RSIS Policy Paper Bibhu (1)

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India’s Response to Maoist Extremism:

Force, Development or Both?

Bibhu Prasad RoutrayMay 2012



India’s Response to

Maoist Extremism:

Force, Development or Both?

Dr. Bibhu Prasad Routray was a Visiting Fellow with the South Asia Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International

Studies, Nanyang Technological University (NTU) from October 2010 to March 2011 and from September 2011 to March

2012. Prior to that he served as Deputy Director at the National Security Council Secretariat, Government of India, NewDelhi, India. He can be contacted at [email protected]

Bibhu Prasad RoutrayMay 2012



Contents

03 Executive Summary

04 The Problem

05 State Responses: Military and Developmental

06 Government Approaches: A Critique

07 Policy Recommendations



Executive Summary

India is currently grappling with an eective response to

let-wing extremism. Even though in the last two years,extremist violence as well as areas under extremist

inuence has somewhat diminished, the problem remains

serious. While India’s military approach has ailed to make

much headway owing to a range o weaknesses among the

orces, the development approach too has been critiqued

or being too romanticised and unreal or implementation.

There is an obvious need or a policy rethink and clarity o

approach i the challenge is to be met. It is essential that

the policy to deal with the problem needs to consider the

ollowing recommendations.

• Thecountryhastoarriveataconsensusonthekindof

approach it wishes to pursue against the extremists.

• Apermanentinstitutionalmechanismintheformofa

coordination centre can be established to thrash out

emerging dierences between the Centre and the

States.

• Augmentingthecapacitiesofthepoliceastheprimary

orce against Maoist violence will be key to neutralizing

the frepower o the extremists.

• While development is a useful tool against Maoist

extremism, it is imperative that a semblance o orderprecede injection o resources into the extremist-

aected areas.

• Developmentmustoperateintandemwiththesecurity

orces. Resumption o administrative activity should

immediately ollow the clearing o an area by the

orces.

• Itisessentialthattheofcialapproachbebasedon

an eective policy o communication that not just

brandishes the extremists as essentially bad, but is

also honest about its own honourable intentions.

• Holding elections for institutions of local self-

government in the aected areas ollowed by the

strengthening o these institutions with additional

fnancial and decision-making powers is a necessity.

• Success of security force operations need to be

based on the concept o just war that strives to do the

maximum to avoid collateral damage.

• Government needs to stay away from propagandistclaims about winning the war in quick time.

03

India’s Response to Maoist Extremism: Force, Development or Both?



The Problem

For the past several years, the let-wing extremism problem

has emerged as a major internal security challenge or

India, described on several occasions as the “biggest

internal security challenge” by the Prime Minister o the

country. The extremists proessing a pro-tribal outlook

and with an avowed objective o overthrowing the present

system o government through an armed revolution have

been able to pose a serious governance and development

challenge. Armed violence by these extremists,

predominantly belonging to the Communist Party o India-

Maoist (CPI-Maoist)1 peaked in 2009 when intelligence

sources inormed that they were active in almost 230

districts o the country, amounting to more than one third

o India’s geographical area. Such areas witnessed large

scale violence targeting the state and what the Maoists

describe as ‘state sympathizers’.

1 The Communist Party o India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) is the result o a 2004 merger between two let-wing extremist organizations- the Maoist CommunistCentreofIndia(MCCI),whichwasactiveinCentralIndiaandthePeople’sWarGroup(PWG),whichwasmostlyactiveinsouthernIndianstates.TheCPI-

Maoist continue to remain the most dominant and violent outft among the various Let Wing Extremist groups, accounting or more than 90 percent o totalLet Wing Extremist incidents and 95 percent o resultant killings. Annual Report 2011-12,MinistryofHomeAffairs,GovernmentofIndia,p.29.

2 State-wise extent of Naxal violence during 2007 to 2011 (from January to December),MinistryofHomeAffairs,GovernmentofIndia,pp.1-2.

3 See “Maoist violence down, says Chidambaram”, 14 June 2011, http://www.inewsone.com/2011/06/14/maoist-violence-down-says-chidambaram/56593.

Accessedon10April2012.

(Source: South Asia Terrorism Portal)

(Remains of a vehicle following a Maoist landmine explosion in

Maharashtra, 2012)

Maoist Violence in IndiaYear Incidents Fatalities

(Civilians

& Security

Forces)

Maoists

Killed

Maoists

Arrested

Maoists

Surrendered

2007 1565 696 141 1456 390

2008 1591 721 199 1743 400

2009 2258 908 219 1981 150

2010 2213 1005 172 2916 266

2011 1755 606 99 1972 393

Source: Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), Government of India.

Areasunderextremistcontrol havesomewhatshrunkin

the past couple o years. While as many as 18 states (o

a total o 28) were said to have been witnessing Maoist

activities in 2009, since 2010 government sources havebeen reporting extremist violence only rom eight. In 2011,

government reported 606 atalities in 1755 incidents o

Maoist violence which was signifcantly lower than 1005

deaths in 2213 incidents in 2011.2 While this represented a

major improvement in the state o extremism, the problem

continues to remain serious. There has been a spike in the

number o training camps organised by the Maoists or

their cadres as well as in the number o ‘people’s courts’ in

which the extremists punish the ‘enemies o the movement’

– indicating that the decrease in violence is only the result

o a tactical and temporary retreat by the Maoists and

is not necessarily due to the augmentation o capacitiesamong the security orces. Moreover, intelligence sources

have indicated Maoist attempts to spread to new states

in southern, central and northeast India. The government

has termed the current level o violence ‘unacceptable’3.

Patterns of Maoist Attacks

Targets 2008 2009 2010

Economic Targets 05 17 24

Railway 27 46 54

Telephone Exchange/ Tower

46 67 45

Power Plant 1 2 3

Mining 6 3 9

Transmission Pole 24 7 2

Panchayat Bhawan 7 23 31

School Building 25 71 39

Forest Rod, Culverts etc 41 126 158

Source: Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), Government of India.

04




State Responses: Military and Developmental

In 2008, an Expert Committee o the Planning Commission,

India’s nodal ofcial development planning body, in

its report recognized the Maoist movement’s political

nature.4 The report, an exhaustive anthology o the roots

o tribal discontent and violence underlined the need or

a development-centric approach to the Maoist problem.

It made a series o recommendations with regard to

implementation o protective legislation, land acquisition,

rehabilitation and settlement and livelihood security.

However,theneedtoobliteratethemilitarycapacitiesofthe

extremists who accounted or the lives o 721 civilians and

security orces in 1591 incidents in 2008 and 908 civilians

and security orces in 2258 incidents in the subsequent

year,pushedtheMinistryofHomeAffairs(MHA)topursueaforce-centricpolicyagainsttheCPI-Maoist.Althoughthe

government described its policy as being based on the

twin pillars o development and security orce operations,

the need to undermine the frepower o the extremists as a

pre-condition beore starting development initiatives was

an unwritten principle.

The belie that major armed operations can break the

back o the extremists was derived rom success stories

in Mizoram in India’s northeast and also Punjab, which

had once been seriously aected by Sikh militancy. Even

intheMaoist-affectedsouthernstateofAndhraPradesh,intelligence-backed tactical operations by the anti-Maoist

commando police force, Greyhounds, was thought to

have played a decisive role behind the victory o the state

over the extremists.

4 Development Challenges in Extremist Affected Areas, Report o an expert

groupto PlanningCommission,April 2008,http://planningcommission.

gov.in/reports/publications/rep_dce.pdf.Accessedon10April2012.

This thinking resulted in Operation Green Hunt, a

coordinated multi-theatre military oensive against the

extremiststhatbeganinearly2010.Around70battalions

ofCentralArmedPoliceForces(CAPFs)weredeployed

bytheMHAtoassistthestatepolicepersonneloperations

against the extremists. New battalions were raised

and existing battalions underwent extensive counter-

insurgency training. The ministry also sanctioned the

raising o ten battalions o specialised counter-Maoist

force called the Combat Battalion for Resolute Action

(COBRA). However, lack of adequate planning and

coordination between the various agencies involved in the

operation and inadequate intelligence backup resulted in

a series o serious reversals or the security orces. Two

big ambushes in the state o Chhattisgarh claimed thelives o nearly 100 security orce personnel, pushing them

intoadefensivestateofoperation.Areorientationinthe

approach was called or.

Althoughthemilitaryoperationshavenotbeenabandoned

and individual states continue to undertake area clearing

operations, such exercises appear to orm parts o a new

‘clear, hold and develop’ strategy that uses development

as a tool to win back the support o the tribal population,

who overwhelmingly appear to sympathize with the

extremists. Since early 2011 there is a renewed ocus

on carrying out development initiatives in areas clearedo Maoist presence. Several agship projects o the

government to improve connectivity o tribal areas with the

administrative centres, to provide employment to the tribal

youth and to ensure health and educational acilities have

been launched. To ensure that proper implementation o

these developmental projects and monitor their progress,

anewschemetitled‘PrimeMinster’sRuralDevelopment

Fellows Scheme’ has also been unveiled. Under the

scheme, 156 young proessionals have been trained

and are being stationed in 78 worst-aected districts or

two years to assist the district administration. Resources

too have started owing into the coers o the district

administration with an emphasis on time bound utilization

and implementation.

Since the extremists are known to have targeted

inrastructure projects in the past or have prevented

contractors rom executing the projects, security orces

are now assigned to protect the planned development

ventures in order to ensure their timely completion and

saety. To ensure that the security orces are not targeted,

as they protect the development projects, the government

is also planning to build landmine-proo Roller-Compacted

Concrete (RCC) roads in aected states. Further, the

government has also cleared a proposal to raise a combatunit under the para-military Central Reserve Police Force

(CRPF) or construction o roads in Maoist-aected areas.

(Security Forces carrying out anti-Maoist Operations in

Chhattsigarh, 2010)

05




Government Approaches: A Critique

Two types o problems continue to aict the counter-Maoist eorts – frst, the lack o coordination between

the ederal government and the states; and second, theinherent problems within the states impacting on theircapacity to tackle the challenge.

Even when the Centre embarked on the now abandonedOperationGreenHunt,differentstatespursueddivergentpolicies against the extremists, oscillating between peacetalks, development and security measures. The lacko a common approach was taken advantage o by theextremists who used the territories o the states sot on

security orce operations to regroup. Even the centralorces who aided the state police orces were ound tobe operating without direction and able leadership. Themilitary approach did achieve some notable successesby neutralizing some senior extremist leaders. But in theabsence o a coherent nation-wide approach, a completevictory over Maoist extremism remained a ar-etcheddream.In2009,thethenHomeSecretaryhadpredictedthat “within 30 days o the security orces moving in anddominating the area, we should be able to restore civiladministration.”5 The goal was never met.

Similarly, the lack o unanimity among the Centre andthe states has the potential o becoming a bane or the

development-centric approach o the government aswell. InOctober 2011, the Rural DevelopmentMinisterJairam Ramesh, whose ministry oversees most o thedevelopment programmes in the Maoist-aected areas,pointed to this specifc problem. “We need to rise abovepartisan political considerations and set aside old Centre-vs-State arguments and work concertedly to restorepeople’s aith in the administration...only then will the tideo Naxalism be stemmed”, he is reported to have said.6 This, however, is easier said than done. Media reports inJanuary 2012 indicated that the development projectsinitiated in the eastern state o Jharkhand have run intoa rough patch owing to the unenthusiastic responserom the state government. The state orest department

has been extremely slow in providing clearances or thesetting up o security orce camps in the protected orestareas.Accordingtotheplan,theseforcesaretoprovidesecurity to the development projects.

Similarly, the relative weakness o the state police orcesand the complete absence o intelligence networksto assist the security orce operations have impactedon the eectiveness o the security orce operationsagainst the extremists. Since 1969-70, the MHA hasbeen implementing a Scheme or Modernisation o StatePolice Forces.7However,implementationofthescheme,according to which the Centre provides money to the statesto build capacity among their police orces, has been

slow, barring a ew states. States continue to demonstratean overwhelming tendency to all back on the fghtingability o the central orces rather than going through thetedious process o capacity building among their ownpoliceforces.Auditingbythecentralgovernmentonmanyoccasions has revealed serious gaps in implementation othe modernisation programmes.

I the military approach is seen to have achieved minimalresults, development initiatives in the extremist aectedareas too have received setbacks. Firstly, without anyunctional system o governance worth its name in vastareas under extremist inuence, it has been almostimpossible to execute the developmental projects.

Secondly, wherever the government has managed to setup a unctional project implementing mechanism, real orthreatened extremist attacks targeting the executing agencyhave slowed down the project execution considerably.This has widened the trust defcit among the intendedbenefciaries and the government. Thirdly, a perennialabsence o coordination between the security orces andthe civilian administration has meant that areas continueto remain without ofcial developmental intervention, evenater these are cleared o Maoist presence by the orces.Assoonastheforcesretreat,Maoistsrecapturethearea,nulliying the achievement.

5 AlokeTikku,“Anti-Naxaloffensivetobegininelevenplaces”,Hindustan Times,10October2009,http://www.hindustantimes.com/India-news/NewDelhi/ Anti-Naxal-offensive-to-begin-in-eleven-places/Article1-463353.aspx.Accessedon10April2012.

6 “Central and state govts responsible or Naxalism: Jairam Ramesh”, Daily News & Analysis, 11 October 2011, http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report_

central-and-state-govts-responsible-for-naxalism-jairam-ramesh_1597691(Accessedon25January2012).

7 Scheme for Modernization of State Police Forces,MinistryofHomeAffairs,GovernmentofIndia,http://mha.nic.in/pdfs/MPF.pdf.Accessedon10April2012.

India’s Home Minister P Chidambaram

Rural Development Minister Jairam Ramesh has been one of the

main advocates of the development approach

06




Policy Recommendations

Wide-ranging suggestions or an optimal response

have been made by analysts, activists and experts.

Organisations which the government considers to be

pro-Maoist categorize the ofcial approaches to deal with

Maoist extremism as a war unleashed by the Indian state

on the hapless tribals. They allege that the government

is merely interested in the natural resources lying buried

in the tribal inhabited lands and is trying to cleanse the

area o tribal presence on behal o the Multi-National

Corporations (MNCs), with whom it has signed several

Memorandums o Understanding (MoUs). Even the

ofcial development initiatives have been termed as a

‘sot counter insurgency’ method by these activists. They

prescribe that the government leave the tribal population

alone.

Apartfromthe factthatstoppingminingandexploration

o natural resources is an unviable proposition or India’s

growing economy, such suggestions gloss over the act

that the CPI-Maoist has an avowed objective o replacing

the current structure o governance with a people’s

government. Even though, in real terms, this objective

appears grossly unrealistic, the CPI-Maoist’s capacity to

pose a major hurdle or ofcial developmental activity in

remote areas remains a reality.

Another group ofexperts opines that dialoguewith theMaoists and development o the tribal areas, rather than

a military solution, is the way out o the current mess. This

approach too is untenable, given the act that Maoists

have either resisted attempts at negotiation or have used

the peace process to recoup. Similarly, suggestions have

also been made to use land reorms and to bringing about

changes in the laws that secure the rights o the tribal

population over orests. Land reorms have remained

a contentious issue in many states invoking divergent

policies rom the governments. While many states have not

bothered to take any steps towards land reorms, in some

likeAndhraPradesh,wheretheneedforlandreformshas

been accepted, entrenched stake holders have slowed

down the process considerably. The Central government

has initiated several schemes and passed legislations

aimed at empowering the tribals. But the growing

criminalisation in the Maoist ranks has severely limited the

impact o such measures on the level o extremism.

On the other hand, a separate groups o experts avouring

a security orce-led response underline the need to

strengthen the state police orces as an eective model o

counter-insurgency rather than depending on the central

forces.However,giventhepoorstateofpoliceforcesin

the aected states, this approach appears to be highly

ambitious and may take years to implement.

Thereore, an eective approach to deal with the Maoist

problem may contain the ollowing.

(i) Consensual approach: The country has to arrive at a

consensus on the kind o approach it wishes to pursue

against the extremists. Whether it is purely military,

developmental or a judicious mix o both has to be decidedby national-level brain storming. The MHA will have to

be at the oreront o building such a consensus. Merely

supporting the state governments by providing unds and

orces is inadequate.

(ii) Institutional arrangements for centre-state cooperation:

Since problems in ormulating a counter-Maoist policy as

well as in dealing with the issue on a day-to-day basis

are sourced to the lack o centre-state cooperation,

a permanent institutional mechanism in the orm o a

coordination centre can be established to thrash out

emergingdifferences.AcoordinationcentredoescurrentlyexistwithintheMHA,butrequirestheactiveparticipation

o state representatives to ensure smoother coordination.

(iii) Police hold the key: Augmenting the capacities of

the police, who are conversant with local conditions, as

the primary orce against Maoist violence will be key to

neutralizing the frepower o the extremists. To optimize

this, close and timely monitoring o the expenditure o the

unds made available by the Centre is required.

(iv) Development follows military success: While

development is a useul tool against Maoist extremism, it is

imperative that a semblance o order precede injection o

resourcesintotheextremist-affectedareas.Asexemplied

by India’s experience in other conict theatres like the

northeast, without some level o security, conict-ridden

areas resemble bottom-less pits. Without local capacities

to absorb the available resources and an accompanying

mechanism or accountability, unds simply disappear

into the coers o the extremists, politicians, bureaucrats

and the contractors. Here again, careful monitoring is

essential.

07




(v) Coordination between the administration and

security forces: Asexplainedearlier, developmentmust

operate in tandem with the security orces. Resumption

o administrative activity should immediately ollow the

clearing o an area by the orces. In this context, the

creation o a dedicated team o administrators, with some

level o independent decision making authority, requires

special attention.

(vi) Strategic communication: Maoists have exploited

tribal disenchantment against government apathy lasting

over decades. It is essential that the ofcial approach be

based on an eective policy o communication that not

just brandishes the extremists as essentially bad, but is

also honest about its own honourable intentions.

(vii) Development of local political leadership: It is not

the security orces, state or central, but local political

leadership which will act as a primary resistance orce

against a cleared area relapsing into extremism. Every

step must be taken or the resumption o political activity

intheaffectedareas.Holdingelectionsforinstitutionsof

local sel-government could be the frst step in this regard,

ollowed by the strengthening o these institutions with

additional fnancial and decision-making powers. This

would ameliorate the reality o alienation among the aected

population, thereby making them genuine stakeholders in

maintaining peace and promoting development.

(viii) Need for a just war: Just like other conict theatres,

the Maoist conict theatre too has reported its own share

o human rights violations and excesses committed by the

security orces on non-combatants. While some o these

allegations have been ound to be alse, some are real.

There is an urgent need to base the success o security

orce operations on the concept o just war that strives to

do the maximum to avoid collateral damage that leads tourther alienation o the aected people.

(ix) Cut the hype: Without doubt, the anti-Maoist operations

willbeaprolongedaffair.Augmentingstatecapacitywill

need sustained eort and time. Thereore it is essential or

the government to stay away rom propagandist claims

about winning the war in quick time.

08




S. RAJARATNAM SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, NANYANG TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY

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RSIS Policy Paper Bibhu (1)