SABER ENGAGING THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN …wbgfiles.worldbank.org/documents/hdn/ed/saber/supporting_doc/...ENGAGING THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN EDUCATION SABER Country Report 2015 Policy Goals

Tanzania

ENGAGING THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN EDUCATIONSABER Country Report

2015

Policy Goals for Independent Private Schools Status

1. Encouraging Innovation by ProvidersCentral government has legal authority to set minimum standards for teachers anddetermine class size. Central government also has the legal authority over how thecurriculum is delivered. The school has the legal authority to determine teacher salarylevels, and to appoint and dismiss teachers without review from central authorities.

2. Holding Schools AccountableGovernment sets standards for what students need to learn, by when, and how well.Standardized exams are administered in select grades annually. Governmentrequires schools to undergo a standard term inspection. Inspection reports includestrengths and weaknesses of the school, specific priorities for improvement, andschools are required to submit a school improvement plan following the inspection.Sanctions include additional monitoring, and as a final measure school closuresbased on the results of school inspections.

3. Empowering All Parents, Students, and CommunitiesRegular information is provided to parents on standardized exam results. Studentsand parents are interviewed as part of the inspection process. The government doesnot provide tax subsidies or cash transfers for families attending private schools.

4. Promoting Diversity of SupplyThe government allows all of the following types to operate a school: community,not for profit, faith based, for profit. Certification standards that are not linked toeducation outcomes restrict entry, including facilities (separate science labs etc.)and assets (ownership of land and buildings). Registration/certification guidelinesare made public but from a single source. Schools are able to operate while payingtwo or three types of fees. Schools set fees, but are subject to review fromgovernment.

TANZANIA ENGAGING THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN EDUCATION SABER COUNTRY REPORT |2015

SYSTEMS APPROACH FOR BETTER EDUCATION RESULTS 2

IntroductionIn recent years, the private sector in education, includinga vibrant mix of for profit, non profit and faith basedorganizations, has grown significantly around the world.In the last two decades, the percentage of students inlow income countries attending private primaryschools doubled from 11 percent to 22 percent (Figure1). This growth in private provision is closely connectedto the boom in access that has taken place in low incomenations over the last two decades—primary netenrolment increased from 55 percent to 80 percentbetween 1990 and 2010.

As countries redouble their efforts to achieve learningfor all at the primary and secondary levels, the privatesector is a resource for adding capacity to the educationsystem. By partnering with private entities, the state canprovide access to more students, particularly poorstudents who remain largely unreached by existingeducation services (Pal and Kingdon 2010; Patrinos et al.2009; Hossain 2007). Additionally, evidence shows thatgovernments have been successful at improvingeducation quality and student cognitive outcomes inmany countries through effective engagement withprivate education providers (Barrera Osorio and Raju2011; French and Kingdon 2010; Barrera Osorio 2006).

Figure 1. Private enrolment as a percentage of total primaryenrolments, by country income level

Source: World Bank (2013)

This report presents an analysis of how effectively thecurrent policies in Tanzania engage the private sector inbasic (primary and secondary) education. The analysisdraws on the Engaging the Private Sector (EPS)framework, a product of the World Bank’s SystemsApproach for Better Education Results (SABER). SABERcollects and analyzes policy data on education systemsaround the world, using evidence based frameworks tohighlight the policies and institutions that matter most topromote learning for all children and youth.

SABER EPS research in Tanzania has found that access toprimary education is nearly universal; howeverenrolments at the secondary level are low. Challengesalso remain at the primary and secondary levelsregarding equity and quality. The private sector’s role inprovision of education exists mainly at the secondarylevel as a result of government policies restricting privatesector involvement in primary education. All non stateschools in Tanzania are ineligible for governmentfunding, and as such operate independently. Based on areview of existing policies and in order to meet thechallenges of access, quality, and equity, SABER EPSoffers the following recommendations for Tanzania toenhance its engagement with the private sector ineducation:

1. Consider public private partnerships at thesecondary level that target low income andmarginalized students in order to support equity;

2. Ensure that the regulatory environmentpromotes consistent quality in existing non stateschools.

The rest of the report provides an overview of SABEREPS, followed by a description of the basic educationsystem in Tanzania, with a focus on the private sectorand government policies related to private provision ofeducation. The report than benchmarks Tanzania’s policyenvironment utilizing the SABER EPS framework, andfinally offers policy options to enhance learning for allchildren in primary and secondary school.

Low income countries

Middle income countries

High income countries



Overview of SABER Engaging the PrivateSector

In many countries, the extent and activity of the privatesector in education is largely undocumented andunknown. SABER EPS is working to help change that.SABER EPS assesses how well a country’s policies areoriented toward ensuring that the services of non stateproviders promote learning for all children and youth.

The aim is not to advocate for private schooling. Theintention is to outline the most effective evidence basedpolicies specific to each country’s current approach ofnon state provision. SABER EPS assesses the extent towhich policies facilitate quality, access, and equity ofprivate education services. Data generated by SABER EPScan support governments in engaging private providersin their efforts to improve education results.

Four policy goals to engage the private sector

SABER EPS collects data on four key policy areas thatinternational evidence has found effective forstrengthening the accountability mechanisms betweencitizens, policymakers, and providers (see Box 1). Thesepolicy goals were identified through a review of rigorousresearch and an analysis of top performing and rapidlyimproving education systems.

The four policy goals allow the government to increaseinnovation and strengthen accountability between thecritical actors in the education system (Figure 2).Empowering parents, students, and communitiesenhances the ability of parents to express their voice andhold their policymakers accountable for results.Additionally, when parents are empowered, their clientpower is increased, and they have greater directinfluence over provider behaviors. Increasing schoolaccountability strengthens the quality and equityassurance mechanisms between the state and providers.Encouraging innovation and promoting diversity ofsupply on the other hand, allow providers to respond tolocal needs. Increasing school level autonomy overcritical decision making will improve the servicesprovided to students. Allowing a diverse set of providersto enter themarket will increase client power and enablecitizens to choose from a wider range of providermodels. By developing these policy goals, a governmentcan improve the accountability of all providers in thesystem, and subsequently have a positive impact oneducational outcomes.

Box 1. Key private sector engagement policy goals

i. Encouraging innovation by providers: Local decisionmaking and fiscal decentralization can have positiveeffects on school and student outcomes. Most highachieving countries allow their schools substantialautonomy over managing resources, personnel, andeducational content. Local school autonomy canimprove the power of the poor in determining howlocal schools operate.

ii. Holding schools accountable: If schools are givenautonomy over decision making, they must be heldaccountable for the outputs they produce. Increasesin autonomy should be accompanied by standardsand interventions to increase access and improvequality. The state must hold all providers in thesystem accountable to the same high standards.

iii. Empowering all parents, students, and communities:When parents and students have access toinformation on relative school quality, they have thepower to hold schools accountable and the voice tolobby governments for better quality services. Forempowerment to work equitably, options for parentsand students should not depend on wealth or studentability.

iv. Promoting diversity of supply: By facilitating marketentry for a more diverse set of providers,governments can increase the responsibility forresults, as providers subsequently become directlyaccountable to citizens as well as to the state.



Figure 2. Relationships of accountability for successful servicedelivery

Source: Adapted from World Bank (2003)

SABER EPS recognizes that all four policy goals will assistgovernments in raising accountability for the educationservices provided in their countries. The tool allowsgovernments to systematically evaluate their policiesand implement practices that have been shown to workacross multiple country contexts.

Four types of private provision of education

Across the world, governments can undertake numerousstrategies to support non state education provision forimproving educational outcomes. SABER EPSbenchmarks the key policy goals across the four mostcommon models of private service delivery:

1. Independent private schools: schools that areowned and operated by non governmentproviders and are financed privately, typicallythrough fees

2. Government funded private schools: schoolsthat are owned and operated by nongovernment providers, but receive governmentfunding

3. Privately managed schools: schools that areowned and financed by the government, butoperated by non government providers

4. Voucher schools: government provides fundingto the school the student chooses to attend;these can be government or non governmentproviders or both, depending on the system

SABER EPS analyzes laws and regulations to (i) identifythe types of private engagement that are legallyestablished in each country and (ii) assess eacheducation system’s progress in achieving the four policygoals. The aim is to provide policy guidance to helpgovernments establish strong incentives andrelationships of accountability between citizens,governments, and private education providers, with thesubsequent goal of increasing education results.

Benchmarking Education Policies: the SABER EPSMethodology

The World Bank has developed a set of standardizedquestionnaires and rubrics for collecting and evaluatingdata on the four policy goals for each type of privateschool engagement established within countries.

The policy goals are benchmarked separately for eachtype of private engagement in the country’s educationsystem. A point of emphasis here is that these tools onlyassess official and established policies governingprivate education provision. Additional tools arerequired to determine on the ground implementationof these policies. This information is compiled in acomparative database where interested stakeholderscan access detailed reports, background papers,methodology, and other resources describing howdifferent education systems engage with the privatesector: http://saber.worldbank.org/.

For each indicator within the four policy goals, thecountry receives a score between 1 and 4, representingfour levels of private sector engagement: 1 (Latent), 2(Emerging), 3 (Established), or 4 (Advanced) (see Figure3).

Figure 3. SABER rubric benchmarking levels

Source: World Bank (2013b)



The overall score for each policy goal is computed byaggregating the scores for each of its constituentindicators. For example, a hypothetical country receivesthe following indicator scores for one of its policy goals:Indicator A = 2 points; Indicator B = 3 points; Indicator C= 4 points; Indicator D = 4 points. The hypotheticalcountry’s overall score for this policy goal would be:(2+3+4+4)/4 =3.25. The overall score is converted into afinal development level for the policy goal, based on thefollowing scale:

Latent: 1.00 – 1.50Emerging: 1.51 – 2.50Established: 2.51 – 3.50Advanced: 3.51 – 4.00

The ratings generated by the rubrics are not meant to beadditive across policy goals. That is, they are not meantto be added to create an overall rating for engaging theprivate sector.

Use of the SABER EPS tool

The SABER tool is to be used not as prescriptive policybut rather as an informed assessment of the countrypolicies in reference to the current knowledge ofeffective approaches. The results of this benchmarkingserve as a good starting point for discussions of potentialpolicy options to be considered in light of the nuances ofthe local context and national education system.Education systems are likely to be at different levels ofdevelopment across indicators and policy goals. Whileintuition suggests it is probably better to be as developedin as many areas as possible, the evidence is unclear astowhether it is necessary to be functioning atAdvancedlevels for all policy goals. National education prioritieslay at the center of recommended policy options, andcountries may prioritize higher levels of development inareas that contribute most to their immediate goals.

Finally, the SABER EPS policy intent analysis focusesstrictly on policies that are in place in each country; itspurpose is not to review the implementation of thesepolicies. Acknowledging that practice often differs fromintent, further research is necessary to understand thechallenges and realities of implementation. The policyoptions offered in this report serve as a starting point forconsideration.



Education in Mainland Tanzania

Tanzania is a low income country in East Africa. With aGDP per capita of US$ 609 in 2012, it is one of the poorestcountries in the world. By 2007 national standards, 34out of 100 people were estimated to be poor (UnitedRepublic of Tanzania 2010). The population is estimatedat 44.5 million, of which about one million reside in thesemi autonomous Zanzibar. The Government ofTanzania is responsible for defense, external affairs,fiscal policy and monetary issues in the entire country,while Zanzibar has autonomy over development policy,including education.

Education in Mainland Tanzania follows a 2 7 4 2system, comprising 2 years of preprimary education, 7years of primary education, 4 years of lower secondary,and 2 years of upper secondary education. Primaryschool is compulsory and fee free, with the legal schoolentry age being 7 years. At the end of primary school,students take the Primary School Leaving Examination,upon which students are selected into secondary school.Lower secondary school is called Ordinary Level (OLevel), and upper secondary Advanced Level (A Level). Atthe end of O Level, students take the Certificate ofSecondary Education Examination (CSEE), the results ofwhich determine selection for A Level governmentschools (UNESCO and MoEVT 2012).

Tanzania made primary education fee free in 2002, andhas since nearly achieved universal primary education

In 1995, Tanzania had a net primary enrolment rate ofless than 50 percent. Enrolment had increased by 10percent by 2001, but dramatically expanded followingthe implementation of the fee free primary educationpolicy in 2002. During 2001 2006, enrolment increasedfrom 61 percent to 96 percent, surpassing even theinternational average for primary enrolment (Figure 4).

Figure 4: Primary enrolment rate (net), Tanzania, SubSaharan Africa, and international average, 1995 2008

Source: EdStats, World Bank 2014

Focus now needs to shift to secondary education,equity, quality, and ensuring that an expanding schoolage population can be accommodated in the system.

Despite Tanzania’s notable progress in expanding accessto primary education, there is now a need to focus onimproving access to secondary education, increasingquality across the board, and supporting equity ineducation. The Tanzanian education sector faces thefollowing challenges, as outlined by the TanzaniaEducation Sector Analysis (UNESCO and MoEVT 2012):

Increasing the public resources allocated tosecondary educationImproving access to and retention in secondarycyclesAchieving greater efficiency gains in the use ofpublic education resourcesEnsuring children enter primary school at theright ageSupporting pro poor schoolingTaking affirmative action to enhance girls’participation in school to ensure gender parityReducing disparities between regions, districtsand schools

Additionally, cross cutting challenges include the highproportion of youth in the population as well aspopulation growth. Under 15 year olds currently makeup around 44 percent of the total population. Thepopulation is estimated to grow by 32 percent between2010 and 2020. Although the share of youth is projected

98%

75%

89%

40

50

60

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100

1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009

Tanzania Sub Saharan Africa World



to remain the same, in absolute terms primary schoolswill need to accommodate nearly 2million children morein 2020 as compared to 2009. (UNESCO and MoEVT2012)

Access to secondary education has increased, but grossenrolment is still only 39 percent in lower secondaryand 4 percent in upper secondary.

Enrolment at both levels of secondary education hasincreased since 2000, with progress being madeparticularly in lower secondary education. At O Level,total enrolment increased from less than 250,000 in 2000to over 1.7 million in 2013. Most of this expansion hasbeen made possible due to the increased supply ofgovernment schools. At A Level, enrolment hasincreased more slowly, from around 24,000 students in2000 to 75,000 in 2013. The rate of enrolment in lowerand upper secondary in 2009 was 39 percent and 4percent respectively. Upper secondary enrolment inparticular is far below the average of Sub Saharan Africaand low income countries (Figure 5). (UNESCO andMoEVT 2012; MoEVT 2014a)

Figure 5: Secondary enrolment (gross), Tanzania (2009), lowincome countries and Sub Saharan Africa (2011)

Source: Tanzania: UNESCO andMoEVT 2012; LIC and SSA: EdStats, World Bank2014

The second National Strategy for Growth and Reductionof Poverty, published in 2010, sets the operationaltargets for increasing access to secondary education at45 percent net enrolment for lower secondary and 5percent net enrolment for upper secondary (UnitedRepublic of Tanzania 2010). The target for upper

secondary represents a mere 1 percent change from thecurrent situation.

Rural and poor children, and girls, do not have equalopportunities to access education, partly because ofindirect schooling costs to households.

Disadvantages tend to be cumulative, as noted by theTanzania Education Sector Analysis. Girls from poorhouseholds, living in rural areas are in the most unequalposition to access education: for every 100 rich urbanboys that complete primary school, only 53 poor ruralgirls do (UNESCO and MoEVT 2012).

Although household wealth is linked to attendance inprimary education, it has a dramatic impact on astudent’s ability to access secondary education (Figure6). Children from the wealthiest households are over sixtimes more likely to be enrolled in secondary schoolscompared with students from the poorest households(Figure 6). Children from rural areas are also at adisadvantage, partly due to the inadequate supply ofrural schools and the unavailability of nearby schools forsome rural children (UNESCO and MoEVT 2012).

Figure 6: Net attendance rate in primary and secondaryschool by income quintile, 2010

Source: EdStats, World Bank 2014

One reason why access to education is unequal is thathouseholds continue to bear indirect costs to education,such as spending on uniforms and books. Even forprimary education, households cover a quarter ofschooling costs, despite the fee free primary educationpolicy (UNESCO and MoEVT 2012).

54%

31%

49%

39%

4%0

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Lower secondary Upper secondary

Low incomecountries

Sub SaharanAfrica

Tanzania

8%

50%

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Quintile1

Quintile2

Quintile3

Quintile4

Quintile5

Primary

Secondary



In terms of achievement, poor and rural students aresignificantly behind their wealthier urban peers; inregional assessments Tanzania performs well.

Tanzania performs well in regional assessments, and haseven improved from 2000 to 2007. The Southern andEastern Africa Consortium for Monitoring EducationalQuality (SACMEQ) projects administered to 6th gradersshowed that Tanzania (mainland) was above the averagein both 2000 and 2007. The country also improved inboth Reading and Mathematics during this period. In2007, Tanzanian students performed the best in Reading(Figure 7).

Figure 7: Student performance in Reading in SACMEQ II andIII, selected participating countries

Source: SACMEQ 2014b

Despite Tanzania’s notable performance overall, thereare distinct differences in learning outcomes dependingon household wealth, geographic location (urban/rural),and gender. In the latest SACMEQ (2007), students fromrural households scored 44 points less than their urbanpeers in Reading, while the difference between thepoorest and wealthiest students was 56 points (seeFigure 8). It is important to note that a difference ofapproximately 50 points represents a difference of oneyear of schooling (Chitiga and Chinoona 2011).Accordingly, students from the poorest households areover a year behind their wealthiest peers in schooling. Adifference is also visible according to gender, with girls

falling slightly below the Tanzanian Reading average of578, and boys slightly above it (Figure 8).

Figure 8: Student performance in Reading, by types ofdisadvantage, Tanzania (mainland), 2007

Source: SACMEQ 2014

These differences in student achievement towards theend of primary school should be of great concern, asstudents are selected into secondary schools based ontheir performance in the Primary School LeavingExamination (Education and Training Policy 1995).Accordingly, it can be expected that poor and ruralstudents, and girls, are restricted in their access tosecondary education even at the stage of initialadmission.

Class sizes in Tanzania are high due to resourceconstraints and a shortage of teachers.

In 2009, the pupil teacher ratio in public primary schoolswas 55 to 1, surpassing the national target of 45 to 1. Inpublic secondary schools, the pupil teacher ratio was 49to 1 in 2009, compared to 23 to 1 in non state schools.Classrooms in Tanzania are crowded because of ashortage of teachers at both levels of education. Highteacher salaries can also be a constraint to recruitingfurther teachers. (UNESCO and MoEVT 2012)

In its National Strategy for Growth and Reduction ofPoverty, Tanzania is striving to lower the pupil teacherratios to 45 to 1 in primary education and 25 to 1 insecondary education (United Republic of Tanzania 2010).

420

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2000 2007

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Bottom25%

Top 25% Rural Urban Girls Boys

Householdwealth

Location Gender

Tanzania average



Although government has prioritized education in itsspending, allocations are unequal.Over the past decade, public expenditure on educationin Tanzania has increased: in terms of GDP, spendingincreased from 4.7 percent in 2004 to 6.2 percent in2010. This surpasses the average of both low incomecountries (4.2 percent in 2010) and Sub Saharan Africancountries (4.3 percent in 2010). (World Bank 2014)

While the above average spending is a positivedevelopment, secondary education is underrepresentedin allocations. Nearly half of all education spending wasallocated to the preprimary and primary sectors in 2009(46 percent), while 34 percent was spent on tertiaryeducation. Meanwhile, secondary education wasallocated only 17 percent of total spending in 2010,which decreased to 11 percent in 2011. The TanzaniaEducation Sector Analysis concluded that this spendingwas excessively low and far below countries that wereequally close to achieving universal primary education(UNESCO and MoEVT 2012).

Tanzania’s education spending has been noted to exhibitother inequalities in resource allocation. For example,teachers have been inequitably distributed betweenregions and districts, with teachers being concentratedin urban areas (United Republic of Tanzania 2010).Additionally, spending on basic education has thus farfocused too little on the quality of services (UNESCO andMoEVT 2012). For example, the National Strategy forGrowth and Reduction of Poverty noted that less than 25percent of planned school inspections were actuallybeing carried out. Hard to reach schools and schools thatneeded regular inspection were the least supervised(United Republic of Tanzania 2010).

Private Education in Mainland Tanzania

The Education Act only allows private schools toprovide technical education.

Private schools in Tanzania are legally only allowed toprovide education in technical fields. The Education Actof 1978 is the primary policy document regulating theprivate sector, and stipulates the following:

23. With effect from the commencement of thisAct, no person may establish a private schoolunless it is intended to provide nationaleducation wholly or mainly in technical fields oflearning.

Further,28. The Commissioner may refuse to register aprivate school if it appears to him:(a) that registration of that school would not bein the public interest;(b) that the school is not intended to providenational education wholly or mainly in technicalfields of learning;(c) that the school is not likely to be able in thenear future to provide national education whollyor mainly in technical fields of learning;

Consequently, the private sector mainly plays a role insecondary education, where its share is 17 percent oftotal student enrolments.

At the primary level, the share of enrolments in nonstate schools is negligible, around 1 2 percent (Table 1,Figure 9). In secondary education, students in non stateschools currently make up 17 percent of secondaryschool students (MoEVT 2014a). In this respect, Tanzaniais very much the average Sub Saharan African country –the average share of secondary private enrolments in theregion is 18 percent (World Bank 2014).

Two details are notable about the engagement of thenon state sector in secondary education. First, the shareof the sector has substantially decreased over the pastdecade: whereas private schools enrolled nearly 4 out of10 lower secondary students in 2004, they currentlyenroll just 16 percent of them (Table 1; MoEVT 2014a).At the upper secondary level, the share of non stateenrolment has similarly halved, from 49 percent in 2004to 24 percent in 2013 (Table 1; MoEVT 2014a). Non stateschools have not necessarily decreased in numbers, butrather the public sector has accommodated theexpansion in access to secondary school over the pastdecade. Second, although the private sector has beenplaying a decreasing role in secondary education overthe past decade, the share of enrolments at this level isstill notably higher than at the primary level (Figure 9).

Table 1: Share of students enrolled in non state schools inTanzania, 2004 2009

2004 2006 2008 2009Primary 0.6% 1% 1.3% 1.5%O Level 38% 27% 14% 11%A Level 49% 39% 36% 32%

Source: UNESCO and MoEVT 2012



Figure 9: Share of students enrolled in non state schools inTanzania, 2013

Source: Ministry of Education and Vocational Training 2014a

Further, the issue of access at the rural level highlightedabove can also be identified when looking at the nonstate schools in Tanzania. According to officialgovernment statistics, there is a divide in terms of thenumber of private schools in rural areas compared to thenumber of private school in urban areas (based on schoolcensus conducted by the Tanzanian Ministry ofEducation).

Non state schools in Tanzania are independent privateschools; they receive no government funding.

Non state schools in Tanzania are all independentprivate schools, as they are owned and operated by nongovernment providers and are financed privately,receiving no government support. Independent privateschools fall into three categories:

Islamic seminary schools: These are schools owned andmanaged by Islamic organizations. Their curriculumtypically includes Islamic studies. These schools are notallowed to discriminate on the basis of religion in studentadmissions, although students may be required to followbasic Islamic principles during their studies. In February2014, there were 44 Islamic (secondary) seminaryschools in Tanzania.

Christian seminary schools: These are schools ownedand managed by Christian organizations. Theircurriculum typically includes Christian studies. Legally, asfor Islamic organizations, these schools are not allowedto discriminate on the basis of religion in studentadmissions. By February 2014, there were 32 Christian(secondary) seminary schools in Tanzania.

Schools owned by non government organizations:These are schools owned and managed by individualorganizations. Most are registered as not for profitorganizations, although a few may operate for profit.These form the majority of private secondary schools inTanzania, numbering 968 in February 2014 (about 97percent of all private schools).

The National Strategy for Growth and Reduction ofPoverty envisions a role for the non state sector inservice delivery to the poor.

The National Strategy for Growth and Reduction ofPoverty emphasizes scaling up the role and participationof the private sector “in priority areas of growth andpoverty reduction” (United Republic of Tanzania 2010).The National Strategy also sees a role for the privatesector in improving public service delivery to the poorand vulnerable. To achieve this, required governmentinterventions include “providing special incentives to theprivate sector in order to motivate it to invest inunderserved locations and in businesses that support thepoor and vulnerable” (United Republic of Tanzania2010).

1.8%

14% 13%

26%

18%

22%

27%

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

Standard

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Form

1 2 3 4 5 6

Primary Secondary



Benchmarking Mainland Tanzania’s PrivateSchool PoliciesThis report presents the results of SABER Engaging thePrivate Sector for independent private schools, asTanzania (mainland) has decided to involve theseproviders in offering basic education services. The reportdiscusses the benchmarking results against theestablished recommended practices. For moreinformation on the global evidence underlying thesepolicy goals, see the SABER framework paper, WhatMatters Most for Engaging the Private Sector inEducation (Baum, Lewis, Lusk Stover, and Patrinos 2014).A rubric explaining the criteria for the score categoriesfor each indicator is included in the Annex of this report.

The main policies, laws and official documentation usedto benchmark Tanzania (mainland) include:

Education Act of 1978Education and Training Policy of 1995Education Sector Development Programme2008 2017Teachers’ Service Agreement, Regulation 120Guidelines for Schools SupervisionWhole School Inspection Checklist

Goal 1: Encouraging Innovation by Providers

The highly particular and contextualized nature ofeducation delivery necessitates decision making at theschool level. In order to be aware of and adapt tochanging student needs, school leaders requireautonomy over the most critical managerial decisions.

The methodologically rigorous studies assessing theimpacts of local school autonomy on student learningoutcomes generally find a positive relationship(Hanushek and Woessmann 2010; Bruns, Filmer andPatrinos 2011). A few studies find evidence that localautonomy for school leaders is associated with increasedstudent achievement, as well as reduced studentrepetition and failure rates (King andÖzler 2005; Jimenezand Sawada 2003; Gertler, Patrinos, and Rubio Codina2012).

Box 3. International best practice: Encouraging innovationby providers

Teacher qualification standards are set at the schoollevel.Appointment and deployment of teachers are decidedat the school level.Teacher salary levels are set at the school level.Dismissals of teachers are decided at the school level.How the curriculum is delivered is decided at theschool level.Class size decisions are made at the school level.Management of operating budgets is conducted at theschool level.

Encouraging Provider Innovation in Tanzania

Levels of Development

Independent private schools:

In Tanzania, education policies for independent privateschools are Emerging, demonstrating some instances ofgood practice.

Teacher standards are set by central government forboth government and non government schools.Curriculum delivery is similarly determined centrally forall schools by the Tanzania Institute of Education:“The Tanzania Institute of Education (TIE) shall beresponsible for pre primary, primary, secondary schooland teacher education curriculum design, development,dissemination, monitoring, and evaluation.” (Educationand Training Policy, 6.2.1.)

Maximum class sizes are also centrally determined forboth government and non government schools. For bothprimary and secondary school, the maximum class size is40 (MoEVT 2012).

Independent private schools are currently autonomousin setting teacher salaries, and deploying and dismissingteachers. This is part of the decentralization ofmanagement that is outlined in the Education andTraining Policy:

4.3.1. “Ministries responsible for education andtraining shall devolve their responsibilitiesof management and administration ofeducation and training to lower organs andcommunities.”



Private schools deploy teachers directly from the labormarket and teachers are normally employees of specificschools. Schools can dismiss teachers within their ownregulations, but, like all employers, they must abide bythe Labour Relations Act, 2004. Similarly, private schoolshave autonomy over setting teacher salaries, as long asthey follow guidelines established in the labor laws. Thepolicies that grant such autonomy for private schools arepresently informal.

Goal 1: Encouraging Innovation by Providers

Independent Private Schools

Item Score Justification

Who has legalauthority to setteacher standards?

LatentCentral governmenthas legal authority toset minimumstandards forteachers.

Who has legalauthority todetermine teachersalary levels?

AdvancedThe school has thelegal authority todetermine teachersalary levels withoutgovernment review.

Who has legalauthority to appointand deploy teachers?

AdvancedThe school has thelegal authority toappoint teacherswithout review fromcentral authorities.

Who has legalauthority to dismissteachers?

AdvancedThe school has thelegal authority todismiss teacherswithout governmentreview.

Who has legalauthority todetermine howcurriculum isdelivered?

LatentCentral governmenthas the legal authorityover how thecurriculum isdelivered.

Who has legalauthority todetermine maximumclass size?

LatentCentral governmenthas the legal authorityto determine classsize.

Based on the benchmarking results for EncouragingInnovation by Providers, the potential policy options forTanzania include the following:

Strengthen the regulatory environment around thenon state sector, so that policies which are currentlyinformal (such as certain provisions of schoolautonomy) are stipulated in policy documents.

Allow schools to determine their own standards forhiring teachers.

Increase the flexibility of schools to adjust class sizesand the curriculum to fit available school resourcesand needs of the local community.

Goal 2: Holding Schools Accountable

On average, students perform better in schools withhigher levels of accountability to the state(Abdulkadiroglu et al. 2011; Carnoy and Loeb 2002;Woessmann et al. 2007; Hanushek and Raymond 2005).For non state providers, when government funding istied to accountability standards, schools are incentivizedto perform more efficiently (Barrera Osorio and Raju2010; Patrinos 2002). A strong accountability systemrequires that government, parents, and educationalprofessionals work together to raise outcomes. Thegovernment must play a role in ensuring that superioreducation quality is delivered in schools.SABER EPS assesses multiple policy indicators todetermine a country’s level of development in regards tonon state provider accountability. A list of the keyindicators is provided in Box 4.

Box 4. International best practice: Holding schoolsaccountable

Government sets standards regarding what studentsneed to learn, including deadlines for meeting thesestandards.Students are required to take standardizedexaminations; results are disaggregated by school,socioeconomic status, gender, etc.Schools are required to report on the use of publicfunds as a condition for continued funding.Government or an external agency performsinspection of schools as determined by school need.Schools produce school improvement plans.School performance is tied to sanctions and/orrewards.



Holding Schools Accountable in Tanzania


Independent private schools:

Tanzania’s policies for holding independent privateschools accountable are Advanced, demonstrating bestpractice in engaging the private sector.

The government sets standards for what students needto learn, and determines by when and how well.Students must pass a series of examinations to proceedto the next level in their education (Education andTraining Policy 1995). These standardized examinationsare administered at four points during the basiceducation cycle:

Grade IV: Standard Four National ExaminationGrade VII: Primary School Leaving ExaminationForm IV: Certificate of Secondary EducationExaminationForm VI: Advanced Certificate of SecondaryEducation Examination

All exams are prepared and administered by the NationalExaminations Council of Tanzania (NECTA).

The results of these standardized exams aredisaggregated by school, gender, region, and schoolownership (government or non government).

Policy outlines that all schools in Tanzania are to beinspected at least once a year. The only governmentdepartment that is mandated to conduct schoolinspection countrywide is the School InspectorateDivision which is divided into several sections, includinga Primary Education Inspectorate Section and aSecondary Education Inspectorate Section. The PrimaryEducation Inspectorate Section performs the followingactivities (MoEVT 2014b):

1. Set targets, guidelines and coordinate inspectionof pre primary, primary, special educationschools, adult and non formal educationcenters;

2. Inspect and recommend strategies for improvingthe quality of pre primary, primary, specialeducation schools, adult and non formaleducation centers and monitor theirimplementation;

3. Evaluate relevance and effective use ofinstructional materials used in pre primary,

primary, special education schools, adult andnon formal education centers; and

4. Inspect and recommend for registration ofprimary schools.

In practice, the Division has been facing resourceconstraints, and nearly half the schools were notinspected at all in 2013 (MoEVT 2014a).

According to the School Inspection Checklist, schoolinspections focus on the following aspects:

1. Infrastructure2. Human resources3. Management and administration4. School revenue and expenditure5. Staff development6. School community relations7. Sports and extra curricular activities8. Guidance and counselling9. Curriculum implementation10. School culture

Inspection reports outline strengths and weaknesses ofthe schools, and recommend priorities (Guidelines forSchool Supervision and School Inspection Checklist). Inpractice, schools are also required to submit animprovement plan.

Sanctions can be imposed on schools and include higherlevels of supervision, and, in extreme cases, cancellationof the school registration and takeover of the school bygovernment. The Education Act (art. 29) stipulates that aschool’s operating license can be cancelled a) on any ofthe grounds on which registration could have beenrefused in the first place, b) if the manager or owner ofthe school has committed an offence against theEducation Act, c) if the school has ceased to exist, or d) ifthe school has failed or is not likely to succeed in the nearfuture to provide national education wholly or mainly intechnical fields of learning.

If a school is taken over by the government, the latter isrequired to pay reasonable compensation to the ownerof the private school. In accordance with The EducationAct (art. 30), the government can take over a schoolunder these circumstances:

1)Where, in the opinion of theMinister, any privateschool:(a) has failed to provide national education whosecategory, nature or level is in the public interest; or



(b) has been closed or its registration has beencancelled and it is not likely to be reopened; or(c) the owner or manager is no longer able tomaintain the school; or(d) the service and facilities provided at the schoolwould be enhanced for the benefit of the public if itwere a public school.

The Minister of Education may, after consultationwith the Minister for Finance, by order published inthe Gazette, require the owner or manager of thatschool to hand over to the Commissioner themanagement and maintenance of the school.

3) Upon the takeover by the Government of anyprivate school the Government shall pay suchcompensation to the former owner or manager ofthe school as the Minister for the time beingresponsible for finance shall consider to be fair,taking into account all relevant circumstances.

Informed by the results of the benchmarking procedure,the following suggested policy options would helpTanzania increase the accountability of private schools:

Move towards a needs based inspection systemin order to reallocate resources to schools thatneed the most attention;Clarify the regulatory environment aroundimprovement plans, to make sure that schoolsare required to submit one as part of theinspection process.

Goal 3: Empowering all Parents, Students, andCommunities

Empowering parents, students and communities forms afoundational piece of providing quality learningopportunities for all students. Poor and marginalizedchildren and youth disproportionately lack access toquality education services. To overcome this obstacle,governments need to increase providers’ accountabilityto all clients, and to underserved groups, in particular.Educational access and performance of schools andstudents can be substantially impacted by openlydisseminating comparable school performanceinformation (Andrabi, Das, and Khwaja 2009; Pandey,Goyal and Sundararaman 2009; Björkman 2007; Reinikkaand Svensson 2005), increasing parental influence in theschool (Skoufias and Shapiro 2006; King and Ozler 2005;Jimenez and Sawada 1999; Gertler, Patrinos, and RubioCodina 2008; Di Gropello and Marshall 2005), andoffering demand side interventions such as scholarships,vouchers, or cash transfers for the most vulnerablestudents (Orazem and King 2007; Filmer and Schady2008; Lewis and Lockheed 2007; Patrinos 2002; BarreraOsorio 2006). The effective policy practices for non stateproviders include some of the indicators listed in Box 5.

Goal 2: Holding schools accountableIndependent Private Schools


Does government setstandards on whatstudents need to

learn and by when?

AdvancedGovernment does setstandards for whatstudents need to learn,by when, and how well.

Are students requiredto take standardizedexams, with resultsbeing disaggregated?

Advanced Standardized exams areadministered in selectgrades annually, andresults aredisaggregated.

Are school inspectionsperformed asdetermined by schoolneed?

EstablishedGovernment requiresschools to undergo astandard terminspection.

Does the inspectionreport outline thestrengths andweaknesses of theschool?

Established

Inspection reportsinclude strengths andweaknesses of theschool and specificpriorities forimprovement.

Are sanctionsadministered basedon the results ofschool inspections orperformance onstandardized exams?

Advanced

Sanctions includeadditional monitoring,and as a final measureschool closures based onthe results of schoolinspections orperformance onstandardized exams.



Box 5. International best practice: Empowering all parents,students, and communities

Information on standardized tests and schoolinspections is made available from multiple sources.Parents and students are included in the inspectionand improvement planning processes.Admission processes for entry into publicly fundedschools are not based on student background; alottery is used in cases of oversubscription.School choice is not hindered by financialcontributions.Tax subsidies, scholarships, or cash transfers areavailable to families attending independent privateschools

Empowering all Parents, Students, andCommunities in Tanzania


Private independent schools:

In Tanzania, policies for independent private schoolswith regard to empowering parents, students, andcommunities are Established.

The Education and Training Policy outlines the centralrole of parents in education:

4.3.4. “Parents are invaluable allies to theteachers. Where there is a good teacherparent relationship, the development of thepupils is enhanced. The success of sucheducation and training institutions is asmuch the concern of parents andcommunities as the teachers.”

Students and parents are interviewed as part of theinspection process (Whole School Inspection Checklist).However, the government is not required to give parentsor students access to inspection reports. Wheninformation is made available, it is through school noticeboards, letters to parents, or through a school newsletteror newspapers. Schools are ranked according to theresults of school inspections, but the public can onlyaccess these rankings by request.

Parents receive information on standardized exams thatis disaggregated by gender, school, region, and schoolownership. National examination results are issuedannually by NECTA and are available from thegovernment website and newspapers.

There are no programs in place to provide informationon standardized exam results to hard to reach groups.An attempt to prepare results in Braille format has yet tobe realized. Schools are ranked based on theirperformance in standardized exams. These statistics areavailable online from the National Examinations Councilwebsite.

Tanzania currently offers no tax subsidies or cashtransfers for families attending independent privateschools.

Goal 3: Empowering all Parents, Students, andCommunities

Independent Private Schools


Are standardizedexam results andinspection reportsprovided regularly toparents?

EstablishedRegular information isprovided to parents onstandardized examresults or inspectionreports.

Are parents andstudents interviewedas part of theinspection process?

AdvancedStudents and parentsare interviewed as partof the inspectionprocess.

Does the governmentprovide tax subsidiesor cash transfers forfamilies attendingindependent privateschools?

LatentThe government doesnot provide tax subsidiesor cash transfers forfamilies attendingprivate schools.

Informed by the results of the benchmarking procedurefor Tanzania, the following suggested policy optionswould help empower parents and students to influencethe quality of education services provided by privateschools:

Consider improving the comparable informationon the quality of schooling that is provided toparents, with specific attention on hard to reachgroups.

Consider strengthening the policy environmentaround equity, to ensure that low income andmarginalized students have equal opportunities.Options that could be considered includevouchers or public private partnerships (PPPs),with safeguards for ensuring equity built intothem.



Goal 4: Promoting Diversity of Supply

By opening choice options to a more diverse set ofproviders, governments can increase client power andmake providers directly accountable to students andparents for results. Although the public sector will alwaysremain an important (and in most cases thepredominant) provider of education services,educational choice can be used as part of a package ofreforms to improve education access and quality in bothpublic and private sectors (Hoxby 2003; Levin andBelfield 2003; De la Croix and Doepke 2009; McEwan2002; Himmler 2007; Angrist et al. 2002; World Bank2003). In order to facilitate quality improvementsthrough increased school competition and choice,governments can allow multiple types of providers tooperate; promote clear, open, affordable, andunrestrictive certification standards; and makegovernment funding (and other incentives) available tonon state schools. This policy goal aims to increase theability for diverse providers to provide educationservices. In order to do this, a number of policy indicatorsare suggested, as represented in Box 6.

Box 6. International best practice: Promoting diversity ofsupply

Government allows different types of providers tooperate a school.Certification standards do not prohibit entry into themarket.Information on requirements to enter the market isavailable from multiple sources.Regulatory fees do not prohibit entry into the market.Publicly funded non state schools and public schoolsreceive equivalent student funding; funding isincreased to meet specific student needs.Government provides incentives for market entrysuch as access to start up funding, public land andpublic buildings.Schools are able to plan budgets six months precedingstart of academic year.Privately managed schools are not restricted bystudent numbers, school numbers, or location.Government does not restrict tuition levels for privateindependent schools.

Promoting Diversity of Supply in Tanzania


Private independent schools:

In Tanzania, the policies in place to promote diversity ofsupply for independent private schools are Established,representing some instances of good practice.

Individuals, private organizations, and non governmentorganizations are legally permitted to own and operateprivate schools in Tanzania. These can be community,not for profit, faith based, or for profit providers.

Guidelines for registration are published only in theEducation Act No. 25 of 1978. Criteria for registering aprivate school in Tanzania relate to the safety andsuitability of buildings, facilities, and equipment; teacherqualifications and conditions of work; and the gap thatthe proposed school will fill in educational services. Theapplicant also needs to indicate ownership of buildingsand land in the registration form for new providers. Intotal, there are 14 criteria upon which a school can bedenied registration, including the following:

28. The Commissioner may refuse to register a privateschool if it appears to him:

a) that registration of that school would not be inthe public interest;

b) that the school is not intended to providenational education wholly or mainly in technicalfields of learning;

c) that the school is not likely to be able in the nearfuture to provide national education wholly ormainly in technical fields of learning;

d) that there would be any danger to persons usingthe premises of the proposed school arisinginside or outside those premises or that therewould be a risk of that danger;

e) that the premises of the proposed school are, orare likely to be unsanitary or unsuitable for aschool;

f) that the proposed school does not conform toany regulations made under this Act;

g) that the qualifications and experience of theproposed teachers are not adequate to ensurethe efficient conduct of the school;

h) that the proposed terms and conditions ofservice of the teachers are not adequate toensure the efficient performance of their duties;or



i) that the premises of the proposed school or theequipment will not allow of effective tuition inthe subjects to be taught in the school; or

j) that adequate educational facilities already existin the area in which it is proposed to establishthe school.

These registration criteria, or rather justifications forrefusal to register a school, are opaque in the sense thatthey do not specify detailed minimum criteria. Forinstance, a school can be refused registration if “thepremises of the proposed school or the equipment willnot allow of effective tuition in the subjects to be taughtin the school”; however, what kinds of premises orequipment would allow effective tuition (teaching) is notstated.

Schools set their own tuition fees, but they are subject toreview from the government. The Education and TrainingPolicy outlines the following:

10.2.5. School and tuition fees, both governmentand non government education and traininginstitutions, shall be based on the actual unitcost of providing education and training ateach level.

10.2.6. School and tuition fees for non governmenteducation and training institutions shall beproposed by the respective owners andmanagers of these institutions and approvedby government.

In order to operate, independent private schools arerequired to pay an inspection fee of 5000 Tanzanianshillings (3 USD) per student per year, as well as anexamination fee of 15,000 Tanzanian shillings (9 USD) foreach student in a grade where standardizedexaminations are administered. The governmentrecently introduced an income tax and skillsdevelopment levy for all private schools.1

Goal 4: Promoting Diversity of SupplyIndependent Private Schools


Does the governmentallow multiple types ofproviders to operate aschool?

Advanced

The governmentallows all of thefollowing types tooperate a school:CommunityNot for profitFaith based

1 All information was obtained from interviews with the Ministry ofEducation in March 2014.

Goal 4: Promoting Diversity of SupplyIndependent Private Schools

For profit

Are there minimumstandards forregistration or forindependent privateschools to be allowed tooperate?

Established

Certificationstandards that are notlinked to educationoutcomes restrictentry, including oneof the three followingcriteria: 1. land(undulating, distancefrom public venuesetc.) or 2. facilities(separate sciencelabs, weather vanesetc.) or 3. assets(ownership of land orbuildings).

Are there guidelinesclearly publicized bymultiple sourcesoutlining therequirements for schoolregistration?

EstablishedRegistration/certification guidelines aremade public but froma single source.

Are schools able tooperate without payingfees?

Emerging Schools are able tooperate while paying2 or 3 types of fees.

Who has legal authorityto determine tuition feestandards?

EstablishedSchools set fees, butare subject to reviewfrom government.

Informed by the results of the benchmarking procedurefor Tanzania, the following suggested policy optionswould help to better promote diversity of supply forindependent private schools:

Ensure that registration guidelines are readilyavailable from multiple sources.

Ensure that certification standards are clear in theirminimum requirements and linked to educationoutcomes.

Consider reducing the number of fees that privateschools are required to pay.



From Analysis to Action: Policy Options forTanzania

Tanzania has made impressive progress in expandingprimary education since 2001, but access to secondaryeducation remains exceedingly low. In 2009, theenrolment rate for lower secondary school was 39percent, and a mere 4 percent for upper secondaryschool. More important, access to secondary schoolinghinges strongly on household wealth, with only 8 percentof poorest students being enrolled in secondary school in2010, compared to 50 percent of their wealthiest peers.Similar gaps are visible in student achievement,although, as a nation, Tanzania’s performance in regionalassessments has been impressive. Classrooms remaincrowded in the country, partly due to resourceconstraints and a shortage of qualified teachers. Further,there are a number of instances in the Tanzanianregulatory environment where quality could be betterinstilled as the primary guiding principle, especiallypolicies that deal with certification standards, schoolautonomy, inspection systems and improvementplanning.

As examined in the previous section, the status ofTanzania’s policies regulating the private sector ineducation range from an overall score of “emerging” forthe policy goal of encouraging innovation by providers,to “established” for empowering parents, students, andcommunities and for promoting diversity of supply, andlastly to “advanced” for holding schools accountable.

Based on the results of the SABER EPS benchmarking ofTanzania’s policies, there are two suggested policyoptions to strengthen the government’s engagementwith independent private schools to ensure learning forall:

1. Consider PPPs at the secondary level that targetlow income and marginalized students in orderto support equity;

2. Ensure that the regulatory environmentpromotes consistent quality in existing non stateschools.

These policy options are supported by internationalevidence, best practice, and examples of countries thathave used innovative interventions to improve from avariety of starting points.

Policy Option 1: Consider public privatepartnerships at the secondary level that targetlow income and marginalized students in order tosupport equity

Poor and marginalized children and youthdisproportionately lack access to quality educationservices. In Tanzania, only 8 percent of the pooreststudents had access to secondary education in 2010. Toovercome this obstacle, governments need to usevarious mechanisms to equalize opportunity. Tanzaniacould consider introducing public private partnerships(PPPs) that explicitly target low income and marginalizedstudents. Such a step would reflect Tanzania’s NationalStrategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty, whichsees a role for the private sector in improving publicservice delivery to the poor and vulnerable (UnitedRepublic of Tanzania 2010).

One form of PPPs that could be considered in theTanzanian context is government funded privateschools. This model could incentivize investment inunderserved locations and businesses that support thepoor—something that the National Strategy also notesas critical—but it could also be set up to specificallytarget poor and marginalized students, for examplethrough quotas. Quality assurance can also be ensuredthrough government funded private schools, as thecontinuation of funding can be tied to certain qualitystandards.

Another PPP option is for the government to providevouchers for poor students to attend the school of theirchoice, including private schools. However, carefulconsideration of the binding constraints to accessingsecondary education would have to be made beforeintroducing vouchers. As students are selected intosecondary schools based on the results of the PrimarySchool Leaving Examination, the binding constraint toaccess for poor and rural students might well be poorresults in addition to low affordability. Affordability is acritical challenge, but it may not be the only reason whystudents cannot access secondary education.

Targeting is critical for PPPs that expand access to poorand marginalized students without forgoing learningoutcomes. Evidence from Cambodia suggests that inorder to promote both equity and learning, it might bepreferable to take a ‘two step’ approach to targeting:first, target the poor, and second, among the poor, target



based on merit. These considerations should be made inboth the case of vouchers and possible quotas ingovernment funded private schools.

In order to further engage the private sector ineducation, the government of Tanzania should alsoconsider the extent to which its regulatory environmentcurrently promotes adequate supply of education. This isespecially salient in the context of population growth andmigration, which leads to rapid changes in demand foreducation in some areas. In certain cases, private sectorproviders may be better positioned than the publicsystem to rapidly respond to such demand. Tanzaniashould ensure that the regulatory environmentpromotes supply rather than restricts it.

i) Ensure that the regulatory environmentpromotes adequate supply

Tanzania should ensure that its policy environment doesnot hinder adequate supply. Currently, a new providercan be declined registration if it appears “that adequateeducational facilities already exist in the area in which itis proposed to establish the school” (Education Act1978). In a context of high population growth andmigration, it can be a difficult task for central authoritiesto keep up with the needs and demand for education. Arecent report by UNICEF suggests that the provision ofbasic services, including education, is not keeping pacewith demand in rapidly growing urban areas in Tanzania(UNICEF 2012). The current criterion may thereforeactually hinder the adequate supply of school places.Tanzania should reevaluate this criterion and ensure thatpolicies promote adequate supply of educationalservices.

ii) Support private schools throughgovernment funding mechanisms

Supporting government funded private schools entailspayments from the government to schools that areowned and operated by non government providers.Funding can come in the form of direct payments,bursaries, grants, subsidies, or the transfer of schoolresources such as textbooks or technological equipment.Ideally, funding is outlined through a contract or legaleligibility standards. In some cases private schools eitherenter into a formal contract or memorandum ofunderstanding with the government, or meetestablished eligibility criteria to receive funding.

These criteria can include, but are not limited to, factorssuch as (1) the amount of tuition charged to students; (2)school and student achievement outcomes; (3) class sizerestrictions; (4) curricular standards; and (5) for profit ornon profit status of the school.

In order to promote equity, government funded privateschools should not, by default, be allowed to selectstudents according to geographic location or academicability without consideration of students’ householdcharacteristics. Additional safeguards for ensuring equityfor low income and marginalized children could also bebuilt into the partnership. For example, governmentfunded private schools could be required to have a quotafor poor students, or the government could offer a ‘pupilpremium’ for each low income or marginalized studentin the school. As mentioned earlier, targeting is a keyconsideration in order to promote both equity andlearning.

Country example: Government funded privateschools

In Burkina Faso, a PPP was set up in order to increaseenrolment in lower secondary schools from 20 percent in2004 to 33.5 percent by 2009. Through this partnership,the government supported the construction andequipment of 80 private schools and hired and paid fortwo teachers per school. The schools aimed to reducedisparities in choice for secondary schools among theprovinces. The 18 provinces with the lowest coveragewould benefit from 70 percent of the program funding.These schools then operated at a lower cost than typicalprivate schools. No recurrent costs were incurred by thegovernment (World Bank 2006).

For more information on the Burkina Faso Post PrimaryEducation Project, see:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/05/6827171/burkina faso post primary education project

Country example: Quotas and Pupil Premium

As part of its Right to Education Act, India outlines that25 percent of places in private schools must be allocatedto economically weaker section (EWS) anddisadvantaged students (Government of India 2010).

For more information on the Right to Education Act see:http://mhrd.gov.in/rte.



In the UK, the government has introduced a pupilpremium to raise the performance of students fromdisadvantaged backgrounds. The government createdthe policy after it recognized that students’ level ofattainment was linked to their social circumstances. Inthe pupil premium scheme, the government awardsschools a grant (£900 in the 2013/14 financial year) foreach pupil who is deemed disadvantaged according toset criteria. An additional premium is added for studentsat the primary level (Government of the United Kingdom,2014).

For more information on the pupil premium, seehttps://www.gov.uk/government/policies/raising theachievement of disadvantaged children.

Country example: Targeting

In Cambodia, two evaluations of the impact ofscholarships for lower secondary school have shownsubstantial increases in school enrolment andattendance as a direct consequence of the programs.Recipients were 20–30 percentage points more likely tobe enrolled and attending school as a result of thescholarships. Impacts on learning outcomes were limited(Filmer and Schady, 2008, 2009 and 2011). A newapproach to scholarships at a primary level weresubsequently tried with two different targetingmechanisms, one based on poverty level and the otheron baseline test scores (“merit”). Both targetingmechanisms increased enrolment and attendance.However, only the merit based targeting inducedpositive effects on test scores. The results suggest that inorder to balance equity and efficiency, a two steptargeting approach might be preferable: first, target lowincome individuals, and then, among them, target basedon merit (Barrera Osorio and Filmer 2013).

For more information on scholarships in Cambodiaplease see http://wwwwds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2013/07/23/000158349_20130723155137/Rendered/PDF/WPS6541.pdf

iii) Use Vouchers to Fund Education for LowIncome Families

Voucher schools are a system where governmentprovides funding to the school the student chooses to

attend; these can be government or non governmentproviders or both, depending on the system. Voucherscan be targeted to certain populations or they can beuniversal for all students in the system. A Colombianprogram that offered school vouchers to low incomefamilies had positive impacts on student achievementand school completion (Angrist et al. 2002.) In theNetherlands, where there is a national voucher policy,school choice is used by the majority of parents, withover 70 percent of students enrolled in non stateschools. This includes families from across the incomespectrum (Koning and Van der Wiel 2010).

As mentioned earlier, the effectiveness of a voucherprogram in the Tanzanian context would need to becarefully considered because of the potentialperformance constraint to access. In the latest SACMEQ(2007), students from poor households scored 56 pointsless than their wealthier peers in Reading. Thisrepresents a difference of over one year of schooling(Chitiga and Chinoona 2011). Thus, vouchers can beexpected to have little effect in expanding access if lowincome students are not being accepted to secondaryschools due to their low grades.

Country example

In Pakistan, the Punjab Education Foundation launchedan Education Voucher Scheme (EVS) in 2006 to benefitchildren in less affluent and underprivileged areas, whootherwise could not access education due to financialand social constraints. The scheme was immenselypopular due to its positive effects on poorer segments ofsociety. The scheme enables children aged 4 17 years toattend a nearby EVS private school of their choice forfree. The scheme particularly targets out of schoolchildren, orphans, children of widows and single parents,as well as children who cannot afford school. There areno up front infrastructure costs, as existing schoolsexpress their interest in participating in the EVS. Apartnership between the school and the EVS isdependent on continuous quality assurance, includingschool visits and bi annual quality assurance tests (QAT)that assess improvements in student learning outcomes.(Punjab Education Foundation 2014)

Formore information on the Education Voucher Scheme,see http://www.pef.edu.pk/pef departments evsoverview.html.



Policy Option 2: Ensure that the regulatoryenvironment promotes consistent quality inexisting non state schools

There are a number of instances in the Tanzanianregulatory environment where quality could be betterinstilled as the primary guiding principle. The regulatoryenvironment for independent private schools currentlyincludes some provisions that are not directly linked toquality, including opaque minimum certificationstandards and restrictions on school autonomy.Meanwhile, the accountability mechanism does notspecifically target the most underperforming schools.The policies for minimum certification standards, schoolautonomy, as well as the accountability regime could allbenefit from strengthening.

For example, the minimum standards for certificationcould be reoriented to focus specifically on learningoutcomes. Additionally, policies around schoolautonomy could be strengthened, especially in light ofthe global evidence that school autonomy generally haspositive impacts on student performance. With regardsto school accountability, Tanzania currently has anadvanced mechanism for holding schools accountable,including standard term inspections and sanctions.However, the government of Tanzania could improve itsaccountability mechanism by focusing inspections on themost underperforming schools, as well as ensuring thatimprovement planning is enforced and made part ofofficial policy.

i) Ensure that certification standards are clearin their minimum requirements and linkedto educational outcomes

In Tanzania, schools currently need to fulfill numerouscriteria to be allowed to operate. Further, policy isopaque on the exactminimum requirements concerning,for instance, school premises and equipment.International research has shown that the schoolinfrastructure and pedagogical materials that have animpact on student outcomes are: adequate numbers oftextbooks, exercise books, desks, tables, chairs, andblackboards, as well as electricity and high quality walls,roofs, and floors (Glewwe et al. 2011). Out of the morecostly interventions, school libraries appear to have agenerally positive impact, while the impact of computersis less clear.

Tanzania should clarify the exact minimum requirementsfor new providers, and ensure that these are strictlylinked to health and safety of students, and educationaloutcomes. Additionally, guidelines for certificationshould be readily available from multiple sources.

Country example

In New York City (NYC), the Department of Educationoversees and supports new charter schools to improvelearning opportunities and meet community needs.Charters have the autonomy to determine their ownpolicies, design their educational programs, and manageall human and financial resource aspects of the school.When a new charter school is established, a five yearperformance contract, or a “charter”, is set up to ensurehigh student achievement. There are no set minimumcriteria for registration, but instead the performancestandards are organized under four guiding questions:

1. Is this school an academic success?a. High Academic Attainment and

Improvementb. Mission and Academic Goalsc. Responsive Education Programd. Learning Environment

2. Is this school a fiscally sound, viableorganization?

a. Governance Structure andOrganizational Design

b. School Climate and CommunityEngagement

c. Financial and Operational Health3. Is this school in compliance with its charter and

all applicable laws and regulations?a. Approved Charter and Agreementb. Applicable Federal and State Lawc. Applicable Regulations (such as safe

and secure school facilities)4. What are the school's plans for its next charter

term?a. School Expansion and Model

Replicationb. Organizational Sustainabilityc. School or Model Improvements

(Source: New York City Department of Education 2013)

For more information on charter school certification inNYC, see:http://schools.nyc.gov/community/planning/charters/Accountability_Oversight.htm.



ii) Strengthen policies around schoolautonomy

Overall, the methodologically rigorous studies assessingthe impacts of local school autonomy on student learningoutcomes generally find a positive relationship(Hanushek and Woessmann 2010; Bruns, Filmer andPatrinos 2011). International education research showsthat teacher credentials, including factors such as yearsof experience, certification, and education, fail to predictstudent learning (Dobbie and Fryer 2011; Goldhaber andAnthony 2004; Goldhaber and Brewer 2000; Hedges etal. 1994; Hanushek 1997).

In Tanzania, schools currently have the autonomy toappoint and dismiss teachers, as well as determineteacher salary levels. These currently informal policiescould be strengthened in official policy documents.Regarding other aspects of school autonomy, such asteacher standards, class sizes, and curriculum delivery,there are currently restrictions for independent privateschools. The highly particular and contextualized natureof education delivery necessitates decisionmaking at theschool level. In order to be aware of and adapt tochanging student needs, school leaders requireautonomy over the most critical managerial decisions.Tanzania could consider expanding the autonomy ofindependent private schools.

Country examples

Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC)Primary Schools currently serve over 670,000 students,64 percent of whom are girls. Students attending BRACschools do not pay fees. BRAC uses an innovative schoolmodel: the one teacher school is operated by the sameteacher for the same cohort of children for the entireperiod of four years. The teacher delivers lessons in allsubjects, and the length of the school day is based onlocal needs. A typical BRAC teacher is a femalecommunity member with 10 years of schooling(completed high school). Teachers undergo an initial 12day training course in order to repeat basic informationon teaching and learning and to enhance their teachingabilities. They subsequently participate in monthly,subject based refresher courses (BRAC 2013).

In England, private independent schools and privatelymanaged schools (known as Free Schools andAcademies) are able to make their own personneldecisions and adapt the curriculum. For example, someschools opt to use the government teacher standardswhile other schools tailor these to meet the needs of thelocal community. They are also able to tailor thecurriculum providing it is balanced and broad. Schoolsare still required to teach English, Mathematics andScience and to make provision for the teaching ofReligious Education (England Department for Education2013).

For more information about the Academies Act of 2010,see:http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/32/pdfs/ukpga_20100032_en.pdf

iii) Focus on improving the quality of the mostunderperforming schools by moving to aneeds based inspection system

A country’s accountability mechanism is crucial inensuring high quality service delivery. On average,students perform better in schools with higher levels ofaccountability to the state (Abdulkadiro lu et al. 2011;Carnoy and Loeb 2002; Woessmann et al. 2007;Hanushek and Raymond 2005). An effective inspectionprocess, including appropriate follow up, can be animportant means of school improvement.

Tanzania has an advanced accountability system, butresources could be more effectively used to improve thequality of the most underperforming schools. Everyschool is currently required to undergo an inspection atleast once a year, even if they are high performing.Tanzania could consider moving towards a needs basedinspection system, whereby the most underperformingschools are given the attention they need and highperforming schools are inspected less frequently.

Country examples: Inspection Process

In Malawi, the inspection framework covers privateindependent schools, religious schools, and publicschools. Schools are inspected once every two years.Malawi also has inspections based on need using thefollowing criteria:



a) Schools with poor examination resultsb) Schools which are poorly managedc) Schools which have not been inspected for more thantwo yearsd) High performing schools in order to learn the goodpracticesMalawi has four different types of inspection (Table 2).

Table 2: Types of inspection in MalawiType ofinspection

Objective Whocarries itout

Duration

Fullinspection

Evaluation of allaspects of theschool (curriculum,organization ofteaching andlearning, generalschooladministration anddocumentation,provisions ofbuildings andgrounds,equipment)

Team ofinspectors(3 6inspectorsdependingon size ofschool )

Full day

Follow upinspection

Evaluation ofextent to whichrecommendationsmade in the fullinspection reporthave beenimplemented

1 2advisors

2 hours

Partialinspection

Examination andevaluation of oneor a limitednumber of aspectsof the school life

1 2advisors

Dependsongravity ofaspect

Blockinspection

Improveinspectioncoverage ofschools in aspecific period oftime

6 8supervisorsfromdifferentdistricts

1 2weeks

Source: Government of Malawi

The inspection report includes the type of school visited,enrolment, staffing, and rating of school performance invarious aspects of the school and the general strengthsandweaknesses of the schools. After the inspection, staffmembers and the head teacher are briefed on the schoolfindings. This discussion gives a chance to the staff andhead teacher to start working on the weaknessesidentified in the school.

In the Netherlands a new risk based inspectionframework was introduced in 2007. The new inspectionmechanism aims to reduce the burden felt by schoolsandmakes inspections more effective. Schools deliveringa good education (no risks detected) and good results donot require inspection, allowing the Inspectorate tofocus on the rapid improvement of schools that supply apoorer education (risks detected) and get unsatisfactoryresults (Onderwijs Inspectie 2010). (See Figure 10)

Figure 10: Risk based inspections in the Netherlands

Source: Modified from Onderwijs Inspectie (Dutch Inspectorate of Education)http://www.onderwijsinspectie.nl/english

iv) Strengthen policies concerningimprovement planning

Improvement planning can facilitate positive change as aschool strives to deliver better educational outcomes forall students. School improvement plans have been animportant piece of multiple successful educationprograms in developing countries (Bruns, Filmer, andPatrinos 2011). Improvement plans traditionally outlinethe goals that the school desires to achieve, thestrategies to achieve those goals, and the practicalactionable steps needed to be taken by each individualwithin the school.

Improvement planning is currently informal policy inTanzania. The government could strengthen officialpolicies to ensure that all schools are required to submitan improvement plan as part of the inspection andquality monitoring process.

1. Data gatheringStudent outcomes: Final tests, exam results, etc.Signals : Complaints, questions, newspaper articlesSchool documents: Annual report, school guide,and funding information

2A. Risk analysis 2B. Quality study

3. Basic inspection 4. Tailoredinspection

Risk

RiskNo riskNo risk



Country examples

Western Cape, South Africa, requires schools to submitindividual school improvement plans. Particularattention is given to those schools that did not achievethe required pass rate on the state examinations. Thenumber of underperforming schools has declined everyyear, from 85 in 2009 to 26 in 2012 (Western CapeGovernment 2013). Western Cape is also cited in a studythat reviewed how the most improved schools continueto improve (Mourshed 2010).

Use of the SABER EPS tool

The SABER tool is to be used not as prescriptive policybut rather as an informed assessment of the countrypolicies in reference to the current knowledge ofeffective approaches. The results of this benchmarkingserve as a good starting point for discussions of potentialpolicy options to be considered in light of the nuances ofthe local context and national education system.



AcknowledgementsThis SABER EPS Country Report was prepared by AnnaMaria Tammi, with inputs from Donald Baum, RachelCooper, Laura Lewis, Wenna Price, and HugoWesley at theWorld Bank headquarters in Washington, DC. The reportpresents country data collected by Dr. KitilaMkumbo usingthe SABER EPS policy intent data collection instrument.The report was prepared in consultation with theGovernment of Tanzania and the World Bank EducationTanzania team. The SABER EPS team would like to thankthe Department for International Development (DfID) fortheir ongoing support of the Education Markets for thePoor research study in the region. For technical questionsor comments about this report, please contact the SABERteam through http://saber.worldbank.org.

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TANZA

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Anne

xI:SA

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gaging

thePrivateSector

Rubrics

Thefollowingtables

displaytheindicatorsandscales

utilizedforb

enchmarking

each

coun

try’se

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entw

iththeprivatesector

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licy.Acrossthefour

type

sofp

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reacertainindicatorp

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TANZA

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n of

by

whe

n or

ho

w w

ell

Gov

ernm

ent d

oes

set s

tand

ards

fo

r wha

t stu

dent

s ne

ed to

lear

n an

d al

so in

dica

tes

EITH

ER b

y w

hen

OR

how

wel

l the

y ne

ed to

be

lear

ned

Gov

ernm

ent

does

se

t st

anda

rds

for

wha

t st

uden

ts n

eed

to le

arn,

by

whe

n, a

nd h

ow w

ell

TANZA

NIA

ENGA

GINGTH

EPR

IVAT

ESECT

ORIN

EDUCA

TION

SABE

RCO

UNTR

YRE

PORT

|201

5

SYSTEM

SAP

PROAC

HFO

RBE

TTER

EDUCA

TIONRE

SULTS

30

Polic

y G

oal:

Hol

ding

scho

ols a

ccou

ntab

le

Indi

cato

rL

aten

tE

mer

ging

Est

ablis

hed

Adv

ance

d

Stud

ent A

sses

smen

t

Stud

ents

do

no

t ta

ke

stan

dard

ized

exa

ms.

St

anda

rdiz

ed

exam

s ar

e ad

min

iste

red,

bu

t no

t an

nual

ly.

Stan

dard

ized

ex

ams

are

adm

inis

tere

d an

nual

ly.

Stan

dard

ized

ex

ams

are

adm

inis

tere

d an

nual

ly,

and

resu

lts

are

disa

ggre

gate

d by

sch

ool,

soci

oeco

nom

ic

back

grou

nd,

gend

er

and

othe

r ty

pes

of

disa

dvan

tage

.

Insp

ectio

n

Gov

ernm

ent

does

no

t re

quire

sch

ools

to

unde

rgo

an in

spec

tion.

Gov

ernm

ent

requ

ires

scho

ols

unde

rgo

an

insp

ectio

n bu

t no

ter

m i

s sp

ecifi

ed.

Gov

ernm

ent r

equi

res s

choo

ls to

un

derg

o a

stan

dard

te

rm

insp

ectio

n.

Gov

ernm

ent

requ

ires

scho

ols

to

unde

rgo

an

insp

ectio

n, a

nd f

requ

ency

of

ins

pect

ion

depe

nds

on

resu

lts

of

prev

ious

in

spec

tion.

Impr

ovem

ent

plan

ning

Not

ap

plic

able

if

the

gove

rnm

ent d

oes n

ot re

quire

sc

hool

s to

ta

ke

part

in

insp

ectio

ns.

Insp

ectio

n re

ports

in

clud

e st

reng

ths

and

wea

knes

ses

of

the

scho

ol.

Insp

ectio

n re

ports

in

clud

e st

reng

ths a

nd w

eakn

esse

s of t

he

scho

ol a

nd s

peci

fic p

riorit

ies

for i

mpr

ovem

ent.

Insp

ectio

n re

ports

incl

ude

stre

ngth

s an

d w

eakn

esse

s of

th

e sc

hool

, Sp

ecifi

c pr

iorit

ies f

or im

prov

emen

t an

d sc

hool

s are

requ

ired

to

subm

it a

scho

ol

impr

ovem

ent

plan

fo

llow

ing

the

insp

ectio

n.

Sanc

tions

and

re

war

ds

Sanc

tions

ar

e no

t ad

min

iste

red

base

d on

the

re

sults

of s

choo

l ins

pect

ions

or

pe

rfor

man

ce

on

stan

dard

ized

exa

ms.

Sanc

tions

incl

ude

addi

tiona

l m

onito

ring/

w

arni

ngs

and

are

adm

inis

tere

d ba

sed

on

the

resu

lts

of

scho

ol

insp

ectio

ns o

r pe

rfor

man

ce

on st

anda

rdiz

ed e

xam

s.

Sanc

tions

in

clud

e ad

ditio

nal

mon

itorin

g an

d fin

es

are

adm

inis

tere

d ba

sed

on

the

resu

lts o

f sch

ool i

nspe

ctio

ns o

r pe

rfor

man

ce

on

stan

dard

ized

ex

ams.

For

gove

rnm

ent-

fund

ed, p

riva

tely

man

aged

, and

vo

uche

r sc

hool

s: r

ewar

ds m

ay

also

be

used

.

Sanc

tions

in

clud

e ad

ditio

nal

mon

itorin

g,

fines

an

d as

a

final

m

easu

re

scho

ol

clos

ures

ba

sed

on

the

resu

lts

of

scho

ol

insp

ectio

ns

or

perf

orm

ance

on

st

anda

rdiz

ed e

xam

s. Fo

r go

vern

men

t-fun

ded,

pr

ivat

ely

man

aged

, an

d vo

uche

r sc

hool

s: r

ewar

ds

are

also

use

d.

TANZA

NIA

ENGA

GINGTH

EPR

IVAT

ESECT

ORIN

EDUCA

TION

SABE

RCO

UNTR

YRE

PORT

|201

5

SYSTEM

SAP

PROAC

HFO

RBE

TTER

EDUCA

TIONRE

SULTS

31

Polic

y G

oal:

Hol

ding

scho

ols a

ccou

ntab

le

Indi

cato

rL

aten

tE

mer

ging

Est

ablis

hed

Adv

ance

d

Fina

ncia

l rep

ortin

g (n

ot a

pplic

able

for

inde

pend

ent p

rivat

e sc

hool

s)

Gov

ernm

ent

does

no

t re

quire

sch

ools

to r

epor

t on

the

use

of p

ublic

fun

ds a

s a

cond

ition

fo

r th

e co

ntin

uatio

n of

fund

ing.

Gov

ernm

ent

requ

ires

scho

ols

to r

epor

t on

the

use

of

publ

ic

fund

s as

a

cond

ition

fo

r th

e co

ntin

uatio

n of

fun

ding

but

ad

hocl

y/ n

o st

anda

rd te

rm.

Gov

ernm

ent r

equi

res s

choo

ls to

re

port

on

the

use

of

publ

ic

fund

s as

a c

ondi

tion

for

the

cont

inua

tion

of f

undi

ng d

urin

g a

stan

dard

term

.

Gov

ernm

ent

requ

ires

scho

ols

to r

epor

t on

the

us

e of

pub

lic f

unds

as

a co

nditi

on

for

the

cont

inua

tion

of

fund

ing

durin

g a

stan

dard

te

rm

with

gre

ater

mon

itorin

g of

sc

hool

s th

at h

ave

faile

d to

ad

here

in th

e pa

st.

Polic

y G

oal:

Em

pow

erin

g al

l par

ents

, stu

dent

s and

com

mun

ities

Indi

cato

rL

aten

tE

mer

ging

Est

ablis

hed

Adv

ance

d

Info

rmat

ion

No

info

rmat

ion

is p

rovi

ded

to p

aren

ts o

n th

e re

sults

of

stan

dard

ized

ex

ams

or

insp

ectio

n re

ports

Ad

hoc

info

rmat

ion

is

prov

ided

to

pa

rent

s on

st

anda

rdiz

ed e

xam

resu

lts o

r in

spec

tion

repo

rts

Reg

ular

in

form

atio

n is

pr

ovid

ed

to

pare

nts

on

stan

dard

ized

exa

m r

esul

ts o

r in

spec

tion

repo

rts

Reg

ular

in

form

atio

n is

pr

ovid

ed

to

pare

nts

on

stan

dard

ized

exa

m r

esul

ts

(dis

aggr

egat

ed b

y sc

hool

, so

cioe

cono

mic

ba

ckgr

ound

, gen

der,

othe

r ty

pes

of

disa

dvan

tage

, et

c.)

and

insp

ectio

n re

ports

fro

m a

var

iety

of

sour

ces.

Polic

y ou

tline

s in

form

atio

n in

terv

entio

ns

to t

arge

ted

disa

dvan

tage

d

grou

ps

TANZA

NIA

ENGA

GINGTH

EPR

IVAT

ESECT

ORIN

EDUCA

TION

SABE

RCO

UNTR

YRE

PORT

|201

5

SYSTEM

SAP

PROAC

HFO

RBE

TTER

EDUCA

TIONRE

SULTS

32

Polic

y G

oal:

Em

pow

erin

g al

l par

ents

, stu

dent

s and

com

mun

ities

Indi

cato

rL

aten

tE

mer

ging

Est

ablis

hed

Adv

ance

d

Voi

ce

Not

ap

plic

able

if

the

gove

rnm

ent d

oes n

ot re

quire

sc

hool

s to

ta

ke

part

in

insp

ectio

ns

Nei

ther

stu

dent

s or

par

ents

ar

e su

rvey

ed a

s pa

rt of

an

insp

ectio

n pr

oces

s

Stud

ents

or

pa

rent

s ar

e in

terv

iew

ed

as

part

of

the

insp

ectio

n pr

oces

s

Stud

ent

and

pare

nts

are

inte

rvie

wed

as

part

of th

e in

spec

tion

proc

ess

Sele

ctio

n(n

ot a

pplic

able

for

inde

pend

ent p

rivat

e sc

hool

s)

Scho

ols a

re a

llow

ed to

sele

ct

stud

ents

ba

sed

on

both

ac

adem

ic p

erfo

rman

ce a

nd

geog

raph

y.

Scho

ols a

re al

low

ed to

sele

ct

stud

ents

bas

ed o

n ac

adem

ic

perf

orm

ance

or g

eogr

aphy

.

Scho

ols

are

not

allo

wed

to

se

lect

stu

dent

s bu

t sc

hool

s ar

e no

t req

uire

d to

use

a lo

ttery

if

over

subs

crib

ed.

Scho

ols a

re n

ot a

llow

ed to

se

lect

st

uden

ts

and

are

requ

ired

to

cond

uct

a lo

ttery

if

scho

ol i

f ov

er-

subs

crib

ed.

Con

trib

utio

ns

(not

app

licab

le fo

r in

depe

nden

t priv

ate

scho

ols)

Pare

ntal

cho

ice

is r

estri

cted

by

co

mpu

lsor

y m

onet

ary

pare

nt c

ontri

butio

ns w

hich

if

not

paid

pro

hibi

ts t

he c

hild

fr

om a

ttend

ing

the

scho

ol.

Pare

ntal

cho

ice

is r

estri

cted

by

vo

lunt

ary

mon

etar

y pa

rent

co

ntrib

utio

ns

i.e.

cont

ribut

ions

to

a

scho

ol

fund

Pare

ntal

cho

ice

is r

estri

cted

by

volu

ntar

y no

n-m

onet

ary

pare

nt

cont

ribut

ions

i.e.

in k

ind

labo

r or

goo

ds

Par

enta

l ch

oice

is

no

t re

stric

ted

by a

ny t

ype

of

pare

ntal

con

tribu

tions

Tui

tion

fees

(fo

r ind

epen

dent

pr

ivat

e sc

hool

s onl

y)

Gov

ernm

ent

sets

st

anda

rdiz

ed tu

ition

fees

. G

over

nmen

t do

es

not

set

stan

dard

ized

tuiti

on fe

es b

ut

impo

ses c

ap (o

vera

ll am

ount

or

% i

ncre

ases

on

tuiti

ons

fees

).

Scho

ols s

et fe

es, b

ut a

re su

bjec

t to

revi

ew fr

om g

over

nmen

t. Sc

hool

s se

t fe

es w

ithou

t an

y re

view

fr

om

gove

rnm

ent.

Fina

ncia

l sup

port

(fo

r ind

epen

dent

pr

ivat

e sc

hool

s onl

y)

The

gove

rnm

ent

does

no

t pr

ovid

e ta

x su

bsid

ies o

r cas

h tra

nsfe

rs

for

fam

ilies

at

tend

ing

priv

ate

scho

ols.

The

go

vern

men

t pr

ovid

es

tax

subs

idie

s fo

r fa

mili

es

atte

ndin

g pr

ivat

e sc

hool

s.

The

gove

rnm

ent

prov

ides

tax

su

bsid

ies

and

cash

tra

nsfe

rs

whi

ch c

an b

e us

ed b

y fa

mili

es

atte

ndin

g pr

ivat

e sc

hool

s.

The

gov

ernm

ent p

rovi

des

targ

eted

ca

sh

trans

fers

w

hich

ca

n be

us

ed

by

disa

dvan

tage

d fa

mili

es

atte

ndin

g pr

ivat

e sc

hool

s.

TANZA

NIA

ENGA

GINGTH

EPR

IVAT

ESECT

ORIN

EDUCA

TION

SABE

RCO

UNTR

YRE

PORT

|201

5

SYSTEM

SAP

PROAC

HFO

RBE

TTER

EDUCA

TIONRE

SULTS

33

Polic

y G

oal:

Prom

otin

g di

vers

ity o

f sup

ply

Indi

cato

rL

aten

tE

mer

ging

Est

ablis

hed

Adv

ance

d

Ow

ners

hip

The

gove

rnm

ent a

llow

s on

e of

th

e fo

llow

ing

type

s to

op

erat

e a

scho

ol:

Com

mun

ity

Not

fo

r pr

ofit

Faith

ba

sed

For p

rofit

The

gove

rnm

ent a

llow

s tw

o of

the

fol

low

ing

type

s to

op

erat

e a

scho

ol:

Com

mun

ity

Not

fo

r pr

ofit

Faith

ba

sed

For p

rofit

The

gove

rnm

ent

allo

ws

thr

ee

of

the

follo

win

g ty

pes

to

oper

ate

a sc

hool

:C

omm

unity

N

ot

for

prof

itFa

ith

base

dFo

r pro

fit

The

gove

rnm

ent a

llow

s all

of t

he f

ollo

win

g ty

pes

to

oper

ate

a sc

hool

:C

omm

unity

N

ot

for

prof

itFa

ith

base

dFo

r pro

fit

Cer

tific

atio

n St

anda

rds

Cer

tific

atio

n st

anda

rds,

whi

ch

are

not

linke

d to

ed

ucat

ion

outc

omes

, res

trict

en

try i

nclu

ding

all

of t

he

follo

win

g:

1.la

nd

(und

ulat

ing,

di

stan

ce

from

pu

blic

ve

nues

et

c.)

or

2.fa

cilit

ies

(sep

arat

e sc

ienc

e la

bs, w

eath

er v

anes

etc

.) or

3.

ass

ets(

ow

ners

hip

of la

nd

or b

uild

ings

)

Cer

tific

atio

n st

anda

rds,

whi

ch

are

not

linke

d to

ed

ucat

ion

outc

omes

, res

trict

en

try i

nclu

ding

tw

o of

the

th

ree

follo

win

g cr

iteria

: 1.

land

(un

dula

ting,

dis

tanc

e fr

om p

ublic

ven

ues

etc.

) or

2.

faci

litie

s (s

epar

ate

scie

nce

labs

, wea

ther

van

es e

tc.)

or

3. a

sset

s( o

wne

rshi

p of

land

or

bui

ldin

gs)

Cer

tific

atio

n st

anda

rds,

whi

ch

are

not

linke

d to

ed

ucat

ion

outc

omes

, re

stric

t en

try

incl

udin

g on

e of

th

e th

ree

follo

win

g cr

iteria

: 1.

land

(u

ndul

atin

g,

dist

ance

fr

om

publ

ic

venu

es

etc.

) or

2.

faci

litie

s (s

epar

ate

scie

nce

labs

, wea

ther

van

es e

tc.)

or 3

. as

sets

( ow

ners

hip

of l

and

or

build

ings

)

Cer

tific

atio

n st

anda

rds,

whi

ch a

re n

ot l

inke

d to

ed

ucat

ion

outc

omes

, do

no

t re

stric

t ent

ry

Mar

ket e

ntry

in

form

atio

n

Reg

istra

tion/

certi

ficat

ion

guid

elin

es a

re n

ot o

ffic

ially

ou

tline

d.

Reg

istra

tion/

certi

ficat

ion

guid

elin

es

are

not

mad

e pu

blic

and

onl

y av

aila

ble

on

requ

est.

Reg

istra

tion/

certi

ficat

ion

guid

elin

es a

re m

ade

publ

ic b

ut

from

a si

ngle

sour

ce.

Reg

istra

tion/

certi

ficat

ion

guid

elin

es ar

e mad

e pub

lic

and

from

mul

tiple

sour

ces.

Reg

ulat

ory

fees

Scho

ols

are

able

to

oper

ate

whi

lst

payi

ng

4 +

type

s of

fe

es.

Scho

ols

are

able

to

oper

ate

whi

lst

payi

ng 2

-3 t

ypes

of

fees

.

Scho

ols

are

able

to

op

erat

e w

hils

t pay

ing

1 ty

pe o

f fee

. Sc

hool

s are

able

to o

pera

te

with

out p

ayin

g fe

es.

Fund

ing

(not

app

licab

le fo

r in

depe

nden

t priv

ate

scho

ols)

Aca

dem

ic o

pera

ting

budg

ets

are

not

equi

vale

nt t

o pe

r-st

uden

t am

ount

s in

pub

lic

scho

ols.

Aca

dem

ic o

pera

ting

budg

ets

are

equi

vale

nt to

per

-stu

dent

am

ount

s in

publ

ic sc

hool

s.

All

budg

ets

acad

emic

an

d ad

ditio

nal

budg

ets

(fac

ilitie

s an

d tra

nspo

rt) a

re e

quiv

alen

t to

per

stud

ent

amou

nts

in p

ublic

sc

hool

s. Sc

hool

s do

not r

ecei

ve

targ

eted

fu

ndin

g to

m

eet

spec

ific

stud

ent n

eeds

.

All

budg

ets

acad

emic

and

ad

ditio

nal

(fac

ilitie

s an

d tra

nspo

rt) ar

e equ

ival

ent t

o pe

r st

uden

t am

ount

s in

pu

blic

sc

hool

. Sc

hool

re

ceiv

es t

arge

ted

fund

ing

to m

eet

spec

ific

stud

ent

need

s.

Ince

ntiv

es

No

Ince

ntiv

es

Scho

ols

are

supp

orte

d by

on

e of

th

e fo

llow

ing

1.

star

tup

fund

ing

sim

ilar

to

Scho

ols a

re su

ppor

ted

by tw

o of

th

e fo

llow

ing

1. st

artu

p fu

ndin

g si

mila

r to

pu

blic

sc

hool

s,

Scho

ols

are

supp

orte

d by

th

ree

of

the

follo

win

g 1.

star

tup

fund

ing

sim

ilar

TANZA

NIA

ENGA

GINGTH

EPR

IVAT

ESECT

ORIN

EDUCA

TION

SABE

RCO

UNTR

YRE

PORT

|201

5

SYSTEM

SAP

PROAC

HFO

RBE

TTER

EDUCA

TIONRE

SULTS

34

Polic

y G

oal:

Prom

otin

g di

vers

ity o

f sup

ply

Indi

cato

rL

aten

tE

mer

ging

Est

ablis

hed

Adv

ance

d

(not

app

licab

le fo

r in

depe

nden

t priv

ate

scho

ols)

publ

ic s

choo

ls,2

. ac

cess

to

gove

rnm

ent

land

ed

or

unus

ed

gove

rnm

ent

faci

litie

s or

3.

exem

pt f

rom

lo

cal

taxe

s(pr

oper

ty

taxe

s)

sim

ilar t

o pu

blic

scho

ols

2.ac

cess

to g

over

nmen

t lan

ded

or u

nuse

d go

vern

men

t fac

ilitie

s or

3.ex

empt

fr

om

loca

l ta

xes(

prop

erty

taxe

s) s

imila

r to

publ

ic sc

hool

s

to p

ublic

scho

ols 2

. acc

ess

to g

over

nmen

t la

nded

or

unus

ed

gove

rnm

ent

faci

litie

s or 3

.exe

mpt

from

lo

cal t

axes

(pro

perty

taxe

s)

sim

ilar t

o pu

blic

scho

ols

Plan

ning

(n

ot a

pplic

able

for

inde

pend

ent p

rivat

e sc

hool

s)

Scho

ols

are

prov

ided

in

form

atio

n on

th

e al

loca

tions

to b

e tra

nsfe

rred

to

the

m l

ess

than

1 m

onth

be

fore

th

e st

art

of

the

acad

emic

yea

r.

Scho

ols

are

prov

ided

in

form

atio

n on

th

e al

loca

tions

to b

e tra

nsfe

rred

to

the

m b

etw

een

1 an

d 3

mon

ths

befo

re t

he s

tart

of

the

acad

emic

yea

r.

Scho

ols

are

prov

ided

in

form

atio

n on

the

allo

catio

ns

to

be

trans

ferr

ed

to

them

be

twee

n 4

and

6 m

onth

s bef

ore

the

star

t of t

he a

cade

mic

yea

r.

Scho

ols

are

prov

ided

in

form

atio

n on

th

e al

loca

tions

to

be

tra

nsfe

rred

to

them

mor

e th

an 6

mon

ths

befo

re t

he

star

t of t

he a

cade

mic

yea

r.

Cov

erag

e (fo

r pri

vate

ly m

anag

ed

scho

ols o

nly)

Cov

erag

e of

ch

arte

rs

is

rest

ricte

d by

th

ree

of

the

follo

win

g:

stud

ent

and

scho

ol n

umbe

rs a

nd lo

catio

n (c

erta

in c

ities

or

dist

ricts

). O

nly

new

or

only

exi

stin

g sc

hool

s ar

e ab

le t

o be

com

e ch

arte

rs.

Cov

erag

e of

ch

arte

rs

is

rest

ricte

d by

tw

o of

th

e fo

llow

ing:

stu

dent

num

bers

, sc

hool

nu

mbe

rs,

loca

tion

(cer

tain

citi

es o

r di

stric

ts).

No

rest

rictio

ns

due

to

new

/exi

stin

g sc

hool

stat

us.

Cov

erag

e of

ch

arte

rs

is

rest

ricte

d by

on

e of

th

e fo

llow

ing:

st

uden

t nu

mbe

rs,

scho

ol

num

bers

, lo

catio

n (c

erta

in c

ities

or d

istri

cts)

.

No

Res

trict

ion.

C

harte

rs

are

not

rest

ricte

d by

st

uden

t nu

mbe

rs,

scho

ol

num

bers

, or

lo

catio

n (c

erta

in c

ities

or d

istri

cts)

.

TANZANIA ENGAGING THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN EDUCATION SABERCOUNTRY REPORT |2015

SYSTEMS APPROACH FOR BETTER EDUCATION RESULTS35

This work is a product of the staff of The World Bank with external contributions. The findings, interpretations, and conclusionsexpressed in this work do not necessarily reflect the views of TheWorld Bank, its Board of Executive Directors, or the governmentsthey represent. The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work. The boundaries, colors,denominations, and other information shown on any map in this work do not imply any judgment on the part of The World Bankconcerning the legal status of any territory or the endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries.

The Systems Approach for Better Education Results (SABER) initiativecollects data on the policies and institutions of education systems aroundthe world and benchmarks them against practices associated withstudent learning. SABER aims to give all parties with a stake ineducational results—from students, administrators, teachers, andparents to policymakers and business people—an accessible, detailed,objective snapshot of how well the policies of their country's educationsystem are oriented toward ensuring that all children and youth learn.

This report focuses specifically on policies in the area of engaging theprivate sector in education.

www.worldbank.org/education/saber

Documents

SABER ENGAGING THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN …wbgfiles.worldbank.org/documents/hdn/ed/saber/supporting_doc/...ENGAGING THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN EDUCATION SABER Country Report 2015 Policy Goals