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United Nations S/2016/281
Security Council Distr.: General
28 March 2016
Original: English
16-04470 (E) 290316
*1604470*
Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali
I. Introduction
1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 2227
(2015), by which the Council extended the mandate of the United Nations
Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) until
30 June 2016 and requested me to report every three months on the situation in
Mali, focusing on progress in the implementation of the Agreement on Peace and
Reconciliation in Mali and the efforts of MINUSMA to support it. It covers the
period from 17 December 2015 to 18 March 2016.
II. Major political developments
2. While the reporting period was characterized by some progress in the
implementation of the peace agreement, maintaining the new momentum that had
emerged towards the end of 2015, significant challenges remained. The Government
took steps to advance political and institutional reforms, decentralization and the
cantonment and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes. The
Government, the Coordination des mouvements de l’Azawad (CMA) and the
Platform coalition of armed groups constructively participated in all deliberations of
the Agreement Monitoring Committee and renewed their commitment to
accelerating the implementation of the agreement. Those positive developments
notwithstanding, the reporting period also saw continued delays in the
implementation of key provisions of the agreement, such as the establishment of
interim authorities in the north. This has been the priority of the signatory armed
groups.
Implementation of the peace agreement: political and
institutional measures
3. On 18 January, in Algiers, Algeria convened a high -level consultative meeting
of the members of the Agreement Monitoring Committee to encourage the Malian
parties to revive the peace process and implement the agreement without further
delay. During that meeting, which was attended by the Government, the signatory
armed groups and my new Special Representative for Mali and Head of
MINUSMA, Mahamat Saleh Annadif, the international mediation team agreed on
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the importance of moving forward with the implementation of the security
provisions of the agreement, in particular cantonment and mixed patrols. The team
strongly encouraged the Malian parties to also accelerate the implementation of
other critical aspects of the agreement, especially matters relating to
decentralization, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, security sector
reform, national reconciliation and development in the north. The participants
deplored the deterioration of the security situation and stressed the need to enhance
communication among the parties on the implementation process. The Government
was represented by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Abdoulaye Diop, who reported
on the steps taken to advance the peace process, including meetings of the nation al
committee for the coordination of the implementation of the peace agreement and
measures taken towards the establishment of interim authorities. CMA and the
Platform, which had expressed frustration at the slow pace of implementation of the
agreement, circulated a document on its status, highlighting shortcomings in the
Government’s engagement. The signatory armed groups also expressed hesitation at
the idea of proceeding with the cantonment process while progress on political and
institutional reforms remained limited. They called for a balanced implementation
of the provisions of the agreement.
4. Subsequently, the Government took further steps to accelerate the
implementation of the institutional reforms envisaged in the agreement. On
19 January, it appointed governors for the regions of Ménaka (formerly part of the
Gao region) and Taoudenni (formerly part of the Timbuktu region), which were
created through legislation that had been passed in March 2012 but left
unimplemented. CMA, the Platform and the traditional authorities of the two
regions welcomed the nominations. The effective administration of the two regions
still requires the appointment of local authorities, however. On 24 February, the
Council of Ministers approved a bill to revise the Local Government Code of 2012
and a decree on the modalities for the implementation of the interim authorities,
which remained pending ratification by the National Assembly.
5. On 25 January, under the auspices of the High Representative of the African
Union for Mali and the Sahel, CMA and the Platform reached an agreement on
representation in the Agreement Monitoring Committee, which had remained a point
of contention since the signature of the peace agreement. They agreed to allocate
both the Coalition du peuple de l’Azawad and the Coordination des mouvements et
forces patriotiques et de résistance II one additional seat each in the Committee and
one seat each in one of the subcommittees of their choice under the umbrella of
CMA.
6. From 19 to 26 February, the Government, CMA and the Platform met in
Bamako with a view to accelerating the implementation of the peace agreement.
After the conclusion of the tripartite consultations, the President, Ibrahim Boubacar
Keita, chaired a meeting with CMA and the Platform on 27 February. The signatory
parties announced in a joint statement following that meeting that they had agreed
on an implementation timeline for March and April, focusing on the establishment
of interim authorities for the north and progress in security conditions, cantonment
and the expeditious implementation of the provisions of the agreement relating to
the preparations for elections. They also committed themselves to holding a
long-planned tripartite reconciliation meeting in Kidal from 27 to 30 March.
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7. From 9 to 10 March, the Agreement Monitoring Committee held its seventh
meeting, in Bamako. It welcomed the joint statement and the planned reconciliation
meeting mentioned above. With regard to the latter, it called upon the parties to
ensure a successful meeting and to make progress in national reconciliation, as
envisaged in the peace agreement. However, it pointed to the absence of progress in
taking forward several recommendations made at the previous meeting on the
implementation of the agreement, such as the establishment of interim authorities in
the north and the launch of mixed patrols by the Operational Coordination
Mechanism, and urged the Malian parties to redouble their efforts to deliver results
by the time of the next meeting, scheduled for April. The pending establishment of
interim authorities remained a contentious issue between the Government and the
signatory armed groups, with the latter insisting that they would not commit
themselves to participating in the cantonment process unless the Government
established the authorities. On the development front, the Committee approved the
final report of the joint evaluation mission to the north, which will inform the
development strategy for the north being prepared by the Government. It also
approved the arrangement brokered on representation in the Committee referred to
in paragraph 5 above.
8. CMA and the Platform also continued to address unresolved issues outside the
formal mechanisms of the peace agreement and within the framework of bi lateral
arrangements. On 2 February, some 250 armed members of the Groupe
d’autodéfense Touaregs imghads et alliés, part of the Platform coalition, entered the
CMA stronghold of Kidal with a large number of vehicles. The Secretary -General of
the group, Fahad Ag Almahmoud, argued that it had acted on the understandings
reached in Anefis i-n-Darane with CMA in October 2015. CMA contested that
assertion, alleging the lack of prior notification by the group of its movement. My
Special Representative used his good offices to open communication channels
among the Government, CMA, the Platform and the international mediation team to
de-escalate tensions. On 6 February, CMA and the Platform issued a statement in
which they agreed that the Platform would reduce its military presence in Kidal and
be included in the administrative structure of the town. On 7 February, the Platform
established a regional bureau in Kidal.
9. Progress was also made in identifying and registering 33 legislative texts, as
required under the peace agreement, with MINUSMA support. On 9 February, the
committee established by the Ministry of Territorial Administration in November
2015 to review the electoral legislation and the Charter of Political Parties
submitted a report recommending, among other things, the establishment of a single
electoral management body and direct universal suffrage for the election of
territorial advisers. A subcommittee on institutional and political reforms is
expected to review the electoral bill before its submission to the National Assembly
in April.
10. The legislative by-elections held in Ansongo (Gao region) on 10 and
31 January revealed the security and political challenges facing future elections in
the north. Voting was conducted in all six municipalities, except Talatayé.
Beforehand, CMA wrote to the prefect of Ansongo to strongly voice its opposition
to the holding of elections, owing to the lack of consultation. On 9 January, the
Malian armed forces escorting the sub-prefect and electoral materials to Talatayé
were met with a local protest, prompting the Government to cancel the elections
there. On 28 January, CMA issued a press release in which it expressed support for
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the local opposition to elections in Talatayé, stating that, in accordance with the
peace agreement, no elections should be held before the establishment of the interim
authorities. While the Mission facilitated dialogue between the Government and
CMA to prevent an escalation of tensions, voting was not conducted in Talatayé.
11. On 31 December, the Council of Ministers adopted a new decree concerning
the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, by which it increased the number
of commissioners from 15 to 25 and created regional offices, regional consultative
councils and five thematic subcommissions. The increase in the number of
commissioners was aimed at addressing claims by CMA and the Platform that they
were underrepresented in the Commission.
12. MINUSMA continued to support the Ministry of National Reconciliation and
the national federation of women’s organizations and trained 120 traditional,
religious and other community leaders in Gao, Mopti and Timbuktu with a view to
fostering a better understanding of the peace agreement. On 18 December, the
President signed a decree providing for a 30 per cent quota for the appointment of
women in national institutions and legislative bodies, following the adoption of the
bill by the National Assembly during the previous reporting period. Notwithstanding
the signing of the decree and the efforts of the Ministry for the Advancement of
Women, Children and Families to promote the effective participation of women and
young people in the implementation of the agreement, their involvement remained
limited.
Other political developments
13. Since my previous report (S/2015/1030), owing to persistent security
concerns, there has been little change in the number of government officials present
at their duty stations in northern Mali, except for the deployment of a prefect to
Ténenkou, in the Mopti region. The overall number of government officials absent
from their duty stations at the sub-prefect level remained at some 49 per cent. In
Gao, there was no increase in the number of sub-prefects deployed to the region
(4 of 16). In Timbuktu, the number of sub-prefects stood at 13 of 31, given that
7 retired and others abandoned their duty stations in the light of security concerns.
In Mopti, although all eight prefects were in place, security threats forced 20 of the
55 sub-prefects to work from their regional offices. No government official was
deployed to Kidal. Some communities in the north, especially in Kidal, where
traditional judges (cadis) are most prominent, expressed their preference for
traditional justice mechanisms.
14. On 15 January, the President reshuffled the Cabinet, increasing the number of
ministers from 31 to 32 and the number of women from five to six. It was the third
reshuffle since the appointment of the current Prime Minister, Modibo Keita, in
January 2015.
15. The international community devoted considerable attention to Mali and the
peace process during the reporting period. The Security Council visited Mali,
including Mopti and Timbuktu, from 4 to 7 March. On 12 February, during his visit
to the country, the President of Germany announced the deployment of up to 650
soldiers to MINUSMA. On 19 February, also in the context of a visit to Mali, the
Prime Minister of France expressed continuing support for the peace process and
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indicated his country’s willingness to maintain the presence of French forces in
order to sustain counter-terrorism efforts.
Regional cooperation in the Sahel
16. Following the deadly terrorist attacks in the capitals of Mali and Burkina Faso
on 20 November and 15 January, respectively, the Heads of State of the Group of
Five for the Sahel met on 31 January on the margins of the twenty -sixth ordinary
session of the Assembly of the African Union, in Addis Ababa, to discuss joint
efforts to tackle common security threats, such as terrorism, organized crime, drug
trafficking, radicalization and violent extremism. On 4 March, during a meeting in
N’Djamena, the ministers of defence of the Group of Five for the Sahel discussed
military, security and intelligence mechanisms to tackle the threat of terrorism. The
creation of a specialized rapid reaction force was also considered.
III. Major security developments
17. While some steps were taken in the implementation of key defence and
security provisions of the peace agreement, including beginning the construction of
three cantonment sites, the security situation did not improve, even in the absence of
fighting among the signatories. The Malian defence and security forces, the French
forces and MINUSMA remained the primary targets of attacks by extremist and
terrorist groups. Notwithstanding several intercommunal agreements mentioned in
my previous report, long-standing tensions continued, especially in Ménaka. The
MINUSMA force continued to face difficulties in allocating adequate resources to
implement mandated tasks owing to the need to escort convoys and protect
cantonment sites in the light of the prevailing security situation.
Asymmetric and extremist attacks
18. Extremist and terrorist groups maintained their determination to undermine the
peace process, increasingly targeting its supporters, including the signatory parties,
civilians, civil servants and the international presences in the central and northern
regions. Threats and intimidation campaigns against civilians by the Front de
libération du Macina and Ansar Eddine in Mopti, in addition to Al -Qaida in the
Islamic Maghreb in Timbuktu, intensified, including, increasingly, through targeted
attacks. For example, on 17 December, armed assailants shot and killed three
civilians — a journalist, a student and a MINUSMA local contractor — in front of a
local radio station in Timbuktu. On 24 January, a member of the National Guard
thwarted an attack by two armed men against the residence of the newly arrived
prosecutor in Gao. Three instances of beheadings of presumed informants working
for the Malian armed forces reportedly took place in the Mopti region.
19. Violent extremist and terrorist groups operated in the northern and central
parts of the country and across borders. The Front de libération du Macina
continued to threaten Mopti, Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb retained its foothold
in Timbuktu and Ansar Eddine continued to operate in Kidal. There was evidence of
increasing cooperation among the extremist and terrorist groups in Mali and across
the Sahel. The attack of 15 January in Ouagadougou, where armed assailants
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attacked a hotel with a modus operandi similar to the attack of 20 November against
a hotel in Bamako, was reportedly perpetrated by three Malians. The abduction of a
foreigner in Timbuktu on 7 January and two other foreigners from Burkina Faso on
15 January, for which Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb claimed responsibility,
signalled a potential increase in the targeting of foreigners in the band stretching
across central and northern Mali, Burkina Faso and the Niger.
20. During the reporting period, MINUSMA recorded 20 violent extremist and
terrorist attacks against it, compared with 25 during the previous reporting period.
Those hostile acts left seven peacekeepers, one civilian staff member and two
civilian contractors dead, compared with two peacekeepers, one civilian staff
member and one civilian contractor during the previous reporting period. The
attacks were increasingly sophisticated, using rockets and mortars, roadside
explosive devices and suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices. One of
the deadliest attacks occurred on 12 February, when unidentified assailants launched
a complex attack against the camp in Kidal. It began with mortar fire on the
northern part of the camp, while a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive
device breached the south gate, killing 7 peacekeepers and wounding 53 others. The
attack was reportedly claimed by both Al Mourabitoun and Ansar Eddine. The
reporting period also saw 19 attacks against the Malian armed forces and 2 against
the French forces, resulting in 17 fatalities for the former.
21. The Malian defence and security forces, the French forces and MINUSMA,
within their respective capacities and mandates, continued to support the creation of
a secure environment in northern Mali. Under separate lines of command,
MINUSMA conducted coordinated patrols with the Malian armed forces, while also
continuing its coordination with French forces.
22. The Malian armed forces conducted three counter-terrorism operations in the
Mopti and Ségou regions, resulting in the arrests of at least 13 suspected terrorists,
the majority of whom were from the Fulani community. Between 13 December and
16 January, the armed forces of Burkina Faso and Mali carried out joint
cross-border counter-terrorism operations. On 29 February, the French and Malian
forces launched a one-month counter-terrorism operation in the Timbuktu region.
Following an increase in crime in the region since the end of December, the Malian
armed forces established checkpoints in Timbuktu, while CMA and the Platform
were in discussion with the Malian armed forces to begin joint patrols outside the
town.
23. The Mouvement national de libération de l’Azawad (MNLA), part of CMA,
increasingly became a target of extremist and terrorist groups during the reporting
period. On 24 December, Ansar Eddine attacked the MNLA-controlled locality of
Talhandak, near the Algerian border in the Kidal region, kil ling at least 11 MNLA
combatants. Another four combatants, including Balla Ag Cherif, the younger
brother of the MNLA leader, Bilal Ag Cherif, were killed in an ambush of a convoy
sent in response to that attack. MNLA accused the Haut Conseil pour l ’unité de
l’Azawad, whose combatants formerly fought with Ansar Eddine, of not supporting
efforts to combat terrorists.
24. MINUSMA continued to provide capacity-building assistance to the Malian
defence and security forces. Its police officers provided technical assistance to a
specialized unit of the national police and gendarmerie investigating the attack of
20 November. Together with the United Nations Development Programme and the
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United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, MINUSMA supported the Malian
authorities in operationalizing a specialized judicial unit on terrorism and
transnational organized crime. On 31 December, the Malian authorities adopted
three decrees filling key posts of magistrates throughout Mali, including two
substitute prosecutors to augment the capacity of the unit. The United Nations Mine
Action Service trained more than 40 officers of the Malian defence and security
forces in explosive ordnance disposal, improvised explosive device threat mitigation
and weapon and ammunition management.
Ceasefire monitoring
25. As at 18 March, all 40 MINUSMA military observers had been deployed, 32
of whom to the north, where they conducted 212 patrols and established contacts
with the military leadership of the signatory armed groups to monitor the local
ceasefire arrangements between CMA and the Platform. They also conducted four
joint investigations with the mixed monitoring and verification teams on potential
ceasefire violations, finding no evidence of violations. At its meeting on 18 and
19 February, the Technical Commission on Security discussed a report of the mixed
teams on the alleged ceasefire violation committed by the Malian armed forces in
Zinzin, in the Timbukutu region, on 15 January; it concluded that the allegation
could not be substantiated.
Implementation of the peace agreement: defence and
security measures
26. Progress was made on some defence and security measures of the peace
agreement during the period under review. On 29 December, with funds from the
Peacebuilding Fund, the construction of two cantonment sites began in Likrakar
(Timbuktu region) and Fafa (Gao region), thereby providing employment to local
young people. The construction of the site at I-n-Eggar (Gao region) began on
26 January, following the clearance of potential explosives by the United Nations
Mine Action Service. The Technical Commission on Security technically assessed
18 of the 24 cantonment sites proposed by CMA and the Platform, validating 17.
During its meeting on 18 and 19 February, it gave the go-ahead for construction to
begin on the five remaining sites (four proposed by CMA and one by the Platform).
The Government also reported on its programme to provide rations to 14,400
combatants and fuel in the pre-cantonment phase; it provided the in-kind
contribution to the CMA and Platform combatants for February. CMA and the
Platform were requested to submit the lists of combatants and an inventory of their
armaments, a prerequisite for the launch of the cantonment process.
27. At the time of writing, the Operational Coordination Mechanism, responsible
for establishing the mixed patrols and protecting the cantonment sites, was yet to
begin work. At its meeting on 18 and 19 February, the Technical Commission on
Security requested CMA and the Platform to provide a list of participants for the
first mixed patrols to be conducted in the Gao region. The Government announced
that it had procured 32 vehicles for the patrols. It also agreed to provide an
allowance for food and operational costs to the CMA and Platform representatives
participating in the Mechanism, while MINUSMA provided funds to secure some of
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the office equipment and furniture needed for the Mechanism to be made
operational. The MINUSMA force protected United Nations personnel present at the
cantonment sites under construction.
28. On 31 December, the President signed decrees establishing national
commissions on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and on integration.
MINUSMA supported the Government to expedite the appointment o f the members
of the two commissions and to finalize the revision of legislation governing the
National Council for Security Sector Reform, which are critical to advancing the
cantonment process. MINUSMA, in collaboration with the World Bank, continued
to support the Malian authorities in drafting a national programme document for
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. The Government continued its
efforts to strengthen democratic oversight of the security sector and, in that context,
held a workshop supported by MINUSMA on 8 and 9 March to discuss the
oversight role of the National Assembly and the development of a triennial strategic
plan for 2016-2019 and an action plan for 2016 in support of the Assembly. The
Mission also supported the Malian authorities in implementing the military
programming law, the formulation of defence and security policies and the revision
of the national strategy on border management.
Protection of civilians
29. Armed banditry constituted the most significant threat to civilians, accounting
for 45 per cent of all incidents in Timbuktu and 25 per cent in Gao and Mopti. As
mentioned above, threats and intimidation by extremist and terrorist groups
targeting civilians, including civil servants and informants of the Mali an armed
forces, increased in the central and northern regions. Nevertheless, MINUSMA
police personnel conducted 2,479 joint patrols with the Malian police in urban
areas. In addition, the MINUSMA force adopted a robust and visible posture by
increasing the frequency of its long-range patrols in the vicinity of Ansongo (Gao
region), Gao, Kidal and Ménaka and using its aviation assets and unmanned aerial
vehicles to monitor remote areas and discourage violence. In the Timbuktu region,
MINUSMA conducted an average of four reconnaissance flights per week over Ber,
Goundam and Gourma Rharous to monitor the movements of armed groups and
reassure the population. On 10 March, the Mission launched a 10 -day combined air
and ground operation in the Mopti and Timbuktu regions to protect civilians and
deter extremist and terrorist groups from poaching elephants.
30. Intercommunal conflict persisted in the Ménaka and Timbuktu regions. The
series of clashes between the Daoussak and the Ibogaletane communities, as well as
between the Daoussak and the Fulani communities, reported since 16 February in
the Ménaka region left more than 20 people dead and some 2,280 displaced. On
20 February, members of the Daoussak community attacked a camp of the
Ibogaletane community near Inékar, 45 km west of Ménaka, reportedly killing six
members of that community and kidnapping two others. On 22 February, the Malian
armed forces deployed to Inékar to de-escalate tensions and to enable access for
humanitarian organizations to provide assistance to the population. Local
reconciliation meetings in Inékar were cancelled following renewed fighting
between the Daoussak and the Ibogaletane communities and between the Daoussak
and the Fulani communities from 25 to 29 February. On 29 February, CMA and the
Platform established a joint commission to ease the intercommunal tensions in the
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region. The risk of escalation of those community conflicts remained high in an
environment characterized by the proliferation of weapons, illicit drug trafficking
and the presence of armed groups, as well as extremist and terrorist groups with
links to various communities. On 20 January, an unknown number of members of
the Daoussak community reportedly entered the Niger and attacked a Fulani camp
18 km north of Bani Bangou and a location 32 km south of the border with Mali,
allegedly killing seven individuals and injuring three. Further to accounts of violent
clashes in my previous report between members of two Tuareg communities, the
Daoussak and the Imghad in the Ménaka area, the leaders of both communities
issued a joint statement in Bamako on 9 March in which they announced that an
agreement to end hostilities had been reached.
IV. Human rights
31. The human rights situation remained of serious concern during the reporting
period. MINUSMA documented human rights violations and abuses committed by
the Malian defence and security forces, CMA, the Platform, other armed groups,
violent extremist and terrorist groups and international forces. A total of 34 cases of
human rights violations and abuses, involving at least 53 victims, were reported,
mostly in the Kidal, Mopti and Timbuktu regions, compared with 25 cases and
157 victims in my previous report. The cases involved 17 instances of killing,
summary execution and enforced disappearance, 12 instances of ill-treatment, 2
instances of a death threat and 1 instance of illegal detention.
32. As at 18 March, MINUSMA had identified 265 conflict- and terrorism-related
detainees, including 4 boys and 72 individuals newly arrested, held in State-run
detention facilities throughout the country. Of those, 124 had been arrested after the
signing of the peace agreement in June 2015 for their alleged involvement in
terrorism-related activities. In February, CMA freed six members of the Malian
defence and security forces, while the Government released nine individuals,
including a boy and four men, associated with CMA. CMA continued to detain six
Platform combatants, while the Platform continued to detain a CMA combatant. In
the context of the counter-terrorism operations mentioned above, MINUSMA
documented that 6 of 13 persons arrested had been subjected to ill -treatment by the
Malian armed forces.
33. Progress in combating impunity remained slow. Major impediments to
criminal proceedings included the lack of logistical resources for magistrates,
insecurity preventing the judicial authorities from effectively carrying out
investigations, especially in the north, and the unconditional release of some
detainees. In a positive development, the Bamako Appeals Court issued an order on
22 December to refer General Amadou Haya Sanogo and all the other suspects or
suspected accomplices for trial. The trial date is pending.
34. On 12 February, as a result of MINUSMA advocacy, CMA signed a
declaration in which it committed itself to abiding by international standards and to
respecting the international ban on the recruitment and involvement of children in
armed forces and armed groups.
35. No new cases of conflict-related sexual violence were reported to MINUSMA.
Continuing security threats combined with sociocultural inhibitions and fear of
reprisals may have hindered the monitoring and reporting of new cases. The Malian
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judiciary investigated conflict-related sexual violence committed in 2012. A total of
19 women were heard by an investigating judge in Bamako, with support from the
MINUSMA trust fund for the protection of victims, witnesses and their rights,
which provides safety measures for survivors of conflict-related sexual violence. On
26 January, 45 parliamentarians and members of civil society engaged in advocacy
with the National Assembly for the adoption of a law strengthening efforts to
combat gender-based violence, including conflict-related sexual violence.
36. On 22 December, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights released joint reports, with MINUSMA, on the attack in Kidal in
May 2014 and on the main findings of the attack on Tin Hama, Gao region, in May
2015. The human rights violations and abuses documented during those attacks may
amount to war crimes. While calling for the prosecution of the perpetrators of those
crimes, MINUSMA and the Office stressed the need for the parties to comp ly with
their obligations under international human rights and humanitarian law and to take
measures to strengthen the protection of civilians. The Mission’s continuous
advocacy notwithstanding, the Malian judicial authorities did not initiate criminal
proceedings in relation to those human rights violations and abuses during the
reporting period.
V. Humanitarian situation
37. The overall trend of schools reopening in the north notwithstanding, 12 per
cent of preschool, elementary and junior high schools remained closed in the Gao,
Kidal and Timbuktu regions, with 380,000 children between 7 and 15 years of age
in the north remaining out of school. In Kidal, 3,811 children in the 21 open schools
received education from 76 volunteer and 8 paid teachers (of the 370 required for
the 62 schools in Kidal). The deteriorating security situation in some parts of the
Mopti region led to 8 per cent of schools being closed, increasing the number from
84 to 117. In the Ségou region, 20 primary and junior high schools were temporarily
closed in the light of the worsening security situation. The World Food Programme
(WFP) provided school meals to 155,094 children, half of whom were girls, in
primary schools in the Gao, Kayes, Koulikoro, Mopti and Timbuktu regions. In
February, WFP again began to provide meal assistance to 11 primary schools in
Kidal. The United Nations Children’s Fund provided school materials and training
to educators in 16 schools and 44 accelerated learning centres in Kidal.
38. Access to basic services remained a challenge in northern Mali. The number of
functioning health facilities remained limited, with only 10 of 26 open in Kidal. The
World Health Organization restored 186 of 203 health facilities in the Gao, Mopti
and Timbuktu regions. The lack of investment in public infrastructure, such as wells
and generators, continued to constrain access to water and electricity. Food
insecurity was affecting 2.5 million of 17 million people, of whom 315,000 were
expected to face severe food insecurity during the lean season. In that context, WFP
provided food assistance to more than 350,000 people in the north every month and
the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations provided agriculture
and pastoral tools and kits to in excess of 26,000 households.
39. As at 18 March, there were some 52,000 internally displaced persons in Mali
and 143,300 Malian refugees in Burkina Faso, Mauritania and the Niger. The Gao
and Timbuktu regions continued to have the highest proportion of internally
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displaced persons. A total of 23 per cent of Malian refugees residing in
neighbouring countries originated from the Ménaka region. On 1 January, the Office
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees opened an office in
Ménaka. On 17 January, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
deployed a national liaison officer to Kidal to facilitate humanitarian coordination in
the region. The Kidal airstrip reopened on 29 January.
40. The United Nations Mine Action Service continued to educate
conflict-affected communities in central and northern Mali about explosive hazards,
reaching some 13,700 beneficiaries, and destroyed 32 explosive remnants of war
and 37 rounds of small arms ammunition.
VI. Economic development, cultural preservation and the environment
41. There was little progress in the delivery of peace dividends and the return of
basic services to the north by the Government. The finalization of its development
strategy for the northern regions, including a national emergency response plan,
remained pending. Government-led development initiatives were constrained by the
prevalence of insecurity, the lack of basic infrastructure and the limited
redeployment of government officials to the north.
42. In support of the Government, MINUSMA implemented quick-impact projects
in areas such as the rehabilitation and equipping of government facilities in the
northern regions. It also used quick-impact projects and the Trust Fund in Support
of Peace and Security in Mali, among other resources, to deliver much-needed basic
services directly to the population in the north. Furthermore, the Mission
contributed to expanding access to potable water in rural areas of the Gao, Kidal,
Mopti and Timbuktu regions, distributed solar-powered electricity kits to improve
physical security and living conditions in Kidal and provided school materials and
equipment to schools in Timbuktu.
43. In addition to the efforts made by humanitarian actors described above, United
Nations agencies, funds and programmes made significant contributions to bridge
the service delivery gap in the northern regions, notwithstanding the limited access
stemming from persistent insecurity. During the reporting period, the Peacebuilding
Fund reached a disbursement of some 75 per cent of its total allocation of
$10.9 million for the period 2015/16. Its financing enabled the resumption of
education activities through the opening of 150 education centres for 4,500 children,
with 105 educators. The Fund also financed income -generating activities for an
estimated 300 women and young people, in addition to supporting intercommunal
dialogue in the Gao and Timbuktu regions.
44. MINUSMA and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization undertook various heritage-related initiatives. On 4 February, a
consecration ceremony, last held in the eleventh century, was conducted by local
communities to mark the reconstruction of 14 of 16 World Heritage mausoleums in
Timbuktu destroyed during the conflict.
45. MINUSMA continued to take measures to mitigate its environmental impact in
Mali. On 1 January, it adopted new waste management measures to enforce
requirements on waste segregation, recycling and volume reduction, in accordance
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with the provisions of the environmental policy of the Department of Field Support
and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations for United Nations field missions.
VII. Deployment and capacities of the Mission
Military
46. As at 18 March, the strength of the military component of MINUSMA stood at
10,698 personnel, of an authorized strength of 11,240, representing 95 per cent of
authorized military personnel. Women accounted for 1.7 per cent of the force. Key
outstanding capabilities included a combat convoy battalion, a force protection
company, an attack helicopter unit and a medium military helicopter unit with
tactical night-flight capabilities. In addition, MINUSMA remained seriously
underresourced in terms of armoured personnel carriers, with 91 required to reach
the originally planned levels and 43 others in need of replacement, meaning that 134
such vehicles are needed to reach the total of 324 assessed as required by the force.
MINUSMA also continued to require additional military staff officers with
sufficient experience and skills for their duties and responsibilities, in particular for
intelligence and imagery analysis. Concerns over the operational capability of some
infantry units remained owing to the lack of sufficient items of contingent -owned
equipment and self-sustainment capabilities (11 contingents are below 60 per cent
of requirements) that meet United Nations standards. The support of bilateral
partners is also required in such areas as maintenance of armoured personnel
carriers, capacity-building for minor engineering works, logistics support and
training to improve the asymmetric warfare capabilities of the contingents.
Police
47. As at 18 March, the strength of the police component of MINUSMA stood at
1,116 personnel, representing 78 per cent of its authorized strength of 1,440, with
84 per cent of individual police officers (11 per cent of them women) and 76 per
cent of formed police unit personnel (5 per cent of them women) deployed. The
deployment of the remaining two formed police units, to Gao and Goundam
(Timbuktu region), in addition to a special weapons and tactics capacity, is under
way. MINUSMA continued to require a small police riverine capacity and additional
specialized police personnel, including experts in forensics, improvised explosive
devices, intelligence, transnational organized crime, trafficking of illicit drugs,
small arms and light weapons, counter-terrorism teams and project managers.
Civilian personnel
48. As at 18 March, 88 per cent of all MINUSMA civilian staff had been
deployed, comprising 86 per cent of international staff, 88 per cent of United
Nations volunteers and 89 per cent of national staff. Women held 30 per cent of
international posts, 32 per cent of United Nations Volunteer positions and 21 per
cent of national posts. Civilian staff had been deployed in Bamako (926), Gao
(191), Kidal (88), Mopti (98), Tessalit (19) and Timbuktu (138), as well as in
Abidjan (38).
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Efforts to secure supply lines
49. The MINUSMA force continued its efforts to secure the main supply routes by
conducting 26 escorted logistics convoy missions with the support of aviation
assets, unmanned aerial vehicles and special forces. Those efforts were essential for
the construction of MINUSMA camps, the reopening of the Kidal airfield and the
sustainment of the Mission in the regions. A backlog of containers for engineering
materials continued to accumulate in Gao, however. The lack of a combat convoy
battalion, the required armoured personnel carriers and mine -protected vehicles
restricted the Mission’s capability to conduct escort missions in non-permissive
environments and limited the number of logistics convoys in northern Mali,
negatively affecting fuel and rations delivery and construction efforts. It also
increased the cost of resupplying MINUSMA personnel in the field, given that fuel
and rations had to be airlifted to Aguelhok, Kidal and Tessalit in the Kidal region.
The continued requirements for the MINUSMA force to heavily invest in force
protection measures, including providing convoy escorts and protecting cantonment
sites, seriously hampered the Mission’s capacity to implement mandated tasks,
notwithstanding the constant reprioritization of tasks.
50. No new camps were completed during the reporting period. The reconstruction
and rehabilitation of the infrastructure destroyed in the Kidal camp in the attack of
12 February continued. In Bamako, the construction of a facility for the MINUSMA
operational base by the airport continued, while alternative premises were secured
in the city to accommodate the Mission’s headquarters. The relocation of
MINUSMA personnel from the Hotel l’Amitié should be completed by the middle
of May.
VIII. Safety and security of United Nations personnel
51. United Nations personnel continued to face a high level of security threats,
with the Mission continuing its efforts to enhance its security measures in the north.
The Kidal camp security project to install detection systems, including a tethered
balloon, a Doppler radar system and enhanced high -performance binoculars, should
reach full operational capacity in the middle of April. The surveillance systems
remained partially operational after the provisional repair of the damage caused in
the attack on the camp of 12 February, which included the perforation of the
aerostat by shrapnel and the destruction of relevant ground infrastructure, including
weather stations. The ground alert system designed to detect incoming fire was yet
to be made operational.
52. MINUSMA also took steps to increase preventive measures. The United
Nations Mine Action Service delivered predeployment training and equipment to
explosive ordnance device military contingents and provided infantry battalions
with search and detection training and equipment for identifying explosive threats.
The use of armoured personnel carriers by the MINUSMA force and police to pass
through high-risk areas resulted in a dramatic decrease in casualties.
53. In the light of the deteriorating security situation and the elevated level of
security threats against United Nations personnel, a joint strategic security review
was undertaken from 19 to 25 January to identify systemic prevention, mitigation
and response measures. The recommendations highlighted the urgency of advancing
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security sector reform and implementing the security provisions of the peace
agreement as a key factor for the security of United Nations personnel and reiterated
the Mission’s acute need for key capabilities, such as armoured personnel carriers
and enhanced medical evacuation capabilities. The recommendations are being
taken into account in the strategic review on MINUSMA, which will conclude in
May. As recommended, MINUSMA is adjusting its security plans, coordination
mechanisms and training programme, in addition to developing additional tactical
intervention capacity and contingency plans.
IX. Conduct and discipline
54. During the reporting period, no allegation of sexual exploitation and abuse
was made. For the allegation of sexual abuse made during the previous reporting
period, the Member State concerned conducted an investigation in Mali and
concluded that it could not be substantiated. MINUSMA and its partners provided
medical support to the alleged victim. The Mission continued to inform the public
about the expected standards of conduct for United Nations personnel, focusing on
the commitment to implement the policy of zero tolerance to sexual exploitation and
abuse within the Mission. MINUSMA reached out to partners, including religious
leaders, law enforcement authorities and local and international non-governmental
organizations, stressing the importance of preventing sexual exploitation and abuse
and reporting such cases.
X. Observations
55. Mali has negotiated a long and difficult road over the past year with
considerable successes, culminating in the signing of the peace agreement in 2015
and the rapprochement between the signatory armed groups. I am encouraged to see
that the signatories have refrained from resorting to violence and remain committed
to resolving differences through discussions. I commend all the Malian parties for
constructively participating in the Agreement Monitoring Committee and
demonstrating gestures of political will to advance the peace process in the best
interest of the people. In particular, I commend the efforts by the Government to
implement political and institutional reforms and decentralization, which have been
the priority demand of the signatory armed groups.
56. I remain concerned, however, that actual progress in the implementation o f the
peace agreement remains limited. The high-level consultative ministerial meeting
held in Algiers on 18 January offered an opportunity for the members of the
international mediation team to impress on the parties the need to accelerate the
implementation process. The Security Council, while visiting Mali from 4 to
7 March, also emphasized the importance of an expeditious implementation and the
key role that the Government must play to tackle the political and security
challenges. To ensure that the Malian people enjoy the dividends of peace, security,
human rights and development that they deserve, more needs to be done to bring
tangible progress without further delay. The parties must adhere to article 50 of the
agreement, in which they recognized that the most important element in making the
agreement a success was their sincerity and good faith and their commitment to
accept the content of the agreement and to work to implement all its provisions. I
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urge all the Malian parties to accelerate the implementation of the agreement in full,
especially the political and security provisions that underpin the successful
execution of all other provisions. The Government’s leadership in making progress
on those provisions will be critical.
57. To sustain the positive steps achieved since the consultations in Algiers, there
must be inclusive and transparent consultations with all stakeholders concerned. I
call upon the signatory parties to include women and young people in all key
implementation mechanisms of the agreement and in the national reconciliation
conference planned for later in 2016. The adoption by the Government of a decree
providing for a 30 per cent quota for the appointment of women in national
institutions and legislative bodies was a welcome development. In the same vein, I
encourage CMA and the Platform to continue constructive consultations in the
framework of the talks held in Anefis i-n-Darane. The tensions resulting from the
Platform’s entry into Kidal on 2 February highlight a need to ensure that parallel
bilateral agreements are clearly linked to the overall framework of the peace
agreement, so as to facilitate progress in implementation and contribute to the
resolution of intercommunal conflicts.
58. I welcome the efforts of the Technical Commission on Security to implement
security arrangements, in particular the launch of the construction of cantonment
sites and the monitoring and verification of ceasefire violations through the mixed
monitoring and verification teams. The Commission remains an important
mechanism to facilitate the implementation of key defence and security provisions
of the agreement. I call upon all parties to fully cooperate with its work, to expedite
the establishment of the Operational Coordination Mechanism and to provide the
lists of participants in the mixed patrols and the cantonment process. In the
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process, I stress that the Government
must ensure the protection of women and children who are victims of the conflict.
In that regard, I call upon the Government to appoint the representatives of the
Ministry for the Advancement of Women, Children and Families to the national
commissions on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and on integration.
59. The improved relationship among the signatories notwithstanding, the
northern and central parts of Mali remain threatened by criminal, violent extremist
and terrorist groups, which take advantage of the limited presence of law
enforcement institutions. The spread of insecurity and the security threat posed by
actors outside the peace process remain alarming, as demonstrated by the attack
against the MINUSMA camp in Kidal on 12 February, which was claimed by Al
Mourabitoun and Ansar Eddine. I strongly condemn the attacks by violent extremist
and terrorist groups against civilians, signatory armed groups, the Malian and
French forces and MINUSMA, which remain the target of asymmetric and
increasingly sophisticated attacks. I reiterate that attacks targeting United Nations
peacekeepers constitute war crimes under international law and I call fo r the
perpetrators to be brought to justice. I also express my most heartfelt condolences to
the bereaved families and the Governments of those concerned, as well as to the
people and the Government of Mali who continue to suffer unconscionable losses.
60. The persistent operational difficulties faced by the MINUSMA force, coupled
with the current environment marked by insecurity, drug trafficking and terrorism,
will continue to pose significant security challenges to the Mission. I encourage all
troop-contributing countries, police-contributing countries and bilateral donors to
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sustain their efforts to ensure that all contingents have equipment and training that
meet United Nations standards. I urge the rapid deployment of the outstanding
armoured personnel carriers and the priority military and police capabilities outlined
herein and in my previous report. Bearing in mind the challenges encountered, the
Secretariat has engaged with troop- and police-contributing countries to identify
practical steps to reach the required standards. I call upon Member States that are in
a position to do so to support the troop-contributing countries.
61. The successful stabilization of Mali ultimately depends on the Government,
which must step up its efforts, including by making progress on the revision of the
2014 strategy for security sector reform to ensure the participation of CMA and the
Platform and by enhancing regional security cooperation. Given the transborder
nature of the security challenges, I reiterate the need for the Government to enhance
the presence of the Malian armed forces in the north and to create a more conducive
environment for the overall peace process and for MINUSMA. I commend the West
African region on its strong engagement in supporting the Government in its efforts
to combat violent extremism and MINUSMA in its efforts to implement its mandate
in such a volatile security environment. The United Nations stands ready to support
regional security cooperation mechanisms, including the planned assessment visit to
Mali by the African Union in the context of proposals for a regional intervention
force. I encourage further collaboration by the countries of the subregion to
reinforce collaboration with the Government and MINUSMA on issues relating to
border security and intelligence sharing, as well as through the United Nations
integrated strategy for the Sahel. I also commend the efforts of the Group of Five
for the Sahel to support those endeavours.
62. I am concerned by the increase in human rights violations and abuses
documented by MINUSMA, in addition to the slow progress in combating impunity.
There can be no sustainable solution to the conflict in Mali without accountability. I
call upon the Malian authorities to swiftly conduct criminal proceedings and bring
the perpetrators of human rights violations and abuses to justice. I urge the
Government to hold itself to the highest standards of due process and abide by its
international human rights obligations in the conduct of its counter -terrorism
operations in central and northern Mali. I welcome the progress made in the
functioning of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission. I encourage the
Malian parties to ensure that the appointment of the additional commissioners will
not result in the politicization of the Commission and the undermining of its
credibility.
63. The return of basic services and the establishment of income -generating
activities in central and northern regions remain critical to addressing the continuing
humanitarian concerns and unemployment among young people and former
combatants, who are vulnerable to radicalization and recruitment by violent actors. I
strongly encourage the Government to sustain its efforts to expand the coverage of
basic social services in the central and northern regions to ensure that conflict-
affected communities benefit from the long-awaited dividends of peace. I also call
upon the Government to make progress on the development strategy for the north,
presented at the international conference for the economic recovery and
development of Mali held in Paris on 22 October 2015, in addition to the
sustainable development fund to which it pledged to contribute 450 million euros
over the period from 2016 to 2018.
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64. Lastly, I wish to express my full support for my new Special Representative
for Mali and Head of MINUSMA, Mahamat Saleh Annadif, who has demonstrated
an indefatigable dynamism, affinity for working productively with all the partners to
the peace process and commitment to United Nations personnel working in a
challenging environment. I commend the members of the international mediation
team for their sustained support for the Malian parties. I also pay special tribute to
the men and women of MINUSMA and the troop-contributing countries and
police-contributing countries for their dedication and contribution to the Mission. I
also express my gratitude to the African Union, the Economic Community of West
African States, the European Union and bilateral partners, United Nations agencies,
funds and programmes, non-governmental organizations and all other partners,
many of which have been operating under difficult conditions and facing grave
threats in a hostile environment, for their contribution in support of peace and
stability in Mali.
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Annex
Military and police strength of the United Nations Multidimensional
Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali as at 15 March 2016
Military component
(staff officers and units)
Police component
Individual police officers Formed police units Total police
Country Men Women Total Men Women Total Men Women Total Men Women Total
Albania
Algeria
Argentina
Armenia
Australia
Austria
Bangladesh 1 466 1 466 140 140 140 140
Belgium 7 7
Benin 259 259 29 1 30 140 140 169 1 170
Bhutan 3 3
Bolivia (Plurinational
State of)
Bosnia and
Herzegovina 2 2
Botswana
Brazil
Brunei Darussalam
Bulgaria
Burkina Faso 1 692 29 1 721 21 2 23 21 2 23
Burundi 13 13 13 13
Cambodia 289 13 302
Cameroon 2 2 20 20 20 20
Canada
Central African
Republic
Chad 1 447 1 447 4 4 4 4
Chile
China 387 15 402
Colombia
Congo
Côte d’Ivoire
Croatia
Cyprus
Czech Republic 1 1
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Military component
(staff officers and units)
Police component
Individual police officers Formed police units Total police
Country Men Women Total Men Women Total Men Women Total Men Women Total
Democratic Republic
of the Congo 5 1 6 5 1 6
Denmark 18 1 19
Djibouti 1 1 1 1
Dominica
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
Egypt 68 68
El Salvador 88 4 92
Estonia 1 1
Ethiopia
Fiji
Finland 4 4
France 29 29 9 9 9 9
Gabon
Gambia 4 4
Germany 18 18 16 3 19 16 3 19
Ghana 218 218
Greece
Grenada
Guatemala
Guinea 848 6 854 3 3 3 3
Guinea-Bissau 1 1
Honduras
Hungary
Iceland
India
Indonesia 142 4 146
Ireland
Israel
Italy 2 2
Jamaica
Japan
Jordan 1 1 2 2 2 2
Kazakhstan
Kenya 3 4 7
Kyrgyzstan
Latvia 1 1
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Military component
(staff officers and units)
Police component
Individual police officers Formed police units Total police
Country Men Women Total Men Women Total Men Women Total Men Women Total
Lesotho
Liberia 47 2 49
Libya
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Madagascar 2 2 2 2
Malawi
Malaysia
Mauritania
Mongolia
Montenegro
Morocco
Mozambique
Namibia
Nepal 146 4 150
Netherlands 461 30 491 18 5 23 18 5 23
New Zealand
Niger 858 6 864 12 12 12 12
Nigeria 76 13 89 2 2 109 31 140 111 31 142
Norway 71 9 80
Pakistan
Palau
Papua New Guinea
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Portugal 2 2
Qatar
Republic of Korea
Republic of Moldova
Romania 1 1 2 2 2 2
Russian Federation
Rwanda
Samoa
Senegal 666 10 676 16 2 18 276 4 280 292 6 298
Serbia
Sierra Leone 7 1 8
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Military component
(staff officers and units)
Police component
Individual police officers Formed police units Total police
Country Men Women Total Men Women Total Men Women Total Men Women Total
Singapore
Slovakia
Slovenia
South Africa
Spain
Sri Lanka
Sweden 202 21 223 2 3 5 2 3 5
Switzerland 4 4 3 3 3 3
Tajikistan
Thailand
The former Yugoslav
Republic of
Macedonia
Timor-Leste
Togo 920 15 935 3 3 134 6 140 137 6 143
Tunisia 46 1 47 46 1 47
Turkey 1 1 1 1
Uganda
Ukraine
United Kingdom of
Great Britain and
Northern Ireland 1 1 2
United Republic of
Tanzania
United States of
America 10 10
Uruguay
Vanuatu
Yemen 7 7 9 9 9 9
Zambia
Zimbabwe
Total 10 496 188 10 684 239 18 257 799 41 840 1 038 59 1 097
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