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Provisional Remedies:

A. Preliminary Attachment [Rule 57]

1. SOL - Wee vs. Tankiansee, GR 171124, 13 February 2008 [nature; construction; requisites]Synopsis: Petitioner made money placement with Wincorp. Wincorp extended loan to Power Marge. In an action (separate case) filed by Wincorp against Hottick Holdings, due to non-payment of loan, said parties reached a settlement wherein Virata, Hottick's president, assumed the obligation of the surety. Petitioner found out that through the false representations of Wincorp and its officers and directors, petitioner was enticed to roll over his placements so that Wincorp could loan the same to Power Merge. Virata purportedly used Power Merge to connived with Wincorp to fraudulently obtain for his benefit without any intention of paying the said placements. Petitioner filed an action for damages wherein a writ of preliminary attachment was issued. Respondents moved to discharged, on the grounds of improper issuance and insufficient bond, which was denied and orders of denial of the same were assailed and reached Supreme Court but failed. Virata moved to discharged before the RTC raising the same grounds and added that he was not present during Wincorps meeting approving the questioned transaction and that he was also a victim. The same was denied by RTC however reversed by CA. Hence, this petition. The affidavit, being the foundation of the writ, must contain such particulars as to how the fraud imputed to respondent was committed for the court to decide whether or not to issue the writ.Petitioner has not shown any specific act or deed to support the allegation that respondent is guilty of fraud.Facts: Wee, the petitioner and valued client of Westmont Bank (now United Overseas Bank), made money placements totalingP210,595,991.62 Westmont Investment Corporation (Wincorp), the banks affiliate and domestic entity engaged in the business of an investment house with the authority and license to extend credit. In an action (separate case) filed by Wincorp against Hottick Holdings, due to non-payment of loan, said parties reached a settlement wherein Virata, Hottick's president, assumed the obligation of the surety. Under the scheme agreed upon by Wincorp and Hottick's president, petitioner's money placements were transferred without his knowledge and consent to the loan account of Power Merge through an agreement that virtually freed the latter of any liability. Allegedly, through the false representations of Wincorp and its officers and directors, petitioner was enticed to roll over his placements so that Wincorp could loan the same to Virata/Power Merge.Petitioner instituted a case for damages with RTC alleging that Virata purportedly used Power Merge as a conduit and connived with Wincorp's officers and directors to fraudulently obtain for his benefit without any intention of paying the said placements. One of the defendants impleaded in the complaint is herein respondent Manuel Tankiansee, Vice-Chairman and Director of Wincorp.A writ of preliminary attachment was issued and defendants moved to discharge on the grounds that it was improperly issued and that the bond furnished was grossly insufficient. The same, as well as defendants MR, was denied. Viratassailed the same viacertiorariunder Rule 65 before the CA and then after before the SC wherein both affirmed RTCs orders.

Respondent moved to discharged before the RTC raising the same grounds and added that (1) that he was not present in Wincorp's board meetings approving the questionable transactions; and (2) that he could not have connived with Wincorp as his side filed cases against the company as they were also victimized by its fraudulent schemes. RTC denied the same and held that grounds raised were already passed upon by it in the previous orders affirmed by the CA and this Court, and that the additional grounds were respondent's affirmative defenses that properly pertained to the merits of the case. It was denied but reversed by CA. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether CA erred in lifting the preliminary attachment?

Ruling: No.The petitioner's affidavit is bereft of any factual statement that respondent committed a fraud. The affidavit narrated only the alleged fraudulent transaction between Wincorp and Virata and/or Power Merge, which, by the way, explains why this Court, in G.R. No. 162928, affirmed the writ of attachment issued against the latter. As to the participation of respondent in the said transaction, the affidavit merely states that respondent, an officer and director of Wincorp, connived with the other defendants in the civil case to defraud petitioner of his money placements. No other factual averment or circumstance details how respondent committed a fraud or how he connived with the other defendants to commit a fraud in the transaction sued upon. In other words, petitioner has not shown any specific act or deed to support the allegation that respondent is guilty of fraud.The affidavit, being the foundation of the writ, must contain such particulars as to how the fraud imputed to respondent was committed for the court to decide whether or not to issue the writ.Absent any statement of other factual circumstances to show that respondent, at the time of contracting the obligation, had a preconceived plan or intention not to pay, or without any showing of how respondent committed the alleged fraud, the general averment in the affidavit that respondent is an officer and director of Wincorp who allegedly connived with the other defendants to commit a fraud, is insufficient to support the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment. In the application for the writ under the said ground, compelling is the need to give a hint about what constituted the fraud and how it was perpetratedbecause established is the rule that fraud is never presumed.Let it be stressed that the provisional remedy of preliminary attachment is harsh and rigorous for it exposes the debtor to humiliation and annoyance. The rules governing its issuance are, therefore, strictly construed against the applicant,such that if the requisites for its grant are not shown to be all present, the court shall refrain from issuing it, for, otherwise, the court which issues it acts in excess of its jurisdiction.Dispositive: Appealed resolution affirmed. Petition denied.

2. SOL Ma. Teresa Chaves Biaco vs. Countryside Rural bank, 515 SCRA 106 [nature of proceeding]

[G.R. NO. 161417 : February 8, 2007]

Facts: Ernesto Biaco, husband of Teresa Biaco, acquired several loans from Philippine Countryside Rural Bank (PCRB) from 1996 to 1998. He mortgaged certain property in favor of the bank which was signed by the spouses. He defaulted in loans obtained in 1998 which amounted to more than a million pesos which resulted to institution of foreclosure proceedings. The Sherriff served the summons to Ernesto at the latters office. No summons was served to Teresa. He failed to file an answer hencethe spouses Biaco were declared in default. Eventually, the mortgaged property was auctioned for Php 150,000.xx, which was not sufficient to cover the one million pesos debt. Upon motion by PCRB, a notice of levy was issued against the personal properties of Teresa to satisfy the deficiency. It was only at this point that Teresa learned of the previous ex parte proceedings. She then sought to have the judgment annulled as she now claims that she was deprived of due process when she did not receive summons and that there was extrinsic fraud because her husband deliberately hid the fact of the foreclosure proceeding. PRCB argued that the foreclosure proceeding is an action quasi in rem, hence Teresas participation is not required so long as the court acquires jurisdiction over the res which is what happened in the case at bar and that Teresa cannot invoke extrinsic fraud because such situation cannot occur in her case because she is a co-defendant of Ernesto. CA denied her petition, as well as her MR. Hence, this petition.Issue: Whether Teresa was denied of due process?Ruling: Yes.The Court explained, citingEl Banco Espaol-Filipino v. Palanca, that foreclosure and attachment proceedings are both actionsquasi in rem.As such, jurisdiction over the person of the (non-resident) defendant is not essential. Service of summons on a non-resident defendant who is not found in the country is required, not for purposes of physically acquiring jurisdiction over his person but simply in pursuance of the requirements of fair play, so that he may be informed of the pendency of the action against him and the possibility that property belonging to him or in which he has an interest may be subjected to a judgment in favor of a resident, and that he may thereby be accorded an opportunity to defend in the action, should he be so minded.Significantly, the Court went on to rule, citingDe Midgely v. Ferandos, et. al.andPerkins v. Dizon, et al. that in a proceedingin remorquasi in rem,the only relief that may be granted by the court against a defendant over whose person it has not acquired jurisdiction either by valid service of summons or by voluntary submission to its jurisdiction, is limited to theres.Similarly, in this case, while the trial court acquired jurisdiction over theres, its jurisdiction is limited to a rendition of judgment on theres. It cannot extend its jurisdiction beyond theresand issue a judgment enforcing petitioner's personal liability. In doing so without first having acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner, as it did, the trial court violated her constitutional right to due process, warranting the annulment of the judgment rendered in the case.Dispositive: Petition granted. CAs resolution and RTCs resolution set aside.

3. SOL - Binan Steel Corporation vs. CA, 391 SCRA 90, 15 October 2002 [nature of attachment]

[G.R. No. 142013. October 15, 2002.]

Synopsis: On July 1998, Property of Spouses Ng was levied, pursuant to the writ of preliminary attachment issued by RTC where a collection of sum of money was pending instituted by BSC against Joenas Metal Corporation and Spouses Ng. Spouses Ng sold the property to of Mylene and Myla Garcia by means of a deed of sale dated June 29, 1998 which was registered only on August 12, 1998, after the mortgagee FEBTC gave its approval to the sale. TCT was issued in the names of Garcias. The trial court rendered judgment by default in favor of BSC. RTC QC, where petition for cancellation of notice of levy was pending instituted by the Garcias alleging they were the registered owners, issued a TRO which was disregarded by the RTC Manila. In thw petition for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction by Garcias, CA denied BSCs motion to intervene and dismissed the petition for violating the rules on forum-shopping. Hence, these consolidated petitions. It turned out that the Garcias registered it only on August 12, 1998, after FEBTC (now BPI) approved the sale. It was too late by then because, on July 27, 1998, the levy in favor of BSC, pursuant to the preliminary attachment ordered by the Manila RTC, had already been annotated on the original title on file with the Registry of Deeds. This registration of levy (or notice, in laymans language) now became binding on the whole world, including the Garcias.

Facts: On July 1998, Bian Steel Corporation (BSC) filed with RTC Manila a complaint against Joenas Metal Corporation and spouses Ng Ley Huat and Leticia Dy Ng for collection of a sum of money with damages wherein in the RTC issued a writ of Preliminary Attachment. Sheriff Viloria levied on the property registered in the names of the spouses Ng covered by a TCT of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City. The said property was mortgaged mortgaged to the Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC), now Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI). Summons was not served upon the defendant spouses Ng because they could not be located. BSC caused the filing of a motion to serve the summons by publication which was granted. Summons by publication thereafter ensued.

Meanwhile, Spouses Ng sold (sale with assumption of mortgage) the property to of Mylene and Myla Garcia by means of a deed of sale dated June 29, 1998 which was registered only on August 12, 1998, after the mortgagee FEBTC gave its approval to the sale. TCT was issued in the names of Garcias.

Motion to intervene by the Garcias was denied and the trial court rendered judgment by default in favor of BSC.

Garcias filed a separate action for cancellation of the notice of levy with RTC Q.C. and claimed that they were the registered owners of the property in dispute. They were able to secure a TRO which was disregarded by the RTC Manila.

RTC Manila, upon ex parte manifestation by BSC, directed to proceed with the public action of the attached property.

Garcias filed another case with the CA for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction with prayer for TRO to enjoin the RTC Manila Judge and Sheriff. BSC was not impleaded. CA issued TRO and denied BSC to intervene on the ground that its rights could be protected in the cancellation case filed by the Garcias before the RTC Q.C. Its MR was denied hence BSC filed this special civil action for certrioari and mandamus. CA also dismissed the petition of the Garcias, as well as its MR, for violating the rules on forum-shopping. The Garcias thus filed with this Court a petition for review oncertiorari.

Hence these consolidated petitions. As no TRO issued by this court, public auction proceeded. When TRO was issued, it was too late. This court ordered to maintain status quo to prevent consolidation of title and possession to BSC.

Issue: Whether BSC or Garcias has a better right to the disputed property?

Ruling:

This Court has always held that attachment is a proceeding in rem. It is against the particular property, enforceable against the whole world. The attaching creditor acquires a specific lien on the attached property which ripens into a judgment against the res when the order of sale is made. Such a proceeding in effect means that the property attached is an indebted thing and a virtual condemnation of it to pay the owners debt.

Insofar as third persons are concerned, what validly transfers or conveys a persons interest in real property is the registration of the deed. In sales with assumption of mortgage, the assumption of mortgage is a condition precedent to the sellers consent and therefore, without approval of the mortgagee, the sale is not perfected.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

When the Garcias bought the property on June 29, 1998, it was, at that point, no more than a private transaction between them and the Ngs. It needed to be registered before it could become binding on all third parties, including BSC. It turned out that the Garcias registered it only on August 12, 1998, after FEBTC (now BPI) approved the sale. It was too late by then because, on July 27, 1998, the levy in favor of BSC, pursuant to the preliminary attachment ordered by the Manila RTC, had already been annotated on the original title on file with the Registry of Deeds. This registration of levy (or notice, in laymans language) now became binding on the whole world, including the Garcias.

It is doctrinal that a levy on attachment, duly registered, has preference over a prior unregistered sale and, even if the prior unregistered sale is subsequently registered before the sale on execution but after the levy is made, the validity of the execution sale should be upheld because it retroacts to the date of levy.

When a conveyance has been properly recorded, such record is constructive notice of its contents and all interests, legal and equitable, included therein.

Because of the principle of constructive notice to the whole world, one who deals with registered property which is the subject of an annotated levy on attachment cannot invoke the rights of a purchaser in good faith.

The purchaser of a property subject to an attachment legally and validly levied thereon is merely subrogated to the rights of the vendor and acquires the property subject to the rights of the attachment creditor.

Dispositive: Petitions denied. RD ordered to cancel TCT in the names of GARCIAS and issue a new title in favor of BSC.

4. SOL - Mindanao Savings and Loan Association (formerly Davao Savings & Loan Association) & Francisco Villamor vs. CA & Juan Mercado, 172 SCRA 480 [ex parte proceedings]

[G.R. No. 84481. April 18, 1989.]

Facts: Private respondents filed a complaint against D.S. Homes, Inc. and its directors, including Francisco D. Villamor, and subsequently amended the same impleading Davao Savings & Loan Association, Inc. (later renamed Mindanao Savings & Loan Association, Inc. or "MSLA") and its president, Francisco Villamor, with RTC Davao City for "Rescission of Contract and Damages" with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment. Judge Dinopol issued ex parte an amended order of attachment against all the defendants named in the second amended complaint. Defendants filed a separate motions to quash the writ of attachment which were later on denied. D.S. Homes, Inc., Et. Al. offered a counterbond and RTC accepted the same and lifted the writ of preliminary attachment. MSLA and Villamor filed with CA a petition for certiorari to annul the order of attachment and denial of their motion to quash the same alleging that the trial court acted in excess of its jurisdiction in issuing the ex parte orders of preliminary attachment and in denying their motion to quash the writ of attachment, D.S. Homes, Inc., Et. Al. did not join them. CA dismissed the petition hence petitioners appealed to SC.

Issue: Whether CA erred in dismissing the petition on the ground that objections against the writ may no longer be invoked once a counterbond is filed for its lifting or dissolution?

Ruling: No.

The only requisites for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment under Section 3, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court are the affidavit and bond of the applicant. No notice to the adverse party or hearing of the application required. As a matter of fact a hearing would defeat the purpose of this provisional remedy. The time which such a hearing would take, could be enough to enable the defendant to abscond or dispose of his property before a writ of attachment issues.

While no hearing is required by the Rules of Court for the issuance of an attachment ,a motion to quash the writ may not be granted without "reasonable notice to the applicant" and only "after hearing.

After the defendant has obtained the discharge of the writ of attachment by filing a counterbond under Section 12, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, he may not file another motion under Section 13, Rule 57 to quash the writ for impropriety or irregularity in issuing it. The reason is simple. The writ had already been quashed by filing a counterbond, hence, another motion to quash it would be pointless. Moreover, as the Court of Appeals correctly observed, when the ground for the issuance of the writ is also the core of the complaint, the question of whether the plaintiff was entitled to the writ can only be determined after, not before, a full-blown trial on the merits of the case. This accords with our ruling in G.B., Inc. v. Sanchez, 98 Phil. 886 that: "The merits of a main action are not triable in a motion to discharge an attachment, otherwise an applicant for the dissolution could force a trial on the merits of the case on this motion.

May the defendant, after procuring the dissolution of the attachment by filing a counterbond, ask for the cancellation of the counterbond on the ground that the order of attachment was improperly issued?

The obligors in the bond are absolutely liable for the amount of any judgment that the plaintiff may recover in the action without reference to the question of whether the attachment was rightfully or wrongfully issued. The liability of the surety on the counterbond subsists until the Court shall have finally absolved the defendant from the plaintiffs claims. Only then may the counterbond be released. The same rule applies to the plaintiffs attachment bond. The liability of the surety on the bond subsists because the final reckoning is when the Court shall finally adjudge that the attaching creditor was not entitled to the issuance of the attachment writ.

Dispositive: Petition denied for lack of merit.

5. SOL - Philippine Commercial International Bank vs. Alejandro, GR 175587, 21 Sept. 2007 [purposes of PA]

Synopsis: In action for sum of money with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment instituted by PCIB against Alejandro, pursuant to failure of latter to add security to the promissory note in view of the fluctuations in foreign exchanges, Petitioner alleged that respondent fraudulently withdrew his unassigned deposits and that respondent is not a resident of the Philippines. The trial court issued the writ ex parte wherein respondent, by voluntary submission, moved to quash the same on the grounds that withdrawal of his unassigned deposits was not fraudulent as it was approved by petitioner and he is a resident of the Philippines maintaining a permanent residence and a law firm in the Philippines. The writ was quashed on the ground that respondent did not intend to defraud and petitioner misrepresented and suppressed the facts regarding respondent's residence. The same was affirmed by CA and SC. Respondent sought to claim damages against the applicants bond on the ground that his check payable to his counsel as attorney's fees, was dishonored by reason of the garnishment of his deposits but opposed by petitioner contending that Nepomuceno, PCIB Assistant Vice President, she acted in good faith in alleging that respondent is a resident of Hong Kong. Trial Court granted the same and the CA affirmed it but modified the award of damages. Hence, this petition. It is clear from the foregoing that even on the allegation that respondent is a resident temporarily out of the Philippines, petitioner is still not entitled to a writ of attachment because the trial court could acquire jurisdiction over the case by substituted service instead of attaching the property of the defendant

Facts: PCIB filed against respondent a complaintfor sum of money with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment alleging that respondent executed in favor of petitioner a promissory note obligating himself to payP249,828,588.90 plus interest. In view of the fluctuations in the foreign exchange rates which resulted in the insufficiency of the deposits assigned by respondent as security for the loan, petitioner requested the latter to put up additional security for the loan. Respondent, however, sought a reconsideration of said request pointing out petitioner's alleged mishandling of his account due to its failure to carry out his instruction to close his account as early as April 1997, when the prevailing rate of exchange of the US Dollar to Japanese yen was US$1.00:JPY127.50. Petitioner alleged that (1) respondent fraudulently withdrew his unassigned deposits notwithstanding his verbal promise to PCIB Assistant Vice President Corazon B. Nepomuceno not to withdraw the same prior to their assignment as security for the loan; and (2) that respondent is not a resident of the Philippines. Bond was issued by Prudential Guarantee & Assurance Inc. The trial court granted the application and issued the writ ex parte.

Respondent, through counsel, filed a manifestation informing the court that he is voluntarily submitting to its jurisdiction. Respondent filed a motion to quashthe writ contending that the withdrawal of his unassigned deposits was not fraudulent as it was approved by petitioner. He also alleged that petitioner knew that he maintains a permanent residence at Calle Victoria, Ciudad Regina, Batasan Hills, Quezon City, and an office address in Makati City at the Law Firm Romulo Mabanta Buenaventura Sayoc & De los Angeles,where he is a partner. In both addresses, petitioner regularly communicated with him through its representatives. Respondent added that he is the managing partner of the Hong Kong branch of said Law Firm; that his stay in Hong Kong is only temporary; and that he frequently travels back to the Philippines.The trial court issued an order quashing the writ and holding that the withdrawal of respondent's unassigned deposits was not intended to defraud petitioner and concluded that petitioner misrepresented and suppressed the facts regarding respondent's residence considering that it has personal and official knowledge that for purposes of service of summons, respondent's residence and office addresses are located in the Philippines. CA and SC affirmed trial courts decision. Meanwhile, respondent filed a claim for damages in the amount of P25 Million on the attachment on account of the wrongful garnishment of his deposits. He presented evidence showing that hisP150,000.00 RCBC check payable to his counsel as attorney's fees, was dishonored by reason of the garnishment of his deposits. Petitioner claimed that she acted in good faith in alleging that respondent is a resident of Hong Kong.On August 30, 2000, the trial court awarded damages to respondent in the amount of P25 Million. CA affirmed the same but modified the amount of damages. MRs of both parties were denied. Hence, petitioner filed this petition. Issue: Whether petitioner bank is liable for damages for the improper issuance of the writ of attachment against respondent?Ruling: Yes.The purposes of preliminary attachment are: (1) to seize the property of the debtor in advance of final judgment and to hold it for purposes of satisfying said judgment, as in the grounds stated in paragraphs (a) to (e) of Section 1, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court; or (2) to acquire jurisdiction over the action by actual or constructive seizure of the property in those instances where personal or substituted service of summons on the defendant cannot be effected, as in paragraph (f) of the same provision.Corollarily, in actions in personam, such as the instant case for collection of sum of money,summons must be served by personal or substituted service, otherwise the court will not acquire jurisdiction over the defendant. In case the defendant does not reside and is not found in the Philippines (and hence personal and substituted service cannot be effected), the remedy of the plaintiff in order for the court to acquire jurisdiction to try the case is to convert the action into a proceedingin remor quasi in rem by attaching the property of the defendant.Thus, in order to acquire jurisdiction in actions in personam where defendant resides out of and is not found in the Philippines, it becomes a matter of course for the court to convert the action into a proceedingin remor quasi in rem by attaching the defendant's property. The service of summons in this case (which may be by publication coupled with the sending by registered mail of the copy of the summons and the court order to the last known address of the defendant), is no longer for the purpose of acquiring jurisdiction but for compliance with the requirements of due process.However, where the defendant is a resident who is temporarily out of the Philippines, attachment of his/her property in an action in personam, is not always necessary in order for the court to acquire jurisdiction to hear the case.The Court held that substituted service of summons (under the present Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court) is the normal mode of service of summons that will confer jurisdiction on the court over the person of residents temporarily out of the Philippines. Meaning, service of summons may be effected by (a) leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's residence with some person of suitable discretion residing therein, or (b) by leaving copies at the defendant's office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.Hence, the court may acquire jurisdiction over an action in personam by mere substituted service without need of attaching the property of the defendant.Rationale of substituted service of summons: A man temporarily absent from this country leaves a definite place of residence, a dwelling where he lives, a local base, so to speak, to which any inquiry about him may be directed and where he is bound to return. Where one temporarily absents himself, he leaves his affairs in the hands of one who may be reasonably expected to act in his place and stead; to do all that is necessary to protect his interests; and to communicate with him from time to time any incident of importance that may affect him or his business or his affairs. It is usual for such a man to leave at his home or with his business associates information as to where he may be contacted in the event a question that affects him crops up.It is clear from the foregoing that even on the allegation that respondent is a resident temporarily out of the Philippines, petitioner is still not entitled to a writ of attachment because the trial court could acquire jurisdiction over the case by substituted service instead of attaching the property of the defendant. The misrepresentation of petitioner that respondent does not reside in the Philippines and its omission of his local addresses was thus a deliberate move to ensure that the application for the writ will be granted.In light of the foregoing, the Court of Appeals properly sustained the finding of the trial court that petitioner is liable for damages for the wrongful issuance of a writ of attachment against respondent.Dispositive: CAs decision affirmed and Damages modified.6. CAVS - City of Caloocan vs. Allarde GR 107271, 10 September 2003 (exemption on non-attachment of govt funds)

FACTS: In 1972, Mayor Marcial Samson of Caloocan abolished the position of Assistant CityAdministrator and 17 other positions via Ordinance No. 1749. The affected employees assailed the legality of the abolition. The CFI in 1973 declared abolition illegal and ordered the reinstatement of all the dismissed employees and the payment of their back-wages and other emoluments. The City Government appealed the decision but such was dismissed.In 1986 the City paid Santiago P75,083.37 as partial payment of her back-wages. The others were paid in full.In 1987 the City appropriated funds for herunpaid back salaries but the City refused to release the money to Santiago. The City of Caloocan argued that Santiago was not entitled to back wages. On July 27, 1992 SheriffCastillo levied and sold at public auction one of the motor vehicles of the City Government for P100,000. The amount was given to Santiago. The City Government questioned the validity of the motor vehicle; properties of the municipality were exempt from execution. Judge Allarde denied the motion and directed the sheriff to levy and schedule at public auction 3 more vehicles. On October 5, 1993 the City Council ofCaloocan passed Ordinance No. 0134 which included the amount of P439,377.14 claimed by Santiago as back-wages, plus interest. Judge Allarde issued an order to the City Treasurer to release the check butthe City Treasurer cant do so because the Mayor refuses to sign the check. On May 7, 1993. JudgeAllarde ordered the Sheriff to immediately garnish the funds of the City Government of Caloocan corresponding to the claim of Santiago. Notice of garnishment was forwarded to the PNB but the City Treasurer sent an advice letter to PNB that the garnishment was illegal and that it would hold PNB liable for any damages which may be caused by the withholding the funds of the city.ISSUE: Whether or not the funds of City of Caloocan, in PNB, may be garnished and the vehicles may be levied to satisfySantiagos claim?RULING: YES.Garnishment is considered a specie of attachment by means of which the plaintiff seeks to subject to his claim property of the defendant in the hands of a third person, or money owed by such third person or garnishee to the defendant. The rule is and has always been that all government funds deposited in the PNB or any other official depositary of the Philippine Government by any of its agencies orinstrumentalities, whether by general or special deposit, remain government funds and may not be subject to garnishment or levy, in the absence of a corresponding appropriation as required by law. Even though the rule as to immunity of a state from suit is relaxed, the power of the courts ends when thejudgment is rendered. Although the liability of the state has been judicially ascertained, the state is at liberty to determine for itself whether to pay the judgment or not, and execution cannot issue on ajudgment against the state. Such statutes do not authorize a seizure of state property to satisfy judgments recovered, and only convey an implication that the legislature will recognize such judgment as final and make provision for the satisfaction thereof. However, the rule is not absolute and admits of a well-defined exception, that is, when there is a corresponding appropriation as required by law.In such a case, the monetary judgment may be legally enforced by judicial processes. Herein, the City Council of Caloocan already approved and passed Ordinance No. 0134, Series of 1992, allocating the amount of P439,377.14 for Santiagos back-wages plus interest. This case, thus, fell squarely within the exception.We now come to the issue of the legality of the levy on the three motor vehicles belonging to the City of Caloocan which petitioners claimed to be exempt from execution, and which levy was based on an alias writ that had purportedly expired. It is thus unnecessary for us to discuss a moot issue. Hence, petitioners cannot now be heard to impugn the validity of the auction sale.

7. CAVS - San Miguel Bulacan vs. Hon. Oscar Fernandez, GR L-61744, 25 June 1984 [Dissolution of writ; non-levy of govt funds]FACTS: Petitioner municipality is liable to private respondents. 1. ordering the partial revocation of the Deed of Donation signed by the deceased Carlos Imperio in favor of the Municipality of San Miguel Bulacan, dated October 27, 1947 insofar as Lots Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, Block 11 of Subdivision Plan Psd-20831 are concerned, in the name of the Municipal Government of San Miguel Bulacan, 2. ordering the defendant to execute the corresponding Deed of Reconveyance over the aforementioned five lots in favor of the plaintiffs in the proportion of the undivided one-half () share in the name of plaintiffs Margarita D. Vda. de Imperio, Adoracion, Rodolfo, Conrado, Ernesto, Alfredo, Carlos, Jr. and Juan, all surnamed Imperio, and the remaining undivided one-half () share in favor of plaintiffs uses Marcelo E. Pineda and Lucila Pongco; 3. ordering the defendant municipality to pay to the plaintiffs in the proportion mentioned in the immediately preceding paragraph the sum of P64,440.00 corresponding to the rentals it has collected from the occupants for their use and occupation of the premises plus interest. 4. ordering the restoration of ownership and possession over the five lots in question in favor of the plaintiffs in the same proportion aforementioned.Petitioner, on July 30, 1982, filed a Motion to Quash the writ of execution on the ground that the municipality's property or funds are all public funds exempt from execution. The said motion to quash was, however, denied by the respondent judge in an order dated August 23, 1982 and the alias writ of execution stands in full force and effect. ISSUE: Whether the said funds are exempted from garnishment?RULING: NOWell settled is the rule that public funds are not subject to levy and execution. The reason for this was explained in the case of Municipality of Paoay vs. Manaois, 86 Phil. 629 "that they are held in trust for the people, intended and used for the accomplishment of the purposes for which municipal corporations are created, and that to subject said properties and public funds to execution would materially impede, even defeat and in some instances destroy said purpose." And, in Tantoco vs. Municipal Council of Iloilo, 49 Phil. 52, it was held that "it is the settled doctrine of the law that not only the public property but also the taxes and public revenues of such corporations Cannot be seized under execution against them, either in the treasury or when in transit to it. Judgments rendered for taxes, and the proceeds of such judgments in the hands of officers of the law, are not subject to execution unless so declared by statute." Thus, it is clear that all the funds of petitioner municipality in the possession of the Municipal Treasurer of San Miguel, as well as those in the possession of the Provincial Treasurer of Bulacan, are also public funds and as such they are exempt from execution. Besides, Presidential Decree No. 477, known as "The Decree on Local Fiscal Administration", Section 2 (a), provides: SEC. 2. Fundamental Principles. Local government financial affairs, transactions, and operations shall be governed by the fundamental principles set forth hereunder: (a) No money shall be paid out of the treasury except in pursuance of a lawful appropriation or other specific statutory authority. xxx xxx xxxOtherwise stated, there must be a corresponding appropriation in the form of an ordinance duly passed by the Sangguniang Bayan before any money of the municipality may be paid out. In the case at bar, it has not been shown that the Sangguniang Bayan has passed an ordinance to this effect. Furthermore, Section 15, Rule 39 of the New Rules of Court, outlines the procedure for the enforcement of money judgment: (a) By levying on all the property of the debtor, whether real or personal, not otherwise exempt from execution, or only on such part of the property as is sufficient to satisfy the judgment and accruing cost, if he has more than sufficient property for the purpose; (b) By selling the property levied upon; (c) By paying the judgment-creditor so much of the proceeds as will satisfy the judgment and accruing costs; and (d) By delivering to the judgment-debtor the excess, if any, unless otherwise, directed by judgment or order of the court. The foregoing has not been followed in the case at bar. Respondents are hereby enjoined from implementing the writ of execution. 8. CAVS - City of Caloocan vs. Allarde and San Miguel Bulacan, GR L-61744, 25 June 1984 [Dissolution of writ] (TYPO. SAME TITLE SA NO. 6 AND SAME CITATION SA NO. 7)

9. CAVS - Chuidian vs. Sandiganbayan, GR 139941, 19 February 2001 [motion for dissolution/ to quash the writ]

FACTS: In September 1980, Chuidian allegedly a dummy of Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos, was able to obtain, allegedly under false pretenses, a loan guarantee from Philguarantee Corp., the BOI and the Central Bank, in favor of the Asian Reliability Co. Inc. (ARCI). ARCI, 98% of which was allegedly owned by Chuidian, was granted a loan guarantee of US $25M for the establishment of 5 inter-related projects in the country. However, Chuidian used the same in investing in corporations operating in the US.ARCI then defaulted in the payments of the loan, compelling Philguarantee to undertake payments for the same.Philguarantee sued Chuidian before a Californian court,charging him of violating the terms of the loan, defaulting in payments and misusing the proceeds for his personal benefit. Chuidian claimed that he himself was a victim of the systematic plunder perpetrated by the Marcoses.On November 1985, Philguarantee entered into a compromise agreement with Chuidian whereby Chuidian shall assign and surrender title to all his companies in favor of the Phil. Govt.In return, Philguarantee shall absolve Chuidian from all civil and criminal liability concerning the payments Philguarantee had made on Chuidians defaulted loans. It was further stipulated that the Phil. government shall pay Chuidian the amount of US $5.3M. Chuidian received the 1st two installments of the payment. The remaining balance of US $4.6M was to be paid through an irrevocable Letter of Credit (L/C) from which Chuidian would draw US $100k monthly.

With the advent of the Aquino administration, the newly-established PCGG exerted earnest efforts to search and recover properties and assets suspected as having been illegally acquired by the Marcoses, their relatives and cronies. Chuidian was among those whose assets were sequestered by the PCGG.The PNB was directed to place the letters of credit under its custody, in behalf of the PCGG.

In the meantime, Philguarantee filed a motion before the Superior Court of California, seeking to vacate the stipulated judgment containing the settlement between Philguarantee and Chuidian on the grounds that:(a) Philguarantee was compelled by the Marcos administration to agree to the terms of the settlement; (b) Chuidian blackmailed Marcos into pursuing the settlement agreement by threatening to expose the fact that the Marcoses made investments in Chuidians American enterprises; and (c) the Aquino administration had ordered Philguarantee not to make further payments on the L/C to Chuidian.However, the Californian court concluded that Philguarantee was not able to sufficiently show that the settlement should be set aside.On appeal, the CA of the State of California affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court denying Philguarantees motion.Chuidian filed before the California Central District Court, an action against PNB seeking to compel the latter to pay the proceeds of the L/C. Philguarantee intervened in said action, raising the same issues and arguments it had earlier raised in the action before the Santa Clara Superior Court, alleging that PNB was excused from making payments on the L/C since the settlement was void due to illegality, duress and fraud.The Federal Court rendered judgment ruling:(1) in favor of PNB excusing the said bank from making payment on the L/C; and (2) in Chuidians favor by denying intervenor Philguarantees action to set aside the settlement agreement.

Meanwhile a Deed of Transfer was executed between then Sec. of Finance and then PNB President Edgardo Espiritu, to facilitate the rehabilitation of PNB. Thus, the govt assumed all liabilities of PNB including the L/C listed in favor of Chuidian in the amount of US $4.4M

On July 1987, the govt filed before the Sandiganbayan a civil case against the Marcos spouses, several govt officials, and a number of individuals known to be cronies of the Marcoses, including Chuidian, seeking the reconveyance, accounting and restitution of all forms of wealth allegedly procured illegally by the defendants.On July 1993, the Sandiganbayan ordered the issuance of a writ of attachment against the L/C as security for the satisfaction of judgment. The Sandiganbayan ruled:1) Although there was no separate was attached to the motion, the motion itself contained all the requisites of an affidavit, and the verification thereof is deemed a substantial compliance of Rule 57, Section 3.2) Fiduciary relationship exists between Chuidian and ARCI but not with the Republic. Hence, the Republic cannot invoke Sec. 1(b) of Rule 57.3) There was a prima facie case of fraud committed by Chuidian, justifying the issuance of the writ of attachment.4) The Sandiganbayan also adopted the Republics position that since it was compelled to pay, through Philguarantee, the bank loans taken out by Chuidian, the proceeds of which were fraudulently diverted, it is entitled to the issuance of the writ of attachment to protect its rights as creditor.5) Chuidians absence from the country was considered by the Sandiganbayan to be the most compelling ground for the issuance of the writ.

Almost four (4) years after the issuance of the order of attachment, Chuidian filed a motion to lift the attachment based on the following grounds:1) He had returned to the Philippines, and considering that his absence was the most compelling ground for the issuance of the writ, the latter should be lifted. 2) There was no evidence at all of initial fraud or subsequent concealment

ISSUE:WON the writ of preliminary attachment should be lifted as a result of petitioners return to the country and his averments that there was no fraud in incurring the obligation

RULING: NO.Preliminary attachment issued upon a ground which is at the same time the applicants cause of action. When the preliminary attachment is issued upon a ground which is at the same time the applicants cause of action, the defendant is not allowed to file a motion to dissolve the attachment under Section 13 of Rule 57 by offering to show the falsity of the factual averments in the plaintiffs application and affidavits on which the writ was based and consequently that the writ based thereon had been improperly or irregularly issued the reason being that the hearing on such a motion for dissolution of the writ would be tantamount to a trial of the merits of the action. In other words, the merits of the action would be ventilated at a mere hearing of a motion, instead of at the regular trial.

The merits of the action in which a writ of preliminary attachment has been issued are not triable on a motion for dissolution of the attachment; otherwise an applicant for the lifting of the writ could force a trial of the merits of the case on a mere motion.

There are only two ways of quashing a writ of attachment: (a) by filing a counterbound immediately; or (b) by moving to quash on the ground of improper and irregular issuance. These grounds for the dissolution of an attachment are fixed in Rule 57 of the Rules of Court and the power of the Court to dissolve an attachment is circumscribed by the grounds specified therein. Petitioners motion to lift attachment failed to demonstrate any infirmity or defect in the issuance of the writ of attachment; neither did he file a counterbond.

10. CAVS - Spouses Gregorio and Josefa Yu vs. Ngo Yet, GR 155868, 6 Feb 2007 [Wrongful attachment]FACTS: Spouses Gregorio and Josefa Yu (Spouses Yu) purchased from Ngo Yet Te (Te) bars of detergent soap worth P594,240.00, and issued to the latter three postdated checks 4 as payment of the purchase price. When Te presented the checks at maturity for encashment, said checks were returned dishonored and stamped "ACCOUNT CLOSED".5 Te demanded6 payment from Spouses Yu but the latter did not heed her demands. Acting through her son and attorney-in-fact, Charry Sy (Sy), Te filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), for Collection of Sum of Money and Damages with Prayer for Preliminary Attachment. Upon Tes posting of an attachment bond,9 the RTC issued an Order of Attachment/Levy10 dated March 29, 1993 on the basis of which Sheriff Constancio Alimurung (Sheriff Alimurung) of RTC, Branch 19, Cebu City levied and attached Spouses Yus properties in Cebu City consisting of one parcel of land (known as Lot No. 11)11 and four units of motor vehicle, specifically, a Toyota Ford Fierra, a jeep, a Canter delivery van, and a passenger bus.12 On April 21, 1993, Spouses Yu filed an Answer13 with counterclaim for damages arising from the wrongful attachment of their properties, specifically. On the same date, Spouses Yu filed an Urgent Motion to Dissolve Writ of Preliminary Attachment.15 They also filed a Claim Against Surety Bond16 in which they demanded payment from Visayan Surety and Insurance Corporation (Visayan Surety), the surety which issued the attachment bond, of the sum of P594,240.00, representing the damages they allegedly sustained as a consequence of the wrongful attachment of their properties.While the RTC did not resolve the Claim Against Surety Bond, it issued an Order17 dated May 3, 1993, discharging from attachment the Toyota Ford Fierra, jeep, and Canter delivery van on humanitarian grounds, but maintaining custody of Lot No. 11 and the passenger bus. Spouses Yu filed a Motion for Reconsideration18 which the RTC denied.ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of the RTC valid?RULING: YESThat is a rather limited understanding of Javellana. The counterclaim disputed therein was not for moral damages and therefore, there was no need to prove malice. As early as in Lazatin v. Twao,55 we laid down the rule that where there is wrongful attachment, the attachment defendant may recover actual damages even without proof that the attachment plaintiff acted in bad faith in obtaining the attachment. However, if it is alleged and established that the attachment was not merely wrongful but also malicious, the attachment defendant may recover moral damages and exemplary damages as well. 56 Either way, the wrongfulness of the attachment does not warrant the automatic award of damages to the attachment defendant; the latter must first discharge the burden of proving the nature and extent of the loss or injury incurred by reason of the wrongful attachment.57 In fine, the CA finding that the attachment of the properties of Spouses Yu was wrongful did not relieve Spouses Yu of the burden of proving the factual basis of their counterclaim for damages.To merit an award of actual damages arising from a wrongful attachment, the attachment defendant must prove, with the best evidence obtainable, the fact of loss or injury suffered and the amount thereof.58 Such loss or injury must be of the kind which is not only capable of proof but must actually be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty. As to its amount, the same must be measurable based on specific facts, and not on guesswork or speculation. 59 In particular, if the claim for actual damages covers unrealized profits, the amount of unrealized profits must be estalished and supported by independent evidence of the mean income of the business undertaking interrupted by the illegal seizure. 60 Spouses Yu insist that the evidence they presented met the foregoing standards. They point to the lists of their daily net income from the operation of said passenger bus based on used ticket stubs61 issued to their passengers. They also cite unused ticket stubs as proof of income foregone when the bus was wrongfully seized.62 They further cite the unrebutted testimony of Josefa Yu that, in the day-to-day operation of their passenger bus, they use up at least three ticket stubs and earn a minimum daily income of P1,500.00.63 In ruling that Spouses Yu failed to adduce sufficient evidence to support their counterclaim for actual damagesSpouses Yus claim for unrealized income of P1,500.00 per day was based on their computation of their average daily income for the year 1992. Said computation in turn is based on the value of three ticket stubs sold over only five separate days in 1992.67 By no stretch of the imagination can we consider ticket sales for five days sufficient evidence of the average daily income of the passenger bus, much less its mean income. Not even the unrebutted testimony of Josefa Yu can add credence to such evidence for the testimony itself lacks corroboration.68 Besides, based on the August 29, 1994 Manifestation69 filed by Sheriff Alimurung, it would appear that long before the passenger bus was placed under preliminary attachment in Civil Case No. 4061-V-93, the same had been previously attached by the Sheriff of Mandaue City in connection with another case and that it was placed in the Cebu Bonded Warehousing Corporation, Cebu City. Thus, Spouses Yu cannot complain that they were unreasonably deprived of the use of the passenger bus by reason of the subsequent wrongful attachment issued in Civil Case No. 4061-V-93. Nor can they also attribute to the wrongful attachment their failure to earn income or profit from the operation of the passenger bus. Moreover, petitioners did not present evidence as to the damages they suffered by reason of the wrongful attachment of Lot No. 11. Based on the foregoing testimony, it is not difficult to understand why Te concluded that Spouses Yu never intended to pay their obligation for they had available funds in their bank but chose to transfer said funds instead of cover the checks they issued. Thus, we cannot attribute malice nor bad faith to Te in applying for the attachment writ. We cannot hold her liable for moral and exemplary damages. In sum, we affirm the dismissal of the counterclaim of petitioners Spouses Yu for actual, moral, and exemplary damages. However, we grant them temperate damages and attorneys fees.11. ACE - Pablo Pua vs. Lourdes, GR 173336, 26 November 2012 [Attachment bond]

Facts:Pua is engaged in the business of wholesale rice trading. One of his client was Ang. Pua delivered rice to Ang, co-owners of the JD Grains, and paid him two post dated chekcs. Pua tried to encash them but the same were dishonored. Pua demanded payment to Ang, but the latter refused. Pua filed a complaint for collection of sum of money with preliminary attachment against Deyto as co-owners of JD Grains. The trial court issued an order for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment. Since Ang cannot be located, and no properties available to satisfy the obligation, the properties of Deyto were levied. The summons for Ang was published through Manila Standard. Later, more than 6 months, the case was sent to archive for inactivity, and the trial court dismissed the case for the plaintiff's lack of interest to prosecute the case. Pua contended that he renewed the attachment bond which shows an intention on his part to prosecute the same.

Issue:Whether the contention of Pua is correct?

Held:NO. The payment of an attachment bond is not an appropriate procedure to settle a legal dispute in court; it could not be considered as a substitute for the submission of the necessary pleading or motions that would to prompt action on the case.

12. ACE - Mangila vs. CA, GR 125027, 12 August 2002 [issuance of writ; req. of acquiring jurisdiction]

Facts:Petitioner is an exporter of sea foods. Private respondent, the President and General Manager of Air Swift International, is engaged in the freight forwarding business. Petitioner contracted with private respondent for shipment of the petitioner's goods. Petitioner agreed to pay private respondent cash on delivery. However, petitioner failed to pay private respondent for three shipments. Private respondent filed a case against petitioner before the RTC of Pasay for the collection of sum of money. Unfortunately, it was found out that petitioner left the Philippines with intent to defraud her creditors. Private respondent filed a Motion for Preliminary Attachment against the petitioner. The trial court set the date for pre-trial several times, but the petitioner failed to appear. The trial court terminated the pre-trail and allowed the private respondent to present evidence ex-parte. The petitioner filed an Ominubus Motion stating that the presentation of evidence ex-parte should be suspended because there was no declaration of petitioner as in default party and it did not acquire jurisdiction over her because she did not submit herself to the jurisdiction of the trial court. The court issued the writ of preliminary attachment and tasked its Sheriff implement the said writ, but the petitioner questioned the issuance and implementation of the said writ, that it was issued erroneously.

Issue:Whether the action of the court is correct?

Held:NO. the grant of provisional remedy of attachment involves three stages- (1) the issuance by the court of the order granting the application, (2) the issuance of the writ of attachment pursuant to the order, and (3) the implementation of the writ. For the initial two stages, it is not necessary that jurisdiction over the person of the defendant be first obtained but once the implementation of the writ commences, the court must have acquired the jurisdiction over the defendant.If the defendant's whereabouts could not be ascertained after the sheriff had served the summons, the plaintiff should ask the court for service of summons by publication on the defendant.The belatedly service of summon on the petitioner cannot be deemed to have cured the fatal defect in the enforcement of the writ.The writ of preliminary attachment must be served after or simultaneously with the service of summons on the defendant whether personal, substituted or by publication.

13. ACE - Fort Bonifacio Development Corp vs. Yllas Lending, GR 158997, 6 October 2008 [3rd party claim; indemnity bond]Facts:Petitioner and Tirreno entered into a lease agreement over a unit of the petitioner to be used as a restaurant. Respondent lent a total of Php 1.5M to Tirreno which was secured by a Deed of Chattel Mortgage. Later, Tirreno defaulted in its payment, and forcing the petitioner to their lease agreement. Respondent caused the sheriff of the trial court serve an alias writ of seizure against petitioner, for Tirreno had failed to settle his obligations with them. Petitioner found out that the filed a complaint for Foreclosure of Chattel Mortgage. The sheriff delivered the seized properties to respondent. Petitioner questioned the actions of the sheriff on the ground that there was no indemnity bond filed before the trial court.

Issue:Whether the actions of the sheriff is correct?

Held:NO. Section 14 of Rule 57 the Rules of Court, the sheriff is not obligated to turnover to respondent the properties subject of this case for failure to file a bond. The bond in section 14 of Rule 57 (proceedings where the property is claimed by third person) is different from the bond in section 3 of Rule 57, the purpose of which is to indemnify the sheriff against any claim by the intervenor to the property seized or for damages arising from such seizure.

Section 3, Rule 57 refers to the attachment bond to assure the return of the defendant's personal property or the payment of damages to the defendant if the plaintiff's action to recover possession of the same property fails, in order to protect the plaintiff's right of possession of said property.

14. ACE - Spouses Santiago vs. ABC, GR 16450, 25 November 2008 [liability for damages]

Facts:For value received, Cebu Foremost Const., through its Chairman Tanchan, executed and delivered 7 US$ promissory notes to respondent, and also a Real Estate Mortgage. For failure to pay, respondent instituted to foreclose the Real Estate Mortgage to satisfy its claim. Again, respondent filed with the RTC a complaint for collection of sum of money with preliminary attachment. Armed with Writ of Preliminary Attachment, the sheriff levied several parcels of land registered in the name of petitioner.Petitioner contended that he could not have defrauded respondent because he did not directly contracted the loan but acted merely as sureties. Thus, the issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Attachment is arbitrary. Petitioner claimed for damages that brought upon them social humiliation.

Issue:Whether the petitioner is entitled for damages?

Held:NO. A wrongful attachment may give rise to liability for moral damages but the evidence must be adduced not only of the torment and humiliation brought upon the defendant by attaching party but also of the latter's badfaith and malice causing the wrongful attachment.In the case, the petitioner failed to adduce evidence that shows that the respondent acted with malice in causing the wrongful issuance of the writ.

15. ACE - China Banking Corp vs. Asian Development Corporation, GR 158271, 8 April 2008 [Sale of property attached; exceptions]

Facts:petitioner granted respondent a credit line in the amount of 90M. Alleging that the respondent failed to pay the said credit line, petitioner filed a complaint for recovery of sum of money with prayer for the issuance of Writ of Preliminary Attachment before the RTC of Makati. The trial court issued an order of the prayed Writ. As shown in the Sheriff's report, the Writ was implemented levying personal properties such as vans, dump truck and etc. petitioner filed a motion for grant of authority to sell the attached property, but the trial court denied because of the absence of a final and executory judgment against respondent.

Issue:Whether the action of the trial court is correct?

Held:YES. The attached property may be sold after levy on attachment and before entry of judgment whenever it shall be made to appear to the court in which the action is pending, upon hearing with notice to both parties, that the property is perishable, or that the interest of all parties to thew action will be subserved by the sale of the attached property.

16. MAVEL - Oate vs. Abrogar, GR 107303, 23 February 1995 [improper enforcement does not affect the validity of the writ]Facts: Sun Life filed a complaint for sum of money with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against Onate, et. al. The prayer for the writ was granted by the Court. The Sheriff attempted to serve summons to Onate, et. al. but he was unsuccessful. Despite of this, the sheriff started to serve notices of garnishment upon banks, and notices of attachment upon other properties of Onate. The Sheriff was able to serve summons after the notice of garnishment. Records show that before the summons and the complaint were served on petitioners Oate and Econ Holdings Corporation (Econ) on January 9, 1992, Deputy Sheriff Arturo C. Flores had already served on January 3, 1992 notices of garnishment on the PNB Head Office and on all its Metro Manila branches and on A.B. Capital. In addition he made other levies before the service of summons on petitioners. Onate argues that the attachment is improper because the RTC has not yet acquired jurisdiction over their persons. The SC said that whatever defects attended the attachment, these were cured when the sheriff was finally able to serve them the summons later on. Onate filed an MR. Issue: WON the attachment is valid?Held: No. We hold that the attachment of petitioners properties prior to the acquisition of jurisdiction by the respondent court is void and that the subsequent service of summons on petitioners did not cure the invalidity of such attachment. In cites the following portion of the decision in Davao Light and Power, written by Justice, now Chief Justice, Narvasa: It goes without saying that whatever be the acts done by the Court prior to the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, as above indicated issuance of summons, order of attachment and writ of attachment (and/or appointment of guardian ad litem, or grant of authority to the plaintiff to prosecute the suit as a pauper litigant, or amendment of the complaint by the plaintiff as a matter of right without leave of court and however valid and proper they might otherwise be, these do not and cannot bind and affect the defendant until and unless jurisdiction over his person is eventually obtained by the court, either by service on him of summons or other coercive process or his voluntary submission to the courts authority. Hence, when the sheriff or other proper officer commences implementation of the writ of attachment, it is essential that he serve on the defendant not only a copy of the applicants affidavit and attachment bond, and of the order of attachment, as explicitly required by Section 5 of Rule 57, but also the summons addressed to said defendant as well as a copy of the complaint and order for appointment of guardian ad litem, of any, as also explicitly directed by Section 3, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. It is clear from the above excerpt, however, that while the petition for a writ of preliminary attachment may be granted and the writ itself issued before the defendant is summoned, the writ of attachment cannot be implemented until jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is obtained. As this Court explained, "levy on property pursuant to the writ thus issued may not be validly effected unless preceded, or contemporaneously accompanied, by service on the defendant of summons, a copy of the complaint (and of the appointment of guardian ad litem, if any), the application for attachment (if not incorporated in but submitted separately form the complaint), the order of attachment, and the plaintiffs attachment bond."Further clarification was made in Cuartero v. Court of Appeals, (212 SCRA 260, 266 [1992]) in which it was held: It must be emphasized that the grant of the provisional remedy of attachment practically involves three stages; first, the court issues the order granting the application; second, the writ of attachment issues pursuant to the order granting the writ; and third, the writ is implemented. For the initial two stages, it is not necessary that jurisdiction over the person of the defendant should first be obtained. However, once the implementation commences, it is required that the court must have acquired jurisdiction over the defendant for without such jurisdiction, the court has no power and authority to act in any manner against the defendant. Any order issuing from the Court will not bind the defendant. Private respondent argues that the case of Cuartero itself provides for an exception as shown in the statement that "the court [in issuing the writ of preliminary attachment] cannot bind and affect the defendant until jurisdiction is eventually obtained" and that since petitioners were subsequently served with summons, no question can be raised against the validity of the attachment of petitioners properties before such service. The statement in question has been taken out of context. The full statement reads: It is clear from our pronouncements that a writ of preliminary attachment may issue even before summons is served upon the defendant. However, we have likewise ruled that the writ cannot bind and affect the defendant until jurisdiction over his person is eventually obtained. Therefore, it is required that when the proper officer commences implementation of the writ of attachment, service of summons should be simultaneously made. Indeed, as this Court through its First Division has ruled on facts similar to those in these cases, the attachment of properties before the service of summons on the defendant is invalid, even though the court later acquires jurisdiction over the defendant. At the very least, then, the writ of attachment must be served simultaneously with the service of summons before the writ may be enforced. As the properties of the petitioners were attached by the sheriff before he had served the summons on them, the levies made must be considered void.17. MAVEL - Pepperel vs. Taylor, 5 Phil 536 [attachment allowed if the mortgagee abandons security]Fact: This is an ordinary action on a promissory note to recover the sum of $1,150, United States currency, with interest thereon at the rate of 25 per cent annum from September 14, 1903, the date of the note, until its payment. Plaintiff procured an attachment of the property of the defendant under the provisions of section 424 and following sections of the Code of Civil Procedure. The affidavit for attachment stated that the defendant had disposed of his property or is about to dispose of his property with intent to defraud his creditors. By virtue of the writ of attachment the sheriff levied upon the launch Scotia, the property of the defendant. The defendant moved in the court below to dissolve the attachment, which motion was denied, and to the order denying it he took an exception. The case was tried in the court below, and judgment entered for the plaintiff for the face of the note with interest at the rate of 25 per cent annum from the 14th day of September, 1903, until the debt was paid. The defendant has brought the case here by bill of exceptions.Issue: Whether the affidavit is sufficient upon which the attachment was granted.Held: We do not find it necessary to pass upon the validity of this instrument (affidavit). The object of the statute was to prevent the creditor, who already had security on certain goods, from attaching other goods to secure the same debt. It was not, in our opinion, intended to apply to a case where the plaintiff caused his attachment to be levied upon the very article upon which the security existed, and in an action to recover the debt which was so secured. In fact, under the Spanish law of civil procedure, in an action to recover a debt thus secured the property first to be attached is that upon which the security rested. What the effect of this attachment upon the security is we do not decide. We simply hold that section 426 does not prevent an attachment of the article upon which the security rests for the debt this secured.18. MAVEL - Delos Reyes vs. RTC Batangas, 55 Phil 408 [attachment allowed if the mortgage security is insufficient]Fact: This is an original petition for the writ of certiorari filed in this court by Benito de los Reyes and wife, for the purpose of quashing an order of the Court of First Instance of Batangas granting an attachment of property belonging to the plaintiffs, in an action instituted in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Batangas, wherein the respondents Chua Pua Hermanos are plaintiffs and the petitioners defendants. Issue: Whether in a proceeding to foreclose a mortgage upon land, the court entertaining such proceeding can issue an attachment against other property of the defendants than such as is included in the mortgage, upon a showing, by affidavit, that the mortgaged property is insufficient to pay the mortgage debt and that the defendants are attempting to alienate their unmortgaged property to other persons with intent to defraud the plaintiff.Held: In a mortgage foreclosure proceeding the court has jurisdiction to grant an attachment against the property of the debtor, to be levied upon property not covered by the mortgage, upon proper showing by affidavit that the value of the mortgaged property is insufficient to cover the debt and that the debtor has disposed, or is about to dispose, of his other property with intent to defraud the creditor.The affidavit accompanying the application for attachment shows, in conformity with the requirement of section 426 of the Code of Civil Procedure, that the value of the mortgaged property is not sufficient to satisfy the debt. In addition to this it is alleged in the affidavit that the defendants are attempting to dispose of their other property, meaning property not mortgaged to the plaintiff, with intent to defraud the plaintiff. This is in conformity with the requirement of subsection 5 of section 412 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

19. MAVEL - Cuartero vs. CA, GR 102448, 5 August 1992 [Ground for discharge shld not be ground to dismiss the main case on the merits]Facts: On August 20, 1990, petitioner Ricardo Cuartero filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City against the private respondents, Evangelista spouses, for a sum of money plus damages with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment. The lower court issued an order granting ex-parte the petitioners prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment, the writ of preliminary attachment was issued and the summons for the spouses Evangelista was likewise prepared. The summons and the complaint were all simultaneously served upon the private respondents at their residence. Immediately thereafter, Deputy Sheriff Ernesto L. Sula levied, attached and pulled out the properties in compliance with the courts directive to attach all the properties of private respondents not exempt from execution, or so much thereof as may be sufficient to satisfy the petitioners principal claim in the amount of P2,171,794.91. Evangelista filed a motion to set aside the order and discharge the writ of preliminary attachment for having been irregularly and improperly issued. The lower court denied such motion. Private respondent the filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA questioning the order. The CA granted the petition. Hence, the present recourse to this Court.Issue: Whether the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion when it held that the RTC could not validly issue the writ of preliminary attachment? Held: Yes. Valid service of summons and a copy of the complaint vest jurisdiction in the court over the defendant both for the purpose of the main case and for purposes of the ancillary remedy of attachment and a court which has not acquired jurisdiction over the person of defendant, cannot bind the defendant whether in the main case or in any ancillary proceeding such as attachment proceedings (Sievert v. Court of Appeals, 168 SCRA 692)."A writ of preliminary attachment is defined as a provisional remedy issued upon order of the court where an action is pending to be levied upon the property or properties of the defendant therein, the same to be held thereafter by the sheriff as security for the satisfaction of whatever judgment might be secured in said action by the attaching creditor against the defendant (Adlawan v. Tomol, 184 SCRA 31 [1990] citing Virata v. Aquino, 53 SCRA 30-31 [1973]).It must be emphasized that the grant of the provisional remedy of attachment practically involves three stages: first, the court issues the order granting the application; second, the writ of attachment issues pursuant to the order granting the writ; and third, the writ is implemented. For the initial two stages, it is not necessary that jurisdiction over the person of the defendant should first be obtained. However, once the implementation commences, it is required that the court must have acquired jurisdiction over the defendant for without such jurisdiction, the court has no power and authority to act in any manner against the defendant. Any order issuing from the Court will not bind the defendant.It is clear from our pronouncements that a writ of preliminary attachment may issue even before summons is served upon the defendant. However, we have likewise ruled that the writ cannot bind and affect the defendant until jurisdiction over his person is eventually obtained. Therefore, it is required that when the proper officer commences implementation of the writ of attachment, service of summons should be simultaneously made.In the present case, one of the allegations in petitioners complaint below is that the defendant spouses induced the plaintiff to grant the loan by issuing postdated checks to cover the installment payments and a separate set of postdated checks for payment of the stipulated interest (Annex "B"). The issue of fraud, then , is clearly within the competence of the lower court in the main action.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby GRANTS the petition.B. Preliminary Injunction [Rule 58]

1. MAVEL - Philippine Economic Zone Authority vs. Joseph Carates, GR 181274, 23 June 2010 [preliminary injunction; requisites]Facts: Respondents Joseph Jude Carantes, Rose Carantes and the heirs of Maximino Carantes are in possession of a 30,368-square meter parcel of land located in Loakan Road, Baguio City. They obtained Certificate of Ancestral Land Claim (CALC) No. CAR-CALC-022[4] over the land from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). On the strength of said CALC, respondents secured a building permit[5] and a fencing permit[6] from the Building Official of Baguio City, Teodoro G. Barrozo. Before long, they fenced the premises and began constructing a residential building thereon.Soon, respondents received a letter[7] dated February 9, 1999 from Digna D. Torres, the Zone Administrator of the Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA), informing them that the house they built had overlapped PEZA's territorial boundary. Torres advised respondents to demolish the same within sixty (60) days from notice. Otherwise, PEZA would undertake its demolition at respondents' expense.Without answering PEZA's letter, respondents filed a petition for injunction, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and writ of preliminary injunction before the RTC of Baguio City. By Order[8] dated April 8, 1999, the RTC of Baguio City issued a TRO, which enjoined PEZA to cease and desist from threatening respondents with the demolition of their house before respondents' prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction can be heard. On September 19, 2001, the RTC likewise issued an Order,[9] which directed the parties to maintain the status quo pending resolution of the case. The RTC then granted the respondents' petition and ordered the issuance of a writ of injunction against PEZA. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling. Issue: Whether or not Injunction is ProperHeld: No. Injunction is a judicial writ, process or proceeding whereby a party is directed either to do a particular act, in which case it is called a mandatory injunction or to refrain from doing a particular act, in which case it is called a prohibitory injunction. As a main action, injunction seeks to permanently enjoin the defendant through a final injunction issued by the court and contained in the judgment. Section 9, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides,SEC. 9. When final injunction granted. - If after the trial of the action it appears that the applicant is entitled to have the act or acts complained of permanently enjoined, the court shall grant a final injunction perpetually restraining the party or person enjoined from the commission or continuance of the act or acts or confirming the preliminary mandatory injunction.

Two (2) requisites must concur for injunction to issue: (1) there must be a right to be protected and (2) the acts against which the injunction is to be directed are violative of said right.[23] Particularly, in actions involving realty, preliminary injunction will lie only after the plaintiff has fully established his title or right thereto by a proper action for the purpose. To authorize a temporary injunction, the complainant must make out at least a prima facie showing of a right to the final relief. Preliminary injunction will not issue to protect a right not in esse.[24] These principles are equally relevant to actions seeking permanent injunction.At the onset, we must stress that petitioner does not pose an adverse claim over the subject land. Neither does petitioner dispute that respondents hold building and fencing permits over the lots. For petitioner, the question that must be answered is whether respondents may build structures within the Baguio City Economic Zone on the basis of their CAR-CALC-022, and the building and fencing permits issued by the City Building Official.As holders of a CALC, respondents possess no greater rights than those enumerated in Par. 1, Section 2, Article VII of DENR Department Administrative Order (DAO) No. 02, Series of 1993:SECTION 2. Rights and Responsibilities of Ancestral Land Claimants -

1. Rights1. The right to peacefully occupy and cultivate the land, and utilize the natural resources therein, subject to existing laws, rules and regulations applicable thereto;1. The right of the heirs to succeed to the claims subject to existing rules and regulations;1. The right to exclude from the claim any other person who does not belong to the family or clan; and1. The right to utilize trees and other forest products inside the ancestral land subject to these rules as well as customary laws. (Emphasis supplied.)Respondents being holders of a mere CALC, their right to possess the subject land is limited to occupation in relation to cultivation. Unlike No. 1,[26] Par. 1, Section 1, Article VII of the same DENR DAO, which expressly allows ancestral domain claimants to reside peacefully within the domain, nothing in Section 2 grants ancestral land claimants a similar right, much less the right to build permanent structures on ancestral lands - an act of ownership that pertains to one (1) who has a recognized right by virtue of a Certificate of Ancestral Land Title. On this score alone, respondents' action for injunction must fail.

2. AVA - Roman Catholic Archbishop of San Fernando Pampanga vs. Eduardo Soriano, Jr, GR 153829, 17 August 2011 [Important requisites for issuance of writ]

FACTS: This is a Petition for Injunction underRule 58, filed by Benjamin Guinto, Jr. seeking to enjoin the implementation of the Writ of Executionissued by the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Macabebe-Masantol, Pampanga in Civil Case No. 2000(23).

The RCA of San Fernando, Pampanga, represented by Most Rev. Paciano B. Aniceto, D.D.,claimed that it is the owner of a vast tract of land located near the Catholic Church at Poblacion, Macabebe, Pampanga and covered by OCT. The RCA alleged that several individuals unlawfully occupied the subject land andrefused to vacate despite repeated demands.Having no other recourse, the RCA filed an ejectment case against the alleged intruders. On the other hand, defendants countered that the RCA has no cause of action against them because its title is spurious. They contended that the subject land belonged to the State, but they have already acquired the same by acquisitive prescription.

The decision ejecting the defendants from the premises became final. Thus, a Writ of Execution was issued. Seeking to enjoin the implementation of the same and the notice to vacate, Guinto filed the instant Petition for Injunction with Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO).

Meanwhile, during the pendency of the ejectment case, some of the defendant therein filed Civil for Quieting of Title and Declaration of Nullity of Title before the RTC against RCA. RTC rendered decision in favor of the plaintiffs (defendants in the first case). Aggrieved, RCA filed the with the CA a petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction, to which the latter dismissed. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:WON there is a need to enjoin the sheriff from enforcing the writ of execution as it would cause grave and irreparable damage to Guinto, while the RCA would not suffer any damage if it would later be proved that indeed its title is genuine.

RULING: No. In this case, the defendants in the ejectment case possess no such legal rights that merit the protection of the courts through the writ of preliminary injunction.The MCTC has already rendered a decision in favor of the RCA and ordered the defendants therein to vacate the premises.Their appeal to the RTC was dismissed and the decision has become final.Evidently, their right to possess the property in question has already been declared inferior or inexistent in relation to the right of the RCA in the MCTC decision which has already become final and executory.

To be entitled to the injunctive writ, the applicant must show that there exists a right to be protected which is directly threatened by an act sought to be enjoined. Furthermore, there must be a showing that the invasion of the right is material and substantial and that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. The applicants right must be clear and unmistakable. In the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of the writ constitutes grave abuse of discretion. Where the applicants right or title is doubtful or disputed, injunction is not proper. The possibility of irreparable damage without proof of an actual existing right is not a ground for injunction.

3. AVA - CBC vs. Spouses Ciriaco, GR 170038, 11 July 2012 [strong arm of equity]

FACTS: Respondents spouses obtained a P1,500,000.00 loanfrom the petitioner, secured by a real estate mortgage. When the respondents defaulted in the payment of their loan, the petitioner extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgaged property and sold it at public auction where the petitioner emerged as the highest bidder.

A day before the expiration of the redemption period, the respondents filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of La Trinidad, Benguet for Injunction to enjoin the consolidation of title in the petitioners favor, assailing the redemption price of the foreclosed property.

The respondents sought to amend the complaint to allege further that fraud attended the consolidation of title in the petitioners favor and to include a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or TRO to enjoin the petitioner from disposing of the foreclosed property or taking possession thereof.

RTC granted the respondents application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or TRO, since the respondents were entitled to prove their claim of fraud, and their claim that the interests and penalty charges imposed by the bank had no factual basis. This was affirmed by the ca. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: whether the CA erred in finding that the RTC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in granting the respondents application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or TRO.

RULING: Yes. A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action prior to the judgment or final order requiring a party or a court, agency or a person to refrain from a particular act or acts.It is the "strong arm of equity," an extraordinary peremptory remedy that must be used with extreme caution,affecting as it does the respective rights of the parties.

the RTC abbreviated the proceedings and precipitately granted the respondents application for injunctive relief. The RTC did not conduct a hearing for reception of a "sampling" of the parties respective evidence to give it an idea of the justification for its issuance pending the decision of the case on the merits.35It failed to make any factual finding to support the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction since it did not conduct any hearing on the application for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction or TRO. The RTC conducted the March 22, 2000 and April 24, 2000 hearings on the respondents omnibus motion only whether to admit the amended complaint and whether to hold a hearing on the respondents application for a writ of preliminary injunction.1wphi1In fact, a perusal of the August 1, 2000 order shows that the RTC granted the respondents application for a writ of preliminary injunction based only on the respondents unsubstantiated allegations.

Clearly, the respondents right to injunctive relief has not been clearly and unmistakably demonstrated. The respondents have not presented evidence, testimonial or documentary, other than the bare allegations contained in their pleadings, to support their claim of fraud that brings about the irreparable injury sought to be avoided by their application for injunctive relief. Thus, the RTCs grant of the writ of preliminary injunction in favor of the respondents, despite the lack of any evidence of a clear and unmistakable right on their part, constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

4. AVA - Dolmar Real Estate Development, GR 172990, 27 February 2008 [Status quo ante]

FACTS: spouses Young, respondents, filed with the Regional Trial Court a complaint for specific performance and damages against petitioners with TRO and a preliminary injunction ordering petitioners to: (a) cease and desist from further violating the provisions of the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) and the Shareholders' Agreement executed by the parties; (b) comply with their obligations and duties stipulated in the said agreements by restoring to respondents-spouses Young their authority to manage the corporation; (c) abide by the quorum and consensus rules established in the said agreements governing the exercise of corporate acts and powers; and (d) desist from holding the meeting of the Board of Directors of the corporation.

The trial court issued a 72-hour restraining Order preventing the holding of the Board of Directors' meeting on June 3, 2005.

On October 14, 2005, the trial court issued an Orderdirectinginter aliathat: (1) thestatus quo ante,meaning the situation of the contending parties prior to December 13, 2004, must be maintained; (2) there is a need to observe the four-director quorum and consensus rules; (3) it is necessary to observe the rule on counter-signature by spouses Young on the checks issued by Festive Foods International, Inc. and in banking transactions of the corporation; and (4) the parties shall mutually comply with their respective duties and responsibilities under the MOA and Shareholders' Agreement.

Petitioners then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition forcertiorariunder Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, assailing thestatus quo anteOrder for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The same was denied, hence, this petition. ISSUE: WON the issuance of status quo ante was properRULING: YES. The sole object of a writ of preliminary injunction, whether prohibitory or mandatory, is to preserve thestatus quoand prevent further injury on the applicant until the merits of the main case can be heard. Thestatus quois the last actual peaceable uncontested status which preceded the controversy. The injunctive writ may only be resorted to by a litigant for the preservation and protection of his rights or interests during the pendency of the principal ac