie attributes this to the capacity of bridging social capital to facilitate the acquisition of information about

political and social issues that is not otherwise available, and to build trust with others (Nakhaie, 2008).

Bevelander and Pendakur found that high levels of formal interaction (i.e. membership in a recreational group,

voluntarism, attendance at religious services), trust in government, civic awareness, and a sense of belonging at

the local level were associated with higher odds of voting in federal and/or provincial elections for immigrants

and ethnic minorities. Informal interactions such as talking to friends and neighbours did not have a significant

effect on turnout (Bevelander and Pendakur, 2007).

A related strand of research has focussed on the intensity and substance of involvement in a voluntary

association. Even passive memberships in Swedish voluntary associations were related to higher levels of

political contacting and manifestations, primarily because these groups connected members to more possibilities

for political recruitment (Teorrell, 2003, 56-59). The same was not true for the United States, where simply

being a member of a non-political voluntary organization was insufficient to foster overall levels of political

activity. The capacity for associations to mobilize political participation depended upon whether a member had

been asked to participate in a political activity or had acquired civic skills such as writing a letter, planning a

meeting, or giving a presentation within the organization (Verba et al., 1995). Organizational members who

engage in political discussion are also more likely to be politically active (Verba and Nie, 1972; Rogers et al.,

1975). A study of an Ottawa-Hull bridge league found that political discussions between bridge partners

exerted significant and positive effects on standard measures of federal political participation, even after

controlling for the association’s characteristics, the work performed for the association, a member’s personal

characteristics, and sense of political efficacy (Erickson and Nosanchuk, 1990).

Not all research has been as sanguine about the connection between associational involvements and

political behaviour. Van Deth’s analysis of Western European countries found that membership in social

movement and political organizations was only weakly related to interest in politics and opinions about its

personal and overall saliency. Membership in church-related groups and welfare organizations was actually

linked to a decline in the perceived saliency of politics (2000).

Young People, Social Capital and Political Participation

It has been argued that organizational involvements undertaken in one’s youth can plant the seeds for civic

engagement later in life (Jennings and Stoker, 2004; Stolle and Hooghe, 2004). “The presence of social capital

as early as the eighth grade – in the way of parental involvement, youth religious involvement, and voluntary

association participation in one's youth were significant predictors of greater political and civic involvement in

young adulthood” (Smith, 1999). American adolescents who belonged to religious organizations were

significantly more likely to report that they expected they would cast an informed vote when they became

adults,while in Columbia, adolescent membership in a religious organization was a significant predictor of the

expectation that one would write a letter on a political issue and join a political party in adulthood (Torney-

Purta et al., 2004). In Canada, immigrants under the age of 35 who belonged to a voluntary organization were

more likely to vote in federal, provincial and local elections and to express more interest in current affairs

(Tossutti, 2003).

As with the general population, the salutary effects of social capital on youth political participation are

contingent on organizational type and the nature of activites undertaken in the organization. McFarland and

Thomas found that while involvement in extracurricular activities was important, involvement in youth

voluntary associations concerned with community service, representation, speaking in public forums and

generating a communal identity was most conducive to future political participation in adulthood in the United

States (McFarland and Thomas, 2006), net of self-selection and causal factors. In Canada, voluntary

organization involvements were not significantly associated with higher turnout for people under the age of 30

years, once mobilization factors, socio-demographic attributes and attitudes were held constant (Tossutti, 2007).

In fact, young members of artistic/musical/cultural clubs were significantly less likely to have cast a ballot in

the 2000 federal election. While membership in hobby/sports/leisure, charitable/service,

artistic/musical/cultural, and environmental/human rights associational memberships was positively associated

with a higher score on an index of informal activism (measured by signing petitions, letter-writing campaigns,

meetings and demonsrations), young members of neighbourhood associations were significantly less likely to

engage in informal activism.

Social networks, as a measure of social capital, can be forged in virtual space thanks to digital

infrastructures and applications that are particularly popular among the young. However, the early social

capital literature regarded face-to-face communication as a privileged form of human interaction that

encourages pro-social attitudes and behavioural patterns. Putnam pointed to television and its electronic

cousins as prime culprits behind the erosion of social and civic life, in the way they discouraged socializing and

community involvement and allowed watchers and users to be selective about the information to which they

were exposed, thus limiting their exposure to diverse orientations (Putnam, 2000). It has also been argued that

while some groups use the internet mainly to retrieve information and become informed, the internet is

primarily a source of entertainment for the vast majority of users (Hooghe and Oser, 2015).

Recent literature suggests that internet-based forms of communication can have strong networking

effects (Hooghe and Oser, 2015). Digital media, and social network sites in particular, are useful for

establishing and maintaining relationships with a large and often heterogeneous network of people who provide

support, information and other resources (Quinn, 2016). They allow for “quicker political mobilization,

accelerated cycles of action and protest, and new forms of collectivity” (Couldry, 2014). Hooghe and Oser’s

assessment of the impact of internet screen time on generalized trust, socializing and generosity found there is

usually a positive relationship between internet use (i.e. amount of time per week on email, amount of time per

week on the Web in addition to emailing ) and social capital indicators. A random web survey of college

students across Texas found small, but positive and significant relationships between the intensity of Facebook

use and students’ life satisfaction, social trust, civic engagement, and political participation (Valenzuela et al.,

2009).

Taking into account the diverse ways in which social capital has been conceptualized and

operationalized by researchers across many disciplines, the sum of evidence suggests that membership in

voluntary associations and social trust are positively related to institutionalized and non-institutionalized forms

of political engagement for the general population and some sub-populations. Research also suggests that the

relationship varies across country settings, and is contingent on the structure of the social connection (formal or

informal), as well as the nature, intensity and frequency of social connections (bonding or bridging, strong or

weak). Studies on the same relationship for youth sub-populations and the political consequences of newer

digital forms of networking are less extensive and the results mixed. This paper will further our insights on the

relationship between social capital and political engagement for the most tuned-out segment of the Canadian

citizenry: young people aged 24 years and under, with less than post-secondary education.

Methodology

Based on the literature review, this paper will draw on a rich and detailed set of nationally representative survey

data on young Canadians to test the following research hypotheses:

H1: Indicators of social capital will be associated with higher odds of voting in federal and municipal elections

for Canadian citizens aged 18-24 years.

H2: Indicators of social capital will be associated with higher odds of signing an internet petition and

participating in a boycott or “boycott” for Canadians aged 15-24 years.

H3: Membership in political organizations will be associated with higher odds of institutionalized and non-

institutionalized forms of political engagement for Canadians 24 years and under.

H4: Belonging to bridging organizations and social networks will be associated with higher odds of

institutionalized and non-institutionalized forms of political engagement for Canadians 24 years and under.

H5: Indicators of social capital will be more likely to exert positive effects on the political engagement of

younger Canadians with less formal education.

The General Social Survey on Social Identity interviewed individuals 15 years and over in Canada’s ten

provinces and was conducted from June 2013 to March 2014. It was implemented using telephone and internet

modes of data collection and included an oversample of immigrants and youth to allow for a more sophisticated

analysis of these groups. The final sample for analysis in this paper includes 3,486 respondents between the

ages of 15 and 24. Of those, 2,732 had not obtained a post-secondary diploma or degree and 754 had. The

survey is ideal for this study as it contains batteries of questions on voluntary association memberships, social

networks, generalized and particular trust, and institutionalized and non-institutionalized forms of political

engagement.

Given critical perspectives on the rise of new citizenship norms among the young, this paper adopted a

more inclusive approach to measuring political engagement. The dependent construct of “dutiful”

institutionalized political engagement was measured with two items: turnout in the most recent federal and

municipal elections. The dependent construct of non-institutionalized political engagement was measured with

two items: signing an internet petition and boycotting/buycotting in the previous 12 months. The voting

participation questions were only administered to individuals aged 18 years and over, and non-citizens were

excluded from these analyses.

The independent construct of social capital was measured using structural (i.e. memberships in

voluntary organizations, social networks) and attitudinal components (i.e. generalized and particular forms of

social trust, perceptions of helping behavior at the neighbourhood level). Since previous research has shown

that the effects of voluntary associations are contingent on organizational type, binary items measuring

membership (where 1=yes and 0=no) in political (i.e. political parties, civic associations, with the latter

encompassing school, neighbourhood and community associations) and apolitical organizations whose primary,

albeit not sole purpose, is primarily expressive or service-oriented (i.e. sports, hobby, religious, service, youth,

ethnic ), were included as explanatory variables. These organizations also mirror the analytical distinction

between bonding (religious, youth, ethnic) organizations and bridging organizations (parties, civic associations,

sports, hobby, service). Another item categorized respondents according to whether they were a member of a

bonding organization where at least half or more of the members belonged to the same age group.

The social network concept was measured with six items tapping into the frequency of offline and online

social contacts. These measured the frequency of personal, text and email contacts with relatives, the frequency

of personal, text and internet contact with friends. Frequent contacters were defined as those who were in

contact with friends or relatives, at least once a week if not more. Given the early social capital literature and

the growth in popularity of digital technologies, particularly among the young, it was deemed important to

explore qualitative distinctions between face-to-face and virtual modes of communication. Two additional

explanatory variables contributed to a further refinement of the social network concept by drawing a distinction

between bonding and bridging social networks; respondents were asked about the ethnic and income

homogeneity of their social networks. Respondents who indicated that at least half or more of the individuals in

their social network came from the same ethnic or income group were deemed to be part of bonding networks,

while those who indicated fewer than half came from the same ethnic or income group were deemed to be part

of bridging social networks. The concept of social trust was measured with items asking how much respondents

trusted people in general, their families, and their neighbours; responses at the median or higher were assigned a

value of “1”, while responses below the median were assigned a value of “0”. Neighbourhood social capital

was measured with an item asking respondents whether they lived in a neighbourhood where neighbors helped

each other.

Political participation is affected by a variety of socio-demographic and attitudinal factors. These

variables include: gender (Gidengil et al. 2004); household income (Verba et al., 1971; Nevitte et al., 2000);

immigrant or newcomer status (Blais et al., 2004; Tossutti, 2007); and political interest (Pammett and LeDuc,

2003). Items measuring the respondents’ sex, household income and immigrant status were included as

controls, in addition to two variables measuring political interest and whether the respondent followed the news

on a daily basis. While a sense of civic duty and administrative barriers have also been shown to affect youth

turnout, these items were not available on the GSS survey.

Prior to testing the hypotheses, a bivariate analysis explored whether there are significant differences in

the participation rates of young people with less and more formal education. Binary logistic regression was

then used to test the hypotheses since all the response variables were categorical and dichotomous: event Y

occurs or does not occur. Binary logistic regression permits the analysis of the simultaneous effects of multiple

independent variables on the dependent variables, while holding the values of all other predictor variables

constant. With binary outcomes, estimates derived from conventional logistic regression are preferable to

Ordinary Least Squares regression techniques, which tend to produce inefficient parameters and biased standard

errors (Long, 1997: 38-53).

All variables were entered into the regression model using the block recursive approach developed by

Miller and Shanks (1996). The strength of estimating the model in stages is that it allows for each variable to be

examined in isolation, and then in relation to and in combination with other items. By entering the variables in

stages, shifts in model fit and in the magnitude of the coefficients and their statistical significance may be

observed. The overall fit of the model was assessed with the following summary statistics: the -2 Log

Likelihood statistic (-2LL) shows whether a large portion of unexplained variance still remains in the model

(Pampel, 2000). Smaller values of the statistic indicate better predictions of the dependent variables. The model

chi-square statistics provides a test of the null hypothesis that the model coefficients=0. As a result, if the chi

square is statistically significant, we reject the null hypothesis and conclude that the independent variables help

predict the probability that Y=1, than without the independent variables. Other measures of model fit include

the Cox and Snell R-square, an analogue to the linear regression r-square that reports the amount of variance in

the dependent variable accounted for by the explanatory variables (Menard, 2002). Larger values indicate that

the model explains more variation in the dependent variable. Tables 2 thru 9 show the log odds of turnout for

each level of election, for signing an internet petition and for participating in a boycott/boycott, for the two

education domains. The estimates (b coefficients) show the differences in the log odds of engagement for those

in a category compared to the reference category for each predictor. For reasons of tabular clarity, the

exponentiated coefficients are only presented for the full model (Model 7) for each activity.

In order to determine the quality of the estimates and to calculate the coefficient of variation, the

standard deviation must be calculated. Since the GSS uses a multi-stage survey design and calibration, the

bootstrap method was used to calculate variance estimates (Statistics Canada, 2015). The SAS analytical

package was used to compute variances with the help of 500 bootstrap weights provided with the microdata file.

Only estimates with a coefficient of variation of between 0-16.5 percent are considered for general and

unrestricted release.

A word of caution about the limitations of using a cross-sectional survey to explore the relationship

between social capital and political engagement is necessary. This paper posits that social capital is associated

with the increased odds of political participation. Cross-sectional surveys do not permit a clear conclusion

about the causal relationship between the two. A correct specification of such a relationship requires

longitudinal panel data, where the same subjects are repeatedly asked about their social capital resources and

political behavior. A second limitation is that if differences in political behaviour are observed between

respondents with different stocks of social capital, it is difficult to untangle whether they can be attributed to

social capital indicators or to self-selection effects. In other words, people who engage in political affairs may

also be more inclined to join voluntary organizations, to socialize and to trust. Although studies in Sweden and

the United States suggest that involvement in voluntary associations precedes political participation (Teorrell

2003, 58; Olsen 1972), available evidence on the relationship between associational memberships and social

capital indicators such as generalized trust is inconclusive (Hooghe, 2008). This analysis allows us to view the

relationship between social capital and political participation as a correlation. Only future longitudinal data can

definitively establish a hypothesized causal relationship between the two, and control for self-selection effects.

While these are intriguing questions that merit close inspection, this does not detract from the insight into the

relationship between social capital and political engagement among young respondents, that can be drawn from

the GSS.

Educational Differences in Youth Political Participation

Just 43 percent of people aged 18-24 years reported voting in the 2011 federal election (data not shown). While

surveys generally overestimate voting behaviour by a large margin, the GSS estimate is quite close to official

reports of 39 percent for this age group. Respondents who did not have a post-secondary diploma or degree

voted at about half the rate of their peers with more education in both federal and municipal elections (Table 1).

Slightly more than 65 percent of young Canadians with a higher level of education voted in 2011, compared to

31 percent of their peers with less than a post-secondary education (p ≤ .0001). The same pattern was observed

for the most recent municipal elections. Young citizens with a post-secondary diploma or degree voted at

almost twice the rate of their peers with less education; 41 percent compared to 23 percent (p ≤ .0001). It is

interesting to note that the turnout rates reported by the more highly educated youths are similar to official

turnout for the general population at both the federal and municipal levels, suggesting that the “issue” of youth

absentionism should be framed as a phenomenon restricted to a specific segment of young Canadians.

INSERT TABLE 1 HERE

The education gap carried over to non-institutionalized modes of participation which do not involve the

administrative burden of voter registration; slightly more than 31 percent of the more highly educated reported

participating in a boycott/buycott in the previous twelve months, compared to about 15 percent of those who

had graduated with a high school diploma or less (p ≤ .0001). A narrowing of the participation gap was seen

with respect to internet petitions, but the less educated were still much less likely to engage in this activity as

well. About 32 percent of the best-educated had signed an internet petition, compared to 20.3 percent of the

less educated (p ≤ .0001). These patterns paint a portrait of inequality at all levels of elections, in both

institutionalize and non-institutionalized forms of political engagement.

Social Capital, Voting and Education

Just one form of social capital was associated with higher odds of voting in the previous municipal election for

young people with less than post-secondary education (Table 2). Those who were in frequent personal contact

with their relatives (once a week or more) were significantly more likely to vote than those who were in contact

less frequently, with all else held constant (p ≤ .06). Turnout rates were also significantly higher for males and

respondents who were very/somewhat interested in international, national, provincial or municipal politics, even

after controlling for other demographic, social capital and political interest factors. For the more highly-

educated cohort, party memberships and frequent texting with friends (once a week or more) were significant

predictors of municipal turnout, until the introduction of the social trust variables in Model 6 (Table 3). In the

full model, immigrant status was the only variable significantly linked to local turnout for young Canadians

with higher education; Canadian-born citizens were more likely to vote than their foreign-born counterparts (p≤

.07). Interestingly, none of the social capital variables were important enough to overcome this difference

among young people with more education.

INSERT TABLES 2 AND 3 HERE

Overall, organizational involvements and social networks – whether of the bonding or bridging variety,

as well as social trust, were not significantly associated with municipal turnout for young Canadians, regardless

of their education level. The relevance of frequent personal contact with relatives, and the irrelevance of

contact with friends and all internet-based modes of communication, suggests that who one is in contact with

and how that contact is made matters. Young people with less education may be receiving more cues from their

relatives to vote in local elections, but not from their friends. As Coleman has argued, families can be an

important source of social capital, and appear to be more important than friendship networks in this instance.

The findings also support the early social capital literature, which valued face-to-face modes of communication.

No form of virtual contact, with friends or relatives, was significantly associated with voting in local elections.

Very few social capital indicators were associated with higher turnout in the 2011 federal election for

young citizens with less than a post-secondary education. Among those with less formal education,

membership in a bonding organization and bonding social network increased the odds of federal turnout (Table

4). Respondents who reported that only a few or none of the friends with whom they were in contact in the past

month (in person, by telephone, by text or by email) were from an ethnic group that was visibly different from

their own, had 2.5 times higher odds of voting than those from more ethnically heterogeneous groups.

Furthermore, respondents who belonged to organisations where at least half of the people they met through the

organization were around the same age, had 2.5 times higher odds of voting than their peers who belonged to

organizations with a more diversified age profile. These results challenge theories that bonding social capital is

a less effective means of encouraging civic involvement and an outward-looking perspective than bridging

social capital, and support literature on the positive role of bonding social capital in less privileged populations.

The results show that when young people with less formal education are involved in clubs or associations with

people from their own age group, and socialize with people from their own ethnic group, they are more likely to

vote in federal elections. In this case, bonding organizations and networks may provide the cues, support or

incentive required to mobilize the vote, although this can only be confirmed through a qualitative case study of

how these groups and networks function.

Finally, while certain social capital indicators were significantly associated with federal turnout, they

were not sufficient to wash out the effects of certain demographic differences among the less well-educated:

males and the Canadian-born still voted at higher rates than females and immigrants, with all else held constant.

The failure of any social capital indicator to overcome these gaps speaks to the possibility that the organizations

and networks to which these individuals belong are not venues where political cues and mobilization efforts are

a priority (Table 4).

INSERT TABLES 4 and 5 HERE

For more highly educated young citizens, having few or no friends from a visibly different ethnic group

was significantly and positively related to federal turnout, until the social network indicators were introduced in

Model 4 (Table 5). The difference in immigrant and Canadian-born voting rates that was initially observed for

this group, faded after social trust was controlled. While this paper is not primarily concerned with

investigating the turnout of females and immigrants, the absence of gender and nativity differences among

better-educated young people is noteworthy. When young immigrants with more formal education expressed

similar levels of trust in others, their families, their neighbours, and felt that they lived in a neighbourhood

where people helped each other, they were as likely to vote as their Canadian-born peers (Table 5).

Social Capital and Non-Institutionalized Political Engagement

Young Canadians who belonged to political parties had 5.8 times higher odd of signing an internet petition in

the previous 12 months than non-party members (Table 6). Whether this means that party membership led to

political activity on the internet, or whether those who were active on the internet were more likely to join a

party, is not a question that a cross-sectional survey can resolve. What can be said is that for young people with

less education, membership in organizations that are not primarily concerned with public affairs is not

associated with internet-based political activism. This shows that organizational type matters for young

Canadians, supporting previous research on Canadians under the age of 30 (Tossutti, 2007). As with the federal

voting model, belonging to a bonding organization where at least half of the membership was from the same

age group was positively associated with signing an internet petition. Unlike the federal voting model,

ethnically heterogeneous social networks were associated with signing an internet petition. It is difficult to

explain why contact with people from a similar ethnic group was linked to voting, while ethnically diverse

networks were conducive to internet activism; one possible explanation is that the global reach of digital

technologies exposes young people to diverse social connections and to global issues, which in turn could

reinforce their inclination to sign petitions distributed through this medium. Another is that young people who

are already embedded in ethnically diverse social networks are more interested and invested in the types of

issues that are often the subject of internet petitions, such as environmental and social justice issues. For young

people with less education, both bonding and bridging social capital were associated with signing an internet

petition. Generalized trust was also relevant, as young people who said that people can be trusted were more

likely to sign a petition than those who said one cannot be too careful about trusting others (Table 6).

Interestingly, females and immigrants in this education cohort were no less participatory than males and the

Canadian-born, suggesting that non-institutionalized forms of political engagement provide certain sub-

populations with opportunities that institutionalized forms do not.

INSERT TABLES 6 AND 7 HERE

For the group of young Canadians with a post-secondary diploma or degree, membership in a civic

group was the only significant predictor of the likelihood of signing an internet petition, with all else held

constant, and even that coefficient barely met the conventional threshold of statistical significance (Table 7).

This underscores the point that political and apolitical voluntary organizations have different consequences, and

that voluntary associations need to be venues where political messages and cues are primary and not secondary

activities. With that said, no social capital indicator contributed as much explanatory power as political interest;

respondents who were very/somewhat interested in politics had 10.8 times higher odds of signing a petition than

those who were not interested (Table 7).

Boycotts and buycotts are increasingly popular means of political expression, particularly for the young.

For young Canadians with less formal education, party membership was the only organizational indicator that

was significantly associated with political consumerism. Party members had 9.6 times higher odds of

participating in a boycott or buycott, with all else held equal. Only one other social capital indicator proved to

be significant. Individuals who texted their relatives at least once a week or more, were less likely to engage in

boycott/boycotts in the previous twelve months. Without deeper insight into the content of these texts, this

pattern is difficult to explain. It is possible that young people with closer connections to their relatives, are

inclined towards more conventional forms of political expression, but this remains speculative. As with internet

petitions, political interest was also significantly associated with boycott/boycott behaviour.

INSERT TABLES 8 AND 9 HERE

For young people with a post-secondary diploma or degree, political interest was the only variable

significantly associated with boycott/boycott activity (Table 9). Membership in a hobby organization was a

significant predictor, until its effects were washed out by the political interest control. Finally, an examination

of the change in the Cox Snell R-squared statistic across Models 1 thru 6 presented in Tables 2 thru 9 shows

that contrary to the expectations of H5, social capital indicators contributed more explanatory power to the

political engagement of more highly-educated youths, and were less substantial predictors of political

engagement for young Canadians without a post-secondary diploma or degree. This held true for all forms of

political engagement.

Conclusion

The phenomenon of youth disengagement from politics is best understood as one that is confined to individuals

without a post-secondary education. Young Canadians with higher levels of formal education participate in

both institutionalized and non-institutionalized forms of political engagement at twice the rate of their less well-

educated peers, and at rates similar to those reported for the general population. Starting from this point of

departure, this paper investigated whether the links between social capital and political engagement that have

been observed for the general population in Canada and for citizens in both mature and recently-established

democracies, also hold true for young Canadians, and for the most marginalized group of young Canadians in

particular.

This preliminary analysis provided limited evidentiary support for the first four research hypotheses, and

has rejected the last. Only a few social capital indicators were related to institutionalized and non-

institutionalized forms of political engagement. Social trust effects were limited and mostly non-existent when

other factors were taken into consideration, as were the effects of belonging to apolitical organizations. Overtly

political organizations such as political parties and civic organizations were associated with non-

institutionalized forms of political engagement. Bridging organizations or networks did not generally increase

the odds of political involvement, while bonding organizations and networks were in some instances helpful for

less well-educated young people. Another striking finding is that regardless of the mode of communication,

social connections with friends and relatives, were largely irrelevant. These findings suggest that informal

social networks are not fertile grounds for political discussion and mobilization for this sub-population. They

also raise questions about the privileged place of face-to-face modes of communication in the early social

capital literature. This analysis suggests neither is superior to the other, at least when it comes to offering a

venue where political discussions can take place.

Among the less well-educated, frequent personal contact with relatives was positively associated with

municipal turnout, while ethnically homogeneous social networks and belonging to an organization where at

least half of the members were from the same age group were both associated with higher odds of voting in

federal elections. Those who had signed an internet petition were more likely to belong to a political party, to

an organization with a substantial youth membership, to connect with ethnically diverse social networks, and to

express generalized trust in other people. Boycotters/buycotters were also more likely to belong to a political

party and less likely to be in frequent text contact with their relatives.

The overall and relatively modest contribution of social capital to the political engagement of the most

tuned-out segment of the Canadian population speaks to the need for additional research on understanding why

the impact of membership in voluntary organizations and social networks (face-to-face and virtual), and the

social trust they presumably generate, is limited, and why it is the better-educated young Canadians who seem

to benefit the most from these memberships and ties.

Table 1: Political Participation Among Canadians aged 24 years and under, by Education

(column percent)

Less than

Post-

Secondary

CV Post-

Secondary

Education

CV Rao-Scott Chi

Square

Voted in Previous Federal

Election (n=2324)

31.16

(466)

.06 65.63 (430) .04 92.11a

Voted in Previous

Municipal Election

(n=2295)

23.19

(341)

.07 41.10 (259) .06 36.58a

Signed an Internet Petition

in Previous 12 Months

(n=3445)

20.3 (574) .05 32.22 (201) .08 17.82a

Boycott/Purchase a product

for ethical reasons in

previous 12 months

(n=3451)

15.44(389) .07 31.61(210) .08 39.24a

a p ≤.0001

Table 2: Predictors of Municipal Vote for Domain=Less than Post-Secondary Education

Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 Model7 M7

Odds

Ratio

Intercept -2.53(.47)a -2.74(.49)a -2.54(.68)a -2.81(1.12)b -4.41(2.01)c -4.78(2.29)c -5.73(2.60)c

Male .55(.21)b .57(.21)b .62(.25)d .77(.33)c 1.14(.39)b 1.24(.42)a 1.46(.44)a 4.32

Canadian-

born .51(.27)d .62(.28)d .71(.36)d .38(.45) .31(.54) .31(.56) .15(.57) 1.16

Hhld Income

$60K+

.10(.21) .08(.22) -.08(.28) -.22(.38) -.09(.43) -.09(.45) -07(.47) .92

Party .42(.53) .04(.61) .28(.67) .31(1.07) .26(1.13) -.01(1.17) .98

Sports .10(.22) -.15(.29) -.10(.35) .04(.43) .07(.46) .14(.51) 1.16

Hobby -.13(.25) -.23(.27) -.30(.36) -.24(.42) -.28(.45) -.43(.45) .64

Religious .17(.33) .05(.35) .007(.43) -.15(.50) -.17(.52) -.02(.58) .97

Civic -.07(.27) -.20(.28) -.18(.34) -.20(.40) -.26(.42) -.40(.46) .67

Service .87(.57) .65(.56) 1.43(.80)d 1.21(1.02) 1.28(1.06) 1.12(1.15) 3.08

Youth .04(.38) -.01(.36) .27(.46) .44(.55) .49(.56) .51(.57) 1.67

Ethnic 1.10(.61)d 1.17(.59)d 1.14(.74) 1.11(.98) 1.16(.97) .84(1.02) 2.33

Bonding

Org/Age

.23(.28) .43(.36) .70(.43) .71(.44) .78(.48) 2.20

Personcomm/

relatives

.65(.34)d .77(.38)d .79(.40)c .78(.42)d 2.19

Text comm/

Relatives

.-.15(.38) -.02(.43) -.06(.46) -.13(.51) .87

Int/email

comm/

Relatives

.35(.42) .30(.48) .32(.50) .33(.53) 1.39

Personal

comm/friends

-.05(.55) -.16(.57) -.25(.60) -.47(.62) .62

Textcomm/

Friends

-.21(.96) .41(1.85) .43(1.96) .62(2.22) 1.86

Int/email

contact/friend

.28(.46) .31(.51) .35(.53) .27(.55) 1.31

Bondig

network/Eth.

.34(.43) .37(.45) .53(.45) 1.70

Bonding

network/Inc.

-.32(.47) -.39(.49) -.19(.54) .82

Trust People c .37(.42) .44(.43) 1.56

Trust Family .20(.58) .01(.55) 1.01

Trust

Neighbour

-.02(.61) .06(.67) 1.06

Neighbour

help

-.11(.54) -04(.58) .96

Political

Interest

.91(.52)d 2.50

Follow News .32(.47) 1.38

N 1741 1739 1164 830 740 726 724

AIC 1640325.5 1615255.9 1102083.9 825285.81 697636.38 693185.73 669560.28

-2LL 1640317.5 1615231.9 1102056.9 825247.81 697594.38 693135.73 669506.28

Likelihood

Ratio

8744.47a 3992.82a* 2777.14a 2660.61a 2341.99a 2002.69a 2256.67a

Cox and Snell

Rsquare

.017 .03 .037 .083 .113 .119 .15

ap ≤.001;

bp ≤.01;

cp ≤.05;

d p≤.10

Table 3: Predictors of Municipal Vote for Domain=Post-Secondary Education or more

Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 Model7 Odds

Ratio

Intercept -1.15(.53)d -1.30( )d -.92(.75) -5.016

(3.55) -8.07(2.68)b -8.06(497.6) -8.43(822.9) .

Male .07(.25) .06(.28) .01(.23) -.32(.42) -.66(.46) -.63(.56) -.83(.62) .43

Canadian-

born

.61(.34) .36(.05) .47(.49) 1.56(.73)c 1.59(.81)c 1.45(.89) 1.67(.94)d 5.3

Hhld Income

$60K+

.31(.28) .32(.28) -.04(.34) -.31(.44) -.38(.49) -.32(.53) -.45(.56) .63

Party 1.72(.76)d 1.94(.87)d 2.15(1.29)d 1.87(1.07)d 1.27(1.21) 1.01(1.27) 2.75

Sports -.14(.30) -.008(.35) .02(.43) .20(.44) -.06(.55) -.12(.60) .88

Hobby -.05(.39) -.01(.41) -.20(.52) -.53(.55) -.44(.60) -.59(.63) .54

Religious .54(.50) .26(.55) .14(.71) -.22(.80) -.55(1.03) -.38(1.06) .67

Civic .14(.41) .12(.46) .14(.57) .61(.59) .86(.71) .76(.73) 2.14

Service -.58(1.00) -.38(1.01) -.10(1.14) -.007(1.16) .14(1.54) .20(1.48) 1.22

Youth .16(.58) .11(.57) .29(.75) .62(.78) .26(.90) .18(.95) 1.20

Ethnic -.77(1.07) -.65(1.08) -.72(1.4) -1.00(1.72) -1.23(1.84) -1.5(1.89) .22

Bonding

Org./Age

.01(.34) .27(.42) -.23(.40) -.47(.50) -.50(.51) .60

Personal

Comm/rels

.31(.49) .79(.49) .89(.57) 1.01(.62) 2.76

Text comm/

relatives

.03(.54) -.31(.54) 0.39(.63) -.64(.68) .52

Int/email

comm/rels

.48(.48) .78(.54) .61(.61) .65(.63) 1.92

Pers.comm/

Friends

-11(.65) -.24(.70) -.41(.81) -.59(.87) .55

Text comm/

friends

3.51(3.43) 5.90(2.35)b 5.42(497.7) 5.65(823) 284.7

9

Int/email

comm/friend

-.17(.61) .07(.60) .13(.78) .24(.85) 1.27

Bonding

network/eth

1.13(.76) 1.18(.82) 1.36(.89) 3.93

Bonding

network/inc

.16(.45) .18(.51) .32(.56) 1.38

Trust People .07(.54) .02(.58) 1.02

Trust Family 1.13(.91) 1.23(.92) 3.43

Trust

Neighbours

-.17(.80) -.33(.81) .71

Neighbours

Help

-.03(.61) .05(.63) 1.05

Political

Interest

-.16(.61) .84

Follow News .93(.57) 2.54

N 1741 1739 1164 830 740 726 726

AIC 1220756.6 1232726.8 798797.49 569114.86 471099.52 448229.05 431887.89

-2LL 1220748.6 1232724.8 798771.49 569076.86 471057.52 448179.05 431833.89

Likelihood

Ratio

4427.12a 2969.89a 1741.43a 1660.81a 2813.37a 448179.05 .22

Cox and Snell

Rsquare

.013 .048 .048 .129 .19 .185 .209

ap ≤.001; bp ≤.01; cp ≤.05; d p≤.10

Table 4: Predictors of Federal Vote for Domain=Less than Post-Secondary Education

Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 Model7 M7

Odds

Ratio

Intercept -2.23(.40)a -2.53(.44)a -3.05(.61)a -3.00(1.01)b -3.61(1.39)a -4.25(1.64)b -5.12(1.87)b

Male .40(.18)c .47(.18)b .53(.25)c .58(.31)d .81(.35d .85(.36)c 1.01(.37)b 2.75

Canadian-

born 1.04(.23)a 1.17(.26)a 1.46(.34)a 1.33(.46)b 1.05(.52)d 1.10(.55)c .98(.56)d 2.66

Hhld Income

$60K+

.05(.20) .07(.21) .24(.30) .14(.37) .14(.42) .13(.44) .07(.44) 1.07

Party .07(.21) -.21(.63) -06(.74) -.12(92) -.13(.98) -.27(1.00) .76

Sports .07(.56) -.17(.28) -.26(.35) -.03(.40) -.10(.42) -.04(.43) .95

Hobby -.03(.22) .29(.29) .27(.36) .42(.39) .45(.42) .33(.43) 1.39

Religious .29(.28) .35(.30) .32(.38) .31(.47) .29(.50) .46(.52) 1.59

Civic .30(.29) -.23(.27) -.14(.33) -.34(.37) -.37(.39) -.40(.41) .66

Service .81(.53) .66(.52) 1.43(.80)d 1.78(1.15) 1.81(1.17) 1.65(1.15) 5.21

Youth -.54(.33) -.59(.35)d -.41(.48) -.27(.51) -.16(.53) -.16(1.15) .84

Ethnic .77(.59) .88(.60) .69(.82) .98(1.10) .98(.1.12) .72(1.10) 2.06

Bonding

Org/Age

.29(.27) .58(.36) .78(.41)d .84(.44)d .92(.46)c 2.52

Personcomm/

relatives

.31(.33) .39(.37) .34(.38) .35(.39) 1.42

Text comm/

relatives

-.48(.40) -.62(.38) -.57(.50) -.61(.50) .53

Int/email

comm/

relatives

.46(.43) .64(.50) .60(.51) .63(.52) 1.89

Personal

comm/friends

-.07(.62) -.08(.67) -.08(.70) -.10(.73) .89

Textcomm/

Friends

-.23(.88) -.09(1.36) -.13(1.54) .26(1.71) 1.30

Int/email

contact/friend

.19(.46) .08(.53) .07(.55) -.04(.57) .95

Bondig

network/Eth.

.89(.38)c .87(.41)c .94(.43)c 2.57

Bonding

network/Inc.

-.66(.48) -.74(.54) -.68(.57) .50

Trust People -.05(.42) -.05(.43) .95

Trust Family .26(.61) .15(.61) 1.16

Trust

Neighbour

.01(.49) .13(.51) 1.14

Neighbour

help

.58(.50) .67(.54) 1.97

Political

Interest

.28(.44) 1.33

Follow News .73(.46) 2.08

N 1758 1756 1172 833 743 730 728

AIC 1919380.0 1892914.6 1238872 919662.23 784092.14 775837.88 758770.97

-2LL 1919372.0 1892890.6 1238846 919624.23 784050.14 775787.88 758716.97

Likelihood

Ratio

5797.2a 5777.61 5127.54a 2872.62a 3342.64a 2747.45a 2828.48a

Cox and Snell

Rsquare

.029 .042 .066 .088 .136 .146 .168

ap ≤.001;

bp ≤.01;

cp ≤.05;

d p≤.10

Table 5: Predictors of Federal Vote for Domain=Post-Secondary Education or more

Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 Model7 M7

Odds

Ratio

Intercept .42(.55) .29(.60) .12(.80) -2.54(2.24) -3.32(3.97) -3.39(3.49) -3.47(3.8)

Male -.26(.27) -.31(.28) -.35(.35) -.52(.46) -.61(.56) -.52(.66) -.54(.70) .57

Canadian-

born .84(.33)b .94(.37)b .65(.47) 1.39(.69)c 1.75(.96)d 1.56(1.03) 1.53(1.04) 4.63

Hhld Income

$60K+

-.03(.28) -.05(.29) -.11(.37) -.31(.43) -.41(.53) -.55(.57) -.67(.63) .51

Party 1.23(2.24) 1.49(1.92) 1.69(1.86) 1.65(1.39) 1.26(1.82) .84(1.74) 2.31

Sports -.14(.30) .31(.34) .17(.42) .45(.51) .11(.64) .09(.72) 1.10

Hobby .29(.39) .36(.41) .26(.51) -.01(.58) .15(.64) .06(.73) 1.07

Religious -.005(.46) -.09(.48) -.21(.62) -.36(.74) -.72(.90) -.44(.96) .64

Civic .36(.37) .51(.39) .39(.49) .69(.56) .91(.69) .78(.75) 2.19

Service .31(.87) .70(.92) 1.01(1.02) 1.11(1.46) 1.58(1.48) 1.31(1.54) 3.72

Youth -.07(.58) -.09(.58) -.01(.73) .20(.90) -.21(1.00) -.38(1.04) .67

Ethnic 1.22(.72)d 1.50(.77)d 2.23(.1.70) 2.17(1.65) 2.05(1.68) 1.94(1.70) 7.02

Bonding

Org/Age

-.02(.37) .16(.42) -.14(.47) -.30(.55) -.40(.60) .66

Personcomm/

relatives

.005(.51) .41(.62) .52(.70) .57(.75) 1.77

Text comm/

relatives

-.17(.51) -.67(.66) -.79(.75) -.87(.78) .41

Int/email

comm/

relatives

.007(.46) .43(.60) .21(.64) .16(.66) 1.18

Personal

comm/friends

.77(.62) .75(.78) .72(.97) .70(1.04) 2.02

Textcomm/

Friends

1.79(2.03) 1.99(3.90) 1.32(3.44) 1.11(3.51) 3.05

Int/email

contact/friend

.01(.57) .01(.63) -.05(.73) -.22(.79) .80

Bondig

network/Eth.

.05(.75) .01(.87) -.08(.90) .92

Bonding

network/Inc.

.47(.53) .51(.61) .72(.72) 2.07

Trust People .63(.56) .65(.62_ 1.92

Trust Family 1.09(.73) 1.19(.81) 3.29

Trust

Neighbour

.30(1.00) .15(1.10) 1.217

Neighbour

help

.19(.63) .18(.65) 1.20

Political

Interest

.73(.72) 2.08

Follow News .40(.70) 1.49

N 1758 1756 1172 833 743 730 728

AIC 1123298.7 1099191.9 735843.49 524333.84 451799.83 407841.8 392274.38

-2LL 1123290.7 1099167.9 735817.49 524295.85 451757.83 407791.8 39220.38

Likelihood

Ratio

5721.95a 1880.30a 1985.05a 1914.63a 1676.44a 1616.86a 1491.36a

Cox and Snell

R-square

.019 .044 .065 .145 .173 .218 .239

ap ≤.001;

bp ≤.01;

cp ≤.05;

d p≤.10

Table 6: Predictors of Signed a Petition for Domain=Less than Post-Secondary Education

Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 Model7 M7

Odds

Ratio

Intercept -1.16(.32)a -1.38(.36)a -1.34(.48)b -1.92(.97)c -2.10(.1.49) -2.72(1.63)d -3.23(1.73)d

Male -.04(.17) -.02(.18) -.01(.22) -.49(.28)d -.28(.32) -.14(.34) -.02(.36) .97

Canadian-

born

-.04(.20) .04(.20) .04(.25) .12(.38) .42(.44) .42(.46) .35(.47) 1.4

Hhld Income

$60K+

-.02(.18) -.05(.19) -.12(.25) -.15(.31) -.19(.36) -.22(.38) -.26(.39) .76

Party 1.05(.45)c 1.23(.46)b 1.67(.55)b 1.90(.65)b 1.92(.62)b 1.76(.63)b 5.82

Sports -.27(.19) -.21(.24) -.14(.30) -.04(.35) .009(.37) .04(.39) 1.04

Hobby .57(.21)a .59(.22)b .48(.28)d .62(.33)d .58(.34)d .52(.35) 1.68

Religious -.23(.25) -.24(.26) -.13(.33) -.06(.37) -.11(.38) -.03(.39) .96

Civic -.07(.20) -.04(.21) .17(.27) .10(.31) .06(.32) -.01(.34) .98

Service .43(.42) .52(.41) .57(.58 .67(.65_ .75(.70) .64(.75) 1.89

Youth .38(.26) .36(.28) .40(.34) .31(.39) .32(.42) .37(.44) 1.45

Ethnic .54(.50) .52(.50) .51(.63) .42(.74) .73(.76) .51(.75) 1.67

Bonding

Org/Age

-.11(.22) .38(.30) .64(.35)d .65(.37)d .69(.39)d 2.00

Personcomm/

relatives

-.02(.28) .02(.34) .03(.33) .03(.35) 1.03

Text comm/

relatives

-.52(.30)d -.37(.34) -.45(.34) -.48(.37) .61

Int/email

comm/

relatives

.59(.30)c .55(.34) .57(.35) .56(.37) 1.76

Personal

comm/friends

.17(.45) .37(.51) .30(.54) .19(.55) 1.21

Textcomm/

Friends

.44(.76) .23(1.18) .16(1.22) .15(1.22) .61

Int/email

contact/friend

.16(.37) .07(.43) .13(.46) .13(.47) 1.15

Bondig

network/Eth.

-.87(.36)b -.86(.37)c -.77(.39)c .46

Bonding

network/Inc.

-.09(.41) -.20(.41) -.15(.43) .86

Trust People .56(.31)d .60(.32)d 1.82

Trust Family .45(.42) .38(.41) 1.47

Trust

Neighbour

.-.26(.46) -.24(.47) .78

Neighbour

help

-06(.40) -.001(.44) .99

Political

Interest

.58(.39) 1.78

Follow News .27(.36) 1.31

N 2416 2413 1696 1169 1012 993 991

AIC 2401700.4 2331315.7 1628394.2 1111721 915060.55 893376.75 879299.87

-2LL 2401692.4 2331291.7 1628368.2 1111683 915018.55 893326.75 879245.87

Likelihood

Ratio

112.76a 5499.67a 5312.66 4339.78a 3767.42a 3617.28a 3629.02a

Cox and Snell

Rsquare

.0001 .028 .043 .081 .10 .118 .13

ap ≤.001;

bp ≤.01;

cp ≤.05;

d p≤.10

Table 7: Predictors of Signed a Petition for Domain=Post-Secondary Education or more

Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 Model7 Model7

Odds

Ratio

Intercept -.88(.65) -1.24(.78) -2.55(.92)b -4.45(2.80) -3.55(3.12) -5.20(4.73) -7.61(4.25)d

Male -.003(.28) -.005(.32) .15(.36) .48(.48) .43(.57) .83(.63) .99(.67) 2.70

Canadian-

born

.52(.43) .51(.49) .69(.50) .54(.71) .33(.82) -.10(.92) -.29(1.07) .74

Hhld Income

$60K+

-.43(.31) .60(.35)d -.01(.42) .54(.53) .63(.66) .71(.67) .62(.71) 1.87

Party .48(1.27) .69(1.45) 1.13(1.85) 1.29(1.92) .73(4.35) -.02(3.98) .97

Sports .27(.31) .56(.36) .54(.47) .70(.51) .46(.57) .74(.61) 2.10

Hobby .56(.38) .78(.41)d .79(.51) .88(.59) .91(.62) .42(.68) 1.52

Religious -.60(.64) -.86(.71) -.88(.82) -.79(.97) -1.05(.96) -.54(.95) .58

Civic 1.01(.40)b 1.13(.42)b 1.19(.52)c 1.28(.60)c 1.18(.65)d 1.14(.66)d 3.13

Service -.48(.91) -.37(.92) .07(1.37) .31(1.37) .60(1.37) .08(1.53) 1.09

Youth .69(.57) .46(.58) -.27(.74) -.63(.87) -.82(.85) -1.13(.94) .32

Ethnic -1.23(.96) -1.26(1.13) -1.48(1.48) -2.24(1.99) -2.36(1.98) -2.97(2.18) .05

Bonding

Org/Age

.20(.38) .50(.57) .54(.62) .91(.69) .88(.76) 2.43

Personcomm/

relatives

-.80(.57) -.63(.66) -.36(.63) -.24(.70) .78

Text comm/

relatives

.39(.57) .13(.65) .29(.67) .04(.75) 1.04

Int/email

comm/

relatives

.57(.55) .65(.63) .26(.66) .34(.69) 1.41

Personal

comm/friends

.70(.96) .64(1.13) .01(1.01) -.29(1.07) .74

Textcomm/

Friends

-.48(2.44) -.56(2.83) 1.39(4.22) 1.65(3.61) 5.24

Int/email

contact/friend

.87(.80) .63(.84) .61(83) .64(.86) 1.89

Bondig

network/Eth.

-.26(.68) -.12(.75) .01(.83) 1.01

Bonding

network/Inc.

-.38(.61) -.49(.65) .007(.72) 1.00

Trust People .21(.60) .17(.66) 1.19

Trust Family .11(.86) .42(.89) 1.52

Trust

Neighbour

.44(.82) -.03(.86) .96

Neighbour

help

-.48(.68) -.38(.70) .67

Political

Interest

2.38(.75)a 10.8

Follow News .34(.68) 1.40

N 2416 2413 1696 1169 1012 993 991

AIC 1153876.2 1065969.6 691178.64 483853.37 430876.02 393909.29 335632.84

-2LL 1153868.2 1065945.6 691152.64 483815.37 430834.02 393859.2 335578.84

Likelihood

Ratio

3603.58a 6295.75a 5460.40a 3186.18a 2111.63a 1360.02a 2003.65a

Cox and Snell

Rsquare .012 .102 .145 .24 .227 .235 .338

ap ≤.001;

bp ≤.01;

cp ≤.05;

d p≤.10

Table 8: Predictors of Boycott/Purchase a Produce for Ethical Reasons for Domain=Less than Post-

Secondary Education

Model 1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 Model7 M7

Odds

Ratio

Intercept -2.20(.40)a -2.46(.45)a -2.31(.59)a -4.96(1.60)b -4.54(1.70)b -5.19(2.59)c -6.20(2.80)c

Male .31(.18)d .36(.19)d .32(.23) .38(.30) .31(.34) .41(.36) .63(.39) 1.89

Canadian-

born .46(.27)d .55(.28)c .60(.31)c .73(.47) .70(.51) .91(.58) .86(.63) 2.37

Hhld Income

$60K+ -.37(.20)d -.45(.21)c -.44(.26)d -.44(.35) -.62(.39) -.53(.43) -.62(.44) .53

Party 1.76(.46)a 1.85(.49)a 2.41(.60)a 2.57(.70)a 2.54(.71)a 2.27(.73)b 9.68

Sports -.03(.23) -.13(.27) -.490(.34) -.27(.37) -.18(.41) -.16(.46) .85

Hobby .34(.23) .30(.25) -.07(.30) -.07(.35) -.04(.36) -.16(.38) .85

Religious -.18(.29) -.22(.31) -.19(.39) .04(.43) .03(.47) .23(.51) 1.26

Civic -.06(.24) -.08(.24) .36(.29) .29(.31) .21(.33) .08(.37) 1.09

Service -.17(.45) -.04(.44) -.72(.76) -.81(.93) -.99(1.10) -1.3(.1.14) .27

Youth .04(.30) -.01(.32) -.20(.43) -.17(.48) -.09(.51) -.01(.57) .98

Ethnic 1.09(.50)c 1.11(.50)c 1.51(.67)c 1.33(.75)d 1.30(.87) .90(.93) 2.46

Bonding

Org/Age

-.03(.27) -.05(.32) -.15(.37) -.29(.39) -.23(.42) .79

Personcomm/

relatives

-.28(.33) -.30(.35) -.38(.36) -.44(.43) .64

Text comm/

relatives

-.54(.35) -.89(.40)c -.77(.40)c -.81(.47)d .44

Int/email

comm/

relatives

.09(.35) .44(.38) .31(.37) .32(.43) 1.38

Personal

comm/friends

.64(.49) .71(.60) .61(.68) .31(.73) 1.37

Textcomm/

Friends

2.04(.145) 1.39(1.42) 1.54(2.25) 1.38(.2.21) 3.98

Int/email

contact/friend

.22(.43) .19(.52) .20(.53) .21(.55) 1.24

Bondig

network/Eth.

.002(.39) -.06(.41) .06(.43) 1.06

Bonding

network/Inc.

.46(.51) .37(.53) .49(.56) 1.64

Trust People .50(.38) .54(.40) 1.73

Trust Family -.05(.49) -.11(.50) .89

Trust

Neighbour

-.31(.51) -.31(.53) .72

Neighbour

help

.18(.49) .38(.58) 1.47

Political

Interest

1.31(.55)c 3.74

Follow News .16(.44) 1.17

N 2418 2415 1698 1171 1015 996 994

AIC 2106753.2 2037817.8 1444868.8 912201.29 765165.58 740735.5 704817.03

-2LL 2106745.2 2037793.8 1444842.8 912q63.29 756123.58 740685.15 704763.03

Likelihood

Ratio 7825.23a 7163.37a 5772.31a 4001.30a 3226.60a 2345.31a 2912.82a

Cox and Snell

R-square

.01 .037 .047 .083 .093 .093 .125

Table 9: Predictors of Boycott/Purchse a Produce for Ethical Reasonsfor Domain=Post-Secondary

Education or More

Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 Model7 M7

Odds

Ratio

Intercept -1.16(.64)d -1.45(.84)d -1.84(.95)c -2.30 (3.38) -3.69(5.06) -3.39(6.36) -3.77(5.95)

Male -.03(.30) -.07(.35) -.02(.39) .03(.52) -.16(.50) -/09(.54) .02(.56) 1.02

Canadian-

born .72(.41)d .68(.50) .77(.48) .57(.52) .49(.77) .32(.90) .25(.95) 1.29

Hhld Income

$60K+

-.31(.31) -.35(.36) .04(.42) .38(.50) .49(.47) .33(.54) .41(.57) 1.51

Party 1.80(1.16) 1.68(1.25) 1.58(1.52) 1.49(1.28) 1.47(1.61) 1.07(1.52) 2.93

Sports .12(.30) .07(.33) -.33(.41) -.34(.42) -.41(.48) -.20(.57) .81

Hobby 1.06(.39)b 1.20(.42)b 1.58(.60)b 1.23(.62)d 1.28(.71)d 1.20(.80) 3.33

Religious -.52(.60) -.60(.63) -.18(.72) -.33(.65) -.40(.76) -.48(.86) .61

Civic .42(.41) .54(.45) .19(.60) .28(.60) .07(.70) .004(.81) 1.00

Service -.39(.78) -.46(.83) -.02(1.31) .17(1.40) .02(1.59) -.46(1.62) .62

Youth .23(.57) .19(.63) .03(.74) .30(.73) .18(.91) .11(.95) 1.11

Ethnic .43(1.25) .35(1.35) .19(.1.63) .51(1.78) .32(1.88) .32(2.06) 1.38

Bonding

Org/Age

-.25(.38) -.07(.45) .01(.45) .15(.53) .003(.62) 1.00

Personcomm/

relatives

-.87(.53) -.77(.50) -.81(.59) -1.12(.70) .32

Text comm/

Relatives

.21(.56) -.06(.62) .04(.72) .12(.75) 1.13

Int/email

comm/

Relatives

.46(.50) .76(.51) .74(.61) .85(.67) 2.34

Personal

comm/friends

-.20(.72) -.60(.72) -.53(.85) -.61(.98) .54

Textcomm/

Friends

.34(3.11) 1.64(4.79) 1.58(6.29) 1.06(5.62) 2.89

Int/email

contact/friend

.22(.76) .52(.82) .59(.94) .43(1.00) 1.54

Bondig

network/Eth.

.61(.73) .55(.89) .34(.98) 1.41

Bonding

network/Inc.

-.02(.46) .05(.53) .35(.62) 1.42

Trust People .39(.53) .20(.58) 1.23

Trust Family -.70(.71) -.54(.74) .58

Trust

Neighbour

.35(.89) .10(1.06) 1.10

Neighbour

help

.14(.60) .19(.66) 1.21

Political

Interest

1.99(.91)c 7.31

Follow News -.99(.91) .36

N 2418 2415 1698 1171 1015 996 994

AIC 1140842.8 1049835.5 703163.42 497338.8 431485.03 410963.06 375782.3

-2LL 1140834.8 1049811.5 703137.42 497300.8 431443.03 410913.06 375728.3

Likelihood

Ratio 3419.96a 6803.97a 5055.13a 2300.99a 2204.55a 1168.37a 1353.25a

Cox and Snell

R Square

.012 .104 .134 .199 .212 .194 .257

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