1. Prescriptive period for the crime: interrupted by institution with prosecutor

People v. Pangilinan, G.R. No. 152662, June 13, 2012

The ruling in Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr. is not controlling in special laws. In a catena of cases involving special laws, this Court held that the institution of proceedings for preliminary investigation against the accused interrupts the period of prescription. In fact, in the case of Panaguiton, Jr. v. Department of Justice, which is in all fours with the instant case, this Court categorically ruled that commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused before the Office of the City Prosecutor effectively interrupted the prescriptive period for the offenses they had been charged under BP Blg. 22. Aggrieved parties, especially those who do not sleep on their rights and actively pursue their causes, should not be allowed to suffer unnecessarily further simply because of circumstances beyond their control, like the accused’s delaying tactics or the delay and inefficiency of the investigating agencies.

2. All pleadings must be verified under the Rules on Summary Procedure. (Revised Rules on Summary Procedure)

3. Foreign Corporation has the capacity to sue for protection of its trademarks despite the fact that it is not doing business

La Chemise Lacoste, S.A. v. Fernandez, G.R. No. L-63796-97, May 2, 1984

As early as 1927, this Court was, and it still is, of the view that a foreign corporation not doing business in the Philippines needs no license to sue before Philippine courts for infringement of a trademark and unfair competition. A foreign corporation which has never done any business in the Philippines and which is unlicensed and unregistered to do business here, but is widely and favorably known in the Philippines through the use therein of its products bearing its corporate and tradename, has a legal right to maintain an action in the Philippines to restrain the residents and inhabitants thereof from organizing a corporation therein bearing the same name as the foreign corporation, when it appears that they have personal knowledge of the existence of such a foreign corporation, and it is apparent that the purpose of the proposed domestic corporation is to deal and trade in the same goods as those of the foreign corporation.

By the same token, the petitioner should be given the same treatment in the Philippines as we make available to our own citizens. We are obligated to assure to nationals of “countries of the Union” an effective protection against unfair competition in the same way that they are obligated to similarly protect Filipino citizens and firms.

A review of the grounds invoked by Hemandas in his motion to quash the search warrants reveals the fact that they are not appropriate for quashing a warrant. They are matters of defense which should be ventilated during the trial on the merits of the case. For instance, on the basis of the facts before the Judge, we fail to understand how he could treat a bare allegation that the respondent’s trademark is different from the petitioner’s trademark as a sufficient basis to grant the motion to quash.

True, the lower court should be given the opportunity to correct its errors, if there be any, but the rectification must, as earlier stated be based on sound and valid grounds. In this case, there was no compelling justification for the about face.

One may be declared an unfair competitor even if his competing trademark is registered.

Superior Commercial Enterprises, Inc. v. Kunnan Enterprises, G.R. No. 169974, April 20, 2010

Thus, we have previously held that the cancellation of registration of a trademark has the effect of depriving the registrant of protection from infringement from the moment judgment or order of cancellation has become final.

In McDonalds Corporation v. L.C. Big Mak, Burger, Inc., we held that there can be trademark infringement without unfair competition such as when the infringer discloses on the labels containing the mark that he manufactures the goods, thus preventing the public from being deceived that the goods originate from the trademark owner.

Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc. 233 F. 3d 456 (2000)

Prozac vs. Herbrozac – In assessing the likelihood of consumer confusion, we generally consider seven factors: (1) the similarity between the marks in appearance and suggestion, (2) the similarity of the products, (3) the area and manner of concurrent use of the products, (4) the degree of care likely to be exercised by consumers, (5) the strength of the complainant’s mark, (6) any evidence of actual confusion, and (7) the defendant’s intent (or lack thereof) to palm of its product as that of another. These factors are not a mechanical checklist and the proper weight given to each will vary from case to case. At the same time, although no one factor is decisive, the similiarity of the marks, the intent of the defendant, and the evidence of actual confusion are the most important considerations.

Unlike the mark at issue in Ferrero, Prozac is a fanciful word that has no meaning independent of Lilly’s mark. Such marks are entitled to the highest protection.

More important, we previously cautioned that even if a junior mark meets the definition of a parody, it still runs afoul of the trademark laws if it is likely to confuse consumers. (“the parody has to be a takeoff, not a ripoff”). Given the strong similarity in the marks and the potential overlap in Lilly’s and Natural Answers’ product lines, the mere addition of the HERB prefix does not go far enough to distinguish Natural Answers’’ product from Prozac. Accordingly, the strong similarity of the marks weighs heavily in favor of a finding of likelihood of confusion.

Another factor is whether HERBOZAC and PROZAC are similar products. On a purely technical level, they are different: HERBOZAC is a food and PROZAC is a drug. Dietary supplements are not drugs and should not be regulated as drugs. This is a critical distinction, moreover, because HERBROZAC is not subject to the rigorous testing and approval process applied to drugs.

The fact that they are not the same products does not end our inquiry, however, because we are concerned only with whether they are similar. Although its legal papers take a contrary position, Natural Answers would certainly have consumers believe that HERBROZAC and PROZAC are similar products. The product is described as a “mood elevator,” the mirror image of anti-depressant, and markets it as an alternative to PROZAC. Natural Answers’ dual track conception of HERBROZAC – as a PROZAC alternative for marketing purposes, but a dissimilar product for legal purposes – is

disingenuous. Because dietary supplements and drugs serve somewhat similar functions, and because dietary supplements are an area of natural expansion for pharmaceutical companies, HERBROZAC’s similarity to PROZAC is indicative of a likelihood of confusion.

The term strength as applied to trademarks refers to the distinctiveness of the mark, or more precisely, its tendency to identify the goods sold under the mark as emanating from a particular source.

Despite these limitations, Judge Hamilton found a risk of “initial interest confusion.” Such confusion, which is actionable under the Lanham Act, occurs when a customer is lured to a product by its similarity to a known mark, even though the consumer realizes the true identity and origin of the product before consummating a purchase.

The fact that one actively pursues an objective greatly increases the chances that the objective will be achieved, and we have no doubt that this general principle applies here. For this reason, a defendant’s intent is an “important factor,” and can even be weighed more heavily than the other factors.

Using another’s trademark in one’s metatags is much like posting a sign with another trademark in front of one’s store. As such, it is significant evidence of intent to confuse and mislead. Thus, Natural Answer’s wrongful intent is undeniable.

NOT SURE IF APPLICABLE IN THE PHILIPPINES TRADEMARK LEGAL FRAMEWORK: Courts recognize two principal forms of dilution: tarnishing and blurring. Dilution by tarnishing occurs when a junior’s mark’s similarity to a famous mark causes consumers mistakenly to associate the famous mark with the defendant’s inferior or offensive product. Dilution by blurring, the injury at issue here, occurs when a junior mark’s similarity to a famous mark causes consumers see the plaintiff’s mark used on a plethora of different goods and services, raising the possibility that the mark will lose its ability to serve as a unique identifier of the plaintiff’s product. The Trademark Dilution Act seeks to prevent both of these forms of dilution by protecting the trademark owner from the erosion of the distinctiveness and prestige of a trademark caused by… a proliferation of borrowings, that while not degrading the original seller’s mark, are so numerous as to deprive the mark of its distinctiveness and hence impact. The strongest protection is reserved

for fanciful marks that are purely the product of imagination and have no logical association with the product.

Astra Pharmaceutical Products, Inc. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc. 718 F. 2d 1201

This Court in Pignons enumerated eight factors to be used as guides in assessing likelihood of confusion. Those factors are: (1) the similarity of the marks; (2) the similarity of the goods; (3) the relationship between the parties’ channels of trade; (4) the relationship between the parties’ advertising; (5) the classes of prospective purchasers; (6) evidence of actual confusion; (7) the defendant’s intent in adopting its mark; and (8) the strength of the plaintiff’s mark.

Similarity is determined on the basis of the total effect of the designation, rather than a comparison of individual features.

It is well settled that under certain circumstances otherwise similar marks are not likely to be confused where used in conjunction with the clearly displayed name and/or logo of the manufacturer. This rule would seem to apply in this case, where the Beckman name is clearly visible on the analyzer.

Perhaps the most critical factor that weighs against Astra in our consideration of this issue is the sophistication of the class of prospective purchasers of the subject products. If likelihood of confusion exists, it must be based on the confusion of some relevant person; i.e., a customer or a purchaser.

Koppers Company, Inc., v. Krupp-Koppers GmbH, 517 F. Supp. 836 (1981)

The test of trademark infringement is likelihood of confusion, not actual confusion. The courts recognize that reliable proof of actual confusion is almost always impossible to secure.

However, good faith is not an absolute defense to a statutory infringement action. And intent, is merely one factor among many to be considered by the court in determining whether there is a likelihood of confusion. Even though, there is no evidence of bad faith the late comer has the responsibility to avoid confusion.

However, if the Court views the entire range of services offered by the parties, and takes a less restrictive view of the market and its workings, there is a greater possibility that an evaluation of the same factors would lead to a finding of a likelihood of confusion. Given the facts and circumstances present in the matter sub judice, this Court finds it appropriate to adopt a less restrictive view.

Clearly the likelihood of confusion cannot be considered in a vacuum, but must be determined with respect to certain persons. The amendment also shows such intent that the nature of the confusion should not be restricted the source of the origin of goods and services. Thus, this Court infers that it must broadly define the nature of forbidden confusion and the class of people whose confusion is forbidden.

Even before the 1962 amendment Judge Learned Hand deemed the potential confusion of non-purchasers to be legally material. He found defendant’s deceptively labeled champagne could be substituted for plaintiff’s champagne and mislead non-purchasers.

Citing Communications Satellite Corp. v. Comcet, Inc.: We remand because we hold that the district court used too restrictive a standard (likelihood of confusion of plaintiff’s customers). The test is not only the danger that defendant’s use of the term “Amp” will confuse plaintiff’s customers, but the likelihood of danger that such use will confuse the public in general, including plaintiff’s customers, defendant’s customers and other members of the public.

The nature of the forbidden confusion has also been broadly defined in recent cases. Courts have increasingly come to recognize that damaging misassociation of commercial identities can occur at subliminal levels.

This is a case in which confusion or deception occurs on a subliminal or subconscious level, causing the consumer to identify the properties and reputation of one product with that of another, although he can identify the particular manufacturer of each. The trademark laws protect against this kind of psychological confusion implanted by similar trademarks in the mind of a consumer.

There is substantial case law to indicate that even those who deal in the most sophisticated expensive marketplace may be led astray. In Morgenstern Chemical Co. v. G.D. Searle & Co. 253 F. 2d 390 (3rd Cir.) the court was faced with Mictine and Micturin for drugs dispensed only on a physician’s prescription. Finding a likelihood of confusion, the court wrote “while it is doubtless true” that physicians and pharmacists are highly trained and knowledgeable about drugs, they are human and in connection with the rest of mankind are subject to human frailties.

This court has already found that there is convincing evidence that the parties did not reach any world-wide agreement on the concurrent use of KOPPERS. It know finds there is insufficient evidence of record to support a finding that plaintiff acquiesced in defendant’s use of KOPPERS in the United States. The record is replete with references to plaintiff’s prompt objection to defendant’s proposed use of KOPPERS in the United States. While defendant charges plaintiff with imaginative ambiguity, the record merely shows the parties working hand in hand to fulfill their mutual expectations under their various licensing agreements. Thus, this court finds defendant’s proffered defenses of laches, acquiescence, and estoppels to be unsubstantiated by the record.

Injunctive relief requires the moving party to show it will be irreparably injured if the preliminary injunction is not granted. Oburn v. Shapp. A finding of irreparable injury ordinarily follows when a likelihood of confusion or possible risk to reputation appears. Tefal, S.A. v. Products.

Morgenstern Chemical Company v. G.D. Searle & Company 253 F. 2d 390 (1958)

Some facts: Both Micturin and Mictine are derived from or based upon the same Latin root and are intended to suggest urination. They are, however, prescribed for radically different conditions and for different uses and desired effects. There was evidence that it was extremely unlikely that a physician would prescribe or a pharmacist dispense the product of one of the parties for the treatment of a condition for which the product of the other was indicated.

Nonetheless, the court found obvious similarity in derivation, suggestiveness, spelling, and sound in careless pronunciation between Micturin and Mictine as applied to pills to be taken by mouth for therapheutic

purposes and stated that if the two names had been employed to designate medicinal tablets designed for the alleviation or cure of the same or closely related human ailments, it would have no difficulty in finding a confusing similarity between them. However, since the pills are not designed for the same ailments, the district court concluded that there was no confusing similarity in the two names and that the plaintiff’s trade-name was not infringed. Accordingly, the court refused to enjoin the defendant’s use of the trade-name Mictine.

Moreover the protection to which the owner of a trade-mark or name is entitled is not solely against confusion resulting from the use by another of the same or a similar name for a competing product in the same market. For the courts have frequently enjoined the use of a trade-mark or name in related fields whether or not the products were actually similar or competitive.

In the field of medical products, it is particularly important that great care be taken to prevent any possibility of confusion in the use of trade-marks. The test as to whether or not there is confusing similarity in these products even if prescribed and dispensed only by professionally trained individuals does not hinge on whether or not the medicines are designed for similar ailments. Quoting Cole Chemical Co. v. Cole Laboratories,”plaintiff and defendant are engaged in the sale of medical preparations. They are for ultimate human consumption or use. They are practically for ailments of the human body. Confusion in such products can have serious consequences for the patient. Confusion in medicines must be avoided. Prevention of confusion and mistakes in medicines is too vital to be trifled with.

In R.J. Strasenburgh Co. v. Kenwood Laboratories, Inc., physicians are not immune from confusion or mistake. Furthermore, it is common knowledge that many prescriptions are telephoned to the pharmacist and others are handwritten, and frequently the handwriting is not unmistakably legible. These facts enhance the chances of confusion or mistake by the pharmacist in filling the prescription if the marks appear too much alike when handwritten or sound too much alike when pronounced.

If there is any possibility of such confusion in the case of medicines public policy requires that the use of the confusingly similar name be enjoined. (Lambert Pharmacal Co. v. Bolton Chemical Corporation D.C. N. Y. 1915, 219 F. 325, 326)

Dresser Industries, Inc. v. Heraeus Engelhard Vacuum, Inc. 395 F. 2d 457 (1968)

When the final outcome on a given set of facts may vary, not with the legal concepts involved, but their application to particular states of fact, the pattern is inevitably less clear than in cases where a definite rule is to be applied. How a particular word has been used and how it has been understood by the public or the trade is a question of fact.

Doctrines from various Authors

Amador, Trademarks under the Intellectual Property Code, 1999

A fanciful and arbitrary word is not only the safest but also the strongest mark, since every infringer is suspected of attempting to capitalize upon the reputation and goodwill of its owner.

Similarly, the word SELECTA, it is true, may be an ordinary or common word in the sense that it may be used or employed by any one in promoting his business or enterprise, but once adopted or coined in connection with one’s business as an emblem, sign or device to characterize its products, or as a badge of authenticity, it may acquire a secondary meaning as to be exclusively associated with its products and business. In this sense, its use by another may lead to confusion in trade and cause damage to its business (Arce Sons and Company v. Selecta Biscuit Company, Inc. G.R. No. L-1791, January 28, 1961).

The doctrine of “secondary meaning” is to the effect that a word or phrase originally incapable of exclusive appropriation with reference to an article of the market, because geographically or otherwise descriptive, might nevertheless have been used so long and so exclusively by one producer with reference to his article that, in that trade and to that branch of the purchasing public, the word or phrase has come to mean that the article was his product.

Taiwan Kolin Corporation, Ltd. v. Kolin Electronics Co., Inc. G.R. No. 209843, March 25, 2015

Taiwan Kolin sought to register, Kolin Electronics opposed the revived application. Kolin Electronics argued that the mark Taiwan Kolin seeks to

register is identical, if not confusingly similar, with its KOLIN mark, covering products under Class 9 of the Nice Classification (NCL).

Identical marks may be registered for products from the same classification. But mere uniformity in categorization, by itself, does not automatically preclude the registration of what appears to be an identical mark, if that be the case. In Mighty Corporation v. E. & J Gallo Winery, the survey of jurisprudence is instructive on this point:

(a) in Acoje Mining Co., Inc. vs. Director of Patents, we ordered the approval of Acoje Mining’s application for registration of the trademark LOTUS for its soy sauce even though Philippine Refining Company had prior registration and use of such identical mark for its edible oil which, like soy sauce, also belonged to Class 47;

(b) in Philippine Refining Co., Inc. vs. Ng Sam and Director of Patents,25 we upheld the Patent Director’s registration of the same trademark CAMIA for Ng Sam’s ham under Class 47, despite Philippine Refining Company’s prior trademark registration and actual use of such mark on its lard, butter, cooking oil (all of which belonged to Class 47), abrasive detergents, polishing materials and soaps;

(c) in Hickok Manufacturing Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals and Santos Lim Bun Liong, we dismissed Hickok’s petition to cancel private respondent’s HICKOK trademark registration for its Marikina shoes as against petitioner’s earlier registration of the same trademark for handkerchiefs, briefs, belts and wallets.

Falling under the same categories in the NCL is not the sole and decisive factor in determining a possible violation of Kolin Electronics’ intellectual property right should petitioner’s application be granted. It is hornbook doctrine that emphasis should be on the similarity of the products involved and not on the arbitrary classification or general description of their properties or characteristics. The mere fact that one person has adopted and used a trademark on his goods would not, without more, prevent the adoption and use of the same trademark by others on unrelated articles of a different kind.

A certificate of trademark registration confers upon the trademark owner the exclusive right to sue those who have adopted a similar mark not only in connection with the goods or services specified in the certificate, but also with those that are related thereto.

Issue: whether the products involved are related.

Mighty Corporation is authoritative. There, the Court held that the goods should be tested against several factors before arriving at a sound conclusion on the question of relatedness. Among these are:

a) The business (and its location) to which the goods belong;b) The class of product to which the goods belong;c) The product’s quality, quantity, or size, including the nature of the

package, wrapper or container;d) The nature and cost of the articles;e) The descriptive properties, physical attributes or essential

characteristics with reference to their form, composition, texture or quality;

f) The purpose of the goods;g) Whether the article is bought for immediate consumption, that is,

day-to-day household items;h) The fields of manufacture;i) The conditions under which the article is usually purchased; andj) The channels of trade through which the goods flow, how they are

distributed, marketed, displayed and sold.

In this digital age wherein electronic products have not only diversified by leaps and bounds, and are geared towards interoperability, it is difficult to assert readily, as respondent simplistically did, that all devices that require pluggin into sockets are necessarily related goods.

The ordinarily intelligent buyer is not likely to be confused. In trademark cases, particularly in ascertaining whether one trademark is confusingly similar to another, no rigid set rules can plausible be formulated. Each case must be decided on its merits, with due regard to the goods or services involved, the usual purchaser’s character and attitude, among others. In such cases, even more than in any other litigation, precedent must be studied in the light of the facts of a particular case. That is the reason why in trademark cases, jurisprudential precedents should be applied only to a case if they are specifically on in point.

It cannot be stressed enough that the products involved in the case at bar are, generally speaking, various kinds of electronic products. These are not ordinary consumable household items, like catsup, soy sauce or soap which are of minimal cost. The products of the contending parties are

relatively luxury items not easily considered affordable. Accordingly, the casual buyer is predisposed to be more cautious and discriminating in and would prefer to mull over his purchase. Confusion and deception, then, is less likely. As further elucidated in Del Monte Corporation v. Court of Appeals: Among these, what essentially determines the attitudes of the purchaser, specifically his inclination to be cautious, is the cost of the goods. To be sure, a person who buys a box of candies will not exercise as much care as one who buys an expensive watch. As a general rule, an ordinary buyer does not exercise as much prudence in buying an article for which he pays a few centavos as he does in purchasing a more valuable thing. Expensive and valuable items are normally bought only after deliberate, comparative and analytical investigation. But mass products, low priced articles in wide use, and matters of everyday purchase requiring frequent replacement are bought by the casual consumer without great care.

Esso Standard Eastern, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-29971, August 31, 1982

The then trademark law definition defines infringement as… Implicit in this definition is the concept that the goods must be so related that there is a likelihood of confusion of goods or business. But likelihood of confusion is a relative concept; to be determined only according to the particular, and sometimes peculiar, circumstances of each case.

It is undisputed that the goods on which petitioner uses the trademark ESSO, petroleum products, and the product of respondent, cigarettes, are non-competing. But as to whether trademark infringement exists depends for the most part upon whether or not the goods are so related that the public may be, or is actually, deceived and misled that they came from the same maker or manufacturer. For non-competing goods may be those which, though they are not in actual competition, are so related to each other that it might reasonably be assumed that they originate from one manufacturer. Non-competing goods may also be those which, being entirely unrelated, could not reasonably be assumed to have a common source. In the former case of related goods, confusion of business could arise out of the use of similar marks; in the latter case of non-related goods, it could not.

When a trademark is used by a party for a product in which the other party does not deal, the use of the same trademark on the latter’s product cannot be validly objected to.

Although petitioner’s products are so numerous, they are of the same class or line of merchandise which are non-competing with respondent’s product of cigarettes, which as pointed out in the appealed judgment is beyond petitioner’s “zone of potential or natural and logical expansion.”

Another factor that shows that the goods involved are non-competitive and non-related is the appellate court’s finding that they flow through different channels of trade, thus: “The products of each party move along and are disposed through different channels of distribution. The petitioner’s products are distributed principally through gasoline service and lubrication stations, automotive shops and hardware stores. On the other hand, the cigarettes are sold in sari-sari stores, grocery stores, and other small distributor outlets. Evidently, in kind and nature of the products of respondent and of petitioner are poles apart.

Emerald Garment Manufacturing Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 100098, December 29, 1995.

In determining whether a particular name or mark is a “colorable imitation” of another, no all-embracing rule seems possible in view of the great number of factors which must necessarily be considered in resolving this question of fact, such as the class of product or business to which the article belongs; the product’s quality, quantity, size, including its wrapper or container; the dominant color, style size, form, meaning of letters, words, designs and emblems used; the nature of the package, wrapper, or container; the character of the product’s purchasers; location of the business; the likelihood of deception or the mark or name’s tendency to confuse; etc.

It has been held that a personal name or surname may not be monopolized as a trademark or tradename as against others of the same name or surname. For in the absence of contract, fraud, or estoppels, any man may use his name or surname in all legitimate ways.

The determination as to who is the prior user of the trademark is a question of fact.

Phil Pharmawealth, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc. G.R. No. 167715, November 17, 2010

R.A. 8293 is silent with respect to any remedy available to litigants who intend to question an interlocutory order issued by the BLA-IPO.

Moreover, Section 1(c), Rule 14 of the Rules and Regulations on Administrative Complaints for Violation of Laws Involving Intellectual Property Rights simply provides that interlocutory orders shall not be appealable. The said Rules and Regulations do not prescribe a procedure within the administrative machinery to be followed in assailing orders issued by the BLA_IPO pending final resolution of a case filed with them. Hence, in the absence of such a remedy, the provisions of the Rules of Court shall apply in a suppletory manner, as provided under Section 3, Rule 1 of the same Rules and Regulations. Hence, in the present case, respondents correctly resorted to the filing of a special civil action for certiorari with the CA to question the assailed Orders of the BLA-IPO, as they cannot appeal therefrom and they have no other plain, speedy, adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. This is consistent with Sections 1 and 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended.

It is settled by this Court in several cases that the filing by a party of two apparently different actions but with the same objective constitutes forum shopping. The Court discussed this species of forum shopping as follows: Very simply stated, the original complaint in the court a quo which gave rise to the instant petition was filed by the buyer against the seller to enforce the alleged perfected sale of real estate. On the other hand, the complaint in the Second Case seeks to declare such purported sale involving the same real property as unenforceable as against the Bank, which is the petitioner herein. In other words, in the Second Case, the majority stockholders, in representation of the Bank, are seeking to accomplish what the Bank itself failed to do in the original case in the trial court. In brief, the objective or the relief being sought, though worded differently, is the same, namely, to enable the petitioner Bank to escape from the obligation to sell the property to respondent.

Asia Brewery v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103543, July 5, 1993

Citing Co Tiong Sa v. Director of Patents (1954) and Lim Hoa v. Director of Patents (1956): It has been consistently held that the question of infringement of a trademark is to be determined by the test of dominancy. Similarity in size, form and color, while relevant, is not conclusive. If the competing trademark contains the main or essential or dominant features of another, and confusion and deception is likely to result, infringement takes place. Duplication or imitation is not necessary; nor it is necessary that the infringing label should suggest an effort to imitate. The question at issue in

cases of infringement of trademarks is whether the use of the marks involved would be likely to cause confusion or mistakes in the mind of the public or deceive purchasers.

The fact that the words pale pilsen are part of ABI’s trademark does not constitute an infringement of SMC’s trademark, for “pale pilsen” are generic words descriptive of the color (“pale”), of a type of beer (“pilsen”), which is a light bohemian beer with a strong hops flavor that originated in the city of pilsen in Czechoslovakia and became famous in the Middle Ages.

Most containers are standardized because they are usually made by the same manufacturer. Milk, whether in powdered or liquid form, is sold in uniform tin cans. The same can be said of the standard ketchup or vinegar bottle with its familiar elongated neck. Many other grocery items such as coffee, mayonnaise, pickles, and peanut butter are sold in standard glass jars. The manufacturers of these foodstuffs have equal right to use these standard tins, bottles and jars for their products.

As pointed out by ABI’s counsel, in supermarkets and tiendas, beer is ordered by brand, and the customer surrenders his empty replacement bottles or pays a deposit to guarantee the return of empties. If his empties are SAN MIGUEL PALE PILSEN, he will get SAN MIGUEL PALE PILSEN as replacement. In sari-sari stores, beer is also ordered from the tindera by brand. The same is true in restaurants, pubs and beer gardens – beer is ordered from the waiters by brand.

Our ruling in Del Monte would not apply to beer which is not usually picked from a store shelf but ordered by brand by the beer drinker himself from the storekeeper or waiter in a pub or restaurant.

ABS-CBN Corporation vs. Gozon, G.R. No. 195956, March 11, 2015

The doctrine in Crespo v. Mogul was reiterated in Mayor Balindong v. Court of Appeals where this court reminded the Department of Justice Secretary to refrain from entertaining petitions for review when the case is already pending with this court: In order to avoid a situation where the opinion of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the action of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of Justice should, as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information

has already been filed in the Court. The matter should be left entirely for the determination of the Court.

In Elma v. Jacobi, this court ruled that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is proper when assailing adverse resolutions of the Department of Justice stemming from the determination of probable cause. However, grave abuse of discretion must be alleged.

To be clear, it is the event itself or the arrival of Angelo dela Cruz which is not copyrightable because that is the newsworthy event. However, any footage created from the event itself, in this case the arrival of Angelo dela Cruz, are intellectual creations which are copyrightable. Thus, the footage created by ABS-CBN during the arrival of Angelo dela Cruz, which includes the statements of Dindo Amparo, are copyrightable and protected by the laws on copyright.

However, the Code does not state that expression of the news of the day, particularly when it underwent a creative process, is not entitled to protection.

An idea or event must be distinguished from the expression of that idea or event.

News or the event itself is not copyrightable. However, an event can be captured and presented in a specific medium. As recognized by this court in Joaquin, television “involves a whole spectrum of visuals and effects, video and audio. News coverage in television involves framing shots, using images, graphics, and sound effects. It involves creative process and originality. Television news footage is an expression of the news.

Infringement under the Intellectual Property Code is malum prohibitum. The Intellectual Property Code is a special law. Copyright is a statutory creation: Copyright, in the strict sense of the term, is purely a statutory right. It is a new or independent right granted by the statute, and not simply a pre-existing right regulated by statute. Being a statutory right, the rights are only such as the statute confers, and may be obtained and enjoyed only with respect to the subjects and by the persons, and on terms and conditions specified by statute.

Habana v. Robles, G.R. No. 131522, July 19, 1999

It does not necessarily require that the entire copyrighted work, or even a large portion of it, be copied. If so much is taken that the value of the original work is substantially diminished, there is an infringement of copyright and to an injurious extent, the work is appropriated.

In determining the question of infringement, the amount of matter copied from the copyrighted work is an important consideration. To constitute infringement, it is not necessary that the whole or even a large portion of the work shall have been copied. If so much is taken that the value of the original is sensibly diminished, or the labors of the original author are substantially and to an injuries extent appropriated by another, that is sufficient in point of law to constitute piracy.

In cases of infringement, copying alone is not what is prohibited. The copying must produce an injurious effect. Here, the injury consists in that respondent Robles lifted from petitioners book materials that were the result of the latter’s research work and compilation and misrepresented them as her own. She circulated the book DEP for commercial use and did not acknowledge petitioners as her source.

Silicon Philippines, Inc. v. CIR, G.R. No. 182737, March 2, 2016

Upon the filing of an administrative claim, respondent is given a period of 120 days within which to (1) grant a refund or issue the tax credit certificate for creditable input taxes; or (2) make a full or partial denial of the claim for tax refund or tax credit. Failure on the part of respondent to act on the application within the 120-day period shall be deemed a denial.

Note that the 120-day period begins to run from the date of submission of complete documents supporting the administrative claim. If there is no evidence showing that the taxpayer was required to submit – or actually submitted – additional documents after the filing of the administrative claim, it is presumed that the complete documents accompanied the claim when it was filed.

Whether respondent rules in favor of or against the taxpayer – or does not act at all on the administrative claim – within the period of 120 days from the submission of complete documents, the taxpayer may resort to a judicial claim before the CTA.

As things stood, the CTA had no jurisdiction to act upon, take cognizance of, and render judgment upon the petitions for review filed by petitioner. For having been rendered without jurisdiction, the decision of the CTA Second Division in this case – and consequently, the decision of the CTA En Banc – is a total nullity that creates no rights and produces no effect.

Section 19 of R.A. 1125 provides that parties adversely affected by a decision or ruling of the CTA En Banc may file before us a verified petition for review on certiorari pursuant to Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. In this case, the assailed CTA rulings are not decisions in contemplation of law that can serve as the subject of this Court’s exercise of its power of review.

Arevalo v. Benedicto, G.R. No. L-27895, July 31, 1974

The want of jurisdiction by a court over the subject-matter renders its judgment void and a mere nullity, and considering that a void judgment is in legal effect no judgment, by which no rights are divested, from which no rights can be obtained, which neither binds nor bars any one and under which all acts performed and all claims flowing out of are void, and considering further, that the decision, for want of jurisdiction of the court, is not a decision in contemplation of law, and, hence, can never become executory, it follows that such a void judgment cannot constitute a bar to another case by reason of res judicata.

Resterio v. People of the Philipines, G.R. No. 177438, September 24, 2012

The notice of dishonor required by Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 to be given to the drawer, maker or issuer of a check should be written. If the service of the written notice of dishonor on the maker, drawer, or issuer of the dishonored check is by registered mail, the proof of service consists not only in the presentation as evidence of the registry return receipt but also of the registry receipt together with the authenticating affidavit of the person mailing the notice of dishonor. Without the authenticating affidavit, the proof of giving the notice of dishonor is insufficient unless the mailer personally testifies in court on the sending by registered mail.

What Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 punished was the mere act of issuing a worthless check. The law did not look either at the actual ownership of the check or of the account against which it was made, drawn or issued, or at the intention of the drawee, maker or issuer. Also, that the check was not intended to be deposited was really of no consequence to her incurring criminal liability under B.P. 22.

Citing Dico v. Court of Appeals, a notice of dishonor received by the maker or drawer of the check is thus indispensable before a conviction can ensue. The notice of dishonor may be sent by the offended party or the drawee bank. The notice must be in writing. A mere oral notice to pay a dishonored check will not suffice. The lack of written notice is fatal for the prosecution.

Citing Lao v. Court of Appeals, it has been observed that the State, under this statute, actually offers the violator ‘a compromise by allowing him to perform some act which operates to preempt the criminal action, and if he opts to perform it the action is abated.’ In this light, the full payment of the amount appearing in the check within five banking days from notice of dishonor is a ‘complete defense.’ The absence of a notice of dishonor necessarily deprives and accused an opportunity to preclude a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, procedural due process clearly enjoins that a notice of dishonor be actually served on petitioner. Petitioner has a right to demand – and the basic postulate of fairness require – that the notice of dishonor be

actually sent to and received by her to afford her the opportunity to avert prosecution under B.P. 22.

The mere presentment of the two registry return receipts was not sufficient to establish the fact that written notices of dishonor had been sent to or served on the petitioner as the issuer of the check. Considering that the sending of the written notices of dishonor had been done by registered mail, the registry return receipts by themselves were not proof of the service on the petitioner without being accompanied by the authenticating affidavit of the person or persons who had actually mailed the written notices of dishonor, or without the testimony in court of the mailer or mailers on the fact of mailing. The authentication by affidavit of the mailer or mailers was necessary in order for the giving of the notices of dishonor by registered mail to be regarded as clear proof of the giving of the notices of dishonor to predicate the existence of the second element of the offense. No less would fulfill the quantum of proof beyond reasonable doubt, for, as the Court said in Ting v. Court of Appeals:

Aside from the above testimony, no other reference was made to the demand letter by the prosecution. As can be noticed from the above exchange, the prosecution alleged that the demand letter had been sent by mail. To prove mailing, it presented a copy of the demand letter as well as the registry return receipt. However, no attempt was made to Id. at 594. Ting v. Court of Appeals, supra note 7, at p. 560. Decision 9 G.R. No. 177438 show that the demand letter was indeed sent through registered mail nor was the signature on the registry return receipt authenticated or identified. It cannot even be gleaned from the testimony of private complainant as to who sent the demand letter and when the same was sent. In fact, the prosecution seems to have presumed that the registry return receipt was proof enough that the demand letter was sent through registered mail and that the same was actually received by petitioners or their agents. As adverted to earlier, it is necessary in cases for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, that the prosecution prove that the issuer had received a notice of dishonor. It is a general rule that when service of notice is an issue, the person alleging that the notice was served must prove the fact of service (58 Am Jur 2d, Notice, § 45). The burden of proving notice rests upon the party asserting its existence. Now, ordinarily, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to prove notice. In criminal cases, however, the quantum of proof required is proof beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, for Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 cases, there should be clear proof of notice. Moreover, it is a general rule that, when service of a notice is sought to be made by mail, it should appear that the conditions on which the validity of such service depends had existence, otherwise the evidence is insufficient to establish the fact of service (C.J.S., Notice, § 18). In the instant case, the prosecution did not present proof that the demand letter was sent through registered mail, relying as it did only on the registry return

receipt. In civil cases, service made through registered mail is proved by the registry receipt issued by the mailing office and an affidavit of the person mailing of facts showing compliance with Section 7 of Rule 13 (See Section 13, Rule 13, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure). If, in addition to the registry receipt, it is required in civil cases that an affidavit of mailing as proof of service be presented, then with more reason should we hold in criminal cases that a registry receipt alone is insufficient as proof of mailing. In the instant case, the prosecution failed to present the testimony, or at least the affidavit, of the person mailing that, indeed, the demand letter was sent. xxx Moreover, petitioners, during the pre-trial, denied having received the demand letter (p. 135, Rollo). Given petitioners’ denial of receipt of the demand letter, it behooved the prosecution to present proof that the demand letter was indeed sent through registered mail and that the same was received by petitioners. This, the prosecution miserably failed to do. Instead, it merely presented the demand letter and registry return receipt as if mere presentation of the same was equivalent to proof that some sort of mail matter was received by petitioners. Receipts for registered letters and return receipts do not prove themselves; they must be properly authenticated in order to serve as proof of receipt of the letters (Central Trust Co. v. City of Des Moines, 218 NW 580). Likewise, for notice by mail, it must appear that the same was served on the addressee or a duly authorized agent of the addressee. In fact, the registry return receipt itself provides that “[a] registered article must not be delivered to anyone but the addressee, or upon the addressee’s written order, in which case the authorized agent must write the addressee’s name on the proper space and then affix legibly his own signature below it.” In the case at bar, no effort was made to show that the demand letter was received by petitioners or their agent. All that we have on record is an illegible signature on the registry receipt as Decision 10 G.R. No. 177438 evidence that someone received the letter. As to whether this signature is that of one of the petitioners or of their authorized agent remains a mystery. From the registry receipt alone, it is possible that petitioners or their authorized agent did receive the demand letter. Possibilities, however, cannot replace proof beyond reasonable doubt. There being insufficient proof that petitioners received notice that their checks had been dishonored, the presumption that they knew of the insufficiency of the funds therefor cannot arise. As we stated in Savage v. Taypin (G.R. No. 134217, May 11, 2000, 311 SCRA 397), “penal statutes must be strictly construed against the State and liberally in favor of the accused.” Likewise, the prosecution may not rely on the weakness of the evidence for the defense to make up for its own blunders in prosecuting an offense. Having failed to prove all the elements of the offense, petitioners may not thus be convicted for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.

Also, that the wife of Villadolid verbally informed the petitioner that the check had bounced did not satisfy the requirement of showing that written notices of

dishonor had been made to and received by the petitioner. The verbal notices of dishonor were not effective because it is already settled that a notice of dishonor must be in writing. 19 The Court definitively ruled on the specific form of the notice of dishonor in Domagsang v. Court of Appeals:

Petitioner counters that the lack of a written notice of dishonor is fatal. The Court agrees. While, indeed, Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 does not state that the notice of dishonor be in writing, taken in conjunction, however, with Section 3 of the law, i.e., “that where there are no sufficient funds in or credit with such drawee bank, such fact shall always be explicitly stated in the notice of dishonor or refusal,” a mere oral notice or demand to pay would appear to be insufficient for conviction under the law. The Court is convinced that both the spirit and letter of the Bouncing Checks Law would require for the act to be punished thereunder not only that the accused issued a check that is dishonored, but that likewise the accused has actually been notified in writing of the fact of dishonor. The consistent rule is that penal statutes have to be construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the accused.

Domagsang v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 139292, December 5, 2000

Evidently, the appellate court did not give weight and credence to the assertion that a demand letter was sent by a counsel of the complainant because of the failure of the prosecution to formally offer it in evidence. Courts are bound to consider as part of the evidence only those which are formally offered for judges must base their findings strictly on the evidence submitted by the parties at the trial. Without the written notice of dishonor, there can be no basis, considering what has heretofore been said, for establishing the presence of “actual knowledge of insufficiency of funds.

Bergonia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 189151, January 25, 2012

Citing Republic v. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division): Case law has conveniently demarcated the line between a final judgment or order and an interlocutory one on the basis of the disposition made. A judgment or order is considered final if the order disposes of the action or proceeding completely, or terminates a particular stage of the same action; in such case, the remedy available to an aggrieved party is appeal. If the order or resolution, however, merely resolves incidental matters and leaves something more to be done to resolve the merits of the case, the order is interlocutory and the aggrieved partys remedy is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

Here, the assailed Resolutions issued by the CA had considered the petitioners appeal below as having been abandoned and, accordingly, dismissed. Thus, the assailed Resolutions are in the nature of a final order as the same completely disposed of the petitioners appeal with the CA. Thus, the remedy available to the petitioners is to file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 with this court and not a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

In a long line of cases, this Court has held that the CA’s authority to dismiss an appeal for failure to file the appellants brief is a matter of judicial discretion. Thus, a dismissal based on this ground is neither mandatory nor ministerial; the fundamentals of justice and fairness must be observed, bearing in mind the background and web of circumstances surrounding the case.

Verily, the petitioners were only able to offer their bare assertion that they and their counsel did not actually receive a copy of the January 30, 2009 Resolution and that the person who apparently received the same was not in any way connected with their counsel. There was no other credible evidence adduced by petitioners which would persuade us to exculpate them from the effects of their failure to file their brief.

Nonetheless, the petitioners cite a cacophony of cases decided by this Court which, in essence, declared that dismissal of an appeal on purely technical ground is frowned upon and that, as much as possible, appeals ought to be decided on the merits in the interest of justice and equity.

The petitioners’ plea for the application of the principles of substantial justice in their favor deserves scant consideration. The petitioners should be reminded that technical rules may be relaxed only for the furtherance of justice and to benefit the deserving. While the petitioners adverted to several jurisprudential rulings of this Court which set aside procedural rules, it is noted that there were underlying considerations in those cases which warranted a disregard of procedural technicalities to favor substantial justice. Here, there exists no such consideration.

Vitug v. Abuda, G.R. No. 201264, January 11, 2016

Parties who have validly executed a contract and have availed themselves of its benefits may not, to escape their contractual obligations, invoke irregularities in its execution to seek its invalidation.

Due process dictates that arguments not raised in the trial court may not be considered by the reviewing court.

Llenado v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 193279, March 14, 2012

It is an established rule that the remedy of appeal through a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court contemplates only questions of law and not questions of fact (the actual receipt of the notice of dishonor). The issue in the case at bar is clearly a question of fact that rightfully belonged to the proper determination of the MeTC, the RTC and the CA.

Republic vs. Spouses Florencio de Castro, G.R. No. 189724, February 7, 2011

Section 1, Rule 47 of the 1987 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the remedy of annulment of judgments or final orders/resolutions of a RTC in civil cases can only be availed of where the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner.

A petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 is a remedy granted only under exceptional circumstances where a party, without fault on his part has failed to avail of the ordinary or other appropriate remedies provided by law. Such action is never resorted to as a substitute for a party’s own neglect in not promptly availing of the ordinary or other appropriate remedies.

They could have promptly filed a motion to quash the writ of execution or in the alternative, a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the 1987 Rules of Civil Procedure.

Exodus International v. Biscocho, G.R. No. 166109, February 23, 2011

In illegal dismissal cases, it is incumbent upon the employees to first establish the fact of their dismissal before the burden is shifted to the employer to prove that the dismissal was legal.

As found by the Labor Arbiter, there was no evidence that respondents were dismissed nor were they prevented from returning to their work. It was only respondents unsubstantiated conclusion that they were dismissed. As a matter of fact, respondents could not name the particular person who effected their dismissal and under what particular circumstance.

In Machica v. Roosevelt Services Center, Inc. this Court sustained the employer’s denial as against the employees’ categorical assertion of illegal dismissal. In so ruling, this Court held that: The rule is that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it; thus, petitioners were burdened to prove their allegation that respondents dismissed them from their employment. It must be stressed that the evidence to prove this fact must be clear, positive and convincing. The rule that the employer bears the burden of proof in illegal dismissal cases finds no application here because the respondents deny having dismissed the petitioners.

It is the employer who has the burden of proof to show a deliberate and unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his employment without any intention of returning. It is therefore incumbent upon petitioners to ascertain the respondents interest or non-interest in the continuance of their employment. However, petitioners failed to do so.

In cases where there is no evidence of dismissal, the remedy is reinstatement but without backwages.

People v. Balasa, G.R. Nos. 106357 and 1099601-02, September 3, 1998

It has been held that where one states that the future profits or income of an enterprise shall be a certain sum, but he actually knows that there will be none, or that they will be substantially less than he represents, the statement constitutes actionable fraud where the hearer believes him and relies on the statement to his injury.

What appellants offered the public was a Ponzi scheme, an investment program that offers impossibly high returns and pays these returns to early investors out of the capital contributed by later investors.

The fact that the buyer makes an independent investigation or inspection has been held not to preclude him from relying on the representation made by the seller where the seller has superior knowledge and the falsity of such representation would not be apparent from such examination or inspection, and, a fortiori, where the efforts of a buyer to learn the true profits or income of a business or property are thwarted by some device of the seller, such efforts have been held not to preclude a recovery.

Denials of an accused cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the positive declarations of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.

Spouses Mendiola v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 159746, July 18, 2012

In Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc., however, the Court has interpreted the proscription against appealing the order denying a motion for reconsideration to refer only to a motion for reconsideration filed against an interlocutory order, not to a motion for reconsideration filed against a judgment or final order, to wit: … The denial of the motion for reconsideration of an order of dismissal of a complaint is not an interlocutory order, however, but a final order as it puts an end to the particular matter resolved, or settles definitely the matter therein disposed of, and nothing is left for the trial court to do other than to execute the order. Not being an interlocutory order, an order denying a motion for reconsideration of an order of dismissal of a complaint is effectively an appeal of the order of dismissal itself.

Of the four, the one compelling test of compulsoriness is the logical relation between the claim alleged in the complaint and that in the counterclaim. Such relationship exists when conducting separate trials of the respective claims of the parties would entail substantial duplication of time and effort by the parties and the court; when the multiple claims involve the same factual and legal issues; or when the claims are offshoots of the same basic controversy between the parties. If these tests result in affirmative answers, the counterclaim is compulsory.

The four tests are affirmatively met as far as the Makati case was concerned. The Makati case had the logical relation to the Manila case because both arose out of the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage constituted to secure the payment of petitioner’s credit purchases under the distributorship agreement with Shell. Specifically, the right of Shell to demand the deficiency was predicated on the validity of the extrajudicial foreclosure, such that there would not have been a deficiency to be claimed in the Manila case had Shell not validly foreclosed the mortgage. As earlier shown, Ramon’s cause of action for annulment of the extrajudicial foreclosure was a true compulsory counterclaim in the Manila case. Thus, the Makati RTC could not have missed the logical relation between the two actions.

The identity of causes of action does not mean absolute identity; otherwise, a party may easily escape the operation of res judicata by changing the form of the

action or the relief sought. The test to determine whether the cause of action are identical is to ascertain whether the same evidence will sustain the actions, or whether there is an identity in the facts essential to the maintenance of the actions. If the same facts or evidence will sustain the actions, then they are considered identical, and a judgment in the first case is a bar to the subsequent action.

Thenamaris Philippines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 191215, February 3, 2014

In Republic v. St. Vincent de Paul Colleges, Inc. we had occasion to settle the seeming conflict on various jurisprudence touching upon the issue of whether the period for filing a petition for certiorari may be extended. In said case we stated that the general rule, as laid down in Laguna Metts Corporation v. Court of Appeals, is that a petition for certiorari must be filed strictly within 60 days from notice of judgment or from the order denying a motion for reconsideration. This is in accordance with the amendment introduced by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC where no provision for the filing of a motion for extension to file a petition for certiorari exists, unlike in the original Section 4 of Rule 65 which allowed the filing of such a motion but only for compelling reason and in no case exceeding 15 days. Under exceptional cases, however, and as held in Domdom v. Third and Fifth Divisions of the Sandiganbayan, the 60-day period may be extended subject to the court’s sound discretion. In Domdom, we stated that the deletion of the provisions in Rule 65 pertaining to extension of time did not make the filing of such pleading absolutely prohibited. “If such were the intention, the deleted portion could have simply been reworded to state that ‘no extension of time to file the petition shall be granted.’ Absent such a prohibition, motions for extension are allowed subject to the court’s sound discretion.

Additionally, as cited earlier in Labao, there should be an effort on the part of the litigant invoking liberality to satisfactorily explain why he or she was unable to abide by the rules. Here, the reason offered for availing of the motion for extension is the heavy workload of private respondent’s counsel, which is hardly a compelling or meritorious reason as enunciated in Labao. Time and again, we have held that the excuse of “heavy workload is relative and often self-serving. Standing alone, it is not a sufficient reason to deviate from the 60-day rule.”

The NLRC’s resolution became final ten (10) days after counsel’s receipt, and the respondent’s failure to file the petition within the required (60)-day period rendered it impervious to any attack through a Rule 65 petition for certiorari. Thus, no court can exercise jurisdiction to review the resolution.

De Leon v. Hercules Agro Industrial Corporation, G.R. No. 183239, June 2, 2014

In Habaluyas Enterprises Inc. v. Japson: Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the rule shall be strictly enforced that no motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration may be filed with the MTC, RTC, IAC. Such a motion may be filed only in cases pending with the Supreme Court as the court of last resort, which may in its sound discretion either grant or deny the extension requested.

In Rolloque v. Court of Appeals: The filing by petitioners of a motion for extension of time to file motion for reconsideration did not toll the fifteen-day period before a judgment becomes final and executory.

As the period to file a motion for reconsideration is non-extendible, petitioner’s motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration did not toll the reglementary period to appeal; thus, petitioner had already lost his right to appeal the September 23, 2005 decision. As such, the RTC decision became final as to petitioner when no appeal was perfected after the lapse of the prescribed period.

Aowa Electornic Philippines, Inc. v. Department of Trade and Industry, G.R. No. 189655, April 13, 2011

By reason of the special knowledge and expertise of the DTI over matters falling under its jurisdiction, it is in a better position to pass judgment on the issues, and its findings of fact in that regard, especially when affirmed by the CA, are generally accorded respect, if not finality, by this Court.

Unilever Philippines (PRC), Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119280, August 10, 2006

Section 2 of PD 49 stipulates that the copyright for a work or intellectual creation subsists from the moment of creation. Accordingly, the creator acquires copyright for his work right upon its creation. Contrary to petitioner’s contention, the intellectual creators exercise and enjoyment of copyright for his work and the protection given by law to him is not contingent or dependent on any formality or registration.

The issuance of a preliminary injunction rests entirely on the discretion of the court and is generally interfered with except in cases of manifest abuse. There was no such abuse in the case at bar, especially because petitioner was given all the opportunity to oppose the application for injunction. The fact was, it failed to convince the courty why the injunction should not be issued.

Republic of the Philippines v. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation, G.R. No. 173918, April 8, 2008

As early as 1986, this Court in Tanada v. Tuvera enunciated that publication is indispensable in order that all statutes, including administrative rules that are intended to enforce or implement existing laws, attain binding force and effect, to wit: We hold therefore that statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different activity date is fixed by the legislature. Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purporse is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.

Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations, Inc. (CREBA) v. Energy Regulatory Commission, G.R. No. 174697, July 8, 2010