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STRATEGIC THINKING IMBA Managerial Economics Jack Wu

S TRATEGIC T HINKING IMBA Managerial Economics Jack Wu

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Page 1: S TRATEGIC T HINKING IMBA Managerial Economics Jack Wu

STRATEGIC THINKINGIMBA Managerial Economics

Jack Wu

Page 2: S TRATEGIC T HINKING IMBA Managerial Economics Jack Wu

Nov. 16: Coca-Cola raised price 7% Nov. 22: Pepsi raised price 6.9% “Coke and Pepsi will move now

from price-based competition to marketing-based competition”,

Andrew Conway, Morgan Stanley

COKE VS. PEPSI, 1999

Page 3: S TRATEGIC T HINKING IMBA Managerial Economics Jack Wu

COMPETITIVE DILEMMA

Pepsi

Raise price Discount

Raise price

C: 3, P: 3

C: 0, P: 5

Coke Discount C: 5,

P: 0 C: 1, P: 1

What should Coke do?

Page 4: S TRATEGIC T HINKING IMBA Managerial Economics Jack Wu

STRATEGIC SITUATIONS

parties actively consider the interactions with one another in making decisions

game theory -- set of ideas and principles to guide strategic thinking simultaneous actions: strategic form sequential actions: extensive form

Page 5: S TRATEGIC T HINKING IMBA Managerial Economics Jack Wu

DOMINATED STRATEGY

generates worse consequences than another strategy, regardless of the choices of the other parties

never use dominated strategy

Page 6: S TRATEGIC T HINKING IMBA Managerial Economics Jack Wu

NASH EQUILIBRIUM

Given that the other players choose their Nash equilibrium strategies, each party prefers its own Nash equilibrium strategy

• No one is willing to deviate unilaterally from a Nash equilibrium

Page 7: S TRATEGIC T HINKING IMBA Managerial Economics Jack Wu

SOLVING FOR NASH EQUILIBRIUM

eliminate dominated strategies, then check remaining cells

“arrow” technique

Page 8: S TRATEGIC T HINKING IMBA Managerial Economics Jack Wu

COKE AND PEPSI GAME

Nash equilibrium: for both parties, “raise price” is dominated by “discount”.

but discounting is bad for both -- if only they could agree somehow to raise price.

Coke and Pepsi stuck in this situation for four years until November 1999.

Page 9: S TRATEGIC T HINKING IMBA Managerial Economics Jack Wu

RADIO FORMATS

Merkur

Lite AC no change

Jupiter

Hot AC J: 60,

M: 40

J: 60,

M: 40

no change J: 70,

M: 30

J: 50,

M: 50

Page 10: S TRATEGIC T HINKING IMBA Managerial Economics Jack Wu

RADIO FORMATS

For Merkur, “Lite AC” is dominated by “no change”; so consider only “no change”,

assuming Merkur chooses “no change”, Jupiter should choose “Hot AC”.

Repeat using “arrow technique”.

Page 11: S TRATEGIC T HINKING IMBA Managerial Economics Jack Wu

OUT OF NASH EQUILIBRIUM

What if another player doesn’t play Nash equilibrium strategy? Nash equilibrium strategy may not be best still don’t use dominated strategy

Page 12: S TRATEGIC T HINKING IMBA Managerial Economics Jack Wu

No Nash equilibrium in pure strategies

Competitor.com

NBA NHL

NBA W: 4, C: 3

W: 3, C: 4

We.com NHL W: 3,

C: 4 W: 4, C: 3

WHERE TO ADVERTISE?

Page 13: S TRATEGIC T HINKING IMBA Managerial Economics Jack Wu

RANDOMIZED STRATEGIES

choose among pure strategies according to probabilities

must be unpredictable Example: retail market random discount Example: where to advertise _ We.com: ½ NBA and ½ NHL _ Competitor.com: ½ NBA and ½ NHL

Page 14: S TRATEGIC T HINKING IMBA Managerial Economics Jack Wu

EVENING NEWS:

TVB

7:30pm 8:0pm

7:30pm A: 1, B: 1

A: 3, B: 4

ATV 8:0pm A: 4, B: 3

A: 2.5, B: 2.5

Page 15: S TRATEGIC T HINKING IMBA Managerial Economics Jack Wu

COORDINATION AND COMPETITION Prime time for news is 8:0pm; second best is

7:30pm; since audience is limited, get maximum

viewership if two channels schedule at different times.

Question: which station gets 8:0pm? Situation has elements of

coordination -- avoiding same time slot competition -- getting the 8:0pm slot

Page 16: S TRATEGIC T HINKING IMBA Managerial Economics Jack Wu

ZERO/POSITIVE SUM

zero-sum games: pure competition -- one party better off only if other is worse off

positive-sum games: coordination -- both can be better off or both worse off

co-opetition: competition and coordination

Page 17: S TRATEGIC T HINKING IMBA Managerial Economics Jack Wu

ADOPTING DATABASE SOFTWARE

Sol

IBM Oracle

Venus

IBM V: 1.5,

S: 1.5

V: 1,

S: 1

Oracle V: 1,

S: 1

V: 1.5,

S: 1.5

Page 18: S TRATEGIC T HINKING IMBA Managerial Economics Jack Wu

FOCAL POINT

Nash equilibrium multiple Nash equilibria

Page 19: S TRATEGIC T HINKING IMBA Managerial Economics Jack Wu

SEQUENCING

Game in extensive form – sequence of moves:

nodesbranchesoutcomes

Page 20: S TRATEGIC T HINKING IMBA Managerial Economics Jack Wu

EXTENSIVE FORM: EQUILIBRIUM

backward induction final nodes intermediate nodes initial node

Page 21: S TRATEGIC T HINKING IMBA Managerial Economics Jack Wu

TVB

ATV

ATV

4, 3

2.5, 2.5

1, 1

3, 4

8:00

7:30

7:30

8:00

7:30

8:00

TVB, ATV

TV NEWS: SEQUENTIAL MOVES

Page 22: S TRATEGIC T HINKING IMBA Managerial Economics Jack Wu

STRATEGIC MOVE

Action to influence beliefs or actions of other parties in a favorable way

• credibility– first mover advantage– second mover advantage

Page 23: S TRATEGIC T HINKING IMBA Managerial Economics Jack Wu

EXAMPLES Examples: Evening TV news -- both stations want to move first: which one can?

Use strategic move, eg, contracts with advertisers to deliver news at 8pm.

Famous Chinese general: after crossing a river, burnt his ships -- strategic move to force soldiers to fight harder.

Issue: Is the move credible? Will it convince the other players?

Advantage doesn’t always go to first mover; In war, better to see opponent’s move, and then take action, eg is

enemy moving south or north? new product category -- let competitor test the market and

educate the customers

Page 24: S TRATEGIC T HINKING IMBA Managerial Economics Jack Wu

consumer

Litho

LithoMake prints

Do not

Buy

Do not

Make more prints

Do not

(1) serial number (2) destroying the plate(3) other solution?

LITHOGRAPHER

Page 25: S TRATEGIC T HINKING IMBA Managerial Economics Jack Wu

CONDITIONAL STRATEGIC MOVES

threats promises

Page 26: S TRATEGIC T HINKING IMBA Managerial Economics Jack Wu

MORGAN STANLEY:“SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS PLAN”

If any party acquires 15% or more of company’s shares, other shareholders get right to buy additional shares at 50% discount.

Impact on hostile bidder?

Page 27: S TRATEGIC T HINKING IMBA Managerial Economics Jack Wu

SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS PLAN This shareholder rights plan is a threat to

potential bidders: most hostile bidders begin with small stake; with shareholder rights plan, if bidder

acquires more than 15%, then rights triggered, and bidder will be diluted.

Nickname: poison pill. Actually works against shareholder rights --

by entrenching existing management.

Page 28: S TRATEGIC T HINKING IMBA Managerial Economics Jack Wu

Sharon

Hilda

acquires 100,000shares

doesn’t bid

does not

activates rights

Hilda loses on initial stake + cost of takeover rises

POISON PILL

Page 29: S TRATEGIC T HINKING IMBA Managerial Economics Jack Wu

Union

Employer

reject union demand

accept

do not

strike Lose current wageand possibly gain infuture wage

Maintain current wage

Why are strikes rare inAmerican professional football?

STRIKE