Secure Grid '11 After-Action Report

8/2/2019 Secure Grid '11 After-Action Report

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The views contained in this report are those expressed during the tabletop exercise by participants and do

not reflect the official policy or position of National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or

the U.S. Government.

EXERCISEREPORTANDSUMMARYOFFINDINGSOnOctober45,2011,leadingfiguresfrom

industry,stateandfederalagencies,theArmedForces,andotherrelevantorganizationsmetat

NationalDefenseUniversitysInstituteforNationalStrategicStudiesinWashington,D.C.to

conductandparticipateinacrisissimulationofseveresolarweathereffectsonthenations

power

grid.

Their

purpose

was

to

explore

issues

pertaining

to

how

private

and

governmental

agencieswouldreacttowidespreaddamagetothegrid,howtheymightcooperateduringsuch

acrisis,andtoexplorewhatstepscouldbetakentomitigatetheeffectsofsevereevents.

SECUREGRID11ELECTRICALGRIDCRISISTABLETOPEXERCISE

InstituteforNationalStrategicStudies

NationalDefenseUniversity

October45,2011


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i

SponsoringandHostingOrganizationsDepartmentofHomelandSecurity

UnitedStatesNorthernCommand


ForinformationregardingSecureGrid,pleasecontactthebelowPOC:

Dr.RichardB.Andres

EnergySecurityChair,InstituteforNationalStrategicStudies

ProfessorofNationalSecurityStrategy,NationalWarCollege


(202)6854427,[email protected]


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ii

Whileaseverestormisalowfrequencyoccurrenceevent,it

hasthepotentialforlongdurationcatastrophicimpactstothe

powergridanditsaffectedusers.Theimpactscouldpersistfor

multipleyears

with

potential

for

significant

societal

impacts

and

witheconomiccoststhatcouldbemeasurableintheseveral

TrillionDollarsperyearrange.

AnOverviewoftheNationalAcademyofSciences

ReportonSevereSpaceWeatherandthe

VulnerabilityoftheUSElectricalPowerGrid

MetatechCorporation


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iii

TableofContentsSecureGrid11Overview............................................................................................................................. 1

ParticipatingOrganizations........................................................................................................................... 3

Objectives..................................................................................................................................................... 6

Background................................................................................................................................................... 7

TabletopExercisePart1:Prevent(T0+7hrs).............................................................................................. 9

TabletopExercisePart2:Protect(T0+20hrs)........................................................................................... 13

Tabletop

Exercise

Part

3:

Respond

(T0

+

20

hrs)

........................................................................................

17

Recommendations...................................................................................................................................... 21

AppendixSecureGrid11ScenarioBackground...................................................................................... 24


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SecureGrid11OverviewSecureGrid11isthethirdinanongoingseriesofexercisesthatNationalDefenseUniversitysInstitute

forNational

Strategic

Studies

(INSS)

has

conducted

in

conjunction

with

the

Department

of

Homeland

SecurityandU.S.NorthernCommandonthevulnerabilityoftheNorthAmericanElectricGrid.Previous

exercisesexaminedtheabilityofpublicandprivateinstitutionstoworktogethertopreventand

mitigatecyberandphysicalattacksonthegrid.Thisyearsgameexaminedthethreatposedtothegrid

byextremesolarweather.Thistypeofeventisconsideredalowprobabilityhighimpactevent,thatis,

whiletheprobabilityofaneventislowinanygivenyear,thepotentialharmitcoulddototheUnited

Statesandothercountriesishigh.

Theexercisescenariowasbasedonaspaceweathereventwithimpactssimilarinnaturebutlesssevere

thanthosedescribedbytheNationalAcademiesofScience(NAS)2009ReportExtendedSummary

Severe

Space

Weather

Events

Understanding

Societal

and

Economic

Impacts.

The

NAS

report

describedapossiblegeomagneticdisturbance(GMD)similartoasuperstormwhichoccurredin1921.

ThisGMDproducedamagneticfieldchangerateof4800nanoTeslasperminute(nT/min)at50degrees

geomagneticlatitude.TheNASreportexplainsthatsuchaneventoccurringtodaycouldresultin

widespreadpoweroutageslastingforseveralyears.Bycomparison,thisexercisepostulatedaless

severeeventproducingfewerlongtermpoweroutagesbutstilloccurringatanunprecedentedscale

andduration.Additionalscenariobackgroundisprovidedintheappendixtothisdocument.

SecureGrid11washeldonOctober45,2011atNationalDefenseUniversityinWashingtonD.C.and

attendedbyleadingfiguresfromindustry,stateandfederalagencies,andthescientificcommunity.The

exerciseentailedacrisissimulationwiththegoalofexploringhowprivateandgovernmentagencies

wouldrespondtoasolarstormcausingwidespreaddamagetothegrid,howtheymightcooperate

duringsuchacrisis,andtoexplorewhatstepscouldbetakentomitigatesuchsevereevents.The

scenariosintheexerciseweredesignedbyateamofexpertsfromindustry,theDepartmentof

HomelandSecurity,U.S.NorthernCommand,andtheNationalOceanicandAtmospheric

Administration.

Thetabletopexercisewasconductedinthreemodulesusingaguidedseminarstructuretoexplore

relevantquestionsandissues.AfteropeningcommentsonthemorningofOctober4th,participantswere

assignedtofourseparatebreakoutgroupscontainingadiversemixofrepresentatives.Eachgroupwas

instructedtoaddressaspecificsetofbroadquestionsineachstage,whichconsistedofanearlywarning

stage,an

event

occurrence

stage,

and

apost

event

damage

assessment/consequence

management

and

mitigationstage.Groupsweregiventwohourstoaddresseachstageoverthecourseofthefirstday.

Thesecondday,October5th,consistedofpostexerciseanalysis,whichbroughteachteamintoplenary

sessiontodebrieftheentiregroupontheirfindings,insights,andrecommendations.


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Ontheseconddayoftheevent,allparticipantswereabletohearanddiscussthefindingsofthe

individualgroups.Theafternoonoutbriefsessionprovidedaforumtopresentthegamesresultsto

seniorofficials.

Althoughthedetailsofthelessonslearnedandrecommendationsthatresultedfromeachgroups

participationand

immersion

in

the

experience

are

discussed

in

detail

below,

the

most

important

findingsaresummarizedhere.

Thebroadestconsensusreachedbytheparticipantswasthatinaneventassevereastheonepositedby

theexercise,preventionispreferabletoresponseandrecovery.Improvementsinearlywarning,

especiallythereplacementoftheAdvancedCompositionExplorer(ACE)satellite,hardeningofcritical

equipment,stockpilingofreplacementtransformers,andimprovedresilienceinthegridwereidentified

ascrucialcomponentsofanyefforttominimizetheprobabilityoflongtermgridoutagesresultingfrom

aGMD.

Thebiggestunresolvedquestionconcernsthetypeofdamagesuchaneventmightcausetocriticalgrid

components,especially

large

extremely

high

voltage

(EHV)

transmission

transformers.

Although

the

effectsofgroundinducedcurrent(GIC) ontransformershavebeenstudied,significanttechnical

uncertaintysurroundsquestionsregardingwhethertypicalinservicetransformerswould

catastrophicallyfailinGMDconditions.Thisfactorcomplicateseffortstoaccuratelyestimatethe

possibleextentofequipmentdamageandrelatedgridfailurethatmightoccur.EHVtransformersare

verylarge,extremelyheavy,andhighlydifficulttotransporttotheremotesiteswheretheyaretypically

installed.ThenumbersofexistingsparesarenotsufficienttorecoverfromaGMDthatdamagesa

significantfractionofthenationalorinternationalfleet.Globalsupplychainswouldbeunableto

producereplacementEHVtransformersatarateneededtomeetdemandiflargenumberswere

suddenlyrequiredtorecoverfromaGMDaffectingseveralindustrializedcountries.

Extensivestockpilingofreplacementtransformersisahighlyexpensiveproposition,bothintermsof

manufactureandstorage.Further,givenacatastrophicevent,thejustintimeproductionsystems

currentlyinplacewouldbevulnerabletothecascadingeffectsofabroad,longtermpoweroutage,

makingitdifficulttoobtainreplacementspostevent.Thesetwofactorscreateaconundruminwhich

stockpilingpriortoaneventisexpensiveandproblematic,whilereplacementposteventwouldalsobe

highlyproblematicandextremelytimeconsumingwhentimeisoftheessence.Thus,neitheroptionis

palatableforindustrytoaddress,particularlygiventhelowprobabilityofsuchaneventoccurring.

Therefore,itwastheconsensusoftheexerciseparticipantsthatindustryespeciallyrequiresamore

developedunderstandingofexactlyhowlikelysuchaneventis,aswellashowmuchdamageislikelyto

occurfrom

asevere

GMD.


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ParticipatingOrganizationsOnehundredandtwentyeightindividualsparticipatedinSecureGrid11andweredrawnfromawidevarietyofprivateandpublicorganizations.Participantswereselectedtorepresentorganizations

responsiblefor

operating,

regulating,

and

protecting

the

grid.

These

organizations

include:

AmericanPublicPowerAssociation

AnalyticalServicesInc.(ANSER)

Atmospheric&SpaceTechnologyResearchAssociates(ASTRA),LLC

BCSIncorporated

BoozAllenHamilton

DefenseR&D

Canada

Centre

for

Security

Science

DepartmentofDefense

OfficeofAssistantSecretaryofDefenseforHomelandDefenseandAmericaSecurityAffairs

(OASDHD&ASA)

OfficeoftheAssistantSecretaryofDefenseforOperationalEnergyPlansandPrograms(OASD

OEPP)

OfficeoftheSecretaryofDefenseforInstallationsandEnvironment(I&E)

DepartmentofEnergy

InfrastructureSecurityandEnergyRestorationDirectorate

DepartmentofHomelandSecurity

OfficeofInfrastructureProtection

Science&TechnologyDirectorate

EdisonElectricInstitute

ElectricInfrastructureSecurityCouncil

EmbassyofSweden

Emprimus

ExelonGeneration,LLC


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4

FederalEmergencyManagementAgency(FEMA)

FederalEnergyRegulatoryCommission(FERC)

FriiPwr,Ltd.

GeoStrategicAnalysis

Headquarters,U.S.ArmyCorpsofEngineers(HQUSACE)

HooverInstitution,StanfordUniversity

ICS/SCADAThreatFocusCellTeamLeaders

IdahoNationalLaboratory

InteragencyCoordinationDirectorate

ISONew

England

NARUCStaffSubcommitteeonCriticalInfrastructure

NationalAeronauticsandSpaceAdministration(NASA)

NationalAssociationofStateEnergyOfficials(NASEO)

NationalCommunicationsSystem


NationalOceanic

and

Atmospheric

Administration

(NOAA)

NationalWeatherService

NavalSeaSystemsCommandDahlgrenMissionAssuranceDivision

NAVFACMobileUtilitiesSupportEquipment

Navy,OPNAVN00X(NavalWarfareIntegrationGroup,andQDR)

NorthAmericanAerospaceDefenseCommand(NORAD)andUnitedStatesNorthernCommand

(USNORTHCOM)

NORADandUSNORTHCOMInteragencyCoordination(IC)

NORADandUSNORTHCOMJ7JointTrainingandExercises

USNORTHCOMJ34(AssessmentsandCIPBranch)


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5

NorthAmericanElectricReliabilityCorporation(NERC)

GeomagneticDisturbancesTaskForce(GMDTF)

PHIServiceCompany

PJMCorporation

PotomacElectricPowerCompany

ProgressEnergy

PSEGServicesCorp.

ReliabilityFirstCorp.

SecuredSciencesGroup

SpacePlasma

Laboratory

SSG,LLC

StormAnalysisConsultants

TheNationalAssociationofRegulatoryUtilityCommissioners(NARUC)

ThePraemittiasGroup,Inc.

TranstectorSystems,Inc.

UnitedStates

Air

Force/Air

Force

Weather

Agency

(AFWA)

UnitedStatesNuclearRegulatoryCommission(NRC)

WhiteHouse

NationalSecurityStaff

OfficeofScienceandTechnologyPolicy(OSTP)


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6

ObjectivesIdentifyandunderstandthepotentialimpactofamajorgeomagneticstormontheNorthAmerican

PowerGrid.

ExploreandsocializewaystominimizetheimpactofamajorgeomagneticstormonUScritical

infrastructure.

Examineandassessprocessesandproceduresforrecoveringfromacatastrophicgeomagneticstorm.

Clarifyand

deconflict

roles

and

responsibilities

between

public

and

private

agencies.


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7

BackgroundThesunissubjecttoperiodsofincreasinganddecreasingsunspotactivityapproximatelyevery11years

inwhatisknownasthesolarcycle.Sunspotactivityhasbeencorrelatedtotheoccurrenceofsolarflares

andcoronal

mass

ejections

(CMEs),

which

can

cause

geomagnetic

disturbances

(GMD)

on

Earth.

AlthoughCMEsoccurmoreoftenduringthesolarmaximumwhentheincidenceofsunspotsis

greatest,theycanstilloccuratanytimeduringasolarcycle.MostCMEsareharmlesslydirectedinto

interplanetaryspacebutsometraveldirectlytowardsEarth.WhenaCMEmovingthroughspaceat

millionsofmilesperhourinteractswithEarthsmagneticfield,thenormalfieldisquicklydisturbedand

cancontinuetochangeformanyhoursuntiltheeffectsofthestormhavepassedandthefieldreturns

toanundisturbedstate.AstheEarthsmagneticfieldchanges,DCelectriccurrentsareinducedinlong

distancehighvoltagetransmissionlines.ThesetransmissionlinesareconnectedtogroundedEHV

transformersdesignedtooperateonlywith60cycleACpower.GeomagneticallyinducedDCcurrent

causesACpowertransformerstooperateabnormallyandcanresultinrapidoverhearingandfailureif

conditionsare

unfavorable.

Most

geomagnetic

storms

have

relatively

limited

and

temporary

effects,

however,strongerstormscanadverselyaffectcriticalinfrastructure,bothinspaceandonEarth.In

additiontothegeomagneticeffectsalreadydiscussed,solarstormscantemporarilydistorttheEarths

ionosphereadverselyaffectingradiocommunicationsandGlobalPositioningSystem(GPS)service.

Surfacechargescanbuilduponsatellites,causingunhardenedelectronicsystemstomalfunctionor

permanentlyfail.

In1989astronggeomagneticstormcausedablackoutinQuebecjust90secondsaftertheCMEreached

Earth.SinceNASAsACEspacecraftwasnotlauncheduntil1997,therewaslesseffectiveearlywarning

availabletogridoperatorsinthisevent.Ittookninehourstorestorethe18,000MWnetworkafter

repairingor

replacing

destroyed

equipment.

A

geomagnetic

storm

in

2003

took

down

the

Federal

AviationAdministrations(FAA)GPSbasednavigationsystemfor30hoursanddamagedelectrical

systemsfromScandinaviatoSouthAfrica.Theseandotherrecentstormsweresmallcomparedto

knownsuperstormsin1859(Carringtonevent)and1921.The1859superstormfeaturedtwo

consecutiveCMEsfirstobservedbyBritishastronomerRichardCarrington.WhenthefirstCMEslammed

intoEarthabout18hourslater,therewasnopowergridthatcouldbedamagedbutmanytelegraph

systemsfailedorcaughtfireacrossEuropeandNorthAmerica.

Modernstormscancausemuchmoredamageanddisruptionthanearliereventsbecause

infrastructuresaroundtheworldaremoreubiquitous,complex,andinterconnected.IfaCarrington

level

event

where

to

occur

today,

it

could

cause

enormously

more

damage,

potentially

knocking

out

largeportionsoftheworldselectricinfrastructureandcreatingmassiveblackoutsacrosstheglobe.If

suchblackoutswerelonglastingtheycouldaffectphysicalinfrastructureincludingwaterdistribution,

perishablefoodsandmedications,heating/airconditioning,sewagedisposal,telecommunications,and

fuelsupplies.Accordingtothe2009NASreportthedamageinflictedbyamajorCMEcouldcosttheUS


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8

$12trillioninitsfirstyear.Althoughthe1859stormwasarareevent,stormswitharoundhalfits

intensityoccurmuchmorefrequently.The1921superstormisthemostrecentexample.

ConcernsaboutthesusceptibilityofUSelectricalinfrastructuretoGMDeffectsaresignificantcompared

toothersimilarlyindustrializedcountriesforseveralreasons:

MuchoftheUSislocatedinrelativeproximitytoEarthsmagneticnorthpolewhereGMDeffectsarestronger.

Becauseofgeography,theUShasalargenumberoflongdistanceeastwestorientedhighvoltagetransmissionlineswhichactasgoodantennasforbestcasecouplingwithGMD

producedelectromagneticfields.

TheUShasaddedincreasingamountsofhighervoltagetransmissioninfrastructureineveryyearsincethelastGMDsuperstormin1921.Highvoltagelinestendtobelongerinlengthand

thereforeactasbetterantennasforcouplingGICintothegridandpotentiallydamagingEHV

transformers.

Ifcatastrophic

grid

failure

should

occur

as

aresult

of

asolar

storm,

effective

response

and

efficient

recoverywilldependonthehighlyeffectivecooperationandcoordinationbetweenpublicandprivate

entities.


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TabletopExercisePart1:Prevent(T0+7hrs)0945,October4,2011BrieftoPlayersNOAAs

Space

Weather

Prediction

center

in

Boulder,

CO,

reports

that

an

intense

eruption

on

the

sun

associatedwithalargesunspotclusteronthesunhasbeenobserved.Theyreportthatthisflarehas

alreadyregisteredanR5levelontheNOAASpaceWeatherRadioBlackoutScale,oneofthebiggest

flaresseeninthelastfortyyears.Aradiationstorm,approachingtheS4toS5levelontheNOAASpace

WeatherRadiationScale,isexpectedtoaccompanythiseventinthenextseveralhours.TheCMEis

extremelylargeandbothNOAAandNASAcomputermodelsshowthatitisheadingtowardsEarth.

SomeEarthorbitingsatellitesarealreadybeingaffected.

AverylargegeomagneticstormisexpectedattheG5level,NOAAsspaceweatherequivalentofa

Category5hurricanealthoughabout4eventsofG5strengthoccurinatypical11yearsolarcycle.

Higherlatitudesaretypicallymorevulnerabletothestorm,particularlyinproximitytolargebodiesof

saltwater,whichactsasaconduitforgroundinducedcurrents.Theeffectsofthestrongeststormscan

actuallybegreateratmidlatitudesandleaveextremenorthernorsouthernlatitudeslessimpacted.

ImpactEstimateUpto130MAmericansinitiallyw/oelectricityforseveralhours

Upto2monthstofullyrestorenormalpower

Secondaryimpacts:

Energy

Communications

Water/Sanitation

Banking&Finance

Transportation

EmergencyServices

GovernmentServices

SummaryofTeamDiscussionsTheteamsweregiventwohourstodiscusstheramificationsoftheimpactestimateandtodiscover

whereweaknessesinpreparationcapacitymayreside.Asrepresentativesfromvariousorganizations

spoke,itbecameclearthatissuesofcoordinationwerelessofaconcernthanthoseofphysicalcapacity

torespond.

Given

such

adisaster,

government

agencies

explained

that

only

industry

had

the

appropriateresourcestorespond.

TimeframeofwarningTheprimaryissuesrepeatedacrosseachteamwasthetimelineofwarningsandtheresultantcapacityofindustrytomakemeaningfuldecisionswithinthattimeframe.Fromthetime

theACEsatelliteprovidesfinalinformationabouttheanticipatedseverityofanevent,industrytypically


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hasabout45minutestomakedecisionsonhowtoprotectandpreservethegrid.Thistimeframeis

marginallysufficientforsystemoperatorstoworkthroughmechanismstoidentifyandanalyze

informationabouttheeventasitispasseddown.Importantactionscanbecompletedorinitiatedinthis

timeframebutthereisessentiallynoroomforeventheslightestdelaysormistakes.Actionsofthistype

canincludeunloadingorevensecuringsomelongdistancetransmissionlinesthroughavarietyof

possiblemeasures

in

order

to

reduce

the

GIC

that

will

enter

the

grid,

and

starting

peaking

plants

to

establishasituationwhereregionalloadsandgenerationaremorebalanced.

Advancedwarningcancomeasearlyastwodayspriortoanevent,butthesewarningshavesignificantmarginsoferror,thusmakingthemdifficulttoactupon.

AdvancedwarningsonmeasuredgroundsurgescomemorerapidlyoutofCanadathanfromUSagencies.

Certainoperatingstepscanbetakenwithintwentyhoursofnotificationtoreducevulnerabilityof

the

system

and

the

procedures

for

these

steps

are

already

in

place.

ImmediateStepsGiventhewarningtimeframes,thediscussionturnedtowhatstepscouldactuallybetakentomitigateimpendingdamagetothegrid.Anindustrywideconferencecallwouldoccur,similar

tothecallsconductedbeforehurricanes.AlleightNERCregionswouldbebroughtin,withtheir

respectivecoordinators,tochallengethemtoprepareforwhatevertypeofspaceweathermightbe

approachingandanalyzewhattheimpactcouldbe.

Loadsheddingandthepossibilityofatemporarygridshutdownwerediscussedaslikelycandidatesfor

immediateaction.Loadsheddingincludedsuchconceptsasislandingorestablishingmicrogridswithin

thesystemtoisolatepotentialproblemareasandreducetheneedforlongdistancetransmission.The

mostcontentiousissuewastheideaofsimplyshuttingoffthegridforsomeperiodoftimetoprotectit

fromextensivedamage.Itwasagreedthatthedecisiontotakesuchadrasticmeasureresidedentirely

withtheutilities,butitwasclearthatthepotentialliabilityissuesassociatedwithafalsealarmscenario

weretoogreatforagridshutdowntobeareasonableoption.Complicatingissuesinclude:

Maintainingserviceandkeepingthegridoperatingisalongstandingdeeplyingrainedtoppriorityfromindustryspointofview.

Inplaceproceduresarebasedongettingreadyonceanalertisreceived,buttherestoftheprocedures

are

not

implemented

until

the

grid

is

actually

overloaded,

thus

in

place

procedures

arereactive,notproactive.

Fromtheperspectiveofparticipantsthatwerenotpartofautility,difficultyexistedinunderstandingtheproceduresthatutilitiesalreadyhaveinplacetodealwithcrises.


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Thegridisdynamic;itcanhavehighlystablevoltageatonemomentandpoorvoltagestabilityafewminuteslater,etc.,andasaresult,anymitigationstrategywillchangedailyorfaster.

Thebasicstrategyofcommercialpowercompaniesistomaintainreliableserviceandavoidashutdownatnearlyallcosts.Undernormalconditionsthisapproachensurestheavailabilityof

powerto

utility

customers

but

under

severe

GMD

conditions

this

approach

increases

the

probabilitythatsomeamountofdamagetooperatingequipmentwilloccur.

Muchoftheburdenforrapidlyrespondingtoearlywarningfallsupontheutilitycompanieswhoareboundbyasetofstandardsthatprohibitthemfromdroppingcustomersundermost

conditions.Ifforecastsareincorrectabouttheevent,theutilitywillhavetoanswerto

regulatoryagencies.Thereisnocertaintyaboutwhatdamagewillbecausedandutilities,

operators,engineers,andothersdonotagreeonhowmuchdamagemayoccur.Becausethere

isnolegalprotection,utilitieshavelittleincentivetotakestrongpreventativesteps.

Seasonalityisacriticalfactoraswell.Twotothreemonthswithoutelectricitywouldhavedifferentimpactsinahotsummerascomparedtoaharshwinter.Thisscenarioassumedthat

theweatherwasmild,butshouldasimilaroutageoccurinsubfreezingconditions,the

reactions,procedures,andoutcomeswouldbevastlymorechallenging.

Therewasaconsensusamongexerciseparticipantsthatamoreaccurateassessmentoftheseverityand

timingofGMDconditionsisrequired.Bettermodelingandsimulationcapabilitiescouldhelpinthis

regard.Additionally,abettertechnicalunderstandingoftheeffectsthestormwillhaveonextremely

highvoltage(EHV)transformersthemselvesisimperativesincethisisthemostcriticalfactoraffecting

theduration

of

ablackout

and

recovery.

TransformersTheprimarypieceoftheelectricgridtobeaffectedbyaneventofthemagnitude

positedbytheexercisearetheroughly2000EHVpowertransformersinthebulktransmissiongrid.

Excessivedirectcurrent(DC)flowingthroughalargealternatingcurrent(AC)transformerground

connectionmaycauseoverheatingandfailure.Whilethetruenumberoftransformersthatcouldbe

damagedbyasevereGMDisunknown,losingasignificantportionofthefleetwouldresultin

widespreadlongtermpoweroutages.ThedamagesusceptibilityofanindividualEHVtransformeris

influencedbyitsageandhealth,butalsobythelocalgroundconductanceandgeologyofthe

transformersubstationlocationandconnectedtransmissionlinelengthandorientation.Factorssuchas

thesecan

combine

in

ways

that

can

make

some

older

transformers

less

vulnerable

than

some

newer

ones.

Significantpoints:

MostlargeEHVtransformersaremanufacturedoutsideoftheUnitedStates.IftherewasaneventthatimpactedtheU.S.andothercountries,andifkeypiecesofequipmentweredamaged


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12

andrequiredreplacement,itwouldtakealongtimetoreplacethem,possiblymonthsoryears,

andtheU.S.mightnotbethefirstpriorityofthemanufacturingcountries.

AnothercomplicatingfactorisreplacementEHVtransformertransportationtotheremotelocationswheretheywouldbeneeded.ManylargeEHVtransformerlocationsarenoteasily

accessibleand

these

very

large

and

heavy

transformers

require

special

transportation

equipmentthathaslimitedavailability.Ifthereisalargemagnitudeevent,littlecapabilityexists

torapidlyreplacetransformers.

ThereistheSTEPprogram(SpareTransformerEquipmentProgram)whichinvolvessharingsparetransformersbetweenutilitiesthatarevoluntarysignatoriestothisagreement.This

programwasdesignedtohandleshortnoticerequirementsforsmallnumbersofreplacement

transformersfollowinganeventsuchasanisolatedterroristattackonafewsubstations.The

questionregardinganadequatenumberofsparesforlargerscaleeventssuchasasevereGMD

ismoredifficulttoanswerandthereiscurrentlynoindustrypositiononthissubject.

Furthermore,theleadtimecanbeaslongsas12yearsforprocuringmajortransformers,many

ofwhichareuniquelydesignedforaspecificgridlocationintermsofvoltageandpowerratings.

Inthe1921levelscenariodescribedbytheNASreport,hundredsoflargetransformersmightneedtobereplacedintheU.S.anditwouldtakeanextremelylongtime,asonlyasmallfraction

ofthevoltageclassesandtypesneededarecurrentlyproduceddomestically.

IfaGMDsuperstormdoesproduceablackout,servicecanberestoredtomanylocationsusinglowervoltagesystemstoeffectivelybypassdamagedpartsofthehighvoltagegrid.Generation

iswellconnectedatlowervoltagelevels.

TheMilitaryAccordingtoUSNORTHCOM,itsbasesattheinstallationlevelarenotnormallyprovidedrealtimeadvancewarningofanimpendingGMD.Certainmissionsdirectlyimpactedbyspaceweather

docurrentlyreceiveforecastsandwarnings.However,noticetoinstallationstoensurereadinessofthe

supportinfrastructuremaybenecessaryaswell.Itisessentialthatbaseshostingcriticalmissionshave

sufficientelectricalpowertosustainindependentcontinuousoperationsevenifthesurrounding

commercialpowergridislost.Thoughmanyinstallationspossessdieselpoweredelectricalgenerators,

theyhavelimiteddieselfuelstorage.Intheeventofawidespreadgridoutage,fuelsuppliescould

dwindlerapidly,therebyimpactingtheabilityofinstallationstoconductprimarymissions.


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TabletopExercisePart2:Protect(T0+20hrs)1300,October4,2011BrieftoPlayersNOAAs

Space

Weather

Prediction

Center

in

Boulder

has

issued

a

G5,

extreme

geomagnetic

storm

warning.ThecoronalmassejectionthatleftthesunlessthantwentyhoursagohasreachedtheACE

(AdvancedCompositionExplorer)spacecraftandisanextremelyintensecoronalmassejectionthathas

theworstcasemagneticpolarityandwillbegintoaffectEarthsmagneticfieldinthenexttwentyto

thirtyminutes.

Theconsequencesofthiseventonthepowergridcertainlycouldbesignificant.Themostsignificantly

impactedareaswilllikelybeintheNortheastincludingtheNortheasternCanadianprovinces,through

NewEnglandintotheMidAtlanticStates,thecentralGreatLakesregion,andalsointhePacific

Northwest.

ImpactEstimateWidespreadpoweroutagespossiblylastingforlongerthaninanypreviouslargeblackout.

SummaryofTeamDiscussionsThediscussionsforthesecondmoduleprimarilycenteredupontwomaintopics:communicationsand

authority.Givenasignificantoutageafteraseverespaceweatherevent,issuesdiscussedincludedhow

communicationswouldtakeplace,and,inparticular,howlocalauthoritieswouldcommunicatewiththe

publictopreventpanicandmaintainlevelsoforderandpublicsafety.Theauthorityissuecenteredon

whohadauthoritytoauthorizewidespreadprotectivemeasuresforthegrid,suchasashutdown.

CommunicationsCascadingeffectswereofsomeconcernregardingtheproblemofcommunications

duringamassivepoweroutage.Questionsregardinghowcommunicationinthatsituationwouldoccur

wereaskedamidconcernsoverpublicpanicgivenalongtermoutageofpower.

Landlinesandcellphoneservicewillverylikelybeoverburdenedordown.Itwasquestionedhowcommunicationswouldoccurinthiscase.Someutilitieshavededicatedcommunications

lines,butthemajorityhavemigratedtocommerciallyprovidedservices.Thisisparticularly

importantbetweenprivateandpublicsectors.Thenuclearindustryhasdedicatedlineswiththe

NRC.

Publicbehaviorandreactionscanproducedangeroussituationseveninnormalweatherevents.Itisnotknownhowthepublicwouldreacttowarningsabouthappeningsinouterspace.Itis

unknownwhatrangeofresponsetoexpectfromthepublic(theycouldpanicorcoulddisregard

warnings),andthoseresponseswillvaryfromplacetoplace.


18/28

14

Giventhenominalthirtyminutetoonehourfinalwarningprovidedtoutilities,thereisaquestionregardingwhetherthereshouldalsobeprovisionsforwarningthepublicbeyondthe

NOAAwebbasednotificationprocess. Itisnotclearwhatthepubliccoulddoinresponsetoa

warningexcepttowaitandseewherepowerislostthentakeappropriateactionwhere

possible.Spaceweatherisnotawellknownthreatamongthepublic.Itishardtogaugehow

seriouslysuch

warnings

would

be

taken,

particularly

since

NOAA

typically

issues

four

to

five

G5

worstcaseGMDalertsinatypical11yearsolarcycle.

Ensuringthatcleanwatersuppliesandsanitationareafirstpriorityneedstobecommunicatedtoallplayers,especiallythepublic.Attentionmustbegiventohealthandsecurityifoutagesare

potentiallylongterm.

Localauthoritiesneedtobegiventimelyinformation,particularlyincaseofalongtermevent,tominimizethepossibilityofcivildisorder.

BeforeandduringHurricaneKatrina,theelectricutilitiesmadepreparations,toincludeconferencecalls,alerts,warnings,actions,procedures.Lossofcommunicationsexpectedto

accompanywidespreadpoweroutageswouldmakerecoverycoordinationverychallenging,and

asignificantproblemgiventhepotentiallyshorttimeframebetweenfinalwarningandthe

possiblelossofpower.

DefenseSupporttoCivilAuthorities(DSCA)maybeespeciallyimportantifalongtermpoweroutageoccurs.AlthoughDODactivitieshaverobustbackupandredundantcommunications

equipment,thatdoesnotnecessarilymeanthelocalauthoritiesdoaswell.Coordinatedeffort

mustbemadetoensurecommunicationchannelsareopenduringanevent.

Industryneedstokeepgovernmentinformedaboutwiththestatusofthegridandanymajordifficultiespertainingtocommunications.However,therewassignificantdisagreementabout

theabilityofcommunicationssystemstoremainfunctionalinapoweroutage.

Betterunderstandingofthetimeframeforapossiblewindowofpanicisneededsothatauthoritiescangetinfrontoftheproblemandprepareaccordingly.

FEMAhasemergencybroadcastresponsibilityandtherearebackupsystemstothataswell.Radios

and

other

basic

equipment

might

be

used

to

provide

information

to

the

public,

as

internetandtelevisionwilleventuallybelostatmostlocationsinanextendedpoweroutage.If

FEMAneedstoprovideradiosthentheywilldothatbutobviouslythiscanonlybedonein

limitednumbers.

Therewasalsosomediscussionaboutthepossibilityofestablishinganationalcoordinationcenter.

Industryparticipantswerecriticalofthatidea,claimingthatthefederalgovernmentalreadyhastoo


19/28

15

manyoperationcenters.Abetteralternativewouldbeaprocessratherthananopscenter.Thereis

alreadyagooddealofmonitoringgoingon,wejustneedbettercommunications.

AuthorityandRoleofGovernmentOneachofthefourexerciseteamsthequestionwaspointedlyasked,Whatcangovernmentdotohelputilitiesduringthiskindofemergency?Theresponsewasa

unanimousnot

much.

It

was

quickly

established

that

government

has

little

to

no

authority

to

dictate

toindustryhowitistohandlethesesituations.Manyoftheproceduresneeded,suchasprioritizationof

criticalinfrastructure,arealreadyinplace:water,sanitation,andhospitalstopthatlist.Theprincipal

questions,then,werewhetherthereneedstobeagovernmentalauthoritytoorderutilitiestoshut

downorreduceloadingonthegridinordertoprotectit,whetherinsteadwhatisneededisprotection

fromliabilityshouldutilitieschoosetodosothemselves,and,giventhatmostoftheregulatory

responsibilityrestswiththestates,justwhatistheroleofFederalagenciesinthissituation?

WhatareDOEandDHSdoing?Atthisstageoftheemergency,DHSandDOEwillbecloselyengaged,butwillprobablynottakeanydirectactionaffectingprivatelyownedutilities.Atthe

time

NOAA

issues

the

alert,

DHS

and

DOE

will

be

following

the

situation

but

do

not

have

authoritytorequireanyaction.

Whatarethestatesdoing?InmanycasesstateemergencymanagementofficeswillprobablynotevenbeawareofthethreatofaGMDalertbeforeitcouldstarttoaffectthegrid.Those

thatarewillbespinningupEmergencyOperationsCentersinpreparation.

ForFEMAthefirstpriorityistoprotectlivesandproperty.FEMAsNationalResponseCoordinationCenterwouldbeinitiatingresponseplansatthispoint.Communicationbetween

theFederalgovernmentandthestateswouldbeginaswell.FEMAalreadycommunicateswith

theNOAA

Space

Weather

Prediction

Center

in

Boulder.

VTC

at

20

hours

with

all

partners,

with

multiplelevelsofactivation.Forexample,Level1brings15disparateorganizationsand

activatesdialoguechannels.Level2bringsESF2andESF12intothedialogue.FEMAwillnotbe

tellingthemwhattodo,butusingthemasthemainpointsofcontactfortherestof

government.ESF3,publicworkssupport,willprovidegeneratorsifneededandwillbegin

preparationstomovethemtowheretheythinkthemostaffectedareaswillbe.FEMAwillnot

bedirectlyinvolvedintellingindustryhowtocorrectproblems,buttheywillreachbacktofind

outwhatproblemsneedtobesolvedfirst.FEMAdoeshaveadeskwhichincludesprivatesector

personneltodeterminewhatservicesindustryandtheprivatesectorareabletoprovide.

Industrysmajorcoordinationroleduringthistypeofcrisisistoevaluatethescaleandextentofaneventandtocommunicatewithgovernmentalagencies.

AStaffordActdeclarationmightbeneeded.


20/28

16

Secondaryconcernsneedtobeanalyzed.Whatfuelsuppliesdohospitalsandotheressentialserviceshave?Areairportsstilloperational?

Theprimarymajorissuerequiringmitigationispotentialpublicpanic.Publicpanicmayleadtoarunonresources,socialunrest,eruptionofviolence,anddenigratetheabilityoflocal

governmentto

restore

order.

Emergency

services

are

likely

to

be

strained

to

capacity

and

lifesavingservicesdelayed.Localgovernmentofficialswillberesponsibletoeffectively

communicateunfoldingeventstothepublicandtomaintainpublicorder.Itisimperativethese

officialsareprovidedwiththepertinentinformationtofullyunderstandtheeventsand

empoweredtocommunicatethatinformationtothepublic.

Thequestionwasraisedbyoneparticipant,Shouldweshuteverythingdownfor24hoursinordertoprotectthegrid?Furthermore,doesanyonehavetheabilitytomakethatcallin

regulation?Theunanimousanswerwas,no.Thegridinterconnectionauthoritiescouldtell

powerplantstoshutdownbutthereisnoestablishedauthoritytodirectthisaction.The

Presidenthastheabilitytoprotectutilitiesfromliabilitiesbutshouldauthoritybegiventothe

Presidenttobeabletodirecttheshutdownofthepowergrid?Industryrepresentativesstated

thatplantownersarebestequippedtomakethesedecisions.

OtherItems: Anobviousstepthatgovernmentcoulddotohelputilitieswouldbetoprovideareplacement

fortheACEspacecraftthatprovidesthemostimportantearlywarnings.Itisalreadyseveral

yearsbeyonditsdesignlifetime.Areplacementspacecraftisscheduledforlaunchin2014.

Arewepreparedtoactivateemergencycentersbasedonspaceweatheralerts?Areutilitiespreparedtotellthepublicthattheymaylosepowerduetowhatisgoingoninouterspace?

Powerlossmeansdifferentthingsindifferentregions.Betterunderstandingofthisissueisneeded.Ruralcommunitiestendtobebetterpreparedforpowerlossthanurbanareas.

Federalizetheriskratherthanthegrid.Thisapproachallowsregionaloperatorstocontinuetomaketimelydecisionstoprotecttheintegrityofthegridandminimizestheprobabilityof

extendedblackouts.

Someliabilityconcernsmaybemisunderstoodorinflated,ashospitalsandothermissioncriticalindustriestypicallyhavebackupgeneratorsavailableforemergencies.


21/28

17

TabletopExercisePart3:Respond(T0+20hrs)1500,October4,2011BrieftoPlayersFEMAanditsfederalpartnersarerespondingtotheworstgeomagneticstormindecades.Thisglobal

eventhasproducedwidespreadimpactsthroughouttheUnitedStates,Canada,andseveralother

countriesinAsiaandnorthernEurope.NOAAisreportingthatthestormisessentiallyovernow,buta

varietyofcriticalinfrastructureswereheavilydamagedduringthestormthoughthemostproblematic

impactsareassociatedwiththepowergrid.

TherearelargepoweroutagesintheNortheastandMidAtlanticStates,aswellasacrossthenorthern

borderwheremostoftheCanadianpowergridisinterconnectedtotheU.S.Manycities,towns,military

bases,andindustrialcentersarecurrentlywithoutnormalpowersupplies.Similarelectricaloutages

havebeenreportedinnorthernRussia,Japan,Sweden,Norway,andtheUK.MajordisruptionstoGPS

serviceandsometelecommunicationsoccurred,butthoseeffectsareexpectedtobetemporaryand

theseservicesshouldreturntonormaloverthenextseveralhoursasthefinaleffectsofthestormfade

away.

Theglobalnatureofthiseventalsopresentsproblemssince,insomecases,thecomponentstoreplace

damagedequipmentwillbeneededinmanycountriesatthesametime.Thatcanplaceaseverestrain

ontheworldwidesupplysystem.Thescopeofthisproblemwillrequirefederal,state,andprivate

partnerstoprovideassistanceinmanypartsofthecountry.

DamageEstimate40MAmericansw/oelectricity

About65%expecttoberestoredin8hours About25%notexpectedtoberestoredinlessthan2weeks Final10%notlikelytoberestoredinlessthan2monthsusingnormalsupplies

SummaryofTeamDiscussionsThebulkofthediscussionforthethirdmodulecenteredonbackupgenerationcapabilities,system

restoration,andcoordination.Itwasduringthissessionthatwaysgovernmentcanhelpindustrywere

better

identified

and

expressed.

Given

the

unprecedented

loss

of

dozens

of

US

transformers,

a

gap

discussedduringthefirstmodulewashowtogetreplacementtransformerstolocationswheretheyare

neededgiventhedifficultyintransportingthem.Governmentcanaidconsiderablyinovercomingthis

problem.Further,governmentcanplayasignificantroleinfindinganddeployingtemporarypower

generationoptionsforisolatedcriticalinfrastructure.


22/28

18

BackupGenerationgivenaneventofthismagnitude,someareasmaybecomeisolatedfromthegrid.Inthoseinstances,localgenerationforsometemporaryperiodisneededtokeepcriticalinfrastructures

runninguntilthegridcanberepairedtoastatewhereitcanprovideconsistentpoweragain.Thereare

anumberofFEMAownedtwomegawattelectricalpowersourceskeptavailableforhurricanesand

otherdisasters.Capacityexiststomovetheseandquiteafewcustomerscouldberestoredwiththose

powersources.

This

is

an

opportunity

for

the

government

to

assist

by

identifying

needs

and

supplying

electricalpowergenerationcapabilitiesinatimelymannertomitigatelossoflifeandpropertydamage.

Discussionfindingswereidentifiedasfollows:

Thereareportablegeneratorsthatcomeincontainers.FEMAownsmanyofthesecontainerizedgenerators.

Inthecommercialmarket,therearerentalgenerators,buttheymovewiththeglobalmarket,sothosemaynotbeavailableunlesstheUSpayssomekindofretainertokeepsomeportioninthe

country.

TherearesomegeneratorsintheUStowhichindustryhasexclusiverights.Apremiumispaidsothatindustryhasfirstrightstothem.80percentofthemobilemarketisalowervoltagethan

thegridusesandwouldtypicallyneedastepuptransformertogettothepropervoltage.

AneffectiveresponsewillalsorequireclosecoordinationatthehighestlevelsofDOD. Itisunknownhowmuchbackupgenerationrefineriesandotherlargecustomershave.Although

manycompanieshavehardenedtheirsystemstovaryinglevelsinrecentyears,thispracticehas

notbeen

widespread.

Many

have

purchased

or

leased

generators

for

use

in

emergencies.

Hospitalshavebackupgenerationbutonlyafewdaysoffuel.Thefuelresupplyproblemwould

applyacrosstheboardforsuchbackupgeneration.

Aprimaryproblemisthatthereisonlyenoughfueltorunbackupsforafewdays.Hereisanotherplacewheregovernmentcanhelpbyprioritizingfuelsupplytogenerationsystemsin

placetemporarily.Forinstance,intheVancouverOlympics,thegovernmentaggregatedkey

playersneedsforfuel(diesel)generationandfoundthatnotonlywastherenotenoughfuelin

thisareaofCanadatorefuelthesupplybutalsonotenoughtransportationcapabilitytogetfuel

inplace.TheUKexperiencedasimilarproblemin2007whenthereweremajorfloodsand

difficultdecisions

had

to

be

made

about

prioritizing

distribution

sites.

Floridahasmandatedthatallgasstationsalongevacuationrouteshavebackupemergencygenerationcapabilities.Thisstepmaybeagoodideatohelpmitigatethefuelproblemposedby

anylongtermpoweroutage.


23/28

19

SystemRestorationUltimatelythepowersystemhastocomebackonline.Governmentassistancewouldbeneededtohelpfacilitatetherestorationprocessandsomepotentialsolutionsareoutlined

below:

Easingofregulationsduringcatastrophicevents.Onewaythatgovernmentcouldhelpisthrough

the

issuance

of

waivers

to

existing

regulations,

especially

interstate

waivers

of

vital

commodities,suchasfuel.TheFederalgovernmentcouldassistwithallowingacheaperfuelto

beusedtofacilitatefasterrestoration.Permittingcouldalsobeutilizedtoeasetheroutes.Each

statewouldhavetoapprovethesewaiversunlessthefederalgovernmentmandatedit.The

movementoflargeheavytransformerswouldbeveryresourceconstrained;theyneedtomove

incrediblyslowlyandthereareveryfewcapabilitiestofacilitatemovementofequipmentthis

sizeandweight.

Plannedrollingblackouts.Duringpowerrestoration,rollingblackoutsareapotentialmethodtorationpowersothattherearefewerlocationswithnopoweratall.Servicecanbeprovidedto

somecustomers,

but

not

everyone

at

once.

The

goal

would

be

to

provide

the

best

available

servicetonormalcustomersafterthemostcriticalservicesarerestored.

Prioritizingpowerrestoration.Theremaybesevereeconomicdamageinsteelmillsandindustriessuchaselectronicsfabricationfacilitiesthatnormallyrequirecontinuouspowerto

maintainsterilemanufacturingconditions.Duringtherestorationperiodtherewillbepower,

butitwillbelimited.Noteveryonewillhavepowerallofthetime.

CoordinationIssuesofcoordinationwereasignificantpointofdiscussionamongallthegroups,but

theconsensuswastheprimarycoordinatingbodywouldbeFEMA,underDHS.DOEwouldcoordinate

theenergy

industry

recovery,

while

DHS

would

deal

with

the

overall

federal

response.

It

was

made

clear

again,however,thatindustryisnotcontrolledbygovernment,andthatutilitieswerelargelyfreeto

respondastheyseefit.Inanorganizationalsense,respondingtoalongtermpoweroutagewouldbe

theresponsibilityofthestatewiththeFederalgovernmentmakingresourcesavailable.

Intermsofauthority,thegreatestuncertaintiesarepriortotheevent,notpostevent.Onceaneventhasoccurred,communicationprocessesarewellestablished,thoughsignificantdoubt

existsthattheseprocesseswouldfunctionsmoothlyinalargepoweroutage.Statesandutilities

thathavemanagedmanyrealdisasterswillbebetteratdealingwiththemthanstatesthathave

lessrealexperienceeventhoughthesamemechanismsareinplaceforalltypesofdisasters.

Underemergencysituationssomegenerationprioritiesmaybefungible.IfOhioisabletosupplyallofitsnormalpowerrequirementsbutitsneighborstateIndianais75%blackedoutthen

shouldOhiodenypowertosomeofitsownterritoryinordertoassistIndiana?Thereisno

clearlyestablishedprocessformakingthistypeoftradeoffdecisionundercrisisconditions.

Todaythesedecisionprocessesrestwithutilities.Stategovernmentsworkwithutilitiestokeep


24/28

20

somepublicassetsrunning,suchashospitals,buttheutilitiesowntheirpowergridandcan

makedeterminationsthemselves.Thereareplansfiledwitheachstateregardingprioritiesfor

water,firestations,peopleonlifesupport,etc.Duringemergenciesitismadeknownaccording

tothoseplanswhichsourcesarethemostcritical. In90percentofrestorations,utilitiesmake

thedecisionaboutwhatgoesbackonlinefirst,basedoninstructionsandwhattheycan

physicallydo.

Utilities

frequently

have

interruptible

power

supply

agreements

with

large

customersandtheconditionsoftheseexistingcontractscandeterminetheorderinwhich

powerisrestoredtousers.ThereisnotalistthatisprovidedbytheFederalgovernment.In

general,however,mandatesexistforhospitalsandothercriticalfacilities.

Amajorpotentialgapinvolvesunderstandinghowlongthepowercouldbelost.Manycoordinationissuescanmoveforwardproperlyandconfidentlyifthatinformationisknown

early.

MilitaryThemilitaryhasacriticalfacilitieslistthatwillbeusedasthemilitarymanagesoutages

affectingits

bases.

A

considerable

number

of

critical

assets

on

military

installations

have

generators

or

otherbackuppowersupplies.Manyinstallationscanprovidebackupelectricalpowertosustain

continuousoperationsformissioncriticalfacilitiessuchascommunicationscenters,althoughthelong

termsustainabilityoftheseassetsdependsontheavailabilityoffuelsupplies.

Somebasesmayhavesomeexcesspowerthatcouldfeedbackintothegrid,butonlytemporarily.Inpastdisasters,basecommandershavecoordinatedthesedecisionswithutilities.

Defensecasestudiesarebeingconductedtodiscovertheactualdurationthatbasescansustainthemselves.Thereissomedebateoverhowlongatypicalbasecansustainitself.Somesaya

weekwould

be

avery

optimistic

estimate.

Mission

critical

functions

are

often

covered

but

day

todayassetsarenot.Othersclaimedthatthemilitaryhasafairlyrobustprogramtoprovide

fuelandhasarobustbackupsystemforcriticalfacilities.Someclaimedthatthemilitarybases

couldruntheirgeneratorsforseveralmonthsifneedbe,butothersdoubtedthecapacitytoget

thefuelinplaceneededtodothat.Anobviousexceptiontothislimitationwouldexistatmany

militarybaseswheretherecanbemillionsofgallonsofaviationorshipboardfuelstoredon

base.Generatorsthatcouldrunonthistypeofplentifulfuelinsteadofdieselwouldhavemore

thanenoughsupplytoprovidepowertoabaseformanyweeksormonths.


25/28

21

RecommendationsOnWednesday,October5th,thefourteamsgatheredtodiscusstheexerciseandsummarizetheresults

fromthepreviousdaysefforts.Thefollowingsummarizesthesediscussions.

ReplacementoftheACESatellite:TheACEspacecraftiscurrentlylivingonborrowedtime,havingwellexceededitsdesignservicelife.Areplacementneedstobescheduledasquicklyas

possible.NASAandNOAAareworkingtolaunchtheDeepSpaceClimateObservatory(DSCOVR)

spacecraftonaDODvehiclein2014.DSCOVRwillprovidetheindicationsandwarningsthatACE

hasprovidedinthepast.

Hardeningthegridisthepreferredsolution:Preventionispreferabletoresponseandrecovery.Appropriatemethodstoprovideeffectivehardeningtoprotecttransformersandothercritical

gridinfrastructureinaGMDsuperstormneedtobeexamined,studied,developed,assessed,

tested,and

deployed.

A

national

strategy

is

needed

to

determine

how

the

costs

of

hardening

thegridagainstspaceweathereventsshouldbefunded.Therearepromisingsignsthatmanyof

themostcriticalgridsystemscouldbehardenedforlessthan$1Btotalcost.

Improvementsinforecastingaccuracyandtimelinessarenecessary:AlthoughearlywarningsaretypicallyprovidedbyNOAA24to36hoursbeforeaCMEcanreachEarthandproducea

GMD,thefinalmostimportantinformationisgeneratedbytheACEspacecraftonlyabout45

minutesbeforeGICcanoccurinthegrid.Thistimeframeisshortfortakingeffectiveactionat

morethan3000independentutilitiesandtransmissioncompaniesintheUSalone.Additionally

othercountriesdependonthissameshortwarningtime.

Gridshutdownisseenbyindustryasanunrealisticoption:ThereisnonationalauthoritytodirectagridshutdowntoprotectcriticalinfrastructureagainstGMDimpacts.Ifestimatescited

inthe2008NationalAcademiesofSciencereportareaccurate,thecostsofnotshuttingdown

thegridcouldeasilyexceedthecostofatemporaryshutdown.Iftheauthoritytoimplementa

shutdownislefttoindustry,legalprotectionagainstliabilityclaimswouldalmostcertainlybe

necessary.

Untilthegridishardenedtopreventtransformerfailuresinlargenumbers,thecapacitytoreplacetransformersinlargenumbersovershorttimeframesneedsmajorimprovement:The

United

States

has

limited

capability

to

manufacture

the

numbers

and

types

of

EHV

transformersthatcouldbeneededfollowingaGMDsuperstorm;thereforethereisdependency

uponforeignsuppliersforreplacements.Whetheratransformerisproduceddomesticallyisnot

directlyrelevanttoitsusefulnessbutfollowingaGMDsuperstormforeignmanufacturerswould

likelyberespondingtoordersfrommanyinternationalcustomersandtheUSmightnotbeseen

ashighestpriority.Thislimitationcouldbeaddressedthroughacombinationofexpanded


26/28

22

domesticmanufacturingcapacityorincreasesinstockpilereplacementspares.Inbothcases

thereisnobusinesscaseforsuchactionfromindustrysperspective.Governmentwouldneed

toidentifyanationalsecurityriskrequiringsuchactionbyindustryandfindareasonablewayto

fundthesemeasures.Thiswouldbesimilartowhathappenedafter9/11whenanothernational

securityriskwasidentified.Althoughtheairlinesandairportswereprivatelyownedthe

governmentrequired

changes

including

major

airport

security

enhancements,

hardened

airline

cockpitdoors,FederalAirMarshalls,changestocriticalairspacerestrictions,etc.

Effortsmustbemadetobettereducatestateandlocalemergencymanagementofficials:Spaceweatherremainsapoorlyunderstoodtopictomostemergencyplannersandmanagers.

Althoughitisconsideredalowprobabilityhighconsequenceevent,therehavebeentwo

superstormsinthepast150yearsbutinbothcasestheworldwasfarlessdependenton

electricitysuppliestoprovideadequatelivingconditionstobillionsofpeople.Thepublicdoes

notneedtounderstandthedetailsofCMEs,GMDs,GICs,andspacecraftwarningsbutitdoes

needtobebetterpreparedforlongtermpoweroutageswhethertheyarecausedbyspace

weather,other

natural

disasters,

deliberate

attacks

or

simple

equipment

failure

associated

with

aginginfrastructureandgrowingdemand.

Amorecomprehensivestudylookingatcascadingeffectsisneeded:Theimpactontheeconomyofawidespreadandlongtermgridshutdownduetoaspaceweathereventishighly

complexandpoorlyunderstood.Thepotentialeffectsonsocietyareevenlesswellknown.A

betterunderstandingofthissubjectisneededatanationalandinternationallevel.

Federal,state,andlocalemergencymanagementofficialsneedaccesstoanaccuratedatabaseofportablegenerationequipment:Shouldasignificanteventoccur,itislikelythatsomesectionsofthegridwouldremainoperationalinanislandedmode.Inordertokeepcrucial

infrastructureintheseregionsonline,especiallywaterandsanitation,itwouldbehelpfulto

knowwhereallportablegenerationassetsare,andtohavesomeonewithauthoritybe

responsibleforprioritizingtheirdeploymentacrossstatelinesandbetweenutilityserviceareas

whennecessary.

Providetimelyinformationtolocalgovernmentsandmunicipalities:Theburdenofmaintainingpublicsafetyandcommunicationwiththepublicwilllargelyfallupontheshoulders

oflocalauthorities.IndustryandFederalagenciesneedtoestablisheffectiveemergencybackup

communication

capabilities

that

can

keep

enough

of

the

public

informed

even

though

normal

powersuppliesmaybeunavailable.

Revisitthetransformersharingplan:Fewoftheparticipantshadconfidencethatthecurrentplanwouldholduptoanemergencyofthismagnitude.Additionalcooperationandagreements

shouldbeputinplace.TheexistingindustrySTEPprogramfortransformersharingisvoluntary


27/28

23

andwasdevelopedtohandleemergentneedsforsmallnumbersofreplacementssuchasmight

beneededafteranisolatedterroristattackonnomorethanafewsubstations.


28/28

24

AppendixSecureGrid11ScenarioBackgroundTheSG11scenariowasdesignedtoexamineproblemssimilartothosehighlightedinthe2009National

AcademiesofScienceExtendedSummaryReportSevereSpaceWeatherUnderstandingSocietaland

EconomicImpacts.

This

figure

taken

from

that

report

shows

one

scenario

examined

by

the

NAS

based

onaneventsimilartoanactual1921superstorm.

ForSG11thefollowingassumptionswereselectivelymadeinordertoprovideanextremelychallenging

butmoremanageablescenario:

Theexercisegeomagneticdisturbance(GMD)producesgeomagneticinducedcurrents(GIC)whichquicklycausespowerblackoutswithinthetwooutlinedareasshownabove.

About65%oftheelectricalloadsandgenerationintheseareascanberestoredwithin8hours. About25%oftheelectricalloadsandgenerationintheseareascannotberestoredbynormal

meansinlessthan2weeks.

Thefinal10%ofelectricalloadsandgenerationintheseareascannotberestoredbynormalmeans

in

less

than

2

months.

Documents

Secure Grid '11 After-Action Report