SCA Doctrines Caldona

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2 Special Civil Action: CALDONA Bautista | Lopez | Macabagdal | R. Santos | Taruc

o Ocampo replied to Callejo Law Office and Tirona was also furnisheda copy (content not discussed).

o On 7 August 1995, Ocampo wrote a letter to Tirona demandingpayment for rentals in arrears for the months of April, May, June,July and August at the rate of P1,200 a month and to vacate thepremises.

o Tirona failed and refused to heed [Ocampo’s] demands. Ocampo filed a complaint for unlawful detainer and damages against Tirona

before the MTC. Tirona’s answer:

o The land is actually owned by one Doña Lourdes Rodriguez Yaneza,represented by Assignor Edison A. Hindap (her General Overseerand Attorney-in-Fact).

o The Title of Ocampo overlapped with the Original Land Title of the Assignor.

o The Assignor recognized Tirona as co-owner by possession andthereby ceded, transfered and assigned the said parcel of land inTirona’s favor.

o Tirona denied and discontinued all obligations imposed by Ocampobecause the property in question is not owned by Ocampo, butrather owned by the Assignor, who issued a Certification for

Occupancy and Assignment in favor of Tirona.o The certificate of title to the subject land is not even registered underOcampo’s name.

o Tirona also alleged that she has a right of first refusal in case of saleof the land, pursuant to PD Nos. 1517, 1893 and 1968.

o Tirona asked for attorney’s fees and moral and exemplary damages. MTC --- Tirona does not have any reason to suspend payment of rents until

after PD No. 1517, in relation to PD Nos. 1893 and 1968, is implemented inher favor. Tirona’s non-payment of rents rendered her occupation of thesubject land illegal. As owner of the subject land, Ocampo is entitled to itsuse and enjoyment, as well as to recover its possession from any personunlawfully withholding it. Tirona was ordered to vacate the property, surrenderits possession and pay rentals, attorney’s fees and cost of suit. Tironaappealed to the RTC.

Maria Lourdes Breton-Mendiola filed a motion with leave to file interventionbefore the RTC, claiming to be the owner of the land.

o Tirona filed a memorandum, disclosing for the first time that she isactually the tenant of one Alipio Breton. When Alipio Died, Rosauroand Maria Lourdes inherited the land. Rosauro waived andconveyed the land to Maria Lourdes, and could not have sold hisportion to Ocampo.

RTC --- affirmed in toto the MTC ruling.o The RTC denied Breton-Mendiola’s motion with leave to file

intervention because it would violate the 1964 Rules of Court and jurisprudence.

o Tirona appealed to the CA, claiming a better right of possession tothe land.

CA --- considered partition of the estate of Alipio Breton as a prerequisite toOcampo’s action.

o The principal issue for its resolution is whether Ocampo, being thebuyer of the subject land which is not yet partitioned among theheirs, can validly evict Tirona.

o Until the partition of the estate is ordered by the RTC in the pendingpartition proceedings and the share of each co-heir is determined bymetes and bounds, Ocampo cannot rightfully claim that what he

bought is part of the property occupied by Tirona.

ISSUES:Ocampo argues that the CA ERRED in:

1. Entertaining and not dismissing the petition for review (with prayer for itsissuance of writ of preliminary injunction and immediate issuance of tro),the same having been filed beyond the reglamentary period. --- YES

2. Considering and resolving an issue raised in the petition for review forthe first time on appeal. --- YES

3. Declaring that Leonardo R. Ocampo has no right to eject LeonoraTirona, nor demand payment of rentals from her for the use andoccupancy of the lot involved in the present case. --- YES

HELD: The petition has merit. Instant petition for review GRANTED. RTC decision affirming MTC decision is REINSTATED. Decision of the CA denying the motion for reconsideration is SET ASIDE.

RATIO:1. SC agrees with Ocampo’s observation that Tirona changes her theory of the

case each time she appeals. The evidence on record reveals that the CA did not contradict the

findings of facts of the MTC and RTC. There is no reason to deviate from their findings of facts.

2. Unlawful detainer The elements to be proved and resolved in unlawful detainer cases

are the fact of lease and expiration or violation of its terms. Ocampo has the right to eject Tirona from the subject land. All the

elements required for an unlawful detainer case to prosper arepresent. Ocampo notified Tirona that he purchased the subject landfrom Tirona’s lessor. Tirona’s continued occupation of the subjectland amounted to acquiescence to Ocampo’s terms. However,Tirona eventually refused to pay rent to Ocampo, thus violating thelease.

Mirasol v. Magsuci, et al. --- The sale of a leased property places thevendee into the shoes of the original lessor to whom the lesseebound himself to pay. The vendee acquires the right to evict thelessee from the premises and to recover the unpaid rentals after thevendee had notified the lessee that he had bought the leased


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administration the entire hacienda aforesaid to a charitable institution oflearning which was subsequently called the Colegio de San Jose, governedby the Jesuit Fathers

o Rodriguez de Figueroa died leaving as heirs his two minorsdaughters, who also died without leaving any heirs;

o Since then the Colegio de San Jose, through the Jesuit Fathers, hadheld and administered the hacienda and through the practice called"sustitucion pupilar" by the claimant, the Jesuit Fathers succeeded in

appropriating the same, considering it from then on as their propertyand as part of the temporal properties of the church;o By virtue of the treaty of Paris, the Organic Law of the United States

Congress of July 1, 1902, the Jones Law, and finally the Tydings-McDuffie Independence Law, the aforesaid passed to the ownershipof the Commonwealth of the Philippines and the latter is at presentthe owner thereof, which should be administered and conserved forthe benefit of the inhabitants of the Philippines, particularly those ofthe municipality of San Pedro;

o By the right of escheat the Commonwealth has likewise become theowner of the hacienda because of the death of the daughters ofRodriguez de Figueroa without leaving any heirs and because thereis no one who is legally entitled thereto;

o The municipality of San Pedro has a right to a hacienda for theexclusive benefit of its inhabitants;

o Colegio de San Jose should render an accounting of the rentalswhich it has been collecting from the hacienda, which should not beless than P60,000.

Carlos Young appeared and interposed a demurrer to the complaint of theplaintiffs on the grounds that it does not state facts constituting a cause ofaction and that is allegations are vague, ambiguous, and unintelligible; andurged that said complaint be finally dismissed. He also filed MTD of complaintof interpleader of the municipality of San Pedro, on the ground that the latterentity has no standing to bring the action, that the complaint of interpleader ispremature because the court has not yet ordered the parties therein to litigateamong themselves.

The Colegio de San Jose, Inc., interposed a demurrer to the plaintiff's

complaint, upon the same grounds advanced by Carlos Young in hisdemurrer. It filed it answer to the complaint of interpleader of the municipalityof San Pedro, wherein it denied the material allegation thereof and put up thedefense that the Hacienda de an Pedro Tunasan is it exclusive property andthat its title has been recognized by the government and the courts.

The lower court entered the appealed resolution dismissing the plaintiff'scomplaint, holding further that the complaint of interpleader of the municipalityof San Pedro is premature, overruling all the motion filed by the latter andordering the striking out from the record of the pleadings filed b y appellants’counsel

ISSUES (assignment of errors by appellants): 1. W/N judge acted impartial in the case – NO

2. W/N applicant for interpleading is equivalent to a complaint in an ordinary actionwhich may be demurred to, and consequently, assuming the demurrers of CarlosYoung and of the Colegio de San Jose, Inc. – YES3. W/N applicant (not complaint) of interpleading is sufficient – NO4. W/N special appearance of Solicitor -Genral should be sustained – YES5. W/N complaint of interpleader of the municipality of San Pedro is premature and,consequently, W/N Colegio de San Jose and Carlos young should have been declaredin default – YES & NO

6. W/N proceedings of this case should be suspended until decision of the escheatcase – NO

RATIO: FIRST ISSUE: JUDGE DID NOT ACT PARTIALLY

Appellant question the integrity and impartiality of the judge who entered theappealed resolution and contend that he should have abstained from takingcognizance of the case.

The appellants concede that they have not duly questioned at any time, the judge who decided this case. The facts of record do not furnish any evidencein support of the appellants' contention. The circumstances pointed out by theappellants that one of their attorney filed a complaint and administrativecharge against the judge, and that this naturally created an enmity betweenthem, is not a sufficient ground for concluding that the judge acted partially.

SECOND ISSUE: COURT DID NOT ERR IN CONSIDERING THE DEMURRERS The plaintiff commenced the case under the provisions of section 120 of the

Code of Civil Procedure:SEC. 120. Interpleading. — Whenever conflicting claims are or may be madeupon a person for or relation personal property, or the performance of anobligation or any portion thereof, so that he may be made subject to severalactions by different person, unless the court intervenes, such person maybring an action against the conflicting claimants, disclaiming personal interestin the controversy, to compel them to interplead and litigate their severalclaims among themselves, and the court may order the conflicting claimantsto interplead with one another and thereupon proceed to determine the rightof the several parties to the interpleading to the personal property or the

performance of the obligation in controversy and shall determine the right ofall in interest.

Pursuant to this section, the remedy provided for may be availed of bybringing an "action", for no other meaning may de deduced from the phrase"such person may bring an action against the conflicting claimants" used toindicate the procedure to be followed by one would avail himself of itsprovisions.

The word "action" means the ordinary action defined in section 1 of the sameCode and should be commenced by complaint which may be demurrer to asprovided in section 91 and upon the grounds therein stated. The pleadingwhich commences an ordinary action cannot be correctly called anapplication or petition because these, generally, are the pleadings used onlyto commence special proceedings


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Commonwealth of the Philippines cannot, without its consent, be compelledto litigate in this action of interpleader. This being so, the conclusion isinevitable that the court did not err in sustaining the special appearance of theCommonwealth of the Philippines and in ordering the dismissal of thecomplaint with respect to this party.

FIFTH ISSUE: MUNICIPALITY OF SAN PEDRO’S COMPLAINT OF INTERPLEADERPREMATURE, COLEGIO DE SAN JOSE AND YOUNG NOT IN DEFAULT

In resolving the third assignment of error we already expressed the opinionthat the court should order that the defendant litigate among themselvesbefore any of them may file a complaint of interpleader. Applying this rule, it isevident that the first part of the assignment of error is without merit.

With respect to the default of the Colegio de San Jose and Carlos Young, itsuffices to state that the first and El Colegio de San Jose, Inc., are the sameentity and it, as well as Young, interposed demurrers within the legal period.

SIXTH ISSUE: SUSPENSION OF PROCEEDINGS NOT NECESSARY Before rendering the appealed resolution, the municipality of San Pedro

asked for the suspension of the proceedings in the case for the purpose offirst obtaining final judgment in the other escheat case (Special ProceedingsNo. 3052) commenced by the same municipality. There was no good reason

to suspend the proceedings and to put off the resolution or decision, when atany rate the same result would be reached. At all events, the appellants do not cite the violation of any law, and the

suspension of the proceedings rest entirely in a sound judicial discretion, adiscretion which the court exercised adversely to the municipality of SanPedro.

HELD: For all the reasons stated herein, the appealed resolution is affirmed, with thecosts of this instance against all the appellants. So ordered.

3. Wack-Wack Golf v. WonG.R. No. L-23851 | March 26, 1976

Petitioner: Wack Wack Golf & Country Club, Inc.Respondent: Lee E. Won alias Ramon Lee & Bienvenido A. Tan Ponente: C. J. Castro

Summary:

Won claims ownership of a membership fee certificate at Wack Wack Golf & CountryClub. By virtue of a civil case, he was issued such certificate. But a certain Tan alsoclaims ownership over such certificate pursuant to an assignment made by the allegedtrue owner of the same certificate. Thus, Wack Wack filed a complaint to interpleadWon and Tan to litigate their conflicting claims. Trial court dismissed the complaint onthe ground of res judicata by reason of the previous civil case that issued Won the rightto the certificate. ISSUE is WON Wack Wack is barred to file an interpleader suit. – YES.

As to the subject matter (Membership fee certificate), there is no question that such isproper for an interpleader suit. However, the instant interpleader suit cannot prosperbecause Wack Wack had already been made independently liable in the previous civilcase wherein Won had established his rights to the certificate and, therefore, itspresent application for interpleader would in effect be a collateral attack upon the final judgment in the civil case. Since Won had already established his rights tomembership fee certificate 201 in the aforesaid civil case, it follows then that this

interpleader suit, if granted, would compel Won to establish his rights anew, andthereby increase instead of diminish litigations, which is one of the purposes of aninterpleader. And because Wack Wack allowed itself to be sued to final judgment inthe said case, its action of interpleader was filed inexcusably late, for which reason it isbarred by laches or unreasonable delay.

FACTS: Wack Wack Golf & Country Club, Inc. (a non-stock, civic and athletic corporation

duly organized under the laws of the Philippines with principal office inMandaluyong, Rizal) filed an interpleader suit. In its complaint, the corporationalleged 2 causes of action.

1st cause of action:o Won claims ownership of its membership fee certificate 201, by virtue of the

decision rendered in civil case 26044 of Manila CFI (entitled "Won v. WackWack Golf & Country Club" and also by virtue of membership fee certificate201-serial no. 1478 issued by the deputy clerk of court pursuant to the orderin the said case.

o Bienvenido A. Tan, on the other hand, claims to be lawful owner of the samemembership fee certificate 201 by virtue of membership fee certificate 201-serial no. 1199 issued to him pursuant to an assignment made in his favor by"Swan, Culbertson and Fritz," the original owner and holder of membershipfee certificate 201.

o Wack Wack Golf has no means of determining who of the two defendants isthe lawful owner.

2nd cause of action:o The membership fee certificate 201-serial no. 1478 issued by the deputy clerk

of court of Manila CFI is null and void because it was issued in violation of the

corporation’s by-laws, which require the surrender and cancellation of theoutstanding membership fee certificate 201 before issuance may be made tothe transferee of a new certificate duly signed by its president and secretary.

o This is aside from the fact that the decision of the CFI of Manila in civil case26044 is not binding upon Tan, because he was only made a party to thecase so that complete relief may be accorded therein.

The Corporation prayed thato an order be issued requiring Lee and Tan to interplead and litigate their

conflicting claims;o judgment be rendered, declaring who of the two is the lawful owner of

membership fee certificate 201; ando ordering the surrender and cancellation of membership fee certificate 201-

serial no. 1478 issued in the name of Lee.


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Won & Tan moved to dismiss the complaint upon the grounds of res judicata,failure of the complaint to state a cause of action, and bar by prescription.

Trial Court: Dismissed the complaint due to res judicata.

Wack Wack Golf’s Argument: Trial court erred in dismissing the complaint, instead of compelling the appellees

to interplead because there actually are conflicting claims with respect to the

ownership of membership fee certificate 201, and, as there is not identity ofparties, of subject-matter, and of cause of action, between civil case 26044 of theCFI of Manila and the present action, the complaint should not have beendismissed upon the ground of res judicata.

ISSUE: WON Wack Wack’s interpleader suit can prosper. – NO.

RATIO: Interpleader under section 120 of the Code of Civil Procedure is a remedy

whereby a person who has personal property in his possession, or an obligation torender wholly or partially, without claiming any right to either, comes to court andasks that the persons who claim the said personal property or who considerthemselves entitled to demand compliance with the obligation, be required to

litigate among themselves in order to determine finally who is entitled to tone orthe one thing.o The remedy is afforded to protect a person not against double liability but

against double vexation in respect of one liability. The subject matter of the present controversy, i.e., the membership fee

certificate 201, is proper for an interpleader suit. What is here disputed is thepropriety and timeliness of the remedy in the light of the facts andcircumstances obtaining.

WHEN TO APPLY FOR AN INTERPLEADER A stakeholder should use reasonable diligence to hale the contending claimants to

court.o He need not await actual institution of independent suits against him before

filing a bill of interpleader. He should file an action of interpleader within a

reasonable time after a dispute has arisen without waiting to be sued byeither of the contending claimants.

o Otherwise, he may be barred by laches or undue delay. But where he actswith reasonable diligence in view of the environmental circumstances, theremedy is not barred.

A stakeholder's action of interpleader is too late when filed after judgmenthas been rendered against him in favor of one of the contending claimants,especially where he had notice of the conflicting claims prior to therendition of the judgment and neglected the opportunity to implead theadverse claimants in the suit where judgment was entered.o If a stakeholder defends a suit filed by one of the adverse claimants and

allows said suit to proceed to final judgment against him, he cannot later onhave that part of the litigation repeated in an interpleader suit.

W ACK W ACK DID NOT ACT WITH DILIGENCE, SUCH THAT IT CANNOT EVOKE THE REMEDY OFINTERPLEADER The corporation was aware of the conflicting claims of Won & Tan with respect to

the membership fee certificate 201 long before it filed the present interpleader suit.o It had been recognizing Tan as the lawful owner.o It was sued by Lee who also claimed the same membership fee certificate.

Yet it did not interplead Tan.

o It preferred to proceed with the litigation (civil case 26044) and to defend itselftherein. In fact, a final judgment was rendered against it and said judgmenthas already been executed.

The Corporation has NOT shown any justifiable reason why it did not file anapplication for interpleader in civil case 26044 to compel Won & Tan tolitigate between themselves their conflicting claims of ownership.o It was only after adverse final judgment was rendered against the corporation

that the remedy of interpleader was invoked by it.o By then it was too late.

Because to be entitled to this remedy the applicant must be able to showthat he has not been made independently liable to any of the claimants.

Since the Corporation is already liable to Lee under a final judgment, the present interpleader suit is clearly improper andunavailing.

To now permit the Corporation to bring Lee to court after the latter's successfulestablishment of his rights in civil case 26044 to the membership fee certificate201, is to increase instead of to diminish the number of suits, which is one of thepurposes of an action of interpleader, with the possibility that the latter would losethe benefits of the favorable judgment.o This cannot be done.o Having elected to take its chances of success in civil case 26044, the

Corporation must submit to the consequences of defeat. Besides, a successful litigant cannot later be impleaded by his defeated

adversary in an interpleader suit and compelled to prove his claim anewagainst other adverse claimants, as that would in effect be a collateral attackupon the judgment.

DECISION: ACCORDINGLY, the order dismissing the complaint, is affirmed, atappellant's cost.

4. Ramos v. RamosG.R. No. 144294 | March 11, 2003 | Panganiban, J.

Petitioners: Soledad Ramos, Francisco Chanliongco, Adelberto Chanliongco, Armando Chanliongco, and Florencio ChanliongcoRespondents: Teresita Ramos, Sps. Teresita and Edmundo Muyot, Sps. Vedasta andFlorencio Dato, Loreto Muyot, Sps. TEresita and Elmer Solis, Liceria Torres, SPs.Corazon and Vicente Macatungal, Sps. Precilla and Cirsostomo Muyot, and Sps.Caridad and Salvador Pingol


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SUMMARY: Petitioners are children of the late Paulino. Paulino was the co-owner of a land inTondo together with his siblings Narcisa, Mario and Antonio. A SPA was executed bythe co-owners in favor of Narcisa, by virtue of which her daughter Adoracion was ableto sell the lot to the respondents. Conflict arose among the heirs of the co-owners as tothe validity of the sale. Hence, respondents filed an interpleader to resolve the variousownership claims. RTC upheld the sale insofar as Narcisa’s share was concerned, but

held that Adoracion had no authority to sell the shares of the other co-owners becausethe SPA was executed in favor only of Narcisa, her mother. CA modified the ruling,and held that while there was no SPA in favor of Adoracion, the sale was nonethelessvalid, because she had been authorized by her mother to be the latter’s sub-agent.This CA decision was not appealed, became final and was entered in favor of therespondents. ISSUE: WN CA erred in denying petitioners’ motion and allowing itsdecision to take its course, inspite of its knowledge that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the petitioners. NO, CA WAS CORRECT. Petitiondenied. As a GR, a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable andunalterable. Exceptions are clerical errors, nun pro tunc entries and void judgments.Whether the CA Decision was void depends on the nature of the action and thepropriety of the summons. The Complaint filed by the respondents called for aninterpleader. It forced persons claiming an interest in the land to settle thedispute among themselves as to which of them owned the property. It wastherefore a real action, because it affected title to or possession of real property .Petitioners, as heirs, only had an inchoate right over the property; hence, they had nostanding in court with respect to actions over a property of the estate, because anexecutor or administrator represented the latter. There was no need to implead themas defendants in the case, inasmuch as the estates of the deceased coownershad already been made parties. Futher, under the old Rules, which was in effect atthe time that the Complaint was filed, an executor or administrator may sue or be suedwithout joining the party for whose benefit the action is prosecuted or defended. In thepresent case, it was the estate of petitioners’ father, Paulino Chanliongco, asrepresented by Sebrio Tan Quiming and Associates, that was included asdefendant and served summons. As it was, there was no need to includepetitioners as defendants. Not being parties, they were not entitled to be servedsummons. Petitioner Florencio was impleaded, but was not served summons.

However, the service of summons upon the estate of his deceased father wassufficient to include him.

FACTS Case: Petition for Review on Certiorari under R45 of the Rules of Ct., seeing

to set aside the 7/31/2000 Resolution of the CA which deni ed petitioners’Motion to Set Aside the CA decision dated 9/28/1995

Petitioners are children of the late Paulino Chanliongco, Jr. (“Paulino”), a co-owner of land known as Lot No. 2-G of Subdivision Plan SWO No. 7308

o Co-owners: siblings Paulino, Narcisa, Mario and Antonio By virtue of a Special Power of Attorney (“SPA”) executed by the co-owners

in favor of Narcisa, her daughter Adoracion C. Mendoza (“Adoracion”)had sold the lot to herein respondents on different days in September

1986.

o Because of conflict among the heirs of the coowners as to thevalidity of the sale, respondents filed with the RTC a Complaint

for

interpleader to resolve the various ownership claims. RTC upheld the sale insofar as the share of Narcisa was concerned.

o Held: Adoracion had no authority to sell the shares of the othercoowners, because the SPA had been executed in favor only of hermother, Narcisa.

CA modified RTC’s ruling

o Held: While there was no SPA in favor of Adoracion, the sale wasnonetheless valid, because she had been authorized by her motherto be the latter’s sub-agent.

There was thus no need to execute another SPA in herfavor as subagent.

This CA Decision was not appealed, became final andwas entered in favor of respondents on August 8, 1996

ISSUE: WN the CA erred in denying petitioners’ Motion and allowing its Decision dated9/25/1995 to take its course, inspite of its knowledge that the lower court did notacquire jurisdiction over the person of petitioners and passing petitioners property infavor of respondents, hence without due process of law. – No, CA was correct.

HELD: Petition unmeritorious.

RATIO: GR: A decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable.

A final judgment may no longer be modified in any respect, even if themodification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law;

and

whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court inthe land.

EXC: The only exceptions to this rule are the:o Correction of clerical errors,o Nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, ando Void judgments.

To determine whether the CA Decision of 9/25/1995 is void, the failure toimplead and to serve summons upon petitioners will now be addressed.

o To be able to rule on this point, the Court needs to determinewhether the action is in personam , i n rem or quasi in rem. Therules on the service of summons differ depending on the natureof the action.

An action in personam is lodged against a person based on personal liability;o An action in rem is directed against the thing itself instead of the

person;o An action quasi in rem names a person as defendant, but its object

is to subject that person’s interest in a property to a correspondinglien or obligation

The Complaint filed by respondents with the RTC called for an interpleader to determine the ownership of the real property in question.


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o It forced persons claiming an interest in the land to settle thedispute among themselves as to which of them owned theproperty.

o It sought to resolve the ownership of the land and was not directedagainst the personal liability of any particular person. It wastherefore a real action, because it affected title to or possessionof real property.

o As such, the Complaint was brought against the deceased

registered coowners: Narcisa, Mario, Paulino and AntonioChanliongco, as represented by their respective estates. Petitioners were not the registered owners of the land, but represented

merely an inchoate interest thereto as heirs of Paulino.o They had no standing in court with respect to actions over a

property of the estate, because an executor or administratorrepresented the latter .

o Thus, there was no need to implead them as defendants in thecase, inasmuch as the estates of the deceased coowners hadalready been made parties.

Further , at the time the Complaint was filed, the 1964 Rules of Court(“Old Rules”) were still in effect.

o Under the old Rules, specifically §3 of Rule 3,2 an executor oradministrator may sue or be sued without joining the party for whosebenefit the action is prosecuted or defended.

o The present rule,3 however, requires the joinder of the beneficiary orthe party for whose benefit the action is brought.

o Under the old Rules, an executor or administrator is allowed to eithersue or be sued alone in that capacity.

o In the present case, it was the estate of petitioners’ father,Paulino Chanliongco, as represented by Sebrio Tan Quimingand Associates, that was included as defendant and servedsummons.

o As it was, there was no need to include petitioners asdefendants. Not being parties, they were not entitled to beserved summons.

Petitioner Florencio D. Chanliongco (“Florencio”), on the other hand, was

impleaded in the Complaint, but not served summons.

2 “SEC. 3. Representative Parties. — A trustee of an express tr ust, a guardian, executor or administrator, or aparty authorized by statute, may sue or be sued without joining the party for whose benefit the action ispresented or defended; but the court may, at any stage of the proceedings, order such beneficiary to be madea party. An agent acting in his own name and for the benefit of an undisclosed principal may sue or be suedwithout joining the principal except when the contract involves things belonging to the principal.”

3 SEC. 3. Representatives as parties.

Where the action is allowed to be prosecuted or defended by a representative or someone acting in a fiduciarycapacity, the beneficiary shall be included in the title of the case and shall be deemed to be the real party ininterest. A representative may be a trustee of an express trust, a guardian, an executor or administrator, or aparty authorized by law or these Rules. An agent acting in his own name and for the benefit of an undisclosedprincipal may sue or be sued without joining the principal except when the contract involves things belonging to

the principal.

o However, the service of summons upon the estate of hisdeceased father was sufficient, as the estate appeared for andon behalf of all the beneficiaries and the heirs of PaulinoChanliongco, including Florencio.

We also note that the counsel of petitioners, Atty. Felino V. Quiming Jr., isa partner of the law firm that represented the estate of the deceasedfather .

o Hence, it can reasonably be expected that the service upon the

law firm was sufficient notice to all the beneficiaries of theestate, including Petitioner Florencio. WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Resolution

AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners

5. Beltran v. People’s Homesite G.R. No. L-25138 | August 28, 1969

Plaintiffs-appellants: JOSE A. BELTRAN, ET AL.Defendants-appellees: PEOPLE'S HOMESITE & HOUSING CORPORATION

TEEHANKEE, J. :

SummaryInterpleader suit was filed by plaintiffs praying that the two defendant-governmentcorporations be compelled to litigate and interplead between themselves their allegedconflicting claims involving said Project 4. PHHC announced to the tenants that themanagement, administration and ownership of Project 4 would be transferred by thePHHC to the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) in payment of PHHCdebts to the GSIS. Subsequently, however, PHHC through its new Chairman-GeneralManager, Esmeraldo Eco, refused to recognize all agreements and undertakingspreviously entered into with GSIS, while GSIS insisted on its legal rights to enforce thesaid agreements and was upheld in its contention by both the Government CorporateCounsel and the Secretary of Justice. W/N the complaint for interpleader should bedismissed. – YES. While the two defendant corporations may have conflictingclaims between themselves with regard to the management, administration and

ownership of Project 4, such conflicting claims are not against the plaintiffs nor do theyinvolve or affect the plaintiffs. No allegation is made in their complaint that anycorporation other than the PHHC which was the only entity privy to their lease-purchase agreement, ever made on them any claim or demand for payment of therentals or amortization payments. Both defendant corporations were in conformity andhad no dispute, as pointed out by the trial court that the monthly payments andamortizations should be made directly to the PHHC alone. There were no conflictingclaims by defendant corporations as against plaintiff-tenants, which they may properlybe compelled in an interpleader suit to interplead and litigate among themselves.

CASE: Appeal on purely questions of law from an order of dismissal of the complaintfor interpleader, on the ground that it does not state a cause of action, as certified tothis Court by the Court of Appeals. We affirm the dismissal on the ground that where

the defendants sought to be interpleaded as conflicting claimants have no conflicting


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claims against plaintiff, as correctly found by the trial court, the special civil action ofinterpleader will not lie.

FACTS: This interpleader suit was filed on August 21, 1962, by plaintiffs in their own behalf

and in behalf of all residents of Project 4 in Quezon City, praying that the twodefendant-government corporations be compelled to litigate and interpleadbetween themselves their alleged conflicting claims involving said Project 4.

Plaintiffs' principal allegations in their complaint were as follows: Since they first occupied in 1953 their respective housing units at Project 4, under

lease from the People's Homesite & Housing Corporation (PHHC) and payingmonthly rentals therefor, they were assured by competent authority that after fiveyears of continuous occupancy, they would be entitled to purchase said units.

PHHC announced to the tenants that the management, administration andownership of Project 4 would be transferred by the PHHC to the GovernmentService Insurance System (GSIS) in payment of PHHC debts to the GSIS.

In the same announcement, the PHHC also asked the tenants to signify theirconformity to buy the housing units at the selling price indicated on the backthereof, agreeing to credit the tenants, as down payment on the selling price, thirty(30%) percent of what had been paid by them as rentals.

The tenants accepted the PHHC offer, and the PHHC announced in another

circular that all payments made by the tenants after March 31, 1961 would beconsidered as amortizations or installment payments. The PHHC furthermore instructed the Project Housing Manager in a memorandum

to accept as installments on the selling price the payments made after March 31,1961 by tenants who were up-to-date in their accounts as of said date.

Pursuant to the PHHC-GSIS arrangement, collections from tenants on rentalsand/or installment payments were delivered by the PHHC to the GSIS.

The agreement of turnover of administration and ownership of PHHC properties,including Project 4 was executed by PHHC in favor of GSIS, pursuant to therelease of mortgage and amicable settlement of the extrajudicial foreclosureproceedings instituted in May, 1960 by GSIS against PHHC.

(Conflict) Subsequently, however, PHHC through its new Chairman-GeneralManager, Esmeraldo Eco, refused to recognize all agreements andundertakings previously entered into with GSIS, while GSIS insisted on itslegal rights to enforce the said agreements and was upheld in its contentionby both the Government Corporate Counsel and the Secretary of Justice.

Complaint… Plaintiffs thus claimed that these conflicting claims between the defendants-

corporations caused them great inconvenience and incalculable moral andmaterial damage, as they did not know to whom they should pay the monthlyamortizations or payments.

They further alleged that as the majority of them were GSIS policy holders, theypreferred to have the implementation of the outright sale in their favor effected bythe GSIS, since the GSIS was "legally entitled to the management, administrationand ownership of the PHHC properties in question."

Upon urgent ex parte motion of plaintiffs, the trial Court issued its August 23,1962 Order designating the People's First Savings Bank at Quezon City "to

receive in trust the payments from the plaintiffs on their monthly amortizations onPHHC lots and to be released only upon proper authority of the Court."

Motion to Dismiss filed by PHHC and GSIS The two defendant corporations represented by the Government Corporate

Counsel filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause ofaction as well as to lift the Court's order designating the People's First SavingsBank as trustee to receive the tenants' payments on the PHHC lots.

The trial Court heard the motion on in the presence of all the parties, andthereafter issued its Order dismissing the Complaint:o During the hearing of the said motion and opposition thereto, the counsel for the

defendants ratified the allegations in his motion and made of record that thedefendant Government Service Insurance System has no objection that payments on the monthly amortizations from the residents of Project 4 be madedirectly to the defendant People's Homesite and Housing Corporation.

o From what appears in said motion and the statement made in open court by thecounsel for defendants that there is no dispute as to whom the residents ofProject 4 should make their monthly amortizations payments, there is, therefore,no cause of action for interpleading and that the order of August 23, 1962 is notwarranted by the circumstances surrounding the case.

o In so far as payments are concerned, defendant GSIS has expressed itsconformity that they be made directly to defendant PHHC.

MR Plaintiffs subsequently filed their motion for reconsideration and the trial court,

"with a view to thresh out the matter once and for all," called the Managers of thetwo defendants-corporations and the counsels for the parties to appear before itfor a conference on October 24, 1962.

"During the conference," the trial court related in its Order, denying plaintiffs'Motion for Reconsideration, "Manager Diaz of the GSIS made of record that hehas no objection that payments be made to the PHHC.

On the other hand, Manager Eco of the PHHC made of record that at presentthere is a standing arrangement between the GSIS and the PHHC that as long asthere is showing that the PHHC has remitted 100% of the total purchase price of agiven lot to the GSIS, the latter corporation shall authorize the issuance of title to

the corresponding lot. It was also brought out in said conference that there is a new arrangement being

negotiated between the two corporations that only 50% of the purchase price beremitted to the GSIS by the PHHC, instead of the 100%.

At any rate the two Managers have assured counsel for the plaintiffs that upon payment of the whole purchase price of a given lot, the title corresponding to saidlot will be issued ."

Appeal On appeal, plaintiffs claim that the trial Court erred in dismissing their suit,

contending the allegations in their complaint "raise questions of fact that can beestablished only by answer and trial on the merits and not by a motion to dismissheard by mere oral manifestations in open court," and that they "do not know who,


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as between the GSIS and the PHHC, is the right and lawful party to receive theirmonthly amortizations as would eventually entitle them to a clear title to theirdwelling units."

ISSUE:W/N the complaint for interpleader should be dismissed. - YES

RATIO:

Rule 63, section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court (formerly Rule 14) requires as anindispensable element that "conflicting claims upon the same subject matterare or may be made" against the plaintiff-in-interpleader "who claims nointerest whatever in the subject matter or an interest which in whole or inpart is not disputed by the claimants."

While the two defendant corporations may have conflicting claims betweenthemselves with regard to the management, administration and ownership ofProject 4, such conflicting claims are not against the plaintiffs nor do they involveor affect the plaintiffs.

No allegation is made in their complaint that any corporation other than the PHHCwhich was the only entity privy to their lease-purchase agreement, ever made onthem any claim or demand for payment of the rentals or amortization payments.

The questions of fact raised in their complaint concerning the enforceability, andrecognition or non-enforceability and non-recognition of the turnover agreement ofDecember 27, 1961 between the two defendant corporations are irrelevant to theiraction of interpleader, for these conflicting claims, loosely so-called, are betweenthe two corporations and not against plaintiffs.

Both defendant corporations were in conformity and had no dispute, as pointedout by the trial court that the monthly payments and amortizations should be madedirectly to the PHHC alone.

The record rejects plaintiffs' claim that the trial courts order was based on "mereoral manifestations in court." The Reply to Opposition of September 11, 1962 filedby the Government Corporate Counsel expressly "reiterates his manifestation inopen court that no possible injustice or prejudice would result in plaintiffs bycontinuing to make payments of such rentals or amortizations to defendant PHHCbecause any such payments will be recognized as long as they are proper, legaland in due course by anybody who might take over the property.

Specifically, any such payments will be recognized by the GSIS in the event thatwhatever conflict there might be (and this is only on the hypothetical assumptionthat such conflict exists) between the PHHC and the GSIS should finally beresolved in favor of the GSIS".

The assurances and undertakings to the same affect given by the Managers of thedefendants-corporations at the conference held by the trial Court are expresslyembodied in the Court's Order of November 20, 1962 quoted above.

The GSIS' undertaking to recognize and respect the previous commitments ofPHHC towards its tenants is expressly set forth in Par. III, section M of theturnover agreement, Annex "F" of plaintiffs' complaint, wherein it is provided that"GSIS shall recognize and respect all awards, contracts of sale, lease agreementsand transfer of rights to lots and housing units made and approved by PHHC,subsisting as of the signing of this agreement, and PHHC commitment to sell its

housing projects 4, 6 and 8-A at the selling prices less rental credits fixed byPHHC and as finally approved by the OEC.

In fine, the record shows clearly that there were no conflicting claims by defendantcorporations as against plaintiff-tenants, which they may properly be compelled inan interpleader suit to interplead and l itigate among themselves.

The action of interpleader is a remedy whereby a person who has property in hispossession or has an obligation to render wholly or partially, without claiming any

right in both, comes to court and asks that the defendants who have made uponhim conflicting claims upon the same property or who consider themselves entitledto demand compliance with the obligation be required to litigate amongthemselves in order to determine who is entitled to the property or payment of theobligation.

"The remedy is afforded not to protect a person against a double liabilitybut to protect him against a double vexat ion in respect of o ne l iabi l i t y ."

Thus, in another case, where the occupants of two different parcels of landadjoining each other belonging to two separate plaintiffs, but on which theoccupants had constructed a building encroaching upon both parcels of land,faced two ejectment suits from the plaintiffs, each plaintiff claiming the right ofpossession and recovery over his respective portion of the lands encroachedupon, this Court held that the occupants could not properly file an interpleadersuit, against the plaintiffs, to litigate their alleged conflicting claims; for evidently,the two plaintiff did not have any conflicting claims upon the same subject matteragainst the occupants, but were enforcing separate and distinct claims on theirrespective properties.

Plaintiffs' other contention is that they had raised other issues that were notresolved and would require rendition of judgment after trial on the merits, such as"the issue of the right of ownership over the houses and lots in Project 4 (and) theissue of the status of the commitment agreements and undertakings made by theprevious PHHC Administration, particularly those of the then PHHC GeneralManager Bernardo Torres."

This contention is without merit, for no conflicting claims have been made withregard to such issues upon plaintiffs by defendant corporations, who both boundthemselves to recognize and respect the rights of plaintiffs-tenants. The resolution

of such issues affecting the defendant corporations exclusively may not properlybe sought through the special civil action of interpleader.

Should there be a breach of the PHHC undertakings towards plaintiffs, plaintiffs'recourse would be an ordinary action of specific performance or other appropriatesuit against either the PHHC or GSIS or both, as the circumstances warrant.

We find no error, therefore, in the trial court's order of dismissal of the complaintfor interpleader and the lifting, as a consequence, of its other order designatingthe People's First Savings Bank as trustee to receive the tenants' payments on thePHHC lots.

ACCORDINGLY, the trial Court's order of dismissal is hereby affirmed. Without costs.


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6. Sy-Quia v. Sheriff of Ilocos Sur (MB)Petitioner: Gregorio R. Sy-QuiaRespondents: The Sheriff of Ilocos Sur and Filadelfo De Leon

46 Phil. 400, October 10, 1924Ostrand, J.

SUMMARY:[Short case] Cheng-Laco and ChengKiango executed a chattel mortgage in favor ofpetitioner Sy-Quia on their mercantile establishment including merchandise containedtherein as security for a debt of P6,000. A second mortgage on the same property wasexecuted in favor of respondent De Leon as security for the sum of P4,900. Sy-Quiarequested the Sheriff to take possession of the property and sell it under Sec. 14 of theChattel Mortgage Law (Act No. 1508). The Sheriff seized the property and scheduledthe date of the sale. Meanwhile, De Leon filed an adverse claim on the propertyalleging that the goods covered by Sy-Quia’s chattel mortgage were already sold,hence the 1st chattel mortgage was of no effect. Sheriff suspended the foreclosureproceedings and brought an action requiring the 2 claimants to interplead. Sy-Quiafiled the present petition for the issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel the Sheriffto proceed with the foreclosure sale. SC denied the petition ruling that the Sheriff’saction in suspending the sale pending the determination of the action of interpleader

seems justified. The Sheriff might lay himself open to an action for damages if he soldthe goods without the consent of the holder of the last mortgage, and it does notappear that the petitioner offered to give bond to hold him harmless in such an event.

FACTS: This is a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the Sheriff of the Province

of Ilocos Sur to proceed with a chattel mortgage foreclosure sale. Miguel Aglipay Cheng-Laco and Feliciano Reyes ChengKiango executed a

chattel mortgage in favor of the petitioner Gregorio R. Sy-Quia on theirmercantile establishment, with all the merchandise therein contained, assecurity for a debt of P6,000.

o From its terms it may be inferred that it was the intention of theparties that the mortgagors were to be permitted to sell the

merchandise replenishing their stock from time to time and that thenew stock brought in should also be subject to the mortgage.

Miguel Aglipay Cheng-Laco executed a 2nd chattel mortgage on the sameestablishment and all its contents in favor of the respondent Filadelfo de Leonas security for the sum of P4,900.

Sy-Quia requested the Sheriff to take possession of the mortgaged propertyand to sell it at public auction under the provisions of section 14 of the ChattelMortgage Law (Act No. 1508).

The Sheriff seized the establishment in question as well as its contents andfixed the date of the sale at June 2, 1924.

o In the meantime Filadelfo de Leon presented an adverse claim to theproperty by virtue of his chattel mortgage, alleging that all the goodson which the chattel mortgage of Gregorio R. Sy-Quia was given had

been sold long before the chattel mortgage in favor of De Leon wasexecuted, hence, the earlier chattel mortgage was of no effect.

The Sheriff being in doubt as to the priority of the conflicting claims,suspended the foreclosure proceedings and brought an action requiring thetwo claimants to interplead.

The present proceeding in mandamus was instituted. Sy-Quia alleged that theduty of the Sheriff to proceed with the sale was a ministerial one and prayingthat the Sheriff be commanded to proceed.

ISSUE:[Not stated] W/N the writ of mandamus should be issued. --- NO

HELD: The petition for a writ of mandamus is denied with the costs against the

petitioner. Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Avanceña, Villamor, and Romualdez, JJ., concur.

RATIO: Though it would have been better practice for the Sheriff to sell the property

and hold the proceeds of the sale subject to the outcome of the action ofinterpleader, the SC is of the opinion that the facts shown do not justify our

interference by mandamus. The Sheriff might lay himself open to an action for damages if he sold thegoods without the consent of the holder of the last mortgage, and it does notappear that the petitioner offered to give bond to hold him harmless in suchan event.

In these circumstances, his action in suspending the sale pending thedetermination of the action of interpleader seems justified.

Also, the petition for mandamus should be addressed to the CFI rather thanthe SC.

7. DE JESUS vs LA SOCIEDAD ARRENDATARIAG.R. No. L-7313 | August 29, 1912

Plaintiff-appellant: PRUDENCIO DE JESUSDefendants-appellants: LA SOCIEDAD ARRENDATARIA DE GALLERAS DE PASAY,ET AL.

Summary: A partnership owned a cockpit which was rented to defendant company.Plaintiff became absolute owner of two-fifths interest in the property on February 15,1909 when Lucio Cruz sold his interest and failed to exercise right of repurchase.Plaintiff also purchased another two-fifths share while one of the defendants hold one-fifth share in the partnership. Plaintiff now seeks monthly rental from defendantcompany which he claims to be due on February 15, 1909. The Court ruled in hisfavor. If the defendant company had any sufficient ground to be in doubt as to which ofthe claimants was entitled to the rent, it could have protected itself from the danger ofmaking payment to the wrong person by requiring the contesting claimants to


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interplead, thus leaving the determination of the doubt to the courts. A lessee who is indoubt as to the person to whom he should pay the rent because the property leased isclaimed by several persons may properly bring an action for interpleader against suchpersons (words from another case).

FACTS: A partnership composed of Isidoro Aragon, Lucio Cuneta Cruz and Modesto

de la Cruz, owned a cockpit which it rented to the defendant company. On the

14th of December, 1908, Lucio Cuneta Cruz sold his interest in thepartnership (two-fifths share) to the plaintiff, reserving the right to repurchaseunder certain conditions.

Plaintiff claims that the vendor having failed to exercise the right becameabsolute owner on the 15th day of February, 1909, and that since that date hehas been the sole owner of this two-fifths interest in the partnership.

It appears also that plaintiff purchased the interest of Isidoro Aragon in thepartnership (also a two-fifths share), and that Modesto de la Cruz, one of thedefendants in this action, continues to hold his original interest in thepartnership (a one-fifth share).

ISSUES:1) W/N plaintiff may recover from defendant company the amount of the monthly rentalwhich plaintiff claims to be due to him as the owner of Lucio Cuneta Cruz' interestsince the 15th day of February, 1909 – YES2) W/N plaintiff may terminate the rental contract – NO

RATIO: We think that the evidence of record fully establishes the claim of the plaintiff

as to his purchase of the interest of Lucio Cuneta Cruz in the partnershipwhich entered into the rental contract the defendant company obligated itselfto pay to the owner of that interest the sum of P280 per month so long as thecontract continued in force up to the date of the entry of judgment in the courtbelow; and that the plaintiff became the absolute owner of Cuneta Cruz'interest on February 15, 1909.

PLAINTIFF ENTITILED TO RECOVER AMOUND OF RENTAL FROM DATE WHEN

PURCHASE PERFECTED The trial judge recognized the right of the plaintiff to recover this monthly

rental from the defendant company from the date of the judgment entered byhim, but declined to give judgment for the monthly rental from the date whenthe purchase of Cuneta Cruz' interest was perfected (February 15,1909) tothe date of the judgment.

o Since there had been no formal adjudication of plaintiff's ownershipof Cuneta Cruz' interest prior to the date of the judgment, thedefendant company was not obligated to pay the plaintiff the monthlyrental, since, to have done so might have exposed it to the risk ofhaving the contract terminated by Cuneta Cruz for failure to pay tohim the stipulated rental, in the event that it should later be judicially

determined that Cuneta Cruz and not the plaintiff was the trueowner.

In this we hold that the trial judge erred. The defendant company had due andsufficient notice of the sale at the time when the plaintiff perfected hispurchase of Cuneta Cruz' interest. Demand was formally and promptly madeupon it for the payment of the rent to which the plaintiff was thereafter entitled.

Under its contract it was the defendant company's duty to pay the stipulatedrent to the owner of the interest originally held by Cuneta. If with due notice of

the purchase of this interest by plaintiff, it paid any other person than the trueowner, such payment in no wise relieved it of its obligations under thecontract to pay the true owner.

Judgment for the rent in question from the 15th day of February, 1909, to thedate of the judgment should have been rendered in favor of the plaintiff,together with interest at the rate of six per centum per annum upon theamount of the rent for each month f rom the date when it fell due to the date ofpayment.

ACTION FOR INTERPLEADER PROPER WHEN IN DOUBT AS TO WHOM TO PAYRENT (MAIN)

We do not recognize the force of the contention that merely because the rightof ownership was in dispute the defendant company lawfully refused to paythe rent to the plaintiff, on the ground that it could not be required to take therisk of paying the wrong person and suffering the consequences. Section 120of the Code of Civil Procedure provides for just such a case. If the defendantcompany had any sufficient ground to be in doubt as to which of the claimantswas entitled to the rent, it could have protected itself from the danger ofmaking payment to the wrong person by requiring the contesting claimants tointerplead, thus leaving the determination of the doubt to the courts.

The defendant company not having exercised this right, it voluntarily assumedthe risk of payment to the wrong person, and of course payment to the wrongperson, under such circumstances (even if it were actually made, which doesnot affirmatively appear from the record in the case), would not relieve it ofability to the person lawfully entitled to received payment under the rentalcontract.

RENTRAL CONTRACT CANNOT BE TERMINATED Plaintiff's prayer that the rental contract with the defendant company be

terminated cannot be granted in this action. Plaintiffs appears to rest hisdemand for the termination of the contract on the ground that as the owner oftwo of the three interests which originally constituted the partnership (a"sociedad colectiva" as defined in article 2 of title 1 of the Code of Commerce)that entered into the rental contract with the defendant company, these twointerests constituting a four-fifths share in that partnership, he is entitled tocontrol the operations of the partnership.

Even if it be admitted that plaintiff's purchase of two of the three originalinterests representing a four-fifths share in the partnership gave him the rightto control the operations of the partnership, it does not necessarily follow thathe can arbitrarily repudiate the rental contract.


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Associated Bank moved to amend its complaint, having been notified for the firsttime of the name of Atty. Navarro's client and substituted Marcelo Mesina for JohnDoe. Simultaneously it informed the Western Police District that the lost check ofGo is in the possession of Mesina.o When asked how he came to possess the check, he said it was paid to him

by Alexander Lim in a "certain transaction" but refused to elucidate further. 3rd case: An information for theft was then instituted against Alexander Lim and

the corresponding warrant for his arrest was issued which up to the date of the

filing of this instant petition remains unserved because of Lim's successful evation.

1st case: Interpleader Suit Go filed his answer. Uy filed a motion of intervention and answer in the complaint for Interpleader. Mesina, instead of filing his answer to the complaint filed an Omnibus Motion to

Dismiss Ex Abudante Cautela alleging lack of jurisdiction in view of the absence ofan order to litigate, failure to state a cause of action and lack of personality to sue.o RTC DENIED.o MR also denied.o RTC afterwards issued an order declaring Mesina in default since his period

to answer has already expired and set the ex-parte presentation of Associated Bank's evidence.

Mesina then filed a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction with IAC to setaside 1) order of RTC denying his omnibus Motion to Dismiss and 2) the order ofdefault against him.o IAC dismissed.o MR also denied.

RTC rendered a decision in the Interpleader case ordering Associate Bank toreplace Cashier's Check No. 011302 in favor of Go or its cash equivalent.

2nd case: Complaint for Damages. Go moved to participate as intervenor. Associated Bank moved to dismiss suit in view of the existence of the Interpleader

case. RTC issued an order dismissing the case since the main issue in both cases (the

Interpleader Suit & Complaint for Damages) are the same (ISSUE whobetween Mesina and Go is entitled to payment of Associated Bank's Cashier'sCheck No. CC-011302).o Said issue having been resolved already, the complaint for damages is

already moot and academic.

ISSUES:1. WON IAC erred in ruling that a cashier's check can be countermanded even in the

hands of a holder in due course. – NO. In the first place, Mesina is NOT aholder in due course.

2. WON IAC erred in countenancing the filing and maintenance of an interpleadersuit by a party who had earlier been sued on the same claim. – NO. [main]

3. WON IAC erred in upholding the trial court's order declaring Mesina in defaultwhen there was no proper order for him to plead in the interpleader complaint. –

NO. [important also because it discusses the process involved in an interpleadersuit]

4. WON IAC went beyond the scope of its certiorari jurisdiction by making findings offacts in advance of trial. – NO.

RATIO:

MESINA IS NOT A HOLDER IN DUE COURSE [nego issue]

Mesina failed to substantiate his claim that he is a holder in due course andfor consideration or value.o He became the holder of the cashier's check as endorsed by Alexander Lim

who stole the check, and he refused to say how and why it was passed tohim.

o He had therefore notice of the defect of his title over the check from the start.o The holder of a cashier's check who is not a holder in due course

cannot enforce such check against the issuing bank which dishonorsthe same. If a payee of a cashier's check obtained it from the issuing bank by fraud,

or if there is some other reason why the payee is not entitled to collectthe check, the issuing bank would, of course, have the right to refusepayment of the check when presented by the payee, since it was awareof the facts surrounding the loss of the check.

Moreover, Associated Bank did not issue the cashier's check in payment ofits obligation.o Jose Go bought the cashier’s check from the said bank for purposes of

transferring his funds from Associated Bank to another bank near hisestablishment realizing that carrying money in this form is safer than if it werein cash.

o The check was Jose Go's property when it was misplaced or stolen, hence hestopped its payment.

o Jose Go owns the money the cashier’s check represents and he is thereforethe drawer and the drawee in the same manner as if he has a current accountand he issued a check against it; and from the moment said cashier's checkwas lost and/or stolen no one outside of Jose Go can be termed a holder indue course because Jose Go had not indorsed it in due course.

o The check in question suffers from the infirmity of not having been properlynegotiated and for value by Jose Go.

AN INTERPLEADER SUIT IS PROPER [MAIN]Mesina’s Argument: There is no showing of conflicting claims and interpleader is out ofthe question.

SC: There is enough evidence to establish the contrary. Associated Bank merely took the necessary precaution not to make a

mistake as to whom to pay and therefore interpleader was its properremedy.o The interpleader suit was filed because Mesina and Jose Go were both laying

their claims on the check, Mesina asking payment thereon and Jose Go asthe purchaser or owner.


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Mesina’s allegation that Associated Bank had effectively relieved itself of itsprimary liability under the check by simply filing a complaint for interpleader isbelied by the willingness of the bank to issue a certificate of time deposit ofP800,000 representing the cashier's check in the name of the Clerk of Court ofManila to be awarded to whoever will be found by the court as validly entitled to it.

Associated Bank filed the interpleader suit NOT because Mesina sued it butbecause he is laying claim to the same check that Go is claiming.o In fact on the very day that the bank instituted the case in interpleader, it was

not aware of any suit for damages filed by Mesina against it as supported bythe fact that the interpleader case was first entitled Associated Bank vs. JoseGo and John Doe, but later on changed to Marcelo A. Mesina for John Doewhen his name became known to the bank.

MESINA WAS ALREADY IN DEFAULT WHEN HE FAILED TO FILE HIS ANSWER Mesina’s Argument: IAC erred in upholding the trial court's order declaring petitioner indefault when there was no proper order for him to plead in the interpleader case.

SC: Such contention is untenable. The Order of the trial court requiring the parties to file their answers is to all

intents and purposes an order to interplead, substantially and essentially andtherefore in compliance with the provisions of Rule 63 of the Rules of Court.

IAC’S FINDING OF FACTS WAS NECESSARY IN THE CASE AT BAR Before Associated Bank resorted to Interpleader, it took precautionary and

necessary measures to bring out the truth. On the other hand, Mesina concealed the circumstances known to him and now

that the bank brought these circumstances out in court (which eventually renderedits decision in the light of these facts), Mesina charges it with "gratuitousexcursions into these non-issues."

IAC cannot rule on whether RTC committed an abuse of discretion or not,without being apprised of the facts and reasons why Associated Bankinstituted the Interpleader case. Therefore, IAC did not act therefore beyond thescope of the remedy sought in the petition.

DECISION: WHEREFORE, finding that the instant petition is merely dilatory, the same

is hereby denied and the assailed orders of the respondent court are hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

9. Vda. De Camilo v. Hon. ArcamoGR No. L-15653 | Sept. 29, 1961 | Paredes, J.

Petitioners-appellees: Petra Carpio Vda. De Camilo, et al. (“PETRA”) Respondents-appellants: Hon. Justice of the Peace (“JP”) Arcamo, Ong Peng Kee(“PENG”), Adelia Ong (“ADELIA”)

SUMMARY

Petra, Estrada and the Franciscos owned parcels of land in Zamboanga del Sur, all ofwhich had buildings erected on them. Fire razed the buildings. Afterwards, the Ongserected their own building on the pretense that the Municipality of Malangas leased theland to them. The new building, however, encroached upon the petitioners’ land.Petitioners filed 2 separate forcible entry cases against the Ongs. The Ongs,meanwhile, filed a complaint for interpleader. Petitioners filed the present proceedingsfor mandamus and certiorari claiming that the justice of the peace (JP) had no jurisdiction over the interpleader case. CFI ruled in favor of petitioners. The Ongs

appealed. Issue: WN the Justice of the Peace Court has jurisdiction to take cognizanceof the interpleader case. – No. The petitioners claimed the possession of therespective portion of the lands belonging to them on which the respondents haderected their house. This being the case, the contention of petitionersappellantsthat the complaint to interplead lacked cause of action, is correct . Petitioners didnot have conflicting claims against the respondents. Petra, Estrada and theFranciscos claimed possession of two different parcels of land of differentareas, adjoining each other . Further, it is not true that the Ongs did not have anyinterest in the subject matter. Their interest was the prolongation of theiroccupancy or possession of the portions encroached upon by them . It is,therefore, evident that the requirements for a complaint of Interpleader do notexist. CFI decision affirmed.

FACTS This appeal stemmed from a petition for Certiorari and Mandamus filed by

Petra and others, against Samuel A. Arcamo, Justice of the Peace ofMalangas, Zamboanga del Sur, Ong Peng Kee and Adelia Ong.

Petra had been by herself and predecessor in interest in peaceful, open andadverse possession of a parcel of public foreshore land, situated in Malangas,Zamboanga del Sur, containing an area of about 400 square meters.

o A commercial building was erected on the property which wasdeclared under Tax Dec. No. 5286 and assessed at P7,400.00.

Peng was a lessee of one of the apartments of said commercial building sinceJune 1, 1957.

8/1/1957 – Arthur Evert Bannister (“Bannister”) filed an unlawful detainer caseagainst both Petra and Peng with the JP of Malangas.

o For failure of Bannister and/or counsel to appear at the trial, they

were declared in default and P100.00 was awarded to Petra on hercounterclaim.

o The MR presented by Bannister was denied. The other petitioners (“Other Petitioners;” Severino Estrada, Felisa, Susana,

Antonio and the minors Isabelo, Rene and Ruben, all surnamed Francisco,the said minors represented by their mother Susana) had also been inpossession (in common), peaceful, open and adverse, since 1937, of aparcel of public foreshore land, about 185 square meters which isadjoining that land occupied by Petra.

o On this parcel, a commercial building assessed at P1,000.00 waserected by the Franciscos, and had the same declared under TaxDec. No. 4911.

9/1/1957 – the 2 commercial buildings were burned down.


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o Two weeks after, Peng and Adelia constructed a building of theirown, occupying about 120 sqm.

o However, the building encroached upon portions of the landspreviously occupied by Petra and the Franciscos .

12/3/1957 – Petra filed a civil case for Forcible Entry against Peng and Adelia(“Ongs”) with the JP of Malangas.

8/8/1958 – Estrada and the Franciscos filed a similar case. Ongs’ answer: land where they constructed their building was leased to them

by the Municipality of Malangas. Pending trial of the 2 cases, the Ongs filed a complaint for Interpleader

against Petra, Estrada, the Franciscos, Arthur Evert Bannister, the Mayorand Treasurer of Malangas, alleging that the filing of the three cases offorcible entry indicated that the defendants (in the Interpleader, i.e.,Petra, etc.) had conflicting interests, since they all claimed to be entitled tothe possession of the lot in question and they (Ongs) could not determinewithout hazard to themselves who among the defendants was entitled to thepossession.

o Interpleader plaintiffs (Ongs) further alleged that they had no interestin the property other than as mere lessees.

And motion to dismiss the complaint for interpleader was presented by thedefendants therein (now petitioners), contending that the JP had no jurisdiction to try and hear the case; that there were other pending actionsbetween the parties for the same cause; and that the complaint forinterpleader did not state a cause of action.

o The Ongs opposed the motion.o Respondent JP denied the MTD and ordered the petitioners to

interplead.o The 2 forcible entry cases – dismissed.

The petitioners instituted the present proceedings, for certiorari andmandamus before the CFI of Zamboanga, claiming that the JP actedwithout jurisdiction in denying the MTD, gravely abused his discretion forhaving given due course to the complaint for Interpleader , and unlawfullyneglected the performance of an act which was specifically enjoined by law,and for which there was no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in theordinary course of law.

CFI – JP was without jurisdiction (in favor of the petitioners); Order denyingthe motion to dismiss the interpleader complaint was set aside. Respondentsappealed.

ISSUE: WN the Justice of the Peace Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of theinterpleader case. – No.

HELD: Decision appealed from is affirmed.

RATIO: The petitioners claimed the possession of the respective portion of the lands

belonging to them on which the respondents had erected their house after thefire, which destroyed petitioners' buildings.

o This being the case, the contention of petitionersappellants thatthe complaint to interplead lacked cause of action, is correct.

§1, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court (old):o Interpleader when proper . — Whenever conflicting claims upon the

same subject matter are or may be made against a person, whoclaims no interest whatever in the subjectmatter, or an interestwhich in whole or in part is not disputed by the claimants, he maybring an action against the conflicting claimants to compel them to

interplead and litigate their several claims among themselves. Petitioners did not have conflicting claims against the respondents.

o Their respective claim was separate and distinct from the other.o Petra only wanted the respondents to vacate that portion of her

property, which was encroached upon by them when theyerected their building.

o The same is true with Estrada and the Franciscos.o They claimed possession of two different parcels of land of

different areas, adjoining each other .o Furthermore, it is not true that the Ongs did not have any interest

in the subject matter. Their interest was the prolongation of their occupancy

or possession of the portions encroached upon bythem.

It is, therefore, evident that the requirements for acomplaint of Interpleader do not exist.

Even in the supposition that the complaint presented a cause of action forInterpleader, still SC holds that the JP had no jurisdiction to takecognizance thereof .

o The complaint asking the petitioners to interplead practicallytook the case out of the jurisdiction of the JP court , becausethe action would then necessarily "involve the title to orpossession of real property or any interest therein" over whichthe CFI has original jurisdiction.

o Then also, the subject matter of the complaint (interpleader)would come under the original jurisdiction of the CFI (not the JPcourt), because it would not be capable of pecuniary estimation,

there having been no showing that rentals were asked by thepetitioners from respondents. IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, We find that the decision appealed from

is in conformity with the law, and the same should be, as it is hereby affirmed,with costs against respondentsappellants Ong Peng Kee and Adelia Ong.

10. Makati Devt Corp v. TanjuatcoG.R. No. L-26443 March 25, 1969 Plaintiff-appellant: MAKATI DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Defendants-appellees: PEDRO C. TANJUATCO and CONCRETE AGGREGATES,INC.


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CONCEPCION, C.J.:

SummaryPlaintiff and defendant Pedro C. Tanjuatco entered into a contract whereby the latterbound himself to construct a reinforced concrete covered water reservoir, office andpump house and water main at Forbes Park, Makati, Rizal, furnishing, inter alia, thematerials necessary therefor.Before making the final payment of the consideration agreed upon, plaintiff inquired

from the suppliers of materials, who had called its attention to unpaid bills therefor ofTanjuatco, whether the latter had settled his accounts with them. In response to thisinquiry, Concrete Aggregates, Inc. made a claim in the sum of P5,198.75, representingthe cost of transit-mixed concrete allegedly delivered to Tanjuatco. Plaintiff institutedthe action, in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, against Tanjuatco and the Supplier, tocompel them to interplead their conflicting claims. W/N the CFI of Rizal has jurisdictionover the complaint for interpleader? – It does not have jurisdiction. There is noquestion in this case that plaintiff may compel the defendants to interplead amongthemselves, concerning the aforementioned sum of P5,198.75. The only issue is whoamong the defendants is entitled to collect the same. This is the object of the action,which is not within the jurisdiction of the lower court. As a matter of fact, on May 25,1966 the Supplier sued Tanjuatco, in Civil Case No. 149173 of the Municipal Court ofManila, for the recovery of said amount of P5,198.75, and the decision therein willsettle the question as to who has a right to the sum withheld by plaintiff herein.

Case: Appeal by plaintiff Makati Development Corporation from an order of dismissalof the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasig), predicated upon lack of jurisdiction.

FACTS: February 21, 1963, said plaintiff and defendant Pedro C. Tanjuatco entered into a

contract whereby the latter bound himself to construct a reinforced concretecovered water reservoir, office and pump house and water main at Forbes Park,Makati, Rizal, furnishing, inter alia, the materials necessary therefor.

Before making the final payment of the consideration agreed upon, plaintiffinquired from the suppliers of materials, who had called its attention to unpaid billstherefor of Tanjuatco, whether the latter had settled his accounts with them.

In response to this inquiry, Concrete Aggregates, Inc. — hereinafter referred to as

the Supplier — made a claim in the sum of P5,198.75, representing the cost oftransit-mixed concrete allegedly delivered to Tanjuatco. With his consent, plaintiff withheld said amount from the final payment made to

him and, in view of his subsequent failure to settle the issue thereon with theSupplier, on September 16, 1955, plaintiff instituted the present action, in theCourt of First Instance of Rizal, against Tanjuatco and the Supplier, tocompel them "to interplead their conflicting claims."

October 4, 1965 - Tanjuatco moved to dismiss the case, upon the ground that thecourt had no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the litigation, the amountinvolved therein being less than P10,000.00.

Finding this motion "to be well-taken", the lower court granted the same, overplaintiffs opposition thereto, and, accordingly, issued an order, dated November16, 1965, dismissing the case, without costs.

ISSUE:W/N the CFI of Rizal has jurisdiction over the complaint for interpleader? – Itdoes not have jurisdiction.

RATIO: Plaintiff maintains that the subject-matter of this litigation is not the

aforementioned sum of P5,198.75, but the right to compel the defendants "to

litigate among themselves" in order to protect the plaintiff "against a doublevexation in respect to one liability." We find no merit in this contention. There is no question in this case that plaintiff

may compel the defendants to interplead among themselves, concerning theaforementioned sum of P5,198.75.

The only issue is who among the defendants is entitled to collect the same. This isthe object of the action, which is not within the jurisdiction of the lower court.

As a matter of fact, on May 25, 1966 the Supplier sued Tanjuatco, in Civil CaseNo. 149173 of the Municipal Court of Manila, for the recovery of said amount ofP5,198.75, and the decision therein will settle the question as to who has a right tothe sum withheld by plaintiff herein.

The latter relies upon Rule 63 of the present Rules of Court, prescribing theprocedure in cases of interpleading, and section 19 of Rule 5 of said Rules ofCourt, which, unlike section 19 of Rule 4 of the Old Rules, omits the Rules onInterpleading among those made applicable to inferior courts. This fact does notwarrant, however, the conclusion drawn therefrom by plaintiff herein.

To begin with, the jurisdiction of our courts over the subject-matter of justiciablecontroversies is governed by Rep. Act No. 296, as amended, pursuant towhich municipal courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil cases "inwhich the demand, exclusive of interest, or the value of the property incontroversy", amounts to not more than "ten thousand pesos."

Secondly, "the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of thevarious courts" belongs to Congress and is beyond the rule-making power of theSupreme Court, which is limited to matters concerning pleading, practice, andprocedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law.

Thirdly, the failure of said section 19 of Rule 5 of the present Rules of Court tomake its Rule 63, on interpleading, applicable to inferior courts, merely implies

that the same are not bound to follow Rule 63 in dealing with cases ofinterpleading, but may apply thereto the general rules on procedure applicable toordinary civil action in said courts.

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with the costs of thisinstance against plaintiff Makati Development Corporation. It is so ordered.

11. RCBC v. Metro Container Corp. (MB)Petitioner: Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC)Respondent: Metro Container Corporation (METROCAN)

G.R. No. 127913, September 13, 2001


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conflicting claimants to compel them to interplead and litigate their severalclaims among themselves.

2. Application to the case at hand It is undisputed that METROCAN filed the Interpleader action (2nd case)

because it was unsure which between LEYCON and RCBC was entitled toreceive the payment of monthly rentals on the subject property. LEYCON wasclaiming payment of the rentals as lessor of the property while RCBC wasmaking a demand by virtue of the consolidation of the title of the property in

its name. It is also undisputed that LEYCON, as lessor of the subject property filed an

action for Unlawful Detainer (1st case) against its lessee METROCAN.o The issue in the Unlawful Detainer case is limited to the question of

physical or material possession of the premises.o The issue of ownership is immaterial and the outcome of the case

could not in any way affect conflicting claims of ownership, in thiscase between RCBC and LEYCON.

o This was made clear when the trial court, in denying RCBC's "Motionfor Inclusion x x x as an Indispensable Party" declared that "the finaldetermination of the issue of physical possession over the subjectpremises between the plaintiff and the defendant shall not in anyway affect RCBC's claims of ownership over the said premises,since RCBC is neither a co-lessor or co-lessee of the same, hence

he has no legal personality to join the parties with respect to theissue of physical possession.

Hence, the reason for the Interpleader action ceased when the MeTCrendered judgment in Unlawful Detainer case whereby the court directedMETROCAN to pay LEYCON “whatever rentals due on the subject premisesx x x.”

While RCBC, not being a party to Unlawful Detainer case, could not be boundby the judgment therein, METROCAN is bound by the MeTC decision.

Precisely because there was already a judicial fiat to METROCAN, there wasno more reason to continue with Interpleader case. Thus, METROCANmoved for the dismissal of the Interpleader action not because it is no longerinterested but because there is no more need for it to pursue such cause ofaction.

3. Other comments on Interpleader An action of Interpleader is afforded to protect a person not against double

liability but against double vexation in respect of one liability. It requires, as an indespensable requisite, that “conflicting claims upon the

same subject matter are or may be made against the plaintiff-in-Interpleaderwho claims no interest whatever in the subject matter or an interest which inwhole or in part is not disputed by the claimants.”

o The decision in Unlawful Detainer case resolved the conflictingclaims insofar as payment of rentals was concerned.

4. RCBC may prove its claim through other legal remedies. RCBC is correct in saying that it is not bound by the decision in Unlawful

Detainer case because it is not a party thereto.

However, RCBC could not compel METROCAN to pursue the Interpleadercase.

RCBC has other avenues to prove its claim. The issue of ownership can very well be threshed out in the case for

Nullification of Extrajudicial Foreclosure Sale and Damages filed by LEYCONagainst RCBC.


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another piece of land owned by the late Carmen Planas. In 1964, theadministrator of the estate of Planas sold the lots in question to privaterespondents, Wellington Ty & Bros., Inc. A TCT was issued to the latter.

Soon thereafter, the private respondents made demands upon the petitionersto vacate and surrender the possession of the premises. Petitioners refused,claiming that they had preferential rights to the property. Private respondentsreacted by filing an ejectment proceeding QC.

In 1969, Petitioners-appellants filed a petition entitled Declaratory Relief for

Cancellation of Title and/or Reconveyance with Preliminary Injunction beforethe CFI of Rizal, claiming inter alia,o (a) that they are the bona fide occupants of the lots in question,

having, constructed thereon their respective resident substantialhouses with assessed values as follows: (case listed for each petitioner ranging from 2k to 8k)and

o (b) that through the fraud and misrepr

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