1. Rural Bank of Anda vs Roman Catholic Bishop of Lingayen-DagupanG.R. NO. 155051

The Case           This is a petition for review[1] of the Decision[2] dated 15 October 2001 and the Resolution dated 23 August 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66478. The Facts           The lot in dispute, Cadastral Lot 736 (Lot 736), is located in the Poblacion of Binmaley, Pangasinan. Lot 736 has a total area of about 1,300 square meters and is part of Lot 3. Cadastral Lot 737 and Lot 739 also form part of Lot 3. Cadastral Lot 737 is known as Imelda’s Park, while on Lot 739 is a waiting shed for commuters. Lot 3 is bounded on the north by Lot 1 of Plan II-5201-A and on the south by the national road. In front of Lot 736 is the building of Mary Help of Christians Seminary (seminary) which is on Lot 1.           Lot 1 of Plan II-5201-A, which adjoins Lot 3 on the north, is titled in the name of respondent Roman Catholic Archbishop of Lingayen (respondent) under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 6375 (TCT 6375).  An annotation on TCT 6375 states that the ownership of Lot 3 is being claimed by both respondent and the Municipality of Binmaley.           In 1958, the Rector of the seminary ordered the construction of the fence separating Lot 736 from the national road to prevent the caretelas  from parking because the smell of horse manure was already bothering the priests living in the seminary.[3] The concrete fence enclosing Lot 736 has openings in the east, west, and center and has no gate. People can pass through Lot 736 at any time of the day.[4]            On 22 December 1997, the Sangguniang Bayan of Binmaley, Pangasinan, passed and approved Resolution Nos. 104[5] and 105.[6]  Resolution No. 104 converted Lot 736 from an institutional lot to a commercial lot.  Resolution No. 105 authorized the municipal mayor to enter into a contract of lease for 25 years with the Rural Bank of Anda over a portion of Lot 736 with an area of 252 square meters.[7]

           In December 1997, Fr. Arenos, the director of the seminary, discovered that a sawali fence was being constructed enclosing a portion of Lot 736.  In January 1998, the Municipal Mayor of Binmaley, Rolando Domalanta (Mayor Domalanta), came to the seminary to discuss the situation.  Mayor Domalanta and Fr. Arenos agreed that the construction of the building for the Rural Bank of Anda should be stopped.           On 24 March 1998, respondent  requested Mayor Domalanta to remove the sawali fence and restore the concrete fence.  On 20 May 1998,  Mayor Domalanta informed respondent  that the construction of the building of the Rural Bank of Anda would resume but that he was willing to discuss with respondent to resolve the problem concerning Lot 736.           On 1 June 1998, respondent filed a complaint for Abatement of Illegal Constructions, Injunction and Damages with Writ of Preliminary Injunction in the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan.  On 24 August 1998, the trial court ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.           On 4 January 2000, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads: 

          WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff [Roman Catholic Archbishop of Lingayen-Dagupan]: 1.      Making the writ of preliminary injunction permanent;  2.      Ordering the defendants to cause to be restored the concrete wall with iron railings, to cause to be removed the sawali fence, both at the expense of the defendants, jointly and severally, and 3.      Condemning the defendants to pay jointly and severally, to the plaintiff the amount of P25,000.00 as litigation expenses, attorney’s fees in the amount of P50,000.00  and the costs of this suit.                       SO ORDERED.[8]

                       On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision with the modification that the awards of litigation expenses, attorney’s fees, and costs should be deleted. The Court of Appeals subsequently denied the motion for reconsideration of the Municipality of Binmaley and the Rural Bank of Anda.  The Ruling of the Trial Court                   The trial court found that Lot 736 is not covered by any Torrens title either in the name of  respondent or in the name of the Municipality of Binmaley. The trial court held that Lot 736 is public in nature. Since Lot 736 is property of public dominion, it is outside the commerce of man. Thus, the Sangguniang Bayan of Binmaley, Pangasinan exceeded its authority when it adopted Resolution Nos. 104 and 105 converting Lot 736 from an institutional lot to a commercial lot and authorizing the municipal mayor to enter into a contract of lease for 25 years with the Rural Bank of Anda over a 252 square meter portion of Lot 736 .                          The Ruling of the Court of Appeals           The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that Lot 736 is  property of public dominion and is used by the public as a pathway. Respondent and the Municipality of Binmaley are mere claimants with no sufficient evidence to prove their ownership of Lot 736. The Court of Appeals held that property of public dominion is intended for the common welfare and cannot be the object of appropriation either by the state or by private persons. Since Lot 736 is for public use, it is a property of public dominion and it is not susceptible of private ownership. Thus, Resolution  Nos. 104 and 105 are void for being enacted beyond the powers of the Sangguniang Bayan of Binmaley.  The contract of lease between the Municipality of Binmaley and the Rural Bank of Anda is therefore void.           The Court of Appeals also ruled that since neither the respondent nor the Municipality of Binmaley owns Lot 736, there is no basis for the monetary awards granted by the trial court. The Issue         

          The issue in this case is whether Resolution Nos. 104 and 105 of the  Sangguniang Bayan of Binmaley are valid.          The Ruling of the Court           The petition has no merit.            Both respondent and the Municipality of Binmaley admit that they do not have title over Lot 736. The Assistant Chief of the Aggregate Survey Section  of the Land Management Services in Region I testified that no document of ownership for Lot 736 was ever presented to their office.[9]

           Respondent claims Lot 736 based on its alleged open, continuous, adverse, and uninterrupted possession  of Lot 736. However, the records reveal otherwise. Even the witnesses for respondent testified that Lot 736 was used by the people as pathway, parking space, and playground.[10]

           On the other hand, the Municipality of Binmaley alleged that it is the sole claimant of Lot 736 based on the Property Identification Map, Tax Mapping Control Roll of the Municipality of Binmaley, and the Lot Data Computation in the name of the Municipality of Binmaley. However, these documents merely show that the Municipality of Binmaley is a mere claimant of Lot 736.  In fact, the chief of Survey Division of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, San Fernando City, La Union testified that the cadastral survey[11] of Lot 736, which was surveyed for the Municipality of Binmaley in 1989, had not been approved.[12] The cadastral survey was based on the  Lot Data Computation[13] of Lot 736 which was likewise contracted by the Municipality  of Binmaley in 1989.           The records show that Lot 736 is used as a pathway going to the school, the seminary, or the church, which are all located on lots adjoined to Lot 736.[14] Lot 736 was also used for parking and playground.[15] In other words, Lot 736 was used by the public in general.           Both respondent and the Municipality of Binmaley failed to prove their right over Lot 736. Since Lot 736 has never been acquired by anyone through purchase or grant or any other mode of acquisition, Lot 736 remains part of  the public domain and is owned by the state. As held in Hong Hok v. David:[16]

 There being no evidence whatever that the property in question was ever acquired by the applicants or their ancestors either by composition title from the Spanish Government or by possessory information title or by any other means for the acquisition of public lands, the property must be held to be public domain. For it is well settled “that no public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied, from the government.” It is indispensable then that there be a showing of a title from the state or any other mode of acquisition recognized by law. The most recent restatement of the doctrine, found in an opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes follows: “The applicant, having failed to establish his right or title over the northern portion of Lot No. 463 involved in the present controversy, and there being no showing that the same has been acquired by any private person from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, the property is and remains part of the public domain.”            This is in accordance with the Regalian doctrine which holds that the state owns all lands and waters of the public domain.[17] Thus, under Article XII, Section 2 of the Constitution:  “All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the state.”

           Municipal corporations cannot appropriate to themselves public or government lands without prior grant from the government.[18] Since Lot 736 is owned by the state, the Sangguniang Bayan of Binmaley exceeded its authority in passing Resolution Nos. 104 and 105. Thus, Resolution Nos. 104 and 105 are void and consequently, the contract of lease between the Municipality of Binmaley and the Rural Bank of Anda over a portion of Lot 736 is also void.    WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We  AFFIRM the Decision dated 15 October 2001 and the Resolution dated 23 August 2002 of the Court of Appeals.           SO ORDERED.  ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice

2. Cruz vs Secretary of Environment and Natural ResourcesG.R. NO. 135385

Cruz, a noted constitutionalist, assailed the validity of the RA 8371 or the Indigenous People’s Rights Act on the ground that the law amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of  the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution. The IPRA law basically enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over ancestral domains which may include natural resources. Cruz et al contend that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of “ancestral domains” and “ancestral lands” which might even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) of said law violate the rights of private landowners.ISSUE: Whether or not the IPRA law is unconstitutional.HELD: The SC deliberated upon the matter. After deliberation they voted and reached a 7-7 vote. They deliberated again and the same result transpired. Since there was no majority vote, Cruz’s petition was dismissed and the IPRA law was sustained. Hence, ancestral domains may include public domain – somehow against the regalian doctrine.

R E S O L U T I O N

PER CURIAM:

Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371 (R.A. 8371), otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (Implementing Rules).

In its resolution of September 29, 1998, the Court required respondents to comment. [1] In compliance, respondents Chairperson and Commissioners of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), the government agency created under the IPRA to implement its provisions, filed on October 13, 1998 their Comment to the Petition, in which they defend the constitutionality of the IPRA and pray that the petition be dismissed for lack of merit.

On October 19, 1998, respondents Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) filed through the Solicitor General a consolidated

Comment.  The Solicitor General is of the view that the IPRA is partly unconstitutional on the ground that it grants ownership over natural resources to indigenous peoples and prays that the petition be granted in part.

On November 10, 1998, a group of intervenors, composed of Sen. Juan Flavier, one of the authors of the IPRA, Mr. Ponciano Bennagen, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, and the leaders and members of 112 groups of indigenous peoples (Flavier, et. al), filed their Motion for Leave to Intervene.  They join the NCIP in defending the constitutionality of IPRA and praying for the dismissal of the petition.

On March 22, 1999, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) likewise filed a Motion to Intervene and/or to Appear as Amicus Curiae.  The CHR asserts that IPRA is an expression of the principle of parens patriae and that the State has the responsibility to protect and guarantee the rights of those who are at a serious disadvantage like indigenous peoples.  For this reason it prays that the petition be dismissed.

On March 23, 1999, another group, composed of the Ikalahan Indigenous People and the Haribon Foundation for the Conservation of Natural Resources, Inc. (Haribon, et al.), filed a motion to Intervene with attached Comment-in-Intervention.  They agree with the NCIP and Flavier, et al. that IPRA is consistent with the Constitution and pray that the petition for prohibition and mandamus be dismissed.

The motions for intervention of the aforesaid groups and organizations were granted.

Oral arguments were heard on April 13, 1999.  Thereafter, the parties and intervenors filed their respective memoranda in which they reiterate the arguments adduced in their earlier pleadings and during the hearing.

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of the IPRA and its Implementing Rules on the ground that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution:

“(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of ancestral domains, and Section 3(b) which, in turn, defines ancestral lands;

“(2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which provides that ancestral domains including inalienable public lands, bodies of water, mineral and other resources found within ancestral domains are private but community property of the indigenous peoples;

“(3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines the composition of ancestral domains and ancestral lands;

“(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the ancestral domains;

(5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the ancestral lands;

“(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the indigenous peoples in the harvesting, extraction, development or exploration of minerals and other natural resources within the areas claimed to be their ancestral domains, and the right to enter into agreements with nonindigenous peoples for the development and utilization of natural resources therein for a period not exceeding 25 years, renewable for not more than 25 years; and

“(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the responsibility to maintain, develop, protect and conserve the ancestral domains and portions thereof which are found to be necessary for critical watersheds, mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas, forest cover or reforestation.”[2]

Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of “ancestral domains” and “ancestral lands” which might even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) violate the rights of private landowners.[3]

In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the powers and jurisdiction of the NCIP and making customary law applicable to the settlement of disputes involving ancestral domains and ancestral lands on the ground that these provisions violate the due process clause of the Constitution.[4]

These provisions are:

“(1) sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the process of delineation and recognition of ancestral domains and which vest on the NCIP the sole authority to delineate ancestral domains and ancestral lands;

“(2) Section 52[i] which provides that upon certification by the NCIP that a particular area is an ancestral domain and upon notification to the following officials, namely, the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,

Secretary of Interior and Local Governments, Secretary of Justice and Commissioner of the National Development Corporation, the jurisdiction of said officials over said area terminates;

“(3) Section 63 which provides the customary law, traditions and practices of indigenous peoples shall be applied first with respect to property rights, claims of ownership, hereditary succession and settlement of land disputes, and that any doubt or ambiguity in the interpretation thereof shall be resolved in favor of the indigenous peoples;

“(4) Section 65 which states that customary laws and practices shall be used to resolve disputes involving indigenous peoples; and

“(5) Section 66 which vests on the NCIP the jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of the indigenous peoples.”[5]

Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, which provides that “the administrative relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the President is characterized as a lateral but autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and program coordination.”  They contend that said Rule infringes upon the President’s power of control over executive departments under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution.[6]

Petitioners pray for the following:

“(1) A declaration that Sections 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 52[I], 57, 58, 59, 63, 65 and 66 and other related provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional and invalid;

“(2) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Chairperson and Commissioners of the NCIP to cease and desist from implementing the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371 and its Implementing Rules;

“(3) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources to cease and desist from implementing Department of Environment and Natural Resources Circular No. 2, series of 1998;

“(4) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of Budget and Management to cease and desist from disbursing public funds for the implementation of the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371; and

“(5) The issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources to comply with his duty of carrying out the State’s constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization and conservation of Philippine natural resources.”[7]

After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the Court voted as follows:

Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition.  Justice Kapunan filed an opinion, which the Chief Justice and Justices Bellosillo, Quisumbing, and Santiago join, sustaining the validity of the challenged provisions of R.A. 8371.  Justice Puno also filed a separate opinion sustaining all challenged provisions of the law with the exception of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, the Rules and Regulations Implementing the IPRA, and Section 57 of the IPRA which he contends should be interpreted as dealing with the large-scale exploitation of natural resources and should be read in conjunction with Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.   On the other hand, Justice Mendoza voted to dismiss the petition solely on the ground that it does not raise a justiciable controversy and petitioners do not have standing to question the constitutionality of R.A. 8371.

Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition.  Justice Panganiban filed a separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and related provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional.   He reserves judgment on the constitutionality of Sections 58, 59, 65, and 66 of the law, which he believes must await the filing of specific cases by those whose rights may have been violated by the IPRA.  Justice Vitug also filed a separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3(a), 7, and 57 of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional.  Justices Melo, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon join in the separate opinions of Justices Panganiban and Vitug.

As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not obtained, the case was redeliberated upon.  However, after redeliberation, the voting remained the same.  Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.

Attached hereto and made integral parts thereof are the separate opinions of Justices Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, and Panganiban.

SO ORDERED.

3. Republic vs NaguiatG.R. NO. 134209

Facts:This is an application for registration of title to four parcels of land by Celestina Nuguiat located at Botolan, Zambales. 

Applicant(respondent) alleges that she is the owner of the said parcels of land having acquired them by purchase from the LID Corporation which likewise acquired the same from Demetria Calderon, Josefina Moraga, and Fausto Monje and their predecessor –in-interest who have been in possession thereof for more than 30 years.

The Republic  filed an opposition to the application on the ground that  neither  the applicant  nor her predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the lands in question since June12, 1945 or prior thereto; that the monuments of title and tax payment receipts of applicant do not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bonafide acquisition of the lands applied for, and that the parcels of land applied for are part of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines not subject to private appropriation.

Issue: Whether or not the areas in question have ceased to have the status of forest or other inalienable lands of the public 

domain and the applicants registration of title will prosper.

Held:Applicant’s registration of title for said parcels of land will not prosper because the said land is a public forest lands. Forest 

lands  unless  declassified  and  released  by  positive  act  of   the  Government   so   that   they  may   form part  of   the  disposable  and agricultural lands of the public domain, are not capable of private appropriation.

Forests, in the context of both Public Land act and the Constitution classifying lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands and national parks do not necessarily refer to a large tract of woodland or an expanse covered by dense growth of trees and underbrush.

Here, respondent never presented the required certification from the proper government agency or official proclamation reclassifying   the   land  applied   for  as   alienable   and  disposable.   For  unclassified   land,  as  here,   cannot  be   acquired  by   adverse occupation thereof in the concept of owner, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership and be registered as title.

Facts:Respondent applies for registration of title to 4 parcels of land contending she is the owner of the said land which she acquired from the LID Corporation which in turn acquired the same from persons who have been in possession thereof for more than 30 years. The Republic filed in opposition that said lands belong to the public domain and not subject to private appropriation.

 

Issue:Whether or not the land in dispute as a forest land belonging to public domain may be appropriated as private property.

Ruling:For a public forest land/reserves to be subject for private appropriation, it requires an express and positive act of the government that it will become a part of alienable and disposable agricultural lands of public domain.Occupation in the concept of an owner cannot ripen into private ownership and be registered to as a title.

4. Carino vs Insular Government212 US 449

Land Titles and Deeds – Regalian Doctrine – Statute of LimitationsOn June 23, 1903, Mateo Cariño went to the Court of Land Registration to petition his inscription as the owner of a 146 hectare land he’s been possessing in the then municipality of Baguio. Mateo only presented possessory information and no other documentation. The State opposed the petitionaverring that the land is part of the US military reservation. The CLR ruled in favor of Mateo. The State appealed. Mateo lost. Mateo averred that a grant should be given to him by reason of immemorial use and occupation as in the previous case Cansino vs Valdez & Tiglao vs Government.ISSUE: Whether or not Mateo is the rightful owner of the land by virtue of his possession of it for  some time.HELD: No. The statute of limitations did not run against the government. The government is still the absolute owner of the land (regalian doctrine). Further, Mateo’s possession of the land has not been of such a character as to require the presumption of a grant. No one has lived upon it for many years. It was never used for anything but pasturage of animals, except insignificant portions thereof, and since the insurrection against Spain it has apparently not been used by the petitioner for any purpose.While the State has always recognized the right of the occupant to a deed if he proves a possession for a sufficient length of time, yet it has always insisted that he must make that proof before the proper administrative officers, and obtain from them his deed, and until he did the State remained the absolute owner.

FACTS:  Carino is an Igorot of the Province of Benguet, where the land lies filed for writ of error because

the CFI and SC dismissed his petition for application

For more than 50 years before the Treaty of Paris, April 11, 1899, he and his ancestors had held the land as recognized owners by the Igorots. (grandfather maintain fences for holding cattle>father had cultivated parts and used parts for pasturing cattle>he used it for pasture)

1893-1894 & 1896-1897: he made an application but with no avail

1901: petition alleging ownership under the mortgage law and the lands were registered to him but process only established possessory title

Even if the applicant have title, he cannot have it registered, because the Philippine Commission's Act No. 926, of 1903, excepts the Province of Benguet among others from its operation

ISSUE: W/N Carino has ownership and is entitled to registration.

HELD: YES. Petition Granted.  

Land was not registered, and therefore became, if it was not always, public land.

Spanish Law: "Where such possessors shall not be able to produce title deeds, it shall be sufficient if they shall show that ancient possession, as a valid title by prescription."  For cultivated land, 20 years, uninterrupted, is enough. For uncultivated, 30.

Applicant's possession was not unlawful, and no attempt at any such proceedings against him or his father ever was made. 

Every native who had not a paper title is not a trespasser.

There must be a presumption against the government when a private individual claims property as his or her own. It went so far as to say that the lands will be deemed private absent contrary proof. 

(Land Titles and Deeds – Native Title)Facts: An Igorot applied for the registration of a certain land. He and his ancestors had held the land as owners for more than 50 years, which he inherited under Igorot customs. There was no document of title issued for the land when he applied for registration. The government contends that the land in question belonged to the state. Under the Spanish Law, all lands belonged to the Spanish Crown except those with permit private titles. Moreover, there is no prescription against the Crown.

Issue: WON the land in question belonged to the Spanish Crown under the Regalian Doctrine.

Held: No. Law and justice require that the applicant should be granted title to his land.The United States Supreme Court, through Justice Holmes declared:“It might perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far as testimony or memory goes, the land has been held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the same way from before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land.”There is an existence of native title to land, or ownership of land by Filipinos by virtue of possession under a claim of ownership since time immemorial and independent of any grant from the Spanish Crown, as an exception to the theory of  jura regalia.

5. Ching vs CAG.R. NO. 59731

6. Castillo vs EscutinG.R. NO. 171056

7. Rudolf Lietz Holdings vs RD ParanaqueG.R. NO. 133240

8. Intestate Estate of Don Mariano San Pedro vs CAG.R. NO. 103727

9. Legarda vs SaleebyG.R. NO. 8936

10. Talusan vs TayagG.R. NO. 133698

11. Malabanan vs Republic

G.R. NO. 17998712. Republic rep. the Mindanao Medical Center vs CA

G.R. NO. L-4091213. Chavez vs. Republic Estates Authority

G.R. NO. 13325014. Republic vs Doldol

G.R. NO. 13296315. Republic vs Alconaba

G.R. NO. 155012