SR173 Forecasts LWE Bibhu Libre

IPCS Forecasts

Naxal Violence in 2015 Naxal Might and Ideology I Enclaves of Strength I The Maoist Expansion I

Combating Naxal Violence I A Strategy for the Government

Bibhu Prasad Routray

IPCS Special Report # 172 January 2015

IPCS Forecasts 2015 I Special Report #173, January 2015

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About the Author Bibhu Prasad Routray Dr Bibhu Prasad Routray is an independent security analyst and a Visiting Fellow at the IPCS.

He writes a column for the IPCS titled Red Affairs. See http://www.ipcs.org/columnist/bibhu‐prasad/ This report is an updated and compiled version of his earlier commentaries for his column during 2014.

© IPCS, 2015 B 7/3 Lower Ground Floor Safdarjung Enclave New Delhi 110029 Tel: 91‐11‐4100 1900, 4100 1901 Fax: (91‐11) 41001902 Cover Photo Credit: http://im.rediff.com/news/2011/dec/06naxal1.jpg

CONTENTS Section‐I Naxal Violence in 2015: A Forecast

Continuing Decline Persisting

Weaknesses Morale Boosting

Assaults Enclaves of Strength Southern Expansion

Section‐II 2014: A Review

Naxal Might and Ideology

The Maoist Expansion

Combating Naxal Violence

A Strategy for the Government

Southeast Asia in 2015

IPCS Forecasts

Naxal Violence in 2015 Bibh u Prasad Ro utray VisitingFellowIPCS

LeftwingExtremismin2015:AForecastAt the onset of , left‐wing extremism LWE in )ndia under the aegis of the CommunistPartyof )ndia‐Maoist CP)‐Maoist is confrontedwithachoiceofeithercoming to termswiththe realities of itsweakness and revisit the strategy of sustaining a protractedwarwith thestate; or continuingwith carrying out periodic attacks on the security forces and other stateprotagonistswiththelong‐termaimofresurrectingitselfyetagaininthecomingyears.Although thepast few years have reinforced thenotion that CP)‐Maoist has ceased to be theforceitusedtobe,thereislittlehopethatin ,theoutfitwouldhaltpursuingitsstrategyofcarryingoutintermittentraidsaswellasexpandingintonewerareas.(owthestaterespondstothischallengeviaitsreformulatedstrategywouldbesomethingtowatchoutfor.ContinuingDecline)n , the trend of declining fatalities in LWE‐related violence continued. According toprovisionaldata,only fatalitieswereregistered,whichisthelowestsincetheformationofthe CP)‐Maoist in . While Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand account per cent of thesefatalities, Odisha, Maharashtra and Bihar are the other states that reported the remainingfatalities.TheCP)‐Maoist,whichoncewieldedinfluenceoveralmostone‐thirdofthecountry'sgeographicalexpanse,nowoperateswithaconstrainedpresenceinthesefivestates.AsuddenexpansionintheCP)‐Maoist'sareaofoperationisunlikelyin .Theoutfitwouldmostlybeinvolvedinguardingitsremaininginfluenceinthesestates.PersistingWeaknessAffectedbysurrenders,killingsandarrestsofa largenumbersof itscadres, theCP)‐Maoist isclearly on a back foot, necessitating a phase of tactical retreat when the outfit rebuilds itsstrength.Amongthemanydenominatorsthatpointatthestate'stighteninggripoverLWEistheformer'sabilitytocarryoutlargelypeacefulelectionsinvariousstates.JharkhandwentforanassemblyelectionsinNovemberandDecember .Additionally,theCP)‐Maoistlargelyfailedto carry out its threats of disrupting the poll; the over per cent voter turnout – a recordpercentage in the state –demonstrateda growingpopular confidence in theState's ability toprovidesecurity.Astablegovernment,nowarealityinstate,hasanopportunityofheraldinganeraofdecisiveactionagainsttheextremists.Morale‐boostingAssaultsTheoperationalweaknessoftheCP)‐Maoist,however,hasnotcurtaileditsabilitytocarryoutperiodicattacksresultinginhighcasualtyamongthesecurityforces.)nfact,suchattackswould


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remain part of the CP)‐Maoist's continuing attempt of seeking relevance, rebuilding itsorganisationalstrength,andinflictingsetbacksonthesecurityforces.Thefactthatthesecurityforces ineachof theLWE‐affectedtheatrescontinueto face issuesofcoordination, leadershipanddirection,wouldaidtheextremistefforts.Successfulattackssuchastheonethatresultedinthekillingof CentralReservePoliceForce CRPF personnelinChhattisgarh sSukmadistricton December ,hasalreadyledtoadefensivemindsetamongtheforces,withtheCRPFheadquarters insistingthatallmajoroperationsagainsttheextremistsmustbeclearedbythetopbrassoftheorganisation.)nviewofthis,thehighlypublicisedanti‐extremistsecurityforceoperations launched in Jharkhand in January may not result in its intended results ofwipingoutextremism.EnclavesofStrengthNewDelhi has assured the affected states of support in dealingwith LWE. (owever, for thestates,emergingfromaneraofoverwhelmingdependenceonthecentralforceshasprovedtobe difficult. Progress in enabling its own police forces to take a lead role in counteringextremism has remained a non‐starter. This is apparent in the significant level of popularcompliancetotheCP)‐Maoist'speriodiccalls forshutdowninvariousstates.Evenasthestatemakesadvanceestablishingitswritoverhithertoextremism‐affectedareas,severalenclavesofextremist domination, especially in states like Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh and Odisha wouldcontinuetomocktheofficialclaimsofsuccess.MissingBureaucracyResurrecting governance over the erstwhile Maoist‐dominated areas has proved to be NewDelhi'sAchilles(eel.Asofthebeginningof ,the)ndianMinistryof(omeAffairsispushingthe state governments to appoint "officers with zeal" as district magistrates andsuperintendents of police in the extremism‐affected districts. Even as the security forcesregistersomesuccessesinendingextremistdominationoverselectareas,bureaucraticinertiainkick‐startinggovernancehasremainedoneoftheprimaryhindrancesincementingsuccess.Government functionaries are either reluctant to function in such hazardous zones or areindulging in rampant corruption exploiting the lack of accountability a conflict situationprovides. The attempt to inculcate "zeal" among functionaries, both in the higher and lowerlevelsofbureaucracyislikelytobeatoughoneforthestategovernments.SouthernExpansionOne of the less highlighted aspects of the CP)‐Maoist's activities in was its foray intoKerala. With a handful of incidents involving attacks on a forest department office and anoutpost, and KFC andMcDonald s outlets, theMaoists have announced their presence in thesouthernstate.WhileexpansionintonewareasremainsanavowedobjectiveoftheCP)‐Maoistexploitingfertilegrounds,thedividedofficialresponsehashelpedtheoutfitgainstrengthandsympathisers. Amid the Kerala police's steps to deal with the emerging threat, a seniorgovernment functionary has called for a stop to the hunt and has praised the Maoists for"energising the government machinery in tribal areas." The CP)‐Maoist would continue itsattempts tospread itsactivities intonewareas in .Sansanationalconsensusondealingwiththethreat,someoftheseareaswouldlapseintonewhuntinggroundsfortheextremists.


2014:AReviewI

TheNaxalMightandIdeologyNaxalitesandtheMightofaFragileRevolution1Onthemorningof October ,ShivKumar,apersonnelbelongingtotheChhattisgarhArmedPolicewaspulledoutofapassengerbusinSukmadistrictbyagroupofCommunistPartyof)ndia‐Maoist CP)‐Maoist cadresandkilled.Kumarwasillandwasonhiswaytothehospitalwhenthebushehadboardedwaswaylaidbyextremists.Onthepreviousday,RaghunathKisku,FounderMember,NagarikSurakshaSamity NSS ,ananti‐Maoistorganisation,waskilledbyMaoistsinGhatshilasub‐divisionofJharkhand'sEastSinghbhumdistrict.Kumarwasthe thsecurityforcepersonnelandKisku,the thcivilian,tobekilledbyMaoistsin .OtheractivitiesperpetratedbytheMaoiststill Septemberinclude attacksonthepolice; occasionsofsnatchingofweaponsfromthesecurityforces;andholdingof armstrainingcampsand janadalatsinareasundertheirinfluence.Whiletheoccurrencesoflargerattackshavesubstantiallydecreased,thenumbersofextremism‐relatedincidentsroughlyremainthesamecomparedtothecorrespondingperiodin –indicatingthecontinuationofthechallenge.AndyetitisahardtimefortheMaoists.Till September, CP)‐Maoistcadreswereneutralised,including whowerekilledinencounters,and cadres,arrested.Whiletheoutfitcantakepridefromthesacrificesmadebythesemenandwomen,whatcontinuestotroubleitistheperpetualdesolationcreepingintoitsranksandfiles,leadingtoalargenumberofsurrenderofitsleadersandcadres.Amongthe whohavesurrenderedtill SeptemberareleaderslikeGumudavelliVenkatakrishnaPrasadaliasGudsaUsendi,Secretary,DandakaranyaSpecialZonalCommitteeDKSZC ,arguablytheoutfit'smostpotentmilitarydivisionbasedinBastarandhiswifeRaji;GPReddy,Member,theDKSZC,andhiswifeVattiAdime;andBhagatJadeandhiswifeVanoja.AccordingtotheChhattisgarhpolice,over cadreshavesurrenderedbetweenJuneandSeptember inBastaralone,partlyduetothedisillusionwiththeoutfit'sideologyandpartlyconvincedbythepolice'smethodofhighlightingthediscriminationsufferedbythelocalChhattisgarhcadresatthehandsofthosedrawnfromAndhraPradesh.PressstatementsoftheCP)‐Maoist,whilecondemningthesesurrendersasdemonstrationofopportunismanddesertionofthemovementbycorruptandpoliticallydegeneratedpersons,admitthattherevolutioniscurrentlyundergoingitsmostdifficultphase.TheCP)‐MaoisthasaccusedtheBharatiyaJanataParty BJP ‐ledgovernmentinNewDelhioflaunchingthethirdphaseofOperationGreen(unt,aruthlesswaraimedatannihilatingtheMaoistswhoarethe"biggestthreat"toits"pro‐reform"policies.Assertingthatithasmerelyonlyengagedina"war 1 Originally published as IPCS Commentary on 20 October 2014. See http://www.ipcs.org/article/naxalite-violence/naxalites-and-the-might-of-a-fragile-revolution-4705.html


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ofselfdefence,"theoutfithascalledfora"widespreadstruggletofightbackthethreatbyunitingalltherevolutionaryanddemocraticforces.")tsprogressivelydecliningcapacitytoannihilateenemiessince –inspiteoftheabilitytopulloffsomeofthemostspectacularattacksonsecurityforcesandpoliticiansinrecentyears–hasremainedamatterofworryfortheCP)‐Maoist.)tsfailuretodisrupttheparliamentaryandstateassemblyelectionscoupledwitharegulardesertionofitscadreshasdescendedasanexistentialthreatontheoutfitthatoncecontrolledone‐thirdofthecountry'sgeographicalarea.Evenwiththepersistingbureaucraticinertiaandunimaginativesecurityforceoperations,mostoftheaffectedstateshavegainedintheirfightagainsttheextremists.(owever,theoutfit'sdominationoverlargeswathesofareainChhattiagrh,OdishaandJharkhandwithsignificantpresenceinstateslikeBiharprovidesitwiththeabilitytocontinuewithitssmallambushes.)tsrecruitmentandfundraisingabilityappearstohaveshrunk.Andyet,theoutfitharpsaboutapeople'smilitia"nowinthousands"unitedbyapathyofthestateandcarefullycalibratedimageofthegovernmentbeingarepresentativeoftheexploitativeindustrialhouses.(ence,ascenarioinwhichsurrendersandkillingsoftheMaoistswouldpushtheoutfitintooblivionisremote.The)ndianMinistryof(omeAffairs M(A ,aftermonthsofdeliberation,isnowarmedwithanewpolicytocountertheMaoists.Thepolicy,subjecttocabinetapproval,wouldremainopentouse"anyelementofnationalpower"againsttheextremists.Althoughitdoesnotruleoutpeacetalkswiththeextremists,itmakesthepeaceprocessconditionaltotheCP)‐Maoistrenouncingviolence.)tplanstomakethestatepolicetheleadcounter‐insurgentforceagainsttheextremistswhileassigningthecentralforces,especiallytheCentralReservePoliceForceCRPF ,theresponsibilityofholdingthecounter‐insurgencygridtogether"likeaglue."Whileimpressiveinitsnuances,theapproachisguidedbythebeliefthatitispossibletowipeouttheMaoistsbyforcealone.Theimpactofthenewofficialcounter‐Maoistpolicyremainstobeseen.(owever,intheclashbetweenamilitarily'down‐and‐not‐yet‐out'CP)‐Maoistandtheofficialsecurityapparatusthathasitsownsetofseriousproblems,littlemorethanpersistenceofthelogjamcanbeexpected.SixThousandPlusKilled:TheNaxalIdeologyofViolence2(owdoesoneanalysethekillingsof civiliansandsecurityforcesinincidentsrelatedtoleft‐wingextremismbetween and ?GiventhattheCommunistPartyof)ndia‐Maoist CP)‐Maoist ,sinceitsformationin ,hasbeenresponsibleformajorityofthesekillings,conventionalanalyseshavemostlyfocusedonbigandsmallincidentsthatproducedthesevictims.Whilesuchmethodsareusefulintermsofattemptingtograspthegrowingordecliningcapacityoftheoutfit,itisalsousefultoanalysetheunceasingviolenceasupshotofanideologythathasfordecadesunderlinedthenecessitytoshedtheenemy'sbloodtobringaboutachangeinsocialandpoliticalorder.Threeleaders–CharuMazumdar,KanuSanyalandKondapalliSeetharamaiah–dominatethediscourseonNaxalism,whichbeganinthe s.Mazumdar,inhis EightDocuments in , 2 Originally published as IPCS Commentary on 15 September 2014. See http://www.ipcs.org/article/peace-and-conflict-database-naxal/six-thousand-plus-killed-the-naxal-ideology-of-violence-4657.html


exhortedtheworkersoftheCommunistPartyof)ndia‐Marxist CP)‐M totakeuparmedstruggleagainstthestate.(eunderlinedthatactionandnotpoliticswastheneedofthehour.SuchcallsresultedinanumberofincidentsinwhichtheCP)‐MworkersstartedseizingarmsandacquiringlandforciblyonbehalfofthepeasantsfromthebiglandholdersinDarjeeling.Theseincidentswentontoprovidethesparkforthe peasantuprising.FollowingtheformationoftheAll)ndiaCoordinationCommitteeofRevolutionaries A)CCR ,thatemergedoutoftheCP)‐MinNovember andwasrenamedasAll)ndiaCoordinationCommitteeofCommunistRevolutionaries A)CCCR inMay ,Mazumdarfurtherreiteratedhisideaofkhatamorannihilationofclassenemies.Althoughincidentsofindividualassassinationsinfluencedbykhatamresultedinrepressivestateactiontargetingthenaxalitecadres,theCommunistPartyof)ndia‐Marxist‐Leninist CP)‐ML ,whichwasformedin breakingawayfromtheCP)‐Marxist,continuedprofessingviolenceasthekeytoolofrevolution.WhileMazumdar'spreferenceforusingviolencetooverthrowexistingsocialorderandseizingstatepowerremainedtheCP)‐ML'smodeofoperationtill ,acounterideologywithastressonagrarianconsolidationprecedinganarmedstrugglewasreiteratedbyKanuSanyalfollowingMazumdar'sdeath.Sanyalwasnotagainsttheideaofanarmedstruggleperse.(owever,heopposedMazumdar'sadvocacyoftargetedassassination.)nthesubsequentyears,theCP)‐MLsplitintoseveralfactions.AlthoughSanyalhimselfheadedafaction,hegraduallygrewredundanttotheextremeleftmovementandcommittedsuicidein.Towardsthelastyearsofhislife,SanyalmaintainedthattheCP)‐Maoist'srelianceonexcessiveviolencedoesnotconformtooriginalrevolutionaryobjectivesoftheNaxalitemovement.Onmorethanoneoccasion,Sanyaldenouncedthe wantonkillingofinnocentvillagers .)na interview,SanyalaccusedtheCP)‐MaoistofexploitingthesituationinWestBengal'sLalgarh"byusingtheAdivasisasstoogestocarryforwardtheiragendaofindividualterrorism.")nAndhraPradesh,sincethe'SpringThunder'ofSrikakulamin ,KondapalliSeetharamaiah,wasresponsibleforthegrowthoftheNaxalitemovementundertheaegisoftheCP)‐ML.AfterleadingafactionoftheCP)‐MLandformingthePeople'sWarGroup PWG inSeetharamaiahoversawaregimeofintenseviolence,thus,earningtheoutfitthedescriptionof"thedeadliestofallNaxalgroups".EvenaftertheexpulsionofSeetharamaiahin,thePWGanditsfactionsremainedthesourceofextremeviolencetargetingpoliticiansandsecurityforcesinthestate.KanuSanyal'sreluctantsupportforarmedviolencewas,thus,somewhatanaberration.PlayingdowntheimportanceofmindlessbloodshedremainedaperipheraloftheNaxalitemovement.Eachtransformationofthemovementthereafterintermsofsplits,mergers,andformationofnewidentitiesescalatedtheingrainedproclivitytouseviolenceasaninstrumentofexpansionandinfluence.TheCP)‐Maoistrepresentedanaturalprogressionofthistrend.Andasthefatalitiesdatareveal,eachpassingyear,sinceits formationthroughamergeroftheMaoistCommunistCentre MCC andthePWG,itbecamemoreandmorereliantonviolence,rationalisingthestrategyasadefensivemechanismessentialtoitsexistence.)n KoteshwarRaoaliasKishenji,wholedtheoutfitinWestBengaltermedtheviolenceasa"struggleforindependence".Ganapathy,theCP)‐Maoistgeneralsecretary,reiteratedinhis


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February interviewthattheviolenceisonlya"warofself‐defence"ora"counter‐violence"inresponsetoa"brutalmilitarycampaignunleashedbythestate".MaoistSpokespersonAzad,whowaslaterkilledincontroversialcircumstances,rejectedtheappealforabjuringviolencebythen(omeMinisterPChidambaraminApril indicatingthatsuchamovewouldallowthe"lawless"securityforces"continuetheirrampage".Azadalsomaintainedthatwhiletheoutfitgenerallyavoidsattackingthenon‐combatants,"theintelligenceofficialsandpoliceinformerswhocauseimmensedamagetothemovement"cannotbespared.Thusunderstood,fewconclusionscanbedrawn,incontrasttobeliefsthatapeacefulresolutionoftheconflictcouldbepossible.)tscurrentfrailtynotwithstanding,regainingcapacitiestomaximiseviolencewouldbeapriorityfortheCP)‐Maoist.)twillcontinuetorejectothermethodsofsocialandpoliticalchangeandmaintainanunwaveringfaithintheutilityofviolence.Evenwhilerealisingthatatotalvictoryvis‐a‐visthestateisunattainable,theoutfitwouldremainanagentofextremeviolenceinitsownspheresofinfluence.II

TheMaoistExpansion

SurrenderofGudsaUsendi:OminousbeginningfortheNaxals?3Beginningof couldnothavebeenanyworsefortheCommunistPartyof)ndia‐Maoist CP)‐Maoist .Theoutfitlostoneofitstrustedlieutenants.On January,spokespersonofDandakaranyaSpecialZonalCommittee,GVKPrasadaliasGudsaUsendi,whonotonlywasinchargeofissuingpressstatementsonbehalfoftheoutfit,butwasalsoresponsibleforsomeoftheitsmilitarysuccessesinChhattisgarh,surrenderedtotheAndhraPradeshpolice.(ecomplainedofillhealthanddisillusionmentwiththeoutfit'sexcessiverelianceonviolence.(ewouldreceivetheRupees lakhwhichwasthebountyonhishead.Usendi'ssurrenderwasfollowedbyfewothersurrendersoflowandmiddlerankingcadresinChhattisgarh.TheCP)‐MaoistcameoutwithanaudiostatementtrivializingtheimpactofUsendi'ssurrender.Callinghima'traitor',a'morallyflawed'individual;criticisinghiswayswiththewomencadresandthefactthatUsendichosetoabandonhiswifeandsurrenderwithanotherwomancadre,thestatementnotedthatsuchsurrenders,whichis'notanewphenomenonfortherevolutionarymovement'wouldhavenoimpactontherevolutionthattheMaoistsarewaging.Atonelevel,thestatementappearstobeanaturalreactionoftheoutfit,whichhassufferedfromaseriesofsplitsandsurrenders,andhasalsolostanumberofseniorleaderstoarrestsandkillingsinthepastyears.Whiledeathsandarrestsareunavoidablepartsofitsmilitarycampaign,theoutfitismostperturbedbythepossibleimpactofthepublicdenouncementofitsideologybyitserstwhilelieutenants.Bycriticisingthesurrenderingcadresandidolisingtheoneswhogotkilledinencounterswiththesecurityforces,theMaoistswanttokeeptheirflocktogether.Recenthistoryofleft‐wingextremismin)ndiabearstestimonytothedamagingimpactofneutralisationofkeyleadersontheoutfit'soverallactivity.Kishenji'skillinginNovember 3 Originally published as IPCS Commentary on 19 January 2014. See http://www.ipcs.org/article/peace-and-conflict-database-naxal/surrender-of-gudsa-usendi-ominous-beginning-for-the-naxals-4264.html


ledtothemarginalisationoftheMaoistsinWestBengal.SabyasachiPanda'sinAugust rebellioninOdishawasaserioussetbackfortheoutfit'splanofexpansioninthatstate.TheSeptember arrestofKobadGhandyandtheJuly killingofCherikuriRajkumaraliasAzadconstitutedblowstotheoutfit'spolicymakingapparatusaswellastoitsexpansionstrategyinsouthern)ndia.Usendi'ssuddendeparturefromthescenewouldcertainlyaffecttheoutfit.Thattheoutfitwouldfindaleadertoreplacehimandwouldeventuallyovercomehislossis,however,adifferentdebate.Attheotherlevel,thesatisfactionexpressedintheofficialcircles,postUsendi'ssurrenderthattheCP)‐Moistwouldeventuallycrumblebecauseofitsexcessiverelianceonviolenceanddisenchantmentofitscadresfromtheparty'sideology,maybemisplaced.ThatUsendi'ssurrenderandfairtreatmentaccordedtohimbythestatewouldleadtoastreamofsurrendersoftopcadresisfarfetched.ThatMaoistviolencewoulddieanaturaldeathwithoutanysubstantialeffortfromthestateisanunrealexpectation.GroundrealityintheMaoistconflicttheatresmaybedifferent.Whilethelevelofviolenceorchestratedin ,sofartheworstyearofMaoistviolence,resultinginthedeathsofoverciviliansandsecurityforceswouldpossiblyremainunmatched,anupswinginviolence,albeitmarginal,wasrecordedin overthepreviousyear. civiliansandsecurityforceswerekilledin invariousstatescomparedto deathsin .)nspiteofthekillingofMaoistcadresin ,theoutfit'slevelofviolencedidnotshowmuchsignsofabatement.StateslikeChhattisgarh,Jharkhand,BiharandOdisharemainedaffectedbysignificantamountofextremistmobilisationaswellasviolence.Althoughdeploymentofabout companiesofsecurityforcesminimisedviolenceduringthestateassemblyelectionsinChhattisgarh,therewaslittletosuggestthatthestateisintheprocessofdevelopingitswherewithaltoreplicatetheAndhraPradeshsuccessonitssoil.Bihar'suniqueapproachtowardstheproblemhasmerelytranslatedintoitsdiminishingabilitytoneutralisetheMaoists,whereastheextremistscontinuetokill,abductandsnatchweapons.WhileMaoistinroadsintothenortheastremainsmostlyanexaggeratedclaimbytheAssamgovernment,theCP)‐Maoistappearstohavemadeconcertedeffortsforexpansionintothesouthernstates.)n ,smallvictorieswerescoredbythesecurityforcesagainsttheMaoists.ButtheyearalsowitnessedsetbacksintheformoftheDarbhaattackinChhattisgarhinwhich peopleincludingsomeseniorpoliticianswerekilledandthekillingofanSuperintendentofPoliceinJharkhand.Moreover,thesecurityforcesinChhattsgarhwerealsoinvolvedinatleasttwoencountersinwhichciviliansratherthanextremistswerekilled,highlightingthepersistenceofintelligencecollectionproblems.)tisthecontinuingabilitytoinflictdamagesonthestate,whichwouldkeeptheCP)‐Maoistrelevantintheeyesofitssympathisers.Usendi'ssurrenderwasanominousbeginningfortheCP)‐Maoist,butcertainlynottheendgame.


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MaoistsintheNortheast:RealityandMyth‐Making4On June ,justbeforetheclockstruckmidnight,apolicecontingentinAssam'sTinsukiadistrictboardedtheChennai‐EgmoreExpress,minutesbeforeitsthree‐daylongjourney,andpulledout youths.Acriticalintelligenceinputreceivedbythepolicehadindicatedthattheseyouthsfromteagardens,AhomandMorancommunitiesweregoingtojointheCommunistPartyof)ndia‐Maoist CP)‐Maoist .FollowingtwodaysofinterrogationandconfirmationfromtheemployersoftheyouthsinChennai,allwerereleased.Tocoverupamajorembarrassment,thepoliceestablishmentforcedtheparentsoftheyouthstosignundertakingsthattheywouldproducetheirwardsbeforethepolicewheneveraskedfor.TheincidentinawaysummedthemindsetofthesecurityestablishmentinAssam,whichforthepastcoupleofyears,hasbeenpursuinganon‐existentenemy,invariablyunderpoliticalorders.MediareportsontheallegedinroadsmadebytheCP)‐MaoistintotheNortheastingeneralandAssaminparticularhaveproducedalarmingnarrativescomprisingencounters,arrests,shadowyextremistgameplans,andavisionfortakingovertheregion.Whilefewoftheseincidentsarereal,most,liketheincidentnarratedearlier,areunsustainable.ArrestedMaoistcadresidentifiedascentralcommitteemembers,traininginstructors,andkeyleadersoftheoutfit'seasternwinghavebeenfoundtobeoldmenintheagegroupof to years,acleardeparturefromthemainstreamMaoistmovementwhoseleadersandcadresaremuchyounger.Post‐arrest,thesocalledhighprofilecadreslikeAdityaBorahavebeengiveninstantbailbythecourtsinviewoftheweakandunsubstantiatedchargesbroughtagainstthem.ThesocalledextortionnotesrecoveredinupperAssamdistrictscontainexpressionssuchas Maubadi andsymbolsofarisingsun,indicatingtheinvolvementofpettycriminalsposingasMaoistsorevencadresoftheUnitedLiberationFrontofAssam ULFA ,whosepartysymbolistherisingsun.The disappearance of youthsfromvariousAssamdistrictshasbeendescribedasasuccessfulrecruitmentdrivebytheCP)‐Maoist.TheAssam‐ArunachalPradeshborderregionhasbeendescribedasthenewhotbedofMaoistactivity.(undredsofkilometresseparatetheareafromthenearestMaoistareaofactivityinWestBengal,violatestheprincipleofcontiguity,whichtheCP)‐Maoiststeadfastlyholdontoinitsexpansiondrive.Suchdisquietingnarratives,asaresult,coexistwithsanerassessments,incidentallybysomeoftheseniorpoliceofficialsinAssam.Theyinfact,insistthatthereisnoconstituencyinAssamwhichtheMaoistscanexploittospreadtheirideology.)nJanuary ,Assam'sdirectorgeneralofpoliceconfirmedthat"MaoistshavealsonotyetbeenabletomakestronginroadsintoAssam."ThepurposeofthiscolumnhereisnottoarguethatMaoistshavenoplansfortheNortheast.Theydo.(owever,thatisnotanearormedium‐termplanforsabotage,armedstruggleandcarvingoutofliberatedzonesintheregion,butamorerationalandrealisticstratagemforusingtheregion'sweaknessesandvulnerabilitiesforweaponsprocurementandservicesoftheinsurgentoutfitsfortrainingpurposes.ThejointdeclarationbetweenthePeople'sLiberationArmy PLA inManipurandtheCP)‐MaoistgoesbacktoOctober .Aspartofthedeclaration,thePLAin organisedarmstrainingcampsfortheMaoistcadresinJharkhand.MaoistleaderKishenji whowaskilledinNovember travelledtothePLAandNational 4 Originally published as IPCS Commentary on 17 February 2014. See http://www.ipcs.org/article/terrorism-in-northeast/maoists-in-the-northeast-reality-and-myth-making-4315.html


SocialistCouncilofNagaland‐)sak‐Muivah NSCN‐)M campsinManipurandNagalandrespectivelytodeepenpartnershipandexplorearmspurchaseandjointtrainingopportunities.TheNSCN‐)MpurchasedarmsfromaChinesecompanyintendedfortheMaoists.ULFAchiefPareshBaruahhascongratulatedtheMaoistsfortheirsuccessfulambushesinChhattisgarhandsentcondolencemessagesfollowingthekillingofMaoistsinencounters.(owever,noneoftheoutfitsintheNortheasthaveeverexpressedanydesiretolettheMaoistsoperateinwhattheyconsidertobetheirexclusiveplayingfield.TheCP)‐Maoisthasindeedattractedsomeyouthsfromtheregion.ButthosejourneysfromtheNortheasttoMaoistcampsinthe)ndianmainlandinsomewaysresemblethoseundertakenbyMuslimyouthsfromallnooksandcornersoftheworldtojointheanti‐SovietMujahideeninAfghanistaninthe s.TheobjectivesofthosecadresarecertainlynottowageaguerrillawarinsidetheNortheastbuttoenforcetheranksoftheCP)‐Maoist,conformingtotheirpersonalideologicalaffiliation.This,however,hasnotstoppedChiefMinisterTarunGogoifromrepeatedlydemandingtheMaoist‐affected statusforAssam'sninedistricts,whichwouldentitletheaffecteddistrictstoRupees croreadditionaldevelopmentalfundseveryyear.NotwithstandingNewDelhi'srejectionofthedemand,Gogoicontinuestolabelcivilrightsgroupsandanti‐dammovementsasMaoist‐backedandcallsfordeploymentofadditionalsecurityforces.)facceded,Assam,whichhasnotreportedasinglecivilianandsecurityforcefatalityinMaoistviolence,wouldrankalongwithsomeoftheworstextremistaffectedstatesofthecountry.III

CombatingNaxalViolence

TransientandPermanentSuccess5WouldtheMaoistscontinuetocarryoutintermittentattackstargettingthestateintheforeseeablefuture?Orwouldtheyeventuallydisintegrateanddisappearowingtoaleadershipcrisisbecausethestatehasbeenabletoneutralisesomeoftheirtopleaderswhiletheremainingaretoooldforacontinuousfight?Theanswerswouldshapetheresponsetowhathasbeenthemostpotentcaseofextremismin)ndia.CommentaryontheactivitiesoftheCommunistPartyof)ndia‐Maoist CP)‐Maoist hasbeeninastateoffluxinrecentyears.Commentatorshaveshiftedtheirpositionsalongwithincidentsandwithrisingordiminishingdeathtolls.Tworecentinstancescanbecited.NeutralisationofsevenMaoistsinGadchirolidistrictofMaharashtraon February,forinstance,underlinedthatadvancementofthestateandweakeningoftheMaoists.(owever,followingtwoMaoistattackswithinafortnightinChhattisgarhthatkilled securityforcepersonnelinFebruaryandMarchinDantewadaandSukadistricts,thenarrativeshiftedandthepotencyoftheextremistswasreconfirmed.TheMaoists,whoappearedtohavepreviouslyweakened,haveresurfacedasarealthreattothe LokSabhaelectionsincertainstates.Muchofthesefluctuationsinanalysesowetheirorigintothestates claimsofsuccessagainsttheextremists.Thereisnodenyingthefactthatthesecurityforceshaveindeedmadesome 5 Originally published as IPCS Commentary on 17 March 2014. See http://www.ipcs.org/article/naxalite-violence/combating-naxal-violence-transient-and-permanent-success-4341.html


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advancesintheMaoist‐affectedtheatres.Themostusualparametertojudgethisisthedipinviolenceinrecentyears.Comparedto ,when , civiliansandsecurityforceswerekilledinextremistattacks, deathsoccurredin .Additionally,combinedwithfiguresofkillingsofMaoistcadres,thenumberofsurrendersaswellasoccasionalconfirmationsfromtheoutfit,theCP)‐Maoist'scapacitytoorchestrateviolencehasbeeninterpretedashavingdeclined.)ftheseconclusionsaretrue,howdoesoneinterpretthe Februaryand MarchattacksinChhattisgarh?Aretheseattacksonlyaberrationsandconstitutedesperateattemptsbytheextremiststoreiteratetheirpresence,moresobeforetheelections?Ordotheyindicatethatthesuccessofthestatewasmoreofatacticalfavourgrantedbytheextremistsandhence,thelullinviolencewasmerelytemporary?WhiletheassertionthatMaoistshaveindeedkilledlessciviliansandsecurityforcesinrecentyearsissustainable,whetherthisdeclineinextremistviolenceisdemonstrativeofaugmentedcapacitiesofthestateremainsarelevantquestion.Withparticularreferencetothe Marchattack,thesecurityforceestablishmenthasarguedindefenceoftheambushedCentralReservePoliceForce CRPF team,vouchingforitsbravery.WhilesomeargumentshavetriedtolocateMaoistsuccessesintheviolationofstandardoperatingprocedures SOPs bythesecurityforcepersonnel,theCRPFchiefhasstatedthatSOPsarenotsacrosanctandcanbeimprovisedifsituationsdemand.Similarly,criticismsregardinglackofintelligenceandcoordinationbetweenthecentralandthestatepolicehaveallbeenrebuffed.)falliswellwiththemodeofoperations,whyarethesecurityforcesregularlyfallingpreytoattacksbyasocalledweakanddemoralisedextremistoutfit?Theanswertothisseeminglycomplicatedquestionisrelativelysimple.Thestate,withallitsinstrumentalitiesofpower,hasfailedtodominatetheextremism‐affectedterritoryunderquestion.Blameiteitheronthelackofadequatestrengthofsecurityforcepersonneloracohesivestrategytodislodgetheextremists,thefactremainsthatmuchoftheterritorywhichreportincidentsofviolencecontinuestoremainunderthegripoftheextremists.Eitherthestate'ssuccessofneutralisingkeyMaoistleadersthroughencounters,arrestsandsurrendersoritsinflictingoflossesthroughdisruptionofmeansofcommunicationandlogisticshasnotenlargeditswritintotheungovernedterritories.Asaresult,securityforceraidsintoextremist‐heldterritories,whilemakingimpressivemediaheadlines,havenotconvertedthoseareasintostate‐onlyareas.Thelackofastrategytograduallyexpandthestate'sdominationisalsothereasonwhythedevelopmentinitiativesofthestatehavefailedtowinoverthetribals.Onecannotexpecttohaveloyalistsinareasthatarecontrolledbyone sadversary.Andinsuchareasunderextremistdomination,thelossesundergonebytheoutfitarerecoveredfairlyrapidly.ThisispreciselythereasonwhythestatementoftheUnion(omeMinisterSushilKumarShindethatthestatewill takerevenge forthe MarchattackinChhattisgarhappearshollow.Afewhoursafterthe Marchattack,asocialnetworkpage,ostensiblysupportiveoftheextremists,uploadedapictureofabloodied)ndianmapalongwithaguntottingrebel."Politicsiswarwithoutbloodshedwhilewarispoliticswithbloodshed,"MaoZedong'sfamousline,wasscribbledacrossthepicture.Thepictureisapointertowardsthefuture.TheMaoistwaragainstthestate,aslongasitlasts,willbebloody.Theleastthatthestatecandoistoembarkupona


strategytoensurethattheareasinwhichtheMaoistslaunchthesebloodywarsareshrunkonagradualbasis.MaoistAttackontheCRPF:TimeforNewCounter‐strategies6The December killingof CentralReservePoliceForce CRPF personnelinChhattisgarh'sSukmadistrictbytheCommunistPartyof)ndia‐Maoist CP)‐Maoist shouldinvariablygodownasoneofthecountry'sworstsecurityforceoperationsinrecenttimes.)ntermsofthekillingoftrainedpersonnel,lootingoftheirweapons,andthefollowupresponseofawellestablishedsecurityestablishmentinthestate,theattacksurpasseseventhefarbiggerextremistattacksofthepastinwhichtheforcehadlostfarlargernumberofpersonnel.TheincidentfurthergivesrisetothequestionwhetheravictoryovertheMaoistsisatallpossibleunderaCRPF‐Statepoliceforcecombinationformula?Theattacktookplaceasover personneloftheCRPFwereconductingafour‐phaseoperationagainsttheextremistsinthedistrict.Asexpressedbytheinvolvedpersonneltothemedia,withoutmuchofintelligencetobacktheseinitiatives,therewaslittleobjectivebehindtheoperationsratherthanwhatbroadlyisdescribedasareadominationexercises.Duringtheendofthethirdphaseoftheoperation,asectionoftheforce,variouslydescribedasconsistingof to personnelcameunderattackbytheMaoists–whoapparentlyusedcivilianvillagersasshields.Therewaslittleresistancefromtheforces,whoasreportssuggestgotawayonly fatalities.While perishedinthecombat,twopersonneldiedwhilebeingshifted.(adtheMaoistspersistedandcontinuedtheirattacks,thetollcouldhavebeenmuchhigher,perilouslyclosetothe DantewadaattackinwhichtheCRPFlost troopers.TheattackhasledtoanearlyconclusionoftheareadominationexerciseinSukma.Theattackraisesseveralquestionsregardingtheabilityoftheforcethathasbeendesignatedasthecountry sleadcounter‐insurgentforceaftertheKargilattack,vis‐a‐vistheMaoists.Thereareissuesofleadership,logistics,intelligenceandcoordinationwiththestatepoliceforce.(owever,noneoftheseconcernsarenew.Eachinvestigationfollowingamajorattackhasunravelledthesameillsaffectingtheforcethathasbeenfightingtheextremistsfornearlyadecadeandwhosebattalionstrengthintheconflicttheaterhasgrownmanifoldovertheyears.Whilesomeincrementalimprovementsinthewayoperationshavebeenconductedarenaturalandarethereforeverybodytosee,fundamentalissuessuchastheCRPFleadership'sstrategyoffightingthewarwithwell‐motivatedandadequatelysupportedpersonnelhavebeenchronicallyabsent.Thisexplainswhythetransientsuccessesthathavepushedthe ‐yearoldCP)‐Maoistarguablytoitsweakeststatenotwithstanding,theCRPF'sownhistoryofengagementwiththeextremistsisrepletewithmistakes,setbacks,andaperennialsearchfortherightprinciplesofoperationalaccomplishment.Theforce'sprojectstogenerateintelligencebysettingupandedicatedwing;itsinitiativesofdevelopingbondswiththetribalpopulationbyprovidingthemwithgifts,medicalfacilities,andorganisingsportsandculturalevents;anditseffortstonarrowdownthedifferenceswiththestatepoliceforceshaveallachievedmarginalresults.Eventhe ‐battalionstrongCombatBattalionforResoluteAction COBRA ,raisedwiththespecificobjectiveof 6 Originally published as IPCS Commentary on 15 December 2014. See http://www.ipcs.org/article/naxalite-violence/maoist-attack-on-the-crpf-time-for-new-counter-strategies-4777.html


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fightingtheMaoists,whichhassincebeendilutedtomakethemdealwiththeinsurgentsofalldenominationsinthenortheast,haveminorachievementstodemonstrate,inthe)ndianMinistryof(omeAffairs M(A 'sownassessments.Theuncomfortableconclusiononecanderivefromthestate‐of‐affairsisthattheCRPF,initspresentstate,isnottheforcethatcandeliversignificantsuccessesintheMaoistconflicttheaters.Evenwithanever‐expandingbudgetofRs. , . croresforthecurrentfinancialyear‐amountingtoalmost / thoftheM(A'sentirebudget–thesuccessivechiefsoftheforcehavefailedtoprovideitsfightingtroopseventhebasicoftheprovisions.Medianarrativesindicatesoldierskeepingthemselvesoperationallyfitwithrice,lentilsandMagginoodles.Worsestill,seenincombinationwithpoorconditionofthestatepoliceforcesandtheirvirtualirrelevancetotheconflictresolutionproject,itpointsatanignominiousfutureofapermanentstateofconflictinasizeablegeographicalexpanseofthecountry.)nresponsetotheSukmaattack,theM(AplanstoinductmoreforcesintoChhattisgarh.Suchamove,inthepipelinesincethenewgovernmentassumedpowerinNewDelhiinMay ,isbasedonthepremisethatmorebootsonthegroundwouldbeabletoreversethesuccessoftheMaoists.Nothingcanbefartherfromtruth.TheCRPF'sfailureneedstobeseeninthecontextoftheoveralllackofimaginationamongthecountry'spolicymakersindealingwiththeMaoistthreat.EversincetheCP)‐Maoistemergedasamajorchallenge,lackadaisical,reactionary,andadhoc‐ishmeasureshavebeenpassedoffasofficialpolicies.Evenassuchexperimentationcontinues,thesoldiers,amongothers,arepayingwiththeirbloodandlivesinconflictsmainland)ndiansarecompletelyobliviousto.IV

AStrategyfortheGovernmentThedayPrimeMinisterNarendraModiunfurledthenationalflagfromtheprecinctsofthehistoricRedForttomark)ndia's th)ndependenceDay,theCentralReservePoliceForceCRPF authoritiesinChhattisgarhunfurledthetri‐colouratTadmetlainSukmadistrict.Flaghoistingatthesiteofthebloodiestmassacrethatclaimedthelivesof CRPFpersonnelfouryearsagowasapparentlytomakeastatementthattheforceshavereclaimedtheterritoryfromtheextremistsandareassertingtheirauthorityoverthepieceofland.Thisavoidablesymbolism,inthebackdropofapparentextremistdominationoverthearea,inaway,sumsupthecountry'sstagnatedapproachtowardstheNaxalproblem.Anti‐NaxalOperations:SeekingRefugeinSymbolism7The attackatTadmetla theninDantewadadistrictwhichwasbifurcatedin tocreatetheSukmadistrict stillcountsastheworstattackevertohavebeencarriedoutonthecentralforcesbytheCommunistPartyof)ndia‐Maoist CP)‐Maoist .ThelossofanentirecompanyoftheCRPFcastapallofgloom,andmoreimportantly,pushedtheforcesintoadefensivemindset.)talsobroughtNewDelhi'sattemptstosubduetheextremiststhroughamulti‐theatremilitaryoffensivetoanabrupthalt.Subsequentinquirybyaretiredpoliceofficialrevealedseriouscommandandcontrollapsesamongtheforces.TheCRPFhasnotsufferedalossofthat 7 Originally published as IPCS Commentary on 18 August 2014. See http://www.ipcs.org/article/peace-and-conflict-database-naxal/anti-naxal-operations-seeking-refuge-in-symbolism-4608.html


magnitudethereafter.Whetherthishasbeenachievedbyaddressingtheweaknessesexposedbytheattackormerelybybecomingmoredefensiveinitsapproachisdebatable.Behindthe'successful'flaghoistingatTadmetla,however,werepainstakingpreparations.ACRPFcontingentconsistingofthespecialisedCommandoBattalionforResoluteAction COBRA commandosandledbyan)nspectorGeneral,campedintheareaforseveraldays.AdetailedsanitisationexercisewascarriedoutintheareaduringwhichaCRPFpersonnelwasinjuredinan)mprovisedExplosiveDevice )ED explosionandhadtobeairliftedfortreatment.Aseniorofficialtoldthemediathattheceremonywasessential"tomarkthedominationofthisarea."Extremismrelatedincidentsreportedin ,however,donotindicateanysecurityforcedominationoverthearea.Sukmacontinuestobeamongtheworstextremism‐affecteddistrictsinChhattisgarh.On February,twoCRPFpersonnel,includingaDeputyCommandant,werekilledand othersinjuredinalandmineblastcarriedoutbytheCP)‐Maoist.Notfarfromthesitewherethetri‐colourwashoisted,threeCOBRApersonnelwerekilledandthreeothersinjuredinaNaxalambushon April.Andon May,extremistskilled securityforcepersonnelatJeerumNullahinthedistrict.Severalotherincidentsofambush,attackandexplosionhavebeenreportedfromthedistrict.)nfact,thedominationoftheextremistshasforcedtotheCRPFtotakeuponitselfthetaskofbuildingasevenkmroadstretchasnoprivatecontractorhasagreedtotakeupthejob.)nOctober ,Union(omeSecretaryAnilGoswamihadpulledupthecentralarmedpoliceforceorganisationsincludingtheCRPFoperatinginChhattisgarhfortheir"defensivestrategy."GoswamiregrettedthefactthattherewasalullintheactionbythesecurityforcesdespiteNewDelhi'sdirectivetoengageinresult‐orientedoperations.Theforceswerenotjustreluctanttocarryoutsustainedoffensiveoperationsagainsttheextremists,eventheroutineareadominationexerciseswereavoided.)tisnotclearwhethertheflaghoistinginTadmetla,withsignificantsanitisingpreparations,marksthebeginningofachangeinthetacticoftheforcesandisdemonstrativeofanewfoundvision.)tisunfairtoblametheCRPFpersonneldeployedinChhattisgarhforthelullinaction,forthecurrentstateofaffairsemanatesfromapolicystagnationthatmarkstheanti‐Naxalinitiative.Apartfromtheirowninternalproblemsandthecontinuingconfusionwhethertoremainasupportingorleadcounter‐Naxalforce,lackofcoordinationwiththestateforces,lackofadequateprogressinstatepolicemodernisation,inertiaatthelevelofbureaucracy,andlackofanationalconsensuswithregardtosolvingtheNaxalissue,haveaffectedtheperformanceofthecentralforces.Thiscouldbepushingthemtofindrefugeinsymboliceventsratherthanattemptingdecisivegains.Atonelevel,suchpolicystagnationisstrangeespeciallywhentheCP)‐Maoisthaslostseveralseniorleadersacrossstatesandhasfailedtomaintainalevelofviolencenecessarytokeepitsowninternalmechanismaliveandkicking.Attheotherlevel,however,itunderlinesthecountry'spredominantlyreactionarycounter‐insurgencydoctrine,whichdoesrelativelywellinrespondingtoextremistviolence,butditherswhenviolencedips,eitherduetothesetbackssufferedbytheextremistoutfitsorbecauseofthelatter'stacticalretreatdecision.ThetaskforNewDelhi,thus,iswellcutout.)thastofindawaytoinstillasenseofpurposeamongthestateaswellasthecentralforces.)thastoensurethatthebureaucracyandgrass


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rootpoliticsworksintandemwiththesecurityforces.Anditmustensurethattheactsofsymbolismcometoagrandhalt.A'New'Counter‐NaxalActionPlan8DaysaftertheformationoftheNationalDemocraticAlliance NDA governmentinNewDelhi,contoursofanewpolicyvis‐a‐visLeftWingExtremism LWE remainedamatterofspeculation.Whethertoughmeasureswouldreplacetheadhoconesandclaritywouldsubstituteconfusionwerecommentedupon.Someofthestatementsofthe(omeMinisterandtheMinistryofficialsintheearlydaysfollowingtheformationofthegovernmentraisedhopesthatapolicychange,ifnottheprospectofanimmediatesolutiontotheproblemcouldbeontheanvil.(owever,thenew ‐pointActionPlanevolvedbytheMinistryof(omeAffairs M(A foraddressingtheLWEchallengepointtowardsthecontinuationofthepastpoliciesanddoesnotindicatearadicaldeparturefromtheapproachpursuedbythepreviousgovernment.Threeprincipalassumptionsmarkthenewcounter‐LWEpolicy:a.Securityforceoperationsmustprecededevelopmentalinitiativesb.TheCommunistPartyof)ndia‐Maoist s CP)‐M militarycapacitiescanbecrippledbytargetingitstopleadershipc.Securityforceoperations,withmodestgainssofarcanbemadeeffectivebyadditionalforcedeploymentandaugmentingintelligencecollection.Whileeachoftheseassumptionsisrelevant,whethersuchmeasurescanbeimplementedwithoutbroad‐basedsecurityandgovernancesectorreforms,remainsamatterofdebate.RulingoutnegotiationswiththeCP)‐Mhasbeenoneofthemosthighlightedaspectsof(omeMinisterRajnathSingh'sstatementsinrecenttimes.Speakingon June,Singh,atthemeetingofchiefsecretariesandDirectorsGeneralofPolice DGPs of Naxal‐affectedstatessaid,Thereisnoquestionofanytalksnow.Wewilltakeabalancedapproach.ButtheforceswillgiveabefittingreplyiftheNaxalslaunchattacks. GiventhatseveralpastoffersfornegotiationshavebeenrebuffedbytheCP)‐M,Singh'sstatementaimstoserveasafoundationforaprimarilyforce‐basedapproachtotheLWEchallenge.Thenewactionplaninvolvesadirectivetothe)ntelligenceBureauto infiltrateintoMaoistranks andfollowaspecificpolicyoftargetingthetopleadershipforneutralisation.TheNaxal‐affectedstateshavebeenadvisedtoraisecommandoforcessimilartotheGreyhoundsofAndhraPradesh.Similarly, additionalbattalionsofcentralarmedpolicepersonnelarebeingdeployedinChattisgarh sBastarregionbytheendof forarenewedoffensiveagainsttheextremists.Thenewpolicyfurtherspeaksofcreatingaseriesofincentivesfor goodofficers toserveinMaoist‐affectedareasbyofferingthemmonetaryincentivesandcareerbenefits.Allthesemeasures,incidentally,haveremainedtheM(A'scounter‐LWEapproachinthepast.None,however,achievedmuchsuccessduetoarangeofdeficienciesthatincludelackofabilityaswellascoordinationbetweenthecentralaswellasstatesecurityforcesandtheintelligenceagencies.YearssincetheLWEemergedasamajorsecuritythreattothecountry,bothtechnicalintelligence TEC()NT aswellashumanintelligence (UM)NT gatheringmechanisms 8 Originally published as IPCS Commentary on 21 July 2014. See http://www.ipcs.org/article/naxalite-violence/a-new-counter-naxal-action-plan-4572.html


continuetosufferfromseriousshortcomings.ThereisanacutelackofenthusiasticparticipationofthestatepoliceforcesinNewDelhi soveralldesignthatneithersupplementsnoraimstoreplacethecentralforcesincounteringtheextremists.Thenewplanissilentonthewaystoremovesuchloopholesandmakeoperationsaprincipallystatepolice‐ledinitiative.Giventhefactthatstatebureaucracyhasremainedmostlyapathetictorestartgovernanceinareasclearedbythesecurityforces,policiesneedtogobeyondtherhetoricof'postingofgoodofficers'innaxal‐affectedareas.)nthepreviousyears,evolvinganationalpolicyconsensusonachallengethataffectsatleast stateshasremainedoneofthemainchallengesforNewDelhi.The ‐pointActionPlanfallsshortofaddressingtheproblem.)tmerelyexhortstheaffectedstatestoappointnodalofficerstoincreasecoordinationatthecentreandasksthechiefministersandhomeministerstovisittheaffectedareasintheirrespectivestatestodevelopafavourableimageofthegovernmentamongthetribalpopulation.)ntheabsenceofarewardsystemtomakethenon‐conformingstatesfallinlinewithacentralapproach,suchmeasuresofimprovingcoordinationarelikelytobemetwithlackofenthusiasm,ifnotresistancebythestatesruledbynon‐BharatiyaJanataPartyparties.ThecurrentLWEsituationismarkedbyscaleddownviolencebytheextremistswhounderstandablyareintoaconsolidationmodeaftersufferingsomereversals.Recruitmentactivitiesstillcontinue,sodotheeffortstoideologicallyreshapethemovementthatseemstohavedeviatedsignificantlyfromitsoriginalobjectivesandstrategies.Atacticalretreatofthisnatureoftencreatestheillusionofvictoryamongthepolicymakers.Atthesametime,lowlevelviolencecreatessignificantopportunitiesforthegovernmenttorevisititsownstrategies,makeinroadsintotheextremistareas,andprepareforfutureescalations.WhethertheM(Awouldusethetimewellissomethingtowatchoutfor.TacklingNaxalViolence:AnAgendafortheNewIndianGovernment9)nawaythechallengeofleft‐wingextremismthenewNationalDemocraticAlliance NDA governmentinNewDelhifacesbearscloseresemblancetothesituationthatconfrontedtheUnitedProgressiveAllianceregimeinitssecondtenurein .(owever,giventhattheCongressparty‐ledgovernmentfailedtocontainthethreat,theincumbentBharatiyaJanataPartygovernmentneedstorevisittheoverallapproachandnotrepeatthepastpolicesthatcontributedtothesurvivaloftheextremistoutfit.)n ,theCommunistPartyof)ndia‐Maoist CP)‐Maoist wasintheupswingwithadramaticspikeinthedeathsofciviliansandsecurityforces.Extremism‐relatedincidentsandfatalitiesamongtheciviliansandthesecurityforcesincreasedby percentand percentrespectively,in .StatessuchasMaharashtraandWestBengalcontributedsignificantlytothisupswing,withtheeastern)ndianstatebecomingthethirdmostextremism‐affectedstateofthecountry,in ,with incidentsand fatalities.TheCP)‐Maoistwasindeedlookingatexpandingitssphereofinfluence. 9 Originally published as IPCS Commentary on 16 June 2014. See http://www.ipcs.org/article/naxalite-violence/tackling-naxal-violence-an-agenda-for-the-new-indian-government-4514.html


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TheUPAgovernmentsoughttotametheriseofextremismwithanironhand..ThechangeofguardsintheUnionMinistryof(omeAffairs M(A followingthe Mumbaiterroristattacksledtoaseriesofbrainstormingsessions,andanewpolicyaimingtoannihilatetheCP)‐Maoist,titled OperationGreen(unt tookshape.(owever,hopeexpressedbythethen(omeSecretarythatsecurityforceswouldbeabletoliberatetheareasquicklyandtheciviladministrationwouldkick‐startdevelopmentworkinthoseareasmetanearlyendin withtheCentralReservePoliceForcereceivingaseriesofsetbacksatthehandsoftheextremists.Overthenextfouryears,theUPAgovernmentexperimentedwithacocktailofforce‐centricanddevelopment‐orientedapproach.(owever,evenwithimprovementsintheoverallsituation,theCP)‐Maoistcontinuestoremainaformidableadversary.Aspertheofficialdata,eachdayoftheyearrecordedoverthreeMaoist‐relatedviolentincidentsresultinginthedeathofatleastonecivilianorasecurityforcepersonnel,in .Anidenticalsituationhasprevailedoverthefirstsixmonthsof aswell.Maoistsmighthavebeenpreventedfromexpandingtheirareaofoperationsintonewerterritories,buttheoldtheatressuchasChhattisgarh,Jharkhand,Bihar,partsofOdishaandMaharashtracontinuetoreportsignificantviolence.ThenumberofattackscarriedoutbytheCP)‐Maoistandcloseto deathsinthedaysprecedingandfollowingtheparliamentaryelectionsunderlinesthemilitarycapacitiesoftheextremists.Threesignificantdeficiencies,amongmany,thathavemarked)ndia'sresponsetothechallengeofleft‐wingextremismare:first,thereisnonationalconsensusonwaystomeetthechallenge.Statesandministrieshavedebatedonwhethertopursueasocialdevelopmentoraforce‐centricmodelofconflictresolution.Second,althoughthesecurityforceshavemadesomeadvancesvis‐à‐vistheextremists,theciviladministrationcontinuestobeareluctantpartnerinreintegratingtheformerNaxalhotbedsthroughdevelopmentadministration.Third,thereisanacuteleadershipcrisisatthepoliticalaswellasthesecurityestablishmentlevels,hinderingsuccess.ThesedeficienciesmustbeaddressedbythenewgovernmentinNewDelhiinordertomakeasubstantialimpactintheextremist‐dominatedareas.PolicyPrescriptionstoDealwiththeRedMenaceFirst,theunityofpurposeisakeyelementforsuccessinanycounter‐insurgencycampaign.Thelackofsuccessvis‐à‐vistheNaxalsispredominantlyrootedinthediverseaswellasconflictingprescriptionsmadenotjustbythestates,butalsobythevariousdepartmentswithintheUPAgovernment.Annualmeetingsofthechiefministersorganisedbythegovernmentmerelyprovidedplatformsforairingdiverseopinions,butmadelittleprogressintermsofarrivingatacommonapproach.Thenewgovernmentmustfindawaytobridgethedividebetweentheprescriptions.Theprimeministeraswellasthehomeministermustnotbeseenasdetachedactorsexpressinghelplessnessatthestate‐of‐affairs,butshouldleadfromthefront.Second,contrarytothecommonperceptionthatperiodicmilitarysetbackssufferedbythesecurityforcesaretheprimaryreasonsforthecontinuingextremistdomination;thelackofenthusiasmoftheciviladministrationisabiggerreasonforareasfreedfromtheextremistsrelapsingintochaos.DevelopmentprojectsplannedfortheSarandaregioninJharkhandisanexampleofthismalaise.Asolutionmustbefoundtomakethebureaucracybothatthecentreaswellasinthestatessensitiveandparticipatoryinthedevelopmentprojects.


Third,smallachievementswouldremaincriticalforthestate'scampaignagainsttheCP)‐Maoist.AleafmustbetakenfromthebookoftheMaoists,whoperseveredforyearstofindsupportamongthetribalpopulationandsubsequentlydominatetheareas.Thestatemustattemptincrementalandnon‐reversibleprogressagainsttheextremists.Naxalism:TheInsufficiencyofaForce‐CentricApproach10)nthefirstweekofMay ,securityforceslaunchedafreshanti‐NaxaloperationattheSarandaforestsinJharkhand'sWestSinghbhumdistrict.TheoperationwasstartedfollowingintelligenceinputsthatasquadofarmedMaoistshadenteredtheforests.Fewdaysintotheoperation,thestatepoliceDirectorGeneralofPolice DGP ledacontingentoftroopsandspentanightdeepinsidetheforests.Themotivewastomakeapoint.ThemediapersonnelweretoldbyanassertiveDGP, WehaveconqueredSarandaandnobodycandisputeitnow. )twas,however,strangefortheDGPtoaffirmthesuccessofhisforces,forSarandahadreportedlybeenconqueredthreeyearsback.ConsideredtobeaMaoistliberatedzone,whichhousedtheCommunistPartyof)ndia CP)‐Maoist 'sEasternRegionalBureau ERB headquartersandalsoalargenumberofarmstrainingcamps,theimpregnabilityofSarandahadbeenshatteredin .BetweenJulyandSeptember ,about battalionsofCentralReservePoliceForce CRPF personnelconductedOperationAnacondaseekingtoliberatethearea.Notmanyencounterstookplaceduringtheoperations,probablyduetofactthattheMaoistshaddecidedtodesertthearearatherthantoputupafight.Thestatedulyclaimedvictory.Thedominationofthesecurityforcesoverthe ‐squarekilometreareahadapparentlybeenestablished.TherecoveryofSarandawasimportantfortworeasons.Firstly,itcameafterthefailureandsubsequentabandonmentofOperationGreen(unt,themulti‐theatrecounter‐Maoistoperationwhichwaslaunchedin .TheOG('sfailure,followingaseriesofMaoistattacksonsecurityforces,hadconvincedtheM(Aofthecriticalityofsmallareaoperationsasopposedtoanation‐wideblitzkriegagainsttheextremists.TherecoveryofSarandathroughafocussedareaapproach,thus,becameareaffirmationofthefactthatanincrementalapproachiskeytoultimatelydefeattheextremists.Secondly,fortheUnionMinistryofRuralDevelopment,Sarandabecameatestcaseforadevelopment‐ledsolutiontotheMaoistproblem.UnderMinisterJairamRamesh,supportwasextendedtoJharkhand's'SarandaDevelopmentPlan'thatsoughtallrounddevelopmentforitsinhabitants.)twashopedthattheestablishmentoftheciviladministration'swritovertheareawouldprovideabulwarkagainsttherelapseoftheareaintoextremism.Amongtheschemessoughttobeimplementedintheareawerehousing,connectivity,forestrights,watersheddevelopment,drinkingwater,andemploymentaswellasfreedistributionofsolarlanterns,bicyclesandtransistors.Underidealcircumstances,theretreatoftheextremistsfromtheareaandinterventionofthedevelopmentadministrationwouldhavebeenabletomakewonders.(owever,thegovernment'sambitiousplansofseekingloyalcitizensamongthetribalpopulationwere 10 Originally published as IPCS Commentary on 19 May 2014. See http://www.ipcs.org/article/naxalite-violence/naxalism-the-insufficiency-of-a-force-centric-approach-4445.html


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nullifiedtoalargeextentduetothelackofenthusiasticparticipationbytheciviladministration.Aprominentnewspaper'sop‐edpiecesummedupthedevelopmentsinSaranda,ninemonthsaftertheSDPcameintobeing."Ninemonthson,policecampssoledevelopmentinSarandaPlan",thepieceappearinginTheHindu,June ,read.Otherreportsdetailedhowbicyclesprocuredfordistributionwererustinginthegovernmentoffices,solelybecausenoofficialwaspreparedtodothegroundworkofpreparingalistofbeneficiaries.Overthepassingmonths,evenasMinisterRameshpleadedtothemediatogiveSDPa"secondchance",Sarandasawonlyahaphazarddevelopmentinitiative,providingenoughopportunityfortheextremiststoattemptacomeback.Althoughtheareahasnotseenmuchviolenceinrecenttimes,thenecessityforre‐launchingasecurityforceoperationtodominateanareathathadalreadybeencleared,underlinesthereversalofgainsmadebythestate.)ntheneardecade‐longendeavourofconquestvis‐à‐vistheCP)‐Maoist,arealisationhasdawnedoverthepolicy‐makersthattheextremistscannotbedefeatedthroughmilitarymeansalone.Therefore,inspiteofwhatappearstothehumanrightsandcivilsocietyorganisationstobeapredominantlymilitaryeffortagainsttheMaoists,anumberofdevelopmentalaswellasperceptionmanagementinitiativeshavebeenundertakenbythegovernment.(owever,thisstrategyof"clear,holdanddevelop"hasnotbeenabletomakemuchheadwaymostlyduetothefactthattheciviladministrationhasremainedsomewhatreluctanttobuildupontheaccomplishmentsofthesecurityforces.ForthenewgovernmentinNewDelhi,waystomakethebureaucracyanenthusiasticpartnerinthecounter‐Naxalendeavourswouldremainakeychallenge.ThepoliticalleadershipbothinNewDelhiaswellasintheaffectedstateswouldhavetomakeextraefforttoinjectvigourintowhattillnowremainsamostlyasluggishciviladministrativeestablishment.)nfact,JharkhandDGP'svictoryspeechon Mayunderlinedthekeystepsrequiredtoavoidrelapseofrecoveredareasintoextremism."Thevillagersnowrequireimmediateadministrativeattention",hesaid.NaxalViolence:OldChallengesfortheNewGovernment11ThattheCommunistPartyof)ndia‐Maoist Maoist doesnotbelieveindemocraticprinciplesandanelectoralprocessistoowellknown.The LokSabhaelectionsprovidedtheextremistoutfitwithyetanotheropportunitytoreassertitsvisionforthecountry.)nwordsandaswellaswithaccompaniedviolence,itprovedoncemorethattheprobabilityofanegotiatedsettlementtothelong‐standingconflictisratherlow.TheCP)‐MaoistreleasedthreesetsofsomewhatcontradictorystatementsinMarch ,twosignedbythespokespersonoftheoutfit'sCentralCommittee CC andoneonbehalfoftheoutfit'sEasternRegionalBureau.Dated March,theCCreleaseditscustomaryboycottofelectionscallingtheaffair"anotherhugefinancialburdenonthepeople",whichcannottransformthe"presentexploitativesystem."Critiquingallthepoliticalpartiesfortheirdishonestpoliciestowardsthetribals,thestatementtermedthegovernment'speaceproposals"deceptive." 11 Originally published as IPCS Commentary on 21 April 2014. See http://www.ipcs.org/article/naxalite-violence/naxal-violence-old-challenges-for-the-new-government-4395.html


)nterestingly,another ‐pagedocumentwasreleasedbytheCConthesameday,whichcontainedanswersto questionsposedbythemediapersonstotheoutfit.Respondingtoaquestionontheoutlookoftheoutfitonpeacetalkswiththegovernment,thespokespersonstatedthatwhiletheoutfitis"notagainstPeaceTalkswiththegovernment",sincetalksare"anintegralpartofthepoliticalstruggle."(owever,fivedemandswereoutlinedwhichthegovernmentmustfulfilbeforeapeaceprocesscouldbegin.TheseincludeddeclaringtheCP)‐Maoistapoliticalmovement;de‐proscribingtheoutfitanditsfrontorganisations;initiatingjudicialinquiriesintothekillingsofitsseniorleaders;stoppingofsecurityforceoperations;andreleasingarrestedleaders/cadresoftheoutfit.Thestatementsurprisinglywashailedastheoutfit'sdeclarationforpeacebythemedia,ignoringthefactthattheconditionsoutlinedhaveremainedanintegralpartoftheoutfit'sstatementsinthepast.Whiletheoutfitexpectsthegovernmenttofulfilsomeofitsmostimpiousdemands,theoutfititselfhasrebuffedtheminimumconditionlaiddownbythehomeministryto"stopviolencefor hours"astheloneconditionforstartingofapeaceprocess.FewdayspriortothereleaseofthetwinCCstatements,theCP)‐Maoist'sEasternRegionalBureauhadissuedafour‐page'short‐termvisiondocument'appealingthemassestochosebetween"realdemocracy"ora"pseudo‐democraticsystem."Thisdocument,whicheffectivelyconstitutedamanifestooftheoutfit,reiteratedtheneedfora"newconstitution"includingprovisionsfor"equalsocio‐economicrightstowomen"and"deathpenaltycompulsoryformolestationandrape.")tfurthercalledfor"freedomofspeechandexpression,righttocongregateandprotest,formanorganisation,primaryhealthcare,accesstoprimaryeducation,primaryandminimumemploymentandcompulsoryparticipationindailygovernancesystem."Theoutfitadditionallypromisednottosuppresstheseparatistmovementswiththepowerofthegun,butto"honournationalistmovementsandself‐decisiontoallowthemdignifiedandpeacefulco‐existence sic ."Neithertheproclamationofintentforpeacenorthedeclarationofitsownmanifesto,however,stoppedtheoutfitfromcarryingoutaseriesofattacksonsecurityforcepersonnel,pollofficialsaswellasciviliansintheaffectedstatesthatwenttopolls.Comparedtothe LokSabhapolls,duringwhich peoplewerekilledbytheoutfit,tillthewritingofthearticle,atleast civiliansandsecurityforceshadbeenkilledinMaoistattacks.Thesecontrastingsignalsemanatingfromtheoutfitsignifytwopossibilities.One,peacenegotiationasaninstrumentofconflictresolutiondoesnotfigureintheimaginationoftheextremistoutfitanditsutterancesonapeaceprocessaremerelyrhetorical.Two,theoutfitintendstouseviolenceasabargainingtoolincaseapeaceprocesswiththegovernmentcomestofruition.Facedwiththisdeceptiveextremiststrategy,theactionplansofthepoliticalclasstodealwiththechallenge,remainshighlyfractured.Goingbythemanifestosofthepoliticalparties,theprobabilitythatthenewgovernmentinNewDelhiwouldbeabletoaddresstheanomaliesofthepastandchartanewcourselooksblurry.WhiletheCongressandtheBharatiyaJanataParty BJP promisetodealwiththeproblemwitha"firmhand"andapolicyof"zerotolerance"respectively,theAamAdmiParty AAP prefersa"multi‐lateraldialogue."TheCommunistPartyof)ndia‐Marxist CP)‐M opinesinfavourof


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"specificmeasurestotacklethesocio‐economicproblems"faced"particularlybythetribalpeople."TheBJPinsiststhat"talkswiththeinsurgentgroupswillbeconditionalandwithintheframeworkoftheconstitution."TheCongress,ontheotherhand,issilentontheprocessofdialogueandpreferstopursue"adevelopmentagendatoempowerpeople"intheaffectedareas.WhiletheCP)‐Minsiststhatleft‐wingextremismis"notjustasecurityissue,"theAAPreiteratesthat"socio‐economicdevelopmentandeffectivepoliticalde‐centralisation"holdthekey.Aprojectthatattemptstoreconcilethesestarkdifferencesisnotonlydifficult,butislikelytoproduceacompromisedandineffectivepolicy.Thus,inallprobability,left‐wingextremismwillcontinuetobeachallenge,inhibitinggrowth,developmentandgovernance,intheforeseeablefuture.