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Sequencing in Customs Union Formation: Theory and Application
to Eurasian Economic UnionGerald Pech
based on joint work with Aidos Alimbekov and Eldar Madumarov
Sequencing as a Problem
• Why do economic unions not form in one go?• Historical coincidence? – Eastern Europe• Evolving nature of union?• Increasing attractiveness over time
– could bring in a “strategic” motive behind the sequencing
A “Strategic” Explanation of Sequencing
• Aghion-Antras-Helpman, J Internat Econ (2007): “equilibrium sequencing”
• An “agenda setter/formateur” can form union at once or start with a core union
• Assume that forming the core union has a “negative externality” on an accession candidate
• It should be willing to join under conditions more favourable to the formateur
• Prediction: The country which is most negatively affected joins last
Kyrgyzstan’s delayed entry
• Signatory of the 1995 agreement – but not of the Dushanbe agreement 2007
• WTO member since 1998• April 2010: Bakiyev steps down• Atambaev wins election on promise of close
ties with Russia• Kyrgyzstan joins in 2015
Effect of Customs Union on Kyrgyzstan
• Re-import business and textile industry historically benefitted from low tariff regime
• Kyrgyzstan expected to be a net-loser from joining customs union
• But Kyrgyzstan also suffers negative external effects from core customs union
• Main industries equally hit by exclusion from integrating market
How to Explain Sequencing in Eurasian Customs Union
• So by joining Kyrgyzstan loses compared to status quo ante
• But once core customs union has formed joining is the least bad option
• So is the strategic sequencing model the best explanation of what happened with Kyrgyzstan’s entry?
A Historical Precedent: The Zollverein
• The German Customs Union (Zollverein) was founded in 1833 between independent German states
• Development that started at Prussia’s initiative in 1816
• And finally resulted in German nationhood
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The Zollverein: Hesse-Cassel
• In 1828, Hesse-Darmstadt joined Zollverein• Negative externalities on Hesse-Cassel
– through higher border-tariffs of neighbouring Darmstadt
– resulting in civil unrest– and fear of further loss of transit traffic
• Recalcitrant duke resigned in 1831, successor signed ratification documents
The Zollverein
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An Aside: Why Was Prussia Interested in Integration?
• Prussia did not benefit that much from trading with the smaller states
• But it a gained better bargaining position when negotiating over trade with big players such as England and France
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What is missing from the story
• As Alimbekov/Madumarov/Pech (2015) show, the AAH story either needs – myopic accession candidates– an exogenous constraint on bargaining institutions
which the agenda setter can choose from – bargaining frictions: it takes time to bargain
• Kyrgyzstan’s WTO membership makes negotiations more complicated
• Problems in negotiating with Bakiyev gvt’– better modelled as “political uncertainty?”
Richer Explanations
Some more facts
• Kyrgyzstan receives Russian infrastructure support
… some more facts
• New border facilities at Kazakh-Kyrgyz border– Making core customs union more credible and
costly?• Russia promises Kyrgyzstan help in securing its
outer border – suggests that desire to “incentivize” Kyrgyzstan to
invest into border controls could have played a role
An Imperfect Commitment Model of Accession
• Assume accession is irreversible• and accession candidate cannot credibly
promise to implement policies which are necessary to make union successful
• Like investing in border security• Sequencing solves the incentive problem:
Make accession conditional on investment
Supporting Materials
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Winners and Losers
• Economic welfare of a country is sum of– Consumer surplus– Tariff revenue– Profits of home producers– We assume that foreign firms have market power!
• As a proxy for impact of CU we use– change in current account balance – change consumer surplus of non numeraire good
• Political benefits and costs!www.geraldpech.net 18
Eurasian Customs Union
• 1995: First agreement signed between Belarus, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.– Uzbekistan not interested at the moment– Tajikistan only has land border with Kyrgyzstan
• 2007: Dushanbe agreement on customs union signed between BY, KZ and RU
• 2010: Official launch of CU with external tariff at (high) Russian rates– for some goods July 2010, for others July 2011
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Tariff Protection
simple average 2009
weighted average 2009
Kazakhstan 6.78% 5.52%
Belarus 8.00% 2.3%
Russia 8.09% 5.9%
EU 10.6% 7.37%
from: Jandasov/Sabyrova 2009
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Standard and non standard channels
Source: Vashakmadze, E., Kaminski, B., Mironova, Y., (2011).
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Standard and non standard channels
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• • where is the average value of the export index for country i
in the pre- and the post customs union period (t=1,2), CU is a dummy variable for customs union which takes the value 1 for the subsample starting in 2010, CDi is the country fixed effect and Ii is a dummy which is 1 if the country is a latecomer in the customs union (i.e. Tajikistan (TAD), Kyrgyzstan (KY) or Armenia(ARM)) and 0 if the country as of now is not expected to join the customs union (i.e. Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova).
0 1 72,..,6it s i is
EXP CU CD CU I
Dependent Variable: Method: Least Squares Date: 05/03/15 Time: 17:39 Sample: 1 12 Included observations: 12 =b0+ b1*CU+ b2*TAD+ b3*KY+ b4*ARM+ b5*MOL+ b6*AZ+ b7*(KY+TAD+ARM)*CU
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
b0 238.1018 96.99498 2.454785 0.0701b1 289.1980 96.99498 2.981577 0.0407b2 -166.0115 137.1716 -1.210246 0.2928b3 0.672807 137.1716 0.004905 0.9963b4 49.87698 137.1716 0.363610 0.7346b5 -179.2669 118.7941 -1.509056 0.2058b6 383.8645 118.7941 3.231343 0.0319b7 -235.6465 137.1716 -1.717896 0.1609
R-squared 0.921567 Mean dependent var 338.6452Adjusted R-squared 0.784308 S.D. dependent var 255.7868S.E. of regression 118.7941 Akaike info criterion 12.62738Sum squared resid 56448.15 Schwarz criterion 12.95065Log likelihood -67.76429 Hannan-Quinn criter. 12.50770F-statistic 6.714100 Durbin-Watson stat 2.690579Prob(F-statistic) 0.042389
itEXP
itEXP