Sean Islam

7/30/2019 Sean Islam

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Islam in Southeast Asia:What Should US Policymakers Know?

Policy Bulletin

The StanleyFoundation

Cosponsored byThe Stanley Foundation

and The Asia

Foundation

November 18-19, 2004San Francisco, CA

When Southeast Asia was desig-nated as a second front inthe US war against terrorism

in late 2001, Muslims in the regionbecame the subject of an intense heartsand minds campaign, as did those in theMiddle East and South Asia. Despite thisnew focus, approval of the United Stateshas plummeted among Southeast AsianMuslims. Some analysts point to obviousand immediate reasons, such as the unpop-ularity of the war in Iraq among Southeast

Asians in general, Muslim or not.

A more subtle but complex source of dis-content with the United States lies in USpolicy paradigms for Muslim Southeast

Asia. Many Southeast Asians complainthat the American view of Muslims ismonolithic and inaccurate, based upon

the image of the radical Arab street.They argue that US policy needs to bebased upon a more nuanced understand-ing of Islam in Southeast Asia and of thecomplexities of Muslim politics and soci-ety in the region.

To aid policymakers in this regard, theStanley Foundation organized a round-table on Islam in Southeast Asia in San

Francisco in November 2004. This eventwas the fourth roundtable in an 18-monthprogram on Southeast Asia in the Twenty-First Century: Issues and Options for USPolicy. Cosponsored with the AsiaFoundation, the meeting brought together

American and Southeast Asian governmentofficials, scholars, and nongovernmental

More information onthe Southeast Asia in

the Twenty-FirstCentury program is

available online atww.stanleyfoundation.org

This Policy Bulletin

summarizes the primaryfindings of the conference asnterpreted by the rapporteur

and program officer.Participants neither reviewed

nor approved this bulletin.

Therefore, it shouldnot be assumed that every

articipant subscribes to all of

recommendations, observa-tions, and conclusions.

representatives to consider recommen-dations for US policymakers. Anessential prelude to the recommendationprocess was an examination of Islam inSoutheast Asia, its place in the globalMuslim community, and present USpolicy toward Southeast Asian Muslims.

The Difficulty With Definitions

A common paradigm in US counterter-rorism policy for Southeast Asiadivides Muslims into moderates andextremists and aims to strengthen theformer while weakening the latter.Many Southeast Asians object to thisand any other categorization ofMuslims in the region. In applyinglabels under such sensitive circum-stances, American and Southeast Asianparticipants found that the caveatsinvariably outnumbered the categories.

Underneath these semantic difficultiesare problems of understanding theMuslim spectrum in Southeast Asia andthe tendency to group all extremiststogether. This encourages a confusion ofends and means, and ultimately can cause

Improving the image of the UnitedStates among Muslims in SoutheastAsia requires not only a considera-tion of new initiatives but also a hardlook at some of the assumptions thatundergird US policy in Southeast

Asia. Recommendations on page 4.


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policymakers to conflate Muslim fundamentalismor extremism with terrorism. In an extreme worst-case scenario, this practice can turn hasty andinjudicious tagging of Muslim groups into a self-fulfilling prophecy.

To avoid making enemies in Islamic communities,

policymakers should take a more cautious and cal-ibrated approach when it is necessary to parseMuslim communities in Southeast Asia. ManySoutheast Asians find the categorization ofmainstream and fringe groups more acceptable,because it describes the relation of groups to oneanother, rather than rating them according toIslamic intensity. In addressing the radical end ofthe spectrum, US policy should reflect an under-standing that personal piety does not necessarily

lead to violence. Distinctions should be madebetween groups that advocate jihad as an internalstruggle to follow the teachings of Islam andthose to whom it means armed struggleviolentextremists are the radical fringe of a radicalfringe. However, both American and Southeast

Asian participants acknowledged that the termjihadmay be so linked to violence in popular per-ception that it is no longer a useful term.

To be sure, there are difficult gray areas, such asbetween fundamentalists who adhere strictly toMuslim law in their personal lives and those who

would impose that practice upon others, even onnon-Muslims in Muslim-majority areas. On theother end of the spectrum, policymakers shouldnote that moderates are not limited to those

who favor secular government over theocracy andeschew violence but also include a number ofprogressive groups that believe Islam can make amajor contribution to democracy. In addition,policymakers should avoid rigidity in their assess-ments of Muslim groups, as they can be extremiston some issues but moderate on others.

Southeast Asian participants pointed out thatMuslims in the region themselves use terms suchas moderates and extremists, and allowed thatsome working division is probably necessary forpolicymaking. In many cases, the problem is not

with the terms as much as with the arrogance ofoutsiders attempting such linguistic engineering

Americans do not have the credibility in SoutheastAsia to label Muslims. Moreover, Southeast Asiansthemselves are engaged in a struggle over Islamicterms, particularly in the political arena. InIndonesia and Malaysia both, secular leaders are

inclined to represent themselves as religiousnationalists, so as to co-opt the agendas (if not theimages) of their more radical rivals.

Southeast Asia in the Muslim WorldDespite the awkwardness of defining Muslimidentities, Southeast Asians and Americans alike

view the great majority of Muslims in the region tobe moderate in their orientation and practice. On apolicy level, this would seem to give Southeast

Asia the potential to play an important role in theMuslim world. Indonesia is the worlds largestMuslim-majority democracy, and Malaysia standsout as an example of a modern Muslim state. Butis Southeast Asia positioned to play such a demon-stration effect in the global Muslim community?

Scholars point out the need to separate theologyfrom culture in the Islamic world, and point to sixmajor cultural zones in the global Muslim commu-

nity: Arab, Persian, Turkish, sub-Saharan, Indian,and Malay. Each of these zones has a distinct reli-gious identity, forged by theology, legal frameworks,and interaction with other religious and culturalgroups. Malay Islam, the result of voluntary ratherthan forced conversion and filtered by passagethrough India, has historically differed fromMuslim cultural zones farther away.

At the same time, this distance has narrowed in

recent decades, particularly with the influence ofpetro-dollars from the Middle East. At the presenttime, in both theological and economic dimen-sions, the influence of the Middle East overSoutheast Asia is essentially a one-way street. Priorto the 1970s, many Southeast Asians went toCairo, Jordan, and Baghdad for education and wereexposed to different theological strains. Today theeducational flows to Saudi Arabia are far heavier.


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Muslim men in Southeast Asia and manipulatetensions within impoverished Muslim communi-ties as well as between Muslims and otherreligious or cultural groups. It does not follow,however, that an infusion of funds would neces-sarily reverse these trends. The missing link inthis process is the quality of governance in

Southeast Asia, particularly in the wake of the1997 Asian financial crisis.

Southeast Asian disillusionment with the per-formance of their leaders is broad, encompassingall religious groups. Discontent over the failureof governments to achieve sustainable economicdevelopment in the mid and lower economictiers in the region and to control corruption is

widespread. However, these disappointments are

particularly acute in Southeast Asian Muslimcommunities. Indonesia has yet to recover fullyfrom the 1997 crisis. Among Muslim minoritiesin the Philippines and Thailand, poor gover-nance has exacerbated economic gaps with othergroups. Muslims are also critical of governmentperformance on the protection of human rights,and here too they often find themselves on thelosing end.

These popular views of governance often trans-late directly into politics. In 1999 the MalaysianIslamic opposition party, PAS, gained supportand control of two states at the local level becauseof perceptions of gross injustice from the rulingparty. In Indonesia, although Islamic parties arenot dominant, their support is based on theiranticorruption positions. In recent years, main-stream secular Muslim leaders have attempted togive their parties and policies an Islamic cast, tostem the popularity of more radical groups. Thereare signs that Prime Minister Badawi of Malaysiais attempting to pull away from competitive dis-course with PAS. However, as with President

Yudhyono of Indonesia, this is unlikely to happenuntil their governments have gained more solidsupport based on their performance.

Although Middle Eastern aid to mosques andMuslim schools has played a key role in someSoutheast Asian areas, trade itself is lacklusterfor Indonesia and Malaysia, trade with the MiddleEast is less than 5 percent of the total volume.

Middle Eastern views of Islam in Southeast

Asia, as well as in other regions, do not encour-age two-way transfers and influence in the nearterm. For the most part, Middle EasternMuslims see Southeast Asia as the periphery. Adangerous exception to this is Al Qaedas view ofthe region, which regards Southeast Asia as animportant operational theater. On the Islamic

world stage, however, this dynamic is beginningto change. Malaysia plays an important role inthe Organization of the Islamic Conference.

When Prime Minister Badawi addressed theUnited Nations last year, he warned Muslimleaders that they needed to pay greater attentionto governance and education in their countries.

On the whole, however, ambitions for SoutheastAsia to serve as a moderating example for moreradical corners of the Muslim world are probablyunrealistic. A more critical policy objective maybe for Southeast Asians to focus on influencing

one another, by sharing best educational practicesand stimulating dialogue across the region amongmoderate and progressive groups.

Religious Flashpointsor Failed Governance?

Almost immediately after the September 11attack, Southeast Asian leaders, such as President

Arroyo of the Philippines, stressed to Americanpolicymakers that fighting terrorism was as much

or more a matter of tackling root causes as it wasfighting insurgents. Root causes has becomecode for poverty in Southeast Asia, but that maybe too simplistic and facile an explanation for therise of extremism in a small, but potentially dan-gerous, minority of Muslims in the region.

Most analysts grant that terrorist groups are ableto recruit poor and disenfranchised young


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US Policy: DevelopmentAid or Public Diplomacy?Despite the seemingly abrupt turn by US foreignpolicy to focus on counterterrorism in Southeast

Asia after September 11, ongoing programs in theregion that were launched before 2001 may be

better suited to improve relations with Muslimsthan more targeted hearts and minds campaigns.US assistance programs to promote good gover-nance and economic development, particularly inIndonesia, addressed root cause problems andoffered broad outreach to Muslims as a happybyproduct. Similarly, pre-2001 assistance in thePhilippines focused on governance issues thataffected all Filipinos, but also gave considerableattention to Mindinao. Reaping greater benefitfrom these programs may be primarily a matter of

increasing their scope. However, US policy ishampered by the absence of aid programs inMalaysia and Thailand, both of which have grad-uated from official assistance because of theireconomic levels. In these countries, AmericanNGOs may have a greater role to play in promot-ing relations with Muslim communities.

In contrast to development programs, US publicdiplomacy programs aimed at Southeast Asian

Muslims have been poorly conceived and poorlyexecuted, largely because they have not been tai-lored to the region. The shared values campaignlaunched immediately after September 11 wasunsuccessful in Southeast Asia because treatmentof Muslims in the United States is not an issue inthe region. Although Indonesian and Malaysiantelevision stations obligingly ran the campaign

videos, they inspired more derision than admira-tion and were ultimately a negative factor.

A more serious issue is that of visas and the per-ception that stricter policies in this area are amanifestation of anti-Islam feeling in the US gov-ernment. Transition to new visa regulations lefthundreds of applications in limbo in many USconsulates in Southeast Asia. In some countries,recipients of Fulbright grants to study in theUnited States have been refused visas. Applications

from Southeast Asian students to study in theUnited States have dropped dramaticallyinIndonesia, by 40 percent. Responsibility forimproving the visa situation is not restricted to theUS government alone. Some universities are reluc-tant to complete the more complex documentationrequirements of the new visa policies, which con-

tributes to the dwindling numbers of SoutheastAsians studying in the United States.

Although the visa gridlock has eased somewhat,resentment toward the United States because ofthe visa situation in Southeast Asian Muslim com-munities, and among Southeast Asians in general,has not abated. This new climate has harmed otherUS efforts to gain support among Southeast AsianMuslims. The situation extends beyond the educa-

tional sector and has affected trade, as SoutheastAsian business people have found it more difficultto obtain visas to travel to the United States.

RecommendationsWithout question, improving the image of theUnited States among Muslims in Southeast Asiais a delicate undertaking. It requires not only aconsideration of new initiatives but also a hardlook at some of the assumptions that undergird

US policy in Southeast Asia.

1. Consider the impact on Southeast AsianMuslim views of US actions in other areas ofthe Islamic world. Efforts to improve relations

with Muslims in Southeast Asia may be wastedif policymakers do not fully appreciate theimpact of policies in other regions, particularlythe Middle East. US policymakers have tendedto view Southeast Asia as parochial, concerned

only with its own conflicts and development.This assumption ignores the rapid spread of aglobal Muslim identity in Southeast Asia, as inother regions. International Muslim conscious-ness does not negate the diversity of the Islamic

world, but reflects the impact of globalization.US policy in the worlds Islamic hot spotsthe

Arab-Israeli conflict, Iraq, Iranmay influenceSoutheast Asian Muslim views of the United


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States as much as or more than US actions inIndonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, or Thailand.

Beyond factoring this phenomenon into globalpolicy, the United States should willingly engageSoutheast Asians in dialogue on issues in otherregions of the Muslim world. Washington is not

likely to change direction on the Arab-Israeliconflict and other trouble spots solely in defer-ence to Southeast Asians, but it can do a better

job of explaining US policies to them.

2. Include a broader spectrum of Muslims in pub-lic diplomacy efforts.While there is an obviouslogic to making common cause with moderateMuslims in Southeast Asia, it risks furtheralienating radical Muslims and pushing them

toward violent groups. In addition to supportingmoderate Muslims, policymakers should attemptto widen the distance between nonviolent and

violent radical Muslims by increasing dialoguewith nonviolent groups and including them inexchange programs. This is a high-risk policy

with a potential for high return. However,administrators of official and NGO exchangeprograms should select participants for theseprograms carefully, in view of US regulations

prohibiting funding of groups that may be asso-ciated with terrorist groups.

3. Dont focus exclusively on Muslims in complexand volatile situations. In a policy heavilyfocused on terrorism, US officials tend to focusreflexively on the role of Muslims in communalconflicts. This may in fact exacerbate such ten-sions. US policies in conflict areas of Southeast

Asiafor example, Mindanao or southern

Thailandshould aim for objectivity andaddress the needs and complaints of all sides.In these areas, US assistance should avoidchampioning, and therefore booby-trapping,one side against the other.

4. Educate a broader range of US policymakers onIslam, from congressional members and staff toHomeland Security officials.American legisla-

tors have responded enthusiastically to seminarprograms on Islam when offered. These can be aconduit to educating both authorizers andappropriators on the nuances of Islam inSoutheast Asia, as can increased attention to thisarea by the Congressional Research Service.Both official and NGO policy dialogues on

Southeast Asia should also make an effort toinclude Homeland Security officials, who tend tobe forgotten in these exercises.

5. Fix problems with the visa process and thoserelating to ports of entry.The Bush administra-tion should consider establishing a Track 2blue-ribbon national commission on visa policyto assess the impact that post-9/11 changes in

visa regulations have had on relations with the

Muslim world. The commission should includemembers from the executive branch, Congress,business, and the education community andmake recommendations for improvement with-out compromising security.

A separate but related issue is the need to ensurethat Transportation Security Administration

workers and other port-of-entry officials receivetraining on Islamic culture and the Muslim

world. Correcting visa problems will be of littleuse if Muslims visiting the United States are met

with hostile or nativist attitudes from US officialsupon arrival.

6. Support Muslim education but take a broaderapproach. President Bush emphasized educa-tion for Southeast Asian Muslims in his 2003

visit to the region, but programs promised forIndonesia and the Philippines have yet to be

implemented. In fleshing out this new initia-tive, policymakers should follow the lead ofdevelopment programs. They should not onlytarget Islamic schools but also pay attention tosecular schools, public or private, that servelarge groups of Muslim students.

Beyond improving the overall quality of educa-tion for Muslims, the United States should

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promote understanding of America throughthe Southeast Asian educational system. InMalaysia, for example, the US government andNGOs should support American studies pro-grams at public universities, where the subjectis seldom offered.

7. Make longer-term study and exchange the foun-dation of a public diplomacy program. Publicdiplomacy programs often support the soundbite, with video campaigns and whirlwindtours of the United States for busy Muslimleaders. Longer-term programs that encouragein-depth study or experience are likely to pro-

vide a greater payoff. A greater proportion offunds should be channeled to Fulbright and

American Field Service programs. However,

this measure should be matched with improvedvisa policies, or these programs will not befully utilized. Beyond increasing funding toexisting programs, the Bush administrationand Congress should consider President

Yudhyonos invitation for the Peace Corps toreturn to Indonesia.

8. Promote dialogue between American Muslimintellectuals and their Southeast Asian coun-

terparts.The growing group of AmericanMuslim academics is an untapped resource inpublic diplomacy programs and even as infor-mal diplomats in Southeast Asia. Thesescholars are experienced in interfaith dialogueand so can offer insights on other religions inthe United States to their coreligionists inSoutheast Asia. Moreover, they see no contra-diction between Islam and democracy.

9. Facilitate intra-Muslim networks and dialoguein Southeast Asia behind the scenes. In manyareas of Southeast Asia, the issues most likely togive rise to violent extremism are not betweenMuslims and other religious groups, but withinthe Muslim community. The United Statesshould support intra-Muslim dialogue but can-not be an obvious broker in this process. Beyond

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ad hoc opportunities, the United States shouldprovide assistance for ongoing regional networksof Muslim scholars and civil society groups tohelp build permanent scaffolding for such dia-logue. Given the obvious sensitivities, suchassistance should be channeled through field-based American NGOs.

Participant List

CochairsCatharin E. Dalpino, Adjunct Professor,Southeast Asian Studies, Georgetown University

and The Paul H. Nitze School of AdvancedInternational Studies, The Johns HopkinsUniversity

Gordon R. Hein, Vice President of Programs,The Asia Foundation

Program CoordinatorElizabeth Constantine, Program Officer, TheStanley Foundation

RapporteurElina Noor, M.A. Candidate, Security StudiesProgram, Edmund A. Walsh School of ForeignService, Georgetown University

ParticipantsZachary Abuza, Associate Professor of PoliticalScience, Simmons College

Osman Bakar, Malaysia Chair of Islam inSoutheast Asia, Center for Muslim-ChristianUnderstanding, Georgetown University

Douglas Bereuter, President, The Asia Foundation

John J. Brandon, Director, International RelationsProgram, The Asia Foundation


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Bahtiar Effendy, Lecturer, State IslamicUniversity Jakarta

Donald K. Emmerson, Director, The SoutheastAsia Forum, Asia-Pacific Research Center,Stanford University

Edward Gresser, Project Director, ProgressivePolicy Institute

Heng Pek Koon, Assistant Professor, School ofInternational Service, American University

Marie Huhtala, Deputy Assistant Secretary,Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, USDepartment of State

Erik Jensen, Senior Law Advisor, The AsiaFoundation

Kasit Piromya, Ambassador of Thailand to theUnited States

James Klein, Representative for Thailand, TheAsia Foundation

R. William Liddle, Professor of Political Science,

College of Social and Behavioral Sciences, TheOhio State University

Mark Manyin, Specialist in Asian Affairs, ForeignAffairs, Defense, and Trade Division,Congressional Research Service, The Library ofCongress

G. Eugene Martin, Executive Director, ThePhilippine Facilitation Project, United StatesInstitute of Peace

Patricia Martinez, Associate Professor and SeniorResearch Fellow, Asia-Europe Institute,University of Malaya

Edward Masters, Cochairman, The UnitedStates-Indonesia Society

Ann Marie Murphy, Assistant Professor ofComparative Foreign Policy and Asian Politics,

John C. Whitehead School of Diplomacy andInternational Relations, Seton Hall University

Kevin F. F. Quigley, President, National PeaceCorps Association

Angel Rabasa, Senior Policy Analyst, RAND

Victor G. Raphael, Chief, Southeast AsiaDivision, Office of Analysis for East Asia andPacific, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, USDepartment of State

Amina Rasul-Bernardo, Convenor, PhilippineCouncil for Islam and Democracy

Sheldon W. Simon, Professor of Political Science,Arizona State University

Daniel H. Unger, Professor of Political Science,Northern Illinois University

Bridget Welsh, Assistant Professor, SoutheastAsia Studies Program, The Paul H. Nitze Schoolof Advanced International Studies, The Johns

Hopkins University

Mark Woodward, Associate Professor ofReligious Studies, Arizona State University

Frances A. Zwenig, Senior Country Director, US-ASEAN Business Council

The Stanley Foundation Staff

Leslie Winter, Program AssociateLoren Keller, Writer/Editor

Affiliations are listed for identification purposes only. Participantsattended as individuals rather than as representatives of their gov-ernments or organizations.


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