Smart State Queensland

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2026857

Cambridge Journal of Economics 2012, 1 of 19doi:10.1093/cje/bes004

Government policy, university strategyand the academic entrepreneur: the caseof Queensland’s Smart State Institutes

Mark Dodgson and Jonathan Staggs*

Significant new university initiatives are usually analysed from the perspectives ofgovernment policy, university strategy or the entrepreneurship of particularindividuals, but rarely from the view of their interdependencies. This paper reportson the creation of four Smart State Institutes at the University of Queensland inAustralia and the concatenation of circumstances, decisions and actions that led totheir formation. In the course of just over a decade, these Institutes, addressingbiotechnology, nanotechnology, neuroscience and the molecular and cellular basisof disease, have developed into a cluster of scientific research of global significance,raising over $1 billion in investment and employing 1300 staff.A case study approach was employed in the analysis, involving 59 semi-structuredinterviews with key individuals involved at the organisational, regional and nationallevels. A range of archival data were collected and analysed to help constructa rigorous chronology of the key events, reports and actions that led to thedevelopment of the Institutes.Our research identifies the importance of the policy context, at both the Federal andState levels, conducive to the investment in the new Institutes. It shows how theUniversity’s leadership and strategy took advantage of policy conditions, witha number of individual academic entrepreneurs providing the actions necessary toshape and guide the creation of the Institutes. Private philanthropy played a crucialrole as animateur amongst the contributors. We argue the importance of the mutuallyreinforcing and concurrent contribution of all these actors and draw lessons forfuture government and university policy.

Key words: Universities, Science, Policy, Entrepreneurship, PhilanthropyJEL classifications: I23, L26, O38

1. Introduction

Our understanding of universities as strategic actors in the knowledge economy can draw

upon a burgeoning and diverse literature. This literature addresses issues ranging from the

changing role of the university and its contribution to economic development and national

innovation systems (McKelvey and Holmen, 2009; Mowery and Sampat, 2005); the

Manuscript received 28 October 2010; final version received 8 November 2011.Address for correspondence: Mark Dodgson, UQ Business School, University of Queensland, St Lucia,

Queensland 4072, Australia; email: [email protected]

* University of Queensland Business School.

� The Author 2012. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Cambridge Political Economy Society.

All rights reserved.

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Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2026857

commercial relationships between universities and industry, both encouraging (Etzkowitz,

2008) and cautious (Nelson, 2004); the emerging strategies of universities (Bok, 2003);

and actions and consequences of academic entrepreneurs (George and Bock, 2009;Wright

et al., 2007). There is surprisingly little literature examining the inter-relationships

between all these issues.

This paper argues that understanding how universities act strategically by developing

significant new initiatives—i.e. make irreversible choices about where to invest—is a highly

contingent and serendipitous process that cannot be explained by the single perspectives

adopted by much of the literature. The national policy context is certainly important, as is

the preparedness of universities to make bold decisions and the institutional and academic

leadership provided by key individuals. Philanthropists can play critical catalytic and

animateur roles. Success in these initiatives also involves elements of good fortune as much

as good planning, and negotiating the realpolitik of personal influence and organizational

realities in the political processes within university structures.

The paper reports on the circumstances, decisions and actions that led to the formation

of four major research institutes at the University of Queensland (UQ), Brisbane,

Australia. They are the Institute for Molecular Bioscience (IMB), the Australian Institute

for Bioengineering and Nanotechnology (AIBN), the Queensland Brain Institute (QBI),

and the Diamantina Institute (DI). These ‘Smart State Institutes’ (SSIs), named after

a Queensland State government strategy of the same name, represent a significant new

university initiative of global significance in its scale and interdisciplinarity. The Institutes

now employ over 1300 researchers and have attracted approximately $1 billion of capital

investment and continuing support in just over a decade.1 This development occurred in

a period of decreased funding for the higher education sector from government and within

a research system increasingly driven by the need for greater accountability, productivity

and utility. The SSIs offer a way to understand the complex interplay between changing

strategies and structures in the University and the wider research and innovation systems.

The multidimensionality of factors that led to their formation holds lessons for scholarly

analysis and public policies that favour single frames of reference and policy levers.

2. Background literature

Three broad literatures help frame this paper: research and innovation policy, the

entrepreneurial university, and academic entrepreneurship.

Much discussion about research and innovation policy is conducted in the context of the

virtues of the ‘knowledge economy’ and ‘innovation systems’, which are seen to be the basis

for national wealth and welfare (see, e.g., OECD, 2005). This discussion encompasses the

role of the university at both national and regional levels (Cooke, 2002; Mowery and

Sampat, 2005). Some of this literature addresses institutional dynamics within national

innovation systems. Dodgson et al. (2008), for example, use the case of Taiwan to explore

the evolution of its national innovation system through the development of institutions

supporting biotechnology.

The contribution of universities has to be assessed in the context of macroeconomic

challenges and changing policy frameworks (Guena et al., 2003). The changes that do

occur in universities, however, are rarely uncontroversial. As Kuhlman and Shapira (2006)

1 Financial data are Australian dollars, which currently have parity with US dollars.

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note, conflict amongst governments, universities and firms in innovation systems are ever-

present and tend to be overlooked.

Amongst the strongest drivers of these policies over recent times has been concern to

improve the connections of university research to applications for economic and social

benefit. The increasingly commercial focus of universities has been a major concern within

the literature (Bok, 2003; Nelson, 2004). Analysis of this connection has been extensively

developed over recent years with notions of the ‘Triple Helix’ view of how industry,

government and universities can contribute to innovation (Etzkowitz, 2008). Analysis of

Mode 2 production of knowledge (Gibbons et al., 2001) similarly explores the changing

context in which research agendas are shaped. These conceptualisations of the growing

inter-relationships between government, business and universities capture an increasingly

core element of the development of science and technology policy. In countries such as

Australia where the vast majority of university research is funded by central government,

research policy has a strong bearing on their strategies.

A key policy challenge is to ensure that public investment addresses immediate needs

and at the same time supports the long-term research that may produce new, unforeseen

opportunities. The UK’s Lambert Review (2003) argued how universities have to improve

their identification of areas of research strength and how this has implications for public

funding of research strategies, as it creates a tension between funding world class research

and research that has value within the innovation system. The challenge of meeting

multiple policy objectives by government and universities remains profound and un-

resolved. This is especially challenging as initiating and facilitating change in a university

system is a lengthy task, because universities are bureaucratic organizations traditionally

designed to primarily advance their teaching and research missions (Feldman and

Desrochers, 2004). The reticence of academics to divert from their self-generated research

agendas is well known (Garrett and Davies, 2010; Rothaermel et al., 2007). It is notable

that for all the emphasis on business/university collaboration, evidence continues to

support the contribution of universities that lead in fundamental research (Mansfield and

Lee, 1996; Mowery and Sampat, 2005).

The increasingly commercially orientated strategies in universities invariably link with

notions of the academic entrepreneur and his/her willingness and ability to successfully

interact with firms and industry in general (Lambert, 2003). There is a large and growing

literature on entrepreneurship as it relates to universities in the promotion of technological

development, local spin-offs and business clusters, and regional development. Wright et al.

(2007), for example, argue that as governments in the 1980s saw emerging opportunities in

technologies such as biotechnology and information and communication technology, their

policies came to include actions to stimulate entrepreneurship in public sector research

organisations. Academic entrepreneurship, once considered to be fortuitous and personal,

became seen as something to be managed through the establishment of technology transfer

offices (TTOs) and the development of capabilities in the area of invention disclosures,

patenting and licensing.

The effectiveness of these strategies has been shown to be contingent on having in place

effective management systems and a culture that values entrepreneurship. The outcomes

of these strategies are by nomeans clear cut and the tension between norms of public sector

research versus commercial interests are well documented (Powell and Owen-Smith, 1998;

Slaughter and Leslie, 1997). The idea has been explored of the role of the TTO as an

‘institutional entrepreneur’ to explain how changing relationships in universities are

managed within a socio-political context (Jain and George, 2007). This research

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underscores the institutional context that both researchers and universities must navigate

in their activities and in developing strategies. The challenge to academic work brought

about by legislation and government expectations for public sector research sees most

scientists are reluctant to forgo their existing role identity and endeavour to preserve their

role as scholars when they participate in commercialization activity (Jain et al., 2009).

The forms of engagement used by academics are, however, much wider than through

TTOs and vary between different disciplines (Abreu et al., 2009), and do not therefore

necessarily impinge on academics’ views of their profession. When the approach is taken,

however, to encourage academic entrepreneurship by strategic management processes and

decision-making about university areas of research strength, this can challenge academic

norms and ‘strategic decisions taken by university management in relation to research

focus may be taken as an attack on academic freedom and integrity’ (Wright et al., 2007,

p. 191).

A number of general shortcomings can be identified in these literatures, especially in

regard to explaining the role of different agents and their interactions (Gertler and Wolfe,

2004), and how the organisational rigidities within firms, governments and universities

that constrain the ability to adapt and act entrepreneurially to opportunities (Boschma and

Sotarauta, 2005) can be overcome. In response, scholars have called for empirical studies

that explore how such relationships are mediated by factors such as political leadership and

governance (Atkinson, 1991), and there have been calls for greater attention to be paid to

the historical processes by which innovation systems develop over time around centres of

science (Garnsey and Heffernan, 2005). We believe that an empirical study of the

development of the SSI can go some way in addressing these shortcomings. These

Institutes, in our view, have served as a type of focussing device by bringing together

academic entrepreneurs, university administrators, public servants, politicians and

philanthropists, and provide us with an opportunity to explore dynamics within the

research and innovation systems (Hoyssa et al., 2004). In light of the lack of theoretical and

empirical attention to the interplay between actors, the case of the SSI provides an

opportunity to explore the process of convergence between university, government and

private philanthropic action.

3. Research methods

This paper is based on a case study, an approach well suited to explore the key events,

organisations and actors involved in the establishment of the SSIs and their inter-

relationships. Fifty-nine semi-structured interviews were conducted, as well as 15 follow-

up interviews, encompassing virtually all of the major actors involved, including a former

Australian Prime Minister, four former State Premiers, key academic researchers and

executives, and influential public administrators. The interviews were supplemented with

extensive document analysis that provided a level of confidence in establishing the

chronology of the case. These included government reports, public statements and

extensive university documentation: reports, reviews, minutes of the Research Committee

and funding proposals. This document analysis helped the researchers investigate possible

antecedents of various policies and funding programmes that have gone on to have an

important bearing on the development of the SSI.

At certain junctures a number of reports, such as Backing Australia’s Ability (BAA;

discussed below), were conspicuously effective in influencing the policy conditions in

which the development of the SSI has occurred. These reports have arguably served as




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mechanisms to shared understanding and consensus among participants in the field

(Phillips et al., 2004).

The researchers iterated between interview and documentary data to delve into the

reasons for key actors to make decisions. The depth and range of these interviews and

documentary analysis led to confidence in the researchers’ ability to understand how, over

time, decisions led to the formation of the Institutes.

Criticism exists about the generalisability of case study research and what we can

reasonably infer from the findings. But the investigators have aimed to move beyond

surface-level narratives to present a comprehensive view on how decisions were made and

an enhanced view on the events, actors and reports that led to key funding decisions. This

approach has the potential to overcome limits of a case study, to provide important lessons

and insights for future strategies and policies.

4. Findings

4.1 The case study: brief details of the SSIs2

The SSIs are situated in or near the UQ precinct within the city of Brisbane. The

conception and establishment of these Institutes spanned a 12-year period from 1995.

They are trumpeted by the Queensland Government as being iconic representations to the

world and magnets for recruiting talent (Department of the Premier and Cabinet, 2005).

Their existence is underpinned by a belief that strategic research infrastructure provides

a foundation for Queensland’s innovation system (Smart State Council, 2006).

Each SSI developed in its own way. Their development was mutually reinforcing,

however, and lent weight to arguments for greater research capacity in and around UQ and

south-east Queensland in general. Table 1 includes basic details for each Institute.

4.1.1 Institute for Molecular Bioscience. The IMB was established in 2000, the first of the

SSIs to be built. It formed part of the Queensland Bioscience Precinct (QBP), which

houses 750 researchers. The QBP was established in conjunction with the Commonwealth

Science and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO), Australia’s largest scientific

research organisation. The $105 million QBP brought together an extensive range of

molecular biology researchers working across traditional boundaries with a wide variety of

applications.

While the Queensland Government’s Smart State strategy was fully realised through the

development of subsequent Institutes, the idea behind it lay with the original suggestion for

the IMB presented to the State government in 1997. This National/Liberal government,

led by Premier Rob Borbidge, had pledged funds to Professor John Mattick and Professor

Peter Andrews, the Institute’s eventual Directors, for the development of the IMB. The

idea was presented again to the Labor government led by Peter Beattie in 1998. The IMB

was formed by integrating two complementary research groups: Andrews’ Centre for Drug

Design and Development and Mattick’s Centre for Molecular and Cellular Biology. It was

believed the combination of strengths in chemistry and commercialisation in the former

with those in biology and basic research in the latter could play a significant role in

medicine, agriculture, energy and environmental research. The Institute drew on models

2 There are six SSIs. Our focus lies with the four working in the broad areas of biological and healthsciences. The remaining two institutes are dedicated to sustainable minerals and social science, with theformer in particular being of considerable international significance.




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Table 1 Basic details of the Smart State Institutes

Smart State Institute Incepted Initial funding support Operational funding

Institute for MolecularBiology(IMB)$55 million400 staff

2000 Atlantic Philanthropies:$10 millionUQ: $15 millionCommonwealth Government(Federation Fund): $15 millionState government: $15 million

$77.5 million of continuing support (over 10 years) was basedon outcomes as set out in an operating grant agreementbetween the IMB and the State governmentIMB was co-located in the $105 million QueenslandBioscience Precinct with a $50 million investment fromCommonwealth Science and Industrial ResearchOrganisation

Queensland BrainInstitute$63 million300 staff

2003 Queensland Government:$20 millionAtlantic Philanthropies:$20 millionUQ: $23 million

Queensland Government provided operational fundingsupport of $25 million (over five years)$10 million from the Commonwealth Government forequipment purchases

Australian Institute forBioengineering andNanotechnology$72 million340 staff

2002 Queensland Government:$24 million loan3

Atlantic Philanthropies:$17.5 millionUQ: $30.5 million

$15 million operating establishment fund from UQ (over fiveyears)$14 million in support from Commonwealth’s NationalCollaborative Research Infrastructure Scheme (over fouryears)$3.2 million from Australian Research Council$6.5 million from the Queensland Government’s StateInnovation Building Fund

Diamantina Institute(part of the TranslationalResearch Institute (TRI))$354 million200 staff

2007 Commonwealth Government:$140 millionState government: $107 millionAtlantic Philanthropies: $50 millionQueensland University ofTechnology: $25 millionUQ: $10 millionRemaining funding came from otherorganisations in the TRI

Commonwealth Government Teaching and Research Income:2008, $3.3 million; 2007, $0.5 million; 2006, $0.4 millionUQ grants, fellowships, infrastructure: 2008, $1.1 million;2007, $0.6 million; 2006, $1.8 millionNHMRC: 2008, $5.1 million; 2007, $3.9 million; 2006, $2.8millionCommercial income: 2008, $12 million; 2007, $9.4 million;2006, $1.4 million

3 In contrast to the IMB, the AIBN did not secure a grant from the Queensland Government through the Smart State Research Infrastructure Scheme. This loanneeds to be repaid after 10 years. NHMRC: National Health and Medical Research Centre.

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of research organisation based around scientific problems, found, for example, in the

Scripps Institute in the USA. A $1 million collaboration fund was established between the

amalgamating centres to begin to harness the synergies envisaged.

The proposal for the IMB was originally supported by UQ’s Vice-Chancellor, Professor

Brian Wilson, and subsequently by his successor, Professor John Hay. A crucial event

occurred when Hay met Chuck Feeney, an Irish-American businessman with a philan-

thropic organisation, Atlantic Philanthropies. Feeney contributed $10 million to the IMB,

with UQ putting in $15 million. The IMB also received $15 million from the

Commonwealth Government through its $1 billion Federation Fund. Perhaps what is

most notable about the development of the IMB was the unprecedented recurrent core

funding that Premier Peter Beattie agreed to provide. This continuing core funding totals

$127.5 million over a 15-year period, dependent on meeting various performance reviews

held every five years. The State government had a particular concern for job creation in its

measures of performance and also included commercialisation objectives of licensed

intellectual property. To avoid dispute over pre-existing intellectual property, a commerci-

alisation organisation, IMBCom, was established separate from UQ’s main commercial-

isation arm, UniQuest.

4.1.2 Australian Institute for Bioengineering and Nanotechnology. The AIBN began its life

in 2002, moving into a new building in 2006. The development of the AIBN occurred very

differently from that of the IMB. In contrast to the concept for the IMB, which came from

researchers, the AIBN was conceived of at the executive level of the University. An

opportunity was seen to conduct research at the interface of the biological, chemical and

physical sciences. The Institute enjoyed a close association with its intellectual ‘architect’,

UQ Vice-Chancellor, Paul Greenfield, and its key planner and facilitator, Professor David

Siddle, then Deputy Vice-Chancellor Research. AIBN is headed by Professor Peter Gray,

a world-leading biopharmaceutical researcher.

Professor Paul Greenfield, UQ’s Senior Deputy Vice-Chancellor at the time, was

travelling overseas with Premier Peter Beattie when news of Queensland’s failed bid for

a synchrotron was announced (see discussion below). The disappointment of failing to get

this major piece of research infrastructure, in the face of competition from another State,

became an opportunity for discussions between the Queensland Government and UQ for

the creation of a nanotechnology institute.

The $72 million AIBN was announced in 2001 and was subsequently established with

funding of $24 million from the Queensland Government, $24 million from Atlantic

Philanthropies and the remainder from UQ. The Institute has also been able to secure

subsequent funding of $14 million from the Commonwealth Government’s National

Collaborative Research Infrastructure Scheme. Its mixture of fundamental and strategic

research has a strong industry focus and it has attracted support from the Australian

Research Council’s Linkage Grants, requiring academic and industrial partners.

4.1.3 Queensland Brain Institute. The QBI developed concurrently with the AIBN and

was established in 2003. The University executive had identified the area of neuroscience

to be an emerging area of research strength dating back to a research centre in Vision,

Touch and Hearing established at UQ in 1993. The QBI was modelled on a number of

institutes around the world that have taken an integrated approach to a range of disciplines

and technologies in neuroscience.




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Funding for the $63 million Institute included $20 million from the Queensland

Government, $10 million from the Commonwealth Government and $20 million from

Atlantic Philanthropies. The remainder was provided by UQ through its funding for

strategic projects. At the opening of the Institute in 2007, the Queensland Government

announced operational funding support of $25 million. The QBI is headed by Professor

Perry Bartlett, a world-leading neuroscientist. Staff at the QBI were mostly recruited

externally, with the expectation that the majority would win their salaries competitively.

Professor Bartlett, for example, was a recipient of a Federation Fellowship, a scheme

created by BAA, which covered his salary for five years. Researchers in other Institutes have

also won these highly prestigious awards.

4.1.4 Diamantina Institute for Cancer, Immunology and Metabolic Medicine. The last SSI

to be developed was the DI. It was established through the merger of UQ’s Centre for

Immunology and Cancer Research and the Centre for Diabetes and Endocrine Research.

It is co-located with one of Brisbane’s major hospitals, the Princess Alexandra (PA)

hospital, near UQ. The DI is focussed on the intersection of clinical research and basic

biomedical research.

The DI was developed largely through the reputation of its Director, Professor Ian

Frazer, and the commercialisation of the cervical cancer vaccine, Gardasil, which he co-

developed. In 2008 global sales for this vaccine exceeded US$2.2 billion, from which UQ

will generate royalties until 2026.

The DI is one of the major centres in the $354 million Translational Research Institute

(TRI) at the PA hospital. The TRI has received Commonwealth Government funding of

$140 million, State government of funding of $107 million, Atlantic Philanthropies

contributed $50 million, Queensland University of Technology $25 million, with $10

million from UQ, as well as in-kind contributions from the Mater Medical Research

Institute and the PA hospital. The aim of the TRI is to develop the capacity to fully trial,

commercialise and manufacture new research breakthroughs, and move ‘from bench to

bedside to community’. The timing of Gardasil’s commercialisation gave Frazer and UQ

a platform for making approaches to State and Federal government for facilities that would

improve commercialisation opportunities. As Professor Paul Greenfield has pointed out, in

the past Australia’s limited infrastructure for the testing of drugs capped the value that

could be generated from breakthrough research.

4.2 Policy context

The development of the SSIs has to be understood within the context of national research

and innovation policy. In Australia’s federal structure the Commonwealth Government

holds fiscal dominance over the States. Tax reform in the late 1990s, through the

introduction of a Goods and Services Tax, shifted this balance to some degree and arguably

State governments have more discretionary funds, some of which have been used to fund

science and innovation-related initiatives.

A respondent noted at State level: ‘It was a golden age really. We had a lot of money in

those days . . . at this time we invested heavily in two things—infrastructure and scientific

research. Other people would have no doubt invested in different things, but we had a fair

amount of free cash to play with.’

Queensland’s Smart State strategy was a beneficiary of this financial position. One of the

main stimuli for the Smart State policy is reputed to have occurred in 1998 when Professor




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John Mattick described the potential of genomics and biotechnology to the Premier at the

time, Peter Beattie (Department of the Premier and Cabinet, 2005). Beattie appreciated

the potential of this science and very actively promoted further investment into scientific

research, aiming to shift Queensland from its traditional economic base as a ‘rocks and

crops’ resource-based economy (Beattie and Loukakis, 2005).

The generosity of the State government towards the development of the SSI was not

unbounded. With the exception of the IMB, the investment made into SSIs was based

on government loans. The IMB was the only institute to receive a grant, and this was

a hard-fought battle. As one respondent remembered: ‘It was like being dragged over

broken glass. You would have thought we were a can factory, not a world-class research

institute.’

But it was policies at Federal level that were most influential at the time the SSIs were

created. In addition to the fiscal dominance that the Commonwealth Government has over

State governments in Australia, it also controls to a large degree the policy settings in the

research and innovation system, including funding for universities. One of the most

significant influences was the BAA funding package. Prime Minister John Howard

personally announced funding for BAA in 2001, signalling its political importance to the

government. This was at a time when the opposition Labor Party was gaining some

traction over the perceived neglect of research investments by the ruling government. As

one respondent observed, ‘I don’t think that the Opposition . . . should be underestimated,

because the Howard government was responding to a political pressure. The Opposition

had nailed its colours to the mast on this issue.’ The Labor party argued about the need for

urgency in knowledge investment, creating emerging industries and overcoming a crisis in

Australia’s R&D performance.

BAA was a five-year funding package, separate from the annual budgetary and

expenditure review processes, and was an outcome of a series of initiatives,

including a National Innovation Summit. The initiative for the Summit originally

came from the Business Council of Australia—a body representing the CEOs of leading

companies—but the momentum was taken up by a well-organised science lobby (Marsh

and Edwards, 2009), which managed to negotiate a significant increase in the science

budget.

BAA led to a shift away from block funding for research towards competitive grants. The

strategy of research organisations that had normally relied on block grants had to change to

compete in the new funding landscape. The SSIs, built mostly on the promise of winning

competitive grants, were an organizational form that complied with this policy environ-

ment. A second component of the policy, BAA2, was announced in 2005, maintaining the

thrust of BAA.

At this time, the Commonwealth Chief Scientist’s office was engaged in priority-setting

exercises that shaped and signalled the direction of Commonwealth funding. As a result it

became increasingly important for research organisations to articulate their overarching

strategies in order to be funded. In combination, these factors go some way to explaining

how scientific research institutes came to become a highly favoured organisational form

within the research and innovation systems.

4.3 University strategy

Numerous respondents observed how strategic management has been a central feature

of those Australian universities that have thrived in the last decade of tight financial




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constraints. Strategic management in the UQ case has included the identification and

pursuit of areas of research strength. Beginning in 1996, Vice-Chancellor John Hay

initiated a programme of change through which the faculties were to identify key areas

of strength and priority areas. He then helped obtain external funds that would go to

directly support these newly identified priority areas. In this way there were very clear

financial consequences for the areas with priority and those that were deprioritised. In

this manner the UQ executive supported strategic projects such as the AIBN and QBI

out of the ordinary funds of the University. This selection process has not necessarily

been top-down and has also included selection at the faculty level of projects capable of

attracting external funding. Respondents have noted this move towards strategic

management has not been without pain and cultural change within the University has

taken time.

As early as the mid 1980s the University did not have a clear strategy and had not, for

example, formally identified molecular biology as a major area of study, despite the

remarkable advances in this area in the late 1970s and early 1980s. One respondent

remembers: ‘The budget was doled out and the so-called fairest way was to just allocate

a little bit to all the departments. This meant that we were not in a position to invest in

growth areas.’

Strategic management decisions, and the policy changes described above, have been

made in the context of a range of different forces in Australia, such as the greater

internationalisation of the Australian economy, declining productivity and threats to

competitiveness, which have contributed to pressures being placed on the higher education

sector to be more ‘productive’. Institutes are organisational forms suited to winning

research funding that is increasingly aimed at interdisciplinary projects and greater

accountability to the public purse.

Numerous other virtues of institutes were extolled by respondents. They are believed

to promote interdisciplinarity and can circumvent traditional academic decision-

making processes. They are believed to provide a ‘critical mass’ of researchers and

research infrastructure that serves a magnet for world-class staff. Respondents argued

disciplinary boundaries between engineering, bio-informatics and computing are

becoming blurred, and these new organisational structures allow collaboration to

occur. In the case of the SSI, the physical infrastructure has often been designed to

facilitate greater collaboration among researchers in complementary disciplines. While

this was quickly achieved in many regards, the integration of the CSIRO with the IMB,

however, was less successful, possibly due to a lack of incentives. One respondent

reflected, ‘It never quite worked out quite as we hoped in as much as I thought there

would be a lot more collaborative projects, but actually I think it’s more of a shared

building for convenience actually.’

The SSIs all have similar recruiting strategies aimed at researchers capable of winning

competitive grants. The culture is entrepreneurial in the sense that, according to one

Institute Director, winning competitive grants means ‘staying on our toes’ where ‘no one

rests on their laurels’. He argues a strong internal selection environment is necessary to

match the competitive funding landscape.

4.4 Key individuals

Politicians, policymakers, academic and research leaders, and a philanthropist all played

important roles in the creation of the SSIs. In a nation of very short electoral cycles—three




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years federally and in the State of Queensland—the contribution of politicians to the SSIs is

especially unusual. The unprecedented investment in scientific research in Queensland

and the powerful leveraging with Commonwealth funding required the conviction of

various ministers, Premiers and the Prime Minister of the time to make investments

when there was no immediate electoral advantage and most returns would accrue many

years after they left office. In a number of ways these individuals demonstrated political

leadership in higher education in a manner rare since the nation-building efforts

to establish the Australian National University in the 1940s (Foster and Varghese,

1996).

University leadership was evident in the actions of researchers, such as Mattick,

Andrews and Frazer, executives such as Wilson, Hay, Greenfield and Siddle, and those

leading researchers such as Bartlett and Gray who bought into the vision of the SSIs,

moving from prestigious posts elsewhere.

Key to the establishment of the SSIs was the extraordinary generosity of Chuck Feeney,

who by 2010 had donated around $0.25 billion dollars to UQ. Feeney’s first philanthropic

donations began in 1981 at Cornell University. He has invested considerably in the country

of his birth: providing substantial support to all seven universities in the Republic of Ireland

and two in Northern Ireland. Feeney’s Atlantic Philanthropies also invested $220 million

in Vietnam between 1998 and 2006.

Based on the success of his model in Ireland and Vietnam, Feeney began to look for

opportunities in Australia. In Brisbane, he used his friend, former tennis great Ken

Fletcher, to ‘be a kind of spotter to look for opportunities and bring them to our attention’

(O’Clery, 2007, p. 257). This led to the meeting between Feeney, the Lord Mayor of

Brisbane, Jim Soorley, Director of the Queensland Institute for Medical Research

(QIMR), Lawrie Powell and John Hay.

While Feeney’s approach was to liaise with somebody with knowledge of the country

who would survey the landscape for him and suggest investment ideas when an opportunity

presented itself, Atlantic Philanthropies thereafter carefully assessed the proposal. ‘His

philanthropy was opportunistic but he didn’t give randomly. He investigated and

scrutinized and some times tested the people involved with small initial grants. It always

came down to his instincts about the quality of the people involved’ (O’Clery, 2007, p.

245).

In UQ’s case, Atlantic Philanthropies’ support for the SSIs only came after Feeney

brought in a team that probed researchers and administrators with questions about how the

Institutes would develop. As one observer noted: ‘While Feeney was on board with

the development of the Institute, it was his financial guy that we needed to keep happy.’ In

the case of the QIMR, the Director Lawrie Powell remembers he was on the telephone with

Atlantic Philanthropies night after night as they assessed the proposal and argued that the

project could be done cheaper.

Feeney’s role was not simply to provide funds. His advocacy and negotiating skills, along

with John Hay’s, proved essential in leveraging funds from Commonwealth and State

government.

These individuals, to paraphrase Marx, made history, but not in circumstances of their

own making. Having the right people at the right time was hugely important, but their

actions have to be considered within the context of key strategic reviews, the production

and passage of influential reports and briefs, the existence of powerful personal

connections, and the difficult negotiations and decisions that needed to be made over

many years in order to enact strategic change.




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4.5 Related influential institutions

Assessment of the factors that led to the creation of the SSIs has to include the activities of

related institutions. These include the strategies of the other seven research-intensive

universities in Australia and in similar overseas institutions, research councils and other

research agencies. Thus the Australian Research Council, for example, faced especial

pressure in the late 1990s from central departments within the Commonwealth

bureaucracy wanting greater accountability, and even from Ministerial intervention in its

peer-reviewed decisions. Within these circumstances a number of normative conceptions

emerged as to how research organisations should act. One of these was leveraging public

funds to demonstrate importance and relevance. At the same time, under the leadership of

its CEO, Dr Geoff Garrett, the CSIRO was changing from its past research discipline and

industrial sector structure towards large-scale, interdisciplinary ‘Flagship’ programmes

(Dodgson et al., 2011). Demonstration of its ability to mobilise multiple disciplines

towards problems of national significance led to increases in the Organisation’s funding

(Marceau, 2007).

QIMR played an influential role. It is a statutory authority set up under the

Queensland Health Department, and its reputation reinforced and contributed to the

development of the SSIs. According to several respondents, QIMR was the genesis of

Chuck Feeney’s interest in investing in Queensland through its standing, particularly in

the area of research into liver disease. His initial interest was persistently pursued and

developed by QIMR’s Director, Lawrie Powell, who was described by one respondent in

his interactions with the Queensland Government as a ‘dog with a bone’. One account

suggests that the initial interest that Feeney expressed was rebuffed by the Queensland

Treasury Department. The anonymous (at that time) benefactor seeking leveraging to

extract government funds was not initially well received, and it took advocacy by QIMR

to change minds.

4.6 Timing

Numerous respondents referred to the ‘time being right’ for the creation of the SSIs. The

coincidence of economic conditions, policy circumstances, political, research and

university leadership, and the great fortune of finding a generous and strategically minded

philanthropist contributed immeasurably to the SSIs. A number of temporal issues are

worthy of note.

In the first instance the SSIs built upon significant past investments. Whether in the case

of IMB, with its merger of existing groups, or QBI and DI building on established research

centres, fortune, to paraphrase Pasteur, favoured the prepared mind.

The investment in SSIs benefitted from an upturn in fortunes in the electoral, budget

and business cycles. Pressure from the opposition Labor Party and advantageous

Commonwealth and State budgetary circumstances provided favourable conditions for

increased investment in science. The idiosyncrasies of timing were seen in the case of the

IMB’s receipt of $15 million from the Commonwealth Government through the

Federation Fund. Throughout the previous year representatives of the IMB had submitted

the same proposal to the Fund through a number of avenues without success. Then the

relevant Cabinet Minister requested details of the proposal two days before Cabinet was to

meet to decide on which projects were to receive funding. The outcome of this proposal

was positive. A respondent reflected: ‘Wemust have sent them something 20 times over the

previous year but you know obviously it never got to the right level. We’d made all these




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fancy pretty submissions and everything else but eventually it was just a quick two pager.

Funny how things work!’

The timing of proposals can be as important as their quality.

Long-term horizons are essential as the development of scientific capabilities and the

ability to recruit world-class researchers takes many years. The SSIs have had to mobilize

support incrementally through a process of bricolage and bootstrapping (Garud and

Karnoe, 2003). The Directors of the budding research institutes were able to attract

a number of esteemed international researchers by improvisation in their recruiting

strategies, providing a mixture of research autonomy and seed funding to build their own

research teams. The executive of the University also assisted these budding research

groups by providing initial infrastructure. The story of the development of the SSI is how

funding from the State and Federal government, and Atlantic Philanthropies, built on

a long-term process of research selection within the University to create a point where

external funding could be mobilised.

4.7 Realpolitik

During the course of this study respondents have been generous and open, and the account

unveiled, we believe, is as accurate as can be independently determined. Inevitably,

especially as large amounts of money were concerned, decisions were reached under the

influence of personal and organisational power, allegiances and conflicts. Many of these

stories will never be told, but sufficient evidence has been collected to emphasise the

realities of the idiosyncratic processes that led to the SSIs.

Respondents, for example, referred to examples of how decisions were only made

because certain committees and rules were circumvented or avoided. Such behaviours can

only be sanctioned in bureaucratic organisations, such as universities, through the

patronage of leaders—something not universally popular within them—or the misguid-

ance, or foresight, of committee chairs and faculty deans regarding whether or not they

should be involved in decisions.

The mobilisation of resources is nested within the systems and processes of universities

and public sector organisations, which can often appear interminable. Successful out-

comes have often depended on how well these have been dealt with. Seemingly small

changes can be hugely significant. The hiring of a manager pivotal to the development of at

least two of the Institutes was made possible, for example, only due to reform of howmuch

a non-Professor could get paid at UQ.

Politics was also influential on a larger scale. Australian federalism is complex, providing

an odd arrangement of State governments that unite against centralist tendencies in the

Commonwealth Government, but can also fiercely compete against each other. In June

2001 the Victoria State Government announced its decision to build a national

synchrotron facility, pre-empting a national competition running at the time to decide

its location. According to a number of respondents, key stakeholders in the Queensland bid

for the synchrotron were very upset. Shortly thereafter the Queensland Government

announced its decision to provide support for a nanotechnology research centre, arguably

in response to the actions of the Victorian Government. The creation of the SSI in

Queensland cannot be understood without reference to the competition between Queens-

land and Victoria. Queensland policymakers acknowledge extensive benchmarking and

even analogous policy justifications. Three Institute directors came from the powerful

cluster of medical research in Victoria.




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The decision by the Commonwealth Government to invest in the SSIs derived from

both effective scientific and policy debate, but the importance of personal lobbying has to

be recognized. There was extensive direct representation to the various Ministers at the

State and Commonwealth levels. Chuck Feeney himself went to Canberra to discuss

funding options.

While the contribution of Atlantic Philanthropies to the SSIs is crucial, and in many

ways the most important factor explaining how they came to be formed, some considerable

interpersonal and political hurdles had to be overcome in the process of its involvement.

Initially, Feeney and Atlantic Philanthropies insisted on anonymity, posing significant

challenges to decision-makers at UQ and the Queensland Government. Harvey Dale, a key

member of Atlantic Philanthropies, ran the organisation ‘like the CIA’ (O’Clery, 2007),

enforcing confidentiality so severely that you ‘had to almost sign your life away’ to receive

a donation (O’Clery, 2007, p. 132). Proposals that hinged on money from this anonymous

donor were not met with enthusiasm. One respondent remembers being ‘thrown out of the

Treasury office’, and it was only after a direct negotiation with the Premier that the

Queensland Government began some due diligence and dealings with Atlantic Philan-

thropies. The difficulty was not only in testing the legitimacy of these anonymous funds

and their source, it also lay with the leveraging that money sought from government funds.

One observer, reflecting on how Feeney was rebuffed by a Premier of another State

government in Australia, argued: ‘He didn’t want to be told by some Irish American how

and where to spend his government’s money!’

Successful proposals were also based on appealing to the Commonwealth Government’s

penchant for greater collaboration among research groups around its infrastructure

investment. In other words, the Commonwealth Government would be more inclined to

invest in major infrastructure if it was not seen to be backing winners or prioritising one

industry or region over another. To that end, one of the strategies employed by those

writing proposals was to couch their approaches in national terms.

The high reputation of medical research amongst the Australian public has also to be

taken into consideration in assessing the ‘atmospherics’ surrounding the SSIs. Policy

attention was also raised by government reviews, notably in this case the Wills Report on

Health andMedical Research, published in 1999, that led to a tripling of funds for medical

research. The most highly regarded civil award in Australia is Australian of the Year. The

past Director of the renowned medical research centre, the Walter and Eliza Hall Institute,

Sir Gus Nossal, was a winner and he has directly and indirectly influenced the amount of

funding for medical research and for Australian science in general. Professor Ian Frazer,

Director of the DI, was another, more recent, winner, increasing his authority when

promoting the cause of investments in medical research.

Institutes have advantages, but in contrast with many other research institutes in

Australia that are autonomous, the SSIs are part of UQ’s structure. This required them to

be embedded in an existing academic organization. This has not always been easy, with one

respondent commenting: ‘The university is an organisation that is built up around faculties

and schools. Institutes sit somewhere between a faculty and a school. We were fighting

battles like that, like a square peg in a round hole, not quite fitting; the Institute was

different from the faculties, different focus, different way of operating.’

Institutes can pose challenges for existing faculties as they can be more attractive to

research stars, PhD students and research funders. According to one respondent, they can

separate the research and teaching focus of the university, balkanising the two different

functions. Another respondent argued that being a research-only organisation meant that




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there was a certain degree of ‘fragility’ if competitive funding dried up. Some sentiment has

been expressed by respondents that the Institutes tend to forget that the success of the SSI

was to some extent contingent on support from the faculties.

One of UQ’s responses to problems of faculty/Institute differences has been to make it

a requirement for Institute group leaders to spend a certain amount of time teaching in the

faculties. It is believed this time would enable the researchers to be exposed to the students

and the faculties to get the benefit of those people teaching in the programmes. It also

aimed to encourage collaborative research between people in faculties and Institutes.

Another way by which UQ has attempted to manage this tension is through joint

appointments between faculties and the Institutes. One respondent, however, reflected

that the University ‘hadn’t gone far enough’ with joint appointments to achieve the balance

between teaching and research, and that there was a potential risk of creating a ‘two class

system’. There remain a number of difficult governance issues around joint appointments

when it comes to calculating the research income of the faculties and the Institutes. As one

respondent commented, ‘The difficulty for us is that we have that complex relationship

(that) means our research income is halved. We are sort of down because of that

relationship and the systems of the university don’t actually accommodate that.’

Universities can readily deal with these challenges—by making joint appointments,

sharing research income, creating collaborative research funds, etc.—but the administra-

tive challenges of new structures in bureaucratic organisations are ever-present. One

respondent, for example, remembered how difficult it was to get Institute staff on the

University email lists.

5. Discussion and conclusions

Explaining the creation of Queensland’s SSIs cannot be undertaken by separate recourse to

the academic literature on research policy, university strategy or academic entrepreneur-

ship, but can be better comprehended by examination of their mutual dependencies. This

research uncovers the confluence of events and convergence of factors that led to the

creation of the SSIs. They cannot be explained without reference to serendipity and luck,

the fortune of good timing, and the realpolitik of political rivalries, the character of key

personalities and the delicate negotiation of innovation in conservative university

structures.

The development of the SSIs is largely due to the decade-long nexus between key

individuals, such as Premier Peter Beattie, Vice-Chancellor John Hay and philanthropist

Chuck Feeney. But their contributions have to be placed in the policy context. As well as

being partially involved in the initial construction of the Institutes, the Commonwealth

Government’s BAA1 and BAA2 also helped indirectly shape the SSIs. Queensland’s Smart

State initiative also influenced and itself developed alongside the SSIs. The link between

science, knowledge and innovation became a strategic template for policymakers and was

accepted and legitimized at the State and Federal levels of decision-making. It became

a hook on which proponents for the SSIs could hang their hat, and the role of scientific

research infrastructure, such as these Institutes, provided a central component in the

development of regional and national innovation systems.

It would be wrong to assume that universal consensus about the SSIs was reached. The

internal politics in each of the actors involved, the negotiations between political leaders

and central agencies, faculties and Institutes, were, however, sufficiently resolved to allow

action. For this to occur, in the words of one respondent: ‘a large number of planets needed




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to be aligned’. And these were very diverse planets. Courage and conviction was provided

by a variety of leaders for proposals for funding not linked to immediate, direct and

measurable outcomes. Decisions about research strengths within the University accorded

with the changing policy environment. Institutes that capitalised upon selection processes

within universities required grass roots, local support, or at least acquiescence, amongst

those whose budgets were adversely affected.

A university is embedded in an institutional context of various rules of the game,

including legislation, funding and priority-setting mechanisms, and views by politicians

and the public on what it ‘ought’ to be doing. These complex interdependent relationships

with multiple levels of government shape university strategy as to what capabilities and

structures are needed to capitalise on opportunities in the external environment.

The role of philanthropy in acting as animateur within a set of fecund but not necessarily

well-connected conditions is of great policy significance and worthy of further research.

The contribution of great philanthropists to university formation—such as Rockefeller at

the University of Chicago and Carnegie at Carnegie Mellon University—is well known.

Less well known, we suggest, are the changes that can be encouraged within universities

through the astute and strategic investment of individuals concerned not with short-term

commercial or political payoffs, but with a strategic view of what a university and

government can achieve by working together. In our case, a philanthropic organisation had

sufficient will and resources to help the University cut through significant organisational

and political inertia.

The study shows the relevance of the three strands of literature we framed it within:

research policy, university strategy and academic entrepreneurship. Each contributes

partial explanations. Fuller accounts require combinations of these literatures, something

to be encouraged, and improved theorisation will build upon further inductive cases such

as the one we provide. There is value, we contend, in future inductive studies adopting

similarly ‘actor-centred’ views (Kuhlmann and Shapira, 2006) on the way universities and

governments respond to the demands of the knowledge economy. The foresight, energy

and skill of the individual proponents of the SSIs deserve recognition, but the emergence of

new academic forms, in this case study scientific research institutes, is bounded by the

institutional context. This means that our view of academic entrepreneurship is a messier

and more fractured process than might be expected. The policy implications lie in

comprehending the way that outstanding individuals cannot deliver results unless they are

operating in supportive policy and strategic circumstances, and supportive conditions are

insufficient without exceptional individuals.

Rich empirical case studies, such as the one offered here, capture the interplay between

events and various actors—politicians, bureaucrats, university administrators and

researchers—over a sustained period. The way this case showed the complexity of

contributing factors and the impact of such elements such as fortuitous timing and

realpolitik suggests that the obstacles to a government’s investment into science research

infrastructure, and hence attempts to position itself in the knowledge economy,

are formidable. While decisions to invest in science research infrastructure can be

partially explained by their appropriateness as strategic templates for government and

for universities, future studies need to explore longitudinally the complicated processes

by which decisions to take action are made and how they are implemented. The

policy implications lie with understanding the extraordinary set of circumstances

leading to the creation of the SSIs, and the difficulties in their reconstruction and

replication. The consequence being that having enjoyed these especial conditions and




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made substantial investment, it would be unwise to compromise them for any short-term

considerations.

Similar empirical research in future will improve theory of academic entrepreneurship

by locating it within the wider institutional context in which universities and governments

operate. Universities can be torn between contested pathways of scholarship or

entrepreneurship (Thornton and Flynn, 2003). We found in this case that academic

entrepreneurs saw the SSIs as vehicles to promote world-class scholarship and attract

significant government support for research and, at the same time, as mechanisms with

which to commercialise research. They acted entrepreneurially as bricoleurs (Garud and

Karnoe, 2003), managing laboratory facilities and equipment, mobilising collaborative

networks, and accessing a variety of sources of funding to a variety of ends, requiring

a variety of external engagements. Their entrepreneurship did not occur in isolation.

Entrepreneurial universities depend not only on their relationships with business, but on

entrepreneurship and risk taking by politicians and public servants. In the case of the SSIs,

important actions were taken by these ‘external’ entrepreneurs by their funding and

protecting key research programmes on which the Institutes have depended.

As a concept, entrepreneurship, with its broad focus on risk taking, innovation and

strategic action, has much to contribute in the way of discussion and theorisation about

institutions such as universities in the knowledge economy (Acs and Audretsch, 2003). Yet

the concept of academic entrepreneurship or an entrepreneurial university runs the risk of

being inchoate unless they are carefully located within an institutional and temporal

context. There may be fragility, for example, in perceived successful academic entrepre-

neurship when it is based on ‘soft money’ and its payoffs are long term. Academic

entrepreneurship may depend on continuing entrepreneurial support from within

government well beyond its foundational stages. Academic entrepreneurship is perhaps

best theorised as an element of the broader, long-term socio-political process of

institutional entrepreneurship (Jain and George, 2007).

It has not been our purpose here to examine the performance of the SSIs, but to examine

the conditions of their creation. Nevertheless, it is worth noting the findings of a university-

commissioned review of the SSIs, conducted in 2011 by Allen Consulting, one of

Australia’s leading economic consultancies. It notes that between 2000 and 2009 the

Institutes produced 3,400 peer-reviewed publications and spun out seven spin-off

companies. It argued their non-quantifiable benefits to UQ include cost savings, for

example from shared equipment, and the creation of critical mass and synergies in research

efforts. It estimated the returns to the State government were between 4.2 and 6.5 times

their investment (Allen Consulting Group, 2011). Another, partial and imperfect,

indicator of the impact of the SSIs is seen in UQ’s entry into the Shanghai Jiao Tong

University top 100 ranking for the first time (no. 86) in 2011. Given the heavily science-

based nature of this indicator, it is likely that the SSIs contributed to this position and it

conceivably would not have been achieved with the previous faculty-based structure. Vice-

Chancellor Paul Greenfield argues the value of the SSIs in increasing UQ’s capacity for

interdisciplinary research addressing big problems, and improving the quality of research

across the University as Institutes prove attractive to researchers in faculties through

opportunities for collaboration and access to equipment.

We can observe, however, that the promises made of the potential contribution of the

SSIs obviously places pressures on their delivery. Political patience is usually brief and

political will transient. There will be significant pressure on the SSIs, and not all of it

sensible. As an example, the success of Gardasil attracted funding from the State




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government, but it may expect this type of success in developing a breakthrough drug to be

regularly repeated. One respondent noted: ‘This may have been a one in 25-year discovery.

And now Treasury is looking for the next one.’

These Institutes are experiments in a new organisational form for their host institution.

They have the potential to attract new and increased sources of funding, generate exciting

new ways of creating and using knowledge, and redefining how interdisciplinary collabo-

ration can occur. Yet we do not yet know enough about what these Institutes mean to the

University and what impact this organisational form will have on its culture and

performance. Their significance in and of themselves does not indicate that the University

is efficiently and effectively using resources to best effect and making its most optimal

contributions to the innovation system. There is no capacity to assess a counterfactual of

what would have happened in their absence. It may well be that the organisational template

of an Institute is an unreflective institutional response of a university to a particular set of

temporary circumstances. The SSIs are by any account a substantial achievement, but their

contribution, like all major academic initiatives, will take decades to properly evaluate.

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