SC Lectures 2-6

8/13/2019 SC Lectures 2-6

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Social capital and cooperation

Readings:

Campbell, J.K., 1964, Honour, Family and Patronage, Oxford: Oxford

University Press, (selected pages).

Ahn, T.K. and Elinor Ostrom, 2008, Social capital and collective action,

pp. 70-100, in The Handbook of Social Capital (eds. D. castiglione,

J.W. van Deth, G. Wolleb), Oxford: Oxford University Press.


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Atomistic societyAtomistic society

theoretical concept from anthropology and sociology (mid 20thcentury)

lack of cooperation in the wider society

cooperation is limited to nuclear family or extended kin network

authors: Benedict 1942 , Honigmann 1946, Rubel & Kupfere 1968.

Structural elements of atomistic society: lack of social ties outside

the family. Non-family social ties are few and institutionalized, for

example, client-patron ties, institutionalized friendship, ritual kinship.

Cultural elements of atomistic society:pervasive distrust, hostility

and aggression (physical and verbal), the role of rumours in

maintaining the honour.


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Cooperation

Cooperation is the process of working or acting together with a purpose

of achieving common goal.

Fallacy of composition: If an action is in the collective interest of a

group and if the members of the group are rational, then the group must

be collectively rational, which is to say that the group must act in its

interest just as each of its members would.(R. Hardin, Collective action,

1982).

Social dilemmasare situations in which collective interests are at odds

with private interests.

Three intellectual traditions:

Game theory and Prisoners dilemma ( John von Neumann and

Oscar Morgenstern, 1940-1942; Merill Flood and Melvin Dresher, 1950)

Collective action problem(Samuelson, mid 1950s, Olson, 1965)

The tragedy of the commons (G. Hardin, 1968)


4/23

Prisoners dilemma

person B

c nc

c (1,1) (5,0)

person A

nc (0,5) (3,3)

person A

nc c

(0,0)

person B

nc c

(-1,2) (1,1)

* Basic prisoners dilemma.

Numbers are losses (years in prison).

* Modified sequential Prisoners dilemma.

Numbers are gains.


5/23

Collective action

Collective action

it is about collective goods (public or common goods)

a group of individuals,

a common interest among them, and

potential conflict between the common interest and each

individuals interest

Collective goods:

Public goods: goods are jointly produced, non-excludable

and non-rivalrous, the problem of production of publicgood

Common goods: goods are finite or diminishing, non-

excludable but rivalrous, the problem of overuse of

common good


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Governing the common pool resources

Elinor Ostrom

(Nobel Memorial Prize in 2009)

Success cases:

Communal tenure in high mountain meadows and forests (Switzerland,

Japan

Irrigation communal institutions (Valencia, MurciaSpain, Philippines)

Failure cases:

Fisheries (Turkey, Sri Lanka, Nova Scotia)Goundwater basins (California)

Conditons for success: clearly defined boundaries, collective participation

in creating rules, internal monitoring, graduated sanctions, conflict-

resolution mechanisms, right to organize ..

Collective action concerns theregulation of

the consumption of commons(fishing

stocks, grazing lands, forests, water).


7/23

Solutions to social dilemmas

first generation of collective-action theories(Olson 1965, Hardin, 1968):

the assumption of universal selfishness people using public or common

goods will not cooperate so as to achieve collective benefits.

regulation by an external authority

selective incentives privatization

second generation of collective-action theories: the assumption of

different types of individuals regarding the selfish/unselfish dimension

(values) and the role of social networks and community structures.

trust and norms of reciprocity, collective identification (intrinsic motivations)

networks, communities and social ties (social sanctions)


8/23

Dynamic view of collective action

J. Elster: Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences (1989)

There are two mistakes to be avoided in trying to explain cooperative

behavior. The crudest is to believe that there exists one privileged

motivationsel-finterest, for example, that explains all instances of

cooperation. A more subtle error is to believe that each instance ofcooperation can be explained by one motivation. Several motivations

coexist and reinforce each other.

Kantians: they want to do what would be best if all did it

Utilitarians: they want to promote common (public) good

Fairness motivation: they do not want to take free ride on the cooperation

of others


9/23

Readings:

Coleman, J.S., 1990, Relations of trust, in Foundations of Social

Theory, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press (chapter 5).

Trust


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SOURCES OF TRUST

strategic and non-strategic trust

Truster

(A)Trustee

(B)

Altruistic trust (Jane Mansbridge)

Trust as a gift. One trusts more than warranted by evidence . Norms of reciprocity (treat the other as one would

oneself wish to be treated), belief that cooperation is good (trust as pro-social ideal).Optimistic trust(Julian Rotter) Trust as personal disposition.

Caring atmosphere at home, trusting and optimistic parents, genes.

Cognitive trust(Yamagishi and Yamagishi).

Education and experience of different others help develop social intelligence. People with higher social

intelligence are more trusting.

Strategic predictive trustB is trustworthyStrategic trust: trustworthiness (p) losses (L) and gains (G) (Hardin Russel, Coleman James): social and material incentives of the trustee, trust as encapsulated interest - trust exists when one party to the

relation believes that the other party has incentives to act in his/her interest

prior interactions with the trustee (truster has good information about trustee)

social reputation (what others know about trustee)

social networks (sanctioning power of networks)

the role of coercive power, rule of law (sanctioning power of state)

the role of institutions that embody the values or fairness and solidarity (signaling dominant values in thesociety)

A trusts B

Non-strategic trustA trusts

p

1-pL

G


11/23

Trust in economic exchange

(Jane Mansbridge: Altruistic trust)

1.No established government, weak kin structures and weak social

sanctionsin this society exchange relations must take place at once, on

the spot.

2.No established government but strong and extensive kin networks

with sanctioning capacity.Kin networks allow exchange relations at adistance (overseas trade and long distance banking is carried on by close

knit families or ethnic groups, multilateral reputation mechanism).

3.No established government but overpayment of long distance traders

(Genoa 12th century, bilateral reputation mechanism).

4.Society has an established government supplemented with densereputational networks (the case of London merchant bankers).

5.Established government, weak reputational networks,

supplemented by a moral code, two commands: a) act in a trustworthy

manner to strangers, b) begin interactions with strangers with a trusting act

(modern society).


12/23

Interpersonal relations: the emergence of weak

tiesReadings:

Silver, A. (1997) Two different sorts of commerce: Friendship and

strangership in civil society, in Weintraub and Kumar (eds.) Publicand Private in Thought and Practice, Chicago: Chicago University

Press (pp. 43-72)

Granovetter, M. (1974) The strength of weak ties,American Journal of

Sociology.


13/23

Personal relations: Historical perspective

15th century: Renaissance moralists

How can anyone dream that mere simplicity and goodness will get him friends, oreven acquaintances not actually harmful and annoying? The world is amply

supplied with fraudulent, false, perfidious, bold, audacious, and rapacious men.

Everything in the world is profoundly unsecure..there is more honor and value

in helping your own family than outsiders .a stranger abide you as an enemy,

while a kinsman is always your friend.we find that there is really nothing more

difficult in the world than distinguishing true friends amid the obscurity of so manylies, the darkness of peoples motives.

L.B. Alberti (1404-1472) Italian artist, architect, poet, philosopher

.

17th century: Social contract theory

In the state of nature, where there is no central authority, there is a war of all

against all,and life is solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.

Strong central authority is needed in order to avoid the evil of discord and civil war.

T. Hobbes, (1588-1679) English philosopher


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15/23

Modern personal relations are profoundly disinterested relations. As such

they are not a relict of the past, but are constituted by the impersonal order ofthe modern society.

The new morality described by Scots, which is based on universal sympathy

is a result of impersonalityestablished in the spheres of market transactions

and state authority.

Disinterested personal relations can vary from weak to very close social ties,

depending on the personal affinities of the partners (i.e. gravitational model ofpersonal relationsproposed by Ferguson). Before commercial society, weak

ties were either turned into strong ties or regarded with suspicion (dichotomy

friend or enemy).

Studies of social networks today show the importance of both weak and

strong social ties (strong ties are important for mobilization of resources, and

weak ties for the spread of information and coordination between different

social groups and circles). Weak ties are a result of new universalistic

morality described by Scots.

Putnam distinguishes between bondingand bridgingsocial capitalon the

baisis of a distinction between weak and strong social ties. Weak ties are

more likey to be bridging ties than strong ties.

New universalistic morality


16/23

Weak and strong ties, and social triads

The situation of predominantly strong social ties (high emotionalintensity, intimacy, amount of time, reciprocity of services or loyalty)

B C

Forbidden triad

A

CB

Closed triad

A


17/23

In the situation of mixed strength ties (strong and weak), weak ties can

become bridges between the triads of strong ties. Not all weak ties are

bridges, but bridges tend to be weak ties.

Bridging tie

Brokerage

Overlapping social circles

B

B

B

E

A

D

C

C

A

A

C

D

D

F

E

E

F

FG


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20/23

Study: East Yorkers

Community lost argument small networks

sparse networks weak social ties

formal roles as a source of ties

in person contact

weak social support

no reciprocity

local locus of social ties

Community saved argument large networks

dense networks strong social ties (kin, neighbourhood)

in person contact

kin, neighbourhood as a source of ties

abundant social support

strong reciprocity

local ties and tightly bounded solidarities

Community liberated argument large networks

sparse networks

moderate social ties (friendshipand work as sources of social

ties)

moderate/specialized social

support

uneven reciprocity

differentiated networks in erson ICT

Findings: 5+ intimates

sparse networks

weak and strong social ties (kin andwork- friendship relations)

moderate/specialized social support

uneven reciprocity

differentiated networks, clusters of

solidarities

in person, ICT


21/23

core or ego-centric networks in the USA

analysis of the trends 1985-2004

Study: Core discussion networks in the USA

Findings for 2004:

Increased isolation,

smaller and denser networks, less kin and especially non-kin ties,

long duration, more frequent communication,

higher racial diversity, less educational diversity,

larger differences between education groups.

Explanation: ICT?


22/23

Internet and social capital Internet is decreasing social capital

online interactions are inferior to face-to-face interactions; internet competes

with other activities; internet is a stressor that depresses people; not alluses of internet are social; internet blurs the work-home boundary;

internet keeps people indoors; online ties are more homogeneous

Internet is increasing social capitalnew forms of interaction increase the opportunity for weak and more

diverse social ties; internet recruits people for offline interactions,

increases communal and organizational participation; internet fills

communication gaps in face-to-face contacts

Internet supplements social capital

life online is an extension of offline activities; internet is more useful for

maintaining than creating new ones; the effects of internet will be

evolutionary, increasing the individualization of social networks


23/23

Study: Social isolation and new technology

Report: Pew Internet & American Life Project, november 2009

http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media/Files/Reports/2009/PIP_Tech_and_Social_Isolation.pdf

Findings:

social isolation has not changed since 1985 (6% of population are

isolated)

discussion networks have shrunk by about a third since 1985

networks have become less diverse because they contain fewer non-kin

members

ownership of a mobile phone and use of internet are associated with

larger and more diverse core discussion networks

internet use does not limit participation in local communities (internetusers are as likely to visit with their neighbours as anyone else; they are

more likely to belong to a local voluntary group)

internet does not pull people away from public places (cafes,

restaurants, parks)

ICT are used for local contacts and distant communication
http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media/Files/Reports/2009/PIP_Tech_and_Social_Isolation.pdfhttp://www.pewinternet.org/~/media/Files/Reports/2009/PIP_Tech_and_Social_Isolation.pdfhttp://www.pewinternet.org/~/media/Files/Reports/2009/PIP_Tech_and_Social_Isolation.pdfhttp://www.pewinternet.org/~/media/Files/Reports/2009/PIP_Tech_and_Social_Isolation.pdf

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SC Lectures 2-6