Slovak Transition from Communism to Capitalism Jan Pokrivcak SAU Nitra, Slovakia [email protected]

Slovak Transition from Communism to Capitalism

Jan Pokrivcak

SAU Nitra, Slovakia

[email protected]

Slovak Republic

Area: 49 036 km2

Population: 5.4 million

Pop. density: 109 per sq km

Pol. system: parl. democracy Ethnicity of the population: Slovak (86%)Hungarian (10%), Romany (2%), Czech (1%), Rusyn, Ukrainian, Russian, German, Polish and others(1%)GNI per capita (2005): US$ 7,600GDP growth (2007): 8.7%

The Slovak Experience

Contents

• General Overview of Communist Economic System

• Transition to Capitalism

• The Case of Slovakia and other Central European Countries

• Communist economic system = central planning + state ownership of production factors

• Communist economic system applied in countries with one third of the world population, covering Russia and Mongolia, Central Europe, Balkan, Baltic Countries, and China, Vietnam and other offshoots.

• It started in relatively backward agrarian countries like Russia in 1917.

General Overview of Communist Economic System

Behind Iron Curtain

Source: DeLong: Macroeconomics


• At the beginning it was not clear which system (communist or capitalist) more efficient

• Many economists in the West advocated socialism

• It turned out that communist economic system is less efficient than free market system


Planned Economy vs. Market

Source: DeLong: Macroeconomics


There were still some positive outcomes of communist economies

• equitable distribution of incomes,

• general access to education, health care,

• job security,

• industrialization (from agrarian countries)

• growth of production (in early years)


But negative outcomes prevailed• shortages or surpluses, • slow economic growth in later periods• technological backwardness because of slow

innovation• environmental damage by heavy industry• stagnating social indicators, health, life expectancy,…• intrusive government due to lack of private incentives• governments NOT maximizing social welfare but

seeking own advantages (principal-agent problem)• lack of freedom – dictatorship


Why communist economies poorer than market economies?

– Initial conditions (communist countries were poorer in the first place)

– Communist economies generated lower rates of economic growth


Economic growth in communist period (% per capita p.a. )

Period EAST WEST

1950s

1960s

1970s

1980s

4.5

3.6

2.8

0.8

3.7

4.5

2.8

2.0

Communist economy good at mobilizing resources in short term, not able to sustain growth in long term.

General Overview of Central Planning

What caused poor performance of communist economies?

• Central planning

• Property rights


Problems with central planning Imbalances NOT eliminated by price adjustments and prices do not send signals what is scarce or prospective and what abundant and useles.

Quantities set directly by central planners. The whole economy is managed like a single firm (monopoly).

But central planners unable to manage such a huge firm (ECONOMY): poor info and incentives.

PRICE MECHANISM PERFORMS BETTER THAN CENTRAL PLANNING.


Problems with central planning Central planning is the story of huge government failure stemming from:

- inability to collect relevant information on preferences of consumers, availability of production methods and technology

- inability to set long-term sustainable goals

Free market economy often faces MARKET FAILURE

Government failure bigger than market failure


Q

P

PA

QDA QS

A

M

L

N

K

D

S

PB

E

Q*

P*


Problems with property rights

• Rights to use assets and enjoy income from the use of assets

• In communism all assets owned by the state

• Prices and profits irrelevant.

• Managers not motivated to make profit but to fulfill quantitative plans.

• Inability to motivate people to work hard

• Punishment for increasing efficiency and innovation.


Collapse of communist experiment and transition• Communist system failed and was followed by TRANSITION

from central planning to market economy

• During TRANSITION all “rules of the game” (constitution, laws, codes of behavior, habits, property rights) changed.

i.e., Market economy based on profit seeking entrepreneurial behavior while entrepreneurship in communism is considered to be speculation and trying to avoid hard work and therefore illegal.

Transition

Speed of Transition

• Two options1. Big Bang or Shock Therapy2. Gradual reforms

• Scope of reforms– Economic reforms: Liberalization, stabilization,

dismantling communist institutions (CMEA) and subsidies, privatization, banking system, safety net

– Institutional reforms: large-scale privatization, market oriented legal system and institutions, financial, labor, retirement regulations (in summary laws, regulations, institutions)

Transition

Speed of transition

• CEEC and FSU big bang in economic reforms and variability in institutional reforms.

Havel: “Cannot cross a chasm in two leaps”

• CHINA gradual reforms only.

Deng Xiaoping: “feeling stones to cross the river”

Transition

Speed of transition

• China vs. CEEC and FSU

– China dictatorship while CEEC and FSU became democracies, in China reforms conducted by communists in CEEC by democrats.

– Chinese approach not used in CEEC as reformers (former dissidents) worried of Russia and return of communists in their own countries used WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY to make reforms irreversible.

Transition

Outcome of transition depends on • Initial conditions

Some countries remembered pre-communist period and had market skills

Some countries implemented institutions from the scratch (Slovakia)

Some countries started transition with stable economy while others from macroeconomic imbalances

Transition

Outcome of transition depends on • Liberalization and stabilization policies

– In general the stronger the liberalization the faster recovery of production

– Stabilization macroeconomic policies crucial

– Important to establish hard budget constraint

Transition

Outcome of transition depends on • Privatization and regulation

Private firms more efficient than state owned

Methods of privatization

Financial regulation, labor code, regulation of pension system, taxation

Enforcement of contracts

Functioning of legal system

Transition

Outcome of transition depends on • Political system

Avoidance of government failure

Elimination of redundant redistribution and rent seeking

Economic and legal predictability

Sequencing of reforms

EU accession

Transition

Short history

• 1918 -1992 Slovakia part of Czechoslovakia.

• 1948 -1989 - communist country.

• 1993 - Independent Slovakia in 1993.

• 2004 - a member of the European Union.


Short economic history – communist years

• Most of Slovakia agrarian before 1948

• 1950s – 1960s – industrialization and economic growth

• 1970s – 1980s – economic stagnation

• 1990s – transition to market system and democracy


Short Economic History – Transition Years

• Initial decline of output caused (1990 – 1992)

- Creative destruction• Economic recovery (1993 – 97)

- Fruits of economic reforms• Slowing down and fiscal problems (1999 – 01)

- Lack of institutional reforms and bad politics• Strong economic growth (2002 – current time)

- Institutional market reforms and EU accession


Adoption of EURO

ERMIIERMII parity

Euro adoption date*

Final conv.rate*

SKK rate*

Slovakia – consensus

2006 38 2009 35.0

Czech Republic – cons.

2008 30.4-31 2010-2014 28.5 1.23

Poland – consensus

2008 3.85* 2009-2012 3.7 9.5

Hungary – consensus

2008 255-260 2012-2014 255 13.7


Current economic performance

• Currently, Slovakia is a fast growing economy with GDP growth of about 10 % in 2007

• Unemployment rate remains high but declining (about 10 % in 2009).

• Regional differences: rich Western Slovakia, poor Eastern Slovakia.


GDP Growth in Slovakia


Economic growth

3.94.0

3.6

5.2

0.0

1.0

2.0

3.0

4.0

5.0

6.0

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006f 2007f 2008f average

Czech Republic Hungary Poland Slovak Republic


Unemployment rate

10%

11%12%

13%14%

15%

16%17%

18%19%

20%

93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05

Core Unemployment (average) LT average


Material distress

0.0%

2.0%

4.0%

6.0%

8.0%

10.0%

12.0%

14.0%

1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

number (ths) % of total population

Note: People in material distress include unemployed as well as people on social benefits that qualify. Material distress is defined as income below life minimum. However, the number of the poor is greater as the data does not include low income people (such as pensioners, etc). Some estimates put the poor at 10% instead of 7% in 2005. Source: Ministry of Labour


Structure of Economy

Agriculture 3,5 Industry;

29,4

Services; 67,1


• In the world perspective, SLOVAKIA is an upper middle income country with a Gross National Income per capita of US$ 7,600 in 2005.

• In European perspective, Slovakia achieves about 55% of average income of 25 countries of the EU


GDP per capita in 2005 in PPS EU25=100%

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140Ire

land

Neth

erlan

ds

Austr

ia UK

Swed

en

Germ

any

Fran

ce Italy

EU25

Spain

Gree

ce

Slov

enia

Czec

h R,

Portu

gal

Hung

ary

Esto

nia

Slov

akia

Lith

ueni

a

Polan

d

Latv

ia

GDP

per

capi

ta

GDP (EURbn)Relative to

German market

Populat.(m)Relative to

German population

US (1) 10,119 513 265.6 324

Germany (4) 1,973 100 81.9 100

Poland (22) 403 20.4 38.7 47

Czech Republic (40)

170 8.6 10.3 13

Hungary (44) 139 7.0 10.1 12

Slovak Republic (50)

62 3.1 5.4 7

Note: GDP adjusted by Purchasing Power Parity, 2004 data. Source: EUROSTAT

Size of the market


US 108

Germany 100

Austria 99

UK 94

Hungary 52

Slovakia 49

Czech Republic 45

Poland 41

Mexico 32

Productivity comparisonGDP per hour worked Germany = 100

Source: OECD


# of hours OECD Rank Germany=100%

Czech Republic 1 972 2 136%Poland 1 956 3 135%Slovakia 1 814 7 125%USA 1 792 12 124%UK 1 673 16 116%Italy 1 591 18 110%Austria 1 550 21 107%Germany 1 446 24 100%France 1 431 25 99%Netherlands 1 354 26 94%

Working habitsHours worked per year

Source: OECD


Education% of population 25-64 having completed at least

upper secondary education

Percentage Rank

Czech Republic 87.8 1

Slovakia 85.8 3

Germany 83.0 5

UK 81.7 7

Poland 80.8 9

Austria 78.2 11

Hungary 71.4 14

Netherlands 67.6 15

France 64.1 17Source: Eurostat, 2002 data


Economic freedom

2 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8 3

P oland (41)

Hungary (40)

Slovakia (34)

Czech Republic(21)

2003 2004 2005 2006

big improvement in 2004

The lower the value, the greater the economic freedom.

Source: The Heritage Foundation and Wall Street Journal, Index of Economic Freedom.


Doing business

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

Ease of DoingBusiness

Starting aBusiness

Dealing w ithLicenses

Hiring andFiring

RegisteringProperty

Getting Credit

Slovakia Czech republic Hungary Poland Germany

The smaller the number, the better

Source: World Bank, Doing Business 2006


Labor marketDifficulty of hiring

index

Rigidity of hours index

Difficulty of firing

index

Rigidity of employme

nt index

Firing costs

(weeks)

CE average 18 55 28 34 24

Czech Republic

33 20 20 24 22

Hungary 11 80 20 37 34Poland 11 60 30 34 25

Slovakia 17 60 40 39 13

Germany 44 80 40 55 67

The smaller the number, the better


Informal economy% of GNI

Informal economy (% GNI, 2003)

Slovakia 18.9

Czech Republic 19.1

Hungary 25.1

Poland 27.6

CE average 23

Germany 16.3


FDI inflow

0.0

1.0

2.0

3.0

4.0

5.0

6.012% of GDP


FDI inflow: CE comparison

-1,000 1,000 3,000 5,000 7,000

Czech Republic

Hungary

P oland

Slovakia

1989-1999 2000-2008US$


Most attractive sectors in CE in the future according an Ernst&Young Survey

7%9%9%

10%11%11%

12%12%

16%19%

27%28%28%

0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30%

PharmacyFinancial industry

Real estate/constructionHi-tech equipment

ChemicalsHi-tech services

TelecomTourism&leisure

TransportTelecommunication

Heavy industryMass consum

Car industry


Hourly labor costs in EUR1996 2004E Feb-06

% of CE avg

% of EU15

Czech Republic

2.6 5.5 6.5 116.3 24.6

Hungary 2.7 5.2 5.7 101.0 21.3Poland 2.7 4.2 5.1 91.4 19.3Slovakia 2.3 4.4 5.1 91.3 19.3

CE Average

2.6 4.8 5.6 100.0 21.1

EU Average

20 25.9 26.6 100.0

Germany 25.3 30.4 31.0 116.4


Corporate profit taxation2004 Corp tax rate(%)

2006 effective tax rate(%)

Tax on dividends(%)

Hungary(*) 17.6 18.1 20.0

Slovakia 19 16.7 0.0

Poland 19 18.0 20.0

Czech Republic 28 21.1 15.0

Germany(**) 39.35 36.0 23.5

Netherlands 34.5

France 34.3

Austria 34

EU15 average 31.3


Personal tax rate

2004 marginal tax rate

Slovakia 19

Czech Republic 32

Hungary 38

Poland 40


Government’s role in the economyrevenues as % of GDP

30

35

40

45

50

55

Czech Republic Hungary Poland Slovakia

1998 2003


Government’s role in the economyrevenues as % of GDP

25

30

35

40

45

50

55


Conclusions

• Communist experience taught us that:– Government failure bigger problem than market

failure– Governments lack information and incentives to

manage economy appropriately– Property rights play an important role, common

property invites shirking, hinders activity

Conclusions

• Transition taught us that:– Free market mechanism indispensable– Soft budget constraint invites irresponsible behavior– Private property rights important– Institutions “rules of the game” that reward

productivity rather than redistribution of income are crucial, “people respond to incentives”

– Good legal system “enforcing contracts” decisive – Transparent politics promotes economic growth

AGRICULTURAL TRANSITION

2nd part of presentation

Introduction

• In communist countries (before 1989) all economic activities directly regulated by state, the whole economy like a single firm.

• Central planners set:– What firms have to produce– Trade flows among companies – Allocation of resources among companies

• Prices set centrally and did not send right signals to producers and consumers.

Introduction cont.

• Agriculture centrally regulated too.• Land and farms (cooperatives) de facto

owned by state. Decisions made centrally.

• Land concentrated into large cooperatives.

• Average farm size 1 457 ha in Poland 124 770 ha in Turkmenistan.

• Farm size in market economies (USA, EU, …) much smaller.

Average farm size Workers per 1000 ha Tractors per 1000 ha

Workers/Tractors per 1000 ha (B/C)

Albania 1 907 628 20 32

Bulgaria 19 464 156 10 15

Czechoslovakia 2 988 156 24 6

Hungary 3 559 158 10 16

Poland 1 157 259 29 9

Romania 2 696 209 15 14

Estonia 4 490 92 16 6

Latvia 4 041 102 15 7

Lithuania 3 094 109 15 7

Armenia 1 621 167 10 16

Azerbaijan 2 765 164 10 17

Belarus 3 417 125 14 9

Georgia 2 148 209 10 21

Kazakhstan 75 555 9 1 7

Kyrgyzstan 21 626 41 3 14

Moldova 2 519 279 25 11

Russia 8 473 50 7 7

Tajikistan 8 352 114 9 12

Turkmenistan 124 770 7 1 10

Ukraine 3 930 145 11 13

Uzbekistan 13 637 77 7 11

Farm size during communism

Average farm size

(ha)

Average farm size

(ha)

Albania 1 907 Armenia 1 621

Bulgaria 19 464 Azerbaijan 2 765

Czechoslovakia 2 988 Belarus 3 417

Hungary 3 559 Georgia 2 148

Poland 1 157 Kazakhstan 75 555

Romania 2 696 Kyrgyzstan 21 626

Estonia 4 490 Russia 8 473

Latvia 4 041 Tajikistan 8 352

Lithuania 3 094 Turkmenistan 124 770

Ukraine 3 930

Uzbekistan 13 637

Farm size in market economies

Average farm size (ha)

Japan 1.24

EU-15 18

USA 197

Introduction cont.

• 1989 – The Fall of Berlin Wall – collapse of communist regimes in CEE and FSU

• Transition from centrally planned economy to market economy.

• Transition involves institutional change (change of rules of the game in the form of laws, regulations, property rights, norms, …).

• Institutions constrain behavior of individuals and through this have impact on productivity of the economy.

• Market institutions support private incentives. Communist institutions hinder private incentives.

Introduction: cont.

• Transition of agriculture involves: 1. Privatization2. Farm restructuring3. Price liberalization4. Formation of market institutions

Privatization

• During communism land and cooperatives owned by state. State ownership inefficient. Incentives to work higher in the case of private ownership of resources.

• To increase efficiency property rights transferred from state to private hands – privatization.

• Privatization in agriculture: – Privatization of land– Privatization of assets of cooperatives and

state farms

Privatization cont.

• Privatization of land in FSU and CEE: – Restitution to former owners– Distribution to farm workers– Combination of restitution and distribution

• Restitution to former owners: – Land restituted to owners from before

nationalization and collectivization. Historical injustice caused by communism undone.

– Restitution took place in CEE (except Albania) and in Baltic States.

– Restitution feasible because nationalization and collectivization took place in recent past (after WWII), documentation exists and former owners or their children still alive.

Privatization cont.

• Distribution of land among farm workers : – Land distributed among farm workers in order

to create equitable land ownership. – Applied in FSU and Albania. – Restitution infeasible in FSU because of

search costs, missing documentation. Communist regime introduced in FSU after WWI.

– Combination of distribution and restitution : – Some land restituted to former owners and

some land distributed among farm workers. – Applied in Hungary and Romania.

• In some countries (Byelorussia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan) privatization very limited.

Distribution Restitution Distribution and restitution

Albania

Bulgaria

Czech R.

Hungary

Slovakia

Romania

Estonia

Latvia

Lithuania

Armenia

Azerbaijan

Georgia

Kyrgyzstan

Russia

Ukraine

Belarus Limited privatization

Kazakhstan Limited privatization

Turkmenistan Limited privatization

Privatization cont.

• Privatization of farm assets : – Privatized by restitution and distribution. – Restitution served to undo former injustice

while distribution compensated workers for their contribution to farm surpluses created and invested back into cooperatives.

Farm restructuring• During communism cooperatives and state

farms centrally managed. Farms had to fulfill central plan.

• Restructuring aim was to transform farms such that they would react to market signals (prices and competition).

• Two approaches to restructuring: – New owners could withdraw land from

cooperatives (cooperatives could be dissolved) and establish family farm, these are the farms prevalent in developed market economies.

– Remaining cooperatives transformed. Communist cooperatives changed into cooperatives of owners of property, joint stock companies or limited liability companies.

Farm restructuring cont.

• During restructuring process the average farm size declined.

• In Slovakia, Czech Republic and in most FSU countries there are transformed cooperatives after restructuring.

• In Albania, Baltic States family farms are dominant.

• Both types of farms present in other countries.

Family farms Transformed coops

Share on land (%) Farm size (ha) Share on land (%) Farm size (ha)

Albania 96 4

Bulgaria 44 1 55 861

Czech R. 28 20 72 937

Hungary 59 4 41 312

Poland 87 8 13

Romania 55 2 45 274

Slovakia 12 42 88 1185

Slovenia 94 6

Estonia 63 2 37 327

Latvia 90 12 10 297

Armenia 32 68

Azerbaijan 9 91

Belarus 16 84

Georgia 24 76

Kazakhstan 20 80

Russia 11 89 6 100

Tajikistan 7 93

Turkmenistan 0.3 99.7

Uzbekistan 4 96

Ukraine 17 83 2 100

Price liberalization• Prices are important in market economy.

Prices provide signals to market participants how scarce commodities are.

• High price may signal high demand. Profit maximizing firms therefore increase production. Firms allocate resources to goods with the highest demand which results in efficient allocation of resources.

• In communism prices regulated by the state. Prices actually used only as an accounting tool to monitor state owned firms. Communist regimes therefore created surpluses of some goods and shortages of other goods.

Price liberalization cont.

• Price liberalization was an integral part of reforms.

• Generally price liberalization lead to increase of price level.

• The highest increase of prices observed for agricultural inputs while prices of agricultural outputs increased less. The reason was shortage of inputs and surplus of outputs prior to liberalization.

Development of prices in Slovakia

Development of prices in Hungary

Development of prices in Russia

Formation of market institutions

• Former communist countries had to create institutions supporting market system.

• They include the creation of safe private ownership rights, regulations supporting competition and contract enforcement.

• Many countries, especially FSU, adopted laws preventing sales and renting of land which laead to inefficient allocation of resources.

Formation of market institutions cont.

• Some countries lacked full definition of ownership rights.

• For example, in FSU new owners received shares of cooperatives not entitlement to a particular parcel. Direct relationship between land and individual was not created.

• Better informed managers could constrain rights of less informed owners.

• There was less of the problem in CEE.

Formation of market institutions cont.

• In overall, in CEE and Baltic States ownership rights and law enforcement was stronger than in FSU.

The impact of transformation on agricultural production

• All transition countries experienced the fall of agricultural production in the first years of transition.

• After 4 years of transition agricultural production decreased by 40% in Baltic States, 30% in FSU, and by 20% in CEE.

• The initial fall reflected the destruction of the old system of exchange of commodities while the new system was just being implemented.

• After the initial fall stabilization ensued. Production in many countries started to rise. The biggest increase occurred in Albania, Slovenia and Romania.

The impact of transformation on agricultural production

cont.• Agricultural production reached pre 1989

level only in Albania, Slovenia, and Romania.

• In FSU decline of production was bigger than in CEE and the subsequent rise smaller. The reason is that property rights were better defined and law enforcement was stronger in CEE. Agricultural resources were therefore more efficiently used in CEE than in FSU.

Development of agricultural production in transitive countries

30

100

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

Inde

x

Kazakhstan

Russia

BRSZ

Albania

Czech R.

Poland

Romania

KVSE

Estonia

Baltic States

Počet rokov od začiatku transformačného obdobia

Growth of GAO in Transition Countries (index equals 100 in first year of reform)

CountryCountry Years after Years after start reform start reform with lowest with lowest GAOGAO

GAO index in GAO index in year of lowest year of lowest GAOGAO

GAO index GAO index after 5 years after 5 years of reformof reform

GAO index GAO index after 10 years after 10 years of reformof reform

Czech Czech RepublicRepublic

HungaryHungary

PolandPoland

SlovakiaSlovakia

AlbaniaAlbania

BulgariaBulgaria

RomaniaRomania

SloveniaSlovenia

EstoniaEstonia

LatviaLatvia

LithuaniaLithuania

BelarusBelarus

MoldovaMoldova

RussiaRussia

UkraineUkraine

55

66

55

1010

22

77

33

33

88

99

99

99

99

88

99

7575

6969

7777

6868

7777

5757

7575

6565

4141

3737

6464

5757

4242

5858

5151

7575

7070

7777

7777

100100

6363

9393

8181

5555

5050

6969

6161

6666

6464

6969

7777

7373

8585

6868

113113

6262

9393

7979

5555

5050

6969

6161

6666

6464

6969

Growth of ALP (Output per Farm Worker) (index equals 100 in first year of reform)

CountryCountry Year with Year with lowest ALPlowest ALP

ALP index in ALP index in year of lowest year of lowest ALPALP

ALP index ALP index after 5 years after 5 years of reformof reform

ALP index ALP index after 8 years after 8 years of reformof reform

Czech Czech RepublicRepublic

HungaryHungary

PolandPoland

SlovakiaSlovakia

AlbaniaAlbania

BulgariaBulgaria

RomaniaRomania

SloveniaSlovenia

EstoniaEstonia

LatviaLatvia

LithuaniaLithuania

BelarusBelarus

MoldovaMoldova

RussiaRussia

UkraineUkraine

11

11

33

00

22

99

99

33

11

88

55

44

88

55

88

9999

9999

9696

100100

7777

6060

5959

6161

7676

4949

6262

6969

4141

6363

5252

126126

175175

9999

110110

108108

6969

6767

8585

139139

5454

6262

7171

5858

6363

6565

177177

220220

144144

132132

104104

6363

6363

NaNa

163163

6565

7777

8787

4141

6565

5252

Growth of Input Use Indexes in Transition Countries (index is 100 in first year of reform)

CountryCountry FertilizersFertilizers TractorsTractors LandLand LaborLabor Animal Animal StockStock

55 1010 55 1010 55 1010 55 88 55 1010

Czech Rep.Czech Rep.

HungaryHungary

PolandPoland

SlovakiaSlovakia

AlbaniaAlbania

BulgariaBulgaria

RomaniaRomania

SloveniaSlovenia

EstoniaEstonia

LatviaLatvia

LithuaniaLithuania

BelarusBelarus

MoldovaMoldova

RussiaRussia

UkraineUkraine

2929

1515

3535

1717

1919

2525

2727

5656

1717

2121

1010

2525

4242

1111

2424

2424

1818

3838

1515

1414

1414

1717

5252

2020

5353

1616

4040

22

99

1111

5858

7272

114114

8989

7474

6969

106106

5656

106106

8282

118118

9292

9393

8282

9292

8282

6161

113113

7777

6868

5151

110110

118118

109109

8989

137137

6262

7878

6161

6868

103103

9494

9999

100100

101101

9898

100100

9191

107107

9999

100100

9898

102102

9898

100100

103103

9595

9898

100100

102102

9898

100100

8383

106106

9797

100100

9797

102102

9898

9999

5454

4343

8989

7171

9292

9292

118118

9595

4040

7979

113113

88

114114

100100

106106

4444

3737

9797

6060

107107

9999

110110

8787

3535

7777

103103

7373

111111

9292

102102

6969

5959

8181

6565

121121

4747

6363

8686

5050

3838

5252

7979

6464

7474

7575

5353

5151

6969

4646

107107

4242

5050

8282

3232

66

4141

6464

3232

4747

4141

Growth of Index of Agricultural Yields in Transition Countries (100 in first year of reform)

CountryCountry Average agricultural Average agricultural yield after 5 years of yield after 5 years of transitiontransition

Average agricultural Average agricultural yield after 10 years of yield after 10 years of transitiontransition

Czech Rep.Czech Rep.

HungaryHungary

PolandPoland

SlovakiaSlovakia

AlbaniaAlbania

BulgariaBulgaria

RomaniaRomania

SloveniaSlovenia

EstoniaEstonia

LatviaLatvia

LithuaniaLithuania

BelarusBelarus

MoldovaMoldova

RussiaRussia

UkraineUkraine

96.396.3

79.779.7

87.387.3

92.392.3

94.094.0

68.768.7

100.7100.7

NaNa

86.086.0

82.782.7

80.780.7

72.372.3

NaNa

72.372.3

78.378.3

115.3115.3

98.098.0

100.0100.0

107.3107.3

100.0100.0

75.775.7

102.7102.7

NaNa

100.3100.3

103.7103.7

91.391.3

75.375.3

NaNa

74.774.7

71.071.0

Thank you for your attention

Documents

Slovak Transition from Communism to Capitalism Jan Pokrivcak SAU Nitra, Slovakia [email protected]