SECOND AMENDED PETITION PAGE 2 · 2018-12-10 · PLAINTIFF’S UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR ORDER GRANTING LEAVE TO FILE SECOND AMENDED PETITION PAGE 2 2. Upon further investigation, Plaintiff

PLAINTIFF’S UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR ORDER GRANTING LEAVE TO FILE SECOND AMENDED PETITION PAGE 2

2. Upon further investigation, Plaintiff discovered that CVM has also committed acts

of negligence as set forth in her Second Amended Petition. Therefore, CVM Holdings, LLC and

CVM Management, LLC are proper parties to this lawsuit.

3. All presently named Defendants to this action have stated that they have no

objection to this motion and, indeed, both CVM entities have been added to other lawsuits arising

out of the same nucleus of facts.

4. No parties will suffer prejudice by the filing of this Amended Petition. There is no

Scheduling Order entered in this case nor has a trial date been set.

5. Pursuant to Okla. Stat. tit. 12, §2015(A), “…a party may amend his pleading only

by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when

justice so requires.” (Emphasis added.)

6. Plaintiff has not unduly delayed making this motion, nor has this motion been made

in bad faith or for dilatory purposes. It is being made in order to name the proper parties to this

case and proceed forward with discovery.

7. Plaintiff has attached a copy of her proposed Second Amended Petition as Exhibit

“A.” Upon granting of the instant motion, Plaintiff will cause to be filed her Second Amended

Petition.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, Plaintiff respectfully prays that this Court grant her

leave to file her Second Amended Petition.


Respectfully submitted,

_________________________________ Reggie N. Whitten, OBA #9576 Michael Burrage, OBA #1350 J. Revell Parrish, OBA #30205 WHITTEN BURRAGE 512 North Broadway Ave., Suite 300 Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73102 Telephone: (405) 516-7800 Facsimile: (405) 516-7859 [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] AND Michael P. Lyons (pro hac vice) Texas State Bar No. 24013074 Christopher J. Simmons (pro hac vice) Texas State Bar No. 24058796 Stephen Higdon (pro hac vice) Texas State Bar No. 24087719 DEANS & LYONS, LLP 325 N. Saint Paul St., Suite 1500 Dallas, Texas 75201 Telephone: (214) 965-8500 Facsimile: (214) 965-8505 [email protected] [email protected] [email protected]

ATTORNEYS FOR DIANNA WALDRIDGE


CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 21st day of November, 2018, a true and correct copy of the foregoing was served to: Toby M. McKinstry Ross N. Chaffin Tomlinson McKinstry, PC Two Leadership Square, Suite 450 211 North Robinson Ave. Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73102 -AND- Pat Layden Pat Layden Law Firm, PC 23 E. Carl Albert Parkway McAlester, Oklahoma 74501 -AND- W. Ray Whitman Douglas D. D’Arche Luis Li Baker & Hostetler, LLP 811 Main Street, Suite 1100 Houston, Texas 77002 Attorneys for Patterson-UTI Energy, Inc., Patterson-UTI Drilling Company, LLC, and Patterson-UTI Management Services, LLC

Jeffrey G. Wigington David L. Rumley Wigington Rumley Dunn & Blair, L.L.P. 123 N. Carrizo Street Corpus Christi, Texas 78401 -AND- Mr. John Halepaska The Law Offices of John Halepaska 113 Ardmore Street Castle Rock, CO 80104 -AND- Mr. James T. Branam Law Office of James T. Branam, PLLC 115 West Main Street – Post Office Box 39 Antlers, Oklahoma 74523 Attorneys for Charles Levi Brite as conservator of the estate of Cody Risk, Deceased and as guardian of J.R., E.R., and B.R., minor children and Sarah Ray, surviving spouse of Josh Ray, Deceased and as next friend of A.R., minor child

David L. Kearney Hilary S. Allen Alexandra Butts Brady Durbin Larimore Bialick 920 North Harvey Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73102 Attorneys for Red Mountain Operating, LLC and Red Mountain Energy, LLC

Russell Uselton Eddie Harper Stipe Law Firm 343 E. Carl Albert Pkwy PO Box 1369 McAlester, Oklahoma 74501 Attorneys for Julie Smith, as surviving spouse and next of kin of Matthew Doyle Smith, Deceased

Robert G. Gum April Coffin Gum, Puckett & Mackechnie, L.L.P. 105 N. Hudson, Suite 900 Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73102 Attorneys for National Oilwell Varco, LP

Larry D. Ottaway Monty B. Bottom Ashley M. Thul Foliart, Huff, Ottaway & Bottom 201 Robert S. Kerr Ave., 12th Floor Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73102 Attorneys for Crescent Consulting, LLC


Montgomery L. Lair Clark O. Brewster Guy A. Fortney Brewster & DeAngelis, PLLC 2617 East 21st Street Tulsa, Oklahoma 74114 Attorneys for Betty Jo Cunningham, surviving spouse and personal representative of The Estate of Roger Cunningham, deceased

Charles L. Richardson Raymond S. Allred Nathaniel T. Smith Richardson Richardson Boudreaux 7447 South Lewis Avenue Tulsa, Oklahoma 74136 -AND- Thomas J. Henry Alan Dale Hicks Joseph Fierros The Law Offices of Thomas J. Henry 521 Starr Street Corpus Christi, Texas 78401 Attorneys for Kevin Carrillo

C. William Threlkeld Sterling E. Pratt C. Todd Ward Kelly L. Offutt Fenton, Fenton, Smith, Reneau & Moon One Leadership Square, Suite 800N 211 N. Robinson Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73102 Attorneys for Jim Brody Blagg and B&B DRLG Consulting, LLC

_________________________________

Christopher J. Simmons

Exhibit A

PLAINTIFF’S SECOND AMENDED PETITION PAGE 1 OF 34

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF PITTSBURG COUNTY STATE OF OKLAHOMA

DIANNA WALDRIDGE, personal representative of the Estate of Parker Waldridge and surviving spouse of PARKER WALDRIDGE, deceased, Plaintiff, v. RED MOUNTAIN OPERATING, LLC, RED MOUNTAIN ENERGY, LLC, PATTERSON-UTI DRILLING COMPANY, LLC, PATTERSON-UTI ENERGY, INC., PATTERSON-UTI MANAGEMENT SERVICES, LLC, NATIONAL OILWELL VARCO, L.P., CRESCENT CONSULTING, LLC, CVM HOLDINGS, LLC, AND CVM MANAGEMENT, LLC, Defendants.

§ § § § § § § § § § § § § § § § § § § § §

CASE NO.: CJ-2018-00042

JUDGE TIMOTHY E. MILLS

(Consolidated for discovery purposes only with Julie Smith, et al. vs. Red Mountain

Energy, LLC, et al., Case No. CJ-2018-60)

PLAINTIFF’S SECOND AMENDED PETITION

Plaintiff Dianna Waldridge, Personal Representative of the Estate of Parker

Waldridge and surviving spouse of Parker Waldridge, deceased, respectfully states for

these causes of action against these Defendants as follows:

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

1. On January 22, 2018, Parker Waldridge lost his life when a high pressure,

uncontrolled release of gas occurred during rotary drilling operations, igniting, and resulting in a

catastrophic blowout on the Patterson-UTI Rig #219 (the “Patterson Rig,” “Rig,” or “Rig #219”)

in Pittsburg County, Oklahoma (the “Blowout”). Sadly, four other people were also killed. At the

time of the Blowout, Defendants Patterson-UTI Drilling Company, LLC (“Patterson Drilling”),

Patterson-UTI Energy, Inc. (“Patterson Energy”), and Patterson-UTI Management Services, LLC


(“Patterson Management”) (collectively “Patterson”) directed and controlled these rotary drilling

operations which were being performed using the Patterson Rig at the Pryor Trust 0718, Well No.

1H-9 (the “Well”). At all times material, Defendants Red Mountain Operating, LLC and Red

Mountain Energy, LLC (collectively, “Red Mountain”) were the leaseholder and the operator of

the Well. Crescent Consulting, LLC (in conjunction with CVM Holdings, LLC and CVM

Management, LLC) (“Crescent”) provided a drilling engineer named Joel Acosta to oversee the

Well operations on behalf of Red Mountain along with, among others, Brody Blagg to serve as the

night shift wellsite consultant.

2. Since the Blowout, multiple witnesses have testified that during the night of January

21, 2018 and continuing into the morning of January 22nd, Patterson (along with Acosta) engaged

in unsafe drilling practices and ignored established drilling protocols designed to prevent a blowout

from occurring. As a result, when Parker and the day crew began their shift on the morning of

January 22nd, they inherited a ticking time bomb. A tragedy would follow as a result.

3. Testimony has revealed that while Patterson was pulling pipe out of the Well

(“Trip-Out”, “Tripping-Out” or “Tripping Operations”) during the night of the 21st and into the

early morning of the 22nd, a cascade of errors and multiple departures from safe drilling practices

occurred, including the following acts of negligence and/or gross negligence:

a. Knowingly tripping out of the hole underbalanced;

b. Utilizing an orbit valve as a well control device during underbalanced Tripping Operations;

c. Miscalculating proper hole fill during Tripping Operations;

d. Tripping-Out of the hole without documenting proper hole fill;

e. Tripping-Out of the hole without performing proper flow checks;


f. Contaminating a weighted pill with lost circulation material that was to be placed at the top of the curve of the wellbore during Tripping Operations resulting in a clogged drill string;

g. Knowingly pumping a weighted pill contaminated with lost circulation material which resulted in a clogged drill string in a Well that was already underbalanced;

h. Failing to pump a weighted pill in sufficient weight and quantity at the top of

the curve of the wellbore during Tripping Operations in a well that was already underbalanced;

i. Continuing Tripping Operations while it was known the Well was underbalanced and not taking proper fill;

j. Failing to make proper calculations to account for the fact that the drill string was clogged and the night crew was now pulling “wet” pipe out of the hole resulting in loss of fill;

k. Failing to take reasonable precautions to prevent the “swabbing” effect of pulling a heavy, wet drill string and bottom hole assembly (“BHA”) clogged with lost circulation material out of the hole;

l. Resetting, disabling, and ignoring numerous alarms concerning changing well conditions that occurred throughout the evening and early morning hours; and

m. Failing to properly determine and alert others that the well had not taken proper

fill, had lost significant amounts of the mud column during the Tripping Operations and that the Well was showing signs of an impending well control event.

4. While Patterson was making these critical mistakes, Acosta and at least one “mud

engineer” supplied by National Oilwell Varco, L.P. (“NOV”) were supposed to be monitoring the

Well. Acosta was the drilling engineer and, as a result, had been charged with formulating a drilling

prognosis that included a proper mud weight for the Well. NOV was supposed to prepare a mud

program that was appropriate for the conditions in the Well’s formation so that Acosta could

include it in his drilling prognosis. At any point during the evening of the 21st and into the morning

of the 22nd—while Patterson was making these mistakes—Acosta or NOV’s mud engineer could

have acted to exercise their “stop work authority” in order to prevent Patterson from continuing


their unsafe conduct. Further, neither Patterson nor Acosta recognized the Well was showing signs

of a looming well control event throughout the night and into the morning of January 22nd.

5. In addition to the conditions caused by the ill-fated Tripping Operations,

unbeknownst to Parker and the other men who lost their lives, Patterson’s accumulator—the

machine that actuates the Rams (the “Accumulator”) for Patterson’s Blow Out Preventers

(“BOPs”) in the event of a blowout—was improperly maintained and in a state of severe disrepair.

Patterson’s own documents reveal that as early as September 2017, the Accumulator showed signs

it was not properly maintained and contained safety-critical levels of water in the hydraulic fluid.

Moreover, at least two days before the Blowout, numerous Patterson employees, including the Rig

Manager and Rig Superintendent for Rig #219, received the results of laboratory testing that

contained conspicuous warnings in the form of a skull and crossbones graphic (literally) and

warned that the Accumulator’s hydraulic fluid was “milky, contaminated with water, and had lost

all viscosity”. It characterized the condition as a “Severity Level 4”, warned that water

contamination was “at a critical level for hydraulic systems” and raised additional concerns about

the inner workings of the Accumulator. The Rig Manager for Rig #219 has testified that he never

saw the email, but admitted the document should have been taken seriously and would have

precipitated a call to his Rig Superintendent had he seen it. The Rig Superintendent for Rig #219

testified he received the lab testing report by email in the days before the Blowout, but did not

remember if he looked at it. He testified that the report would warrant some follow-up to look at

the report and determine if it was accurate; however, he conceded that he did neither and was

unaware of any policy or procedure within Patterson that dictated how he was supposed to handle

the situation had he seen it.


6. The standard of care required that the Well be shut-in if the Accumulator was in

disrepair. Instead, Patterson ignored the problem and did nothing. As a result, Patterson’s failure

to act rendered its Accumulator—a mission-critical piece of safety equipment—unfit for use.

Tragically, when they were needed most, the blind rams on the BOP didn’t close fully because of

the Accumulator’s inability to function properly. Sworn testimony from both Patterson and Red

Mountain’s employees confirms that the blind rams on the BOPs did not close when the Blowout

occurred.

7. In the words of Red Mountain’s Vice President of Engineering Operations, Tim

Cummings, this Blowout was “110% preventable.” Truer words have not been spoken. The

testimony and the evidence in this case demonstrates that the Blowout was not only preventable—

it would not have happened but for Defendants’ repeated acts of negligence and recklessness.

8. Rather than recognizing the need for serious change, Patterson’s response to this

tragedy has been to do nothing: Patterson has represented to the Court in this case that it has failed

to conduct an internal company investigation into this Blowout in accordance with its own policies

and procedures; Testimony from Patterson’s employees indicates that Patterson has undertaken no

formal disciplinary actions concerning any of the employees involved; Patterson employees

involved in the Rig #219 Blowout have testified they’ve been offered no additional training or

guidance to prevent this from happening in the future; and Patterson has made no changes to its

drilling policies and procedures. When asked what they would change about their actions in

relation to the Blowout, Patterson’s employees have uniformly testified, “Nothing.” The evidence

in this case will demonstrate that Patterson refuses to learn from its mistakes—even when people

continue to die.


9. The Blowout which tragically killed Parker Waldridge marked the deadliest oilfield

disaster since the Transocean Deepwater Horizon oil and gas well blowout and explosion which

occurred in the Gulf of Mexico on April 20, 2010. Not unlike that disaster, this tragedy was

preventable had safety been the primary concern.

10. According to federal workplace safety data, Patterson is no stranger to workplace

fatalities—having the second worst worker fatality rate among its peers in the industry. Prior to

the Blowout on Rig #219, Patterson Energy and Patterson Drilling have collectively been cited

more than 110 times for serious safety violations in the past ten years and, on at least one occasion,

has been told by federal regulators that its lack of concern for safety created a seriously dangerous

environment for its workers. Going back to 1999, according to available records, Patterson has

been involved in the deaths of at least 50 workers and has received hundreds of thousands in fines

from OSHA. It would appear this tradition was permitted to continue in Quinton, Oklahoma on

Rig #219, as OSHA again cited Patterson with multiple “Serious” safety violations following the

death of five souls. Patterson is appealing those OSHA safety violations.

THE PARTIES

11. Plaintiff Dianna Waldridge is the surviving spouse of Parker Waldridge, deceased,

and the Personal Representative of the Estate of Parker Waldridge. Mrs. Waldridge is a resident

of Crescent, Oklahoma and a citizen of the State of Oklahoma. Prior to his death, Parker Waldridge

was a resident of Crescent, Oklahoma and a citizen of the State of Oklahoma.

12. Defendant Red Mountain Operating, LLC, is a limited liability company with one

or more members that reside in Oklahoma. Defendant Red Mountain Operating, LLC has

appeared herein and can be served through its counsel of record.

13. Defendant Red Mountain Energy, LLC, is a limited liability company in the State


of Oklahoma, with one or more members that reside in Oklahoma. Defendant Red Mountain

Energy, LLC has appeared herein and can be served through its counsel of record.

14. Red Mountain Operating, LLC and Red Mountain Energy, LLC are collectively

referred to herein as “Red Mountain”.

15. Defendant Patterson-UTI Drilling Company, LLC is a limited liability company in

Texas, with headquarters and principal place of business located at 10713 West Sam Houston

Parkway North, Suite 800, Houston, Texas 77064. Defendant Patterson-UTI Drilling Company,

LLC has appeared herein and can be served through its counsel of record. It is a wholly owned

subsidiary of Patterson-UTI Energy, Inc.

16. Defendant Patterson-UTI Energy, Inc. is a Delaware corporation, with its

headquarters and principal place of business located at 10713 West Sam Houston Parkway North,

Suite 800, Houston, Texas 77064. Defendant Patterson-UTI Energy, Inc. has appeared herein

(subject to its challenge to jurisdiction) and can be served through its counsel of record.

17. Defendant Patterson-UTI Management Services, LLC is a limited liability

company in Texas, with its headquarters and principal place of business located at 4510 Lamesa

Highway, Snyder, Texas 79549. Defendant Patterson Management Services, LLC has appeared

herein and can be served through its counsel of record. Defendant Patterson Management Services,

LLC is a wholly owned subsidiary of Patterson-UTI Energy, Inc.

18. Patterson-UTI Energy, Inc, Patterson-UTI Drilling, LLC, and Patterson-UTI

Management Services, LLC, are collectively referred to herein as “Patterson”.

19. Defendant National Oilwell Varco, L.P. (hereinafter “NOV”) is a foreign limited

partnership, doing business, engaging in business, and transacting business in the State of

Oklahoma. NOV has appeared herein and can be served through its counsel of record.


20. Defendant Crescent Consulting, LLC (hereinafter “Crescent”) is a limited liability

company in the State of Oklahoma, with one or more members that reside in Oklahoma, doing

business, engaging in business, and transacting business in the State of Oklahoma. Crescent has

appeared herein and can be served through its counsel of record.

21. CVM Holdings, LLC, (hereinafter “CVM Holdings”) is a domestic limited liability

company doing business, engaging in business, and transacting business in the State of Oklahoma.

CVM Holdings may be served with process by serving its attorney of record, Monty B. Bottom

and the law firm of Foliart, Huff, Ottaway & Bottom at 201 Robert S. Kerr Avenue, 12th Floor,

Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73102.

22. CVM Management, LLC, (hereinafter “CVM Management”) is a domestic limited

liability company doing business, engaging in business, and transacting business in the State of

Oklahoma. CVM Management may be served with process by serving its attorney of record,

Monty B. Bottom and the law firm of Foliart, Huff, Ottaway & Bottom at 201 Robert S. Kerr

Avenue, 12th Floor, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73102. CVM Holdings and CVM Management are

collectively referred to herein as “CVM.”

23. Defendants Patterson, Red Mountain, NOV, Crescent, and CVM are collectively

referred to as “Defendants.”

VENUE AND JURISDICTION

2 4 . This is a wrongful death action resulting from the death of Parker Waldridge

brought by his surviving spouse and personal representative pursuant to 12 O.S. §§ 1053-54. The

Blowout that took Mr. Waldridge’s life occurred in Pittsburg County, Oklahoma, which falls

within the jurisdiction of the District Court of Pittsburg County for the State of Oklahoma. As

such, venue is proper in this county pursuant to 12 O.S. § 134.


25. The amount in controversy exceeds the sum of $75,000.00, exclusive of interest

and costs.

26. Patterson Energy is subject to personal jurisdiction in Oklahoma for the claims

forming the basis of this lawsuit. Patterson claims that Patterson Energy is a holding company

with no employees, no revenues, and no equipment when defending itself in this lawsuit; however,

it takes a much different position when speaking to the public, to investors, or to potential

investors. It would appear that Patterson Energy’s sole existence is to make money at the expense

of the employees that work for its subsidiaries. All the while, Patterson Energy exercises control

over its subsidiaries by stacking the senior leadership of each with the same leadership of the parent

corporation and controlling the day to day business activities, or, as the case may be, failing to

adequately emphasize safety in the operations of Patterson Drilling.

27. Patterson Energy owns one-hundred percent of Patterson Drilling and Patterson

Management. It shares both officers and directors, and exercises pervasive control over both

subsidiaries. For example, the President of Patterson Drilling, James Holcomb, is required under

his employment agreement with Patterson Drilling to report directly to the chief executive officer,

Andrew Hendricks, Jr. Mr. Hendricks is not only the chief executive officer for Patterson Drilling

but also the president and chief executive officer for Patterson Energy. Patterson Energy’s senior

leadership, including Mr. Hendricks, openly state that the safety of Patterson Drilling’s operations

is a primary concern of Patterson Energy, demonstrating its control over its subsidiary. Patterson

Energy’s safety policies which are written by Patterson Management at the request of Patterson

Energy reflect that Patterson Energy is responsible for the promulgation and implementation of

those policies.

28. Indeed, compensation of Patterson Energy’s leadership is also significantly


dependent on Patterson Drilling’s profitability as well as its safety record. According to Patterson

Energy’s 2018 proxy filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission, Patterson Energy’s

CEO, Andy Hendricks, along with Patterson Energy’s other top executives, did not receive a

portion of their 2017 compensation because “safety” as a “key performance indicator” was not met

regarding “maintenance of Patterson-UTI’s leadership position in operating and safety standards.”

As a result, for example, Mr. Hendricks only received $14,253,839 in compensation, losing a

$250k safety incentive for the operational safety of Patterson Drilling. According to the 2018

Proxy Statement filed with the SEC, the compensation deduction was specifically attributed to the

tragedy involving the five workers killed in Quinton, Oklahoma. All five senior executives for

Patterson Energy as well as the President for Patterson Drilling were docked safety incentive

bonuses.

29. Patterson Energy boasts about its direct control over the purchase, upgrade and use

of its equipment around the country, including in Oklahoma, and including the equipment involved

in this Blowout. Based upon Patterson Energy’s own consolidated financial statements, Contract

Drilling operations comprise more than half of its operating revenues over the last five years, and

Patterson Energy makes no distinction between itself and the activities of Patterson Drilling,

holding itself out as one and the same in its references to its “employees,” “rigs,” “operations,”

“activities,” and even with respect to its claimed emphasis on “safety.” Patterson Energy’s own

press releases reflect that the employees lost in the Blowout were Patterson Energy’s employees

and reiterate its continued alleged commitment to “safety.”

30. Patterson Energy’s senior leadership also exercises direct control over Patterson

Management. The CEO, CFO, and General Counsel for Management as well as the managing

members of Patterson Management are also senior executives for Patterson Energy. Mr.


Hendricks, for example, is in direct control of Patterson Management, having the authority and

exercising the authority to make management decisions involving Patterson Management and

having the authority to hire and fire employees of Patterson Management. This includes direct

authority and decision-making involving Patterson Energy’s decision to delegate authority to

Patterson Management in the creation and implementation of Patterson Energy’s safety programs

and policies for use by its subsidiaries such as Patterson Drilling. These are the very same safety

protocols and the very same safety training at issue in this case. Patterson Management, through

the control of common leadership with Patterson Energy and Patterson Drilling, receives all the

cash collections from the subsidiaries, like Patterson Drilling, and transfers money back to the

parent, Patterson Drilling, through accounting entries controlled by the very same people who

control the accounting for Patterson Energy and the rest of the subsidiaries.

31. Clearly, Patterson Energy’s senior leadership has control over Patterson Drilling’s

operations and safety practices abroad, and, specifically, in the operations in Oklahoma. Patterson

Energy ultimately has control over Patterson Management as well as all of its subsidiaries utilizing

parallel executive management structures.

32. Patterson Energy filed challenges to personal jurisdiction in this lawsuit which were

denied by the Court after a hearing. In a sworn statement from Mark Cullifer made on behalf of

Patterson Energy, he maintains under oath that Patterson Energy did not supply any equipment,

did not have any “affiliation with the decedent or with any other party related to any activities at

the Well,” although he concedes later that Patterson Energy does have an affiliation with Patterson

Drilling. Patterson Energy’s position before this Court has been, at best, misleading and dishonest.

33. Patterson Energy’s own annual reports and disclosures boast of the number of

drilling rigs it owns, its revenues from its drilling operations, and capabilities of its drilling


equipment. Patterson Energy even boasts of having 24 drilling rigs that are based in Oklahoma,

including the Rig that is at issue in this lawsuit.

34. Patterson Energy repeatedly releases information on a monthly basis to existing and

prospective investors where they openly refer to Patterson Energy’s “market leading positions in

contract drilling” and the number of drilling rigs Patterson Energy operated for the particular

month. On February 8, 2018, the CEO for Patterson Energy, Andy Hendricks, Jr. released a

statement to report that Patterson’s revenues in 2017 were over $2.4 Billion, compared to $916MM

in 2016. In that same press release, Hendricks stated, “Before reviewing the financial results, I

want to express again that all of us at Patterson-UTI [Energy] are mourning those who lost their

lives in the tragic accident in Oklahoma. There is nothing more important to us than the safety of

our employees and others we partner with in the field.” A little more than sixty days after

Hendricks’ statements to the public, Mark Cullifer, on behalf of Patterson Energy, offered his

affidavit before this Court and swore that Patterson Energy had no employees who were working

on this Well at the time of this Blowout. Hendricks then went on in his press release to discuss all

of Patterson Energy’s “rig upgrades” to the Apex rotary drilling rigs used by Patterson.

35. The Contract under which the Well made the subject of this lawsuit was drilled

includes indemnification in favor of Patterson Energy and all of its subsidiaries—again

highlighting the connection between Patterson Drilling and its parent, Patterson Energy, who are

both represented by the same General Counsel.

36. Patterson Energy, through the direct control of its subsidiaries Patterson

Management and Patterson Drilling, conducts rotary drilling operations throughout Oklahoma, as

well as the United States and Canada. By voluntarily engaging in rotary drilling operations in

Oklahoma, Patterson has purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing business in


Oklahoma. The tort claims that form the basis of this lawsuit are a direct result of the activities

Patterson purposefully directed to Oklahoma. As such, Patterson Energy, Patterson Management,

and Patterson Drilling are all subject to this Court’s jurisdiction. To that end, the Court denied

Patterson Energy’s challenge to personal jurisdiction on August 28, 2018.

BACKGROUND FACTS

37. On January 22, 2018, at the time of the Blowout, Patterson was in the process of

drilling the Well, which was operated by Red Mountain. In order to facilitate Patterson’s drilling

operations, Red Mountain and Patterson entered into an IADC Daywork Drilling Contract setting

forth the respective obligations of Patterson and Red Mountain. According to this contract,

Patterson’s safety policies and procedures governed all the work being performed on the Rig

(whether performed by Patterson or another company). In addition, Patterson had the ultimate

responsibility over well control.

38. Red Mountain was responsible for this Well’s design and the Well’s Drilling

Program (otherwise referred to as the Drilling Prognosis) (the “Plan”). Red Mountain retained the

services of Crescent (and/or CVM as the case may be), i.e., Joel Acosta, to formulate the Plan

along with the input of Red Mountain’s Tim Cummings. The Plan required Patterson to drill to a

vertical depth of approximately 7,700 feet and a horizontal length of 10,286 feet. A critical aspect

of the Plan was the selection of the mud weight that would be used during Patterson’s drilling

operations. On behalf of Red Mountain, Cummings and Acosta hired NOV to assist them in the

creation and revision of a mud program. In order to determine the mud weight, Red Mountain and

Acosta asked for and received a significant amount of data for other “off-set” wells that had been

drilled in the same formation. In each instance, the mud weights utilized for the “off-set” wells

averaged approximately 9.0 ppg. NOV eventually provided Red Mountain and Acosta with a


proposed mud plan that recommended mud weights ranging from 8.8 – 9.1 ppg. Despite NOV’s

recommendation and the data on other “off-set” wells that showed higher mud weights, the

Defendants would ultimately utilize lower mud weights that would result in the Well being drilled

underbalanced. Documents produced in this case demonstrate at critical times the mud weight was

8.1 to 8.3 ppg during the drilling of the Well.

39. As the company providing recommendations for a mud program, NOV supplied

the mud/drilling fluids and technicians to administer/monitor the mud program. As would later be

confirmed, the mud program was not adequate to prevent the Blowout and was not adequate to

facilitate the desired drilling operations being performed on the Rig. Furthermore, the mud

program—which was itself inadequate—was not followed by Red Mountain, Crescent, and

Patterson, and NOV failed to ensure that the mud program was adequate and failed to ensure that

the mud program was being carried out in a reasonably safe manner.

40. Shortly before the Blowout occurred, Patterson had drilled to a depth of

approximately 13,500 feet when it was decided to Trip-Out the entire assembly of pipe, its bottom-

hole assembly (“BHA”) and the Rock Bit (“Bit”), i.e., (the “Drill String”), out of the Well based

on the request by Red Mountain and Acosta. During the time leading up to the Trip-Out of the

BHA, monitoring data strongly suggested that gas was in the Well. Nevertheless, reasonable steps

were not undertaken to maintain well control or shut the Well in prior to a complete loss of control.

41. Joel Acosta, Crescent’s Vice President of Operations, an owner of CVM, and an

alleged professional engineer, managed Crescent’s operations for Red Mountain. Acosta, on behalf

of Red Mountain, had ordered that the Well be drilled using a lighter mud column than the mud

program recommended by NOV (the Mud Engineer) and significantly lighter than other similar

offset wells. Acosta wanted the Well to be drilled “light” in an effort to save time and money and


to prevent potential damage to the formation.

42. During the day on Sunday, January 21st, it was widely known by Acosta and the

Patterson crew that the Well had produced a gas flare off and on throughout the day—a signal that

gas was making its way into the Well while drilling operations were underway. Despite being

aware of this, Acosta ordered that the mud weight be kept in their “back pocket.”

43. Patterson’s Rig Manager, Tony Thompson, and the night shift driller, Lionel

Deanda, have testified that on the evening of January 21st and into the early morning hours of

January 22nd, they were subjectively aware that the Well was underbalanced, but still agreed with

a plan to Trip-Out of the hole utilizing the Orbit Valve as a well control device. Both were

subjectively aware that this practice was unsafe and could result in a loss of well control. They

did it anyway. The mud weight during this exercise was reported as 8.3 in and 8.2 out. The Pason

data shows flow during each stand pulled from the hole while Tripping Out. Deanda testified that

he and Thompson were both aware the Well was not taking proper fill—yet another sign of a

looming well control event.

44. At least one reason why the Well was not taking proper fill appears to be because

Patterson had failed to properly pump a heavy weighted pill (“ECD Pill”) at a location ordered by

Acosta to maintain hydrostatic pressure at the kick off point and prevent an uncontrolled influx of

gas from migrating into the vertical section of the Well. Instead, Patterson pumped a pill that

contained lost circulation material (“LCM”) which clogged the BHA and clogged the drill string.

45. The testimony to date shows that Thompson and the rest of the Patterson crew knew

the ECD pill was stuck in the drill string but proceeded with Tripping Operations in an

underbalanced state anyway. Following the failed placement of the ECD pill, Patterson continued

to trip the clogged drill string out of the hole, “pulling wet”. This meant that the drill string,


because it was clogged, contained the mud designed to help control the Well. The clogged string

and clogged BHA added weight that would lead to a “swabbing effect” of the vertical section of

the Well. This only further compromised well control in an already underbalanced Well, as the

heavy BHA and drill string acted like a stopper in a syringe, drawing the fluids up the well bore

as they Tripped-Out. Signs that this was occurring was ignored throughout the night and into the

early morning hours.

46. Both Patterson’s Rig Superintendent (Bryan Cornelison) and Patterson’s Rig

Manager (Tony Thompson) over Rig #219 during this time testified that they were unaware of any

training, policies or procedures that have been formalized by Patterson for pulling “wet” or dealing

with a clogged drill string under the circumstances. Lionel Deanda, Patterson’s Driller who was

physically operating the controls to remove the drill string, testified that he had not received any

training for Tripping Out in the manner performed on the night of the 21st and into the morning

of the 22nd. Thompson and Deanda both testified they were unaware of any prohibition by

Patterson of Tripping-Out of the hole in an unbalanced state. Both have admitted this operation

was unsafe.

47. During the Trip-Out of the horizontal leg of the Well, the Pason data demonstrates

a loss of at least 36 barrels of mud out of the hole and reveals that the Well was not taking proper

fill. Deanda testified this was consistent with a potential well control event to come. Nevertheless,

no action was taken and no one was notified. Deanda testified that he failed to properly keep a

trip sheet that would track the mud displacement for the last 69 stands of pipe during the Trip-Out

of the vertical section of the Well—both a violation of the standard of care and a violation of

Patterson’s policies. All of these mistakes would contribute to what would become a disastrous

night with fatal consequences the following day.


48. Pason data confirms that significant additional mud losses occurred while Patterson

Tripped-Out of the vertical section of the Well. Based on all available data and testimony, it

appears Patterson “swabbed” the Well, creating a plunger effect with the heavy, clogged BHA.

Incredibly, Thompson has admitted the Pason data demonstrates that several thousand feet of pipe

was tripped out of the hole without the Well taking proper fill. Thompson also admitted that loss

of the mud column coupled with failing to spot the pill properly could result in a loss of well

control. The Chemical Safety Board has already concluded that conditions created on the evening

of January 21st and the morning of the 22nd resulted in gas influx into the vertical section of the

Well.

49. By the time of the shift change in the 6:00 a.m. hour of January 22nd, the Well was,

in fact, a ticking time bomb. Despite the repeated miscues by the evening shift, no one took steps

to alert anyone to the fact that the Well had shown signs of a looming well control event all

throughout the night. Testimony by Acosta demonstrates that he was aware the ECD pill had been

botched the evening before, yet he made no attempts to review the Pason data or follow-up with

the night Well Site Consultant (Blagg) regarding what had occurred during the Trip Out on the

night shift. No one at Patterson attempted to notify anyone of what should have been great cause

for concern over the evening’s events.

50. That morning, Parker Waldridge came on shift at 6 a.m. Mr. Waldridge served as

a WSC on behalf of Crescent. Crescent contracted with Red Mountain to provide wellsite

management at the Well. Mr. Waldridge reported directly to Acosta who was the first in command

at Crescent as it concerned this Well. He had not been present during the Trip-Out operations that

took place during the evening of the 21st into the morning of the 22nd. On the morning of the

Blowout, Parker had a safety meeting early that morning. He then attended a call with Red


Mountain and Acosta around 7:30 a.m. He called his wife, Dianna, at 7:43 a.m. It would be the

last time they would ever speak. He went to the Rig Floor sometime after 8:06 a.m. to observe the

morning’s activities on the Rig floor with the BHA and to photograph the bit change.

51. The Well was flowing. At 7:57 a.m., the Patterson Day crew opened the blind rams

to begin testing the BHA. Under Patterson’s safety policies and procedures and any accepted

standards of care, the Well should have been shut in at this point, but no one noticed what was

happening. The Pason data shows that the mud pits below the rig floor were rapidly filling up at

this time. By the time of the Blowout, another 107 barrels of mud had been lost out of the Well.

Deposition testimony from members of the Patterson crew confirms that no alarms were heard by

anyone. The CSB has confirmed that both the audible alarms inside the Doghouse as well as the

horn outside on the Rig floor had been disabled. In fact, between 10:30 p.m. on the evening of

January 21st until the Blowout at approximately 8:35 a.m. on the morning of the 22nd over 1000

different alarms went off on Rig #219. Nearly 100 of those alarms provided evidence of a well

control event.

52. Testimony from survivors of Patterson’s day crew further confirms that in the

minutes before the kick, mud was flowing out of the stack. The Patterson Derrickman has testified

that he saw mud coming over the stack in the minutes before the Blowout. In the moments leading

up to the Blowout, at least two Patterson employees have testified they heard Josh Ray, the day

shift Driller, come on the squawk box and indicate that he was going to “shut the well in”. Tony

Thompson, who was standing on the Rig floor at the time, was surprised when the Well didn’t

close and began to “burp” uncontrolled out of the stack.

53. It is believed Josh Ray attempted to shut the Well in remotely from the control

panel located behind the Driller’s station. The remote controls to the Accumulator are located


behind the driller’s chair inside the Doghouse. Those attempts failed to close the blind rams

completely.

54. Stacked atop of the Well’s equipment used to construct and complete it (the

“Wellhead Assembly”) is an assembly of high-pressure valves, the BOPs, that can be used to close

(“Shut-in”) the Well and prevent it from flowing to the surface. Rig #219 had three individual

BOPs: an Annular Preventer (the “Annular”), a double Ram-Type Preventer (the “Double Ram”)

and single Ram-Type Preventer (the “Single Ram”). All these BOPs were atop the Wellhead

Assembly. The Rig’s BOPs could be operated to OPEN or CLOSE from the Doghouse remotely

and/or manually down on the ground. The Accumulator used on Rig #219 was a hydro-pneumatic

machine that actuated the BOPs, among other things.

55. The testimony and documents to date demonstrate that Patterson’s Accumulator

was in disrepair, Patterson knew it was in disrepair, and it failed to actuate the Blind Rams at the

moment it was needed most.

56. Around 8:35 a.m., high pressure gas came out of the Well with tremendous force,

shooting mud out of the Well bore. The gas would find an ignition source, igniting the gas and

leading to an inferno which tragically claimed the lives of Parker Waldridge, Josh Ray, and three

other men who sought shelter in the Doghouse (Matthew Smith, Roger Cunningham and Cody

Risk).

57. Within seconds of the Blowout, Tony Thompson, the Rig Manager, ran down the

staircase from the Rig floor to the ground level. He ran straight for the Accumulator and attempted

to shut the Well in through the use of the manual controls on the Accumulator. According to his

deposition testimony, Thompson carelessly opened all of the stations on the Accumulator

simultaneously, needlessly drawing power to stations that actuated equipment other than the Blind


Rams. With the Accumulator already in disrepair, Thompson’s actions only ensured that the Blind

Rams would not close.

58. While the Fire raged, Parker was trapped in the Doghouse along with the four other

men. Documents obtained from the Medical Examiner’s Office demonstrate that these men were

trying to get out of the Doghouse to flee to safety but could not. Tragically, all five men were

burned to death. The resulting Fire was so intense that authorities had to rely on dental records in

order to confirm the identities of Mr. Waldridge and these four other men.

59. NOV designed and manufactured the Doghouse where these five men lost their

lives. Based on the documents and testimony to date, it appears that NOV designed the Doghouse

in such a manner that caused its door to be hinged the wrong way, thus, any person needing to

utilize the door in an emergent situation (i.e. to escape a flaming inferno on the Rig floor) would

be exposed to the flames. In addition, Patterson modified an already ill-conceived design by NOV

by changing the configuration of the quick escape staircase designed by NOV and moving it behind

the Doghouse. If a fire occurred on the Rig floor, not only would a crew member have to open the

door causing exposure to the threat on the Rig floor, but any escape was blocked by an air

conditioning unit that was placed behind the Doghouse door. Tragically, in order to escape the

Doghouse, these five men would have had to open the door, expose themselves to the heat and

flame of the fire, close the door to get around the opened door, and then exit down the stairs toward

the rear of the Doghouse—one at a time.

60. In addition to the Doghouse, NOV designed and manufactured the Accumulator. It

is undisputed the Accumulator did not function properly to close the BOPs at the time of the

Blowout. Testimony from Patterson employees demonstrates that one reason it did not function as

intended is because Tony Thompson operated all the handles simultaneously. It appears that NOV


failed to provide proper instruction and warnings to Patterson concerning the safe and proper use

of the Accumulator. It also appears that, in addition to failing to maintain the Accumulator,

Patterson did not properly train its crew on how to safely operate it in the event of an emergency.

61. Patterson’s maintenance records demonstrate that the Accumulator showed signs

of serious maintenance and mechanical deficiencies two days before the Blowout. Records

obtained from Pilot Thomas demonstrate that Patterson, by January 20th, was aware that the

hydraulic fluid in the Accumulator was milky and lacked viscosity. In addition, grave concerns

were raised by the Pilot Thomas report about internal parts inside the Accumulator breaking down

based on elevated amounts of iron, aluminum, silicon and other materials found in the fluid. Pilot

Thomas’ warnings about the Accumulator were ignored and explain why the Blind Rams did not

close.

62. According to those who knew him best, Mr. Waldridge was a loving father, devoted

husband, loving son, caring grandfather, and dedicated worker. Mr. Waldridge predeceased his

wife, Dianna Waldridge, their four daughters, his mother, and six grandchildren. Their lives will

never be the same as a result.

CAUSES OF ACTION

Count One: Negligence – Red Mountain

63. Each of the foregoing paragraphs is incorporated herein for all purposes.

64. At the time of the Blowout, Red Mountain was the Operator of the Well and had

entered into Agreements with various Contractors and Subcontractors to perform work on the

Well. Red Mountain owed a duty of ordinary care to persons working at the Well, including Mr.

Waldridge, to ensure that the working conditions at the Well were safe under all circumstances.

Red Mountain failed to use that degree of care, which should be used by an Operator of ordinary


prudence under the same or similar circumstances and, as a result, the Blowout and Fire occurred.

Red Mountain was also negligent for failing to properly instruct and supervise its employees and/or

agents, including Patterson, as described above and further below. Red Mountain’s acts and

omissions as stated herein constituted negligence. This negligence includes, but is not limited to:

a. Allowing hazardous conditions to exist at the time of the Blowout;

b. Negligently approving work to be performed by the Contractors, such as

Patterson, it provided at the Well;

c. Failing to hire a Drilling Contractor who was competent to safely perform all

rotary drilling operations at the Well;

d. Failing to ensure that the drilling operation was conducted in a safe and prudent

manner;

e. Failing to provide a safe workplace;

f. Failing to properly supervise the work being done at the time of the Blowout;

g. Failing to ensure that the equipment being used in the drilling operation was

working, was well-maintained, in good working order, not defective, and

properly used;

h. Failing to prepare a reasonably safe well plan;

i. Failing to ensure that the well plan was followed;

j. Failing to ensure that all workers were properly trained;

k. Failing to warn of a dangerous condition on the Wellsite;

l. Failing to ensure that adequate safety policies and procedures were in place and

properly implemented at the Wellsite; and

m. Failing to exercise appropriate stop work authority.


65. Red Mountain’s negligence was a proximate cause of Plaintiff’s injuries.

Count Two: Negligence – Patterson


67. Patterson was the Drilling Contractor on the Well, who was obligated to supply the

infrastructure and equipment, including the Rig, as well as trained and competent personnel and

other rotary drilling operational resources to operate and control the Rig during rotary drilling

operations. Patterson Energy, at a minimum, undertook to train the employees of Patterson that

were working on the Rig through its wholly owned subsidiaries Patterson Management and

Patterson Drilling. Patterson Energy had ultimate control over the management, operations,

policies, procedures, and capital expenditures for equipment involving its wholly owned

subsidiaries, Patterson Management and Paterson Drilling. Patterson Drilling had the most direct

control over the drilling operations and emergency response to changing conditions and failed to

use ordinary care with respect to its conduct. Patterson failed to use that degree of care, which

should be used by a Drilling Contractor of ordinary prudence under the same or similar

circumstances. Patterson Energy, Patterson Management, and Patterson Drilling were also

negligent for failing to properly train, instruct, and supervise its employees and/or agents, as

described above and further below. Patterson’s acts and omissions as stated herein constituted

negligence. This negligence includes, but is not limited to:

a. Allowing hazardous conditions to evolve, exist, persist and worsen on the

Patterson Rig before and at the time of the gas release, Fire and Blowout;

b. Failing to ensure that the drilling operation was conducted in a safe and prudent

manner;

c. Failing to provide a safe workplace at the Rig;


d. Failing to ensure that the equipment being used in the drilling operation was

working, was well-maintained, in good working order, not defective, and

properly used;

e. Failing to prepare and/or ensure that a reasonably safe well plan was in place;

f. Failing to ensure that the well plan was followed;

g. Failing to warn of dangerous conditions on the Rig;

h. Failing to ensure that adequate safety policies and procedures were in place and

properly implemented on the Rig;

i. Failing to create adequate safety policies and procedures;

j. Failing to exercise appropriate stop work authority;

k. Failing to properly train its employees, and other contractors, working on the

Patterson Rig to perform rotary drilling operations safely and appropriately;

l. Failing to properly supervise the rotary drilling operations being performed on

the Patterson Rig at the time of the Fire and Blowout; and

m. Directing Patterson employees and contractors to perform rotary drilling

operations on the Patterson Rig in an unsafe and dangerous manner.

68. Patterson’s negligence was a proximate cause of Plaintiff’s injuries.

Count Three: Negligence – NOV


70. NOV supplied the mud/drilling fluids and technicians to administer/monitor the

mud program at the Well on the date of the Blowout. The mud program supplied, administered,

and monitored was not adequate to prevent the Blowout. NOV had a responsibility to ensure that

its mud program was adequate for the drilling operations being performed at the time of the


Blowout; however, NOV failed to ensure that the mud program was adequate and failed to ensure

that the mud program, such as it was, was carried out in a reasonably safe manner.

71. NOV designed the Doghouse. The door to the Doghouse was hinged in a manner

that would expose workers to the heat and flames of a well fire. As such, the design of the

Doghouse failed to meet the accepted standards of care.

72. As stated herein, NOV’s conduct, performed by and through its employees, agents,

and representatives committed acts and/or omissions that taken individually and collectively

constituted negligence.

73. NOV’s negligence was a proximate cause of Plaintiff’s injuries.

Count Four: Negligence – Crescent


75. Crescent supplied the well-site management and monitoring services at the Well

for Red Mountain on the date of the Blowout. Crescent’s Vice President of Operations, Joel

Acosta, reported to Red Mountain and Patterson, and had control and the ability to direct the day-

to-day operations at the Well. Crescent’s acts and omissions through its agents, contractors and

employees, primarily Acosta, failed to ensure the work was being performed in a reasonably safe

manner, in accordance with industry standards, Red Mountain’s policies and procedures, or

Patterson’s policies and procedures.

76. As stated herein, Crescent, through its conduct performed by and through its agents,

contractors and employees, committed acts and/or omissions that taken individually and

collectively constituted negligence.

77. Crescent’s negligence was a proximate cause of Plaintiff’s injuries.


Count Five: Reckless Conduct – All Defendants


79. The wrongful conduct specifically alleged hereinabove (as well as other acts and

omissions, which will be revealed during the discovery process), also constitutes reckless disregard

for the rights of others. By reason of such conduct, Plaintiff is entitled and therefore assert a claim

for punitive or exemplary damages in an amount sufficient to punish and deter all Defendants and

others like them from such conduct in the future.

Count Six: Negligence Per Se – All Defendants


81. Defendants’ acts and omissions as stated above, separately and together, are

governed by numerous state and federal laws and regulations.

82. The state and federal laws and regulations that governed the Wellsite, Well, Rig,

and drilling operations (all of which are set forth above in greater detail) are intended to protect

persons such as Mr. Waldridge from unnecessary risk of injury or death at the Wellsite.

83. Defendants’ conduct described herein constitutes a violation of one or more of the

applicable standards. Such violations constitute negligence per se.

84. Mr. Waldridge’s death and the damages suffered by Plaintiff which resulted from

the negligent acts and omissions by Defendants were of the nature in which the applicable state

and federal laws and regulations were implemented to prevent.

85. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ acts and omissions, together and

separately, Mr. Waldridge died a horrific death and the lives of Plaintiff and others under § 1053

are forever damaged by the loss of a beloved husband, father, and son. Accordingly, Plaintiff is


entitled to recover all damages suffered, whether in law or in equity, as a result of Defendants’

negligent acts and omissions.

Count Seven: Wrongful Death – All Defendants


87. As a direct and proximate cause of Defendants’ negligence described above, Mr.

Waldridge died and his surviving spouse has suffered damages.

88. Plaintiff seeks damages for her loss of consortium and the grief, the mental pain

and anguish Mr. Waldridge suffered, the pecuniary loss suffered by Mr. Waldridge’s survivors,

and the grief and loss suffered by Mr. Waldridge’s survivors.

Count Eight: Survival – All Defendants


90. As a direct and proximate cause of Defendants’ negligence described above, Mr.

Waldridge endured grievous pain and suffering.

91. Plaintiff seeks damages for the pain and suffering Mr. Waldridge endured pursuant

to 12 O.S. § 1051.

Count Nine: Gross Negligence – Patterson Only

92. Plaintiff pleads gross negligence against Patterson. As set out in the multiple

affidavits of Mark Cullifer filed in various courts, Patterson Energy contends it is essentially a

corporate shell with no employees, no rigs, and no revenue. It says one thing to its shareholders

and prospective investors and a differing story to each Judge they appear before in cases where

they get sued. To their shareholders, Patterson brags about conducting drilling operations all over

the United States, including Oklahoma, but when they get sued, the same exact officers who make

these statements to their shareholders tell the Judge that they do not do business, conduct no


drilling activities and other falsities with the sole intent of trying to mislead a Judge into dismissing

them from the case. The apparent truth is Patterson Energy is a corporation whose sole purpose is

to make money without the accountability for the safety of its employees. Patterson is a $4 Billion

company who accepts hundreds of millions of dollars from shareholders by representing that they

conduct drilling operations all over the United States including Oklahoma. Patterson has an

obligation to make sure that its drilling operations are conducted in a safe manner. Patterson

Energy has stood idle while its wholly owned drilling subsidiary, controlled and managed by the

same corporate leadership as the parent, has been involved in over 136 separate OSHA incidents

and at least 50 deaths. Patterson Energy has already testified that notwithstanding these facts, it

has taken no action to control or otherwise direct the safety activities of its subsidiaries. In fact, it

would appear that despite having and exercising control over its subsidiaries, the only action taken

by Patterson Energy over the course of the last ten years is to increase its insurance

coverage. Rather than paying money for more insurance to hedge against their bad corporate

conduct and representing that they have no employees, Patterson Energy should be taking more

action to make its operations safer.

93. Patterson Drilling’s history of work-related injuries and deaths can only be

described as extraordinary. Its abhorrent safety record in Oklahoma goes as far back as August

2004 where then Secretary of Labor Elaine Chao denounced Patterson’s safety record after a

worker was killed at a Patterson location in Chickasha, Oklahoma. Patterson’s complete disregard

for safety led Senator Edward M. Kennedy to conduct a special investigation wherein a report was

authored: Discounting Death: OSHA’s Failure to Punish Safety Violations that Kill Workers,

United States Senate, Health, Education, Labor and Pensions Committee report, Edward M.


Kennedy, Chairman, April 29, 2008. Senator Kennedy’s investigation documented 38 deaths at

that time from 1999 to 2010. That number continues to grow.

94. In response to Senator Kennedy’s investigation and then placement in the OSHA

EEP Program, Patterson then adopted a “Behavior Based Safety” Program whereby every

employee including management would buy into a strong safety culture where safety is elevated

to be a core value of the company. The 24/7 Safety Program was purportedly signed off on by the

top-level persons of the company at the time including, Cloyce Talbott, then CEO of Patterson

Energy, Mike Holcomb, then Senior VP over Operations/Safety and current President of Patterson

Energy, and Mark Cullifer, then VP over Safety (and Affiant before this Court). Mr. Cullifer is

now a VP within Patterson Management—Mr. Holcomb is now President of Patterson Drilling.

95. In sharp contrast to what would become Patterson’s “24/7 Safety Culture”, Cloyce

Talbott described Patterson Energy’s true core values in interviews given to the Wall Street Journal

in 2002 and 2005. Rather than safety, Mr. Talbott admitted that Patterson’s actual core value was

money:

a. Patterson’s top value is money and more money: “…we both [Patterson Energy & Drilling] have the same philosophy. Stockholder appreciation is what we want and shareholder value is at the top of the list all the time…,” Emphasis added.

b. Patterson valued growth and more growth. Talbott explained that Patterson “…managed to grow from 302 rigs to 396 rigs…and our strategy is going to be to keep trying to grow…” Talbott went on to state that Patterson’s growth created dominant capture of market share and thereby, phenomenal leverage.

96. Talbott would further explain that this emphasis on “shareholder value” was really

putting money in the pockets of the management team, including himself, to wit: “when

management are large shareholders, I think it is good for the shareholder.”

97. That motto continues today under Patterson’s current management. According to

its 2018 Proxy statement filed with the SEC, the CEO, CFO, EVP, COO, and Chairman of the


Board for Patterson Energy received stock compensation valued at just under $25MM for 2017

alone. That’s separate and apart from salaries and other bonuses paid to these same officers and

directors. In this same year, Patterson received a distinction for safety only held by 13 other

companies in the United States. The National Counsel for Occupational Safety and Health named

Patterson to the “Dirty Dozen”, a list compiled of only the worst workplace safety violators around

the country. In doing so, it was noted that, “The disaster in Quinton was one of the worst onshore

drilling incidents in U.S. history, and the deadliest event in the oil and gas industry — onshore or

offshore — since the 2010 Deepwater Horizon rig explosion.”

98. Patterson has demonstrated itself to be a rogue corporate entity that lacks

accountability for its actions. Plaintiff requests that punitive damages be awarded by the jury in

an effort to deter this company from future misconduct and to incentivize it to change its ways.

DAMAGES

99. Dianna Waldridge, individually and on behalf of the survivors, has suffered and

will continue to suffer enormous damages, including:

a. Extraordinary grief and mental anguish over the loss of Parker Waldridge;

b. The loss of future financial support of contributions of money from Parker

Waldridge;

c. The loss of services of Parker Waldridge;

d. The loss of parental care, training, guidance, or education that would have been

forthcoming from Parker Waldridge;

e. The loss of consortium and companionship of Parker Waldridge;

f. The pain and suffering of Parker Waldridge;

g. The grief and loss suffered by Parker Waldridge’s survivors; and


h. The burial expenses.

100. The wrongful acts and omissions of Defendants were intentional, willful, wanton,

malicious, and evidence gross negligence and a reckless disregard of the rights of others, without

just cause or excuse, entitling Plaintiff to an award of punitive damages so as to punish Defendants

and deter others from engaging in such wrongful conduct. Defendants were either aware or did not

care that, under the circumstances, there was a substantial and unnecessary risk that their conduct

would cause serious injury to or the death of others, and there was a high probability that their

conduct would cause serious harm to or death of another person, such that a jury should give

punitive damages with no cap in place for the sake of example and by way of punishing said

Defendants and deterring others from engaging in such wrongful conduct.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Dianna Waldridge, Personal Representative of the Estate of

Parker Waldridge and surviving spouse of Parker Waldridge, deceased, prays judgment against

the Defendants jointly and severally for wrongful death damages, and against the Defendants for

exemplary or punitive damages, in an amount in excess of $75,000.00, together with interest, costs

thereon and all other relief as the Court deems just and equitable.


Respectfully submitted,

_________________________________ Reggie N. Whitten, OBA #9576 Michael Burrage, OBA #1350 J. Revell Parrish, OBA #30205 WHITTEN BURRAGE 512 North Broadway Ave., Suite 300 Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73102 Telephone: (405) 516-7800 Facsimile: (405) 516-7859 [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] AND Michael P. Lyons (pro hac vice) Texas State Bar No. 24013074 Christopher J. Simmons (pro hac vice) Texas State Bar No. 24058796 Stephen Higdon (pro hac vice) Texas State Bar No. 24087719 DEANS & LYONS, LLP 325 N. Saint Paul St., Suite 1500 Dallas, Texas 75201 Telephone: (214) 965-8500 Facsimile: (214) 965-8505 [email protected] [email protected] [email protected]

ATTORNEY’S LIEN CLAIMED JURY TRIAL DEMANDED


CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this ____ day of ___________, 2018, a true and correct copy of the foregoing was served via first class mail to: Toby M. McKinstry Ross N. Chaffin Tomlinson McKinstry, PC Two Leadership Square, Suite 450 211 North Robinson Ave. Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73102 -AND- Pat Layden Pat Layden Law Firm, PC 23 E. Carl Albert Parkway McAlester, Oklahoma 74501 -AND- W. Ray Whitman Douglas D. D’Arche Luis Li Baker & Hostetler, LLP 811 Main Street, Suite 1100 Houston, Texas 77002 Attorneys for Patterson-UTI Energy, Inc., Patterson-UTI Drilling Company, LLC, and Patterson-UTI Management Services, LLC

Jeffrey G. Wigington David L. Rumley Wigington Rumley Dunn & Blair, L.L.P. 123 N. Carrizo Street Corpus Christi, Texas 78401 -AND- Mr. John Halepaska The Law Offices of John Halepaska 113 Ardmore Street Castle Rock, CO 80104 -AND- Mr. James T. Branam Law Office of James T. Branam, PLLC 115 West Main Street – Post Office Box 39 Antlers, Oklahoma 74523 Attorneys for Charles Levi Brite as conservator of the estate of Cody Risk, Deceased and as guardian of J.R., E.R., and B.R., minor children and Sarah Ray, surviving spouse of Josh Ray, Deceased and as next friend of A.R., minor child

David L. Kearney Hilary S. Allen Alexandra Butts Brady Durbin Larimore Bialick 920 North Harvey Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73102 Attorneys for Red Mountain Operating, LLC and Red Mountain Energy, LLC

Russell Uselton Eddie Harper Stipe Law Firm 343 E. Carl Albert Pkwy PO Box 1369 McAlester, Oklahoma 74501 Attorneys for Julie Smith, as surviving spouse and next of kin of Matthew Doyle Smith, Deceased

Robert G. Gum April Coffin Gum, Puckett & Mackechnie, L.L.P. 105 N. Hudson, Suite 900 Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73102 Attorneys for National Oilwell Varco, LP

Larry D. Ottaway Monty B. Bottom Ashley M. Thul Foliart, Huff, Ottaway & Bottom 201 Robert S. Kerr Ave., 12th Floor Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73102 Attorneys for Crescent Consulting, LLC


Montgomery L. Lair Clark O. Brewster Guy A. Fortney Brewster & DeAngelis, PLLC 2617 East 21st Street Tulsa, Oklahoma 74114 Attorneys for Betty Jo Cunningham, surviving spouse and personal representative of The Estate of Roger Cunningham, deceased

Charles L. Richardson Raymond S. Allred Nathaniel T. Smith Richardson Richardson Boudreaux 7447 South Lewis Avenue Tulsa, Oklahoma 74136 -AND- Thomas J. Henry Alan Dale Hicks Joseph Fierros The Law Offices of Thomas J. Henry 521 Starr Street Corpus Christi, Texas 78401 Attorneys for Kevin Carrillo

C. William Threlkeld Sterling E. Pratt C. Todd Ward Kelly L. Offutt Fenton, Fenton, Smith, Reneau & Moon One Leadership Square, Suite 800N 211 N. Robinson Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73102 Attorneys for Jim Brody Blagg and B&B DRLG Consulting, LLC

_________________________________

Michael P. Lyons