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ISSUE FoUrAprIl 2007
FIRE down belowSmoke and flame billowed from jet boat
over-reliance on GPS reSultS in GroundinG
GPS gets it wrong
11
Fire down belowSmokeandflamebillowedfromjetboat.
13
GPS gets it wrongOver-relianceonGPSresultsingrounding.
7
Man overboard in heavy seas
Anoiltanker’sdeckhandissweptintoheavyseas.
5
Autopilot with no lookout
Afishingvesselonautopilotalmostcollideswithanchoredrecreationalvessel.
Front cover photo courtesy of the Otago Daily Times
Contents
6 Alcohol involved in man overboard
10 See and be seen
12 Poor lookout and speed almost kill
14 No pre-determined track
15 Loss of control in 65 knot gusts
17 Collision with bridge
Regulars
3 Introduction
4 Guesteditorial:Shipping – a risky adventure
AprIl 2007 ISSUE FoUr
16
Overconfidence causes night-time collision
Watertaximotoredintoanchoredvessel.
10
What will catch your fall?
Aseamansuffersseriousspinalinjuriesonacargoship.
LOOKOUT!Introduction
Welcome to issue #4 of Lookout! – our quarterly safety newsletter. I cannot help but think of the period of change that Maritime New Zealand (MNZ) is experiencing at present – a pace of change that is here to stay.
WeareupgradingourITcapability–allowingustooperateinabetterandsmarterway.TheRescueCoordinationCentreNZisimplementingnewsoftwarethatwillassistinsearchplanning,andourWellingtonofficehasrelocatedprovidingamoreefficientandcohesiveenvironment.
ItisinterestingtoobservethechangesinmaritimeactivityontheNewZealandcoastastheindustryrespondstochangesintheinternationalmarket.ItisclearthattransportingmoregoodsaroundtheNewZealandcoastbyshipinsteadofsendingbyroadorrailisnowbeingseenasaviableandsensiblealternative.
MNZcontinuestoassesshowgoodorbadourcommunicationis,soIdonotmindreceivingfeedbackonwhatwedowellandwhatwe“coulddobetter.”Thatispartofbeinga“learningorganisation,”particularlyaschangeisgoingtobewithusforawhile.
Tomoveahead,togrowandsurviveinthecurrentenvironmentweallneedtoadaptandIaimtoensurethatMNZdoesjustthat.Myoverallobjectiveistoencouragevoluntarycomplianceforsafety,securityandenvironmentalprotectionratherthancompliancebyregulation.
Iplantobeoutoftheofficeonedaypermonth,sothatIcanmeetwithMNZstaffandlocaloperatorsaspartofknowingwhatishappeningoutthere.AnysuggestionsastopeopleIshouldmeetorthingsIcouldlearnaboutwouldbegratefullyreceived.
Enjoythisissue–keepsafeandhaveagreatquarter.
catherine taylorDirectorofMaritimeNewZealand
LOOKOUT!APRIL2007 �
LOOKOUT!Guesteditorial
in 1969 jack Hutchings went to sea as a deck cadet, leaving behind a small farming village in South west england. for the next 30 years he stayed at sea before taking up a shore job.
Ispent2�yearsonchemicaltankerscarryingeverythingfromliquidphosphorustothesocalledeasychemsliketolueneandxylene,whichaccountsforthetwitchingandthefearofloudbangsandobtainingamongotherthingsaClass1(Deck)CertificateofCompetencyortousolderones,aMasterForeignGoing. Thelastnineyearsofmysea-goingcareerwasasMaster.ThesmallestshipIwasMasterofwas56metreslong,thelargest280metreslong–thedifferenceindeadweightbeing900tonnesto150,000tonnes. In1997thefamilycameouttoNewZealand,andin2000IcameashoretoworkfortheformerMSAasManager,ShipSafetyInspections.Istayedtherefornearlyfiveyears,thenspenteightmonthsinChristchurchastheRegionalHarbourmasterwithEnvironmentCanterbury,eventuallyendingupwithStraitShippinginNovember2005. MyofficialtitleatStraitisMarineManager.MymainfunctionistoprovidealinkbetweentheMastersofourvesselsandtheseniormanagement.Mymost
importanttaskistoensureourvesselsareoperatedinasafeandefficientmanner. Incarryingoutthistask,Ihavetobalancetheneedsoftheofficeandtheneedtoengagewiththeships’staffonaregularbasis.Iattempttospendatleastonedayamonthonboardoneofourvessels.IalsotryandvisitthevesselsatleastonceaweekwhentheyareinWellington. Theotherbalancingactistheneedforequipmenttobemaintainedtoaveryhighstandardbyonboardstaffonourvesselsthatworkona24/7basiswheretheroutestheyplyaremostlypilotagewaters.Thismeansthatstaffworka12-hourday,muchofwhichisspenteitherloading,dischargingoronwatch,givingverylittletimefortasksoutsideoftheseduties.Wedoattempttogiveourvesselsatleasta12-hourlayoveronaweeklybasissothatroutinemaintenancecanbecarriedout. RiskmanagementisamajortaskIundertake.Wheneverashipputstoseatherearerisks.Thisiswhyinthemarineinsuranceworldshippingisdescribedasanadventure. ManyoftherisksthatareencounteredonourvesselshavebeenmitigatedthroughourSafetyManagementSystem,andtheprovisionofinternalpublicationssuchasrouteguides.Toensurethatourvesselsaresailedinthesafestmannerpossible,thecompanyhasimplementedapeerreviewprocesswheretheBridgeStaffareauditedandreviewedonaregularbutrandombasisforcompliance
withbestpracticeinregardtobridgeresourcemanagementandwithcompanyoperationalinstructions.Ourvesselsundergoanannualinternalauditoftheircompliancewiththecompany’ssafetymanagementsystem. MaybebecauseofmybackgroundIhavealsobecomethemainpointofcontactwithMaritimeNZ,whichusuallyisapleasantexperience,thoughoccasionallyfrustratingasoneforgetsthatthingsdon’thappenatonceingovernmentagencies. ThelifeatseahasdefinitelybecomesafersinceIoriginallywenttosea.AstatisticquotedwhenIwassittingformyMatesTicketinthelate70swasthatanyoneovertheageof25atseashouldhavebeeninvolvedinatleastoneseriousaccident.Theremusthavebeensomeaccident-pronepeopleoutthereasIdon’tthinkthatstatisticholdsgoodnow. Alongwiththesaferenvironmenthascomeadramaticincreaseinthebureaucracyonboardships.Whetheronehasdriventheotherisdebatable.Ipersonallythinkthatthesaferenvironmentisaresultoftheaverageageofseafarersincreasing.Peoplebecomefarmoreriskadverseoncetheysettledownandhavefamilycommitmentsandofcoursewithageofficiallycomeswisdom.Thoughthispartofagingseemstohaveescapedme!
jack HutchingsMarineManager,StraitShipping
ShIPPInG – a risky adventure
LOOKOUT!APRIL20074
LOOkOUT!POInts
1.Thefishingvessel’sskipperbreachedtwoimportantmaritimerules.Hefailedtokeepaproperlookoutandhewastravellingtoofasttotakeactiontoavoidacollision.Whenhefirstnoticedtherecreationalvessel,theskippershouldhavedeterminedwhetherornotitwason
asteadybearingwithaconsequentriskofcollision.Heshouldalsohavecalledadeckhandtotakeoverthelookoutwhileheworkedondeck.
2.Theskipperwasalsoinbreachoflocalbylawsbyoperatingonautopilotwithinharbourlimits.
3.Heshouldhaveensuredtherewasacrewmemberonthebridgereadytorespondimmediatelytoanyneedtosloworstopthevessel.
4.Iftheskipperoftherecreationalvesselhadnotreleasedhisanchorwarpandgonefullasterntherewouldhavebeenacollision.
Autopilot with no lookouta 15 metre fishing vessel on autopilot almost motored into an anchored recreational vessel. the fishing vessel’s skipper was distracted with equipment maintenance.
Therecreationalvessel’sskipperhadanchoredhisvesselwithinharbourlimitstoenjoysomefishing.Henoticedafishingvesselthatappearedtobeheadingdirectlytowardhim,andcouldmakeoutapersonbentoveronitsforedeck. Asthefishingvesseldrewclose,theskipperoftheanchoredrecreationalvesselrealisedcollisionwasimminentandorderedhiscrewtoweighanchor.
Hesoonsawtherewouldnotbeenoughtimeandinsteadorderedtheanchorwarpbereleasedandappliedfullasternpower.Acollisionwasnarrowlyavoidedwiththefishingvesselpassingwithinthreetofivemetres. Theskipperofthefishingvesselsaidhefirstnotedtherecreationalvesselonhisportbowatadistanceofabouthalfamile.Ashisvesselapproached,hethoughttherecreationalvesselwasunderwayandbearing20degreesonhisportbow.Heleftthevesselonautopilot,
makingabout6knots,andstartedgreasingbearingsonasurfacelonglinedrumontheportsideinfrontofthewheelhouse. Momentslater,hewenttothesideofthevesselandsawananchorwarpinthewaterdirectlyacrossthevessel’spath.Runningtothewheelhouse,theskippertooktheengineoutofgearandcoastedoverthewarp.Onlythendidtheskipperseethesmallervesselabout15to20metresoffhisstarboardside.
Viewthefullreportonlineat:www.maritimenz.govt.nz
a colliSion waS narrowly avoided witH tHe fiSHinG veSSel PaSSinG witHin tHree to five metreS.
ShIPPInG – a risky adventure
The RecReaTional vessel. The Fishing vessel.
LOOKOUT!APRIL2007 5
sleeping in cabin heRe
sliding dooR
1.Theaccidentwasnotwitnessed,however,thepostmortemfoundthemanhaddiedfromdrowninginassociationwithischemicheartdiseaseandacuteorchronicalcoholabuse.
LOOkOUT!POInts
tHe man’S recovered body SHowed a blood alcoHol level of almoSt five timeS tHe leGal drivinG limit.
Alcohol involved in man overboard
Theman’srecoveredbodyshowedabloodalcohollevelofalmostfivetimesthelegaldrivinglimit. Hehadspenttheeveningwiththreefriendsandhiswifeatayachtclub,andthepartyhadreturnedtotheirmotorlaunchviawatertaxi.Afterafewmoredrinks,thegrouphadgonetobed.Theman’swifewaswokenabouttwohourslaterbythesoundofbottlesrattlingatthesternofthevessel,andassumeditwasthesoundofherhusbandgoingtothetoilet.Whenhehadnotreturnedaboutfiveminuteslatershewenttocheckonhim,buthewasnotonboard,norvisiblebytorchinthesurroundingwaters.
Therestofthepartyjoinedthesearchusingtorchesandcallingout,buttonoavail.Almosttwohourslatertheman’sbodywasfoundcloseintoshore,inaboutonemetreofwater.
Viewthefullreportonlineat:www.maritimenz.govt.nz
a man drowned early on new year’s morning after an evening of drinking and celebrating with friends.
LOOKOUT!APRIL20076
LOOkOUT!POInts
Man overboard in heavy seasan oil tanker’s deckhand was swept into heavy seas while trying to unlash the base of the accommodation ladder from a lashing point on the hull plating as the vessel departed a harbour. Thedecisiontoraisetheaccommodationladderhadbeenleftlatebecausethepilothadoriginallyplannedtoreturntoshoreoncethevesselhadbeenmanoeuvredoutoftheharbour.Onceunderwaythough,thepilotdecidedthiswouldbeunsafe,becauseofthehighseasandthathewouldremainonboarduntilthenextport. Thedeckhandhaddescendedtheladdertounlashthebasemanytimesbeforeandworenolifejacketorsafetyharness.Hisprogressdowntheladderwasnotmonitored,althoughanothercrewmemberhadsaidtheythoughttheweatherconditionsweretoodangerousatthattime. Shortlyafterthedeckhandhadbegunhisdescent,aloudbangwasheard.
Rushingtothetopoftheaccommodationladder,asecondcrewmemberwasnotabletoseethedeckhandandguessedhehadbeensweptintothesea.Afterthrowingalifebuoywithalightintothewater,thecrewmembercouldjustmake
outthedeckhandabout50to100metresasternofthevessel. Onfindingthephonetothebridgeengaged,thecrewmemberstoodshoutingandgesticulatingatthetopoftheaccommodationladderuntilhewasnoticedbythepilot.Themanoverboardalarmwassoundedandtheengineslowed. Asthevesselwasstillintheharbourchannel,therewasnoroomfortheshiptoturnaround.TheMasterputouta
MAYDAYcallonVHFchannel16andthelocalpilotboatarrivedabouttenminuteslater.Withinafurther15minutesahelicopterhadjoinedthesearch. The2�yearolddeckhandwasneverfound.
Viewthefullreportonlineat:www.maritimenz.govt.nz
gangway and lashing poinT. combinaTion accommodaTion laddeR and piloT laddeR.
1.Theship’smanualstatedthatadeckofficershouldsuperviseeveryraisingorloweringoftheaccommodationladder.Nonewaspresentonthisoccasion,andtheMaritimeNewZealandinvestigationshowedthiswasnotunusual.Becausethedeckhand’sdescentwasnotmonitored,crewwerealertedtohisfallonlybyaloudbang.
2.Althoughthecompanyhadrecentlyinstalledproceduresrequiringcrewtoweara“flotationdevice”whenworkingoverthesideofthevessel,nolifejacketshadbeenprovidedforthistask.Therewasnorequirementthatasafetyharnessbeworn.
3.Theaccommodationladderwasvisiblefromthestarboardbridgewing,
however,noneofthebridgeteamhadcheckedthatitwassafetoraisetheladderbeforetheorderwasgiven.
4.Thedelayindecidingtoraisetheladdermeantthedeckhandwasorderedtooperateoverthesideofthevesselinexposedanddangerousconditions.
tHe crew member could juSt make out tHe deckHand about 50 to 100 metreS aStern of tHe veSSel.
lashing poinT
LOOKOUT!APRIL2007 7
Knowing more about how and why accidents happen means more can be done to prevent them.
Call our 24hr accident line to report all accidents 0508 222 433
LOOKOUT!APRIL20078
HElp US to prevent
accidents
1.Thefishingvessel’sskippersaidhedidnotannouncethenavigationallightfailureviaVHFradiobecausehewascarryingoutasensitiverepossession.However,thesafetyofhisownvesselandthosearoundhimwascompromisedbecauseofthis.
2.Thefishingvesselhadnootherexperiencedcrewmemberonboard.Giventhatthiswastheskipper’sfirsttimeonboardthevessel,asecondexperiencedcrewmemberwouldhaveprovidedadditionalassistance,particularlywhendealingwithunexpectedevents.
3.Thefishingvesselimpededtheprogressofbothferries.Localbylawsrequiredthattheskipperkeepoutoftheirwaybecausetheywereover500grosstonnes.
LOOkOUT!POInts
two ferries were forced to reduce speed and alter course to maintain a safe distance from a fishing vessel whose navigational lights had failed. Thefishingvesselwasbeingrepossessedandtheskipperwasmanningitforthefirsttime.Theonlyotherpersononboardwasarepossessionagent. Theskipperwastakingthevesselfromasecludedbaytoabusynearbyport,frequentedbypassengerferries.Enroute,thevessel’snavigationallightsfailedtwice,butwererepairedbytheskipper,whowasabletoreplacethefuses.Whenthelightsfailedathirdtime,theskipperagainreplacedthefuse,
butthelightsfailedagainimmediately.Theskipperturnedonallavailabledecklights,butcontinuedthepassage.HedidnotbroadcastawarningoverVHFtoothervessels. Atthistime,oneferrywasleavingtheportwhileanotherwasinbound.Thefishingvesselwasbetweenthetwo. BothferryMasterswereawareofavesseldisplayingonlywhitelights.Theywereforcedtoslowconsiderablyandacquirethevesselonradarinordertodeterminewhichdirectionitwastaking. Thefishingvesselcontinuedtoapproachtheoutboundferry.Theferry’sMastersoundedfiveshortblasts,whichthefishingvessel’sskipperlatersaidhedidnothear.Bothvesselswenthardtostarboardtoavoidacollision,andtheyeventually
passedwithinabout�00metresofeachother.Theoutboundferrythencontinuedoutoftheportwithoutfurtherincident.Meanwhile,theinboundferry,whichwasfollowingthefishingvessel,wasforcedtoreducespeedtoestablishasubstantialsafefollowingdistanceoutofconcernatthefishingvessel’serraticbehaviour.
Viewthefullreportonlineat:www.maritimenz.govt.nz
What will catch your fall?a seaman suffered serious spinal injuries after falling about four metres to the deck of a cargo ship. Theseamanwaspartofagangsecuringportablestanchionsinpreparationforloadinglogs.Donningasafetyharness,theseamanclimbedafixedstanchionladdercarryingashackleandtheendofariggingwire.Afellowcrewmemberstood
belowfeedingouttheriggingwireastheseamanclimbedtheladder. Whenhewasaboutfourmetresuptheladder,theseamansuddenlyslippedoff,hittingthebottomofthestanchion,andthenthedeckbelow.Hehadnotattachedhissafetylinetotheladderbeforehefell. Anambulancewascalledandtheseamanwashospitalisedwithseriousspinalinjuries.Hewasadvisednottoreturntoworkforthreemonths.
log sTanchions aT The poRT side oF no. 2 haTch.
See and be seen botH veSSelS were
Put Hard to Starboard to avoid a colliSion
LOOkOUT!POInts
1.Althoughthefixedstanchionladderswereingoodcondition,theirrungswerewetwithmorningdew,andslippery.
2.Theseamanwascarryingashackleandtheendofariggingwirewhileclimbingtheladder.Threepointsofcontact(suchasbothhandsandonefoot)shouldbemaintainedonladdersatalltimes.
3.Theseamanshouldhavegivenhisfullattentiontoclimbinguntilhereachedthepointwhereheplannedtoworkandthesafetylinewasattached.
LOOKOUT!APRIL200710
Smoke and flame billowed from a commercial jet boat during pre-trip river checks.
Carryingoutchecksbeforethenextscheduledpassengertrip,thedriverhadnoticedthestarboardenginerevolutioncounterwasreadingabout200revolutionslow.Heturnedbothenginesonandofftoseeiftheywouldresetspontaneously.Whenthelowreadingcontinued,thedriverreturnedtheboattothejettyandcontactedboththecompany’soperationsmanagerandtechnicianforhelp.Whilewaitingforthemtoarrive,thedriverrefuelledinpreparationforthenexttrip. Arrivingatthejetty,theoperationsmanagerandtechnicianboardedthe
jetboatwiththedriverandstartedtheenginesinsuccession.Withinsecondstheyhearda“backfire”soundinsidetheenginebay,andthensawsmokeandflamesbehindtherearseats. Theyactivatedthefixedfirefightingsystem,andlessthan�0secondslaterliftedthehatchtotheenginebaytodischargeafireextinguisherattheflames.Thefirewasextinguishedbriefly,butthenreignitedandthecrewwereforcedtoclimbbackontothejettytoavoidthesmokeandfumes. TheFireServicemanagedtoextinguishthefire,buttheboatsankduetotheamountofwaterusedtofightthefire.Itwaslaterrecoveredtoallowforathoroughsafetyinspection.Therewerenoinjuriesresultingfromthefire.
Viewthefullreportonlineat:www.maritimenz.govt.nz
LOOkOUT!POInts
1.Thedaybeforetheincident,anotherdriverhadnoticedthatthejetboat’sstarboardenginewasnotfiringcorrectly.Theworkshopforemanhaddecidedthesparkplugsneededtobereplacedduetoleaderosion,whichhadbeenanongoingproblemsincethecompanyhadswitchedtousing100octaneAVGAS.Theinvestigationfoundthataloosesparkpluglead,oneendofwhichhadfallenintotheenginebilgespace,hadignitedthefirewhentheengineswerestarted.
2.Fuelhadbeenregularlyspillingoverthesideofthejetboatduringrefuelling,whichhadbeennotedas“blowback”and“slowfillingproblems”.Duetothedesignofthefillingsystem,anyspillagewouldrunbetweenthefillerhousingandtheinsideofthehull,andthenintotheenginebay.Thehoseclampconnectingthefillerhosetothefueltankwasalsothewrongsize,andwasheldonlylooselyinposition.Thefueltank’scapwasalsoleakingaroundthesecuringscrews.
3.Thefixedfirefightingsystemfailedtofullydischargeintotheenginecompartmentbecauseithadbeenmountedatanincorrectangle.Inopeningtheenginebayhatchandaiminganextinguisherattheflames,thecrewhadallowedoxygenbackintotheenginebay,feedingthefire,andhadalsoblowntheflamesforwardunderthefueltank,whichcontainedthecollectedspilledfuelinthebilgespace.
Fire down below
witHin SecondS tHey Heard a “backfire” Sound inSide tHe enGine bay
The vessel on FiRe. oTago daily Times phoTo.
LOOKOUT!APRIL2007 11
LOOkOUT!POInts
1.TheskipperbrokelocalbylawsandMaritimeRulesbytravellingfasterthan5knotswithin200metresofshoreandshowedpoorseamanship.Thevessel’sspeeddidnotallowtheskippertimetoproperlydetermineitsposition.
2.Theskipperalsodidnotkeepaproperlookoutinnavigatingbyeyealone.AsthevesselwasequippedwithGPS,heoroneofhiscrewshouldhavebeenmonitoringit.
3.Anincreasingnumberofrecreationalvesselsaregroundingatnightathighspeed.Onthisandsomeotheroccasions
personsonboardhavebeenseriouslyinjured.Failuretokeepaproperlookoutonahighspeedvesselendangersthesafetyofnotonlythecrew,butothermariners.InthiscasetheskipperofthevesselwasseverelycensuredbyMaritimeNewZealand.
a skipper would have drowned if not for the determination of his crew to rescue him after he grounded his recreational vessel at speed onto a reef at night.
Theskipperwastravellingat25knotsandnavigatingbyeyeonaverydarknight.Heandhiscrewoftwowereallexperiencedrecreationalboaters,andwerereturningfromadivingtrip. Theskipperwaslookingaheadthroughaviewingopeninginthevessel’scanopy.Hewassearchingforakayakthatheknewfrequentlyfishedoffanearbyreef.Thevessel’sGPSwasswitchedon,butwasnotbeingmonitored.
Theskipperlostawarenessofhowclosehewastothereefandthevesselgroundedatspeed.Asitrolledtostarboardandcapsized,allthreeonboardweretrappedunderthehull. Thetwocrewmemberssoonswam
clearofthehullandpoppeduptothesurface,buttheskipperdidnot.Hiscrewimmediatelybegandivingunderthehullinsearchofhim,butafterabouttwominutestheyhadstillnotlocatedtheskipper.Thecrewconsideredawidersearch,butdecidedtodiveunderthehullonemoretime.Onthisfinaldive,theyfoundtheskipperandhauledhimtothesurface.
Hewasnotbreathing,andafterdragginghimontoarock,thecrewmanagedtoadministersuccessfulCPR.Theskippersufferedsevenbrokenribs,abrokenshoulder,lacerationstohisfaceanddamagetohislungs.Onecrewmemberalsorequiredstichestohisface. Thevesselwasaconstructiveloss.
Viewthefullreportonlineat:www.maritimenz.govt.nz
Poor lookout and speed almost kill
aS it rolled to Starboard… all tHree on board were traPPed under tHe Hull.
The vessel. The vessel’s canopy. The ciRcle shows The secTion The skippeR was looking ThRough.
LOOKOUT!APRIL200712
LOOkOUT!POInts
waTeR ingRess
one blade missing
damaged hull and pRopelloR.
GPS gets it wrongover-reliance on GPS caused an otherwise experienced and prudent skipper to ground a passenger boat on rocks. Theskipperandcrewwerereturningfromanevening’sfishingincalmconditions.Asnightfell,theskippermotoredhomerelyingmainlyonhisGPS,butwithacrewmemberpostedatthebowasanadditionallookout. Theskipperknewthesectionofthecoastwell,includingthepositionofsomehazardousrocks.HeusedtheGPSfrequentlyandwasconfidentinthereadingsitgave.
Justastheskipperwasabouttoconsulthispapercharttoconfirmasuspicionthatheneededtobefurtheroffshore,thelookoutatthebowcalledoutthattherewasbrokenwaterahead. About10secondslater,thevessel’shullandportpropellergroundoverthetopofarock.Thebilgealarmandautomaticpumpsactivatedimmediately,andinspectionshowedthevesselwastakingonwateraroundadrivelegsealthathadbeenshuntedasternonimpact.
Fortunately,pumpscontrolledthewateringresslongenoughforthevesseltobebeachedonanearbyisland. Thevesselwaslaterfoundtohavesufferedextensiveporthulldamageandalostpropellerblade.
Viewthefullreportonlineat:www.maritimenz.govt.nz
1.OverrelianceonGPSdataisbadnavigationalpractice,especiallywhileoperatingclosetothecoast.Thedayaftertheaccidenttheskippernotedtheunitpositionedthevesseloveranislandeventhoughtheywerewellclear.Themanufacturer’sagentforthe
GPScheckedtheunitanddeterminedtherewasnocrosstrackerror.Also,thepositionoftherocksasdisplayedonthechartplottercorrespondedwiththeirpositionontheofficialpaperchart.
GPSderivedpositionsoftenaremoreaccuratethanthepositionsforcharted
data.NavigatorsshouldbeawareofallthefactorsthatmayaffecttheuseofGPSpositions.Prudentmarinersshouldpasschartedhazards,suchasshoalsorisolateddangerswithutmostcautionandatasafedistance,nomatterwhatnavigationalmethodisused.
He uSed tHe GPS frequently and waS confident in tHe readinGS it Gave.
tHe lookout at tHe bow called out tHat tHere waS broken water aHead.
LOOKOUT!APRIL2007 1�
LOOkOUT!POInts
a yacht with an inoperable mainsail rolled twice in breakers after it came too close to the shore while attempting to reach the nearest port for repairs. the mast was lost and the yacht’s life raft was damaged during inflation. Theaccidentoccurredatnightinviolentseas,closetoaleeshore.Theyachtwasstruckbyalargebreakingwavethatcausedittobroachandcapsizebeforereturningtotheupright.Thevesselwaspartlyflooded,andthemotorhadstoppedrunning. AMAYDAYmessagewassentadvisingthattheyachtwassinking.Beforethemessagewascompletedasecondwavestruck,causingtheyachttoroll�60°.Inthecourseofthis,themastwaslostandwithittheyacht’sVHFcommunication.Also,theliferafthadbrokenloosefromits
locationonthedeckandbecameinflated.Ashortwhilelaterthecanopywastornoffandtheraftstartedtodeflatewhilestilltetheredtotheyacht. Twoofthecrewmanagedtoclimbonboardtheliferaftandhaulitclosetotheyacht,intendingtoholditthereuntiltheremainingcrewmemberandtheskipperclimbedin.Severallargewavesthenbrokeoverthedeckoftheyacht,sweepingtheskipperandthecrewmemberintothesea.Atthesametimetheliferaftcapsized.Thethreecrewmemberswereabletoswimbacktowardtheliferaftandclamberonboard,buttheskipperwaslostintheheavyseas. Thedamagedliferaftwasdeflatingrapidly,andasitwasdriventowardsthecoast,itservedonlyasanobjectforthe
crewtoclingto.Thecrewbegantosufferhypothermiainthe12degreewater.Theywereeventuallywasheduponarockyshoreline. Thecrewfiredahandheldflarefromtheliferaft’semergencybag.ItwasspottedbythesearchandrescuehelicopterthathadbeentaskedbytheRescueCoordinationCentreNZfollowingtheyacht’sMAYDAYcall.Aboutanhourlater,thehelicopterlocatedtheskipper’sbody,washeduponrocksabout100metresfromtheliferaft. Thesurvivorsweretakentohospitalandtreatedformildhypothermia.Theyachtwasdeclaredaconstructiveloss.
Viewthefullreportonlineat:www.maritimenz.govt.nz
1.Theskipperhadjustpurchasedtheyachtandthiswasarelocationvoyage.Thoroughpreparationsandsafetycheckshadbeenmadepriortodeparture.However,enroutethemainhalyardhadwrappedaroundtheradarscanneronthemast,renderingthemainsailinoperable.Theworkingjibhadalsobeendamagedandwasfurled.Theroughseastatemeantthecrewcouldneitherreplacethejibnorascendthemasttofreethehalyard.Itwasbecauseoftheseriggingproblemsthattheskipperdecidedtoheadforaportofrefuge.
2.Asthevesselhadjustbeenpurchased,noneofthecrewhadexperienceinherhandling.Thisisasituationcommontomanydeliveryvoyages.
3.Duetosevereseasicknessforsomesixhoursbeforetheaccident,theskipperhadbeenunabletomonitortheyacht’strack.Althoughtwoofthecrewwereexperiencednavigators,theyachtwasmuchclosertothecoastatthetimeoftheaccidentthantheskipperhadintended.ItisalsopossiblethatthecrewmembernavigatingduringthefinalstagesofthejourneymayhavebeenfollowinganincorrectlyenteredGPSwaypoint.Theroughseasalsomadeitdifficulttoholdasteadycourse,withthecompassvaryingasmuchas40degreesduetothemovementofthevessel.
4.Thenavigatorswerebothplottingtheyacht’spositionregularly,butthiswasmoretodeterminethevessel’spositionthantoensureshewasfollowinga
steady,pre-determinedcourse.Failingtoplanacoursethatwouldkeepthevesselclearofthecoastwasakeyfactorinthisaccident.
5.Thecoastwheretheaccidentoccurredischaracterisedbyshallowwaters.Inheavyseasbreakersareencounteredwelloffshore.
6.Keepingwelloffshoretoavoiddangerouscoastalseasisoftenasaferoptionprovidedthevesseliscapableofsafelydoingso.Skippersmayfindthisanunpopulardecisionwithcrewthatareseasickandtiredbutthesafetyofthevesselandcrewshouldalwaysbeparamountindeterminingwhatactiontotake.
tHe accident occurred at niGHt in violent SeaS, cloSe to a lee SHore.
No pre-determined track
LOOKOUT!APRIL200714
1.Theowningcompanyhadnooperatinglimitsforstrongwinds.Becauseofthenatureofthesurroundingterrain,whichcreatedlocalisedandvariedwindconditions,ithaddeterminedthateachskippershouldmakethisdecisionbasedontheforecastandtheactualconditionsfoundatthetime,aswellasusualoperatingdeterminants.Immediatelyfollowingtheincidents,thecompany
madethedecisiontoinstallaninterimoperatinglimitof45knotsonthevessel.
2.Thevessel’sdirectionalcontrolwasquestionedfollowingthetwoincidents.Inparticular,itsskipperspointedoutthatthevesselhandledquitedifferentlytoasistership.Thecompanydecidedtotrialusingadditionalballastandpositivetrimtoincreaselateralresistance,andto
commissionanavalarchitecttoexaminetheresults.
3.Afterthetrials,thecompanyfittedakeelbartothevesselthatwasthesamedepthasthatusedonthesistervessel.Thisthenactedasa‘spoiler’tobreakupthelateralflowofwaterunderthehull.
an enclosed water vessel with 130 passengers on board slewed out of control for about 1500 metres after being struck on the starboard quarter by a 65 knot wind gust.
Duringthethreetofourminutesthatthevesselslewedoutofcontrol,theskipperdisplayedthevessel’sNotUnderCommandlightstoalertotherpassengervesselsintheareathathecouldnotcontrolthevessel.Theskipperwasabletoregaincontrolonlyasthewindabated.Heheadedstraightbacktoportandthepassengersweresafelydisembarked.
However,theincidentwasnotisolated.Twomonthslaterthesamevesselwasstruckbya70knotgustinotherwise20to�0knotwinds.Thistimetheguststrucktheportsideofthevessel,againcausingthevesseltoslewoutofcontrol.Therewereseveralotherpassengervesselsnearby,buttheskippermanagedtoregaincontrolandavoidcollision. Thecompanycommissioneditsownsafetyreportintotheincidents,aswellasanavalarchitect’sreport.
Viewthefullreportonlineat:www.maritimenz.govt.nz
Loss of control in 65 knot gusts
diagRam oF The incidenT dRawn by The skippeR oF The vessel aT The Time oF The incidenT (The diagram does noT necessarily accuraTely reflecT The acTual Times and disTances).
durinG tHe tHree to four minuteS tHat tHe veSSel Slewed out of control, tHe SkiPPer diSPlayed tHe veSSel’S not under command liGHtS
LOOkOUT!POInts
No pre-determined track
LOOKOUT!APRIL2007 15
LOOkOUT!POInts
1.Thereisdisagreementastowhetherornottherecreationalvesselwasdisplayinganallroundwhitelightasisrequiredforvesselsofitssizeatanchor.Theskipperofthewatertaxihadradaronboard,buthadleftitinstandbymode.Althoughheknewtheareaverywell,usuallypassingthroughonadailybasis,hehadbeenawayforaweekprecedingtheaccident,andsowasunawarethatanewvesselwasnowatanchor.Hislookoutwasobviouslydegradedbyhisover-confidence.
2.Theskipperwastravellingatabout15knotswhenthecollisionoccurred.ThisiswellinexcessofboththesafespeedrequiredbytheMaritimeRulesandthelocalbylawrestrictionof5knots.
the skipper of a water taxi motored straight into the port quarter of an anchored recreational vessel in a quiet bay at night. Therecreationalvesselwasextensivelydamaged,andeventuallysankinshallowwater. Theskipperofthewatertaxihaddeliveredsomefueltoafriend’syacht,mooredinanearbybayandwasreturninghome.Heknewtheareawell,includingthepositionoftwoanchoredvesselsthatwereoftenunlitatnight,andkepthissearchlightstrainedonthemtoensurehewouldnotcollide.Ashispassageprogressed,theskipperincreasedhisspeed.
Justasthevesselreachedabout15knots,theskipperwassuddenlythrownfromhischair.Standingup,herealisedhehadcollidedwithanothervessel. Theskippersteppedoutontotheothervesseltocheckforanycasualties,butfounditwasatanchorandunmanned. Hemanuallyweighedtheanchoroftherecreationalvessel,andtowedittoshallowwater,whereitcontinuedtotakeonwaterandeventuallysettledonanevenkeel.
Viewthefullreportonlineat:www.maritimenz.govt.nz
RecReaTional vessel aFTeR salvage. RecReaTional vessel submeRged. juSt aS tHe veSSel
reacHed about 15 knotS, tHe SkiPPer waS Suddenly tHrown from HiS cHair.
Overconfidence causes night-time collision
LOOKOUT!APRIL200716
1.Thiswasthethirdtimeinsevenyearsthatvesselshadcollidedwiththebridgewhilstdepartingthewharfinstrongwinds.ThecompanyhadnowindoperatinglimitsinplaceandreliedinsteaduponMasters’discretion.DocumentedguidelineswouldhaveassistedtheMasterwiththisdecision.
2.TheMasterwasawarethatthetughadalowbollardpull.GiventheweatherconditionstheMastershouldnothaveattemptedthedeparture.
3.TheChiefOfficershouldhavechallengedtheMaster’sdecision.GoodBridgeResourceManagementisintendedtocreateanenvironmentwherechallengesofthisnaturearewelcomed.
4.ThevesselwasequippedwithaBeckerrudder.It’sflaphadbeentemporarilyweldedintopositionfollowingaproblemwiththebearings.Thismeanttherudderwasnotfullyfunctional,adefinitemanoeuvringdisadvantage.TheMasterwasawareofthislimitationandshouldhavefactoreditmoreheavilyintohisdecisiontodepart.
LOOkOUT!POInts
Collision with bridgea container vessel collided with a harbour bridge during a botched wharf departure, in strong winds and a flooding tide.
Thevesselwasberthedwithitsportsideagainstthewharf.Owingtotheprevailingconditions,theMasterorderedatug,anddevisedaplanforthetugtofirstpullfromthesternofthevesselto
clearitfromitsberth,andtothenpullfromthestarboardbowtoswingthevessel’sbowtostarboard.However,windconditionsmeantthevesselcouldbarelytravelastern,evenatfullpowerandusingthetug.Realisingthis,theMasterdecidedtoaborttheplanandtobringthevesselbackalongsidetheberth. However,beforehecoulddoso,thewindcaughttheportsideofthesternandswungthevessel’ssterntostarboard.Thestarboardquartercollidedwiththebridge,andthestarboardbowhitamooringdolphin.Thetugmanaged
toremainclear,butcoulddolittletoassistasitwastrappedinanareaofclearwaterbetweentheberth,thevesselandthebridge. Althoughthevesselsufferedminordamagetohershellplating,nowateringresswasfound,andoverthefollowingfourhours,theturningtideallowedthe
vesseltobemanoeuvredbacktothewharftoberthonitsstarboardside.
Viewthefullreportonlineat:www.maritimenz.govt.nz
wind conditionS meant tHe veSSel could barely travel aStern, even at full Power and uSinG tHe tuG.
haRbouR bRidge
Tidal diamond ‘c’
Tug ‘conTained’ in This coRneR
mooRing dolphin
vesselOverconfidence causes night-time collision
LOOKOUT!APRIL2007 17
SafetybulletinsMaritimeNZpublishesSafetyBulletinsasameansofcommunicatingandencouragingdialogueonavarietyofsafetyissuesandtheproposalsrelatingtothese.Thebulletinsarepublishedasandwhenrequired,andaredirectedtothosesectorsdirectlyinvolved.Theyarealsoavailabletothewidermaritimeindustryviaourwebsite.Wewelcomeanycommentyoumayhaveontherecommendationsorcontentingeneral.
From 1 January to 15 March 2007, there were four fatalities – one in the commercial sector and three in the recreational sector.04
From 1 January to 15 March 2007 MARITIME FATALITIES 2007
disclaimer: All care and diligence has been used in extracting, analysing and compiling this information, however, Maritime New Zealand gives no warranty that the information provided is without error.
copyright maritime new Zealand 2007: Parts of this document may be reproduced, provided acknowledgement is made to this publication and Maritime New Zealand as source. IS
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Imagine being at sea on your fishing vessel at night in bad weather. Water is being shipped on deck and it is dark. Can you be absolutely sure that the sliding covers on your freeing ports have not slipped down and are stopping the water escaping off the deck?ArecentreviewofMaritime rule part 40D Design, Construction and Equipment – Fishing Shipshashighlightedthataconsiderablenumberoffishingvesselshaveblockedfreeingports.Thefreeing
portsarebeingblockedbyslidingcovers,locksonhingedcovers,orothermeans.
Theaccumulationofwateronthedeckreducesstabilityandexposestheshipandthecrewtoconsiderablerisk.
Itisacceptabletohavecoversonfreeingports,aslongastheyarearrangedinsuchawaythattheydonotpreventtherapidescapeofwaterfromthedeck.
MaritimeNZhasinvitedagroupofsurveyorsandmembersofFishSAFE/FederationofCommercialFishermentohelprevisitrulepart40D.
Theworkinggroup’sobjectiveistoproduceaclearinterpretationoftherule.Theywillevaluateeachapplicablerule(�1intotal)andthenrecommendifeachruleisvalid,orwhetheramendmentsshouldbeconsidered.
MNZsaysitneedstobettereducatefishermenonwhycompliancewiththeruleissoimportant.Tokickstarttheeducationprocess,asafetybulletinonfreeingportcovershasbeenproducedandcirculated.
Formoreinformationabouttheworkinggroup,oracopyofthesafetybulletin,pleasecontactJessieFillmoreon0508 22 55 22oremailJessieat:jessie.fillmore@maritimenz.govt.nzorforacopyofthebulletingototheMNZwebsite:http://www.maritimenz.govt.nz/publications/safety_bulletins/sb_issue7.pdf.
FeedbackYour feedback and ideas on Lookout! are very welcome.Ifyou’dlikeaparticulartopiccoveredinournextedition,thenpleasecontactthepublicationsteambyemail:[email protected] 22 55 22.
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Ourpostaladdressandallcontactnumbersandemailsarethesame:POBox27006,Wellington6141Tel:0508225522(04-47�0111) Fax:04-494126�.
SAFETYBULLETIN–ISSUE7,2007
freeing Port covers on fishing vessels