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SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ASPECTS OF TSUNAMIS Presentation, Geography 269 March 11, 2013 Jessica Marter-Kenyon, Jonathan Sim, & Alana Yurkanin

SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ASPECTS OF TSUNAMIS Presentation, Geography 269 March 11, 2013 Jessica Marter-Kenyon, Jonathan Sim, & Alana Yurkanin

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SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ASPECTS OF TSUNAMIS

Presentation, Geography 269

March 11, 2013

Jessica Marter-Kenyon, Jonathan Sim, & Alana Yurkanin

TSUNAMIS AND VULNERABILITY

What is vulnerability?

• Inability to withstand the effects of a hostile environment

Consequences of vulnerability• Physical• Economic• Socio-political• Psychosocial

Vulnerability over time

Vulnerability by geography

Vulnerability in LDCs

Vulnerability in DCs

What is Vulnerability?• Technical approach

• Focused on physical ‘things’ and processes • An ‘acute’ conception• “presence of on and off-shore protective barriers and flood

defences, distance from the shore, depth of flood water, building construction standards, preparedness activities…” (Papathoma and Dominey-Howes, 2003, p. 733)

• Focused on initial risk and vulnerability• Highly measurable and addressable• BUT: simplistic?

What is Vulnerability?• Social approach

• Directly human-focused• Views vulnerability as chronic• Not just about initial exposure, but also ability to prepare and

recover• Why do people, experiencing the same level of exposure, suffer from

varying consequences?• Not one event but a series of multiple, interrelated events

• Related to underlying social, economic and political (structural) systems and interactions

• BUT: Complex, difficult to quantify

Models of social vulnerability:Pressure and Release (PAR)

Policy Implications:Mainstream/ technical approach

• Disaster as an aberration, as an acute condition• A focus on:

• Physical event as the trigger• Human response and consequences

Policy Implications:Social approach

• Disaster as a chronic problem• Link recovery and reconstruction to sustainable

development• Vulnerability mapping that includes social aspects

POLITICAL AFTERMATH OF 2004 TSUNAMI

A Quick Look: Banda Aceh

Banda Aceh• Capital & largest city of province• Closest major city to epicenter• 31,000 dead

Republic of Indonesia

• First & worst hit of countries in region, last to receive aid• Strong government & bureaucracy, history of disasters • Impact of tsunami initially overwhelmed state capacity• International aid important role for recovery

Providing Aid to Banda Aceh

• Provincial government declared totally crippled• Politicians based in Banda Aceh killed in tsunami• Administrative control moved to Jakarta, 1132 miles away

• Bottlenecks created by lack of infrastructure & red tape• Aid for 200,000 people held at Jakarta to clear customs• Aid piling up at airports due to lack of transport trucks

• Aid trickled through primarily by boat & air• One functioning airfield outside Banda Aceh• Cargo plane landing at 2:30am

hit a water buffalo

Blocked runway for a day

International Aid• Important role: $13.6 billion to region• Challenges of aid allocation

• Difficult to assess, involves multiple groups• Affected by current government policies• Affected by social organization of area• Empower or disempower groups

“Humanitarian action cannot operate independently of the context in which it takes place”

• Seen as a negative in some areas– Without cultural sensitivity

Immodestly dressed aid workers– Inappropriate donations

Pork products & Bibles88.2% Muslim

Banda Aceh: Civil War

• Indonesian gov’t vs. Rebels (Free Aceh Movement)• 15,000 people killed over 30 year conflict• Military crackdown: ban on journalists, aid workers• 15,000 troops in region to fight rebels: many killed in

tsunami

• One day after tsunami, rebels declare a ceasefire (and later peace treaty)• Gov’t lifts ban on foreign journalists and aid workers• Greatly improved effectiveness of humanitarian aid

• Alternative: Separatists in Sri Lanka (Tamil Tigers)– Perceived social and political injustice in aid

distribution– Further exacerbated recovery efforts

Political Changes• Prior to 2004 tsunami, early warning systems not well

developed• Emergency communication systems failed• Coastal populations & tourists not educated

• 2005: UN ESCAP establishes Trust Fund• Tsunami Early Warning Arrangements in Indian Ocean & Southeast Asia• Based on voluntary donations (Thailand: $10M, Sweden: $2.6M, etc.)• Reached consensus on building distributed, interconnected system• 2008: Indonesia gets Tsunami Early Warning System up and running• 2012: Thailand Warning System ready, “best in Southeast Asia”

• 2007: Indonesia gets new disaster management law (Law 24/2007)• 1. Instead of just emergency, now includes all risk management, esp. prevention• 2. Gov’t must provide protection against disaster threat as a basic human right• 3. Responsibility no longer lies just with gov’t, shared with all elements of society

Movement towards decentralization of government

RESPONSE TO TSUNAMI DISASTERSHawaii in the Wake of the 1946 and 1960 Tsunamis

1946

Image retrieved from: http://www.pbs.org/wnet/nature/episodes/violent-hawaii/deadly-tsunamis/1862/

1946

Image retrieved from: http://archives.starbulletin.com/2001/03/31/news/story3.html

1960

Image retrieved from: http://pubs.usgs.gov/circ/c1187/

1960

Images retrieved from: http://pubs.usgs.gov/circ/c1187/

Why was Hawaii unprepared in 1946?

• Recorded tsunamis in Hawaiian newspapers in 19th century• Relationship between earthquakes and tsunamis unclear• Warnings issued in 1920s and 1930s by the Hawaiian Volcano

Observatory (Jaggar) based on the occurrence of earthquakes• False alarms• Need an earthquake of at least 7 on the Richter scale to produce a

tsunami in Hawaii

• 1946 no warning issued for a tsunami

Defending Against the WavesAfter the 1946 tsunami:• Developed the Tsunami Warning System:

• long-wave measuring stations in Pacific• no false alarms

• Tsunami travel-time chart• Updated seismograph instruments• Communication system

• breakwaters to reduce impacts from the waves?• Buildings on stilts

• Hilo hotels expect ground floor and basement inundation• Walls between columns expandable

• Reinforced concrete structures• Retreat downtown area

• parkway

Defending Against the Waves• After the 1960 tsunami:

• Hawaiian Redevelopment Agency• Oceanside buffer-zone• Landfill plateau 26 feet above sea level• Rebuild in higher areas with quality materials• Federal/state funded urban renewal• Loans for business start-up

• Tsunami warning system a success – but public education a failure• New alarm system• Education initiatives