SECURITY IN THE BLACK SEA REGION Aslıhan Anlar Kocaeli ... Anlar_79-108.pdf · annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation in 2014. The crisis continued with the escalation of

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ABSTRACT

The paper focuses on developments that took place after November 2013, starting with Euromaidan (a challenge against the supremacy of the Russia) and the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation in 2014. The crisis continued with the escalation of tension between Russia and Turkey in 2015, originating from the fact that the two countries provided support to opposing sides in the Syrian civil conflict. Tension was further increased with the establishment of a missile defense station in Romania in 2016. These incidents, which took place over a three year period, worsened the security situation of the Region. The factors behind them are investigated through the prism of the multiple hierarchy model developed by Douglas Lemke and Randal Schweller’s arguments on international security. I conclude that a spill-over effect of an on-going civil war in a nearby region may lead to an immediate but short term crisis among regional actors while the incompatibility between the efforts of the dominant country to maintain the status-quo and the efforts of the dissatisfied states to change the order and other non-regional great powers’ support to the latter group of states are the basic causes of the tension in the Black Sea Region. Revisions regarding these two models are suggested in terms of the clarification of the status-quo, measuring satisfaction of the regional states, different stances towards the regional and the global hegemons, factors behind the efficiency of the great power interference and the effects of the balance of dissatisfied and satisfied states on security

KEYWORDS

• Black Sea Region• Russia• Turkey• Regional security• Great power• Status-quo

1. Introduction

The Black Sea Region (BSR, hereafter), 25 years after the end of the Cold War, still suffers from the absence of order, security and stability. Moreover, the state of affairs in the Region regarding security has continuously been threatened and challenged. Order in the BSR has been based on the tri-partiality of littoral states: firstly, the EU and the NATO member states (Bulgaria and Romania); secondly, the NATO member, EU candidate and middle range power (Turkey); and lastly, Russia and the post-Soviet countries. Since the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, NATO and EU integrationist policies have been expanding from the former Warsaw Pact member states to the countries which Russia sees in its sphere of influence. During the

Aslıhan AnlarKocaeli [email protected].

Aslıhan Anlar

SECURITY IN THE BLACK SEA REGION

BEFORE AND AFTER 2014

The Romanian Journal of Society and Politics80

ten year period from November 2003 (the Rose Revolution in Georgia) to November 2013 (Euromaidan in Ukraine), relationships among regional countries vis-à-vis the great powers were changing and Russia has made attempts to prevent this process that may threaten its existing superior position over the post-Soviet countries.

While doing this, it has been conducting four main policies towards the post-Soviet countries. First of all, either with or without an invitation from the governments of these states, it has tried to maintain the Russian or Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) peacekeeping military forces which had been previously deployed in/near these countries. In this way, it has attempted to preserve its prominent position in the post-conflict process. To keep its dominant position among these countries, it has supported political elites and leaders who were viewed as pro-Russian (or at least not pro-Western) by offering some advantageous exchanges and halted dissident states’ attempts at change by carrying out punishment tactics, including natural gas cuts or trade bans (Kelkitli: 2008, p.79). Thirdly, it has pursued more integrationist policies towards the CIS region countries either in economic (Eurasian Economic Union- EEU) or military spheres (the Collective Security Treaty Organization -CSTO). Finally, it has tried to prevent the other great powers or regional powers from becoming influential over these countries or in any way exerting influence in the Region. Except its relations with subordinates, Russia could not prevent NATO enlargement and was compelled to accept Romanian and Bulgarian membership into NATO and the EU, while sustaining cooperative relations with Turkey.

Although Russia was striving to avert the process of change in the Region, it could not fully succeed in coercing regional countries to pursue policies in compliance with its preferences. As regards the deployment of military bases, Russia withdrew all troops from Georgia and closed all military bases there, with only one exception - the Gudauta military base, which has been transformed into the Russian military base in Abkhazia (Russian troops are also found in Tskhinvali) (Piven: 2015). Regarding its second tactic, the pro-Russian Ukrainian leader was ousted by the parliament. It was unable to persuade Ukraine to enter the CSTO or the EEU or keep Georgia in the CIS. Despite its fierce opposition, it could not prevent the establishment of military ties between Georgia and the USA and NATO. In Ukraine, it managed to prevent the signing of the Association Agreement, but the population of Western Ukraine organized a protest.

With every attempt of Ukraine or Georgia to change their position vis-à-vis the Russian Federation and following each failure of Russia in its policies towards these two countries, the Region became the scene of military conflicts, instability or uncertainty because of Russian reactions, aiming to avert the undesired results or overturn their failures. The developments which took place in November 2013 in Ukraine were the last case in a chain of challenges against Russia and the Russian counter policy in March 2014 is the last example of its reaction.

The strain between Russia and Turkey arose because the two countries supported opposing sides of the Syrian civil conflict, and on 24 November 2015 it threatened to totally rupture relations after a Russian SU-24 fighter jet was shot down on. Regional order and security, this time, was challenged in the north and south of the Region. While the region suffered from internal tension in the northern part, the problems

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between Russia and Turkey were affected by an external problem – a long term civil war in the southern part. In 2016, Russia faced another challenge, caused by another regional country, i.e. Romania, letting NATO establish a missile defense shield system in its territory.

In this paper, I argue that the main reason behind this new security situation is the existence of discontent between the satisfied regional hegemony and other dissatisfied states in the Region. The challenge of the latter against the former, when backed by other non-regional great power leads to increase tension between the states, which could pave the way towards military conflict in the Region. While assessing the effects of tension between the regional states on regional security, Douglas Lemke’s multiple hierarchy model and Randall Schweller’s arguments on international security are benefitted.

Within this framework, the next section will show the change in the state-of-affairs of security in the BSR. The third section will summarize general arguments of Douglas Lemke and Randall Schweller and explain how these two theoretical frameworks are to be used. Then, the fourth section will lay down the factors behind the security situation since 2014, benefitting from the theoretical framework explained in the previous section. In the conclusion, generalizations are to be made regarding factors behind regional security such as roles of the great power and the middle range powers, non-regional great powers and the spill-over effect of military conflicts on the surrounding regions.

2. Comparing Security Situations in the BSR before and after 2014

In order to lay out the changes that emerged after 2014, it is crucial to explain the previous security situation in the BSR. The state-of-affairs concerning security in the BSR will be explained by examining the following: (a) the number of military conflicts in the Region; (b) the significant increases in military expenditures of states; (c) the threat perceptions of regional actors towards each other (by reviewing security documents) and (d) the challenging or revisionist policies of the non-regional great powers regarding the Region.

In the Black Sea Region, there had been no military conflicts during the period from 1996 to 2008 and then from 2009 to 2013. In 2014 a military conflict took place between the Ukrainian central government and the so-called independent republic of Donetsk and Luhansk from March 2014 to February 2015 (the Minsk II ceasefire). While it is categorized as “medium intensity” by the Armed Conflict Database (International Institute for Strategic Studies: 2016), it led to the emergence of another source of instability in the Region by resulting in 9,300 fatalities, 318,000 refugees, 1,382,000 IDPs (by June 2015) (UNCHR, 2015), an annexed territory and the establishment of two break away de facto states.

When the military expenditures from 2000-2012 are compared, slight increases could be seen from 2011 to 2012 in Ukraine and Russian Federation’s figures. Georgia’s expenditure rose significantly in 2007/2008; then decreased as other countries’ expenditures were steadily decreasing (Figure 1).


Figure 1. Military Expenditures of Black Sea Countries from 2000 to 2012 (Ratios of Military Expenditures to GDP)

Source: These figures were prepared by the author, benefitting the data from the “SIPRI Military Expenditure Database 1988-2012” (the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute: 2013).

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Figure 2. Ratios of Military Expenditures to GDP of the Black Sea Countries from 2012 to 2015

Source: The figure was prepared by the author, benefitting the data from the Military Expenditure Database (the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute: 2015)

During the period from 2012 to 2015, the military expenditures of Georgia, Bulgaria and Turkey have decreased slightly. Romania’s slightly increased while Russian and Ukrainian expenditures significantly increased (Figure 2).

Regarding threat perceptions of regional countries, Ukraine accepted a military doctrine which underlined the country’s non-bloc status in April 2011. At that time, the document did not consider any state (or coalition of states) as a military enemy, but would consider a state or coalition of states whose actions or intentions indicated a threat of the use of military force against Ukraine as a potential military enemy (Russia Today: 2011). After 2013, the President of Ukraine signed two more documents on security: “Decree of the President of Ukraine on the Strategy of National Security of Ukraine” on 26 May 2015 and “Decree on the New Edition of the Military Doctrine of Ukraine” on 25 September 2015. According to the Military Doctrine, “Ukraine is currently facing an acute military threat, Russian armed aggression, which includes temporary occupation of the Crimea and aggression in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions” and it defines the full-scale armed aggression of Russia against Ukraine as “the possible threat that may emerge in the future” (Ministry of Defence of Ukraine: 2015). In the Strategy of the National Security of Ukraine, the “aggressive Russian actions” are defined as recent threats to the national security (Presidency of Ukraine: 2015).

Georgia also published the “National Military Strategy” in 2014 and defined


“occupation of Georgian territory by the Russian Federation, regional instability, cyber threats, natural and manmade disasters, international terrorism and transnational organized crime and the fact that the occupied Georgian territory creates a favorable environment for them” as major risks and threats (Ministry of Defence of Georgia: 2014).

Turkey revised its “National Security Policy Document” in 2015 and defined five basic risks: (a) civil disobedience, provocative activities aiming to initiate a public uprising; (b) illegal entities aiming at eliminating or disabling the elected government or any kinds of tutelage attempts; (c) threats against communication security; (d) social media postings that provoke the population or create a threat perception among the population; (e) threats against cyber security; (f) threats against capital and funds; (g) terrorist organizations exploiting religious feelings (e.g. ISIS), regional threats or activities triggering sectarian conflicts; (h) ethnic terrorist organizations including the PKK/PYD and (i) other threats against public safety and order, energy supply security, virtual environment, food and water security, disasters epidemic diseases or threats against public health (Milliyet: 2015). As can be seen in this document, Turkey attaches great importance to internal developments as well as terrorist organizations. The military attacks by the PKK in urban city centers rather than rural areas and its attempts to establish de-facto administrative units after the breakdown of the Kurdish Peace process in July 2015 and anxiety regarding the possibility of PYD led Syrian Kurds establishing an autonomous region on Turkey’s border (especially after YPG crossed to the west of the Euphrates River), threats posed by the ISIS, negative repercussions from Syria and Iraq (including serious spillover of ethnic sectarian conflicts from Syria into Turkey) and huge refugee flows from Syria (Dalay: 2016) may be defined as basic regional threats against Turkey.

Russia also announced two new documents: the Military Doctrine (29 December 2014) and the Russian National Security Strategy Paper- RNSSP (31 December 2015). The latter is a detailed document, containing issues ranging from strategic weapons to public health (Russian Federation Presidency: 2015). The part of the Paper entitled “Russia in the Modern World” underlined policies of the USA and its allies which aim to contain Russia (Russian Federation Presidency: 2015). Militarization and arms-race processes in regions adjacent to Russia and Euro-Atlantic countries’ support to Ukraine were also addressed in the Paper (Russian Federation Presidency: 2015). The utmost importance was devoted to further NATO enlargement and the deployment of its infrastructure in countries closer to the Russian border, including US missile defense systems (Russian Federation Presidency: 2015).

Intrastate instability and conflicts, terrorism (including ISIS) interethnic strife, religious enmity, extremism, the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and the likelihood of them falling into terrorists’ hands, transnational organized crime, problems related to the environment and food security, shortage of fresh water, climate change, epidemics and the use of economic methods for achieving political goals were all underlined in the RNSSP (Russian Federation Presidency: 2015). The last part of the document attached importance to relations and collaboration with various countries of the world, including CIS countries, and other entities such as Abkhazia and South Ossetia, CSTO, EEU, Shanghai Cooperation Organization and cooperation

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with the USA in the spheres of strategic offensive arms and nuclear weapons, the fight against terrorism and the settlement of regional conflict (Russian Federation Presidency: 2015). The points of “NATO enlargement, deployment of the European missile defense system and the implementation of the ‘Global Strike’ concept with the addition of regime changes threatening Russia’s interests” were also dealt with in the Russian Military Doctrine (Russian Federation Presidency: 2014).

A review of the security documents of various countries clearly indicates that there have been growing threat perceptions in Ukraine and Georgia because of aggressive Russian actions; in Russia because of deployment of NATO’s military infrastructure, possible regime change in the post-Soviet countries and terrorism and other transnational threats; and in Turkey because of internal developments and terrorist activities.

The last indicator is the challenging or revisionist policies of the non-regional great powers towards the region. As is widely known, the USA had supported the ambitions of Ukraine and Georgia to join NATO (Dempsey: 2008; Harding: 2008; Voice of America: 2009). Ukraine and Georgia had applied for the MAP, and at the 2008 Bucharest Summit it was pledged that Georgia and Ukraine would be admitted to the Alliance at an unspecified time in the future (NATO: 2008). The USA had also established bilateral military ties with regional countries (especially with Georgia) and organized military exercises with Romania, Bulgaria, Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine. It had also made efforts to be influential in the Region by establishing political, economic and military ties with the regional countries. The EU developed many policies and initiatives regarding the post-Soviet countries, including Ukraine and Georgia, such as the European Neighbourhood Policy, the Black Sea Synergy and the Eastern Partnership.

Before 2013, order in the Region can be defined as the existence of hegemonic regional order. In this order, a regional dominant country has other countries in its sphere of influence. In the region, some countries may fall outside of this sphere but they, as well as other non-regional countries, would not follow policies challenging the dominant country.

After November 2013, this order was transformed into another form – a regional balance of power system in which the competitive stances of great powers prevail[1]. This was reflected in the creation of more intense relations between EU/NATO and the two former Soviet republics, Russian Federation’s military operations and the decision of Romania to host parts of the NATO missile defense system. Moreover, the conflict in Syria has had serious repercussions on Turkey-Russian relations since 2011. These two states, which were dealing with internal problems (Turkey has been fighting against terrorist organizations and Russia has been dealing with the Ukrainian conflict), are facing the prospect of military conflict on another front.

3. Factors Behind the Regional Tension

There may be various factors behind the eruption of a regional crisis as well 1 The concepts of “hegemonic regional order” and “regional balance of power system” are borrowed from Papayoanou (1997, pp. 133-135)


as the outbreak of a local or global war. One of the most common categorizations regarding reasons for war is efficient causes vs. permissive causes. Efficient causes are connected to the particular circumstances surrounding individual wars (Garnett: 2013, p. 24) and war may break out due to a certain set of objectives or defensive concerns of a state. Permissive causes are features that exist in the international system, which do not promote war but allow it to occur (Garnett: 2013, p. 25). There is another categorization: immediate vs. underlying causes. Immediate causes refer to situations which could be trivial or accidental events that eventually trigger a war, while underlying causes are the background conditions originating from structural and international circumstances, rather than deliberate state policies, causing war (Garnett: 2013, p. 25).

Regional crises also have efficient and immediate causes which may accidentally emerge and may only lead to short term effects if they are managed properly and on time. On the other hand, underlying and permissive causes of war can both be related to the specific demands of a certain state which may originate from long term background developments or more structural problems and policies.

For analyzing the second group of regional events, the general claims of two theorists on the outbreak of war can be used. The first one is Douglas Lemke’s multiple hierarchy model. According to Lemke, other than regions under the effect of tight great power politics, the world is composed of local hierarchies. Within this local hierarchy, predominance of a certain state in a locale decreases the likelihood of war; but if a dissatisfied challenger achieves parity with the dominant state, the probability of war is hypothesized to increase (Lemke: 2004, p. 50). It was clearly seen that he interrelates the occurrence of war with the existence of a dissatisfied regional power with the capability to challenge the dominant state (see Figures 3 and 4). Dissatisfaction is related to the existing status-quo, including the rules governing control of territory, natural resources and ethnic, military, economic and even ideological matters (Lemke: 2004, pp. 54-55). Lemke also downscales the “fight for control of the status quo” at the international level with the “fight for the privilege to write the rules governing important local elements” at the regional level (2004, p. 68).

Figure 3. Hierarchy and Distribution of Satisfaction

Source: Kugler et al: (2004, p. 165)

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Although his analysis is performed at the regional level, he needs to attach importance to the global level and touches upon great power interference because if it occurs it may change the dynamics of the relationship between parity, dissatisfaction and war (Lemke: 2004, p. 52). If great power interference becomes common, then “their intentions and preferences” would be “cause of [regional] wars (tensions) (…), rather than the structure of local relations between the minor powers” (Lemke: 2004, p. 52). He also defines a situation in which “a local dominant state would be courting trouble if it established a local status quo at odds with the global dominant power’s preferences since such a local status quo might “invite” interference by the global dominant power” (Lemke: 2004, p. 54). It seems that Lemke thought that the local dominant states should establish an order according to the global hegemony’s desire and interests. At this point, Lemke claims that “it seems likely the local dominant state would prefer to avoid such great power interference, and therefore the local status quo of most local hierarchies would revolve around issues of local concern” (Lemke: 2004, p. 54).

Figure 4. Russian Regional Hierarchy in the Central Asia and the Black Sea Region

Source: Author, based on Kugler et al (2004, p. 166)


In many regions, the local hierarchy may be in compliance with global powers’ preferences; however, some developments (such as the 9/11 terrorist attacks) may affect the policy preferences of the global powers, and the strategic importance of the some regions (such as the South Caucasus and Central Asia), which have secondary importance in the eyes of the global powers, may increase. Then global powers’ interference in local issues and the emergence of a competitive stance between the regional dominant power and global powers become inevitable in those regions.

After setting out the hypothesis about the occurrence of war, Lemke defines how he measures the relative power and status-quo satisfaction of states. To measure national capabilities, he uses the Correlates of War’s Composite Index of National Capability- CINC database and the GDP of states. He defines status-quo as the formal and informal arrangements and satisfaction as the condition in which states perceive these arrangements as advantageous. He advises “alliance portfolio similarity” to measure the satisfaction of great powers. This is an indicator of the similarity between international preferences and “the more a great power’s alliance portfolio coincides with the alliance portfolio of the dominant state, the more it has similar preferences to the dominant state, and is thus satisfied with the international status quo” (Lemke: 2004, p. 100).

He also suggested two more indicators to measure state dis/satisfaction: territorial dis/agreement (disputatious type) and similarity of states’ votes in the United Nations General Assembly (Lemke: 2004, p. 102). However, he used the “extraordinary military buildups” indicator to measure status quo dissatisfaction (2004, p. 104).

Schweller has similar views; however, his arguments are more about great power policies than minor states. He defined five types of states; expressing that “some states value what they covet more than what they have (1st type); others are entirely satisfied with their possessions (2nd type); still others value what they have only slightly more than what they covet (3rd type), and vice versa (4th type); some states consider their possessions meager but are not envious of others (5th type)”[2] (Schweller: 1994, p. 100). He argues that “the stability of the system depends on the balance of revisionist and conservative forces. When status-quo states are far more powerful than revisionist states, the system will be stable. When a revisionist state or coalition is stronger than the defenders of the status quo, the system will eventually undergo change. (…)” (Schweller: 1994, p. 104).

Within this framework, developments in the BSR can be assessed according to Lemke and Schweller’s conceptualizations. First of all, six Black Sea countries should be categorized according to their satisfaction at regional level (vis-à-vis the Russian Federation) and at global level (vis-à-vis the USA or the European Union) (Figure 5).

2 Categorizations written in parenthesis are not found in the original text.

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Figure 5. Regional Hierarchy in the Black Sea Region

Source: Author, based on Kugler et al (2004, p. 165)

a) The Russian Federation, a regional dominant country vis-à-vis the post-Soviet part of the Region (2nd Type)

b) Turkey, also a satisfied regional country, is not a challenger either at regional or at global level (2nd Type)

c) Romania, satisfied at the global level, but a challenger at the regional level (4th type), values what they covet slightly more than what they have.

d) Bulgaria is not a challenger at either regional or global level (5th type) because it is neither a dominant country nor a challenger

e) Georgia is a regional dissatisfied country, a regional challenger; but not capable enough. (1st type)

f) Ukraine, a divided country: a pro-dominant country part (3rd type or 5th type) and a challenger part (1st type) [3]

When this regional dynamic is looked into, there are two powerful satisfied states; one is neither satisfied nor dissatisfied; two are dissatisfied states and one is divided (containing both satisfied and dissatisfied parts). According to both Schweller and Lemke, the region should be experiencing peace and stability, as was observed in the Region during the period from 1996 to 2008 and then from 2009 to 2013.

At two points, in 2008 and in 2013/2014, military conflicts threatened the stability.

3 Position of these countries are defined according to their challenging/supporting policies vis-à-vis the Russian Federation- regional hegemon. Georgia and Ukraine (the western part) have had a challenging position; Turkey and Bulgaria have not had. Romania, which has been different from both the satisfied group and the dissatisfied group, would like to change the status-quo, but not totally destruct it.


These two military conflicts firstly originated from the efforts of one dissatisfied state to change the existing status-quo and secondly, the dissatisfied group’s outweighing the satisfied group and the transformation of this contention between these two parts of the country into a military conflict. Besides military conflicts, tensions also arose from the second type states (Russia vs. Turkey in 2015) and fourth type states (Russia vs. NATO through Romania in 2016); among them the former one ended without a conflict and the latter continues to be a source of tension.

To explain these developments, they are evaluated by capturing the relationship between the dissatisfaction of the regional countries and their challenging policies. While assessing these policies that challenge regional dominance, alliance portfolios and territorial contentions are examined[4]. Military expenditures were looked at in the previous section. After defining this relationship, the causes behind the regional dissatisfied states’ policies, which are not in compliance with Lemke’s assumptions regarding the likelihood of war in regions (without great power interference), are analyzed. To do this, Schweller’s calculation of values will be consulted and another variable – non-regional great power interference – will be looked into. Since an offer of membership in another alliance or economic union is considered an example of great power interference[5], this appears to be the main driving force behind the current crisis in the region.

4. Developments after November 2013

4.1. Efficient/ Immediate Cause of Regional Tension: Deterioration of Russian-Turkish Relations

Despite their support to the warring parties in the Syrian civil war, Turkish-Russian relations started to deteriorate after 30 September 2015 when the Russian Federation began its military operation in Syria upon a formal request by the Syrian government for military help against rebel and jihadist groups. Tension increased on 24 November 2015 when the Turkish armed forces shot down a Russian SU-24 fighter jet with the accusation that it was violating Turkey’s airspace. Turkey immediately carried the issue to the NATO agenda and refused to apologize for its actions, while Russia harshly responded by declaring large-scale economic sanctions against Turkey, suspending the visa-free regime, banning charter flights and accusing the Turkish government of assisting ISIS and other terrorist groups in Syria (Erşen: 2016, p. 2). Moscow additionally deployed S-400 anti-aircraft missiles at the Hmeimim airbase in Syria. Such missiles can hit targets up to 400 km away, which covers the airspace of Syria, Lebanon, Cyprus, half of Israel and a large area of Turkey (BBC News: 2015). Following the freezing of relations between two countries, the Kremlin announced on June 27 that the President of Turkey had apologized to the family of the pilot and expressed his willingness to begin a process of normalization in bilateral relations in his 4 Regarding vote affinity in the UN General Assembly, Lemke, himself claims that it is not a reliable indicator for third world countries.5 It is accepted as a sufficient indicator because in a relationship between a dominant state and a subordinate state, a dominant state may restrict its subordinate “from giving market privileges to third parties or entering into economic transactions that give others influence over their affairs” in the economic sphere and may “limit a subordinate’s cooperation with third parties” in the military sphere (Lake: 2009, pp.54-56).

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letter (Russia Today RT: 2016). Finally on 9th August 2016, the two leaders met in St Petersburg and at the press conference organized after their meeting, they both stated their desire to improve economic relations by lifting economic measures, strengthening educational and cultural cooperation, establishing cooperation and joint councils for strategic planning, cooperating on energy issues such as the Turkish Stream and the Akkuyu nuclear plant and setting up a Turkey-Russia-Azerbaijan trilateral Commission. They also decided to organize a second meeting separately to discuss the Syria crisis and the fight against terrorism (TRT Haber: 2016).

Upon the fall of Aleppo, Turkey and Russia started to harmonize their policies regarding Syria and a ceasefire, brokered by Turkey and Russia, was put into effect across Syria after the Assad regime and the opposition groups agreed to a nationwide deal on 30 December 2016 (Walker and Shaheen: 2016). This ceasefire and, if it is signed, a prospective peace agreement, will reinforce Russian regional and global power and, at the same time, will eradicate sources of threats against Turkey’s national security, originating from the large flow of refugees and the existence of Kurdish paramilitaries in northern Syria (Walker and Shaheen: 2016). This cooperation between Turkey and Russia regarding Syria continued in the Astana negotiations on 23-24 January 2017, on 14-15 March 2017 and 3-4 May 2017.

This Russian-Turkish strife emerged accidentally and it did not last long. Cooperation on long term strategic and economic interests is preferred to the continuation of confrontational policies. The Astana process is a reflection of this policy preference of the two leaders and an example of the management of a short term crisis and the re-establishment of cooperation between two satisfied regional countries.

4.2. Permissive Causes of Regional Tension

4.2.1. The Regional Level:4.2.1.1. Emergence of the second regional challenger after Georgia - Euromaidan and Civil War in Ukraine

The most recent crisis was set off on 21 November 2013 due to mass protests by pro-Western groups supporting the signing of the EU Association Agreement, including the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements with the EU, in response to the Ukrainian presidency’s announcement that it would not sign the agreement. The unrest escalated, culminating in a political coup against Yanukovich on 22 February 2014 and a referendum in Crimea that established the ‘Republic of Crimea’ on 16 March 2014. Two days later, Russian and Crimean leaders signed a deal in Moscow to join the peninsula with Russia (BBC News: 2014a). The agreement annexing the Crimean Peninsula to Russia was approved by the State Duma on 20 March 2014 (Tsvetkova and Gutterman: 2014) and formally entered into force with Vladimir Putin’s signature on 21 March 2014 (BBC News: 2014b).

Unrest in Ukraine’s Eastern provinces continued; a referendum on the status of Luhansk and Donetsk was set for 11 May 2014 in these two regions (BBC News: 2014c). This referendum prompted Ukraine to commence a military operation against


the pro-Russian groups in the eastern part of the country on 14 April 2014 in order to preserve Ukraine’s territorial integrity (Russia Today RT: 2014). On 12 May, the People’s Republic of Donetsk and the People’s Republic of Luhansk declared their independence. (The Guardian: 2014). Finally, on 15 February 2015, the Minsk Protocol, which set terms for a ceasefire, was signed by Ukraine, Russia, France, Germany, the OSCE and the pro-Russian separatists (Pieniazek: 2015).

The Euromaidan events and the removal of Yanukovich from office were clear signs of Western Ukrainian dissatisfaction regarding the status-quo and an effort to change the rules of the game and its partner country. Beginning with the Orange revolution, with the exception of Yanukovich’s rule from 2010 to 2014, Western Ukraine wanted to strengthen relations with the Euro-Atlantic institutions and set a NATO membership goal. Georgia, under the presidency of Eduard Shevardnadze, declared its intention to join NATO at the Prague Summit in 2002 (NATO: 2002). According to Lemke, it is one of the signs of dissatisfaction with the status-quo because their alliance portfolio does not coincide with the alliance portfolio of the dominant state and this means that they do not have preferences similar to those of the dominant state, so they are not satisfied with the regional status quo. Georgia had been dealing with territorial disputes since its independence and wanted to end the dismantling of Georgian territory. Unlike Georgia, Ukraine had no additional land demands or any intention of changing the autonomous status of Crimea and seemed to be satisfied with the on-going territorial demarcation. However, the Western part of the country was not satisfied with the pro-Russian orientation of Ukraine.

The following charts (Figures 6-10) clearly display the power differences between regional countries. Although these countries suffered from insufficient capabilities, their political and territorial situations had worsened considerably by the end of this challenge. How did these dissatisfied states without capabilities dare to challenge the regional dominance (a situation totally unexpected according to Lemke’s theory)?

Figure 6. National Capabilities of the Regional Countries

Source: The figure was prepared by the author, based on data from the Composite Index of National Capabilities 1816-2012. (The Correlates of War)

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Figure 7. GDP of the Regional Countries (in current US$ millions; in 2015)

Source: World Bank “GDP (current US$)” (World Bank, 2017a)

Figure 8. GDP of the Regional Countries 1992-2015 (in trillion current US$)

Source: World Bank, GDP (current US$)” (World Bank, 2017a)


Figure 9. GDP of Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine and Georgia 1992-2015 (in tril-lion current US$)

Source: World Bank, GDP (current US$)” (World Bank, 2017a)

Figure 10. GDP per Capita (Purchasing Power Parity) of the Regional Coun-tries (current international $)

Source: World Bank. “GDP, PPP” (World Bank, 2017b)

At this point, Schweller’s argument can be considered more relevant to explain the situation: what they covet is far more valuable than what they have. Georgia, before 2008 was already a territorially dismantled country. When the military expenditures of Georgia in 2007/8 are examined, it is clear that it aims to change this situation. Due to threat perception, Georgia was already in search of another security guarantee, such as

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NATO. In economic and social terms, poverty rate (relative share of population under 60% of consumption) was at 20.1%. The GDP per capita was US$1012 and the human development index value was 0,769, which positioned it at 70 out of 188 countries. (UNDP: 2016)[6]. Closer relations with the West were perceived as an advantage for Georgia’s economy and the ongoing security predicament (Waller: 2016).

In Ukraine, the human development index value was 0.743 (84th in rank) (UNDP: 2016). About one quarter of Ukrainians live at or below the national poverty line; the poverty rate is 28.6% (Duda et al: 2015, p. 18). In 2014, according to Maplecroft’s tenth annual Human Rights Risk Atlas (HRRA), Ukraine was defined as the country in which the human rights situation had deteriorated the most, with Turkey “due to heavy-handed government responses to civil unrest and failures in rule of law” (Maplecroft: 2014).

Figure 11. Democracy Ranking of the Regional Countries

Source: Global Democracy Ranking

Ukraine’s democracy rank was 73rd in 2014, while Georgian, Romanian and Bulgarian are respectively 57th, 43rd and 42nd (see Figure 11). To cope with these economic and political problems and with security problems after 2014 (dealing with the rebels in the Eastern Ukraine), most of the Ukrainians (outside of Luhansk, Donetsk and Crimea) (71%) saw the EU as a reliant partner to receive economic aid from. Although 67% of the population supported EU membership, they were more hesitant about receiving military arms from NATO (54% support) or joining the alliance (53%) (Simmons et al: 2015). According to the GFK’s opinion poll, 55% of the population agreed with the statement that Association Agreement with the EU

6 To compare, the human development index value for Romania was 0.802 (50th in rank); 0.794 for Bulgaria (56th); 0.767 for Turkey (71st) and 0.804 for Russia (49th) (UNDP:2016)


would help Ukraine to eliminate corruption and build a stable democracy (Volosevych and Vitkovska: 2016, p. 3).

While the EU and NATO integration processes were widely perceived by Ukrainian and Georgian populations as the solution to their economic, social and military problems, it should be noted that the NATO and the EU’s policies for regional countries encouraged the leaders of Ukraine and Georgia towards further rapprochement.

4.2.1.2. Level of Russian Dominance and the Fight for the Privilege to Write the Rules

Since the end of the Cold War, Russia has tried to establish a set of relationships between the former Soviet Union countries, which can be defined as international hierarchy. This emerges when one unit, the dominant state, possesses authority over a second, the subordinate state’ (Lake: 2007, p. 50). This type of relationship is a model of international relations in which ‘authority is not a law but a contract’ under which the rulers ‘must produce an acceptable social order and … [the ruled] must consent to the former’s authority’ (Lake: 2007, pp. 54-55). When this mutually accepted relationship composed of order and compliance begins to wane, subordinate states may start to challenge the dominant state (Anlar: forthcoming). Alternatively, subordinate states may make a cost-benefit analysis and “if the expected benefits outweigh the expected cost, they challenge a dominant power” (Podliska: 2010, p. 47). Finally they will attempt to change the existing order.

Russia’s dominant position over Ukraine and Georgia has been challenged at various times by both subordinate countries and other non-regional great powers. In each challenge, Russia succeeded in re-establishing its hierarchic relations with Georgia until 2008 and with Ukraine until 2013[7]. However, after the Georgian operation against South Ossetia and the Ukrainian parliament’s decision to depose the former Ukraine president and the Euromaidan events, Russia decided to sustain its dominant position, not by supporting pro-Russian or neutral political elites in Georgia and Ukraine, but by supporting the emergence of new actors (the so-called republics in Ukraine and Georgia) and establishing its dominance over them. Because its dominant position over Ukraine and Georgia and their hierarchic relations have been loosening, the role of the Russian Federation in the BSR has been transformed from security-provider into instability-creator, as it destroyed regional stability and regional order in the north-eastern part of the region by creating a new order that provides security for its new subordinate partners while simultaneously terminating security for its former subordinates (Anlar: forthcoming).

Russian efforts to maintain control over Georgia and Ukraine by supporting dissidents in these countries are examples of fighting for the privilege to write the rules governing important local elements because one of Russia’s main priorities regarding the post-Soviet region was to prevent other great powers from becoming 7 The relationship between Russia and Georgia during the period between 1992-2013 was divided into three periods: high degree of hierarchy-sphere of influence (1993-2000); low degree of hierarchy-sphere of influence (2001-2007) and disappearance of hierarchy after 2008. During the 1992-2004 period, relations between Ukraine and Russia can be described as hierarchy, the degree of hierarchy began to diminish after 2005. After 2010, the degree of hierarchy returned to its pre-2005 level and finally, hierarchic relations have been disappearing since 2014. For more details, see Anlar (forthcoming).

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influential in these regions. To reach this aim, it has used many tactics such as energy cut-offs, increasing prices or trade bans to discourage pro-Western leaders. After 2008 in Georgia and after 2013 in Ukraine; it preferred to replace its partner countries to establish a new status-quo which was similar to the previous one in that the dominant state is again Russia, but its partners are different.

4.2.1.3. A Regional Challenger - Establishment of Missile Defense Systems

In 2010, NATO allies decided to develop a territorial Ballistic Missile Defense System in order to protect its European populations, territory and forces against threats emanating from regions outside the Euro-Atlantic area in November 2010 at the Lisbon Summit (NATO: 2016a). As part of this program, it was planned that “Turkey is hosting a US BMD radar at Kürecik, Romania is hosting an Aegis Ashore site at Deveselu Air Base, Germany hosts the command center at Ramstein Air Base and Poland will be hosting another Aegis Ashore site at the Redzikowo military base (in the 2018 timeframe)” (NATO: 2016a).

Within this framework, in May 2016, the US activated a land-based missile defense station at the Deveselu air base in Romania. It was said that this shield aimed to protect major European cities from short and medium-range missiles, particularly from the Middle East and Iran (BBC News: 2016; Emmott: 2016). Neither NATO nor US officials could reassure Russia although they said that the shields in Romania and Poland would not be used against any future Russian missile threat (Emmott: 2016), and it did not undermine Russia’s strategic nuclear deterrent (BBC News: 2016). However, Russia sees this system as a direct threat to Russian security and to peace in Europe (Arkhipov and Strzelecki: 2016) and as an attempt at the military and political containment of Russia (Emmott: 2016).

When reviewing Romania’s alliance portfolio, it is clearly part of its integration policy; but allowing the construction of a missile defense shield system despite strong Russian opposition is a clear challenge to Russian dominance in the area. It is also claimed that Romania is determined to take on a leadership role in the Black Sea region (Moroney and Hogler: 2006, p. 27). Despite its weakness vis-à-vis the Russian Federation, how can a regional country challenge the regional dominance, as the opposite situation is foreseen in the theory?

The policies of regional hegemony and satisfied states are in compliance with Lemke’s claims. The dissatisfied states, however, are daring to challenge the regional hegemon and the continuation of its policies despite their military and economic weakness. This inconvenience regarding the theory and practice can be explained by a third factor – the non-regional great power interference.

4.2.2. The Global Level Great power interference – Relationships of Georgia and Ukraine with the EU and NATO

The Euromaidan events, as well as subsequent developments, paved the way for further integration of Ukraine into the EU institutions. In June 2014 the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement was signed by EU Heads of State and Government


and Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko. On 16 September 2014, the Association Agreement was ratified by the Ukrainian Parliament and consent was given by the European parliament. In this way, provisional application of the Association Agreement (1 November 2014) and the parts related to the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (from 1 January 2016) became possible (EU Commission: 2015). In mid-2014 the European Commission established the Support Group for Ukraine in order to assist Ukraine in the implementation of the Association Agreement (EU Commission: 2015). In April 2016, the EU Commission offered to allow visa-free travel to the Schengen area for Ukrainian citizens, in November 2016 the Council agreed to its negotiating position on visa liberalization for Ukraine (European Union External Action: 2017) and in June 2017, visa obligation for citizens of Ukraine for a short stay was abolished (European Commission: 2017).

The EU signed the Association Agreement with Georgia in June 2014. The agreement with DCFTA entered into force on July 1, 2016 and the Association Council was established to oversee its application (Delegation of the European Union to Georgia: 2016). The EU Monitoring Mission was located in the vicinity of the administrative boundary lines of Georgia and the break-away regions (Delegation of the European Union to Georgia: 2016). The EU-Georgia Visa Liberalisation Dialogue was launched on 4 June 2012 and visa obligation for citizens of Georgia for a short stay was abolished in March 2017 (European Commission: 2017).

Regarding NATO, Georgia, as in the term before 2014, continued its membership aspiration and hope to join in NATO-led operations and exercises. After the 2008 Bucharest summit, the decision to provide Georgia with membership prospects was confirmed at the NATO Summits in 2009, 2010, 2012 and 2014. In the Wales Summit, the NATO leaders accepted the Substantial NATO Georgia Package (SNGP) and its initiatives (NATO). In 2015 the NATO Military Committee, under the SNGP, agreed to conduct periodic NATO exercises in Georgia, and the 2016 NATO-Georgia exercise took place (NATO). In the Warsaw Summit on 8-9 July 2016, NATO leaders decided to re-affirm all elements of their decision on Georgia’s eventual membership. At the end, they reiterated their support to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Georgia within its internationally recognized borders (NATO: 2016c). The NATO leaders also called on Russia to “reverse its recognition of the South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states, to stop its construction of border-like obstacles along the administrative boundary lines, and to withdraw its forces from Georgia” and announced that “NATO does not recognize the so-called treaties signed between the Abkhazia region of Georgia and Russia in November 2014, and the South Ossetia region of Georgia and Russia in March 2015” (NATO: 2016c).

In Ukraine, after the current developments, NATO leaders on 1 April 2014 condemned Russia’s illegal military intervention in Ukraine and its violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and they further decided to suspend all practical civilian and military cooperation with Russia (NATO: 2016b). After that, they repeatedly affirmed their firm support of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and called on Russia to reverse the illegal and illegitimate “annexation” of Crimea (NATO: 2016b). Petro Poroshenko also signed a new law, accepting the Strategy of National Security of Ukraine in which Ukraine cancelled the non-bloc status of Ukraine

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(Presidency of Ukraine: 2015a) and approved a new edition of the Military doctrine which envisages the start of a process towards achieving the criteria needed for NATO membership (Presidency of Ukraine: 2015b). The Ukrainian parliament passed a bill to restore NATO membership as the country’s strategic foreign policy objective in June 2017 (Adamovski: 2017). After the Russia-Ukraine conflict, NATO continued to reinforce its support for capability development and capacity building in Ukraine. In the Warsaw Summit, the NATO leaders along with Ukraine president accepted the Comprehensive Assistance Package, which aimed at “consolidating and enhancing NATO’s support to Ukraine, by tailoring capability and capacity building measures for the security and defense sector, which will contribute to enhance Ukraine’s resilience against a wide array of threats, including hybrid threats” (NATO: 2016c).

As was seen in the review of relations, the integrative policies of the Euro-Atlantic institutions became more significant in these two countries. At this point, mutual demands and efforts on both sides should be underlined due to the fact that they are among the driving forces behind Russian reaction aimed at avoiding any change in its position in the Region.

Table 1. Tactics of Coercive Diplomacy of the Russian FederationDevelopments Target

countryDate Russian Reaction Western

ReactionOutcome

Georgian military intervention

against the South Ossetia

Georgia 8 August 2008

Military intervention, recognition of

Abkhazia and South Ossetia

Further integration,

but not membership

Frozen conflict with a cease-

fire; territorially dismantled

GeorgiaRussian SU-24 fighter jet shot

down a by Turkish armed forces

Turkey 24 November

2015

Economic sanctions, suspending visa-free

regime, deployment of S-400 missiles

NATO announce-ment of

support to Turkey

Reconciliation after 7 months

Euromaidan and Military

Conflict between Ukraine Central

Government and Luhansk and

Donetsk

Ukraine 21 November 2013- 15 February

2015

Annexation of Crimea; supporting pro-Russia separatists in eastern Ukraine; (Russia is

also accused to send combat forces and

military equipment by the West)

Further integration,

but not membership

Frozen conflict with a cease-

fire; territorially dismantled

Ukraine

Deployment of Missile Defense

Station in Deveselu Air Base in Romania

Romania/NATO

May 2016 Condemnation; deployment of nuclear-

capable Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad

Deployment of additional

troops in Baltics and

Poland

Increase in tension

Source: Author


To do this, Russia changed its coercive diplomacy tactics from threats, sanctions and inducements to the use of limited force in Georgia in 2008 and in Ukraine in 2014. It has refused to cooperate with the Western countries and drew a red line in the Region. The basic factor that pushes the Russian leaders to prefer to use limited force is the fact that they have achieved only temporary success instead of a lasting success (Jakobsen: 2010, p. 286). Russia got what it wanted at that time, but after a while it was facing another crisis, mostly originating from attempts of the EU or NATO to further integrate with the post-Soviet countries. To halt this process, Moscow has decided to establish a new web of relations in the post-Soviet region and also in the Middle East, which will enable Russia to gain influence through being the main actor in the resolution process of all conflicts there.

5. Conclusion

The current developments in the Black Sea Region display the fragility of the state-of-affairs of the security. In such a fragile region, there may be some destabilizing factors and frozen conflicts, but it is important to avoid triggering them. In the Region, the existence of a regional hegemon and its dominance over subordinate countries, as well as the great power competition, has had a triggering effect on hot points.

In particular, it is claimed that a spill-over effect of an on-going civil war (in a region, near to the BSR) may lead to an immediate but short term crisis among regional actors. Meanwhile, the incompatibility between the efforts of the dominant country to maintain the status-quo and the efforts of the dissatisfied states to change the order in the Region and other non-regional great powers’ interference (in terms of support to the latter group of states) are the basic permissive causes of regional tension.

Status-quo in the BSR cannot be defined only touching upon the position of having the privilege to write the rules governing local matters; it has socio-economic and political components, as well as military elements. The post-Soviet countries perceive that the domestic problems, the need for economic and military aid and security problems continue within the existing status-quo. For other regional countries (those out of the Russian sphere of influence), the status-quo may be related to having a leading position in transferring Western values to the regional countries.

Regarding measuring the satisfaction of regional states, Lemke limited his measurement to their military build-up to detect the possibility of the outbreak of war; but in this study, poverty rate, human development index values and democracy ranking are also looked into. Thus, economic, social and political dimensions are added to the military aspect to determine the effects of the dissatisfaction of regional states on the eruption of regional tension.

Within this status-quo, the Russian Federation and Turkey are considered as regional satisfied states; Georgia is dissatisfied; Romania is dissatisfied; Bulgaria is satisfied; and Ukraine is partly satisfied and partly dissatisfied. These dissatisfied states, however, are following policies in compliance with the global hegemon. Therefore, they are dissatisfied with the regional order but satisfied with the global order. This is because the Russian Federation, through its policies in 2008 and 2014 has been challenging the US dominated global world order (Trenin: 2014, p. 24). Only Turkey

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and Bulgaria are neither regional nor global challengers. To keep this status-quo, the Russian Federation has used a coercive diplomacy

towards the post-Soviet countries. It changed its coercive diplomacy tactics from threats, sanctions and inducements to the use of limited force in Georgia in 2008 and in Ukraine in 2014 where and when it saw its own vital security interests challenged (Trenin: 2014, p. 24) by the U.S or the EU and Western-friendly forces in Georgia and Ukraine.

In the developments that took place in the BSR after 2014, the role of non-regional great powers – the USA, NATO and the EU should not be ignored. They have developed many regional programs, directly aimed at the post-Soviet countries (such as the Eastern Dimension). NATO, besides partnership and cooperation programs, offered a membership perspective. Therefore, the Russian reaction was seen as part of great power rivalry. The fact that not all of the post-Soviet countries are responsive to the EU and USA policies (for example, Belarus and Armenia do not have any NATO membership perspective and are CSTO members; Azerbaijan and Moldova accepted a neutrality policy) indicates that without dissatisfaction in these two countries (Ukraine and Georgia), great power interference cannot cause trouble or make any changes in the region. Therefore, even in an effort to understand the relationship between great powers, the regional perspective should be considered.

Regarding the effect of a balance between dissatisfied and satisfied states on the security of a region, it should be pointed out that even very weak states can invoke a great power, which may lead to a military confrontation in the Region. Therefore, the calculation of the national capabilities of satisfied and dissatisfied states is not sufficient to foresee the occurrence of war and regional tension. Instead, developments at national and international level need to be considered. Events occurring after 2014 show the interrelationship between regions and the importance of the safety of neighboring regions as well as how a local conflict or a civil war is transformed into a multi-dimensional destructive full scale war and how the expansion of its harmful effects to neighbor countries cannot be impeded. Today, Turkey, Russia, Iran, and even the USA have been in Syria with their military forces or backing different active groups there and this creates a dangerous environment for regional countries.

Taking everything into account, security in the BSR will also display that the intense interdependence between regional (hegemon power), international (competition among great powers), inter-regional (repercussions of developments in the Middle East onto the BSR), domestic (civil wars and terrorist organization) and local (establishment of de facto states) dynamics necessitates an encompassing study considering all level of analysis.


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