SI 84 Altman Foundation 060113

CASE: SI-84

DATE: 02/14/06 (REV’D 09/12/07)

Lecturer Laura Arrillaga-Andreessen and Victoria Chang prepared this case as the basis for class discussion rather than to illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of an administrative situation. The Stanford Graduate School of Business gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Giving 2.0 (giving2.com) in the development of this case. Copyright © 2013 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University. Publically available free cases are distributed through ecch.com. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, used in a spreadsheet, or transmitted in any form or by any means –– electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise –– without permission of the Stanford Graduate School of Business. Every effort has been made to respect copyright and to contact copyright holders as appropriate. If you are a copyright holder and have concerns, please contact the Case Writing Office at [email protected] or write to the Case Writing Office, Stanford Graduate School of Business, Knight Management Center, 655 Knight Way, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305-5015.

ALTMAN FOUNDATION

The Altman Foundation was founded in 1913, in accordance with Benjamin Altman’s will that it would operate “for the benefit of … charitable and educational institutions in the City of New York.”1 The foundation’s assets came from Altman’s bequest of his capital stock in the department store B. Altman & Co. Despite the eventual demise of B. Altman & Co, the proceeds from the store’s sale in 1985 ensured that the foundation would continue to perpetuate Benjamin Altman’s vision and dedication to the people of New York City. By 2005, the foundation’s assets had increased to over $250 million, the number of annual grants had grown to 155, and the organization had expanded to nine staff members. The Altman Foundation’s growth in assets triggered several strategic and operational shifts. Following the sale of the store, the foundation delineated its program areas for the first time, while honoring Altman’s original areas of concern: social welfare (now termed strengthening communities), health care, education, and arts and culture. In 1996, a new president, Jane O’Connell, instituted an emphasis on strategic grantmaking, as well as a more diversified approach to financial management. A strategic plan in 2001 further unified and energized the foundation’s board members and staff. As O’Connell and her team reviewed the foundation’s history in 2005, they considered the key factors that had prompted the organization’s strategic evolution.

1 The Altman Foundation, “Foundation History,” http://www.altmanfoundation.org/history.html (July 24, 2006).

Altman Foundation SI-84

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THE EARLY YEARS (1913-1984)

B. Altman & Co. was started in 1865 by Benjamin Altman, the son of a milliner who built his small store into an internationally known retailer of fine furniture, clothing, silks, and carpets. Benjamin Altman created the Altman Foundation shortly before his death in 1913 in order to devote the profits from his retail business to support nonprofits in New York City. Until 1984, the Altman Foundation operated the Manhattan department store, B. Altman & Co. and its six branches outside Manhattan while distributing a total of $24 million to 600 New York organizations and programs. For more than 70 years, the foundation’s trustees gave the largest percentage of funds to local hospitals and universities and to the three large federations that represented Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish charities around the city. O’Connell elaborated:

The charitable part of the foundation was significant in that it all went mostly to New York City, but it was on a very different scale. At that time, the amount donated was based on the foundation’s yearly vote to give ‘X’ number of dollars from the net of the retail business…. The money they gave away fluctuated year-to-year depending on the profitability of the corporation/department store. Traditionally, retail businesses are not high yield businesses, so it was never huge amounts of money. Basically, between 1913 and 1985, not a lot in the foundation’s giving philosophy changed.2

During the early years, the seven to nine board members met six times per year, and annual grantmaking typically totaled no more than $800,000. Board members generally received a list of recommended grants at each meeting that had been generated by the secretary of the foundation. The list of potential grantees came from “board member connections” or “letters written to the foundation,” according to O’Connell, who explained the post-1979 process: “The grantmaking process wasn’t casual—there was some forethought—but the process certainly wasn’t strategic. The list was mostly what came into the door, and someone would plow through it and decide that some were worth consideration and others were not.” Grantmaking decisions were made by majority board vote, and there was seldom any disagreement. Over the years, many of the foundation’s grantees had been supported through long-term commitments, which led to a certain degree of familiarity: “It wasn’t quite as casual as one might think,” said O’Connell. “Repeat grantees often came in the office and made presentations to some of the board members, so there was a lot of personal contact. We made grants thoughtfully but not particularly strategically or with any particular structure. A review of the foundation’s earliest grantmaking, undertaken in preparation for the foundation’s 90th anniversary in 2003, highlighted over 20 nonprofits that were current grantees but had also received funding during the foundation’s first decade of existence. Approaches to issues had changed and become more strategic, but the organizations’ underlying strengths had allowed them to adapt and remain relevant.” THE LATER YEARS (BEYOND 1984)

2 All quotations from representatives of the Altman Foundation are from interviews by the authors unless otherwise cited.


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A Larger Altman Foundation

The situation for B. Altman & Co. changed in the mid-1980s when a combination of federal law and pressure from the New York State Attorney General’s office forced the foundation to divest itself of the retail business. The Federal Tax Reform Act of 1969 required the foundation to divest “excess” business holdings—approximately 50 percent of its stock. According to The New York Times, “The law was enacted to tighten controls over foundations after some philanthropies had been accused of abusing their tax-exempt statuses.”3 Moreover, in 1983, the New York State Attorney General’s office had begun examining the Altman Foundation’s record of giving and concluded that the foundation should have been able to donate more funds, given its financial situation. John Burke, president of the foundation and chairman of the retail business at the time, felt that the retail store could have given more had it had lower costs, but not without harming the store’s customer service and reputation.4 Nevertheless, as a result of tax laws and other concerns, the Altman Foundation sold the company in 1985 to B.A. Realty Associates for approximately $100 million (the foundation netted $86 million). The sale of the department store at 34th and Fifth Avenue in 1985 marked the end of an era for generations of New Yorkers, but it brought about a new future for the foundation with a significant growth in assets to further Benjamin Altman’s legacy. During the first half of the decade, the foundation had donated approximately $800,000 annually to various New York charities and programs, and the foundation’s total assets had consisted of around $7 million. With an additional $86 million from the sale, the Altman Foundation became the second-largest philanthropy in New York devoted to meeting the City’s needs and planned to donate $5 to $6 million per year.5 At the time of the sale of B. Altman, the foundation changed its style of grantmaking. “It would have been easy to maintain our old pattern of giving to worthwhile institutions and multiply the grants by seven, but instead we decided to make grants as well in new areas,” said John S. Burke, the foundation’s president.6 The existing board hired Paul N. Ylvisaker, a professor of education and foundation management at Harvard University, to provide a report proposing new grantmaking options. “Up until 1985, although most of the giving had been within four areas, no one had articulated the focus areas,” noted O’Connell. “Paul Ylvisaker created the foundation’s first guiding document, based on interviews with the board, and provided recommendations on governance issues.” Prior to the sale of B. Altman, the board included John S. Burke’s brother, Thomas C. Burke, a lawyer; his sister, Jane B. O’Connell, an educator; and three businesspeople who had a long history with the family.7 Ylvisaker advised diversifying and growing the board and adding board members with experience in the nonprofit sector and New York philanthropy. He also recommended developing a “Trustee Committee” and dividing the financial portfolio among several investment advisors, although it was not until nearly a decade later that the foundation diversified its investment advisors, under the recommendation of another consultant, Margaret Mahoney.

3 Kathleen Teltsch, “Charity Law May Force Sale of Altman’s Store,” The New York Times, May 13, 1984. 4 Ibid. 5 The largest was the New York Community Trust, with $370 million in assets. 6 Kathleen Teltsch, “Stores’ Sale is Bonanza for Altman Foundation,” The New York Times, October 20, 1985. 7 Kathleen Teltsch, “Sale of Altman Chain Widens Foundation’s Scope,” The New York Times, December 30, 1984.


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Ylvisaker additionally advised immediate publishing of annual reports and guidelines for applicants (similarly, the foundation did not institute annual reporting until 1996).8 After a six month search, the foundation named Paul B. Mott as its first director in October of 1985. Mott, who was 55 at the time, had previously served as director of a group of philanthropies established by the William S. Beinecke family. He hoped to expand the Altman Foundation’s focus to include increasing employment opportunities for the homeless and disenfranchised. After Mott joined the foundation, he started putting together a staff and in 1986 hired Karen Rosa, then a consultant at the Rockefeller Foundation, as associate director. According to Rosa, “Paul Mott worked with Paul Ylvisaker’s report, spoke with the board members, and established the first set of guidelines and grantmaking focus areas, which are not very different from what we do today. Mapping out these areas was a major shift for the foundation.” O’Connell added, “Until 1985, the foundation had no staff. It used some bookkeeping services, but there were not permanent staff. The foundation basically ran out of a shoebox. The bookkeeper kept all the records for the foundation on 4x6 index cards.” During its first two years after the sale of B. Altman, the foundation donated $2.7 million and $4.2 million respectively. Rosa summarized the time period following the sale of B. Altman: “The money increased during that time, and we developed a lot of wonderful relationships with grantees. Someone once said the great thing about making all your grants in one city is that you can put your arms around your grantees.” In 1987, Mott left the foundation, and Rosa remained as associate director, becoming executive director in 1991 and acquiring the title of vice president in 1994. The foundation added a program associate in 1989. “It took us a while to add another staff member, but it became just too difficult to get the money out the door without more help,” said Rosa. During the initial years after 1986, Rosa presented every single grant proposal to the board because there was not a large quantity of proposals. “But once we got larger, our poor board members were looking at 35 full proposals at every meeting, and we were drowning them in paper.” At that point, Rosa and the foundation collected “final reports” related to grantees and made site visits to all the grantees. “Starting in 1986, we visited every single grantee that we funded; we still do,” she said. After the program associate left at the end of 1993, the foundation in early 1994 hired its first program officer, Nina Mogilnik, who eventually became a senior program officer, and added a second program officer, Kate Liebman, in 1997. Rosa labeled grantmaking at that time as “reactive” and not “strategic”:

We were different from the Rockefeller Foundation, for example, where grants were decided through white papers and research and strategy. Here strategy was more a grant-by-grant process. The program staff certainly had an idea of what we were trying to accomplish, but we were not doing strategic grantmaking in the sense that board members were stating where they wanted the foundation to go, how we were going to evaluate grantees, etc. We were handling everything on a grant-by-grant basis from grantmaking to write-ups to discussions. Our board meetings were quite packed, and we didn’t have much time for discussion of larger issues.

8 Paul N. Ylvisaker, “Future Shape and Directions,” Report to the Board of Trustees, December 5, 1984.


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Despite the foundation’s lack of strategic processes, Rosa provided an example of how responsive grantmaking enabled the foundation to assess and respond to community needs:

Even though we were reactive, we still were able to effect change based on information we collected from our grantees. For example, in 1992, we were funding work related to pediatric AIDS. We had a grantee who asked us if we were willing to look at a different area because he was starting to get his pediatric AIDS work funded through another source. He proposed the issue of asthma in New York City. He saw that families in his hospital’s clinic population were bringing children having asthma attacks into the emergency room, which was an inefficient, expensive, and ineffective way to handle the disease; whereas private-practice patients were handled with continuity of care through their primary care providers and rarely ended up in the emergency room. This doctor proposed educating families about asthma and treatments and developing a new model of care for clinic patients with asthma. Within two weeks, we received two other proposals on the same topic. Having been prompted by what we were hearing, we did some research and ended up funding three proposals, each in a different area of the city and each proposing a different model of care for a similar population. Now, three programs does not an initiative make, but it was a way, for a foundation that really didn’t operate in a strategic way, to have an early impact in one small area.

During the period between 1986 and 1995, Rosa primarily focused on grantmaking. In terms of asset management and the portfolio, Thomas Burke provided overall supervision of the newly acquired funds. O’Connell said, “In terms of asset management, the board would vote on the financial reports and ask a few questions if they felt that they weren’t making enough return on the foundation’s investment, but the board wasn’t fully involved in asset management.”

A NEW PRESIDENT AND A NEW ORGANIZATION

In 1995, the foundation elected a new president, Jane O’Connell, who embraced the idea of strategic philanthropy and focused more attention on asset management. She recalled, “Given the growth in the foundation’s assets between 1985 and 1995, it would have seemed that the board was doing something right, but I felt that the process wasn’t particularly professional or modern. I felt that this kind of management was going to be a problem going forward for all organizations beyond our own foundation, which actually turned out to be true.” When O’Connell, a trustee since 1979, assumed the presidency, she articulated two goals: (1) to make grantmaking strategic and (2) to broaden the responsibility of financial management. “I wanted to take a very hard and close look at what we were investing our assets in, even though the foundation had done so well in the past. Thus my goals weren’t criticisms so much as governance issues,” she said. As part of the transformation process, in 1996, O’Connell and the foundation hired Margaret Mahoney as a consultant to lead the foundation through its planning process. O’Connell noted, “I don’t think the board ever looked at the Mahoney process as a strategic plan, per se, but rather as a formative moment in the foundation’s development when a new president [O’Connell] came on board.” Mahoney, the retired longtime president of the Commonwealth Fund, owned her own consulting business that focused on nonprofits. Mahoney worked with the foundation for nearly a


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year to write a mission statement. O’Connell recalled, “This was not an easy process because some of our board members were very reluctant, but we knew Margaret Mahoney had the skill and personality to draw people out, and she earned the respect of the board members. But it was badly needed. This is basically the same mission statement we use today.” Part of the proposed mission statement read:

…. Since its earliest days, the foundation has reflected Mr. Altman’s own philanthropic concern for social service, healthcare, educational and cultural institutions, and organizations within the City of New York. In carrying out its mission, the Altman Foundation seeks to strengthen communities and enhance the well-being of all New Yorkers. The foundation’s grants support programs and institutions that enrich the quality of life in the city, with a particular interest in initiatives that help individuals, families, and communities benefit from the services and opportunities that will enable them to achieve their full potential.9

Beyond the mission statement, Mahoney focused on governance and, as a result of her efforts, the foundation revised the financial management structure and process. A key recommendation was the development of a finance committee that would “help the board develop its policy role in selecting investment managers and reviewing their performance.”10 “We shouldn’t have had all of our eggs in one basket in terms of having one person manage the foundation’s finances, but Thomas Burke did a wonderful job,” said O’Connell. Although existing grantmaking guidelines did not change much, Mahoney did encourage the foundation to publish an annual report. Rosa explained, “Our former president had not wanted to publish an annual report because he felt that we would be tooting our own horn and opening ourselves up to an infinite number of proposals. Agreeing with us that promoting our grantees’ work was a positive step, Margaret Mahoney encouraged the idea of publishing an annual report, which our new president, Jane O’Connell, had really wanted to do.” O’Connell said, “In my past, I had written a zillion proposals to raise money for various organizations, so I felt very strongly about transparency in terms of a foundation’s mission and grantmaking guidelines. My intuition was that if we were clear about our strategy and what we do as a foundation, we would receive fewer proposals, not more proposals, and that turned out to be right. We not only received fewer proposals, but we funded more of the proposals that we did receive.” Mahoney also promoted the idea that grantmaking should be at a higher strategic level, not determined on a grant-by-grant basis.

A SECOND STRATEGIC PLAN: 2001

After the first strategic plan transformed the foundation, the organization embarked on another strategic plan in 2001. “The 2001 strategic plan was really the result of all the work stemming from our initial engagement with Margaret Mahoney,” said Rosa. The 2001 strategic plan efforts began prior to September 11th. According to Rosa, “We had around $260 million before September 11th. We thought we were going to have that amount and more for many years to come.” O’Connell elaborated: “We felt strongly that we didn’t want to grant the extra money 9 Margaret Mahoney, “Taking Stock,” June 5, 1996, p. 1. 10 Ibid., p. 9.


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that we had in the same way as we had in the past, thus we engaged in another strategic planning process. We had implemented a lot of Margaret Mahoney’s recommendations, but we hadn’t incorporated her process to the extent that we wanted to.” As part of the strategic planning process, Rosa and O’Connell spent the summer of 2001 interviewing other foundations about their strategies and processes. They also hired a consultant, Denise Cavanaugh, to lead a retreat for the foundation trustees and staff. O’Connell commented:

Even though Margaret Mahoney’s study brought about changes, we had never spent a bulk of time discussing her suggestions with the board, except during her final report and presentation. And the staff was not part of that process, except for Karen Rosa, so we decided to initiate a strategic planning process that involved everyone. At that point, there was a bit of a disconnect between the staff and the board in that the staff had the grant proposals and the grants in their heads and lived with the grants on a daily basis, but the board members didn’t and often asked, ‘Why are we doing this?’ We were not very good at putting together materials in a way that was helpful to the board members.

Part of the problem, according to Rosa, was the lack of time during board meetings (two hours per board meeting). As a result of time constraints, meetings focused on transactions such as financial assessment and grant approvals. “We didn’t have time to talk about policy or strategy,” said Rosa. The board retreat was “only the beginning,” according to Rosa. “Everyone came together and shared their concerns. We talked about the mission and processes. At the end of the retreat, it was clear that this was the beginning of a much longer process,” she said. The retreat inspired O’Connell and the foundation to hire a local consultant, The Conservation Company (TCC Group), to help develop a strategic plan. Rosa said, “We couldn’t do this on our own. We also wanted the credibility of a group like TCC.” Beginning in 2002, TCC met with board members and staff, surveyed grantees over the previous three years, and held focus groups with and interviewed grantees and other experts in the area in which the foundation made grants. The Altman Foundation learned much from TCC’s study. Rosa explained:

The situational analysis showed that Altman grantees see the foundation as a ‘steady, reliable partner that is willing to take a chance on an organization or an idea without being too prescriptive in its approach…’. Participants praised our flexibility and responsiveness but expressed concern that the breadth of our grantmaking kept us from being as fully effective as possible. They valued our not chasing the latest trends in grantmaking, but they also encouraged us to be more proactive and more visible in a select group of areas. Recommendations from the field included increasing funding for capacity building (including general support) and for advocacy, and continuing support for partnerships, collaborations, and ‘matchmaking’ among grantees and other funders.”11

11 The Altman Foundation, “Annual Report,” 2002, p. 7.


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The strategic plan included a mission statement, values, and operating principles, as well as new program guidelines, all of which remained largely the same in 2005. Despite the foundation’s progress, September 11th 2001 hampered its strategic planning implementation efforts. The foundation’s endowment decreased in value (from $254 million in 2000 to $236 million in 2001 to $205 million in 2002) in spite of the initial financial asset planning and diversification from the first strategic planning effort. However, concerned about the city’s nonprofits, the foundation’s trustees chose to maintain the same amount of funding rather than lowering the absolute amount by maintaining a 5 percent giving rate. After September 11th, the foundation’s giving percentage increased from 5-5.5 percent to 6-7 percent. Rosa said, “Our endowment amount has since come back to $250 million. In fact, our strategic planning process had become even more important when our endowment decreased, which is humorous because we started the whole process to receive guidance on new strategic initiatives with our extra money.” O’Connell said, “Our established grantmaking guidelines really helped us after September 11th because we could strategically make cuts versus cutting grants without a proper rationale.” As a result of its strategic planning efforts, the foundation shifted its usual six grantmaking review meetings to four grantmaking meetings and two broader policy meetings, in which participants only discussed key strategic and policy issues. The grantmaking meetings shifted from “transactional dockets” to discussion forums around thematic issues such as “literacy” or strategic issues such as “leveraging.” In addition, renewal grants went through a streamlined approval process called a “consent agenda.” Renewals under $35,000 were streamlined even further and were simply described in a short paragraph by foundation staff, which the board used to vote on, versus an entire proposal. The foundation staff also used the strategic plan during their weekly staff meetings and referred to the plan while assessing incoming proposals and assessing existing grants on an informal basis. Furthermore, the foundation decided to strengthen its finance committee. In December of 2003, the board invited two distinguished and experienced members of the financial community to join in the foundation’s work as non-board members of the finance committee. As part of its ongoing efforts, the foundation reviewed its strategic plan during its fall 2005 board meeting to determine whether the foundation had been achieving the plan’s objectives. The board members looked at grantees, number of grants, and amount of funding to determine whether such efforts were aligned with the foundation’s overall strategy. “We actually revisited the strategic plan,” said Rosa. “We didn’t want to put it on a shelf and never look at it again.”

OTHER OUTCOMES OF STRATEGIC PLANNING: ASSESSMENT AND COLLABORATION

Through its informal grant assessments, the foundation staff singled out one particular grantee that embodied the foundation’s overall strategy: the Literacy Assistance Center. According to Rosa:

Education is really important to the Altman Foundation, but as we looked at our strategic goals, we realized that underlying education is literacy. As a result, we’ve been working in the areas of reading, writing, health, and economic literacy. Benjamin Altman was concerned with education and self-sufficiency. In


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today’s world, we’ve translated that to mean giving people the tools to navigate systems and take advantage of opportunities.

Another outcome of the strategic planning exercise and process was “bundling some of our grantmaking,” said Rosa. “We don’t necessarily conduct a whole study like the Ford Foundation might, but we begin to see patterns in proposals that we receive, and we investigate these concepts further. We have been able to pull together other funders and have a real impact on particular areas,” she added. One example of the Altman Foundation’s collaborative efforts was labeled “Library Connections.” Rosa explained:

We receive many proposals from Catholic elementary schools because we don’t fund public schools—we focus on inner-city non-public and independent schools. We really wanted to do something broader than working with each of these individual small schools, though. We received a proposal from a small school in Harlem for $10,000 to create a library, but we didn’t fund libraries at that time. We realized that we really didn’t know anything about libraries in inner-city schools, so we called up a colleague who did a ‘quick-and-dirty’ survey and told us this was a very needy area. We decided to fund research that revealed that across 118 inner-city Catholic elementary schools, there was only one full-time Master’s-level librarian, which just floored us.

As a result of its initial research, the foundation funded a $40,000 planning process to develop a program to roll out effective libraries in inner-city Catholic schools. The foundation then brought together a group of additional funders, raising $4.5 million (including $1.5 million from Altman itself) towards the project. By late 2005, the project had launched in 32 schools. In addition, because of the magnitude of the project, the Altman Foundation hired a consultant to conduct an evaluation of the project from the outset in order to provide funders and other stakeholders with ongoing information. Rosa said, “The results of this project have been stupendous. This project is an example of building connections, leveraging our resources, being more strategic in our grantmaking, and making a concrete impact.” Because the foundation had a lean staff and a large quantity of grants, in 2004, the foundation hired its first intern who had recently graduated from college to assist with all aspects of the foundation, from the administrative to grantmaking work. The intern initially focused on reviewing reports, visiting sites with program officers, and conducting interim site visits. Rosa said, “By the end of the year, our intern had her own portfolio of renewals. She did such a great job, we kept her for a second year, and next year she is going to graduate school. This worked so well that we decided to create a two-year intern rotation, and our new intern just started in November 2005. These are bright, young, and enthusiastic people who bring new voices into the field—it’s a way we can help diversify philanthropy.” Interns were paid a starting-job salary and benefits. O’Connell added, “This intern model is a great model that we think other foundations could adopt.”


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THE FUTURE

By 2005, O’Connell and her team had not only maintained Altman’s original philanthropic wishes but also had reinvigorated the foundation to reflect changing community needs. In the future, they hoped to develop a broader research and evaluation strategy that would heighten learning opportunities related to the foundation’s mission, organization, processes, and approach to communications. They also planned to maintain a focus on the foundation’s four program areas while deepening its work in family and health literacy, professional development in the inner city Catholic high schools, and palliative care. Based on feedback from the foundation’s stakeholders, the overall goal was not to chase the latest trends in grantmaking but to be more proactive and visible in a few select areas. The shift to a more strategic orientation had been demanding, and it would continue to present the organization with new challenges. Yet, O’Connell and her team were energized by their progress and committed to the foundation’s continued evolution.

ASSIGNMENT QUESTIONS

1. What factors enabled the Altman Foundation’s shift toward a more strategic orientation? What aspects of the Altman Foundation’s practice could a smaller foundation with fewer financial and human resources apply to its own strategy and operations?

2. The Altman Foundation’s ability to respond to changing community needs in New York City

stemmed in part from its broad founding purpose, to operate for “the benefit of…charitable and educational institutions in the City of New York.” Discuss the costs and benefits of the foundation’s decision to become more active in selected areas of focus.

3. As the Altman Foundation seeks to deepen its work in the areas of family and health literacy,

professional development in inner city Catholic high schools and palliative care, what steps should it take to increase its opportunities for learning and knowledge sharing?


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Exhibit 1 Trustees (Board Members) and Staff (2006)

TRUSTEES

Jane B. O’Connell President

John W. Townsend Vice President

Julia V. Shea Secretary

Sharon B. King Assistant Secretary

James M. Burke Bernard Finkelstein

Maurice A. Selinger, Jr. Patricia J. Volland

Thomas C. Burke Trustee Emeritus

Wilfred A. Finnegan Peter Nadosy

Non-Trustee members, Finance Committee

STAFF

Karen L. Rosa Vice President & Executive Director

John P. Casey Treasurer

Anna M. Johnson, Grants Manager Justine Koch, Accountant

Kate Liebman, Program Officer Nina B. Mogilnik, Senior Program Officer

Jason Nino, Intern Roshni Parikh, Intern

Doriann Sama, Administrative Assistant


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Source: The Altman Foundation, “Trustees and Staff,” http://www.altmanfoundation.org/trustaff.html (July 24, 2006).


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Exhibit 2 Mission, Values, and Operating Principles (2006)

Mission

To support programs and institutions that enrich the quality of life in New York City, with a particular focus on initiatives that help individuals, families and communities benefit from the services and opportunities that will enable them to achieve their full potential. Values

• The foundation seeks to increase meaningful access for New Yorkers to quality programs, institutions and resources, both public and private.

• The foundation is interested in encouraging system-wide improvement and change while at the same time maintaining its tradition of direct service and the opportunity to test models in action.

• The foundation prefers to support preventive and early intervention strategies.

• The foundation supports efforts that help New Yorkers build and preserve self-sufficiency.

• The foundation encourages innovation and funds programs and organizations that offer high-quality services based on best practices in their field and that exercise systematic efforts to track credible and meaningful outcomes.

• The foundation has a particular interest in supporting programs that serve disadvantaged children and youth, immigrants, and the elderly, among other vulnerable populations, across all program areas.

Operating Principles • The foundation seeks to promote connections among organizations doing complementary

work, including nonprofits, government agencies, foundations, and for-profit entities, in order to advance best practices and build knowledge within a given field.

• The foundation seeks to leverage its limited resources by investing in issues, programs, or initiatives that have the potential to attract other funding sources, both public and private.

• The foundation will allocate limited grant dollars to: o targeted capacity-building efforts that strengthen the ability of organizations to

deliver high-quality services within the foundation's key program areas; and o strategic policy, advocacy, and applied research initiatives that advance the

foundation's grantmaking priorities. • The foundation will consider support for key umbrella organizations that advance the

ability of community-based agencies to address critical issues in the foundation's priority areas.

Source: The Altman Foundation, Program Guidelines, http://www.altmanfoundation.org/guide.html#values (July 24, 2006).


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Exhibit 3 Sample Grants in 2004

Education ($4,060,000):

1. Arthur Ashe Institute for Urban Health, Inc., $40,000: To build the capacity of the Health Services Academy for minority youth and young adults.

2. Bank Street College of Education, $300,000 (over two years): To help support the Institute for Leadership, Excellence and Academic Development (I-LEAD) for talented students from inner-city Catholic high schools.

3. Xavier High School, $100,000 (over two years): To help build Xavier’s scholarship endowment for financially disadvantaged young men from underserved communities.

Health ($1,934,000):

1. The Children’s Aid Society, $74,500: To renew support for the Enhancing New York’s Facilitated Enrollment Initiative, a citywide effort to strengthen community-based enrollment in public health insurance.

2. The New York Immigration Coalition, Inc., $70,000: To help support the Immigrant Health Outreach Project.

3. UJA-Federation of Jewish Philanthropies of New York, Inc., $300,000 (over two years): To help support the Regional Care Center of New York City, part of the Jewish Healing and Hospice Partnership.

Strengthening Communities ($2,325,000):

1. BrooklynWoods, Inc., $25,000: To renew support for this job training and placement program in the custom woodworking industry.

2. City Parks Foundation, Inc., $100,000: To enhance Catalyst for Neighborhood Parks by increasing the initiative’s capacity to provide technical assistance and evaluate its work.

Arts & Culture ($1,253,000)

1. Figure Skating in Harlem, Inc., $25,000: To renew support for the sports program and academic program.

2. Jazz at Lincoln Center, Inc., $18,000: For a planning grant to develop a pre-professional instrumental jazz instruction program for underserved youth.

3. Queens Theatre in the Park, Inc., $25,000: To help expand access to the arts for underserved Latino and Black communities in Queens.

Services to Not-for-Profit Organizations ($653,300)

1. NPower NY, Inc, $121,000: To renew support for services aiding nonprofits in the effective use of information technology.

2. United Neighborhood Houses of New York, Inc., $96,000: To support planning and implementation of the Professional Development Program for Middle Managers in partnership with the Institute for Not-for-Profit Management at Columbia University.

Source: The Altman Foundation, “Grants Authorized 2004,” http://www.altmanfoundation.org/grantlist04.pdf (July 24, 2006).


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Exhibit 4 Evolution of Grantmaking Guidelines and Strategic Plan

1986

1. Education: Projects that identify, tutor and sponsor talented, underprivileged youth and assist them in obtaining a quality education.

2. Hospitals and Health Centers: Projects of private, voluntary hospitals and health centers that extend medical services to those who lack adequate health care.

3. Artistic and Cultural Institutions: Projects that extend the benefits of major artistic and cultural institutions to those who could not otherwise enjoy them.

4. Social Welfare: Programs that suggest creative, workable, long-term solutions for the needs of the disadvantaged.

2005

EDUCATION – Goal: Given the importance of education in building strong individuals, families, communities and the city as a whole, and the primacy of literacy in enabling people to succeed, the foundation seeks to (1) increase access for disadvantaged children and youth to high-quality academic opportunities, and (2) promote excellence in education for disadvantaged children and youth in non-public in-school, after-school and early childhood settings, with a specific emphasis on expanding and enhancing the availability of high-quality education programs that nurture cognitive, social, and emotional development. With finite resources to commit to achieving these objectives, the foundation seeks, to the greatest extent possible, to maximize its impact by focusing on system-wide initiatives.

Objective 1: To increase access for disadvantaged children and youth to high-quality academic opportunities.

Strategies: • Give promising students access to education in independent and other academically

challenging schools through enrichment and placement programs; and • Strengthen superior non-public schools with a demonstrated commitment to enrolling,

supporting and successfully graduating disadvantaged students by providing targeted endowment support.

Objective 2: To promote excellence in education for disadvantaged children and youth in non-public in-school, after-school, early childhood and other settings, with a particular emphasis on system-wide initiatives that expand and enhance the availability of high-quality programs that nurture cognitive, social, and emotional development.

Strategies: • Improve the caliber and diversity of faculty and staff;

• Improve educational outcomes by enriching and enhancing programming and/or resources;

• Promote and support the involvement of parents in their children's education; and


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• Support the development and expansion of effective family literacy models. HEALTH – Goal:

Recognizing the critical role of quality and accessible health and mental health care in the well-being of individuals, families, communities, and the city as a whole, the foundation seeks to (1) promote access to care for underserved and/or uninsured populations; (2) increase the capacity of New Yorkers to be active and educated health care consumers; and (3) promote the development and delivery of new approaches to quality and responsive care for the most vulnerable populations.

Objective 1: To promote access to care for underserved and/or uninsured populations. Strategies:

• Encourage efforts to enroll New Yorkers in existing public and/or publicly subsidized insurance programs;

• Develop creative solutions to the problems of the uninsured; and • Support programs that seek to eliminate language, cultural, physical, financial and

systemic barriers to care. Objective 2: To increase the capacity of New Yorkers to be active and educated health care consumers who are able to make informed choices about their own health and effective use of the health care system.

Strategy: • Support programs that promote outreach, health education, and service linkage, with a

particular focus on primary, preventive, and other non-disease-specific services. Objective 3: To promote the development and delivery of quality and responsive care for the most vulnerable populations. Strategy:

• Support new approaches to non-disease-specific services, such as palliative care and family caregiving, through the creation and demonstration of models and the training of practitioners.

STRENGTHENING COMMUNITIES – Goal:

The foundation has an historic interest in ensuring that individuals and families living in the city have access to the services and resources they need to pursue and sustain successful lives. The foundation has chosen to focus on efforts that (1) build and preserve economic security and independence among low-income individuals and families; and (2) promote and sustain the availability of, and equitable access to, essential community resources needed to support stable, healthy communities.

Objective 1: To build and preserve economic security and independence among low-income individuals and families.

Strategies: • Help low-income New Yorkers gain access to and retain jobs that lead to economic

independence through programs that can provide the combination of occupational,


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literacy, job placement, retention and other services individuals need to enter and remain in the job market successfully;

• Reinforce the efforts of individuals and families to move towards self-sufficiency by supporting advocacy and direct service efforts to promote access to available public benefits that complement work; and

• Support targeted efforts to build and/or preserve the independence of vulnerable populations, e.g., the elderly, in communities.

Objective 2: To promote and sustain the availability of, and equitable access to, essential community resources needed to support stable, healthy communities. Strategies:

• Provide targeted support for policy, advocacy, technical assistance and planning initiatives to build and preserve community infrastructure, including affordable housing and well-maintained parks and open spaces; and

• Support key umbrella organizations that advance the ability of community-based agencies to address critical issues and deliver high-quality programs.

ARTS & CULTURE – Goal:

The foundation has had a longstanding interest in the arts, reflecting not only Benjamin Altman's personal commitment, but also the foundation's recognition of the value of the arts in enriching the lives of New Yorkers and the city as a whole. In this program area, the foundation seeks (1) to promote positive youth development through arts and cultural programming; (2) to promote the acquisition of preprofessional arts skills among underserved youth; and (3) to promote access to the arts for underserved populations.

Objective 1: To promote positive youth development through arts and cultural programming. Strategy:

• Support programs in the out-of-school setting that recognize the effective role that arts and cultural programming can play in engaging children and young people and helping them master essential, developmentally appropriate skills.

Objective 2: To promote the acquisition of preprofessional arts skills among underserved youth.

Strategy: • Support programs that identify promising students from underserved communities and

provide them with the highest-quality preprofessional training in specific arts disciplines. Objective 3: To promote access to the arts for underserved populations.

Strategy: • Support programs that extend the benefits of the arts through established and meaningful

organizations and institutions committed to making their resources available to underserved populations.

Source: Compiled from http://www.altmanfoundation.org/guide.html#values and information provided by the Altman Foundation.

Documents

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