Sawyer R. D. - The Tao of Spycraft. - 1998

8/10/2019 Sawyer R. D. - The Tao of Spycraft. - 1998

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In memory of those who courageously risked their lives among the shadows,only to be shunned and disdained when peace arose

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ContentsChronology of Appro1imate $ynastic Periods 1i

Preface 1iii

Part 1 Early History Barly #ecords and the irst Spies )Di Din and Barly istory,

China/s Second Spy6 5he 5/ai -ung, +

5Eu -ung, +'

+ 5he Spring and Autumn Period + 5ime and Communications, +"

5erminology and Agents, )'

$iplomatic 8issions, )

5he sing*Fen, >

5he 8u, or Clandestine Shepherd, >

8ilitary :ntelligence, >!

$efectors, &'

Covert and Subversive Practices, &"*vi*
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$ivination and Prognostication, &

5he (attle of Den*ling,

) 5he %arring States Period "&Agents and :ntelligence, "

Su Ch/in, "!

8ilitary :ntelligence, !+

Covert Practices, !"

#umors and Bstrangement 5echni undamental 5hrust +)Necessity for :ntelligence and Agents, +;

*vii*
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Stress on uman Agency, )

& Nature and 5heory of Agents ))

Shih 5Eu*mei/s 4ectures on GBmploying Spies,G >)

B1pendable and $ouble Agents, &;

0ther Agents, ;

; 0perations and Control ':dentifying and #ecruiting Agents, "

0perational 8ethods and Agent Control, "&

Secrecy and Countermeasures "!

Communications, !;

Concealment and $eception, +'

Counterintelligence, + ;

Prisoners, +++

Part 3 Covert Activities" Systematic Programs and Psychological %arfare ++-ing -ou*chien and the State of D9eh, +)+

4ater Contemplations, +>)
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! Assassination and 0ther 5echni!(eauty and Se1, +;

Consorts and Concubines, +;"

(ribes and Bstrangement 5echni

Stealthy 8ethods, +"+

Part 4 Theories of Evaluating and Intelligence' (asic 5heory and :ssues +"!PreFudices, :nclinations, and :nterference, +!+

Sources and Credibility, +!

Semblances and $oubt, )''

$oubt and the 8ilitary Perspective, )'+

0ther :ssues and Perceptions, )';

-nowing 8en )'!(asic Problems and Huestions, ) +

Selecting 8en, ) &*viii*
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Problematic 5heory of 5ransparency, ) ;

Perceiver/s Hualifications, )+)

5he (ody as Naturally B1pressive, )+&

5he (asic Principle, )+;

Constancy, )+

Criteria for Bvaluating, )+"

Physiognomy, )>;

B1pressions and Postures, )>

Possibilities and Problems in Criteria, )&+

an ei*tEu/s Iiews, )&>

+ Character, Archetypes, and 5ypology );'Somatotypes and Character, );>

Din and Dang Somatotypes, );&

G5he 0ffices of -ing %en,G );

) :ntelligence Applications )

> Political :ntelligence )""istorical Bpisodes and 5heir Significance, )"!
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Political Bvaluation in the 8ilitary %ritings, )!!

Political :ntelligence in the Philosophical andPolitical %ritings, >'+

Signs of a $oomed State, >

Steppe and (order Peoples, >+'

Part !ilitary Intelligence& ield :ntelligence >+Concept of 5imeliness, >+"

0bservation and #econnaissance, >)'

Active Probing 8easures, >)

Jeneral ield Assessments, >)!

5he #ole and :mportance of Ch/i, >&

Commanders, >;)

; Classifications of 5errain >; 5opography and Configurations of 5errain, >;!

Configurations of 5errain in the u*ling Ching, >"+
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8ountains and #ivers, >"&

s9 5ung/s Contrary Practices, >""

5he %u*ching 5sung*yao, >!

Bvaluating and 5argeting Cities, & '

Part " Prognostication# $ivination# and %onhu&an 'actors istorical Practices and 5heir #eFection &+

Prognosticatory Systems in 8ilitary Practice, &+!

$ust, Smo@e, and Atmospheric 8anifestations, &))

Ch/i 5heory and #epresentative Selections, &);

Notes &>!

:nde1 &!

Chronology of Appro(i&ate $ynastic PeriodsDynastic Period Years

4egendary Sage Bmperors +"&+*++&& (.C.sia ++'&* ;;Shang ;;* '>&Chou

%estern Chou '>&* 'Bastern Chou '*+&;
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Dynastic Period Years Spring and Autumn ++*>"%arring States >')*++

Ch/in ++ *+'

ormer an K%estern anL +'; (.C.*A.$. "4ater an KBastern anL +)*++'Si1 $ynasties +++*&"!Sui &"!*; "

5/ang ; "*!'ive $ynasties !' *!&!Sung !;'* +;Southern Sung + * + !

D9an K8ongolL + !* );"8ing );"* ;>>Ch/ing K8anchuL ;>>* !

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PrefaceN0 NA5:0N AS P#AC5:CB$ 5 B C#A 5 of intelligence ortheoriEed about it more e1tensively than China, filling theirmilitary writings with discussions on concepts and techni


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era, the initial section on anti


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researched boo@s touching on Chinese intelligence methodshave even appeared, largely directed to business applicationsor developing esoteric tactics that will allow their readers toovercome others in even the most dire and unrealisticcircumstances. 5hese fre


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8ei*ch9n collaborated in reading the later dynastic histories,reviewing secondary materials, discussing the translations, andgenerally scrutiniEing the drafts, thereby ma@ing the boo@possible.

inally, we would li@e to reiterate that this is a historical studybased upon readily accessible materials and open, printedsources. None of our many clients, friends, relatives, orassociates in the United States or Asia, including the P#C,provided any restricted materials whatsoever. Bven though thisproFect is in part an outgrowth of a paper presented at theSociety for 8ilitary istory/s Si1ty*third Annual 8eetingsponsored by the C:A/s Center for the Study of :ntelligence inApril !!;, there is no connection whatsoever with anyintelligence agency in the United States or abroad. 8oreover,although : have been a careful, hopefully astute, student ofintelligence theory and methods over the years and ourconsulting practice has largely focused upon information andanalysis, : have not been actively involved in any aspect offormal intelligence wor@ on behalf of any government since theIietnam era.

#alph $. Sawyer*1vi*

THE TA) )' SP*C+A'T*1vii*

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Part )neEA+,* HIST)+*


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* *

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1Early +ecords

and the 'irst Spies$BSP:5B (B:NJ C0880N4D PB#CB:IB$ as long having beena politically and culturally integrated state, China sufferedalmost incessant warfare and rampant political intrigue overthe three millennia of its tenuous geopolitical e1istence. :nconse" (.C.L and %arring States K >')*++ (.C.L periods abody of military theory evolved that gradually ac


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and then on through the Sung into the 8ing. :n every case theauthors embraced Sun*tEu/s principles and analysis bute1panded the methodological details, cate

*)*

gories of operatives, range of activities, types of mission, andpsychology of recruitment, eventually emphasiEing security andcounterintelligence measures to frustrate increasinglynumerous and effective agents, both diplomatic and covert.

Chinese intelligence efforts have historically focused uponrulers and powerful officials, economic factors, and militaryplans, capabilities, dispositions, and movements. 5he data

collected were comparatively analyEed to determine probableintentions, develop a net assessment, and plot possiblereactions. Clandestine operations naturally evolved to gathersecret information critical to Gpreparing against theunforeseen,G resulting in the employment of several types ofagents, methods of control, and techni


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compendiums of ancient practices and stories, the essence andfoundation of a national mind*set that would delimit the verypossibilities of conception and action. Bventually they wereviewed not Fust as benign portrayals of ancient times, but alsoas virtual handboo@s of covert practices, stealthy techni


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thoroughly understand the &ook of !des , they will @now themartial. :f their teachers probe deeply into the 'i Chi , they will@now about the monthly ordinances. %hen their e1periencedsoldiers have penetrated the Tso Chuan , they will learnnumerous deceptive methods and stratagems for employingtroops. %hen they become thoroughly familiar with the literarypieces in the Wen (s)an , they will @now the regulationsgoverning war dispatches. ow will this differ from loaningweapons to the invaders and providing them with provisionsO

: have heard that when the state of 4u embraced the Chou 'i ,Ch/i did not attac@ them. %hen %u learned how to employchariots, Ch/u/s troops were e1hausted in running for theirlives. + 5he former preserved their state by maintaining theclassics, the latter endangered their state by losing theirtactics. 8oreover, having been sent out in marriage, theprincess has traveled a great distance to a foreign state whereshe should be embracing the rites of the Di peoples, not turningaround and see@ing our outstanding boo@s. According to mybumbling analysis, this is not really the princess/s idea. :suspect that some defector is encouraging these teachingsamong them.

*&*

:f your maFesty is concerned about losing the affection of the 5urfan and preserving the state/s credibility so there isabsolutely no other way, : suggest you eliminate the Ch#unCh#iu ?and Tso Chuan because it was composed when thevirtue of the Chou was already in decline, when the feudallords were forcefully violating the constraints of rites and

music, each going forth to engage in warfare. At that timeprevarication was born, at that time change and deceit arose. 5here were cases of ministers summoning their rulers as wellas seiEing the awesomeness and name of hegemon. :f youprovide them with this boo@, it will be a source of misfortune toour state. :n the Tso Chuan it states that ?as his reward forvalor Du*hsi re


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present them with sil@s and generously gift them with Fades.%hy must you grant what they see@ and thereby increase their@nowledgeO >

5he antecedent cited in which the emperor refused to provide

the Shih Chi and other philosophical wor@s even to his ownuncle, the nominal @ing of a subsidiary an fief, is similarlyilluminating. irst, it implies that nearly a century after itscompletion the Shih Chi was still largely retained in the courtarchives rather than generally circulated. Second, politicalwor@s, including historical writings and the arguments of thephilosophers, were seen as e


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have ruled the sia dynasty in the nineteenth century (.C.,because he apparently dispatched an agent to clandestinelyobserve his father/s murderer while secretly developing thepower base necessary to successfully restore sia rule, anevent traditionally dated to " & (.C. 5he @ey historicalreference, much cited thereafter, actually appears in the TsoChuan , embedded in %u 5Eu*hs9/s futile attempt to persuadethe @ing of %u to e1terminate their archenemy, the state ofD9eh under -ing -ou*chien, now that they had van


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* *

ally resulting in 8encius/s definitive portrait in the middle%arring States period.

A chapter in the ')$shih Ch#un$ch#iu , a late third century (.C.eclectic te1t, preserves the most dramatic account to be foundamong China/s numerous historical writings. Not only does itintegrate the image of a moral paragon with the deviousness ofa seasoned spyM it also includes a painful cover story6

(ecause Bmperor Chieh of the sia dynasty was immoral,brutal, perverse, stupid, and greedy, All under eaven


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5/ang e1claimed6 G%hat you have Fust said is much li@e aprophetic lament G 5hey then swore an oath together toevidence their determination to e1tinguish sia.

Di Din went again to observe the mighty sia, where he learned

from 8o si that Gthe previous night the emperor had dreamtthere was a sun in the west and a sun in the east. %hen thetwo suns engaged in combat, the western sun emergedvictorious and

*"*

the eastern sun was van


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army from the west thus proved sufficient to trigger Chieh/sterror and flight. urthermore, Chieh/s downfall wasundoubtedly hastened because the hostile state of 8inshanhad consciously e1ploited the debilitating power of women andse1. 5he two new concubines who so fascinated him wereneither accidental ac


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owever, the &amboo Annals , increasingly viewed by scholarsas a somewhat reliable source for the period, offers a startlingly different conclusion to this otherwise idealiEed story, statingthat Di Din actually usurped the throne and was eventuallye1ecuted when the rightful @ing escaped his confinement.

(efitting his status as China/s first recogniEed covert agent, DiDin/s historical image thus subsumes two different personae6 avirtuous, self*sacrificing minister, and the s@illed spy whomade the con


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8encius/s version may of course be seen as a hopefulproFection of the process that rulers should underta@e inhumbly e1tending sincere invitations to moral e1emplars Ksuchas himselfL to participate in their governments. owever, thestory persisted that after Di Din had failed to win 5/ang/sattention despite many audiences, he finally resorted tobecoming his coo@ and thereby ingratiated himself sufficientlyto gradually offer his persuasions. At the end of the %arringStates period the brilliant but ill*fated an ei*tEu, oftentermed China/s 8achiavelli, in fact employed this story toillustrate the difficulty of achieving the obFectives ofpersuasion6 G:n high anti


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opt for the victorious**and therefore, by de facto definition, theGmoralG**side, while traitors are those who aban

* *

don the banner of righteousness or simply betray the eventualcon


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thoughts, he may e


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Shang ruler had arrived. ++ urthermore, the late %arringStates ')$shih Ch#un$chiu even contains a dialogue showinghow the @ing controlled his agents that, while definitely afabrication, enFoyed credibility thereafter and added to the fundof ancient lore6

-ing %u of the Chou deputed an agent to observe the state ofShang. 5he observer returned to the Chou capital andreported, G Shang is in chaos.G 5he @ing


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blatantly ignored the Chou/s growing threat because the rulerfelt himself secure and well protected by the sanctions ofeaven, although he had earlier imprisoned -ing %en forseveral years before releasing him in response to overlygenerous bribes. Bven the (an .ei$t%u contains an episodeportraying the Shang @ing/s negligence in underestimating thedangers posed by -ing %en/s visible pursuit of righteousness6

ei Chung attempted to persuade -ing Chieh6 G5he 4ord of the%est is a worthy so the hundred surnames are pleased withhim and the feudal lords submit to him. Dou must e1ecutehim, for if you do not he will certainly be a source of misfortunefor the Shang.G

-ing Chou replied6 GDou are spea@ing of a righteous ruler. owcan he be e1ecutedOG ei Chung retorted6 GA hat, even thoughworn through, must still be placed on the headM shoes, eventhough multicolored, must still tread upon the ground. Nowthe 4ord of the %est is a subFect. e is cultivatingrighteousness so people incline toward him. :f anyone willcause you misfortune, it will be him Any person who does notemploy his worthiness on behalf of his ruler must be e1ecuted.

8oreover, where is the transgression in a ruler punishing hissubFectOG

-ing Chou replied6 G(enevolence and righteousness are whatrulers employ to encourage their subordinates. Now as the4ord of the %est loves benevolence and righteousness, it is notpossible to punish him.G ei Chung attempted to persuade himthree times, then left the state.

owever, perhaps the critical factor in the Chou/s deliberaterise was the remoteness of the %ei #iver valley, situated inlargely Gbar

* >*

barianG territory, whose isolation provided relative secrecy anddeterred casual visitors. Under the 5/ai -ung/s guidance, -ing%en was able to devise and implement the policies necessary tonurture the state/s strength without attracting undueattention. 5he Chou thus managed to perfect themselves in theera/s measures and technologies, and systematically develop


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policies, strategies, and even battlefield tactics not previouslywitnessed in Chinese history. :n all, they re


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After spea@ing with him, he was greatly pleased and said6 G8yformer lord, the 5/ai -ung, said, /5here should be a Sage whowill come

* &*

to Chou, and Chou will thereby flourish./ Are you truly thisSage or notO 8y 5/ai -ung loo@ed out ?wang for you for a longtime.G 5hus he called him 5/ai -ung %ang, and returnedtogether with him in his carriage, establishing him asstrategist.

Someone has said6 G5he 5/ai -ung had e1tensive learning, andonce served -ing Chou of the Shang. -ing Chou lac@ed the

5ao, so he left him. e traveled about e1ercising his persuasionon the various feudal lords but did not encounter anyonesuitable, and in the end returned west with the 4ord of the%est.G

Someone else has said6 G 49 Shang was a retired scholar whohad hidden himself on the seacoast. %hen the 4ord of the %estwas confined at Du*li, San*i Sheng and ung Dao, having long@nown 49 Shang, summoned him. 49 Shang also said, /: have

heard that the 4ord of the %est is a %orthy and also e1cels atnurturing the old, so : guess : will go there./ 5he three mensought out beautiful women and rare obFects on behalf of the4ord of the %est, and presented them to the Shang @ing inorder to ransom the 4ord of the %est. 5he 4ord of the %est wasthereby able to go out and return to his state.G +>

Although the ways they say 49 Shang came to serve the 4ord of the %est differ, still the essential point is that he became

strategist to -ings %en and %u. After the 4ord of the %est wase1tricated from Du*li and returned to Chou, he secretly plannedwith 49 Shang and cultivated his Iirtue in order to overturnShang/s government. 5he 5/ai -ung/s affairs were mostlyconcerned with military authority and unorthodo1 stratagems,so when later generations spea@ about armies and the Chou/ssecret tactical advantage of power, they all honor the 5/ai -ungfor ma@ing the fundamental plans.

5he 4ord of the %est/s government was e


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peoples. 5hus the &ook of !des refers to the 4ord of the %estas -ing %en once he received the 8andate of eaven. esuccessfully attac@ed the states of Ch/ung, 8i*hs9, andCh9an*i, and constructed a great city at eng. :f All undereaven were to be divided into thirds, two*thirds had alreadygiven their allegiance to the Chou. 5he 5/ai -ung/s plans andschemes occupied the maFor part.

%hen -ing %en died, -ing %u ascended the throne. :n hisninth year, wanting to continue -ing %en/s tas@, he mounted acampaign in the east to observe whether the feudal lords wouldassemble or not. %hen the army set out, the 5/ai -ung wieldedthe yellow battle a1 in his left hand, and grasped the whitepennon in his right, in order to swear the oath6

* ;*

Ts#ang$ssu/ Ts#ang$ssu/ 0nite your masses of common people With your boats and oars1Those who arrive after will be beheaded1

5hereafter he went to 8eng*chin. 5he number of feudal lords

who assembled of their own accord was eight hundred. 5hefeudal lords all said, G -ingChou can be [email protected] -ing %ureplied, GNot yet.G e had the army return and made the Jreat0ath with the 5/ai -ung.

After they had remained in Chou for two more years, -ingChou of the Shang @illed prince Pi*@an and imprisoned the%orthy Chi*tEu. -ing %u, wanting to attac@ the Shang,performed divination with a turtle shell to observe the signs.

5hey were not auspicious and violent wind and rain arose. 5heassembled du@es were all afraid, but the 5/ai -ung stiffenedthem to support -ing %u. -ing %u then went forth.

:n the eleventh year, the first month, on the day chia$t%u the@ing swore an oath at 8u*yeh and attac@ed -ing Chou of theShang. 5he Shang army was completely defeated, so -ing Chouturned and ran off, and then ascended the $eer 5ower. -ing%u/s forces pursued and beheaded -ing Chou. 0n the morrow-ing %u was established at the altars6 5he du@es presentedclear water, -/ang Shu*feng of %ei spread out a variegated mat,


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Ch/i was able to conduct a campaign of rectification to subduethe rebellious and become a great state. :ts capital was Ding*ch/iu. Probably when the 5/ai -ung died, he was more than ahundred years old.

5he Jrand istorian comments6 G: went to Ch/i**from 4ang* yeh, which belongs to 8t. 5/ai, north to where it fronts the sea,embracing two thousand @ilometers of fertile land. :ts peopleare e1pansive, and many conceal their @nowledge. :t is theireaven* given nature. 5a@ing the 5/ai -ung/s Sageness inestablishing his state, isn/t it appropriate that $u@e uanflourished and cultivated good government and was therebyable to assemble the feudal lords in a covenantO Iast, vast,truly the style of a great state G

$espite the lucidity of his biography and its fre


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increasing their debauchery with musicians, wine, women, andfascinating rarities. Spies must be employed, complete secrecyis mandated, and once an engagement begins no constraintsshould ever be imposed on the fighters.

5he Si Secret Teachings also analyEes numerous battlesituations and formulates general principles to guide thecommander/s efforts to determine the most effective tacticsbased upon classifications of terrain, aspects of the enemy, andthe relative strength of the forces. :ntensive efforts to gatherinformation must always be mounted because, in accord withthe analytic thrust of Chinese military science, the enemy mustbe carefully evaluated and Fudgments weighed before a decisionwhether to attac@ or defend can be calculated. Among thenumerous related topics are techni


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T0u /ungAlong with Di Din and the 5/ai -ung, 5Eu -ung, who was activein the last decade of the si1th century (.C. and first decade of

the fifth, is the third figure fre


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retains the 5ao of -ings %en and %u, so where wouldConfucius not learnO %hy should he have had a constantteacherOG +

Ch/en 5Eu*ch/in further in


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there. 8oreover, %u employs enlightened officials to preservethem. 5hey would be easy to [email protected]

5/ien Ch/ang angrily flushed and said6 G%hat you considerdifficult everyone else ta@es as easyM what you consider easy

everyone else believes to be difficult. %hat do you mean byinstructing me in this fashionOG

5Eu -ung replied6 G: have heard it said that one who suffersfrom internal difficulties should attac@ the strong, but one whosuffers from e1ternal pressures should attac@ the wea@. Now

you are troubled about internal affairs. : have heard that yourlordship has been enfeoffed three times unsuccessfully becausesome of the important ministers do not heed your words. Now

if your lordship destroys 4u and thus broadens Ch/i, yourvictory will ma@e the ruler arrogant. $estroying 4u will alsocause the minis

*+ *

terial families ?who command the armies to be furtherhonored, while your achievements will not ran@ among them.

5herefore you will daily become further estranged from the

ruler.G%hen the ruler has become arrogant and the great ministersare free to pursue their desires, yet you see@ to accomplishgreat deeds, it will be difficult. :n general, when rulers becomearrogant, they give free rein to their desires, but whenministers grow arrogant, they wrangle. or this reasondifferences will force you to defer to the ruler while you willhave to struggle with the ministers. :n such circumstances

your position in Ch/i will be endangered. 5hus : advised that itwould be better to attac@ the state of %u.

G:f you attac@ %u and fail to be victorious the people will perishoutside while within the state the high ministers/ positions willbe empty. 5hen you will not have any powerful enemies withinthe ministerial ran@s nor e1cesses in the people below. Asolitary ruler will then govern Ch/i, and it will be your maFesty.G

5/ien Ch/ang said6 GB1cellent owever, : have already sent myforces forth against 4u, so withdrawing them now to send


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against %u would cause the great ministers to be suspicious.%hat should : doOG

5Eu -ung replied6 GDour lordship/s forces should merelyassume a position there without attac@ing. 8eanwhile, : would

li@e permission to go to %u and persuade the ruler to rescue4u by attac@ing Ch/i. Dou could then employ your army torespond to their offensive.G

5/ien Ch/ang agreed and had 5Eu -ung proceed south on hismission, where he gained audience with u*ch/ai, @ing of %u.

5Eu -ung said6 G: have heard that a true @ing does note1terminate generations or a hegemon strengthen his enemies.A weight of a thousand tons can shift when but a few ounces

are added. #ight now the state of Ch/i, with its ten thousandchariots, and my own state of 4u, with its thousand, arestruggling with %u for supremacy. )' : am afraid that you willbe endangered by this conflict. owever, rescuing 4u wouldresult in a glorious name, attac@ing Ch/i would produce greatprofits. Nothing would be more advantageous than dispellingthe worries of the feudal lords above the Ssu #iver ande1ecuting brutal Ch/i in order to bring about its subFugation to

mighty Chin. Bven the wise would have no doubts about thefame that would be achieved for preserving the lost state of 4uand actually putting strong Ch/i in straits.G

u*ch/ai replied6 GB1cellent. Although we once engaged D9eh incombat, isolated their forces, and then defeated them at -/uai*chi, the @ing of D9eh has disciplined himself through enduringgreat

*++*

suffering, nurtured his warriors, and harbors a burningintention to avenge himself. ) %ait until we attac@ D9eh, andthen : will heed your words.G

5Eu -ung said6 GD9eh/s strength does not e1ceed 4u/s, nor does%u/s might e1ceed Ch/i/s. :f you defer attac@ing Ch/i to stri@eD9eh, Ch/i will have already pacified 4u. 8oreover, yourmaFesty was Fust now concerned with garnering a name forpreserving the lost and continuing the e1tinguished, whereasattac@ing the small state of D9eh while being frightened of
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mighty Ch/i is not courageous. Now the courageous never avoidhardshipM the benevolent do not impoverish the straitenedM thewise do not lose the momentM nor do @ings e1tinguishgenerations**all Fust to establish their righteousness.Preserving D9eh would display your benevolence to the feudallords, while rescuing 4u by attac@ing Ch/i would impose yourawesomeness on Chin. 5he feudal lords would then inevitablybe compelled to lead each other to pay court to %u, andhegemony will thus be achieved.

GNow your maFesty must certainly hate D9eh. : would li@e to goeast for an audience with -ou*chien, @ing of D9eh, to convincehim to dispatch troops to support you. 5his will truly emptyout D9eh, although the image will be of following the otherfeudal lords in this concerted attac@ on Ch/i.G Blated, the @ingof %u then had 5Eu -ung go to D9eh.

-ou*chien, @ing of D9eh, had the roads cleared, went to meethim in the suburbs, and thereafter personally escorted him tothe guest house, where he as@ed, G ow is it that such a greatofficial has deigned to so dishonor himself with a visit to ourunciviliEed stateOG

5Eu -ung replied6 G: have Fust persuaded the @ing of %u torescue 4u by attac@ing Ch/i. e wants to do it but fears D9ehand so said, /%ait until : attac@ D9eh, and then it will bepossible./ 5hus the destruction of D9eh is therefore certain.Now to not have any intention to repay %u ?for permitting yoursurvival but yet cause them to have doubts is stupid. 5o beintent on ta@ing revenge against others but let them @nowabout it is disastrous. 5o allow the discovery of affairs that

have not yet been initiated is dangerous. 5hese three are greatworries in underta@ing affairs.G

-ou*chien bowed twice and said6 G ormerly : failed to calculateour strength, engaged %u in combat, and ended up being indifficulty in -/uai*chi. 5he pain of this e1perience haspenetrated my very bones. $ay and night : have gritted myteeth and parched my mouth, see@ing only to engage the @ingof %u in a fatal struggle. 5his has been my wish.G

*+)*


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5hereafter he further


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court. Now we happened to hear that your maFesty intends tounderta@e great affairs, to e1ecute the mighty and rescue thewea@, put brutal Ch/i in difficulty and sustain the house ofChou. D9eh re


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%u/s armies. 5he @ing of D9eh learned of it, forded the DangtEe#iver, and suddenly attac@ed %u, encamping seven @ilometersfrom the capital. 5he @ing of %u heard about thesedevelopments, abandoned Chin, returned to %u, and engagedD9eh in battle at ive 4a@es. e failed to be victorious in threebattles and could no longer defend the city gates. D9eh/s forcesthen surrounded the @ing/s palace, @illed -ing u*ch/ai, ande1ecuted Chancellor Po P/i. 5hree years after destroying %u,D9eh faced east and became recogniEed as hegemon. 5husonce 5Eu -ung ventured forth, he preserved 4u, brought chaosto Ch/i, destroyed %u, and achieved hegemony for D9eh. 5Eu-ung/s single mission caused the strategically powerful statesto destroy each other, and within a decade each of the five

states e1perienced significant changes. )>

*+&*

5Eu -ung loved real estate speculation and was able to profitfrom the material changes of the times. e enFoyed spea@ingabout people/s good points but was unable to conceal theirerrors. e fre


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term/s meaning throughout Chinese history. As the Shih Chi summariEed, G0nce 5Eu -ung ventured forth, he preserved 4u,brought chaos to Ch/i, destroyed %u, and achieved hegemonyfor D9eh.G

*+;*

2The Spring andAutu&n Period

5 B :#S5 PB#:0$ 0 C :NBSB :S50#D for which narrativematerials become available, @nown as the Spring and Autumnperiod after the annals that chronicle it, is normally dated from

++ to >" (.C. 5he terse Ch#un Ch#iu KSpring and AutumnAnnalsL, traditionally said to have been personally edited byConfucius to reflect his moral approbation of political behaviorduring an increasingly turbulent period and serve as ahandboo@ for future generations, becomes comprehensible only through its three classic commentaries, the famous Tso Chuan and the comparatively ignored ung -ang and u 'iang .(ecause all three were composed during the subse


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established by the Chou dynasty after their con


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:n the Spring and Autumn period cities were largely isolated,scattered about a rural countryside still mar@ed by maForwoods and e1tensive marshes. 5ransportation and mountedcommunication were limited to o1*drawn carts and wagons,horse*drawn carriages, and military* style chariots. All threemodes were e


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per day compared with the slowest messenger/s rate of twentyto forty and a normal transmission time for vital informationbetween states of several days.

Unli@e later historical periods when, for e1ample, messages are

said to have been hidden in wa1 or rice balls**a developmentfacilitated by the discovery and populariEation of paper in thelate an dynasty**little information has been preserved aboutcommunication techni


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messenger himself not only had to be physically present toverbaliEe his report, but also had to be in a conscious,unimpaired condition. Anyone suspected of conveying covertinformation could easily be detained, poisoned, or otherwiseslain en route, the contents then irretrievably lost. :n contrast,messages committed to writing e1isted independently of theiroriginators or carriers and could be passed from person toperson, forwarded innocuously, even un@nowingly, withoutarousing suspicion, especially when buried amongmerchandise being plied by the itinerant traders increasinglycommon in the period.

Naturally such difficulties with communication means andmodes not only restricted the range of possible covert activities,but also made the passing of information from clandestinesources to their consumers more difficult, often necessitatingperilous face*to*face contact. An informant, traitor, or agentmight have vital information but nothing at hand beyond adining plate upon which to write. 5his conFures up imaginativescenes of people desperately trying to wedge bul@y dishes oreven valuable items into a dead drop outside a privy wall orburying them in a stable/s straw for later retrieval where somebump@in might suddenly stumble upon them Although theadvent of paper obviously facilitated clandestinecommunications, mere inconvenience and difficulty neverdeterred the truly determined, particularly when the fate of thestate or vast rewards lay at sta@e.

Ter&inology and Agents:n an age that basically lac@ed organiEed intelligence staffs ordistinctly defined functions, information had to be gatheredfrom every available source. Particularly important would havebeen the relatively few travelersM emigrants, although lowsocioeconomic status would generally have precluded access tovital informationM diplomatic missions, tas@ed with bothspecific evaluative missions and general observationMmerchantsM and defectors from among the military and nobility.

5he Tso Chuan depicts a wide range of intelligence activities,

the practice of which can easily be followed down through theages and will be again


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*)'*

5he first truly important character, tie, is composed from theclassifier or radical for GwordsG or GspeechG and a right handcomponent for the foliage of a tree, prompting speculation Kbut

no historical evidenceL that it first referred to someoneconcealed in a tree covertly listening to or observing others6

Although tie does not appear in the Ch#un Ch#iu itself, itfunctions both as a noun, referring to Gspies,G and a verb,meaning Gto spy upon,G in the Tso Chuan . :n addition, tie alsodesignates reconnaissance scouts inconspicuously observingthe enemy, much li@e such ordinary terms as Gobserve,G

Gwatch,G or even Ginvestigate.G 5he first of seven usages in the Tso Chuan occurs in a passagechronicling events that occurred in '' (.C.6 G:n invadingChiao, Ch/u/s armies divided up to ford the P/ang #iver. 5heforces from 4uo, wanting to attac@, sent Po Chia to spy onthem. 5hree times he went round their encampment, countingthem.G " (ased upon this account, Po Chia obviously passedamong Ch/u/s forces in some sort of disguise in order to

estimate their total numbers, part of the essential informationneeded for the process of assessing battlefield options underChina/s classic approach to warfare.

5he ne1t entry, for ;;; (.C., sees the term being employed fora reconnaissance scout that Cheng dispatched to determineCh/u/s position after having successfully repelled their assaultbut remaining undecided about retreating themselves. ! %henCheng/s scout 2tie3 observed birds about Ch/u/s encampment, ina very basic piece of military intelligence codified later, heconcluded that it was empty, sufficient evidence to deduce that
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Ch/u/s forces were in retreat. K5he possibility that they hadbeen deliberately feeding the birds to attract them seems not tohave arisen. ' L owever, the nature of his report implies he didnot actually enter the enemy encampment to verify hisdeduction and, although presumably ma@ing his observationsearly in the morning**the troops having dispersed during thenight**offers no confirmatory indication of the e"> (.C. right at the end of the Spring andAutumn period similarly indicate a spy from 4u reported onenight that Ch/i/s forces had withdrawn following a disordered

battlefield retreat at the end of the day. L#ecords of the famous episode of appro1imately ;)& (.C. thatestablished $u@e %en of Chin/s great credibility indicate thatafter he besieged the city of D9an for three days and was visibly prepared to abandon the siege in accord with his earlier publicproclamation, a spy 2tie3 came out and reported the city wasabout to fall. K(ecause sieges were difficult, e1pensive, anduncertain, employing subversives to both undermine the city/sdefenses and provide information about wea@ points in thefortifications, the defenders, and provisions was of paramountimportance. 5his accounts for the presence of a Chin agentwithin D9an.L

:n the Tso Chuan the term tie also appears in %u 5Eu*hs9/sdiatribe Kalready mentioned in the section on early historyLdirected against granting a peace treaty to the Fust van (.C., needing to fi1 the e1act date, Chindispatched a covert agent, a tie, to Cheng, but this clandestinecourier was caught in the first recorded e1ample of Chinesecounterintelligence because a staff member bitter over ill

treatment had betrayed the heir apparent, resulting in thelatter being secretly watched by local Cheng agents. )
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inally, an entry for ;' (.C. illustrates the wor@ing alliancesthat occurred between indigenous Chinese states and so*calledbarbarian steppe peoples even in anti


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(sien /s Kchien /sL meaning evolved over the subse*

tivities of sowing dissension within the court, estranging rulersfrom their ministers, and besmirching successful generals andmeritorious officials. ; rom this basic image also derives thee1tended usage of Gpeering into a creviceG**discerning the moonthrough the crac@ and otherwise learning what lies insideclosed doors**and thus to spy on from without. Bventuallyhsien , the primary pronunciation of the character with moon,came to mean Gleisure,G Gidleness,G or Gspare time,G shedding

the earlier meanings e1cept in arcane language. owever,perhaps in response to this shift an even more comple1
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character evolved, redundantly placing the signifier for GeyeG tothe left of the original character6

Also pronounced hsien , meaning Gto watchG or Gspy on,G itappears in the famous "encius .

:n some eighty occurrences of the original character hsien inthe Tso Chuan Kand virtually none in the other commentariesL,only four une


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*);*

:n at least one Tso Chuan passage it clearly means Gtoclandestinely observe,G ++ but the definitive use appears in the

famous %arring States te1t on the nature, practice, andpsychology of the rites or normative forms of behavior, the li, @nown as the 'i Chi, in connection with a story about 5Eu an6

%hen an armed guard at the east gate of Sung died, the City8agistrate, 5Eu an, entered his house and wept tears of grief.An agent from Chin, having secretly observed 4chan5 this,reported bac@ to the mar


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their counterparts and local servants. An early e1ample of adeliberate evaluative mission occurred in ;; (.C.6

:n the winter Chung*sun Ch/iu went from Ch/i on a mission toobserve 4u/s difficulties ?following the ruler/s assassination .

After he returned, he reported, GUnless they get rid of Ch/ing u?the murderer , 4u/s difficulties will never end.G

G ow can he be eliminatedOG the $u@e as@ed.

Chung*sun replied6 GSince the difficulties are unending, he willperish by himself. Can you not wait for itOG

GCan we seiEe 4uOG the du@e in


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ascertain the conditions in Sung. Upon his return he made ahighly negative report based upon the contiguous state ofCh/en/s disregard of proper diplomatic protocol and theirneglect of agriculture and public wor@s, fundamental activitiesthat would have to be organiEed and administered by the stateif it was to survive. $u@e 4ing, whose debauched demise isretold in this section of our study as well, was another sorrye1ample of the myopic rulers who fervently destroyed theglorious heritage entrusted to them. 5he detailed criteria that$u@e 5an systematically applied in ma@ing his politicalassessment, although illuminating in themselves, subse


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GAccording to the instructions of the former @ings, when therainy season ends, the roads should be clearedM when waterdries up, the di@es are completedM when the season for treesand grass is ended, they are prepared for storageM when frostappears, winter clothes are readied. %hen clear winds blow,the city/s inner and outer walls and its palaces are repaired.

5hus the regulations of the sia dynasty ?employed even todaystate, /:n the ninth month clear the roads, in the tenthcomplete the bridges./ 5he seasonal rescripts state6 /Afterharvesting, winnow the wheat. %hen the year star is in theying constellation, earth wor@s are underta@en. %hen mars isfirst seen, assemble under the directors of villages./ 5his wasthe way the former @ings bespread their Iirtue throughout the

realm without ma@ing fiscal e1penditures. Now mars wasvisible when : was in Ch/en, but the roads were almost bloc@edwith vegetationM the fields seem to have been abandonedM themarshes were not yet ban@edM and the rivers lac@ed pontoonbridges. 5hey are neglecting the instructions of the former@ings.

G5he regulations of Chou include6 /Array rows of trees in orderto mar@ the roads, establish way stations in order to watch theroads./ Cities had pastures in the outer suburbs, the bordershad permanent loo@outs. $ried marshes provided tall grass,state gardens had trees and pools in order to prepare againstdisaster. All the remaining land was planted in grain, and thepeople never hung up their hoes. 5he fields did not have weeds.

5he people/s agricultural seasons were not interfered with, nordid the state see@ the people/s labor. 5here was abundancewithout lac@, ease without e1haustion. 5he states were

ordered, the districts disciplined. Now in the state of Ch/en theroads cannot be recogniEed,

*)!*

the fields are covered with grass. 5heir grains, althoughmature, remain unharvested, while the people e1haustthemselves in ease and pleasure. 5hus they have abandonedthe laws and regulations of the former @ings.

G5he #oyal 0ffices of Chou state6 /%hen a high*ran@ing envoyfrom an enemy state arrives, the captain of the customs barrierinforms the ruler about it. 5he director of guests greets him


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with his credentials. An usher guides them to the capital, ahigh minister comes forth to in'*


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G5he former @ings e1erted themselves to lead the people withIirtue, yet they still feared nearly committing transgressions.ow can anyone who abandons their instructions and castsaside their regulations, insults their offices and contravenestheir edicts, preserve their stateO $welling amid four greatstates and yet lac@ing these four, how can Ch/en long endureOG

:n the ;' (.C. year $u@e 5an went to Ch/enM two years later$u@e 4ing was @illed at the sia mansionM the following yearthe @ing of Ch/u e1terminated Ch/en.

Agriculturally based societies such as China in the early si1thcentury (.C. were much subFect to the vagaries of weather andclimate and therefore relied for their very e1istence upon

carefully prepared calendrical materials that included detailedinstructions for initiating seasonally appropriate actionscorrelated with celestial phenomena. ailure to observe theadmonitions and prohibitions, even without une1pected rainsor drought, could result in crops damaged by frost in thespring or grains insufficiently mature for harvesting in the fall.

5hus, in his report 5an siang was very precise in describingCh/en/s failure to meet autumn/s progressive responsibilities

and therefore concluded that the government could not survive.+&

The Hsing en 5heoreticians writing in the 5/ang observed that the firstadministrative official operationally responsible for underta@ingintelligence activities in China was the (sing$6en of the Choudynasty. A title composed of the characters for hsing , meaning

Gto travelG or Gperform some action,G and 6en , GmanG or Ghumanbeing,G the post and its duties seemed to have varied from stateto state and the circumstances of the moment rather thansystematically evolving over time. Bvery state that modeled onChou bureaucratic organiEation employed (sing$6en ,sometimes several, and while ran@ing in power and prestigebelow the prime minister, they still resided at the ape1 ofpower, often as functionally significant as the early specialiEedministers for war and wor@s. As with many Chinese terms, nosimple Bnglish e


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encompassed everything from simple messenger, in which caseit was not a titled position, through diplomatic courier, protocoldirector, secretary of state, and foreign minister.

5he Chou 'i K#ites of ChouL, an idealiEed reconstruction of

Chou administrative offices and practices probably composedlate in the

*> *

%arring States period, enumerates several criticalresponsibilities for both the Jreat (sing$6en and 8inor (sing$

6en 6

5he Ta (sing$6en ?Jreat (sing$6en administers the rites forimportant visitors and the formal ceremonies for maFor guestsdesigned to gain the intimacy of the feudal lords. ?5hrough hisauspices , in the spring the @ing of Chou assembles the feudallords at court to plan the affairs of the realm and in theautumn holds audiences to compare the achievements of thevarious states. :n the summer he holds court to display theplans of the realm, and in winter convenes them in order toharmoniEe their thoughts. Seasonal assemblies are held in

order to publiciEe the prohibitions applicable throughout thefour


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5he (siao (sing$6en ?8inor (sing$6en administers the rites oftribute for the submissive states and thus attends to theemissaries from the four +*

its, and harm to the myriad people are all recorded in a boo@. 5he customs and ceremonies, government affairs, instructions,administrative measures, as well as adherence to and violationof instructions and prohibitions, are to ma@e up another boo@.

5hose among the feudal lords who are contrary, perverse,brutal, chaotic, conceal hidden plots, or violate edicts are tocompose one boo@M deaths and mourning, famines andimpoverishment, another boo@M and health, happiness,harmony, and tran


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indicates that apart from his basic role as an observantemissary, intelligence gathering was a dedicated function.

5herefore, it might be concluded that China/s first official staffposition with intelligence responsibilities was the (siao (sing$

6en , operating within the purview of the Ta (sing$6en . +;

#ecords preserved in the Ch#un Ch#iu and Tso Chuan , whileproviding a more historically grounded portrait of (sing$6en activities, essentially substantiate the claim that they shouldbe considered not only China/s first official covert agents, butalso its first intelligence directors. owever, their primary rolewas simply and probably originally that of a messenger,whether between states or enemies on a battlefield. + Accordingly, in such situations the title might be translated asGmessengerG or Gcourier,G although when deputed with full statesanctification Genvoy,G Gemissary,G or GambassadorG is moreappropriate and even e1plicitly Fustified by the Tso Chuan1 :nfact, the ung -ang commentary to the Ch#un Ch#iu emphasiEesthat one is termed a (sing$6en only when acting on officialbusiness, not private concerns. +" owever, the three titles Fustmentioned imply discretionary powers within the parameters of a defined mission rather than a mere verbatim presentation ofa message from a ruler or prime minister to foreigncounterparts. Presumably the messenger would not only returnwith a reply or in the company of someone bearing a reply, butalso carefully scrutiniEe the reactions of those receiving themessage,

*>)*

note the situational conte1t, and mar@ other relevant facts for

subse


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enemy encampment, might naturally have been frightened,protocol should have dictated that he be returned unharmed,suggesting he was actually observing their preparations andevaluating their ability to sustain renewed combat. )'

:n their role as couriers and envoys several (sing$6en wereseiEed and even @illed, implying the e1istence of clandestineaspects to their official roles, whatever the ostensible reasonsfor their detention. A number of nonfatal e1amples are alsorecorded, states such as Chin, Ch/u, or Ch/in detaining (sing$

6en and seiEing those who violated their territory withoutpermission while crossing to a third state. ) Commenting onthe Ch#un Ch#iu entry that GCh/u seiEed Cheng/s (sing$6en ,4iang siao,G the Tso Chuan notes that Cheng had dispatchedemissaries to announce a shift in allegiance from Ch/u to Chin,resulting in the envoys being detained, and adds that the Ch#un Ch#iu refers to them as (sing$6en because they were officialambassadors. K%oeful were the prospects for bearers of such illtidings L After they were held for more than a year, 4iang siaoand his companion finally persuaded Ch/u/s ruler that he wasonly subverting Ch/u/s purposes by frustrating their mission,thereby further estranging Cheng and allowing the remaininglords there a comparatively free hand. )+

:n another prominent incident the Tso Chuan e1plains that theGmen of Chin seiEed the (sing$6en from %ei, Shih 8ai,G because%ei, under Shih/s leadership, had successfully mounted anattac@ on 5s/ao, Chin/s client state, the year before. Althoughsmoldering hatred triggered this precipitous action, of greaterinterest is the (sing$6en# s

An unfortunate envoy from the peripheral southwestern stateof Pa was seiEed and e1ecuted by border peoples in the minorstate of 5eng

*>>*
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while en route there from Ch/u, eventually precipitating a battlebetween a Pa*Ch/u coalition force and 5eng/s army. )& owever,cases also arose in which (sing$6en were the hapless victims ofviolence directed against them because of strife arising withintheir home states or some action in the greater diplomaticarena. or e1ample, Ch/u seiEed and e1ecuted Ch/en/s envoyeven though Gthe guilt did not lie with the (sing$6en .G ); Atypical Ch#un Ch#iu entry for &' (.C. that laconically states,GCh/i seiEed %ei/s (sing$6en , Pei -ung*chieh, in order to invade%eiG is e1plicated by the Tso Chuan 6 G5he mar


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may be seen in three specific historical instances. irst, whenthe $u@e of Shen departed from %u after completing hismilitary mission, he deputed his son to act as %u/s (sing$6en and thus control all its communications with foreign states. >+ Second, the historically famous %u 5Eu*hs9 was appointed as(sing$6en when he fled to %u, a post he retained throughouthis career Gso as to plot against Ch/u.G Although this vengefulplotting clearly was confined to the court, he certainlyconsulted on state affairs in general and may also havetraveled, much as he did to Ch/i late in life, on missions hecould have subverted to this purpose had o*l9 not also beenin favor of an aggressive, e1pansionist policy. >) Det until therise of -ing u*ch/ai and machinations of the traitor Po P/i, his

influence and power were une


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%henever Cheng had some pending matter with the feudallords, 5Eu Ch/an in;

rom this description Cheng (sing$6en , while nominallyprotocol directors, were clearly masters of foreign information,essentially state intelligence directors as detailed in the Chou 'i definition of the (siao (sing$6en /s duties. 5Eu D9/s own famederived from his superlative performance in e1ecuting foreignmissions, handling visiting dignitaries, gathering andevaluating information, and planning state affairs, as befits aTa (sing$6en . >

The !u# or Clandestine Shepherd

A (an$shih Wai$chuan passage asserts that an official calledthe "u ** a term meaning GshepherdG**should be established forthe steppe and tribute regions and charged with intelligencegathering responsibilities6

5he @ing must establish two shepherds for each of the four


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lawsuits that have not been decided e!

:n all other cases the term refers to shepherds, herders, fodderoverseers Kserving in the


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assault on Sung/s forces and defeated them, prompting Ch/i towithdraw as predicted. &&

:n ;>& (.C. when Chin and Ch/in were about to engage inanother of the numerous battles that would occur over the ne1t

century, Chin dispatched an Chien to watch Ch/in/s army. eadvised, G5heir army is fewer than ours, but their elite warriorsare twice as many.G &;

China/s first recorded active reconnaissance probe**a techni!*

%u Ch/i**is for ;)' (.C. & 5hat spring a force from Chin madea limited incursion into Cheng to determine whether it could besuccessfully invaded or not. &" Apparently the results inspiredconfidence because they besieged it in alliance with Ch/in thatautumn.

(arbarian peoples of the steppe region somehow were also wellinformed about the northern plains states**no doubt throughtraders and other contacts along a very porous border, as wellas diplomatic missions**and fre


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realiEe their obFectives, often with une1pectedly adverseconse


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perhaps counterfeit traitors providing false information to theenemy/s advantage, such as the case of -ung*shan Pu*niu, oneof the rare e1amples preserved in the Tso Chuan 6 G5he du@e of%u, being about to attac@ 4u on behalf of the minor state ofChu, in


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macerating rushes in the river to ma@e mats and accused himof polluting their water. 5herefore, when %u/s army arrived, hewillingly led it inland to attac@ and subFugate %u*ch/eng. ;>

Although the rich and powerful naturally commanded the

attention of historians and state scribes, disaffected defectorsincluded many ordinary people**such as the mat*ma@er in theforegoing incident**who acted as local guides, spies, and evensubversives out of a variety of motivations.

Another oft*cited e1ample unfolded toward the end of theSpring and Autumn period6

:n autumn, -ao a of Ch/i led the army to attac@ the minor

state of Ch9. 5he prince of Ch9 fled to Chi*chang, so -ao ahad Sun Shu go to attac@ it. 4ong before, the prince of Ch9had @illed the husband of a local woman. %hen she grew old,the widow had cast her lot with the city of Chi*chang. ?Seeingthese developments, she plaited a rope that matched theheight of the city wall and then stored it away. %hen Chi/sforces arrived, she ?secured it and tossed the end over the wall.Someone pointed it out to Sun Shu, who had his men ascendit. %hen some si1ty had successfully climbed up, the ropebro@e, but then the army beat the drums and set up a clamorwhile the men already on top of the city wall also began yelling.:n terror the prince of Ch9 opened the west gate and fled. Ch/i/sforces then entered the city of Chi*chang. ;&

A particularly dramatic recounting of the pernicious effects ofdefectors appears in Sheng*tEu/s persuasion directed towardCh/u/s prime minister, one designed to gain readmittance forhis e1iled friend %u Ch9. ;; 0bserving that Ch/u had beenadversely impacted by defections to other states**a devastatingtrend much remar@ed upon later in Chinese history, essentially one the world/s first Gbrain drainsG**he e1pounded threeimportant e1amples, e1plicating their bac@grounds and severeconse


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Ch9 and Sheng*tEu. %u Ch9 married a daughter of Prince8ou. %hen the du@e of Shen fled and Prince 8ou alsodeparted, it was said that %u Ch9 had actually escorted themaway. %u Ch9 therefore raced off to the state of Cheng andwas about to venture on to Chin when he encountered Sheng*tEu, who was similarly bound for Chin on a diplomatic missionin the suburbs of Cheng. Spreading out some reeds, they satupon the ground and ate together, discussing whether %u Ch9could somehow be restored to his position in Ch/u. Sheng*tEusaid6 GContinue your Fourney, : will certainly get you restored.G

%hen Sheng*tEu reached the state of Sung, siang s9 was Fust calming relations between Ch/u and Chin. Sheng*tEucompleted his mission to Chin and then commenced his returnby first going to Ch/u. 5here the prime minister, 5Eu 8u,spea@ing with him, in


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rewards. %hen they were about to impose punishments theydid not hold any ban


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impressed for combat, send one bac@. Select your bestweapons and array the chariots. eed the horses with grainand ta@e brea@fast while in your tents. After the army hasdeployed burn the encampment because tomorrow we shallengage in final combat./ ; 5hose returning to Chin set off, andthe prisoners from Ch/u were also released. $uring the nightCh/u/s army collapsed. Chin then compelled the surrender ofP/eng*ch/eng and restored it to Sung, ta@ing D9 Shih bac@ toChin with them. Ch/u/s loss of the Bastern Di and the death of

5Eu sin both resulted from Dung*tEu/s efforts.

G 5Eu an and the du@e of Shen *

relations between Chin and %u. 8oreover he went on amission to %u, where he instructed the people how to rebelagainst the power of Ch/u. e taught them the martial artsrelated to charioteering, including driving, racing, andemploying bows, as well as how to ma@e swift invasions.8oreover, he had his son -u Dung become (sing$6en in %u.%u then attac@ed your subFect state of Ch/ao, seiEed yourdistrict of o, con


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and New Armies, will certainly be able to van


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reasonably successful in its ongoing efforts to contain Ch/u, forvarious reasons it sought to develop a counterbalance to Ch/u/sascending might. :n &"> (.C. the ruler was therefore happy todispatch the du@e of Shen**apparently at his own suggestion**with one hundred or more elite warriors and perhaps ninechariots to %u for the e1press purpose of introducing thechariot and instructing them in land warfare tactics. Althoughhis visit mar@ed a military turning point and at leastsymbolically brought %u into the realm of civiliEed states, %u/sgrowing strength clearly suggested the possibilities of such amission. owever, the direct military impact of the du@e ofShen/s chariot instructions was probably limited because navaland infantry forces continued to predominate.L

5he du@e of Shen/s diplomatic mission mar@ed two importantdevelopments6 he was the first Gguest adviserG to be honored in%u, thereby initiating a practice that would later see %u 5Eu*hs9 and Sun %u entrusted with power, and his visit entangled%u in an alliance with Chin, thereby ensuring its future enmity with Ch/u. :ncreasingly e1tensive clashes between Ch/u and %uin fact commenced in &"> (.C. when Ch/u sought to occupythe region between them and %u mounted a preemptive stri@eagainst Ch/u/s client state of s9. 5hereafter, over the ne1t si1decades battles occurred at least every few years as they bothstrove to dominate the region, with %u emerging victoriousfrom every significant encounter. 5hese repeated defeats forcedCh/u to constantly reassess its military organiEation andmethods, to rebuild and retrain its forces. As the decadespassed, %u commenced increasingly aggressive actions againstCh/u/s cities, forcing them to underta@e massive defensive

preparations from &)" (.C. on, including the construction ofcity walls and other fortifications. %u also benefited fromCh/u/s brutal suppression of minority peoples and smallerstates, readily e1ploiting their hatred and antagonism toac


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the other feudal lords in order to conduct campaign ofrectification against the guilty. Now if you bring sia Chi into

your palace, it will be because of avarice for her beauty. Avaricefor beauty is licentiousness, and licentiousness is a greatoffense.G & %hen the @ing reluctantly yielded, 5Eu an soughtto possess her, prompting the du@e of Shen to similarly pointout that she was the most cursed of women and e1claim6G uman life is truly difficult, how can one avoid deathOowever, there are many beautiful

*& *

women in the realm, so why must you have this oneOG 5Eu annaturally desisted as well, and the affair seemed at an end

when the @ing married her off to one of his officers Kwho thendied in battle, allowing his own son to enFoy an illicitrelationship with her as wellL.

owever, the du@e of Shen had apparently become entrancedby her beauty and through a comple1 subterfuge managed topersuade her to marry him, e1tricate her from e1ile, and Foinher outside Ch/u when he supposedly undertoo@ a militarymission to Ch/i. 5hereafter the couple fled to Chin, where theyresided


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is basically irrelevant because later generations of thin@ers,politicians, generals, and schoolchildren all learned the storyfrom the Analects itself. :t was an unruly time, and 4u itselfsuffered from internal conflict as three powerful, nonroyalfamilies contended for power. %hen Confucius began toachieve visible progress, the prospect of 4u achieving socialorder**one of the ac@nowledged foundations of a strong state**engendered fear in the mighty state of Ch/i6

5he du@e of Ch/i said6 G:f Confucius controls the government in4u, its ruler will certainly become hegemon. :f 4u is going toattain hegemony, since our territory is contiguous with theirswe should pay our respects first and present them with someland.G

4i 5su said6 G4et me first try to impede Confucius. :f : fail toobstruct him and we then sacrifice some territory, how will itbe too lateOG

5hereupon 4i 5su selected eighty beautiful women from amongCh/i/s young ladies, all of whom were dressed in embroideredclothes and could both dance and play elegant music. e thenchose thirty teams of dappled horses to convey them to thestate of 4u. After arriving, 4i 5su had the female musicians andhorses all arrayed outside the high gate in the city/s south wall.Chi uan*tEu went in disguise to observe them two or threetimes and was about to accept them when he suggested to theruler that

*&!*

he should wander among them. 5he ruler went and stared at

them for a whole day, neglecting government affairs. 5Eu 4usaid to Confucius, GNow you may leave G "

Confucius remained hopeful and didn/t depart until furtherincidents of governmental neglect, such as in the performanceof the sacrifices, one of the two great affairs of state with war,became manifest. 5he Analects tersely records that the rulerremained away from the court for three days in a paragraphthat countless millions memoriEed over the centuries6 G5hepeople of Ch/i presented female musicians and Chi uan*tEuaccepted them. or three days the ruler did not hold court and
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Confucius departed.G ! 5he fascination and appeal of beauty,subse


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have become increasingly arrogant and licentious. Superiorse1ploit the awesomeness of the laws and measures in order toupbraid and control those below them, while the people, totally e1hausted, view their superiors with annoyance for failing topractice benevolence and righteousness. 5hus superiors andinferiors compete in detesting each other and go on to murderand slay each other. 5his even results in the e1tinction ofe1tended families, all through concepts such as the rites andmusic. owever, the 3ung and Di are different. Superiorsencompass purity and virtue in dealing with inferiors, whileinferiors embrace loyalty and good faith in the affairs of theirsuperiors. Joverning the entire state is li@e controlling thebody. Since the people do not perceive the means of control, it

truly is the administration of a Sage.G$u@e 8u thereupon withdrew to


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*; *

monstrated with the @ing on several occasions but wentunheeded. :n addition, $u@e 8u repeatedly had emissariessecretly press Du D until he finally abandoned the 3ung and

surrendered to Ch/in. $u@e 8u then treated him with all thecourtesies due an honored guest and


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and shot him. %hen the invaders indeed arrived, the ruler wassleeping drun@enly beside a wine Far, so the troops tied him upand captured him alive.G ">

5he ac


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accomplishments and augmented the invader/s enmity. %e willcertainly perish in no time G Naturally the du@e, realiEing theenormity of his negligence, dispatched troops to recapture thethree commanders, but the pursuers succeeded only in hearinga sarcastic retort as the former captives crossed the river.#ather than being e1ecuted, they were in fact warmlywelcomed by the du@e of Ch/in and lived to distinguishthemselves in subse


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counterattac@ and defeated %u at -u*su, inFuring -ing o*l /stoe, so %u withdrew its army. o*l , who had developed aninfection from his wound and was near death, addressed eirApparent u*ch/ai, G%ill you ever forget that -ou*chien @illed

your fatherOG u*ch/ai replied, G: would not dare forget it.G 5hatevening o*l died. uch/ai was then enthroned as @ing,appointed Po P/i as Jrand Steward, and practiced warfare andarchery.

5wo years later he attac@ed D eh, defeating D eh at u*chiao.-ou*chien, @ing of D eh, with his remaining five thousandtroops ensconced himself on the heights of -/uai*chi, and hadthe high official %en Chung dispatched with generous gifts tosee@ peace through %u/s Jrand Steward Po P/i, offering tosubordinate their state as a menial subFect to %u. -ing u*ch/ai was about to give his assent when %u 5Eu*hsremonstrated with him6 G5he @ing of D eh is capable ofenduring great hardship. :f your maFesty does not e1terminatehim now, you will certainly regret it later.G :nstead of heedinghis advice, the @ing of %u employed Po P/i/s plans and madepeace with D eh.

ive years later the @ing of %u heard that $u@e Ching of Ch/ihad died and that Ch/i/s great ministers were contending forfavor. Since the new ruler was wea@, u*ch/ai mobiliEed %u/sarmy to go north and attac@ Ch/i. %u 5Eu*hs remonstrated6 G-ou*chien

*;>*

does not have two flavors in his food. e consoles the familiesof the dead and in


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masses to assist %u while greatly augmenting the treasuresthat he had presented to Po P/i. aving already received bribesfrom D eh on several occasions, Jrand Steward P/i/s love andtrust for D eh became ever greater, and day and night he spo@eon D eh/s behalf to the -ing of %u. 5he @ing trusted andemployed Po P/i/s plans.

%u 5Eu*hs remonstrated6 GNow D eh is an abdominal illness. 5oday you trust their specious phrases and false behaviorwhile coveting Ch/i. :f you destroy Ch/i, it will be li@e gaining aroc@y field, of no utility. 8oreover the /Announcement of P/an-eng/ said6 /:f there are those who overturn, overstep, or aredisrespectful to my orders, then cut off their noses, utterlye1terminate them. Bnsure that they will not leave behind anyposterity, do not allow their seed to be moved to this city./ 5hisis how the Shang arose. : would li@e your maFesty to abandonCh/i and give priority to D eh. :f you do not, you will e1perienceimmeasurable regret.G

(ut the @ing did not listen, and sent %u 5Eu*hs to Ch/i. %hen 5Eu*hs was about to return to %u, he addressed his son6 G:have remonstrated with the @ing several times, but the @ing

has not employed my plans. : now perceive that %u is lost. or you to perish together with %u would be of no advantage.G 5hen he entrusted his son to Pao 8u of Ch/i, and returned toreport to %u.

%u/s Jrand Steward Po P/i had already had disagreements with 5Eu*hs , so he slandered him6 G5Eu*hs /s character is hard andbrutal, of little charity, suspicious and malevolent. : fear hisenmity will cause great disaster. Previously your maFesty

wanted to attac@ Ch/i, but 5Eu*hs felt it was not possible. :nthe end your maFesty attac@ed it with great success. 5Eu*hswas ashamed that his strategies had not been employed, so hereacted with rancor. Now that you are again about to attac@Ch/i, 5Eu*hs alone opposes and strongly remonstrates againstit. e obstructs and slan

*;&*

ders those in authority and would reFoice if %u should bedefeated since his own plans would then prevail. Now yourmaFesty is himself going forth, assembling the entire military


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force of the state in order to attac@ Ch/i. (ecause 5Eu*hs /sremonstrances have not been heeded, he declines to participateand feigns illness and inability to travel. Dour maFesty must bepreparedM for this to turn into a disaster would not be difficult.

G8oreover, : dispatched men to secretly observe him. %hen hewas an emissary to Ch/i, he entrusted his son to the Pao clan of Ch/i. Now he is a minister who within has failed to attain hisambition and without relies on the feudal lordsM who personally acted as the former @ing/s minister for planning but now is notused. e is constantly discontented and resentful. : would li@e

your maFesty to plan for it early on.G

5he @ing of %u said6 GNot only do you spea@ about it, : also

have doubted him.G 5hen he had an emissary present %u 5Eu*hs with the Shu*l sword, saying, GDou should use this to die.G

%u 5Eu*hs loo@ed toward eaven and sighed6 GAlas 5heslanderous minister Po P/i causes chaos, but the @ing turnsaround and e1ecutes me : caused your father to becomehegemon. %hen you had not yet been established as heirapparent and the various princes were contending for thedesignation, : engaged in a death struggle on your behalf withthe former @ing. Dou almost were not established. %hen yougained the throne, you wanted to divide the state of %u withme, but : wouldn/t dare hope for it. Det now you listen to thespeeches of sycophants and thereby @ill your elders.G

5hen he instructed his retainers6 GDou must plant my gravewith catalpa trees in order that they may be used for coffins.And gouge out my eyes and suspend them above %u/s eastgate so that : may see D eh/s invaders enter and destroy %u.G

5hen he cut his throat and died. %hen the @ing of %u heardabout it, he was enraged and seiEed 5Eu*hs /s corpse, stuffed itinto a leather sac@, and floated it out onto the DangtEe #iver.

5he people of %u pitied him, so they erected a shrine above theriver. 5hereafter it was called G8ount s .G

%hen the @ing had e1ecuted %u 5Eu*hs , he proceeded toattac@ Ch/i. 5he Pao clan of Ch/i assassinated their ruler $u@e

5ao and set up Dang Sheng. 5he @ing of %u wanted to mount apunitive e1pedition against the brigands but was not victoriousand abandoned it. 5wo years later he summoned the rulers of


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4u and %ei to a meeting at 5/ao*@ao. 5he year after heconvened a great meeting of the feudal lords in the north atDellow Pool, forcing

*;;*

the Chou to come. -ou*chien, @ing of D9eh, suddenly attac@ed,@illing %u/s heir apparent and destroying his forces. %hen the@ing of %u heard about it, he returned and had envoys arrangea truce with D9eh w

Documents

Sawyer R. D. - The Tao of Spycraft. - 1998