Rx commissioning report.pdf

7/27/2019 Rx commissioning report.pdf

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/rx-commissioning-reportpdf 1/16

Document Number: RRRP-7200-EBEAN-011-A Revision : A

Replacement Research Reactor Project

OPAL CONSTRUCTION AND STAGE ACOMMISSIONING EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY REPORT

Prepared By Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisat ion

18 May 2006

Page 1 of 16



INVAP ANSTO

Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation

OPAL CONSTRUCTION AND STAGE A COMMISSIONING EXECUTIVE SUMMARY REPORT

ANSTO Document N°: RRRP-7200-EBEAN-011-A Revision: A

Replacement Reactor Project Document Title: OPAL CONSTRUCTION AND

STAGE A COMMISSIONING EXECUTIVESUMMARY REPORT

REVISION SHEETRef No:

Print name, date and sign or initial

RevisionLetter

Description of Revision Prepared Checked/Reviewed

Approved

0 Original issue for submission to ARPANSA

AFX MSX

RMX

GDW

Notes: 1. Revision must be verified in accordance with the Quality Plan for the job.



INVAP ANSTO



TABLE OF CONTENTS

1 INTRODUCTION....................................................................................................................4 2 SUMMARY OF VERIFICATION PROCESSES.....................................................................4 2.1 Detai led Engineering Phase ................................................................................................4 2.2 Construction Phase..............................................................................................................5 2.3 Pre-Commissioning Phase..................................................................................................6 2.4 Stage A Commissioning Phase ..........................................................................................6 3 SUMMARY OF KEY ACTIVITIES AND EVENTS .................................................................7 3.1 Construction Phase..............................................................................................................7

3.1.1 Civil Works......................................................................................................................8 3.1.2 Mechanical / Process Systems.......................................................................................9 3.1.3 Electrical Systems.........................................................................................................10 3.1.4 Instrumentation and Control Systems...........................................................................10

3.2 Pre-Commissioning Phase................................................................................................10 3.2.1 Electrical Systems.........................................................................................................11 3.2.2 Building Service Systems .............................................................................................11 3.2.3 Process Systems ..........................................................................................................11 3.2.4 Instrumentation, Control and Shutdown Systems ........................................................12 3.2.5 Containment Systems...................................................................................................13 3.2.6 Radioisotope Handling and Neutron Beam Systems ...................................................13

3.3 Stage A Commissioning Phase ........................................................................................14 3.3.1 Instrumentation and Control Systems Tests.................................................................14 3.3.2 Reactor State Tests ......................................................................................................14 3.3.3 Containment Systems Tests.........................................................................................15 3.3.4 Control Rooms & Emergency Preparedness Tests......................................................15 3.3.5 Electrical Power System Tests .....................................................................................15 3.3.6 Other Stage A Commissioning Tests............................................................................16

4 FINAL CONCLUSIONS .......................................................................................................16



INVAP ANSTO



1 INTRODUCTION

The ARPANSA Construction Authorisation for the OPAL Reactor covers four project phases:

1. Detailed Engineering Phase

2. Construction Phase (including civil construction, procurement, manufacture andinstallation works)

3. Pre-Commissioning Phase

4. Stage A Commissioning Phase

This report summarises the activities conducted under the Construction Authorisation andconsists of two substantive sections: Section 2, which summarises the verification processeswhich were applied to ensure the reactor was constructed in accordance with specifiedrequirements and which have produced the documentation that allows ANSTO to demonstratethis; and Section 3, which summarises the major activities and events which occurred under the

Construction Authorisation. Full details of the verification processes and all activities and eventsare contained in the OPAL Construction Report (RRRP-7033-EBEAN-001) and the OPALStage A Commissioning Report (RRRP-7311-EDEIN-004).

2 SUMMARY OF VERIFICATION PROCESSES

The verification processes which were applied to ensure the OPAL Reactor was constructed inaccordance with specified requirements are summarised in the following subsections for theDetailed Engineering, Construction, Pre-Commissioning and Stage A Commissioning Phases.These verification processes form part of the Quality Management Systems (QMS) of both

ANSTO and INVAP, which are both certified to ISO 9000:2000. The verification processes

summarised below are those which have produced the documentation that allows ANSTO todemonstrate that the OPAL Reactor has been constructed in accordance with specifiedrequirements. It should be noted that many other verification processes were also in placethroughout the various phases of the project as part of the certified Quality ManagementSystems, including processes for design change control, non-conformance control, measuringand test equipment control, quality management system auditing, etc.

2.1 DETAILED ENGINEERING PHASE

During the Detailed Engineering phase, the design of structures, systems and components wasestablished through the preparation of design documentation including drawings, specifications,calculations and analyses. This documentation was subject to a thorough review, verificationand acceptance process by ANSTO in accordance with project procedures prior to thecommencement of construction activities. During the OPAL design phase, over 10,000 detailedengineering documents were reviewed, verified and accepted by ANSTO. In addition, for SafetyCategory 1 and 2 structures, systems and components, this documentation was used to supportrequests to ARPANSA for approval to construct items important to safety to meet therequirements of ARPANS Regulation 54 and Licence Condition 4.6. During the OPALConstruction Phase, over 120 approvals to construct were obtained from ARPANSA prior tocommencement of construction of items important to safety. Where a relevant change was

File Name: RRRP-7200-EBEAN-011-A.DOCRRRP-7200-EBEAN-011-A Page 4 of 16

Revision: A



INVAP ANSTO



made which had significant implications for safety, ARPANSA approval was also obtained inaccordance with ARPANS Regulation 51 prior to implementing the change.

2.2 CONSTRUCTION PHASE

During the Construction Phase, activities were controlled through the preparation andimplementation of Specific Inspection and Test Plans (SITPs), in accordance with the projectConstruction Inspection and Test Plan (CITP). This verification process was applied to allConstruction Phase works, including civil, mechanical / process, electrical, and instrumentationand control systems. Each SITP comprised a sequential list of the activities involved in theperformance of a task, including inspection and test activities, specifying for each activity therelevant reference documentation, acceptance criteria, control points and requirements for records/reports generation.

Each SITP proforma used during construction was subject to review, verification and acceptanceby ANSTO in accordance with project procedures prior to its implementation. As part of thisprocess, control points, in the form of witness and hold points, were nominated by ANSTO andother relevant organisations, on key SITP activities to ensure that the reactor was beingconstructed in accordance with specified requirements.

Each SITP included a final inspection/review hold point which was not released until eachorganisation involved was satisfied that all SITP activities had been satisfactorily completed anddocumented. Deviations from specified requirements were dealt with through non-conformancecontrol procedures, or, for relatively minor issues, through the generation of punch-lists. Theseprocesses ensured that all deviations were appropriately identified, documented andsubsequently corrected.

Upon completion of all activities on an SITP and release of the final hold point, the completedSITP, and all supporting records and reports, were compiled into a document termed a HistoryDocket, which forms the final record of the procurement, manufacture, installation and / or construction of an item. During the Construction Phase, around 650 SITP proformas were

reviewed, verified and accepted by ANSTO, from which over 2500 individual SITPs wereimplemented and final hold points released.

Once all SITPs for a system (or in some cases certain parts of a system) were completed, aSystem Construction Release Certificate (SCRC) was issued listing all completed SITPsinvolved in construction of the system. SCRCs were signed off by both INVAP and ANSTO, andsignified the completion of construction of a system, allowing pre-commissioning activities toproceed on that system. The SCRCs also reference the History Dockets which contain therelevant SITP records.

Once all SCRCs had been issued for those parts of the facility necessary to have beencompleted in order to commence Stage B commissioning, a Facility Construction ReleaseCertificate (FCRC), listing all of the completed SCRCs, was issued. The FCRC was signed off

by both INVAP and ANSTO, and signified the completion of the construction phase as relevantto the commencement of Stage B commissioning. A second FCRC will be issued at a later dateto cover the remainder of the facility, but these activities are not required prior to commencementof Stage B Commissioning.

Details on the specific activities to which the SITP process described above was applied for each system, as well as the SCRCs which were issued for each system and the FCRC whichwas issued for the facility, are contained in the OPAL Construction Report (RRRP-7033-EBEAN-


Revision: A



INVAP ANSTO



001). This documentation demonstrates that the reactor has been constructed in accordancewith all specified codes and standards, and design, safety and regulatory requirements.

2.3 PRE-COMMISSIONING PHASE

Pre-Commissioning inspection and testing activities were controlled primarily through thepreparation and implementation of pre-commissioning test procedures, which describe in detailthe activities involved in pre-commissioning of a system, along with relevant referencedocumentation, acceptance criteria and requirements for records generation. In addition, eachpre-commissioning test procedure was accompanied by an SITP used in a similar manner tothose of the Construction Phase.

As for the Construction Phase, all pre-commissioning test documentation, including procedures,SITPs and check-sheets, was reviewed, verified and accepted by ANSTO in accordance withproject procedures prior to implementation, with control points nominated as required. Ingeneral, all pre-commissioning activities were witnessed by ANSTO, with hold points specified atkey points to ensure that all requirements were met prior to certain activities proceeding.

Similar to Construction Phase SITPs, each Pre-Commissioning Phase SITP included a finalinspection/review hold point which was not released until each organisation involved wassatisfied that all pre-commissioning activities had been satisfactorily completed anddocumented. Processes for documentation of deviations, preparation of History Dockets andissue of system release certificates during the Pre-Commissioning Phase also mirrored those for the Construction Phase, with a System Test Release Certificate (STRC) issued upon completionof pre-commissioning activities for a system, and a Facility Test Release Certificate (FTRC)issued once all relevant STRCs had been issued for the facility.

During the Pre-Commissioning Phase, around 115 pre-commissioning procedures werereviewed, verified and accepted by ANSTO. Two FTRC’s have been issued, the first prior tocommencement of Stage A Commissioning (at which point about 80% of the pre-commissioningprocedures had been completed and released), and the second prior to commencement of

Stage B commissioning (at which point about 90% of the procedures had been implemented andreleased). This second FTRC signifies the completion of the pre-commissioning phase asrelevant to the commencement of Stage B commissioning. A third FTRC will be issued at a later date to cover the remainder of the facility, but these activities are not required prior tocommencement of Stage B Commissioning.

Details on the pre-commissioning procedures completed for each system, the STRCs whichwere issued for each system, the FTRCs which were issued for the facility and a summary of thekey results obtained during the pre-commissioning activities for each system are also containedin the OPAL Construction Report (RRRP-7033-EBEAN-001). This documentation demonstratesthat the reactor has been pre-commissioned in accordance with all specified codes andstandards, and design, safety and regulatory requirements.

2.4 STAGE A COMMISSIONING PHASE

Stage A Commissioning was the first of three stages of commissioning planned for the OPALreactor. It involved testing the facility without nuclear fuel, its objectives being to verify thefunctionality and performance of safety systems and the integrated functioning of reactor systems.

The overall arrangements for the management of the Stage A Commissioning phase werespecified in the overall Commissioning Plan and the Stage A Commissioning Specific Plan.


Revision: A



INVAP ANSTO



These plans were prepared by INVAP and reviewed, verified and accepted by ANSTO inaccordance with project procedures prior to commencement of Stage A Commissioning.

In June 2004, a request for approval relating to Stage A Commissioning of items important tosafety was submitted to ARPANSA to meet the requirements of Facility Licence: Construction

Authorisation, License Condition 4.7. This request for approval was based on the abovecommissioning plans, although it also covered the final commissioning testing of a number of safety-related systems to be undertaken during the Pre-commissioning Phase. In January 2005,the CEO of ARPANSA revised License Condition 4.7 so that it required ARPANSA approval of the Stage A Commissioning program as a whole, rather than requiring separate approvals for the commissioning of the various safety-related items of plant. He also approved the Stage ACommissioning program for items important to safety, provided certain conditions were metduring implementation of the program, including a number of ARPANSA control points imposedon specific commissioning activities.

Stage A Commissioning activities were controlled through the preparation and implementation of commissioning procedures for the various systems and subsystems of the OPAL Reactor andoverseen by the Commissioning Management Group. Commissioning procedures wereprepared in accordance with the commissioning plans, and described in detail thecommissioning activities, including the objective of the activities, acceptance criteria, referencedocumentation, responsibilities, prerequisites, step by step instructions and requirements for records generation. Those commissioning procedures were reviewed, verified and accepted by

ANSTO in accordance with project procedures prior to commencement of the relevantcommissioning activities. Stage A Commissioning activities were controlled by INVAP, butinvolved significant participation by ANSTO. This included ANSTO reactor operators performingall plant operations under the direction of INVAP.

During Stage A Commissioning, the Commissioning Quality Assurance Group conducted qualityassurance audits of the various commissioning activities, while the Commissioning SafetyReview Committee conducted reviews and provided advice on safety issues as requested by the

Commissioning Management Group. A total of 47 commissioning test procedures were implemented during the Stage ACommissioning Phase. Upon completion of all Stage A Commissioning procedures, a Stage ACommissioning report was prepared, providing the final record of the Stage A Commissioning.This report was prepared in accordance with the commissioning plan, and includes a summaryof the tests carried out, including reference to the relevant Stage A Commissioning procedures,a description of the limitations, problems or deficiencies observed during commissioning andtheir resolution; references to data collected, analyses and deviations, and the conclusions andrecommendations drawn from the testing. The Stage A Commissioning report signified thecompletion of Stage A Commissioning, and has been approved by both INVAP and ANSTO.

3 SUMMARY OF KEY ACTIVITIES AND EVENTS

The key activities and events which occurred during the Construction, Pre-Commissioning andStage A Commissioning Phases of the project are summarised in the following subsections.

3.1 CONSTRUCTION PHASE

The Construction Licence was issued by the CEO of ARPANSA on 4 April 2002. On 8 April2002, the Acting Director-General of the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office(ASNO) advised the CEO of ARPANSA that he was satisfied with the construction site protective


Revision: A



INVAP ANSTO



security measures. On 10 April 2002, the Minister for Environment and Heritage advised theMinister for Science that he was satisfied with the arrangements covered by the conditionsarising from the EIS process relating to the design and construction of the reactor. Theseapprovals allowed construction to commence. Excavation works on the OPAL site commencedon 10 April 2002.

The following subsections provide a summary of the key activities and events relevant to worksin the areas of civil works, mechanical systems, electrical systems and instrumentation / controlsystems during the Construction Phase.

3.1.1 Civil Works

The civil works program commenced with bulk excavation works in April 2002. On 20 June2002, this work was suspended following the discovery of two geological faults during bulkexcavation. A significant geological investigation was undertaken by independent consultantswith expertise in fault dating and structural geology, and involved several hundred metres of deep trenching in rock in the immediate vicinity of the excavated site. Those investigationsrevealed that the faults were not significant in terms of any future seismic events. Thesuspension of site construction work was revoked on 23 October 2002 following the CEO of

ARPANSA’s decision that the faulting on the site was not capable of resulting in surfacedisplacement and that there was no change in the basis for his earlier conclusions on thereactor’s seismic design.

Construction of the Reactor Building, including construction of the Reactor Building concretestructure and the high density concrete Reactor Block which surrounds the Reactor and ServicePools, took place over the period between November 2002 and February 2005. Concretepouring activities were strictly controlled, and concrete testing carried out in accordance withrelevant codes and standards. The aircraft impact grillage was assembled and mounted on topof the Reactor Building in July 2004. Fit-out and installation of building services proceeded inparallel with and following completion of the Reactor Building structure, including installation of

cranes, fire systems, water supply systems, compressed air and gas supply systems andcommunications systems. Civil works activities were strictly controlled in accordance with theSITP process described in Section 2.2 to ensure compliance with relevant codes and standards,design, safety and regulatory requirements. ANSTO fully participated in this verification processby witnessing key activities, conducting inspections and reviews, and providing final acceptanceof the works.

Other facility buildings, including the Neutron Guide Hall and the Main Entry Building, wereconstructed in parallel with the Reactor Building.

During September 2003, waterproofing problems were encountered at levels -7 and -5 of theReactor Building due to cracking in the concrete wall and floor slabs. The cracking was causedby concrete shrinkage, coupled with stress concentrations and restraint formed by the

foundation rock. Upon detection of the problem, investigations were performed andcomprehensive remedial measures were devised and implemented to seal all detected leaks. Allremedial works were undertaken in accordance with approved procedures and SITP’s. Remedialworks have been completed in a significant portion of the affected area with all leakssuccessfully sealed and released. However, work in a small number of areas has not yet beencompleted. Whilst waterproofing works in some areas of the Reactor Building are ongoing, theworks have no significant effect on the building structure and INVAP and ANSTO have acceptedit as fit for purpose.


Revision: A



INVAP ANSTO



3.1.2 Mechanical / Process Systems

Construction of mechanical/process systems included manufacture and installation of theReactor and Service Pools, reactor core components, process piping systems and components,ventilation systems (including containment ventilation and energy removal systems), neutronbeam and cold neutron source (CNS) components, radioisotope handling components andradiation shielding components.

The largest single mechanical components to be manufactured were the Reactor and ServicePool liners, the manufacture of which commenced off-site in 2002. In March 2003, manufactureof the Reactor Pool liner was suspended after it was determined that the heavy water penetrations in the bottom of the Reactor Pool liner had been cut out without the approval of theCEO of ARPANSA. In April 2003, ARPANSA granted conditional permission to continue withthe manufacture of the Reactor Pool liner with the heavy water penetration cut-outs in thebottom of the liner as is. In May 2003, a non-conformance in the manufacture of the Reactor Pool liner, in which 22 of the wall penetrations were mistakenly positioned due to amanufacturing error, was identified. An investigation was undertaken, and a report outlining the

findings of this investigation together with a set of corrective and preventive measures, and anoverall strategy for the repair of the Reactor Pool liner incorporating appropriate tests and mockup qualifications, was prepared and submitted to ARPANSA. In August 2003, the CEO of

ARPANSA decided that the repairs to the Reactor Pool liner were consistent with his originalauthorisation to construct that item. The manufacture was then completed, with the liner delivered to the site during December 2003 and installed in January 2004. Manufacture of theService Pool liner was completed in February 2004 and installed in April 2004 without problems.

Process piping systems and components were manufactured and installed in parallel withconstruction of the Reactor Building and the Reactor Block. Key items of plant, such as themain primary and secondary cooling pumps, were subject to factory acceptance testing.Reactor core components, including the reflector vessel, control rods, core supportingcomponents, flap valves and Reactor Pool internal piping, were manufactured by INVAP in

Argentina and delivered to the site in May 2005. The control rod drives, also manufactured byINVAP in Argentina, were subject to significant factory testing to verify the reliability of their reactor control and shutdown functions. Components such as flap valves and control rod driveswere also subject to qualification tests to verify compliance with seismic and operationalrequirements. Fuel Assemblies were manufactured by CNEA in Argentina, with the firstshipment scheduled to be delivered to site in May 2006. The CNS refrigeration / cryogenicsequipment was manufactured by Air Liquide in France and was subject to full factory acceptancetesting before being delivered to site in May 2004. The in-pile components of the CNS, includingthe CNS vacuum containment, were manufactured by PNPI in Russia and delivered to site in

August 2005.

Manufacture and installation of all mechanical components was strictly controlled in accordancewith the SITP process described in Section 2.2 to ensure compliance with relevant codes andstandards, design, safety and regulatory requirements. ANSTO fully participated in thisverification process by witnessing key activities such as factory acceptance tests, conductinginspections and reviews, and providing final acceptance of the manufacture and installation of systems and components. In particular, ANSTO applied significant resources and expertise toverifying the quality assurance of welding and fabrication processes, to ensure that systems andcomponents were manufactured to a high level of quality in full compliance with relevant codesand standards.


Revision: A



INVAP ANSTO



3.1.3 Electrical Systems

Construction of electrical systems included manufacture and installation of electricalswitchboards, uninterruptible power supplies and diesel generators, as well as installation of cabling, cable raceways and electrical fittings throughout the facility. Factory acceptance testingwas carried out for all switchboards, uninterruptible power supplies and diesel generators.Qualification testing was also performed on switchboards and uninterruptible power supplies toensure compliance with seismic and other design requirements.

Manufacture and installation of all electrical components was strictly controlled in accordancewith the SITP process described in Section 2.2 to ensure compliance with relevant codes andstandards, design, safety and regulatory requirements. ANSTO fully participated in thisverification process by witnessing key activities such as factory acceptance tests, conductinginspections and reviews, and providing final acceptance of the manufacture and installation of systems and components.

3.1.4 Instrumentation and Control Systems

Construction of instrumentation and control systems included manufacture and installation of theFirst and Second Reactor Protection Systems (FRPS/SRPS), Post Accident Monitoring System(PAM), Reactor and Facilities Control and Monitoring Systems (RCMS/FCMS), nucleonicsinstrumentation, radiation monitoring instrumentation and control room consoles, as well asinstallation of cabling, cable raceways and field instruments throughout the facility.Instrumentation and control systems, particularly those involving software based digital systems,were subject to rigorous verification and validation programs by both the manufacturer andINVAP. These activities culminated in the integrated instrumentation and control factoryacceptance test conducted by INVAP in Argentina during 2004. In that test, the FRPS, SRPS,RCMS, FCMS, nucleonics instrumentation and control room consoles were fully integrated andtested before being delivered to the OPAL Reactor site. Radiation monitoring instrumentationwas also subject to factory acceptance testing in Argentina prior to shipment. Where necessary,

instrumentation was subject to qualification testing to ensure compliance with IEEE standards for qualification of safety-related instrumentation.

Manufacture and installation of all instrumentation and control components was strictly controlledin accordance with the SITP process described in Section 2.2 to ensure compliance withrelevant codes, standards, design, safety and regulatory requirements. ANSTO fully participatedin this verification process by witnessing key activities such as factory acceptance tests,conducting inspections and reviews, and providing final acceptance of the manufacture andinstallation of systems and components.

3.2 PRE-COMMISSIONING PHASE

The Pre-Commissioning Phase involved complete testing of the OPAL Reactor facility on a

system by system basis. Tests were carried out in accordance with approved pre-commissioning procedures and SITPs, with tests commencing on a system once all constructionactivities for the system were completed and released. ANSTO participated fully in the pre-commissioning program by witnessing pre-commissioning activities, reviewing pre-commissioning results, and providing final acceptance of systems.

The following sections provide a summary of the key activities and events relevant to pre-commissioning of the various system types: process systems, electrical systems, containmentsystems, building service systems, instrumentation/control/shutdown systems and radioisotope


Revision: A



INVAP ANSTO



handling and neutron beam systems. The order of sections follows approximately the order inwhich pre-commissioning activities were undertaken during the Pre-Commissioning Phase.

3.2.1 Electrical Systems

Electrical pre-commissioning activities commenced in June 2004 with testing of the electricalearthing system and subsequent energisation and testing of the facility’s high voltageswitchboard and six electrical power transformers. This was followed by energisation and no-load testing of the six Main Distribution Switchboards and the downstream distribution system,including safety-related standby switchboards, motor control centres and distribution boards. No-load pre-commissioning of the distribution system included full functional testing, verification of electrical protective devices and electrical inspections/tests required by Australian Standardsand the electrical power supplier, Energy Australia.

Pre-commissioning of the diesel generators commenced in November 2004, and comprised acomprehensive set of starting and loading tests to verify the capability and reliability of the dieselgenerator units, including a 24 hour full load run test. The tests revealed some problemsrelating to priming of the diesel generator fuel supply lines, which were rectified by modifying thelines to prevent the occurrence of air pockets in the lines. Following pre-commissioning of thediesel generators, a no-load integration test of the standby power system (SPS) was performedto verify the automatic operation of the SPS to connect the diesel generators on loss of normalpower supply (NPS).

Uninterruptible power supplies, including those which supply the FRPS, SRPS, RCMS andFCMS were also subject to full functional testing including loading tests and mains failuresimulation tests.

Pre-commissioning of the electrical system culminated in a series of full load system testsconducted in December 2005 once sufficient electrical equipment was available to provideelectrical load. These tests verified the operation of both the NPS and the SPS while supplyingthe full facility electrical load.

3.2.2 Bui lding Service Systems

Building service systems include the radioactive liquid waste management system, compressedand breathing air systems, gas supply systems, water supply systems, fire detection andsuppression systems, ventilation and air conditioning systems, cranes and hoists,communications systems, lifts, surveillance CCTV systems and security systems. Each of thesesystems was subject to one or more pre-commissioning procedures to demonstrate that theoperation of the system is in accordance with design specifications and relevant codes andstandards. In addition, ASIO T4 will conduct inspections and a performance demonstration of the integrated security system to demonstrate that it meets the specified performancerequirements. The ASIO T4 report on security system performance will be transmitted to ASNO

and if deemed satisfactory, ASNO will issue a report to the CEO of ARPANSA that confirms thesecurity system is suitable for reactor operation.

3.2.3 Process Systems

Process systems include the primary cooling system (PCS), the reactor and service poolscooling system, the reflector cooling and purification system, the emergency make-up water system, the hot water layer system, the reactor water purification systems and associated resinshandling system, the secondary cooling system and the demineralised water supply system.


Revision: A



INVAP ANSTO



Each of these systems was subject to a comprehensive pre-commissioning procedure involvingtesting of all system equipment and verification of system performance. As there was no nuclear fuel in the core during pre-commissioning, fuel assembly dummies were used to simulate thepresence of the core. The performance of each process system was shown to meet specifiedacceptance criteria, with any deviations dealt with through non-conformance control procedures,and supported by additional analysis and testing, where required.

An occurrence of note during the pre-commissioning of the PCS was an event in which theprimary cooling flap valves opening time during pump coast down was outside the specifiedacceptance criteria. In summary, this early opening of the PCS flap valves was determined tobe caused by a pressure transient generated by the starting or stopping of secondary coolingsystem pumps, which was transmitted to the PCS via the heat exchanger plates. As thepressure transient could not be eliminated, additional safety analysis and testing was performedto examine whether early opening of the PCS flap valves compromises the safety of the reactor.The conclusion of that analysis and testing was that the safety of the reactor is not compromisedand this was transmitted to the CEO of ARPANSA in May 2006.

Other pre-commissioning testing related to process systems included testing of reactor andservice pool internal components. This included testing of the fuel assembly clamps (whichclamp the fuel in the reactor core) and testing of the siphon effect breakers (which preventdraining of the pools in the event of a leak in one of the reactor cooling systems). Those testsshowed that those components performed as per the design. In addition, leak testing of thecontrol rod drive room, which is designed to be sufficiently leak-tight to contain water in the eventof a leak through the reactor pool bottom penetrations, demonstrated compliance with therelevant acceptance criteria.

3.2.4 Instrumentation, Control and Shutdown Systems

Pre-commissioning of instrumentation and control systems included testing of the FRPS, SRPS,PAM, RCMS, FCMS, nucleonics instrumentation systems and radiation monitoring systems.

Pre-commissioning of these systems involved testing of the main system functions andverification of all field and control room connections by testing every system input and output for correct operation. In addition, for radiation monitoring systems, radiation sources were used tosimulate high radiation conditions in order to verify correct system operation.

Pre-commissioning of shutdown systems included testing of both the First Shutdown System(FSS), designed to shutdown the reactor by rapid insertion of control rods, and the SecondShutdown System (SSS), designed to shutdown the reactor by rapid draining of the heavy water reflector. Pre-commissioning of the FSS involved testing of the control rod withdrawal andinsertion times, as well as trip tests including measurement of the control rods’ insertion timefollowing a reactor trip for various system conditions. The testing also included verification of theoperation of the control rod movement protection interlock, which prevents the simultaneousmovement of more than one control rod and limits the control rod withdrawal speed. Pre-

commissioning of the SSS included performance tests to measure the rate of drainage of theheavy water reflector following a reactor trip for various system conditions. Acceptance criteriaassociated with these tests of both the FSS and SSS were satisfied.

An event of note which occurred during pre-commissioning testing of the FRPS and the FSSwas a number of spurious actuations of the SRPS and SSS. Investigations determined that thiswas caused by the control rods bouncing slightly when they were dropped, which in turn resultedin the control rod bottom position indication incorrectly showing that more than one control rodwas not fully inserted in the period immediately following the trip. This condition is interpreted by


Revision: A



INVAP ANSTO



the SRPS as a failure of the FRPS and thus actuates the SSS. To prevent this spuriousactuation of the SRPS and SSS, modifications were made to the SRPS instrumentation.

3.2.5 Containment Systems

Pre-commissioning of the reactor containment system included testing of the Reactor Containment Ventilation System (RCVS), Containment Energy Removal System (CERS),Containment Pressure and Vacuum Relief System (CPVRS), and containment isolation system,as well as containment permeability testing.

The RCVS and CERS were subject to several comprehensive pre-commissioning proceduresinvolving testing of all system equipment and verification of system performance. This includedtesting of the containment pressure control system, which ensures the containment ismaintained at negative pressure with respect to atmosphere, and full functional tests includingverification of system response to abnormal conditions. Testing of the CPVRS included tests toverify that the system successfully relieves containment pressure in the event of simulated over and under pressure conditions. In addition, pre-commissioning included verification of theefficiency of all particulate and charcoal filters in the facility’s ventilation systems. Theperformance of the RCVS, CERS and CPVRS was shown to meet specified acceptance criteria,with any deviations dealt with through non-conformance control procedures, and supported byadditional analysis and testing, where required.

Pre-commissioning of the containment isolation system involved testing of all containmentisolation provisions to ensure correct operation in response to containment isolation signals.

In order to verify the integrity of the reactor containment boundary, a containment permeabilitytest was conducted. This test involved pressurising the containment and calculating thepermeability based on measurements of the input air flows required to maintain the containmentpressure. This test effectively verified that the overall permeability of the containment boundary,including the reactor building concrete structure and its embedded penetrations, the containmentair-lock doors and the containment service hatches, was within the safety criterion. In addition,

leak tests were performed on individual containment penetrations to verify the correct sealing of containment closures in the event of containment isolation.

3.2.6 Radioisotope Handl ing and Neutron Beam Systems

Pre-commissioning of radioisotope handling systems involved testing of irradiation rigs andassociated process systems, hot cells and associated radioisotope transport systems, and other radioisotope handling equipment. Pre-commissioning activities on these components andsystems have not been fully completed; however, their completion is not required in order tocommence Stage B commissioning.

Pre-commissioning of neutron beam systems involved testing the CNS and its associatedprocess systems, the neutron beam primary and secondary shutters, the neutron guide helium

cooling system and the neutron guide vacuum system. Tests consisted of equipment operationtests and system functional tests. For the CNS this included integrated functional tests with theCNS in-pile thermosiphon connected (without deuterium) including transitions between standbyoperation (warm) and normal operation (cold) modes with simulated heat load, thermal balancetests and CNS protection and control system tests. Pre-commissioning activities on all thesecomponents and systems, with the exception of the neutron guide vacuum system, have beencompleted, with acceptance criteria satisfied. Pre-commissioning of the neutron guide vacuumsystem is not required to have been completed in order to commence Stage B commissioning.


Revision: A



INVAP ANSTO



3.3 STAGE A COMMISSIONING PHASE

Stage A Commissioning commenced in February 2006, once the Commissioning ManagementGroup was satisfied that sufficient construction and pre-commissioning works had beensuccessfully completed. Stage A Commissioning consisted of a series of facility integrationtests, each carried out in accordance with an approved Commissioning Procedure. ANSTO wasfully involved in the Stage A Commissioning program through active participation incommissioning activities, and review, verification and acceptance of commissioning results.

The following subsections provide a summary of the key activities and events relevant to thevarious types of commissioning tests: instrumentation and control systems tests; reactor statetests; containment systems tests; control rooms and emergency preparedness tests; electricalsystems tests; CNS tests; facility cold run and health physics tests.

3.3.1 Instrumentation and Control Systems Tests

Stage A Commissioning tests included a group of integration tests on specific instrumentationand control systems, namely the FRPS, SRPS, PAM, RCMS, nucleonics instrumentation and

radiation monitoring instrumentation, to verify their functionality. These tests includedverification of interfaces with the operators, interactions with the power supply systems and thetriggering of protective actions. In addition, instrumentation and control systems were testedconcurrently with testing of other systems throughout the Stage A Commissioning Phase, asdescribed in the following subsections. The safety settings of the FRPS and SRPS, as well asset points for automatic RCMS limitation actions, were verified to be as per specifiedrequirements, and the nucleonics instrumentation was verified to be functional through the useof a neutron source. Stage A Commissioning results for instrumentation and control systemsdemonstrated that the systems are fully operative and integrate in a consistent manner withother plant systems.

One non-conformance report was raised during Stage A Commissioning of instrumentation and

control systems. This report covered an event in which the FRPS did not operate correctly dueto inhibitions being mistakenly left in the FRPS. Following this event, a full verification of theFRPS hardware and software was undertaken to ensure that no inhibitions or bypassesremained in the system, and the FRPS Stage A Commissioning procedure was repeated in itsentirety to verify functionality of the system.

3.3.2 Reactor State Tests

The OPAL reactor has four defined operating states, known as the Power State, Physics TestState, Shutdown State and Re-fuelling State. Each state defines a particular reactor operatingenvironment, with specific rules, interlocks and alarms, as well as requirements relating toconfiguration of plant systems in order to either allow or preclude the performance of certaintasks.

The bulk of the Stage A Commissioning test procedures involved testing to demonstrate thecorrect operation of the reactor’s safety and plant systems for each of the four reactor operatingstates. This included verification of the operation of reactor cooling systems, hot water layer system, electrical system, instrumentation and control systems and reactor shutdown systems.

As there was no nuclear fuel in the core during Stage A Commissioning, fuel assembly dummieswere used to simulate the presence of the core, and nucleonic signals were simulated wherenecessary. For each reactor operating state, the systems were operated and configuredaccordingly in order to verify that the reactor’s systems are able to perform their assigned


Revision: A



INVAP ANSTO



functions and that plant parameters remain within acceptable limits. Trial tests of plant operationmanual procedures, including those for transitions between the various reactor operating states,were included in this series of tests.

Reactor state tests included coolant flow distribution measurements which demonstrated that the

coolant flow rates within the reactor core and irradiation rig positions comply with the specifiedacceptance criteria. Also, a blocked fuel assembly simulation which demonstrated that thisoccurrence would be detected by the FRPS instrumentation was performed.

The operation of the PCS flap valves to initiate the transition from forced to natural convectioncooling of the reactor core following a reactor shutdown was also tested and found to complywith the specified acceptance criteria.

3.3.3 Containment Systems Tests

Stage A Commissioning included tests of the reactor containment and associated containmentventilation systems in both normal mode and containment isolated mode. The test for normalmode verified that containment conditions, including pressure, temperature and humidity,

remained within acceptable limits and that system instrumentation and interlocks relevant tonormal mode were functional. The test for containment isolated mode verified the triggering of the various groups of containment isolation closures, the correct operation of containmentsystems (including the CERS and RCVS) during and following containment isolation, thatcontainment conditions remained within acceptable limits and that system instrumentation andinterlocks relevant to isolated mode were functional. The tests demonstrated that the reactor containment and associated containment ventilation systems function correctly.

3.3.4 Control Rooms & Emergency Preparedness Tests

Stage A Commissioning included testing of procedures for evacuation of the Main Control Roomto the Emergency Control Centre (ECC) and tests of the operation of the ECC Ventilation andPressurisation System, which is designed to protect reactor operators from radiation duringoccupancy of the ECC. An emergency drill was also conducted in order to verify emergencypreparedness, including the effectiveness of the reactor systems, emergency plans andprocedures, and reactor operations staff in responding to simulated accident scenarios. Theresults of these tests demonstrated an adequate level of emergency preparedness within thereactor and its operating organisation.

3.3.5 Electrical Power System Tests

Stage A Commissioning included tests to verify the behaviour of the facility following a loss of NPS and to verify the ability of the SPS to provide power to the various reactor systemsfollowing loss of normal electrical power. The tests included verification of the effect of loss of NPS on the reactor protection systems, shutdown systems, reactor control and monitoring

system, control room consoles and wall panels, heat removal systems, containment andventilation systems and CNS systems. Also verified was the automatic operation of the SPS inresponse to loss of the NPS and its ability to supply essential loads including the containmentsystems, emergency lighting and ventilation, reactor cooling systems and instrumentation andcontrol systems.


Revision: A



INVAP ANSTO



3.3.6 Other Stage A Commissioning Tests

Other Stage A Commissioning Tests consisted of an entire facility cold run test, CNS tests andhealth physics tests.

The entire facility cold run test involved the reactor being operated in Power State at simulatedfull power for a period of 36 hours, with dummy fuel assemblies in the core, irradiation rigsloaded with dummy irradiation targets, and the CNS and hot cells facilities in operation. The testalso trialled procedures for control room shift arrangements and hand-overs, as well asprocedures for plant surveillance and in-service inspections. The tests demonstrated that thereactor facility is capable of operating with high availability over an extended period and theplant operating documentation is appropriate. Some tests originally planned for the cold run testrelating to operation of irradiation facilities could not be completed due to incomplete installationof some items. However, this did not prevent the test’s ability to demonstrate operation of thereactor systems.

CNS tests involved CNS instrumentation and controls systems functionality verification, systemmanoeuvring tests, and integrated functional tests, similar to those conducted during pre-

commissioning, but with deuterium loaded.

Health physics tests conducted during Stage A Commissioning consisted of a health physicswalk-through and conducting radiological measurements to provide a baseline on radiationlevels prior to fuel loading. The result of the health physics walk-through was that health physicsprovisions, including radiation shielding, signage, monitoring equipment, personal protectiveequipment and decontamination facilities are in place and adequate.

4 FINAL CONCLUSIONS

This report has outlined the activities conducted under the Construction Authorisation, includingthe verification processes applied to ensure the reactor was constructed in accordance with

specified requirements and the major activities and events which occurred under theConstruction Authorisation. The activities and verification processes completed during theConstruction Authorisation have demonstrated that the OPAL Reactor has been constructed inaccordance with design, safety, quality assurance and regulatory requirements, and that thefacility is in a state suitable for commencement of Stage B Commissioning activities.


Revision: A

Documents

Rx commissioning report.pdf