Seizing the Initiative: An argument for the return to true light infantry doctrine in Afghanistan; a Platoon/ Company level perspective SFC Andrew Moore,

Seizing the Initiative:Seizing the Initiative:An argument for the return to true light An argument for the return to true light infantry doctrine in Afghanistan; infantry doctrine in Afghanistan; a Platoon/ Company level perspectivea Platoon/ Company level perspective

SFC Andrew Moore, 1LT Nick Black SFC Andrew Moore, 1LT Nick Black and 1LT Andrew Pepplerand 1LT Andrew Peppler

UnclassifiedUnclassified 16 JAN 0916 JAN 09

• A Tactical ProblemA Tactical Problem

• Perceived and Real ObstaclesPerceived and Real Obstacles– How Attack Co, 1-503D IN (ABN) How Attack Co, 1-503D IN (ABN)

Overcame them Overcame them

• Long Term RecommendationsLong Term Recommendations

OutlineOutline

““Experience is the ability to recognize a Experience is the ability to recognize a mistake when you make it again. Four times in mistake when you make it again. Four times in the last century the U.S. has to come to the the last century the U.S. has to come to the end of a war, concluded that the future of man end of a war, concluded that the future of man and the world had changed for the better and and the world had changed for the better and turned inward, unilaterally disarming and turned inward, unilaterally disarming and dismantling institutions important for our dismantling institutions important for our national security giving ourselves a so-called national security giving ourselves a so-called ‘peace dividend’. Four times we chose to ‘peace dividend’. Four times we chose to forget history.”forget history.”

––Secretary of Defense, Robert Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, Gates, November 2007 November 2007

The ProblemThe ProblemIt is dangerous to discount the vast and It is dangerous to discount the vast and salient tactical lessons provided by historical salient tactical lessons provided by historical counter-insurgencies based on their eventual counter-insurgencies based on their eventual politicalpolitical capitulation and defeat capitulation and defeat

The ProblemThe Problem

• One of the major problems in Afghanistan is largely tactical – One of the major problems in Afghanistan is largely tactical – insurgents have regained the insurgents have regained the tacticaltactical initiative initiative

• In order for the U.S. to take it back will require a fundamental In order for the U.S. to take it back will require a fundamental shift in the way we fight in Afghanistan as a theater shift in the way we fight in Afghanistan as a theater

• An over-reliance on TTPs translated from Iraq will lead to a An over-reliance on TTPs translated from Iraq will lead to a protracted conflict and an overall strategic defeatprotracted conflict and an overall strategic defeat

Perceived and RealPerceived and RealObstaclesObstacles

Perceived ObstaclesPerceived Obstacles• The level of physical fitness required to The level of physical fitness required to

operate dismounted in Afghanistan is not operate dismounted in Afghanistan is not attainable or sustainableattainable or sustainable– Too much gear to carryToo much gear to carry– Safest place to be is in the truckSafest place to be is in the truck

• Insurgents are “used to” the altitude and Insurgents are “used to” the altitude and terrain and hence superior as dismounted terrain and hence superior as dismounted combatantscombatants– ANSF have begun to believe and perpetuate this ANSF have begun to believe and perpetuate this

mythmyth• Anything smaller than a platoon-sized Anything smaller than a platoon-sized

friendly element will be overrun and friendly element will be overrun and destroyed destroyed

Perceived ObstaclesPerceived Obstacles

““No matter how tough you think you No matter how tough you think you are, you’ll never get up those are, you’ll never get up those mountains.”mountains.”

-Platoon Sergeant, Light -Platoon Sergeant, Light Infantry Company replaced by Infantry Company replaced by

FitnessFitness

Historical Precedent:Historical Precedent:Soviet-Afghan War (1979-1989)Soviet-Afghan War (1979-1989)

• Within the first 3 years of Within the first 3 years of combat most of the effective combat most of the effective kinetic operations were kinetic operations were shouldered by paratroops shouldered by paratroops and SPETSNAZ forces due and SPETSNAZ forces due to the unsuitability of the to the unsuitability of the majority of the Soviet 40th majority of the Soviet 40th Army to dismounted warfareArmy to dismounted warfare


““Your physical fitness levels must be at a Your physical fitness levels must be at a point where it is no longer a consideration. point where it is no longer a consideration. You are not fit in order to survive; you are You are not fit in order to survive; you are not fit to excel at a physical task; you are fit not fit to excel at a physical task; you are fit because it allows you to bring to the battle because it allows you to bring to the battle that critical component of being a that critical component of being a Commander and a Leader. You are fit Commander and a Leader. You are fit because you must retain the greatest ability because you must retain the greatest ability to lead, command, to inspire, to think, to to lead, command, to inspire, to think, to plan, and to accomplish your mission. plan, and to accomplish your mission. Everything else is for show, and therefore Everything else is for show, and therefore meaningless.”meaningless.”

––D.M. DayD.M. Day

FitnessFitness


• A Co, 1-503 IN (ABN) was A Co, 1-503 IN (ABN) was able to overcome this able to overcome this perception by training with a perception by training with a combination of CROSSFIT, combination of CROSSFIT, body armor runs and road body armor runs and road marching incorporating any marching incorporating any and all hills around post and all hills around post

• We found the APFT We found the APFT inadequate for gauging “real inadequate for gauging “real world” fitness requirementsworld” fitness requirements

FitnessFitness

Perceived ObstaclesPerceived ObstaclesFitnessFitness


• We adopted a tactic we We adopted a tactic we coined “offensive coined “offensive disruption” utilizing squad to disruption” utilizing squad to section-sized elements section-sized elements mutually supported in mutually supported in traveling overwatch in the traveling overwatch in the high ground regardless of high ground regardless of mission type or objective mission type or objective

• We were able to out-march, We were able to out-march, out-maneuver and outflank out-maneuver and outflank dismounted enemy elements dismounted enemy elements and always held the initiative and always held the initiative

Insurgent “Superiority”Insurgent “Superiority”

Offensive DisruptionOffensive Disruption““Maneuver is the essence of every tactical Maneuver is the essence of every tactical operation. It is the use of movement in operation. It is the use of movement in combination with fire (or fire potential) combination with fire (or fire potential) employed to achieve a position of advantage employed to achieve a position of advantage with respect to the enemy. The commander with respect to the enemy. The commander employs those techniques that avoid the employs those techniques that avoid the enemy’s strength, focus on enemy enemy’s strength, focus on enemy weakness, and conceals the company’s true weakness, and conceals the company’s true intentions.”intentions.”

––para 4-29, FM 3.21-10, para 4-29, FM 3.21-10, The Infantry Rifle The Infantry Rifle CompanyCompany

Offensive DisruptionOffensive Disruption

• In late September 2007, 1In late September 2007, 1stst and 2 and 2ndnd PLT, Attack PLT, Attack Company were tasked to react to an ambush on HHC, Company were tasked to react to an ambush on HHC, 1-5031-503rdrd, and clear the high ground to the West of a , and clear the high ground to the West of a road nicknamed “Ambush Alley”road nicknamed “Ambush Alley”– over 6 km of mountainous terrain, the Company encountered over 6 km of mountainous terrain, the Company encountered

dozens of hasty and semi-permanent fighting positions dozens of hasty and semi-permanent fighting positions within as close as 100m of the roadwithin as close as 100m of the road

– well-used goat trails that could facilitate quick infil and exfil well-used goat trails that could facilitate quick infil and exfil to and from the ambush lineto and from the ambush line

• Based on the relatively good upkeep of these Based on the relatively good upkeep of these positions and combat detritus, it was clear that the positions and combat detritus, it was clear that the high ground had not been cleared by friendly forces high ground had not been cleared by friendly forces any time recentlyany time recently– units had been employing the same mounted TTP as their units had been employing the same mounted TTP as their

primary method of movement through the area time and time primary method of movement through the area time and time again again

VignetteVignette

Moving Flank ScreenMoving Flank Screen• Throughout its 15-month deployment, A/1-503 Throughout its 15-month deployment, A/1-503

regularly used dismounted flank screens as its regularly used dismounted flank screens as its primary method to protect vehicle convoys through: primary method to protect vehicle convoys through: – areas that were historical ambush sites areas that were historical ambush sites – where the terrain significantly facilitated that possibilitywhere the terrain significantly facilitated that possibility

• Where IEDs were the most likely threat, the Where IEDs were the most likely threat, the Company would employ dismounts in front of the Company would employ dismounts in front of the convoy in a large “V” shapeconvoy in a large “V” shape– clearing the ground immediately in front of the lead vehicle clearing the ground immediately in front of the lead vehicle – searching for possible paths for command wire leading searching for possible paths for command wire leading

from the initiation point to the roadfrom the initiation point to the road• Attack Co also used simulated (and actual) vehicle Attack Co also used simulated (and actual) vehicle

breakdowns to mask a dismount point or to draw breakdowns to mask a dismount point or to draw SIGINTSIGINT– the unit always operated under the assumption that the the unit always operated under the assumption that the

convoy was being watchedconvoy was being watched

Real ObstaclesReal Obstacles

Real ObstaclesReal Obstacles• Quality gear and equipment that suits Quality gear and equipment that suits

dismounted operationsdismounted operations– Shortcomings of the ACU pattern Shortcomings of the ACU pattern

• Shortage of helicopter assets to facilitate air Shortage of helicopter assets to facilitate air assaultsassaults– Fixed-wing Air Force platforms move too quickly Fixed-wing Air Force platforms move too quickly

to adequately support infantry with overwatchto adequately support infantry with overwatch– Burden of rotary wing logistical support was Burden of rotary wing logistical support was

placed on private contractors in Russian Mi-8’s placed on private contractors in Russian Mi-8’s

• Over-emphasis on SIGINT and a lack of Over-emphasis on SIGINT and a lack of specific HUMINT specific HUMINT

Real ObstaclesReal Obstacles• A/1-503 often relied on the traditional A.L.I.C.E. pack with A/1-503 often relied on the traditional A.L.I.C.E. pack with

Tactical Tailor (TT) customizations or bought Multicam Tactical Tailor (TT) customizations or bought Multicam TT rack systems for their equipment and ammunitionTT rack systems for their equipment and ammunition– Not only are these systems more comfortable and efficient Not only are these systems more comfortable and efficient

during dismounted movements, their patterns were more suited during dismounted movements, their patterns were more suited to the environmentto the environment

– ACU pattern and construction were a major hindrance in the field ACU pattern and construction were a major hindrance in the field

• The IOTV is longer and bulkier than its IBA predecessor The IOTV is longer and bulkier than its IBA predecessor and the shape is not built to facilitate a rucksackand the shape is not built to facilitate a rucksack– The construction is meant for easy removal in case of a soldier’s The construction is meant for easy removal in case of a soldier’s

submersion in water but its quick release wire system is submersion in water but its quick release wire system is EXTREMELY uncomfortable over the shouldersEXTREMELY uncomfortable over the shoulders

• A/1-503 paratroopers willingly paid out of pocket for A/1-503 paratroopers willingly paid out of pocket for civilian hiking boots which stood up better to the rigors civilian hiking boots which stood up better to the rigors of day-to-day movement through the mountainsof day-to-day movement through the mountains

EquipmentEquipment

Real ObstaclesReal ObstaclesEquipmentEquipment

A.L.I.C.E. packsA.L.I.C.E. packs

Multicam Multicam RackRack


Multicam Multicam RacksRacks

Civilian Civilian RucksackRucksack

TT modified ALICE pack TT modified ALICE pack w/ civilian sleep padw/ civilian sleep pad

Real ObstaclesReal ObstaclesTact. Tailor MALICE Pack Tact. Tailor MALICE Pack with civilian sleeping padwith civilian sleeping pad

Civilian bootsCivilian boots

Multicam Rack Multicam Rack SystemSystem

EquipmentEquipment


The ACU in its natural environment…The ACU in its natural environment…

Real ObstaclesReal Obstacles• Coordination with Air Force at Coordination with Air Force at

Company level is difficult – Air Company level is difficult – Air Support often will not work with “on Support often will not work with “on the ground leaders” and will the ground leaders” and will consequently take commands from consequently take commands from an Air Force JTAC miles awayan Air Force JTAC miles away

• Attack Helicopters:Attack Helicopters:– terrain is easily covered by slow terrain is easily covered by slow

moving attack helicoptersmoving attack helicopters– ability to take fire commands from ability to take fire commands from

ground commander makes it the best ground commander makes it the best platform for destroying the enemyplatform for destroying the enemy

– Afghanistan needs more Attack Afghanistan needs more Attack HelicoptersHelicopters

• Artillery is King in Afghanistan:Artillery is King in Afghanistan:– ability to call for fire (CFF) evens out ability to call for fire (CFF) evens out

any enemy ambush and causes any enemy ambush and causes enemy to break contactenemy to break contact

– absence of indirect support is known absence of indirect support is known to the enemy; regularly stage their to the enemy; regularly stage their attacks in areas with “dead space” in attacks in areas with “dead space” in artillery coverageartillery coverage

Joint FiresJoint Fires

Real ObstaclesReal Obstacles

• 1-503 IN (ABN) had to 1-503 IN (ABN) had to fight for aviation supportfight for aviation support– often there were not often there were not

enough birds or they did enough birds or they did not arrive in a timely not arrive in a timely manner, ceding the manner, ceding the initiative to the enemyinitiative to the enemy

• A/1-503 had to make the A/1-503 had to make the most of assets when they most of assets when they got themgot them

• Company minus air Company minus air assault in Aug 2007 assault in Aug 2007 resulted in the most resulted in the most successful operation of successful operation of the entire deploymentthe entire deployment

Aviation AssetsAviation Assets

Operational VignetteOperational Vignette

1250z: 1/A, 2/A and Headquarters 1250z: 1/A, 2/A and Headquarters element Air Assault into element Air Assault into suspected enemy staging areasuspected enemy staging area

1350z: A Co (-) begin to ascend the 1350z: A Co (-) begin to ascend the mountain during darknessmountain during darkness

1600z: A Co (-) reaches Hilltop 2653 1600z: A Co (-) reaches Hilltop 2653 and 2/A sets up OP in support and 2/A sets up OP in support of 1/A and HQ movementof 1/A and HQ movement

1815z: 1/A and HQ reach patrol 1815z: 1/A and HQ reach patrol base site on ridge east of A/2base site on ridge east of A/2

1830z: 1/A 240B gun position hears 1830z: 1/A 240B gun position hears noises and observes three noises and observes three personnel with weaponspersonnel with weapons

1845z: Small 1/A and HQ element 1845z: Small 1/A and HQ element maneuvers to engage personnelmaneuvers to engage personnel

1850z: Enemy fighter confuses US 1850z: Enemy fighter confuses US interpreter for a Taliban fighter; interpreter for a Taliban fighter; A Co engages the enemy A Co engages the enemy combatants combatants

NEXT DAY: Sensitive Site NEXT DAY: Sensitive Site Exploitation (SSE) finds three Exploitation (SSE) finds three enemy KIA and the largest enemy KIA and the largest weapons and equipment cache weapons and equipment cache found in Eastern Paktika in OEF found in Eastern Paktika in OEF VIIIVIII

LEGENDLEGEND

1/A DESIGNATOR1/A DESIGNATOR

2/A DESIGNATOR2/A DESIGNATOR

DISMOUNTEDDISMOUNTED

MOUNTEDMOUNTED

CACHE SITECACHE SITE

Movement to Contact and Hasty AmbushMovement to Contact and Hasty Ambush

Lessons LearnedLessons Learned

• Keys to success:Keys to success:– Air Assault capabilityAir Assault capability– Mutually supported Mutually supported

“Small unit” “Small unit” movementsmovements

– Dismounted night Dismounted night operationoperation

• Result: Result: – Discovery and Discovery and

disruption of enemy disruption of enemy training/staging areatraining/staging area

Historical Precedent:Historical Precedent:Algeria (1954-1962)Algeria (1954-1962)

• General Challe sought to remove local support and safe-General Challe sought to remove local support and safe-havens from insurgent bands at all costs through havens from insurgent bands at all costs through saturation of enemy lines of communication (LOCs) and saturation of enemy lines of communication (LOCs) and operational areas by aggressive light infantry and operational areas by aggressive light infantry and paratroopsparatroops

• Lack of timely, accurate Lack of timely, accurate intelligence is a notorious intelligence is a notorious problem in Waziri tribal problem in Waziri tribal areasareas

• But A Co, 1-503But A Co, 1-503rdrd’s ’s aggressiveness and aggressiveness and pursuit of combatants pursuit of combatants anywhere they sought anywhere they sought safe-haven diminished safe-haven diminished enemy morale and bred enemy morale and bred psychological uncertaintypsychological uncertainty

• Caused in-fighting and Caused in-fighting and disrupted recruitment disrupted recruitment potential among local potential among local populacepopulace

Real ObstaclesReal ObstaclesIntelligenceIntelligence

Effects Achieved Effects Achieved

• Oshakay in JUN07: “These Americans are different.”Oshakay in JUN07: “These Americans are different.”• Gayankhel in SEP07: “Do not go there, you will be Gayankhel in SEP07: “Do not go there, you will be

killed.”killed.”• Spera in MAR08: “These Americans look strong.”Spera in MAR08: “These Americans look strong.”• Spera in MAR/JUN08: “The Americans are in the Spera in MAR/JUN08: “The Americans are in the

mountains and we don’t know where they are and mountains and we don’t know where they are and the ASG are setting up checkpoints. We can’t move.”the ASG are setting up checkpoints. We can’t move.”

• Spera in JUN08: “We are outside the village. We are Spera in JUN08: “We are outside the village. We are hungry. We asked the villagers for food and they hungry. We asked the villagers for food and they would not help. What should we do?”would not help. What should we do?”

SIGINTSIGINT

Effects Achieved Effects Achieved

• Gayankhel in SEP07: Numerous Sub-Gayankhel in SEP07: Numerous Sub-Commanders and insurgents seek out the Commanders and insurgents seek out the Program for Strengthening Peace and Program for Strengthening Peace and Reconciliation (PTS) because they have lost Reconciliation (PTS) because they have lost the will to fightthe will to fight

• Spera in MAR08: HUMINT source points out Spera in MAR08: HUMINT source points out the location of a Taliban and foreign fighter the location of a Taliban and foreign fighter safe-house just inside the border of Pakistan safe-house just inside the border of Pakistan resulting in a HIMARS strike that neutralizes resulting in a HIMARS strike that neutralizes many high level leaders of Al Qaeda in many high level leaders of Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. Several of these leaders were Afghanistan. Several of these leaders were foreign fighters. foreign fighters.

HUMINTHUMINT

Long Term Long Term RecommendationsRecommendations


• Units operating largely dismounted Units operating largely dismounted need equipment tailored to that end:need equipment tailored to that end:– Body armor or plate carrier that more Body armor or plate carrier that more

comfortably facilitates a heavy rucksackcomfortably facilitates a heavy rucksack– Better quality uniform that tears less easilyBetter quality uniform that tears less easily

• Multicam has been field-tested and Multicam has been field-tested and preferred by combat infantry units in preferred by combat infantry units in the field as a superior patternthe field as a superior pattern– Light infantry units should be authorized Light infantry units should be authorized

to make the switch to Multicam or to make the switch to Multicam or something similar to MARPAT something similar to MARPAT


• Expand the responsibility of light Expand the responsibility of light infantry/airborne/air assault/cavalry forcesinfantry/airborne/air assault/cavalry forces– standardize a “functional fitness” program standardize a “functional fitness” program

modeled on CROSSFIT/road march combination modeled on CROSSFIT/road march combination designed specifically for frontline, Combat Arms designed specifically for frontline, Combat Arms soldierssoldiers

– give light infantry and standard line units a more give light infantry and standard line units a more aggressive and kinetic role in combataggressive and kinetic role in combat

• Depart from the COP concept until increases Depart from the COP concept until increases in available manpower and return to the in available manpower and return to the Airmobile/LRRP-style unit and mission setAirmobile/LRRP-style unit and mission set– increase Army aviation assets significantly increase Army aviation assets significantly


• Theater school teaching offensive Theater school teaching offensive disruption and its tactical advantagesdisruption and its tactical advantages– Precedent: Brits’ FTC in Malaya and Precedent: Brits’ FTC in Malaya and

Americans’ Recondo in VietnamAmericans’ Recondo in Vietnam– None of our current pre-deployment None of our current pre-deployment

training centers are able to accurately training centers are able to accurately duplicate Afghanistan’s altitude and duplicate Afghanistan’s altitude and terrain so units arrive unpreparedterrain so units arrive unprepared

– A school in theater would better prepare A school in theater would better prepare line infantry units for the rigors they will line infantry units for the rigors they will endure during their deploymentendure during their deployment


• Improve “Bottom-Up” Information FlowImprove “Bottom-Up” Information Flow– Better unfiltered contact between soldiers Better unfiltered contact between soldiers

at the tactical level and decision makers at at the tactical level and decision makers at the strategic levelthe strategic level

– Only a network can defeat a networkOnly a network can defeat a network– Better dissemination and promotion of Better dissemination and promotion of

tactical academia-style journal tactical academia-style journal submissions from Captains and below submissions from Captains and below


• Sustainable ANSF training based on the level Sustainable ANSF training based on the level of technology they will be relying uponof technology they will be relying upon– Who will provide air support and logistics after we Who will provide air support and logistics after we

are gone?are gone?– Shifting their focus to dismounted, light infantry Shifting their focus to dismounted, light infantry

missions – their light-skinned vehicle convoys are missions – their light-skinned vehicle convoys are soft, easy targetssoft, easy targets

• Strengthening their NCO corpsStrengthening their NCO corps• Current Embedded Tactical Training Teams Current Embedded Tactical Training Teams

(ETT’s) are inconsistent in quality and level (ETT’s) are inconsistent in quality and level of knowledge and experienceof knowledge and experience


““I didn’t carry out my tactics in Malaya by I didn’t carry out my tactics in Malaya by raising masses of local troops and putting raising masses of local troops and putting them all in British uniforms and giving them them all in British uniforms and giving them enormous loads to carry so that they became enormous loads to carry so that they became completely immobile. We did it by equipping completely immobile. We did it by equipping them and training them as near as possible them and training them as near as possible to the enemy they had to compete with in a to the enemy they had to compete with in a particular terrain. This applied not only to particular terrain. This applied not only to local forces but also to British units.”local forces but also to British units.”

––Field Marshal Templer, Field Marshal Templer, 1968 1968


• An Air Force platform that is designed An Air Force platform that is designed specifically to move slowly and support specifically to move slowly and support infantry movementsinfantry movements– Need more A-10C Warthogs or AC-130s in Need more A-10C Warthogs or AC-130s in

theatertheater

• Greater focus on current conflict than Greater focus on current conflict than present allocations allowpresent allocations allow

The tactical war in Afghanistan is entirely The tactical war in Afghanistan is entirely WINNABLE. The points discussed in this WINNABLE. The points discussed in this briefing are purposely apolitical and are briefing are purposely apolitical and are

simply meant to highlight changes we can simply meant to highlight changes we can make right now with existing technology, make right now with existing technology, resources, and personnel as the fighting resources, and personnel as the fighting

force built to win our Nation’s wars. force built to win our Nation’s wars.

ConclusionConclusion

QuestionsQuestions

Documents

Seizing the Initiative: An argument for the return to true light infantry doctrine in Afghanistan; a Platoon/ Company level perspective SFC Andrew Moore,