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only one tenth of the prewar figure, and trains ran just once a week between the

major cities. The forcible requisition of extra food and the prohibition of trade did

not stimulate peasants to produce food beyond their needs. They did not sow much

grain. Thus, when drought came in 1921 it caused a famine that killed over a

million of peasants in Ukraine and the Volga region in Russia.

Dissatisfied with Bolshevik agrarian policy peasants rebelled in many

regions of Ukraine and Russia. There were strikes in Petrograd and even the

marines of the Kronshtadt fortress, the cradle of the Bolshevik revolution, staged

an uprising. Faced with such problems Vladimir Lenin in March 1921 introduced

the New Economic Policy (NEP), which denationalized small-scale industry and

trade and replaced grain requisitions with a tax that enabled the peasant to sell the

surplus of food on the free market. The policy of creating collective farms was also

abandoned. Reach peasants even got the right to hire poor peasants. Thus the NEP

included elements of a free-market economy. The results were quite good. By

1927, the Ukrainian economy had recovered to the prewar level.

Ukrainization

In 1923 the Bolsheviks announced the policy of indigenization, or korenizatsiia

(“putting down roots”). As the name implies the Bolsheviks wanted to ‘put down

roots’ (вкоренитись) in all Soviet republics.

The policy had three major tasks: 1) promotion of native languages in all

spheres of life; 2) fostering of national cultures; 3) recruitment of the party and

government cadres from the indigenous (local) populations to bind them to the

Soviet regime. The Bolsheviks did not want their party made up mainly of Jews

and Russians look foreign in Soviet republics. The Ukrainian version of this policy

was called Ukrainization. By korenizatsiia the Bolsheviks attempted to disarm the

forces of nationalism in Soviet republics. The new Communist regime tried to

show that in contrast to Tsarist Russia it respected the cultures of the non-Russians

in the USSR.

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In Ukraine, this program started a decade of rapid cultural flourishing.

Enrollments in Ukrainian-language schools and the publication of Ukrainian-

language books increased dramatically. Government officials who could not speak

Ukrainian were forced to attend language courses. If they did not want to learn

Ukrainian they could lose their jobs. A lot of various Ukrainian cultural

organizations were established.

The results of Ukrainization were really impressive. Whereas in 1922 only

20% of government business was conducted in Ukrainian, by 1927 the figure rose

to 70%. In 1923 only 35% of government employees and 23% of party members

were Ukrainian. By 1926-27 the respective percentages rose to 54% and 52%. In

1929, over 80% of schools and 30% of universities offered instruction in Ukrainian

only. By 1930, nearly 80% of all books published were in Ukrainian, and by 1931

nearly 90% of all newspapers were in Ukrainian.2 All radiobroadcast was in

Ukrainian only. The Ukrainian language stopped being primarily a village

language. It became a language of government and science.

The Communists widely used their achievements in cultural policy for

domestic and international propaganda. It was effective. Many Ukrainian political

emigrants decided to return to Ukraine (M. Hrushevsky and others). Thousands of

West Ukrainians also moved to Soviet Ukraine from Poland. Later, in the 1930s,

they were repressed.

The purpose of Ukrainization was to implant Soviet power. But there was a

side effect of this policy. Ukrainians started to hear their previously persecuted

national language in schools and in the workplace. Forbidden under the tsarist

regime courses in Ukrainian history, culture and literature were now taught in

schools and universities. A national revival began in Ukraine.

By the 1930s the Kremlin understood that korenizatisiia did not contribute to

the unity of the state as it developed different national identities in the USSR. The

growth of national consciousness in Soviet republics could lead in time to demands

2 It should be noted, however, that Ukrainian books did not dominate the republic’s book market, as three quarters of the books sold in the republic were published in Russia. Many Russian-language newspapers were also brought to

Ukraine from Russia.

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for economic and then political independence. The Soviet dictator Iosif Stalin

decided to use the old experience of Tsarist Russia and strengthen his totalitarian

empire through the promotion of a single culture. Such a culture was to be

common to all Soviet nations. The only common culture was Russian. So, since the

1930s till the end of the 1980s the Soviet nations had been experiencing a

favorable promotion of Russian culture at the expense of their own. Russification

in all republics reached gigantic proportions. The study of national histories,

languages, and literatures was severely limited. The communist government tried

to create a new people – the “Soviet people”, and Russian culture was to serve as

the basis for the development of this people. That explains why national cultures

and languages in the Soviet Union had not been paid proper attention since the

1930s. As a result of such a policy Ukraine gradually became heavily Russified

and the level of national consciousness significantly dropped.

Industrialization

When the Bolsheviks came to power in 1917 they believed that they had started arevolution which would soon spread all over the world. Thus all nations were

expected to build a new communist society together. By the end of the 1920s it

became apparent that the world revolution would not happen. The party declared a

new course aimed at “building socialism in a single country.” The Soviet

leadership wanted to create a powerful industrial base which would enable the

USSR to survive in a hostile capitalist environment. A strong industrial base was

also a necessary condition for creating an efficient army. Some historians believe

that the major aim of industrialization was militarization. The NEP helped the

Soviet Union reach the pre-war industrial level. But it was clear that the

communist state was lagging far behind major capitalist countries. New radical

reforms were needed to show the world the advantages of a new socialist society,

to prove that the revolution with its numerous sacrifices did not happen in vain.

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The NEP was also not good for the Bolsheviks since it created self-reliant

businessmen who were difficult to control.

The Soviet government under the leadership of Stalin, who by the end of

1920s had assumed dictatorial power, decided to build a powerful industry in a few

years at the expense of the Soviet people. The NEP policy was curtailed as it was

unable to solve this problem. All factories and plants were proclaimed the

“people’s property” and came under state control. A strictly centralized planned

economy was introduced. Five-Year Plans were implemented that determined

every detail of every branch of economic activity – production, trade, services,

prices, wages, costs. Every enterprise, and every worker, was given ‘norms’ that

were to be fulfilled without discussion. The workers were exploited harshly. They

had to work long hours (with one day-off on Sundays) and got very low wages.

The labor discipline was very strict. If a worker was late for work for three times

he could be accused of sabotage (‘вредительство’) and sent to the Gulag (forced

labor camps system). Many workers lived in barracks.3 Food and goods were

rationed (distributed through card system). Besides, millions of convicts in the

Gulag worked for free.

The reward for hard work and successful accomplishments was praise rather

than money. Various propagandistic techniques were used to arouse enthusiasm

among the workers. One of the most famous innovations was the so-called

‘socialist competition.’ Brigades of workers, factories, cities, and even republics

competed with each other. Outstanding workers were honored as “heroes of

socialist labor” and highly praised in newspapers and on the radio. Many workers

believed that sufferings were necessary and temporary. Stalin set the tone in his

famous 1931 speech: “We are behind the leading countries by 50-100 years. We

must make up this time in ten years”. Stalin also warned: “If in ten years we do not

cover the distance we will be crushed.”

3 The lucky ones lived in so-called communal apartments where each family occupied a single room. Families in

barracks used curtains to separate their beds from the others.

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There was also another thing that stimulated people to work enthusiastically.

The noble aim of building the “best society in the world” united many people and

gave meaning to their lives. Despite severe hardships many people really believed

they were happy (mostly because of an enormous impact of propaganda) and

helped each other in work. Collectives at factories and plants were like families for

many workers. Stalin was interested in the formation of collectivistic mentality

among Soviet people because individualistic mentality (typical of western

democracies) was not good for his totalitarian regime. People with collectivistic

mentality are easier to be manipulated because they believe that the government

must rule and give orders and instructions.

The achievements of industrialization were great. Eastern Ukraine was

turned onto a huge construction place. Hundreds of huge plants and factories

emerged within several years. The most impressive among them were such giants

as the Kharkiv tractor-building plant, the Kryvyi-Rih metallurgical plant

( Криворіжсталь), the Dnieper Hydroelectric Station or Дніпрогес (which was the

largest in Europe and became a symbol of industrialization), and others. In a

decade the USSR became the world’s second largest industrial power. Ukraine

became one of Europe’s most advanced industrial countries. The modernization of

industry stimulated the process of urbanization as well. Before the industrialization

every fifth Ukrainian lived in a city, after – every third. Ukrainian cities became

less Russified.

Industrialization had serious setbacks, however. Though the quantity of the

output was impressive, its quality was low. Moreover, heavy industry was

developed at the expense of light industry. Thus, the common people could not

find many kinds of necessary goods in shops. Their food was rationed. The

standard of living of the ordinary people was extremely low. In contrast, the living

standard of high-ranking party officials was high. They lived in large apartments,

received high salaries, and bought goods and food in special shops. They also often

had household servants. In fact they formed a special privileged class called the

apparatchiks or nomenklatura.

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Europe and especially the USA profited greatly from Soviet industrialization

in the time of world depression. In 1931, for example, the USSR purchased 30

percent of the world export of machinery and equipment for plants and factories; in

1932 – almost 50 percent. Some historians blame the West that its greed for money

helped raise the “communist monster.” Other historians say that the Soviet Union

by buying western industrial products helped western economies during hard times

of the world recession of the 1930s. Thanks to industrialization the USSR turned

from a country that imports machinery into a country that produces machinery. In

the 1930s the Soviet Union became one of a few countries capable of producing

any kind of industrial goods.

Collectivization and the famine of 1932-33

The ambitious industrialization program required a lot of money. Stalin decided to

get it mostly by exploiting the peasantry. With this aim the program of

collectivization was designed. Soviet plans for industrial expansion were based on

the assumption that the state would be able to buy grain cheaply from the peasants.Stalin planned to sell grain abroad to finance industrialization. But the prices the

state offered – often as little as one-eighth of the market price – were considered

too low by the peasants and they refused to sell their grain. Infuriated by this

“sabotage,” Stalin decided to put the peasants under total control through

collectivization and squeeze grain from them practically free of charge.

Wholesale collectivization began in 1929. Realizing that the wealthier

peasants (kulaks in Russian or kurkuls in Ukrainian) would resist collectivization

most bitterly, Stalin decided to liquidate them as a class. By liquidating the kulaks

Stalin also planned to deprive the peasants of their leaders and weaken their

resistance. Hundreds of thousands of kulaks were deprived of their property and

deported to forced labor camps in Siberia. As the kulaks were crushed, Stalin

launched his attack on the peasantry as a whole.

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The Famine of 1932-33

The famine that occurred in 1932-33 was a great tragedy in Ukrainian history. It

clearly shows an inhumane nature of the Stalinist regime. The famine was

completely artificial. The harvest of 1932 was only 12% below the 1926-30

average. In 1932 many trains loaded with grain crossed the Soviet Union’s state

borders as usual.

Many historians believe that Stalin made famine to put down mass resistance

to collectivization. For example, in the Ukrainian village in the period from

January till June 1930 over 1500 terrorist acts against Communist officials were

registered. In a number of oblasts armed revolts occurred. Historians calculated

that the number of rebels in the Ukrainian village exceeded 40 000 in 1930. Before

joining collective farms the peasants slaughtered 50% of their livestock. The

peasants who did not want to join a collective farm faced serious difficulties. They

were given poor land and were forced to pay high taxes. Some peasants were just

deported to Siberia for refusal to join a collective farm. Those who joined did not

show much enthusiasm to work for a symbolic reward. Their efficiency in

collecting the harvest which did not belong to them was low. The amount of

collected grain was declining year after year despite good weather conditions.4

Such ‘sabotage’ enraged Stalin who needed grain to finance the ambitious

industrialization program. The dictator decided to teach peasants a lesson by

famine.

In fact, all grain after 1932 harvest and all remaining food supplies were

taken from the peasants. The government needed grain not foodstuff (vegetables,

honey, nuts, dried fruits, etc) for export. Thus, it collected the foodstuff only to

punish the villagers. The result was the famine of 1932-33 that killed over three

million people.5 Lacking bread, peasants ate pets, rats, frogs, earthworms, bark,

and leaves. There were numerous cases of cannibalism. Whole regions died out.

4 According to some historians Stalin also believed that the peasants were hiding grain from the state.5 The most distinguished Ukrainian expert on the famine of 1932-33, historian S. Kulchytsky, calculated that the

direct losses of the famine were not more than 3, 5 million. The same figures are given by the famous Australiandemographer Stephen Wheatcroft and Ukraine’s Institute of Demography. Some politicians try to exaggerate the

number for political reasons and say that over 10 million died from the famine.

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Special police forces often blocked the areas with dying peasants preventing them

from leaving the place. The famine inflicted an incurable psychological trauma on

the peasants: they lost the will to fight for their rights. The peasants’ will and the

spirit of individualism were broken. In fact, they were turned into serfs. They did

not have the right to leave their villages without permission. They worked almost

for free. They lost interest in the land and in the results of their labor. The

Holodomor (the name of the famine of 1932-33) imbued the peasants with fear,

political apathy, and passiveness. The village could not oppose the regime

anymore. By the end of 1935 almost all peasants were collectivized.

Many Ukrainian historians, especially in western Ukraine and Kyiv,

consider the famine of 1932-33 as genocide (killing a group of people because of

their nationality) against the Ukrainian people. In their opinion Stalin used famine

to crash the foundation of Ukrainian nationalism – the peasantry. Russian

historians and many Ukrainian historians from Eastern Ukraine admit that

Holodomor was a horrible crime but refuse to recognize it as an act of genocide

because the 1932-33 famine killed not only millions in Ukraine but also 1,5 million

in Kazakhstan (38% of its population) and over two million in some regions of

Belarus and Russia (the Central Volga region, the Northern Caucasus Territory, the

Kuban region, the Don region, Western Siberia, Southern Urals, and Central Black

Soil Region).6 In those territories there were also blockades to prevent people from

escaping. Russian historians stress the fact that many Ukrainian (not Russian)

communist activists actively participated in food requisitions in villages that

caused numerous deaths. Not only Ukrainians died on Ukrainian territory, many

thousands of Germans (the descendants of the colonists brought here by Catherine

II), Jews, Russians, Tatars, and other nationalities also perished in Ukraine in

1932-33. Russian historians say that if most productive peasants had lived in cold

regions of the USSR they would have suffered not less than Ukrainian peasants.

They claim that famine happened mostly in regions with rich soil where peasants

6 Some Russian historians say that of 8 million people perished from the famine, Ukraine lost less than 50 percent(3,5 million), the Russian Federation lost 4,5 million. The heaviest losses in the USSR among the peasants were in

Saratov region (Russia) – over 41 percent.

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had individualistic mentality and showed serious resistance to collectivization. In

their opinion Stalin used the famine as a tool to force the peasants to cooperate

with the regime and he was indifferent to their nationality.

Russian historians suggest that their Ukrainian colleagues should prove with

facts that Ukrainians died because of their nationality and that “the Holodomor was

engineered for this very purpose.” They stress the fact that the communist

leadership was international (with a Georgian on the top)7 and that neither Russian

nor Ukrainian archives have party orders to use famine for killing Ukrainians.

Thus, in their view, there is no direct evidence that Ukrainians were killed by

starvation because they were Ukrainians. Statistics says that in contrast to the

Ukrainian village the mortality rate in Ukrainian cities in 1932-33 was usual.8 It

was the place of living (city or village) and not nationality that defined people’s

chances for survival. In 2009 Russian historians published archive documents that

show that Kremlin provided aid to starving people in Ukraine in 1933. Without this

aid almost all of the 25 million people who lived in the rural areas of Ukraine

would have died. According to Russian historians these documents refute the

concept of the ‘engineered genocide against Ukrainians.’ Ukrainian historians say

that Kremlin, after confiscating all foodstuffs from the village, decided to feed the

peasants to secure the 1933 harvest that was needed for export. In 2008 Russia

proposed to create an international commission to investigate the famine of 1933.

Foreign scholars’ views on the problem also differ. The majority of foreign

historians believe that Holodomor was aimed not at the Ukrainians as a nation but

rather at the peasants to break their resistance to collectivization. In 2003 the UN

General Assembly recognized the fact of horrible artificial famine in Ukraine, but

it refused to regard it as genocide. A similar resolution was issued by UNESCO on

November 1, 2007. In 28 April 2010, Parliamentary Assembly of Council of

Europe (PACE) also recognized the famine of 1932-33 as crime against humanity

and refused regard it as genocide.

7 Stalin was Georgian. His real name was Dzhugashvili.8 After 1928 the food stores and shops turned into distribution centers where foods were available to people with

ration cards for foodstuffs and industrial goods. Thus peasants could not buy food in cities.

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The question of genocide is highly politicized in Ukraine. President Viktor

Yushchenko urged the parliament to recognize the famine as an act of genocide

against the Ukrainians. Some analysts say that in such a way he wanted to discredit

his political rivals (who are mostly pro-Russian). In 2006 the Ukrainian parliament

rather reluctantly recognized the famine as an act of genocide.9 Yushchenko also

tried to introduce criminal punishment for those who refuse to regard the famine as

an act of genocide but failed. The concept of genocide is very harmful for Russia

politically since it seriously undermines a popular in Russia and Eastern Ukraine

idea about common roots of Russians and Ukrainians and deprives the Kremlin of

arguments for reunification.

Some Ukrainian political analysts criticize Yushchenko for drawing extra

attention to the issue of Holodomor. “Historically, the complex of ‘victim’ has

been formed in Ukraine that doesn’t exist in Russia and Belarus,” said V. Fesenko,

director of Penta political research center. “We form the nation not on our

successes, but on defeats,” stressed he.

The question of whether the famine was genocide or not provokes debate not

only among historians and politicians but also among Ukrainian public in general.

In November 2009 the Horshenin Institute’s survey revealed that 66 percent of

Ukrainians believe that the famine was not genocide. Thirty-two percent believe it

was, while two percent say the Holodomor didn’t happen at all. The position of the

new Ukraine’s president Victor Yanukovych on the famine does not differ from

that of European Union.

The topic of Ukrainian famine of 1932-33 had been taboo in the Soviet

Union for decades. The official Soviet propaganda claimed that it never existed

and was “invented” by “Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists” in emigration for

political aims. The fact of the famine was officially recognized during Gorbachev’s

perestroika in the late 1980s.

Repressions

9 Almost half the parliament (the Party of Regions and Communists) refused to take part in voting.

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Repressions as a whole are typical trait of a totalitarian regime. In fact, it cannot

exist without them. One of the major aims of repressions of the Stalinist regime

was to create an atmosphere of fear and uncertainty. When a person lives in fear he

is much easier to control. Even high governmental positions did not guarantee

safety. Quite the contrary, the ruling class was the first victim of repressions. The

majority of high-ranking party officials in Moscow as well as in all other Soviet

republics were repressed. For example, of 1966 deputies of the USSR Supreme

Council 1931 (more than 95%) were repressed in the middle of the 1930s. Of 66

members of Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine 55 were

repressed. Of 11 members of Ukrainian Politburo 10 were repressed. In 1938 all

the Ukrainian government (17 ministers) were arrested and shot. The Prime

Minister P. Liubchenko committed suicide. Before killing himself he killed his

wife to save her from tortures by the political police and from a horrible life in the

Gulag. In general, 37% of Ukrainian Communists (170,000) were repressed. By

the late 1930s, the limited self-government that Ukrainians (and other non-

Russians in their republics) had possessed earlier was almost totally destroyed.

A lot of intellectuals (because they could think critically and understand the

nature of the regime) in all republics were repressed.10 The NKVD (political

police) accused many representatives of the Ukrainian cultural elite of participating

in secret anti-Soviet organizations, spying and terrorism. Victims were usually

asked two questions “Who recruited you?” and “Whom did you recruit?” Then

under physical tortures or threats to repress close relatives the victims usually

pointed at any people they knew. In all, some four-fifths of the Ukrainian cultural

elite was repressed in the course of the 1930s. As a result of such a policy the

intelligentsia was intimidated and had to glorify the regime.

Besides intellectuals many ordinary Soviet citizens perished in prisons or

were shot. Millions political prisoners worked in the Gulag in extremely difficult

conditions. The food ratio of a Gulag victim was less than the food ratio of a dog

10 The regime was afraid of them because intellectuals remained the only source of alternative information and they

could tell the brain-washed citizens the truth about the regime.

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that guarded the Gulag. In the Soviet Union nobody could feel secure and many

people could not trust each other. There were millions of informants. Even children

were encouraged to inform on their parents and friends.11 Under such conditions

the forming of any kind of opposition was impossible. Thus, through repressions,

Stalin consolidated his rule in the USSR.

The Ukrainian Autocephalous (Independent) Orthodox Church was banned

and many of its priests were sent to prisons. Practically all Ukrainian kobzari (folk

musicians and singers of poems about the Cossacks12) were invited to a congress,

then arrested and shot. By eradicating Ukrainian religious and cultural differences

Stalin planned to make his empire more unified. The same policy was adopted in

other Soviet republics.

All those who were repressed were officially called “enemies of the people”.

The NKVD even had plans how many people were to be repressed within a certain

time. For example, 268 950 Soviet citizens were to be repressed from August till

December of 1937. Of that number 75 500 were to be executed immediately. In

1991, shortly before the collapse of the USSR, the KGB (successor of the NKVD)

announced that 42 million Soviet citizens died during the dictatorship of Stalin

(1928-1953) as a result of the forced collectivization and repressions.

The political police (NKVD) was also not immune from repressions. The

majority of NKVD leaders in Moscow, Kyiv and other Soviet capitals were

repressed in the 1930s. In Ukraine alone 1193 senior NKVD officials died as a

result of repressions in the 1930s.

Part II: Western Ukraine between the Wars

Ukrainians under Polish rule

The fate of Western Ukraine was decided at the Paris peace conference (1919).

The Ukrainians made 64% of the region’s ethnic composition, the Poles – 25%,

11 The famous cult of Pavlik Morozov who informed on his father was created.12 The Cossack was a symbol of freedom.

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and the Jews – 10%. The majority of Ukrainians (94%) lived in villages. At the

conference Poland promised to grant the Ukrainians autonomy and respect their

rights. The Entente powers accepted the Polish proposal and placed Western

Ukraine under Polish jurisdiction. France, the major power in Entente, was

interested in creating a strong Poland as a counterbalance to Germany in Eastern

Europe. Paris believed that in case of war between France and Germany the

grateful Poland would attack the Germans from the East. The Entente also wanted

Poland to be a strong barrier between Bolshevik Russia and Europe. These facts

explain why Western Ukraine found itself under Polish rule.

Poland did not keep its promise, however. Western Ukraine did not get

autonomy. The number of Ukrainian-language secondary schools was reduced and

Ukrainian was pushed out of administrative use. The old Austrian system of

Ukrainian elementary schools was transformed into a bilingual one in which Polish

was dominant. Ukrainian Studies departments at Lviv University, created under

Austrian rule, were abolished. But in contrast to the totalitarian Bolshevik Ukraine,

Western Ukraine enjoyed some political liberties under Poland. There were many

Ukrainian political parties that existed legally and issued their newspapers.13

Numerous Ukrainian cultural, scientific, professional and public organizations

such as Prosvita (275 000 members and 3071 libraries in 1936), T.Shevchenko

Scientific Society, the Association of Ukrainian Women (50 000 members), the

Association of Ukrainian Teachers, the Association of Ukrainian Lawyers, etc

acted quite freely. It was allowed to establish private schools with Ukrainian as the

language of instruction. The Polish parliament had a significant number of

Ukrainian deputies (25%), and even its vice-speaker was a Ukrainian. The largest

and most influential legal Ukrainian political party was UNDO (Ukrainian

National Democratic Union) which advocated constitutional democracy and

favored a compromise with the Poles. The program-maximum of the party was the

establishment of independent Ukraine by legal means. The program-minimum was

autonomy.13 There were 83 Ukrainian newspapers in Poland, 21 of them were political.

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For security reasons Poland tried to gradually eradicate the differences

between Poles and Ukrainians. The old name of “Western Galicia” was changed

into “Eastern Little Poland.” Greek Catholic priests received government orders to

change Ukrainian last names in church documents according to Polish samples (for

example “Levytsky” was to be changed into “Lewitski”). There were numerous

official attempts to describe the Ukrainians not as a different nation but as a branch

of the Polish people, and the Ukrainian language, accordingly, as a Polish dialect.

The Polish government forbade using word ‘Ukrainian,’ the old word ‘Ruthenian’

was reanimated instead. This measure was aimed at discouraging West Ukrainians

from perceiving themselves as part of a broader Ukrainian nation. To dissolve the

predominantly Ukrainian ethnic composition of Galicia and Volyhnia Polish

authorities settled about 200,000 Polish colonists there. The Polish government

also tried to instigate religious conflicts between 3-million Greek Catholics

Ukrainians of Galicia and 2-million Orthodox Ukrainians of Volhynia (Divide-

and-Rule policy). Since rural areas of Western Ukraine were overpopulated many

Ukrainians emigrated to the USA, Canada, Argentina, etc.

Ukrainian nationalism in Galicia

Ukrainian nationalists gained wide influence in Galicia in the interwar period

(1920-1939). In 1920, the secret Ukrainian Military Organization (УВО – in

Ukrainian) was founded by veterans of WWI and the civil war, headed by Colonel

Yevhen Konovalets. From its very beginning the organization applied terror 14 as a

way of destabilizing Polish control over the Ukrainian population. In 1929, УВО

was transformed into a broader underground movement, the Organization of

Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN).

The major aim of the OUN was unification of all Ukrainian ethnic lands in

one independent state. The aim was to be achieved by violent means (through

revolution and establishment of a dictatorship).

14 It included the burning of Polish estates; the destruction of Polish governmental buildings, railroads, and telegraph

lines; and political assassinations of Poles and Ukrainians who favored cooperation with the Poles.

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The ideology of the OUN was based on the writings of Dmytro Dontsov

(1883-1973). Dontsov’s nationalism, which came to be known as integral

nationalism, proclaimed that a nation was an absolute value (‘The Nation above

All’). Everything, including human lives, should be sacrificed in the name of the

nation, according to this teaching. Integral nationalists called for the creation of a

new type of Ukrainian, one who was unconditionally committed to the nation and

to independent statehood.

According to integral nationalists, the political system of a future state must

be based on the rule of one nationalist party (all other parties should be banned)

under the leadership of a strong leader (“вождь”) with unlimited powers. He must

be responsible only to God. The nation should be purified and consist of

Ukrainians only (‘Ukraine for Ukrainians!’). Democratic ideas were proclaimed

decadent. Integral nationalists believed that it was impossible to achieve

independence by democratic means. Hence is their skeptical attitude to democracy.

Integral nationalists paid special attention to Ukrainian history which was to

be rewritten and mythologized (all negative aspects were to be silenced and the

cult of heroes created) with the aim of brining up nationalistic youth. The

ideological writings of such Ukrainian national leaders as Drahomanov, Franko,

and Hrushevsky were condemned as too soft and “feminine” (because they praised

democracy and humanism). The idea of creating a merciless super human being

was widely propagated among youth.

Ukrainian integral nationalism was a typically totalitarian movement with

elements of fascism. Similar movements were popular in Europe in the 1920s.

Such half-fascist nationalistic movements as the Iron Guard in Romania, the

Ustashi in Croatia, the Arrow Cross in Hungary, the Iron Wolves in Lithuania, and

related movements in other countries were quite influential in the interwar period.

Italian and German fascists gave an example of creating a powerful nationalistic

state. Dontsov himself admired Hitler and Mussolini and published their speeches

in his journal.

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The OUN was quite intolerant to other political views except its own. In its

practical activity the OUN carried out acts of terror aimed at Polish officials and

those Ukrainians who favored compromise with the Poles. A popular brochure,

published in Lviv in 1929 said, “Треба крові – дамо море крові! Треба терору –

учинимо до пекельності. Не встидаймось убивств, грабунків і підпалів. У

боротьбі не існує етики.”15

A number of high-ranking Polish politicians and liberal Ukrainians (who

cooperated with the Poles) were assassinated. In fact more Ukrainians were killed

by OUN terrorists than Poles. By using terror OUN leaders wanted not only to

destabilize Polish rule but also to provoke the Ukrainian masses to rebellion.

Stepan Bandera, most popular OUN leader, believed that the Ukrainian people

were ready for rebellion; they needed only to be awakened by terrorist acts. 16

Hatred for OUN enemies (the Poles) was cultivated to unite the nation. Dontsov

wrote, “Hatred for the enemy must be felt even if he has done nothing harmful to

you”.

The OUN managed to attract widespread support among Ukrainian youth.

Its stress on revolutionary action, radical solutions, and the creation of a new type

of “super Ukrainians” appealed to youth who wanted to be heroes. The OUN

leaders believed that using terror would help them to destabilize the situation in

Poland until the government collapsed. Older generation usually condemned the

terror unleashed by the OUN. Many parents criticized the OUN for the

involvement of their immature and inexperienced teenagers into terrorist activity

that often ended tragically. The Creek Catholic church condemned using terror as

political means. Its head, metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, asked Ukrainians to

stop killing people in terrorist acts as it would bring only harm to Ukraine. He

believed that ‘a person who sheds the innocent blood of his political opponent is

just as much as murderer as one who does it for robbery.’ The metropolitan

15 “If blood is needed we’ll provide a sea of it, if terror is needed we’ll give a hell of it! Do not be ashamed of

killings, robberies and arsons. There is no ethics in the struggle.”16 S. Bandera was a major organizer of terrorist acts in the interwar Galicia. On February 25, 2010 the EuropeanParliament passed a resolution on Ukraine where it expressed its regret over granting by President V. Yushchenko

the title of ‘National Hero of Ukraine’ to S. Bandera, posthumously.

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advocated the policy of cooperation between Poles and Ukrainians. All legal

Ukrainian parties publicly denounced the terrorist activities of the OUN. The OUN

in its turn condemned all legal Ukrainian parties as collaborationists.

The reaction of Polish authorities to the terrorist activity of the OUN was

often brutal. The most notorious action was so-called “pacification campaign,”

(September-October 1930). During the campaign Polish police forces and army

units encircled Ukrainian villages and brutally searched for terrorists, humiliating

the local population.

The underground movement in Galicia consisted of two major political

forces. One was the OUN. The other one was the Communist Party of Western

Ukraine (CPWU). The Communists wanted to separate Galicia from Poland

through a revolution and join it to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. The

influence of the CPWU dropped significantly when it became known about large-

scale repressions and Holodomor in Soviet Ukraine.17

Ukrainians under Romanian Rule

After the First World War the Entente gave the former Austrian province of

Bukovyna to Romania. Under Austrian rule, Ukrainians in Bukovyna enjoyed wide

political rights, extensive local self-government, and a well-developed system of

Ukrainian-language education. The situation radically changed when the region

became part of Romania. Like Poland, Romania pursued a policy of assimilation.

Ukrainian schools, parties, cultural organizations and newspapers were shut down.

The departments of Ukrainian studies at Chernivtsi University were abolished.

Bucharest refused to recognize the Ukrainians as a distinct nationality. Ukrainians

were classified as “Romanians who had forgotten their native language” or

“Ukrainized Romanians.” Ukrainian surnames were changed to sound more

17 The similar processes took place in areas populated by Ukrainians in Romania and Czechoslovakia. TheCommunist forces in those countries wanted unification with Soviet Ukraine while nationalists wanted creation of

an independent state.

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Romanian. The same happened with Ukrainian names of villages and towns. In

1940 the Rumanian government under pressure from Stalin ceded Bukovyna to

Soviet Ukraine.

Ukrainians in Czechoslovakia

In 1919 Transcarpathia voluntarily joined the newly created by the Entente

Czechoslovak republic, one of the most democratic states in Europe. The

population of the region consisted of Ukrainians (71,3%), Jews (13%), Hungarians

(7%), and other minorities such as Slovaks, Germans, Czechs, and Romanians. The

Czech government allowed its population to use the language of its choice in

schools and open cultural and political organizations. Such liberalism led to the

growth of Ukrainian national life in the region. The Czech government, however,

planned to abolish any possibility of unification of Transcarpathian Ukrainians

with Ukrainians in other lands. Prague propagated the idea that Ukrainians in

Transcarpathia were a separate nation – Carpathian Rusyny. This movement was

called Rusynophile and it enjoyed significant support of the government. Another

Ukrainian movement in Transcarpathia was called Russophile (москвофіли або

русофіли). Russophile believed that Ukrainians of Transcarpathia were in fact

Russians. The third movement was that of Ukrainophiles who believed that

Ukrainians of Transcarpathia were brothers of the Ukrainians who lived under

Polish and Soviet control. The fourth movement was called Magyarophile

(“мадярони”). The Magyarophiles wanted to return Carpathian Ukraine under

Hungarian control.18 Thus Ukrainians in Czechoslovakia had four national

orientations and that suited Prague well as it prevented Ukrainians from

unification.

Carpatho-Ukrainian autonomy

18 Hungary (as part of Austro-Hungarian Empire) controlled Transcapathia from 1867 till 1918.

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In October 1938 Prague granted autonomy to Transcarpathia. A famous Ukrainian

political figure and respected Greek Catholic priest, Avhustyn Voloshyn, was

appointed head of the cabinet, which started a large-scale Ukrainization policy.

The educational system, publications, and administration were Ukrainized. All

political parties except the pro-governmental Ukrainian National Union were

banned and their newspapers closed. In February 1939, elections were held for the

regional parliament and the Ukrainophiles received 86% (or 94% according to

other data) of the votes. Some historians say that the elections results were

falsified. It was not difficult under such non-democratic conditions. Meanwhile, a

military organization, the Carpathian Sich, was organized and soon had about 5000

soldiers, who were mostly enthusiastic Ukrainian youth from Galicia – many of

them members of the OUN.

There were pressing reasons for establishing a military force, for as

Czechoslovakia slowly disintegrated, neighboring Hungary demanded the return of

its former Transcarpathian lands. On 14 March 1939, the Hungarian army moved

into the region. On 15 March, in a symbolic gesture, the Voloshyn government

proclaimed the independent Republic of Carpatho-Ukraine19 and sent a telegram to

Hitler asking him to accept the new republic as a German protectorate. 20 Voloshyn

did not know that Hitler had already promised Transcarpathia to his ally and friend

Admiral Horthy, the Hungarian dictator. The sejm (parliament) adopted the blue-

yellow national flag, the coat of arms containing a trident, and the national anthem

‘Ukraine has not perished yet’ ( Ще не вмерла Україна). Ukrainian was

proclaimed the state language. Many young integral nationalists from Galicia

illegally crossed the border and joined the Carpathian Sich. The Carpathian Sich

showed brave but futile resistance to the outnumbered enemy. Soon the whole

territory was occupied by Hungarians.21

19 Strictly against the proclamation of independence were local Slovaks, who wanted to join Slovakia, and local

Hungarians, who wanted to join Hungary.20 Protectorate means a country that is controlled and protected by a more powerful state.21 The independence of Carpatho-Ukraine lasted only one day.

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After conquering Transcarpathia the Hungarian government started

Magyarization (Hungarization) policy. All Ukrainian publications and

organizations, including Prosvita, were banned. The Ukrainian language in schools

was gradually replaced with Hungarian.

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Documents

Seminar 6 (1)